MICHAEL TOOMEY

0236209

RUSSIAN AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS

PO5112

ESSAY

“HOW SERIOUS A THREAT IS MILITANT ISLAM IN

CENTRAL ASIA?”

LECTURER: DR. NEIL ROBINSON

Following the achievement of their independence in 1991, many scholars speculated about

what the future held for the post-Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,

Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. According to Tazmini, many believed that given

the prevalence of Islam in the five countries, and their broad geopolitical similarities, that this

would lead to the creation of a fundamentalist bloc or super-state in the region (Tazmini,

2001; p63). Later on, in the wake of the emergence in neighbouring Afghanistan of the

extremist Sunni Muslim Taliban organisation, fears were raised that this group would sweep

northwards from their bases into Tajikistan and threaten the security of the region (Cooley,

2002; p121). Although neither scenario has yet been carried out, there remains quite a degree

of apprehension about the role of Islam in the region, and the potential threat posed by violent

extremists. Militant Islam has a long tradition of resistance in the region, and has previously

proved to be “a touchstone for criticising, attacking, or even trying to overthrow what are

perceived as authoritarian, corrupt, incompetent and illegitimate regimes” (Fuller, 2002; 50).

In this essay, I will examine how serious the threat offered by these groups is to the

Central Asian republics. The essay will approach the issue in several ways. First of all, it will

explore the origins of Islam in the area. It will discuss the role it played in organising the

various clans in both Tsarist Russia, and during the time of the Soviet Union. Following this,

it will outline the current situation of Islam in the five countries. It will explain the character

of the religion, the dominant strands, and the extent of its prevalence. Furthermore, it will

expand upon the various different Islamic organisations, extremist or otherwise, and will

extrapolate on their strengths, weaknesses, and general prospects. These two sections will

serve to introduce the reader to the topic, and to the issues at hand.

Following this, the essay will begin to discuss the threat of radical Islam. It will first

of all appraise the feasibility of an Islamic political revolution in one (or several) of the

countries, as things currently stand. In order to conduct an accurate assessment of the chances
of such a revolution, I will examine the reasons for the success of the Iranian Revolution, and

will contrast the circumstances that allowed that revolution to happen with the current

circumstances in Central Asia. Furthermore, I will also explore the possibility of an Islamist

‘colour revolution’, along the same lines as other such revolutions which have occurred in the

post-Soviet space.

The essay will then focus on other dangers. It will consider the potential for the

involvement of foreign groups, including the previously-mentioned Taliban, and how this

may contribute to instability in the area. It will elaborate on the risks associated with the

authorities using increasingly repressive methods to deal with the challenge of Islam, and will

also determine which actions and effects could cause fundamentalist Islam to propagate in the

sub-continent. Finally, I will summarise and conclude the essay. This essay will show that

while militant Islam remains currently underpowered in Central Asia, and that there exists

very little prospect for an Islamic revolution, this does not mean that there is no threat. I will

contend that militant Islamist movements could become a source of instability in the region,

and depending on the response taken by the governments of the five affected countries, could

become a more serious threat in the future.

Islam has long been associated with Central Asia. It first appeared in the area in the 8 th

Century, as a result of the conquest of the region by Arabic invaders (Brill Olcott, n.d.; 5). By

the 10th Century, the region had become an important centre of Islamic learning (Walker,

2001; 3). It was the Sunni version of Islam that initially proliferated in the region. This was

on account of its greater flexibility; Sunni Islam was more conducive to being adapted to fit

in with the various cultures of the region (Baran, Starr and Cornell, 2006; 11). The Sufi sect

of Islam became particularly popular during this time, with Sufi clerics helping to define

relations between rulers and their subjects during the time of Tamarind (Brill Olcott, 2007;

2). The incorporation of the Central Asian khanates into the Russian Empire, which began in
the early 18th Century, was to have a massive impact on the course of Islam. The Russians

were generally tolerant of the practice of Islam in the region, although they did try to

influence it in such a way as to make it serve the Russian Tsars. Even so, Muslim clerics and

imams led the resistance in the area to Russian imperialism. In 1885, revolts in the Andijan

region, which were led by Sufi dervishes, were crushed by Russian troops; a further uprising

which occurred fifteen years later saw the deaths of several Russian soldier, before it was

brutally suppressed by the authorities (Rashid, 2002; 24-25). In order to dissuade any further

revolutions, the Russians resettled the region with ethnic Russians, Caucasians, and

Cossacks, thus changing the demographic balances in the region. Meanwhile, radicalised,

reactionary preachers, known as ‘Vaisites’, began to exert some influence in the region.

These preachers can be seen as the forefathers of Salafism in Central Asia. Violence broke

out in the region again in 1916, when the government tried to introduce conscription in the

region, leading to thousands of deaths. The Vaisites were heavily involved in the organisation

of this rebellion, proclaiming jihad and inciting the residents of Central Asia to take up arms

(Naumkin, 2005; 18-19).

However, the rise to power of the Bolsheviks in 1917 proved to be an even greater

threat to the existence of the Islamic religion and its practitioners. Shortly after seizing power,

the Bolsheviks unveiled a comprehensive anti-religion programme, which launched violent

campaigns against all religious institutions in the state (Tazmini; 64). This was based on the

traditional Communist opposition to all organised religion. This provoked serious opposition

from the Muslim establishment, especially from the Sufis, who organised a Mujahidin

revolution in 1918 (known as the Basmachi revolution) (Tazmini; 64). Although this was

similarly defeated, it was clear that radical Islam was a potent ideology of resistance in

Central Asia even at this stage.

 Following the Soviet defeat of the Basmachi rebellion, although controls were briefly

relaxed during the Russian Civil War, the Soviets began to crack down on Islam, closing

madrasas, destroying mosques, and punishing those that did not ascribe to the ‘official’

version of Islam, including the various Sufi brotherhoods (Naumkin; 20-21). It was about this

time that those who opposed this ‘state Islam’ began to be known as ‘Wahhabis’ regardless of

whether this was descriptive of their beliefs or not (Brill Olcott, n.d.; 6-7). Suppression

became even more extreme during Stalinism; with that being said, certain puritanical forms

of Islam not only managed to survive this period, but even began to develop (Brill Olcott,

n.d.; 12-13). During the ‘Great Patriotic War’, Stalin tolerated some forms of religious

activity in order to appease the Muslims of the USSR (Rashid; 38). To this end, he created

the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia in 1943, which was to function as the central

institution for Islam in the region until 1991 (Hann and Pelkmans, 2009; 1524). ‘Unofficial’

versions of Islam continued to operate independently of the Spiritual Boards, even in the face

of Soviet hostility; this formulation, for the most part, was neither fundamentalist, nor

particularly hostile to the state (Walker, 2003; 24).

This is the situation which reigned until the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev

came to power. Gorbachev initially tightened controls over Islam in Central Asia, fearing the

spread of an Islamist ‘contagion’ from Iran and Afghanistan (Tazmini; 66). However, as the

power of the state receded, an increased liberalisation of the laws governing religion was

observed, leading to the mushrooming of Islam in Central Asia (Tazmini; 66-67). Thousands

of new mosques were opened, and people began to reconnect with their faith. It must again be

noted that this revival was not an anti-state, or anti-Communist phenomenon; for the most

part, it was apolitical, and even in those places where it was politicised, it was done in a way

that recognised Islam as part of the national identity and heritage of the area (Walker, 2003;

25).
 With the achievement of independence by the five Central Asian states in 1991, the

new authorities saw the resurgence of Islam as a means to bolster their own power. To this

end, new leaders played up their Islamic credentials. For example, Islom Karimov, the new

President of Uzbekistan, made the ‘hajj’ the sacred pilgrimage to Mecca undertaken annually

by Muslims. The citizens of these states likewise turned to their Muslim roots in order to help

define their new identities (Khamidov, 2007; 79). However, many of these new governments

soon found that Communism had been keeping a lid on various elements; they then had to

cope as these elements returned to the surface (Peyrouse, 2007; 245). A prime example of

this, and one of the defining moments in terms of making the world aware of the issue of

militant Islam in Central Asia, was the outbreak of the Tajikistan Civil War, which began

virtually immediately after the country achieved independence. Following the outbreak of

violence between supporters and opponents of the regime, Tajik Islamists formed the Islamic

Renaissance Party, which became the main vehicle of the opposition, and allied with various

different Islamist groups to fight the government (Bonney, 2004; 347).

Noting this, the other countries began to take a firm stance with religion. Each country

formally secularised their constitutions; strict laws concerning religion were passed, with

particularly harsh legislation being generated in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; and national

religions and certain ‘tolerated’ religions were identified and selected, with all others being

marginalised (and virtually criminalised) (Peyrouse; 246-248). States identified themselves as

bulwarks against fundamentalism, ‘wahhabism’ and terrorism, all of which were made

virtually synonymous with anyone who criticised the state, tried to follow a different

religious path to those identified as suitable by the authorities, or otherwise challenged the

status quo (Megoran, 2007; 149).

In spite of these attempts, radicalised and politicised Muslim organisations continued

(and continue) to exist and grow. The two which have received the most attention are the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, respectively, although there are various

other smaller organisations in existence in the region. I will briefly discuss these movements

here.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was founded in 1998. It thrived initially,

thanks in large to part to the lack of a coherent and decisive strategy by the central authorities

on how to deal with it (Baran, Starr and Cornell; 26). It was also able to capitalise on the

instability in neighbouring Afghanistan, with operatives being able to use Taliban-controlled

areas as safe havens to avoid capture by the Uzbek authorities. IMU training camps were also

established in the north of the country (Rashid, 1999; 30). Furthermore, the IMU was able to

take advantage of its Taliban contacts to finance its operations through smuggling Afghan

drugs (Rashid, 1999; 34). The IMU launched a wave of terrorist bombings in Uzbekistan in

early 1999, and also launched incursions from their Afghan bases into Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (Walker, 2003; 27). Furthermore, they made further attacks in

2000 in Uzbekistan, penetrating the state as far as the outskirts of the capital, Tashkent;

according to regional experts, this was in order to either secure their drug-smuggling

networks, or to force negotiations with the Uzbek government in order to achieve a similar

settlement as that with the Islamic Renaissance Party had achieved in Tajikistan (Khamidov;

80-81).

The IMU subscribed to a militant, pan-Islamist ideology, aiming to create an Islamic

state incorporating the Central Asian states and the Xinjiang provinces in China. It was also

devoted to overthrowing the Uzbek government and seizing control of the Ferghana Valley,

as a first step towards creating their Islamic state. In spite of its name, however, it was neither

ethnically homogenous nor devoted to Uzbek issues; to this end, it changed its name in the

early 2000s to the ‘Islamic Party of Turkestan’ (Mann, 2002; 296). The organisation managed

to recruit members from a multitude of backgrounds, including those disenchanted and

disgruntled by the repressive rulers of the Central Asian governments, unemployed youth,

and some of those militants on the losing side of the Tajikistan Civil War. Some were even

enticed by financial incentives (or the prospect of such) (Mann; 298). However, it is clear that

the IMU was never a mass movement: many people in the region have never even heard of

the group (Walker, 2001; 1). At its height, it numbered between 2,000 and 6,000 members

(Walker, 2001; 7).

If the link with the Taliban was a source of strength in the early days of the

organisation, then it also led to the groups near annihilation in 2001. Following the

September 11th attacks, and the commencement of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’, many

IMU members fought alongside the Taliban. However, the war went disastrously wrong for

them. They suffered severe reverses alongside their Afghan allies, including the death of their

leader, Namangani, and saw their numbers reduced to no more than 300 disorganised

fighters, although some estimates put the figure as high as 1,000 (Hanks, 2007; 213). With

that said, even in spite of these setbacks, the IMU remains the most active violent Islamist

group in the region (Naumkin, 2003; 4-5).

The other organisation to have received major coverage is Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), a

shadowy and highly secretive organisation which calls specifically for the restoration of the

Caliphate (a Muslim state which would unite all the various strands of the religion under the

one leader). In the immediate term, HT aims to create the Caliphate on a localised scale;

however, it envisages the ultimate spread of Islam throughout the world, and the creation of a

globalised version of the Islamic state (Baran, Starr and Cornell; 18). It does not claim to be a

religious organisation, instead viewing itself as a “political party whose ideology is based on

Islam” (Karagiannis, 2006; 1). Its methods are presently non-violent, and it belongs to the ‘al-

da’wa al Islamiya’ (Islamic Call) school of thought, which calls for gradual transformations
of the structures and values of a society, until it achieves the ideal, islamicised form

(Khamidov; 80-81).

HT operates throughout the Central Asian region. It has gained support as a result of

the corruption and repression endemic in the five countries; its messages of social and

economic justice, combined with its non-violent approach, have seen it harness public

support (Khamidov; 77). Furthermore, it has capitalised on the dejection many Central Asian

men felt as a result of the harsh economic realities of the states in which they: membership of

HT appeals to men on a gendered basis, as it provides them with a means to “reconstitute

their masculinity” by renewing in them the prospect of being able to provide for their families

(Megoran; 150-151). HT has planned its development in three stages: recruitment and

conversion of new members first; establishment of a ‘cell’ network; and finally, infiltration of

the government. It is believed to still be in its first stage, although due to its secretive nature,

this is uncertain (MacWilliam, 2005). Accurate estimates of its numerical strength throughout

the region are likewise difficult to come up with, with guesses varying wildly from a few

hundred to in excess of 60,000. It is believed that the organisation continues to grow (Baran,

Starr, and Cornell; 24).

There is a great deal of speculation about HT’s commitment to peaceful change.

Indeed, some important scholars have argued that terms such as ‘non-violent’ or ‘peaceful’

cannot be credibly used to describe HT, given its viciously anti-Semitic rhetoric, its

justification of the murder of American soldiers in the name of Islam, and its goal of the

Caliphate (Megoran; 148). Most of the academic studies on the movement agree that while

the organisation is presently committed to non-violence, this is neither done for altruistic

reasons, nor is it likely to remain a permanent fixture in the group’s strategy. Baran, Starr and

Cornell argue that its policy is a pragmatic one, observant of Western reactions to revolutions

(supportive in the case of peaceful ones, antagonistic in the case of violent ones) (Baran, Starr
and Cornell; 18). In this sense, it is an approach that could easily be abandoned if it ever

became politically opportune to do so. However, it is believed that this could occur sooner

rather than later; many of its members have expressed disillusionment in the face of

continued government repression and a sense of not having achieved anything for their

efforts (Khamidov; 83-84). It has already been suggested that the organisation may have

splintered on the tactics it should adopt in the wake of the September 11 th bombings (Hanks;

213).

Although the organisation is not formally linked with any other, there has been some

contact on the ground between its members and members of groups such as the afore-

mentioned IMU (Khamidov; 81-82). However, its most important activity on the ground may

be as an ideological guide for other radical organisations. It has been claimed that HT acts as

a ‘conveyor belt’ for potential terrorists, radicalising them and giving them the appropriate

mindset with which to wage Jihad (Mayer, 2004; 9). It is known that the IMU has made use

of their literature, in order to combat the ‘ideological illiteracy’ of many of its members

(Khamidov; 82).

HT has not been designated in the West as a terrorist organisation, in spite of urgings

by the Uzbek government (among others); this is largely a result of its not explicitly having

taken part in violent or terrorist activities. Any such move would likely be extremely counter-

productive, as it would drive HT further underground and into the arms of militant groups

such as al-Qaeda; furthermore, it would help fuel anti-Western sentiment in the region by

making it seem like they had sided with the barbarous regimes governing the Central Asian

countries1 (Khamidov; 87).

The previous sections have served to introduce the history of Islam in Central Asia,

the nature of radical Islam in the area, and the major proponents of extremist views. I will

1
One of the primary motivations behind declaring HT a terrorist organisation for Central Asian rulers has been
the legitimisation of cruelly repressive tactics
now discuss in closer detail the threats these militant groups pose to the stability and security

of the region. I will begin by examining the chances for a political revolution in the region,

whether it is along the lines of the Iranian revolution, or a hijacked ‘colour’ revolution.

In order to properly understand the likelihood of Central Asia emulating Iran, one

must compare the situation in Iran in the 1970s with the current situation in the five republics.

There are many points to consider here. Under the rule of the Shah, Iran had experienced

extremely repressive governance, with political opposition being tightly controlled and any

attempt at democratisation being (often brutally) suppressed (Abrahamian, 1980; 24). There

had also been a huge growth in ‘relative deprivation’ in the country, as while the country had

enjoyed a massive increase in oil revenues over the twenty-five years preceding the

revolution (from less than $34 million to over $20 billion), the vast majority of this income

was wasted on various fripperies, such as hyper-advanced weapons systems (which the

country had no need for), palaces, festivals, and various other luxury items (Abrahamian; 22).

And while improvements had, admittedly, been made in the socioeconomic situations of most

citizens, these improvements were far less than had been expected. Meanwhile, a plethora of

serious problems remained, including inequality, low quality-of-living, inadequate housing,

and so on (Abrahamian; 23).

However, the breaking point was the lack of democratic outlets for expressions of

discontent. The Shiite clergy, in particular, had grown appalled at the moral decay,

corruption, and injustice they witnessed; however, when the attempted to make their voices

heard, they were usually imprisoned and tortured for their troubles (Rouleau, 1980; 5). In the

absence of any means of redressing their complaints, the clerics (even those who had not

been particularly anti-regime to begin with) were forced to join the ranks of the anti-regime

forces. This occurrence is what created the momentum for revolution in the country

(Abrahamian; 26).
 Many of these circumstances are either currently apparent in the Central Asian

republics, or could manifest themselves quite easily. There is certainly a sense of relative

deprivation in the region. Given the vast gas and oil reserves in the country, there has been

remarkably little improvement in the livelihoods of the common citizens. Given the

revolutionary trends apparent in the region, it is possible that political deprivation may be

more important for these people than the socioeconomic deprivation felt in Iran; nonetheless,

the sentiment is the same (Katz, 2007; 131-132). Social problems, such as unemployment,

corruption, inequality and low standards of living are obviously prevalent, as in Iran. And the

lack of democratic outlets for the airing of grievances is equally barefaced; this could

theoretically force people to turn to other avenues of rectification.

However, there are significant reasons why any Iranian-style revolution is far from

likely. One of the major rallying points for the Iranian revolution was popular anger over

American influence in the country (Rouleau; 4). This sentiment is far less apparent in Central

Asia. Furthermore, in the case of the Iranian revolution, there was no major power broker in

the region ready and able to derail the revolution; in the case of the five republics, Russia

would be prepared to act in order to guarantee the security of the regimes, should they ever

appear to be in serious danger from revolution (Mihalka, 2007). However, most importantly

of all, the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini was absolutely critical to the success of the

Iranian Revolution; without him the revolution would most likely have imploded (Mahdi,

2003; 705). No such figure exists in any of the Central Asian republics. In addition, the

various clans and ethnicities are too divided at present to unite behind any group, let alone a

group of radical Islamists such as HT. So, while there are certainly some of the factors which

contributed to the Iranian Revolution present in Central Asia, there is no credible prospect at

present of an Iranian Revolution in any of the five republics individually, not to mention in

the region as a whole.

 However, one must also consider the prospect of a ‘colour revolution’ being hijacked

by Islamists. Mihalka, for example, mentioned this as a distinct possibility (Mihalka; 29).

However, a colour revolution itself is unlikely in any of the countries (with the exception of

Kyrgyzstan, whose regime status is unclear at the present time). McFaul cited seven criteria

necessary for a successful colour revolution: the existence of a semi-autocratic regime; an

unpopular incumbent President; a united and organised opposition; awareness of the

falsification of electoral results; the presence of an independent media; a political opposition

capable of mobilising tens of thousands of protestors; and divisions in the forces of coercion

(McFaul, 2005; cited in Marples, 2006). In each of the Central Asian republics, at least three

of those criteria are missing. Regimes are fully autocratic, and opposition movements are

extremely divided. At present, no single movement (not even HT) could motivate the

numbers required to present a threat to the regimes to come out on to the streets. Even at that,

it is unlikely an Islamist movement could hitch itself to any mainstream movement. The one

time a colour revolution did happen in the area, in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, neither HT nor any

other Islamist group was capable of capitalising on it (Mihalka; 25).

This is not to say that there is no possibility whatsoever of a future revolution being

commandeered, or being led, by an Islamist movement. HT’s strategy of non-violent political

action is designed around this goal; as noted before, it is a pragmatic policy based on the

lesson that colour revolutions receive international commendation, while violent revolutions

lead to international condemnation (Baran, Starr and Cornell; 18). Uzbekistan, for example,

could have potential for an Islamist-led colour revolution. HT has expressed confidence

before that it has the sympathies of members of the political elite and the military in

Uzbekistan (Katz; 139). Its failure to act in Kyrgyzstan could be explained by its lack of an

effective organisation in that country; however, its strength in Uzbekistan is undoubtedly

much greater. Finally, the Uzbek President is deeply unpopular, as evidenced by the disorder
that led to the Andijan Massacre in 2005 (MacWilliam, 2005). Such a revolution would have

grave significance for the stability of the entire region. However, it must be stressed that even

with all of the above criteria in place, a colour revolution is still unlikely in Uzbekistan for

the foreseeable future. So while the potential certainly exists, it is currently unlikely that any

political revolution could lead to the rise to power of a militant Islamist group.

The following section will discuss the prospect for armed foment in the area. As

explained earlier in the essay, the most active militant organisation in the region, the IMU,

was decimated by the 2001 War in Afghanistan, and has had trouble recovering since then.

However, the threat of external actors funding and supplying a resurgent IMU (or some other

group) must be examined. There are two possible sources of interference: Iran and

Afghanistan. It has previously been stated that Iran has an interest in the region. Many

American commentators have warned that Iran might sponsor terrorist organisations in the

region, as a means of gaining regional influence and spreading their version of the Islamic

revolution (Tazmini; 76-77). However, Iranian ambitions in the region have been wildly

overstated. Iran’s contributions to religious and politicised Islamist movements in the five

countries have been insignificant when compared to that of other countries (Tazmini; 77).

Furthermore, Iran has been wary of threading on Russia’s toes. Indeed, its policies have

firmly kept in mind the desire to remain on good terms with Russia, even when the sentiment

has been less than reciprocated (Hunter, 2007; 193). Any attempt to sow the seeds of

rebellion in these countries, or to explicitly sponsor a militant organisation, would then be

completely contradictory of its previous policies in the region. As such, Iran can virtually be

discounted as a source of instability.

On the other hand, the continuing situation in Afghanistan, combined with the

renewed Taliban, could prove to be a much more credible threat. As was outlined earlier,

prior to 2001, the Taliban provided support and resources for militants in the area. Following
its reverses in the early part of the 21st Century, the organisation has recovered, fuelled by

massive drug revenues (Blank, 2007; 16). According to Blank, as long as the Taliban exists,

then the threat of a destabilising force in the region will continue. However, the precise

danger posed by the Taliban may be somewhat overstated. When the IMU’s link with

Afghanistan was at its strongest, the Taliban had control over the northern and western

provinces of Afghanistan which bordered Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

However, even in spite of the renewed violence in the country, these provinces remain

relatively quiet and free of Taliban influence (Mihalka; 26). As such, it would be much more

difficult for any organisation to use Afghanistan as a base of operations. Furthermore, the

IMU is still licking its wounds from its reverses; there has been no sign of a full scale re-

emergence of the group. As a result, it can be reasonably expected that external factors will

not be able to stir up trouble in the region for the time being.

From this, we can see that there is little immediate threat to the existence of the

Central Asian republics from militant Islamist groups. Conditions are not right either for

political or military revolution, and the influence of Russia (and to a lesser extent, China)

would almost certainly defeat any attempt at overturning the governments in these countries.

However, this should not be taken to mean that there will never be a major Islamist

movement in the region. Governmental policies of repression and tyranny could yet prove

counter-productive; indeed, signs of this may already be emerging. Central Asians, for the

most part, are hostile to extremist groups. This is for a variety of reasons. Many ordinary

citizens in these countries see proponents of radical views as ‘intruders’, and their doctrines

as being ‘foreign’ (Peyrouse; 258). In addition, ‘wahhabist’ or ‘salafist’ viewpoint are only

appealing to the most disaffected and marginalised members of societies (Hanks; 217). Even

in Tajikistan, during the Civil War, the Islamic Renaissance Party did not receive support as

an Islamist party; in fact, it was mostly driven by clan loyalties (Tazmini; 69). Given the
various religious and ethnic disparities in Central Asia, it is no surprise that radical Islam has

not taken hold in the region to date.

However, this is a situation which could change in the future. Many of the root causes

required for an outburst of Islamist activity continue to be present in the region, including

poverty, mass unemployment, and disgruntlement over corruption and the flagrant abuse of

power by the authorities (Khamidov; 85). More important, however, are the methods the

governments of the regions have used to tackle Islamists. By overstating the threat posed to

the region, authorities have effectively justified excessive approaches to dealing with those

they identify as ‘wahhabist’ (Megoran; 145). However, this term has virtually become a

euphemism for anyone expressing opposition to the government. As such, it could serve to

drive those who are otherwise not aligned with militant Islamic groups into allying

themselves with these groups out of desperation. In response to the repression and

inefficiency of the central authorities, Islamic groups could reprise their roles as resistors to

tyranny. In Turkmenistan, for instance, there has been a noticeable hardening of religious

attitudes, with more people expressing extremist viewpoints out of revulsion at the state’s

corruption of the religion (Hann and Pelkmans; 1533). As was outlined above, continued

repression could also result in the HT turning towards violent methods out of frustration; such

a situation would surely lead to a sharp rise in terrorist attacks. In future, the only way to

ensure that Islamic militancy does not gain a firm foothold will be to ensure that reforms

guaranteeing democratic freedoms and rule of law are passed and supported (Megoran; 148).

However, given the nature of rule in the region, such an occurrence is unlikely. In addition,

any weakening of the autocratic rule in Uzbekistan specifically could create a Catch-22

situation where the prospects of a HT-led colour revolution become greatly increased.

In this essay, I have outlined the various threats militant Islam could pose to the

stability of Central Asia. I have outlined the historical basis of Islamic resistance, dating back
to the time of the Russian Empire. I have discussed the situation which emerged in the region

in the immediate aftermath of independence, where the removal of Communist controls

unleashed previously undetected forces. I have examined the primary Islamist organisations

in the area, and have explored the prospects of Islamic organisations seizing control through

political revolutions. I have also looked at the chances for external forces fomenting violence

in the five republics, and have studied the possible effects of governmental repression on the

nature of Islam. I have found that militant Islam poses little credible threat to the survival of

the five countries in the short- to mid-term. The criteria required for an Islamic revolution do

not exist on the ground at present. There is no force which could tie together the various

dissenting factions, and point their energies in a meaningful direction. Furthermore, the

circumstances required for a colour revolution, which a well-organised Islamist group could

manipulate for their own ends, are likewise lacking. The 2001 War in Afghanistan destroyed

the most viable militant organisation in the region, the IMU, and deprived any other

prospective armed group of much needed bases in northern Afghanistan. Finally, Russian

influence in the region acts almost as a guarantor. However, this is not to say that there will

not be a threat in the longer term. Given the lack of avenues for groups to express their

grievances in the region, people may well turn to the only opposition available to them in the

region, that which is provided by extremist Islamic groups. As such, while there is little real

threat from militant Islam in Central Asia in the present day, reforms need to be undertaken

to ensure that this remains the case.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books:
Baran, Z.; Starr, S.F.; Cornell, S.E. (2006) Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Implications for the EU, Uppsala: Uppsala University Press

Bonney, R. (2004) Jihad: From Qur’an to bin Laden, London: Palgrave Macmillan

Cooley, J. (2002) Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, Third edition,
London: Pluto Press

Naumkin, V.V. (2005) Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, Oxford: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers

Rashid, A. (2002) Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven: Yale University
Press

Chapters in Edited Books:

Hunter, S. (2007) ‘Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia: The Islamic Connection’ in Van Wie Davis, E.;
Azizian, R. (eds.) Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers

Khamidov, A. (2007) ‘Countering Religious Extremism in Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’ in Van Wie Davis, E.; Azizian, R. (eds.) Islam, Oil, and
Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers

Journals:
Abrahamian, E. (1980) ‘Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution’, MERIP Reports, 87, 21-26

Fuller, G.E. (2002) ‘The Future of Political Islam’, Foreign Affairs, 81(2), 48-60

Hann, C.; Pelkmans, M. (2009) ‘Realigning Religion and Power in Central Asia: Islam, Nation-State
and (Post)Socialism’, Europe-Asia Studies, 61(9), 1517-1541

Hanks, R.R. (2007) ‘Dynamics of Islam, identity, and institutional rule in Uzbekistan: Constructing a
paradigm for conflict resolution’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 209-221

Karagiannis, E. (2006) ‘The challenge of radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’,
Nationalities Papers, 34(1), 1-20

Katz, M.N. (2007) ‘Will there be revolution in Central Asia?’, Communist and Post-Communist
Studies, 40, 129-141

Mahdi, A.A. (2003) ‘The Iranian Revolution Then and Now’, Historian, 65(3), 704-706

Mann, P. (2002) ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Will it Strike Back?’, Strategic Analysis, 26(2),
294-304

Marples, D.R. (2006) ‘Color revolutions: The Belarus case’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies,
39(3), 351-364

Megoran, N. (2007) ‘Author-Critic forum: ‘Radical Islam in Central Asia’’, Central Asian Survey,
26(1), 141-154
Mihalka, M. (2007) ‘Not Much of a Game: Security Dynamics in Central Asia’, China and Eurasia
Forum Quarterly, 5(2), 21-39

Peyrouse, S. (2007) ‘Islam in Central Asia: National Specificities and Postsoviet Globalisation’,
Religion, State, and Society, 35(3), 245-260

Rashid, A. (1999) ‘The Taliban: Exporting Extremism’, Foreign Affairs, 78(6), 22-25

Rouleau, E. (1980) ‘Khomeini’s Iran’, Foreign Affairs, 59(1), 1-20

Tazmini, G. (2001) ‘The Islamic revival in Central Asia: a potent force or a misconception?’, Central
Asian Survey, 20(1), pp63-83

Walker, E.W. (2003) ‘Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia’, Journal of International
Affairs, 56(2), 21-41

Websites:
Blank, S.J. (2007) ‘U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them’, Strategic Studies
Institute [online], available at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub758.pdf
(accessed on 29/4/2010)

Brill Olcott, M. (no date) ‘The Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia’, Carnegie Endowment for
Peace [online], available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/olcottroots.pdf (accessed on
28/4/2010)

Brill Olcott, M. (2007) ‘Sufism in Central Asia: A Force for Moderation or a Cause of
Politicization?’, Carnegie Endowment for Peace [online], available at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp84_olcott_final2.pdf (accessed on 28/4/2010)

MacWilliam, I. (2005) ‘Central Asia’s Islamic Militancy’, BBC News Online [online], available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4531848.stm (accessed on 29/4/2010)

Mayer, J.F. (2004) ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir – The Next Al-Qaida, Really?’, The Graduate Institute, Geneva
[online], available at: http://webprod.iheid.ch/webdav/site/iheid/shared/iheid/514/hizb-tu-tahrir.pdf
(accessed on 29/4/2010)

Naumkin, V.V. (2003) ‘Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan’, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies [online], available at:
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7ch968cn (accessed on 29/4/2010)

Walker, E.W. (2001) ‘Roots of Rage: Militant Islam in Central Asia’, Berkeley University [online],
available at: http://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/u4/bps_/caucasus_/articles_/walker_2001-
1029.pdf (accessed on 28/4/2010)