Mind Association

The Rule-Following Considerations

Author(s): Paul A. Boghossian
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 392 (Oct., 1989), pp. 507-549
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2255039
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 The Rule-Following
Considerations'
PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN
This is thefifthof our commissioned
State of the Art Series

INTRODUCTION
i. Recentyearshave witnesseda greatresurgence of interestin the
writingsof the later Wittgenstein, especiallywith those passages-
roughly,Philosophical Investigations ##I/38-242and Remarkson the
Foundations ofMathematics, sectionVI-that areconcerned withthetopic
ofrules.Much ofthecreditforall thisexcitement, unparalleled sincethe
heydayof Wittgenstein scholarship in the earlyI96os, mustgo to Saul
Kripke'sWittgenstein onRulesandPrivateLanguage.2 It is easyto explain
why.
To beginwith,the dialecticKripkeuncoveredfromWittgenstein's
discussionis enormously excitingon itsownterms.On Kripke'sreading,
thepassageson rule-following are concernedwithsomeoftheweightiest
questionsin the theoryof meaning,questions-involving the reality,
andprivacy
reducibility, ofmeaning-thatoccupycentre-stage incontem-
poraryphilosophy.Furthermore, Kripke represented Wittgenstein as
defending a set of unifiedand extremely provocative claimsconcerning
thesequestions.And,finally, he arguedfortheseclaimswithpowerand
clarity.The ensuingfloodof articlesand bookson the subjectof rule-
followingwas bothpredictable and warranted.
The presentpaperis theresultofan invitation to surveythisliterature.
It couldhavebeenaboutexegetical matters,on whattherecentdiscussions
have had to teachus about the historicalWittgenstein's philosophical
views. In the event,however,it is almostentirelyconcernedwitha
retrospectiveassessment ofthephilosophical contributions. Limitations of
space dictatedthata choicebe made; and the philosophical assessment
seemedthemorefruitful thingto do.3Despitea lotofdiscussion, thereis
roomforan improvedunderstanding of the precisenatureof Kripke's
1 I am grateful
to manypeopleforhelpfuldiscussionoftheissuescoveredin thispaper,including
MarkJohnston, JohnBurgess,Jerry Fodor,BarryLoewer,RichardRorty,BarryAllen,LarrySklar,
CrispinWright,Saul Kripke,Neil Tennant,SteveYablo, Nick White,and participants in various
seminarsat theUniversityofMichigan.Specialthanksaredue to Paul Benacerraf,
JenniferChurch,
and David Velleman.
2 Cambridge, HarvardUniversity 'K'.
Press,I982. Henceforth,
3 The main reasonis thatI have actuallycome to despairof a satisfactoryinterpretation
of
views.I tryto say whyin 'The Problemof Meaningin Wittgenstein',
Wittgenstein's to appearin
MeaningScepticism,ed. K. Puhl,De Gruyter, forthcoming.

Mind, Vol. 98 . 392 . October I989 ? OxfordUniversityPress I989

5o8 Paul A. Boghossian
arguments, of theirultimatecogency,and of theirrelationto the wider
discussionofmeaningin contemporary philosophy ofmindand language.
Pullingon thethreadthatis Kripke'sargument leadsquitenaturallyto a
discussionofmanyofthemostsignificant issuesoccupyingphilosophers
today;in thatlies themainimpetusbehindthepresentessay.
I proceedas follows.In partsI and II, I lay out the essentialsof
Kripke'sargument. In subsequentparts,I offeran extendedcritiqueof
thedialecticit presents,consideredon its own termsand independently
of exegeticalconcerns.A discussionof the criticalliteraturewill be
woveninas appropriate. The moralwillnotbe recognizably Wittgenstein-
ian:I shallarguethat,pace Kripke'sintent,
theconception ofmeaningthat
emergesis a realist,non-reductionist,and judgement-independent con-
ception,one which,moreover, sustainsno obviousanimusagainstprivate
language.

KRIPKE ON MEANING AND THE SCEPTICAL

PROBLEM

The scepticalproblem
2. As Kripkeseesit,theburdenoftherule-following is that
considerations
it cannotliterally
be trueofanysymbolthatit expressessomeparticular
conceptor meaning.This is the now-famous 'scepticalconclusion'he
attributesto Wittgenstein:
[T]hereis no factaboutmethatdistinguishes
between
mymeaning
a definite
function
by '+'... and mymeaningnothingat all.4
How is sucha radicalthesisto be supported? Kripkeargues,in effect,
by
elimination:all the available factspotentiallyrelevantto fixingthe
meaningofa symbolin a givenspeaker'srepertoire-facts abouthowthe
speakerhasactuallyusedtheexpression, factsabouthowhe is disposedto
use it,and factsabouthis qualitative
mentalhistory are canvassed,and
foundwanting.Adequatereflection on whatit is foran expressionto
possessa meaningwouldbetray, so Kripkeinvitesus to believe,thatthat
factcouldnotbe constituted by anyof those.
The claimis, of course,indisputable in connectionwithfactsabout
actualuse and qualitative
phenomena; it is a familiar
and well-assimilated
lessonof, precisely,Wittgenstein'sInvestigations,thatneitherof those
speciesoffactcould,eitherin isolationor in combination,capturewhatit
is for a symbolto possess a meaning.Much more importantand
however,is Kripke'srejectionof a dispositionalaccountof
controversial,
K., p. 2I.
 509
Considerations
TheRule-Following
meaningfacts.Why are factsabout how a speakeris disposed to use an
expressionheld to be insufficient to determineits meaning?
Kripke develops two sortsof consideration.First,the idea of meaning
somethingby a wordis an idea withan infinitary character if I meanplus
by ' + ', thenthereare literallyno end oftruthsabout how I oughtto apply
the term,namely to just the membersof this set of triplesand not to
others,if I am to use it in accord withits meaning.This is not merelyan
artefactof the arithmeticalexample; it holds forany concept. If I mean
horseby 'horse', then there are literallyno end of truthsabout how it
would be correctforme to apply the term to horseson Alpha Centauri,
to horsesin ImperialArmenia,and so on, but not to cows or cats wherever
theymay be if I am to use it in accord with its meaning.But, Kripke
argues,the totalityof my dispositionsis finite,being the dispositionsof a
finitebeing that exists fora finitetime. And so, factsabout dispositions
cannotcapturewhat it is forme to mean additionby '+'.
The second objectionto a dispositionaltheorystemsfromthe so-called
'normativity' of meaning.This objectionis somewhatharderto state,but a
roughformulation will do fornow. The pointis that,if I mean something
by an expression,thenthe potentialinfinity of truthsthatare generatedas
a resultare normative truths:theyare truthsabout how I oughtto applythe
expression,ifI am to apply it in accord withits meaning,not truthsabout
how I-will apply it. My meaningsomethingby an expression,it appears,
does not guaranteethat I will apply it correctly;it guaranteesonly that
therewill be a factof the matterabout whethermy use of it is correct.
Now, this observationmay be convertedinto a conditionof adequacy on
theoriesof meaning: any proposed candidate for being the propertyin
virtueof whichan expressionhas meaningmust be such as to groundthe
normativityof meaning it ought to be possible to read offfromany
allegedmeaning-constituting propertyofa word,whatis thecorrectuse of
that word. And this is a requirement,Kripke maintains,that a disposi-
tionaltheorycannotpass: one cannotread offa speaker'sdispositionto use
an expressionin a certainway whatis the correct use of thatexpression,for
to be disposed to use an expressionin a certainway implies at most that
one will, not that one should.

The contentsof thought

3. But whatabout thoughts,intentions,and othercontent-bearing mental
states?How do theyfigurein the scepticalargument?More specifically:is
the scepticalthesisdirectedagainstthemas well, or is it confinedsolelyto
linguistic representation?
It is hardto see how a convincingmeaningscepticismcould be confined
purely to the linguistic domain, given the intimate relation between
thought and language. Philosophers divide, of course, on the precise
5 IO Paul A. Boghossian
natureof this relationand, in particular,on the question of priority:Do
the semantic propertiesof language derive from the representational
propertiesof thought,or is it the otherway round?5Whateverthe correct
answer,however,therewould appear to be no plausible way to promotea
language-specificmeaningscepticism.On the former(Gricean) picture,one
cannot threatenlinguisticmeaningwithoutthreateningthoughtcontent,
since it is fromthoughtthatlinguisticmeaningis held to derive; and on
the latter (Sellarsian) picture, one cannot threatenlinguisticmeaning
withouttherebythreateningthoughtcontent,since it is fromlinguistic
meaningthat thoughtcontentis held to derive. Either way, contentand
meaningmust stand or fall together.
If a scepticalthesisabout linguisticmeaningis to have any prospectof
succeeding,then,it must also threatenthe possibilityof mentalmeaning
(or content).Of course,on a Sellarsianview,thatresultis automatic,given
a demonstration thatnothingnon-mental fixeslinguisticmeaning.But on a
Gricean view mattersare not so simple. Since the Gricean holds that
linguisticitemsacquire theirmeaningfromthe antecedently fixedcontent
of mentalstates,an argumentto the effectthatnothingnon-mentalfixes
linguisticmeaningwould leave the Griceanunmoved;he needs to be given
a separateargumentagainstthe possibilityof mentalcontent.Does Kripke
see this need and does he show how it is to be met?
Colin McGinn has argued thatthe answerto both questions is 'no':
My thirdpoint... pointsup a reallacunain Kripke'spresentation ofhisparadox.
The pointis thatit is necessaryforKripketo applyhis paradoxat thelevelof
concepts;thatis, he has to arguethatthe notionof possessinga determinate
conceptis likewisedevoidoffactualfoundation. . .. It cannotbe said,however,
thatKripkeexplainshowthisneedis tobe met,howthisextension oftheparadox
to thelevelof conceptsis to be carriedout; and briefreflectionshowsthatthe
exerciseis by no meanstrivial.6
I thinkMcGinn is wrongon both counts;it will be worthwhileto see why.
In fact, the suggestionthat some appropriatelygeneral thoughtor
intentionconstitutesthe soughtaftermeaning-determining factcomes up
earlyin Kripke's presentation,
beforethe dispositionalaccountof meaning
is consideredand foundwanting:

In theUnitedStates,it is the Griceanview,thatlinguistic expressions acquiretheirsemantic

propertiesbyvirtueofbeingusedwithcertainintentions, beliefs,and desires,thatis mostinfluential;
whereasin Britainit appearsto be theSellarsian(Wittgensteinian?) viewthatthinking is a formof
internalizedspeaking-speechinforointerno, as Sellarslikesto putit-that tendsto predominate.
For theGriceanviewsee H. P. Grice,'Meaning',Philosophical Review,I957; and relatedpapers.
See also, S. Schiffer,
Meaning,Oxford,ClarendonPress, I972. For the Sellarsianview see his
'Empiricism and thePhilosophy ofMind',in his Science,Perception andReality,London,Routledge
and KeganPaul, I963. For a debateon thepriority questionsee 'The Chisholm-Sellars Correspon-
dence',in Intentionality,
Mindand Language,ed. A. Marras,Urbana,University of IllinoisPress,
I972.
6
ColinMcGinn,Wittgenstein
onMeaning,Oxford,Basil Blackwell,I984, pp. I44-6.
 5II
Considerations
TheRule-Following
This setofdirections, gavemyself
I maysuppose,I explicitly at someearliertime.
onmymindas ona slate.It is incompatible
It is engraved withthehypothesis that
notthefinite
I meantquus. It is thissetofdirections, additions
listofparticular
thatI performed and determines
in thepast,thatjustifies mypresentresponse.7
And his responseto it seems clear (p. i6ff).The idea is thatthoughtsthat
someone may have had concerninghow he is prepared to use a certain
expressionwill help determinea meaningforthatexpressiononly if their
correctinterpretation is presupposed.But this is equivalentto assuming,
Kripke suggests,thatthe scepticalchallengehas been met withrespectto
the expressionsthatfigurein thosethoughts.But how was theirmeaning
fixed?Not by factsabout theiractual or counterfactualhistoryof use, (if
theargumentagainsta dispositionalaccountof meaningis to be believed);
and not by factsconcerningassociated experientialepisodes. Hence on
the assumptionthat no other sort of fact is relevantto the fixationof
meaning by nothing.
The strategyseemsclear; but is it not problematic?The troubleis thatit
seems to depend on the assumption that thought contents are the
propertiesof syntacticallyidentifiablebearers properties,that is, of
expressionsbelongingto a 'language of thought'.And althoughtheremay
be much to recommendthisview,still,does Kripke reallywish to restthe
scepticalconclusionon so contestablea premiss?
Fortunatelyforthe scepticalstrategy, we will see below that,althougha
contestablepremissabout thoughtis involved,it is nothingso rich as a
languageof thoughthypothesis.But we will be in a positionto appreciate
this properlyonly afterwe have examined McGinn's claim that, even
granteda linguisticmodel ofthinking,it is stillimpossibleto runa Kripke-
stylescepticalargumentagainstthought.

of meaning
The normativity
4. McGinn writes:
The issueofnormativeness, thecrucialissueforKripke,has no clearcontentin
applicationto the languageof thought:whatdoes it meanto ask whethermy
currentemployment of a wordin mylanguageof thought (i.e. theexerciseof a
concept)is correct
particular in thelightofmyearlieremployment ofthatword?
What kind of linguisticmistakeis envisagedhere?. . . There is just no analogue
(as opposedtothefalsityofa thought):
incorrectness
herefortheideaoflinguistic
(ofthekindweareconcerned
incorrectness
linguistic with)is usingthesameword
meaningfromthatoriginally
witha different intended(and doingso in ignorance
ofthechange),butwecannotin thiswaymakesenseofemploying a conceptwith
a different intended it wouldjust be a different
contentfromthatoriginally
concept.8
The idea of mental contentcannot be threatenedby Kripke, McGinn
7
K., pp.I5-I6. 8 Op. Cit.,p. I47.
5I2 Paul A. Boghossian

argues,because theprincipalrequirementby whichputativereconstructions

of thatnotionare to be dispatched-the normativity
requirement-has no
cogent application to the language of thought.The claim calls for a
somewhatmoresearchingarticulation ofthenormativitythesisthanwe have
of meaningconsist?
attemptedso far.In what does the normativity
McGinn offersthe followingcharacterization:
The notionofnormativenessKripkewantscapturedis a transtemporalnotion....
We have an accountof this normativeness whenwe have two things:(a) an
accountofwhatitis tomeansomething at a giventimeand(b) an accountofwhat
itis to meanthesamethingat different
times-since(Kripkean)normativeness is
a matterof meaningnowwhatone meantearlier.9
So, the lateruse of the expressionis 'correct',accordingto McGinn, if it
then expressesthe same meaningas it did earlier;'incorrect'if, without
intendingto introducea change of meaning by explicit stipulation,it
expresses a differentmeaning. It is in such facts as this that the
normativity of meaningis said to consist.
Supposingthisweretherightunderstanding ofnormativity,howwouldit
affectmentalcontentscepticism?McGinn says thatthe problemis thatwe
cannotmakesenseofemployinga conceptwitha different contentfromthat
originallyintended-it would just be a different concept.But althoughthat
is certainlytrue,it is also irrelevant:whatwe need to make sense of is not
employinga conceptwitha different contentfromthatoriginallyintended,
but employingan expressionin the languageof thoughtwith a different
contentfromthatoriginallyintended,whichis a ratherdifferent matter.
As it happens, however,it is an idea that is equally problematic.The
difficultyis thatwe do not have the sortof access to the expressionsof our
language of thoughtthat an attributionto us of semanticintentionsin
respectof themwould appear to presuppose.You cannotintendthatsome
expressionhave a certainmeaning unless you are able to referto that
expressionindependentlyof its semanticproperties.But we have no such
independentaccess to the expressionsof our language of thought;we do
not, forinstance,know what theylook like. So we cannot have semantic
intentionsin respectof themand, hence,cannotmake sense of usingthem
correctlyor incorrectlyin the sense definedby McGinn.
If McGinn's understandingofnormativity werethe correctone, then,it
would indeed be difficult to see how it could operateat thelevel of thought
(thoughnot quite forthe reasonshe gives). It oughtto be clear,however,
thatthe 'normativity'requirementdefinedby McGinn has nothingmuch
to do withthe concept of meaningper se and is not the requirementthat
Kripke is operatingwith.
We mayappreciatethispointby observingthattherequirementdefined

9 Ibid.,p. I74.
 5I 3
Considerations
TheRule-Following
by McGinn could hardlyact as a substantiveconstrainton theoriesof
meaning,even where these are theoriessolely of linguisticmeaning.Any
theoryofmeaningthatprovidedan accountofwhatspeakersmean by their
expressionsat arbitrarytimes howevercrazy thattheorymay otherwise
be would satisfyMcGinn's constraint.In particular,the main theory
allegedby Kripketo founderon thenormativity requirement,would easily
pass it on McGinn's reading: since thereare perfectlydeterminatefacts
about what dispositionsare associated with a given expressionat a given
time-or, rather,since it is no part of Kripke's intentto deny that there
are-it is always possible to ask whetheran expressionhas the same or a
differentmeaning on a dispositionaltheory,thus satisfyingMcGinn's
requirement.How to explain, then, Kripke's claim that a dispositional
theoryfounderspreciselyon the normativity requirement?

5. The answer is that the normativityrequirementis not the thesis

McGinn outlines.What is it then?
Suppose the expression'green' meansgreen.It followsimmediatelythat
theexpression'green' applies correctly onlyto thesethings(the greenones)
and not to those(the non-greens).The fact that the expressionmeans
somethingimplies, that is, a whole set of normativetruthsabout my
behaviourwith that expression:namely,that my use of it is correctin
applicationto certainobjects and not in applicationto others.This is not,
as McGinn would have it, a relationbetween meaningsomethingby an
expressionat one timeand meaningsomethingby it at some latertime; it
is rather,a relationbetweenmeaningsomethingby it at some timeand its
use at that time.
The normativity ofmeaningturnsout to be, in otherwords,simplya new
nameforthefamiliarfactthat,regardlessofwhetherone thinksofmeaningin
truth-theoretic terms,meaningfulexpressionspossess
or assertion-theoretic
conditionsof correctuse. (On the one construal,correctnessconsistsin true
use, on theother,in warranted use.) Kripke'sinsightwas to realizethatthis
observationmaybe convertedintoa conditionofadequacyon theoriesofthe
determination ofmeaning:anyproposedcandidateforthepropertyin virtue
of which an expressionhas meaning,must be such as to ground the
'normativity' ofmeaning-it oughtto be possibleto readofffromanyalleged
meaningconstituting propertyofa word,whatis thecorrectuse ofthatword.
It is easyto see how,on thisunderstanding oftherequirement in question,a
dispositional theorymightappearto failit:for,itwouldseem,one cannotread
offa dispositionto use a wordin a certainwaywhatis thecorrectuse ofthat
word,forto be disposedto use a wordin a certainwayimpliesat mostthatone
will,notthatone should(one can havedispositionsto use wordsincorrectly). '0
10 As weshallsee below,however,thequestionwhether accountsofmeaningreallydo
dispositional
succumbto thenormativity objectionis muchmorecomplicatedthanthis.I am notheretryingto
assesstheobjection,butmerelyto stateit.
5 I4 Paul A. Boghossian
6. Withthisclarification ofthenormativity thesisin placewe arefinally in
a positionto settlethe question:can Kripkedevelopthe same sortof
meaning-sceptical argument againsta languageofthought as he develops
againstpubliclanguage? Andtheansweris: clearly, yes.For:whatfixesthe
meaning ofexpressions in thelanguageofthought? Not otherthoughts, on
pain of viciousregress.Not factsabout the actual tokening of such
expressionsor factsabout associatedqualitativeepisodes,forfamiliar
reasons.And not dispositional factsaboutthetokening of such expres-
sions,for,sincemeaningful expressions of mentalese possessconditions of
correct use in precisely thesamesenseas publiclanguageexpressions do,
becausecorrectness cannotbe reconstructed dispositionally.So, nothing
fixestheirmeaning.
Indeed,we arealso nowin a positionto see,as promised, thatnothing
so richas a languageofthought hypothesis needed.A language
is strictly
of thoughtmodelis composedout of two theses:(a) thatthinking the
thoughtthatp involvestokening an item-a representationthatmeans
thatp; and (b) thatthe representation whosetokeningis so involved
possessesa combinatorial syntacticand semanticstructure.In other
words,accordingto a languageof thoughthypothesis, thoughtcontents
are the semanticproperties of syntactically and semantically structured
bearers.Butitshouldbe quiteclearthatnothing in thescepticalargument
dependson theassumption ofstructure:eveniftherepresentation wereto
possessno internal syntax, we couldstillask,in properKripkeanfashion,
what its correctness conditionsare and in virtueof what theyare
determined.
It wouldappear,however,thatthescepticalargument's strategy does
presupposethatcontentproperties havesomesortof bearer(evenifnot
necessarilya structured one). For,otherwise, therewillbe no naturalway
to formulate a dispositional theory ofthought content,andno naturalway
to bringthenormativity requirement to bearagainstit. Therehas to be
something-a state,event,or particular, it neednotmatterwhich whose
disposition to get tokenedundercertaincircumstances constitutes, on a
dispositionaltheory, itspossessionofa certaincontent. Andalthough this
commitment is, I suppose,strictly speakingcontestable, it is also very
naturaland plausible.Afterall, contentsdo not figurein a mentallife
exceptas subtendedby a particularmode belief,desire,judgement,
wish and,hence,arenaturally understood as theproperties ofthestates
or eventsthatinstantiate thosemodes.
And so we see thatthe scepticalargumentmust,can, and does (in
intent,anyway)includementalcontentwithinthescopeofthescepticism
it aims to promote.''

l Since nothingwillhangon it,and sinceit willease exposition,

I shallhenceforth
writeas ifa
languageofthoughthypothesisweretrue.
 TheRule-Following
Considerations
5I 5
Theconstitutive
natureofthesceptical
problem
7. Havinga meaningis essentially a matterof possessinga correctness
condition.And the scepticalchallengeis to explainhow anything could
possessthat.
Notice,by the way,thatI have statedthe scepticalproblemabout
meaningwithoutonce mentioningKripke's notorioussceptic.That
character, as everyoneknows,proceedsby invitinghis interlocutor to
defenda claimaboutwhathe previously meantbytheexpression '+'. The
interlocutor innocently assumeshimselfto havemeantaddition;but the
scepticchallenges himtoprovethattheconceptin questionwasnotinfact
quaddition, wherequadditionis justlikeaddition,exceptfora singularity
at a pointnot previously encountered in the interlocutor's arithmetical
practice.
It mayseem,then,thatthescepticalproblemI havedescribed couldnot
be Kripke's.For Kripke'sproblemappearsto be essentially epistemological
incharacter-itconcerns a speaker'sabilitytodefenda particular meaning
ascription; whereas the problem I have outlined is constitutive,not
epistemological-its topicis thepossibilityofmeaning, notourknowledge
of it.
In fact,however,the two problemsare the same; Kripke merely
choosesto presentthe constitutive problemin an epistemological guise.
Epistemological scepticism abouta givenclass ofjudgements is theview
thatour actualcognitivecapacitiesare incapableof delivering justified
opinionsconcerning judgements in thatclass.Kripke'sscepticis notafter
a thesisofthatsort.This is evidentfromthefactthathisinterlocutor, in
beingchallengedto justifyhis claimthathe meantadditionby '+', is
permittedcompleteand omniscient access to all the facts about his
previousbehavioural, mental,and physicalhistory; he is notrestricted to
thesortof knowledge thatan ordinary creature,equippedwithordinary
cognitivepowers,would be expectedto possess.'2 Kripke'ssceptical
scenariois, thus,completely unsuitedto promoting an epistemological
scepticism.What it is suited for is the promotionof a constitutive
scepticism. For ifhis scepticis able to showthat,evenwiththebenefit of
access to all the relevantfacts,his interlocutor is stillunableto justify
anyparticular claimaboutwhathe meant,thatwouldleaveus no choice
butto concludethatthereare no factsaboutmeaning. 13
Pace manyofKripke'sreaders,then,theproblemis not-not evenin

12 McGinn's failure to notethisleads himto wonderhow the constitutive and epistemological

aspectsof Kripke'sdiscussionare related,'fortheepistemological claimis clearlydistinctfromthe
metaphysicalclaim'(op. cit.,p. 149).
13 This pointis made verynicelyby CrispinWright in his 'Kripke'sAccountof theArgument
AgainstPrivateLanguage',JournalofPhilosophy, I984, pp. 76I-2. Wright,however, discernsanother
sortofepistemologicaldimension to thescepticalproblem.I willdiscussthatbelow.
5I6 Paul A. Boghossian
part-epistemological scepticismabout meaning.14But, of course,one
mayagreethattheproblemis constitutive in character,
and yetbelieveit
to havean epistemological dimension.Accordingto CrispinWright,for
example,Kripkeis not interested in the merepossibilityof correctness
conditions; he is interestedin thepossibilityofcorrectness
conditions that
maybe,at leastin one'sowncase,known non-inferentially.
5 The problem
is essentially
constitutive in character; butacceptableanswersto it are to
be subjectto an epistemicconstraint.
I do notwishtoargueaboutthisat length.It doesseemtomethat,once
we havecorrected forthedistortions inducedbythedialogicsetting, there
oughtnot to be any residualtemptation to thinkthatepistemological
considerations areplaying a critical
roleinKripke'sargument. In anycase,
whatever intention Kripkemayhavehad, theconsiderations he adduces
on behalfofthescepticalconclusion appeartoowenothing to epistemolo-
gicalconstraints and can be statedwithouttheirhelp.16 That,anyway, is
howI shallpresentthem.

The 'rule-following'
considerations?
8. It wouldnotbe inappropriate towonderat thispointwhatall thishasto
do withthe topicof rule-following? Where,precisely, is the connection
betweentheconceptsofmeaningand content, on theone hand,and the
conceptoffollowing a rule,on theother,forged? I shallarguethat,in an
importantsense, the answeris 'nowhere',and hence that 'the rule-
following considerations'is, strictly
speaking, a misnomer forthediscus-
sionon offer.
Many writersseemto assumethatthe connection is straightforward;
theymaybe represented as reasoning as follows.Expressions cometohave
correctness conditions as a resultof peoplefollowing rulesin respectof
them;hence,exploringthe possibilityof correctness is tantamount to
exploring thepossibilityofrule-following.
But,at leaston theordinary understanding oftheconceptoffollowing a
rule,itcannotbe trueofall expressions-inparticular, itcannotbe trueof
mentalexpressions-that theycome to have correctness conditionsas a
resultof peoplefollowing rulesin respectof them.The pointis thatthe
ordinaryconceptof followinga rule-as opposed to that of merely
14 For example, McGinn,op. cit.,pp. 140-50; G. Bakerand P. Hacker,'On Misunderstanding
Wittgenstein:Kripke'sPrivateLanguageArgument', Synthese,1984, pp. 409-I0. Neil Tennanthas
complained thatKripke'sscepticdoesnotultimately supplya convincing bent-rule of
reinterpretation
his interlocutor's
words.See his 'AgainstKripkeanScepticism',forthcoming. Tennantmaywellbe
rightaboutthis.But hereagain,I think,the perception thatthisaffects the forceof thesceptical
problemaboutmeaning is a resultoftakingthedialogicsetting
tooseriously. The constitutiveproblem
aboutmeaning-howcouldthereso muchas be a correctness condition-canbe statedquiteforcefully
withouttheactualprovision of a convincingglobalreinterpretation
of a person'swords.
15 See op. cit.,pp. 772-5. 16 Withone relativelyminorexceptionto be notedbelow.
 Considerations
TheRule-Following 517

conformingto one is the concept of an intentionalact: it involves the

intentionalattemptto bring one's behaviourin line with the dictatesof
some graspedrule. CrispinWrighthas decribedthis intuitiveconception
veryclearly:
Correctlyapplying a ruletoa newcasewill,itis naturalto think, involve
typically
a double success:it is necessaryboth to apprehendrelevantfeaturesof the
presentedsituation and to knowwhat,in thelightofthoseapprehended features,
castling
willfitorfailtofittherule.Correctly in thecourseofa gameofchess,for
instance,willdependbothon apprehension of theconfiguration of chessmenat
thetimeofthemove,and on a knowledge ofwhether thatconfiguration(and the
previouscourseof thegame)permitscastlingat thatpoint.17
As such,however,the ordinaryconceptof followinga rule is the conceptof
an act among whose causal antecendentslie contentful mentalstates;con-
sequently,it is a conceptthatpresupposestheidea ofa correctnesscondition,
not one thatcan, in fullgenerality,help explainit. Since it makesessential
playwiththe idea of a propositionalattitude,whichin turnmakesessential
play withthe idea of content,rule-following in thissense presupposesthat
mentalexpressions have conditionsofcorrectapplication.On pain ofregress,
then,it cannotbe truethatmentalexpressionsthemselvesacquire meaning
as a resultof anyonefollowingrules in respectof them.
What Kripke's discussion is concerned with is the possibility of
correctness;so long as we keep thatclearlyin mind,talkof 'rule-following'
is harmless.Simon Blackburnhas capturedthis perspectiveverywell:
I intendno particular
theoretical bytalking
implications ofruleshere.The topicis
thatthereis sucha thingas thecorrectandincorrect
applicationofa term,and to
I
saythatthereis sucha thingis no morethantosaythatthereis truthandfalsity.
of wordsbeing
of therebeingcorrectnessand incorrectness,
shall talkindifferently
rule-governed,and of theirobeyingprinciplesof application.Whateverthis is, it
is the factthatdistinguishesthe productionof a termfrommere noise, and turns
utteranceinto assertion into the makingof judgment.'8

II
THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTION
A non-factualist of meaning
conception
9. Having established to his satisfactionthat no word could have the
propertyof expressinga certainmeaning,Kripke turnsto askinghow this
1 CrispinWright:'Wittgenstein's Rule-Following and the CentralProjectof
Considerations
on Chomsky,
TheoreticalLinguistics',in Reflections ed. A. George,Oxford,Basil Blackwell,I989,
p. 255.
18 SimonBlackburn, 'The IndividualStrikesBack',Synthese,
I984, pp. 281-2. My onlydisagree-
mentwiththispassageconcernsits identificationof correctnessconditionswithtruthconditions.
Truthconditions condition;proofconditions
are simplyone speciesof a correctness or justification
supplyfurther
conditions instances.
518 Paul A. Boghossian

conclusion is to be accommodated.The question is urgent,in his view,

because the conclusionthreatensto be not merelyshockingbut paradoxi-
cal. The troubleis thatwe would ordinarilytakea remarkto theeffectthat
therecould not be any such thingas the factthatI mean somethingby the
' + ' sign, to entail that thereis nothingI could mean by the use of that
sign. Applied quite generally,across all signs and all people, the claim
becomes the seeminglyparadoxical and self-refuting thesis that no one
could mean anythingby theiruse of linguisticexpressions.
A scepticismabout meaningfactswould appear to be, then,primafacie
anyway,an unstableposition.Sustainingit requiresshowingthatwhat it
asserts does not ultimatelylapse into a formof pragmaticincoherence.
What is called for, in other words, is a rehabilitationof our ordinary
practice of attributingcontent to our thoughtsand utterances,which
neverthelessconservesthe scepticalthesisthatthereare no factsforsuch
attributionsto answerto. That is whatthe 'sceptical solution'is designed
to do. It is allegedto have thefollowingstartlingconsequence:theidea ofa
language whose meanings are constitutedsolely out of an individual's
speaker's properties,considered'completelyin isolationfromany wider
communityto which he may belong', is incoherent.'9
The scepticalsolutionhas two partsthatare usefullydistinguished.The
firstconsists in the suggestion that we replace the notion of truth
conditions, in our intuitivepicture of sentence meaning, by that of
assertibilityconditions. The second consists in a descriptionof the
assertibility conditionsformeaning-attributing sentences,in the course of
which it is argued that it is essential to such sentences that their
assertibilityconditionsadvertto the actions or dispositionsof a commu-
nity.
The adjustmentrecommendedin the firstpart is supposed to help
because
if we supposethatfactsor truthconditionsare of the essenceof meaningful
it willfollowfromtheskepticalconclusionthatassertions
assertion, thatanyone
evermeansanything are meaningless. On theotherhand,if we applyto these
thetestssuggested
assertions . . . no suchconclusion
follows.Allthatis neededto
legitimizeassertionsthatsomeonemeanssomething is thattherebe roughly
circumstances
specifiable underwhichtheyare legitimately assertible,and that
the gameof asserting themhas a role in our lives.No suppositionthat'facts
correspond' to thoseassertions is needed.20
19 FollowingGoldfarb,we maycall thistheconceptof a 'solitarylanguage'.See his 'Kripkeon
Wittgensteinon Rules',JournalofPhilosophy,1985. Goldfarb goeson to saythattheideaofa solitary
languageis moregeneralthanthatof a Wittgensteinian 'privatelanguage',forthelatteressentially
involvestheidea ofnecessary to another.It is hardto assessthis,becauseit is hardto
unintelligibility
knowhow to interpret 'necessaryunintelligibility'.
Surelyit cannotmean: a languageto whose
predicates
no twopeoplecouldattachthesamedescriptive conditions.Andit is notclearwhatit is to
mean,if notthat.For usefuldiscussionsee C. Wright,'Does Philosophical InvestigationsI.258-6o
Suggesta CogentArgument AgainstPrivateLanguage?',inSubject,Thought andContext, ed. P. Pettit
and J.McDowell,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I986. 20 K., pp. 77-8.
 Considerations
TheRule-Following 5 9

The proposed account is, in effect,a global non-factualism:sentence

termsand
significanceis construedquite generallyin assertion-theoretic
no invidiousdistinctionis drawnbetweenthesortofsignificance possessed
by meaning-attributing sentencesand thatpossessed by sentencesof other
types.

againstsolitarylanguage
The argument
io. The argument against 'solitary language' emerges, according to
Kripke, fromthe observationthat,so long as a speakeris consideredin
isolationwe can assign no assertibilityconditionsto judgementsto the
effectthat he has misapplieda symbolin his repertoire:
[I]fwe confine ourselvesto lookingat onepersonalone,thisis as faras we cango
.... Thereareno circumstances underwhichwe can saythat,evenifhe inclines
tosay'125', heshouldhavesaid'5', orvice-versa whatcircumstances
. . .. Under
can he be wrong?No one else by lookingat his mindor behavioralonecan say
something like,'He is wrongifhe does notaccordwithhis ownintention'; the
wholepointof theskepticalargument was thatthereare no factsabouthimin
virtueofwhichhe accordswithhis intentions or not.21
The possibilityof error,however,is essentialto our ordinaryconcept of
meaning,and can only be accommodatedif we widen our gaze and take
intoconsiderationthe interactionbetweenour imaginedrule-follower and
a linguisticcommunity.Were we to do so, Kripke continues,we could
introduceassertibilityconditionsforjudgementsabout errorin termsof
the agreement,or lack of it, betweena given speaker'spropensitiesin the
use of a termand the community's.Since, however,thiswould appear to
be the onlyway to give substanceto the correlativenotionsof errorand
correctness,no one considered wholly in isolation fromother speakers
could be said to mean anything.And so a solitarylanguage is impossible.
Let us turn now to an assessmentof the various central aspects of
Kripke's argument.

III
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST
SOLITARY LANGUAGE

accountsand solitarylanguage
Constitutive
i i. Kripke is veryclear about the limited,whollydescriptivenatureof the
scepticalsolution,at least in his 'official'explicationsof the view:
We haveto see underwhatcircumstances ofmeaningare madeand
attributions
exhorta-
playin ourlives.FollowingWittgenstein's
whatroletheseattributions
21 K., p. 88.
520 Paul A. Boghossian
tionnot to thinkbut to look,we will not reasona prioriabout the role such
statements oughtto play; ratherwe will findout whatcircumstances actually
licensesuchassertions and whatrolethislicenseactuallyplays.It is importantto
realizethatwe are not lookingfornecessaryand sufficient conditions(truth
conditions)for followinga rule, or an analysisof what such rule-following
'consistsin'. Indeedsuchconditionswouldconstitute a 'straight'solutionto the
skepticalproblem,and havebeenrejected.22
It is importantto see that the counselled modesty-we will not reason a
prioriabout the role such statementsought to play-is compulsory.The
assertibilityconditionsmay not be understoodto providethe content(or
truthconditions)of the meaning-attributing sentences,on pain of falling
preyto the accepted scepticalconsiderations.(That is whythe solutionon
offerhas to be sceptical:it has alreadybeen conceded thatnothingcould
cogentlyamount to the fact that a meaning sentencereports).It would
appear to followfromthis,however,thatthe scepticalsolutioncan do no
morethanrecordthe conditionsunderwhichspeakersin factconsiderthe
attributionof a certain concept warrantedand the endorsementof a
particularresponseappropriate.The Wittgensteinian exhortation'not to
thinkbut to look' is not merely(as it may be) good advice; the modestyit
counsels is enforcedby the factthat truthconditionsforthese sentences
has been jettisoned.For how, in the absence of a conceptionof the truth
conditionsofmeaningattributing sentences,could theprojectofproviding
an account of their assertion conditionsaspire to anythingmore than
descriptiveadequacy? Were we equipped with an account of theirtruth
conditions,of course,we mightbe able to reasona prioriabout whattheir
assertion conditions oughtto be and, hence, potentially,to revise the
conditionsforassertionactuallyacceptedforthem.But withoutthebenefit
of such an account there is no scope for a more ambitious project: a
descriptivelyadequate account of the actual assertionconditionsforsuch
sentencesis the most one may cogentlyaim for.
If this is correct,however,we ought to be puzzled about how the
scepticalsolutionis goingto delivera conclusionagainstsolitarylanguage
of the requisite modal force: namely, that there could not be such a
language.For even ifit weretruethatour actualassertibility conditionsfor
meaning-attributing sentencesadvertto the dispositionsof a community,
the mostthatwould licensesayingis thatourlanguageis not solitary.And
thiswould be a lot less thanthe resultwe were promised:namely,thatany
possiblelanguage has to be communal.

Communal assertibilityconditions?
I 2. Puttingthisworryto one side, let us ask whetherit is in facttruethat,
if we accept the sceptical conclusion, we cannot introducesubstantive
22 K., pp. 86-7.
 Considerations
TheRule-Following 521

conditionsformeaning-attributions
assertibility thatdo not advertto the
dispositionsof a communityof speakers?It appears,on the contrary,that
not only can we introducesuch conditions,but have actuallydone so.23
Consider the following:
(A) It is warrantedto assertof Jones thathe means additionby '+',
provided he has responded with the sum in reply to most
arithmeticalqueries posed thus far.
As a descriptionof our practice,(A) is, of course,quite rough:roomhas to
be made forthe importanceof systematicdeviations,the greaterimport-
ance attachingto simple cases, and manyothersuch factors.But all these
refinements may be safelyignoredforthe purposeof raisingthe following
criticalquestion:what in the scepticalconclusionrules out attributionsof
form(A)? It had betterrule themout, of course,if the argumentagainst
solitarylanguageis to be sustained,for(A) advertsto no one otherthanthe
individual.But as Goldfarbpointsout, thereappears to be nothingin the
scepticalconclusionthatwill rule it out.24 It can hardlybe objected that
the interpretationof 'sum' is being presupposedin the statementof the
condition,forthescepticalsolutionis not meantto be a straight solutionto
the problem about meaning; as Kripke himselfsays, in fendingoffa
similarimaginedobjectionto his own account of the assertibilitycondi-
tions:
WhatWittgenstein is doingis describingthe utilityin our lives of a certain
practise.Necessarilyhe mustgivethisdescription in ourownlanguage.As in the
case ofanysuchuse ofourlanguage,a participant in anotherformoflifemight
applyvarioustermsin the description (such as 'agreement')in a non-standard
'quus-like'way.... This cannotbe an objectiontoWittgenstein'ssolutionunless
fromanyuse of languageat all.25
he is to be prohibited
Nor is thereany problemin the assumptionthatit is a genuinelyfactual
matterwhat any two numbers sum to; as Kripke himselfrepeatedly
emphasizes, the sceptical argumentdoes not threatenthe existence of
mathematical facts.But how,then,is (A) to be ruledout,and theargument
againstsolitarylanguage preserved?
I3. Could it perphapsbe arguedthat(A) is permissiblethoughparasiticon
thecommunalassertibility conditionsKripke outlines?As a matterof fact,
just the opposite seems true.26
Kripke's communitarianaccount of meaning-attributions runs as fol-
lows:
SmithwilljudgeJonesto meanadditionby 'plus' onlyifhe judgesthatJones's
answerstoparticular agreewiththosehe is inclinedtogive....
additionproblems
23
is canvassedbothin Goldfarb,
This sortofrejoinder op. cit.,and in McGinn,op. cit.
24 25 K., p. I46.
Ibid.
26
This is arguedin McGinn,op cit.,pp. I85-7, fromwhichthispointis derived.
522 Paul A. Boghossian
IfJonesconsistently
failstogiveresponsesinagreement withSmith's, Smith
willjudgethathedoesnotmeanaddition by'plus'.EvenifJonesdidmeanitin
thepast,thepresent
deviation Smithinjudging
willjustify thathehaslapsed.27
According to thisaccount,then,I willjudgethatJonesmeansadditionby
'plus' onlyifJonesuses'plus'enoughtimesin thesamewayI am inclined
to use it. As a roughdescription of our practice,and manyimportant
refinements aside,thisseemsacceptableenough.One of therefinements
thatis calledfor,however, exposesthefactthatKripke'scommunitarian
conditions are parasiticon thesolitaryconditions,and nottheotherway
round.
It wouldbe absurdforme,underconditions whereI hadgoodreasonto
believethatI had becomeproneto makingarithmetical mistakes-per-
hapsowingto intoxication or senility
or whatever-toinsiston agreement
withme as a precondition forcreditingJoneswithmastery oftheconcept
ofaddition.Andthiswouldappearto showthat,at a minimum, Kripke's
communitarian accountmustbe modified to read:
(B) It is warranted
to assertofJonesthathe meansadditionby '+',
providedhe agreeswithmy responsesto arithmetical queries,
whereI have beena reliablecomputer
underconditions of sums.
But thismodification
wouldseemimmediately torevealthatthereference
to 'my own responses'is idle, and thatthe basic assertionconditionI
acceptis just(A):
It is warrantedto assertof Jonesthathe meansadditionby '+',
providedhe has respondedwiththesumin replyto mostarithmetical
queriesposedthusfar.
It wouldappear,in otherwords,thattheacceptabilityofthecommunitar-
ianconditionsis strongly on theacceptability
parasitic ofthesolitary
ones,
and nottheotherwayaround.
In sum:bothbecauseitis difficult togenerate
(impossible?) constitutive
resultsoutofnon-constitutiveaccounts,and becauseouractualassertibil-
ityconditionsformeaningascriptions appearnotto be communitarian, I
concludethatthescepticalsolutiondoes notyielda convincingargument
againstsolitary
language.

IV
IRREALIST CONCEPTIONS OF MEANING
I4. The argument againstsolitary
languagewassupposedtoflowfromthe
adjustedunderstanding of sentencesignificanceforcedby the sceptical
conclusion.The scepticalconclusion
hasitthatitcannotliterally
be trueof
2
K., p. 9I.
 Considerations
TheRule-Following 523
any symbolthatit expressesa particularmeaning:thereis no appropriate
factfora meaning-attributing sentenceto report.The scepticalsolution's
recommendationis that we blunt the forceof this result by refusingto
thinkof sentencesignificancein termsof possession of truthconditions,
or a capacity to state facts. We should think of it, rather,in terms
of possession of assertibilityconditions. But is this solution forced?
Are there not, perhaps, other ways of accommodatingthe sceptical
conclusion?
The solutionon offeris bound to strikeone as an overreaction,at leastat
firstblush,in two possiblerespects.First,in thatit opts fora formof non-
factualism,as opposed to an error theory; and second, in that the
recommendednon-factualism is global,ratherthanrestrictedsolelyto the
region of discourse meaning talk that is directly affectedby the
scepticalresultit seeks to accommodate.
Semanticallyspeaking,the most conservativereactionto the news that
nothinghas the propertyof being a witchis not to adopt a non-factualist
conceptionof witchtalk,it is to offeran errorconceptionof such talk.An
error conception of a given region of discourse conserves the region's
semantical appearances predicates are still understood to express
properties,declarativesentencesto possess truthconditions;the ontologi-
cal discoveryis taken to exhibit merely-the systematicfalsityof the
region's (positive,atomic) sentences.28
Could not the moralof the scepticalargumentbe understoodto consist
in an errorconceptionof meaning discourse?It could not, for an error
conceptionof such discourse,in contrastwith errorconceptionsof other
regions,is of doubtfulcoherence.The view in question would consistin
the claim thatall meaning-attributions are false:

(i) For any S: FS means thatpl is false.

But the disquotationalpropertiesof the truthpredicateguaranteethat(i)

entails

(2) For any S: [Si has no meaning.

(i)implies,thatis, thatno sentencewhateverpossesses a meaning.Since,

however,a sentencecannotbe false unless it is meaningfulto begin with,
thisin turnimpliesthat(i) cannotbe true:forwhat (i) says is thatsome
sentences namelymeaning-attributing sentences are false.29

28 See JohnMackie,Ethics:InventingRightand Wrong,London, Penguin,I977, forsuch a

conceptionofmoraldiscourse.
29 An errorconceptionofmeaninghas beenadvocatedby Paul Churchland; see his 'Eliminative
Materialismand thePropositional
Attitudes',
Journal I98I . This argument
ofPhilosophy, is elaborated
and defendedin my'The Statusof Content',Philosophical
Review,forthcoming AprilI990.
524 Paul A. Boghossian

So it appearsthatKripkewas rightto avoid an errorconceptionof

meaningdiscourse.But does his non-factualistconceptionfare any
better?
I5. The canonicalformulation ofa non-factualist
view-and theone that
Kripkehimself favours-hasit thatsometargeted sentenceis
declarative
not genuinely A non-factualism
truth-conditional. about meaning,con-
sists,thatis, in theviewthat
(3) For anyS, p: rS meansthatpl is nottruth-conditional.
As I noted above, however,the projectivism recommendedby the
scepticalsolutionis intendedto applyglobally:it is notconfined
solelyto
meaning-attributing sentences.
Thus,
(4) For any S: rS[ is not truthconditional.
Whydoes Kripkeadopt so extremea view?Why does he not suggest
merelythatwe abandona truth-conditional modelforsemanticdiscourse,
whilepreserving it,as seemsnatural,forat leastsomeregionsoftherestof
language?Kripkedoes notsay.But it maybe thathe glimpsedthatthe
globalcharacter oftheprojectivism is in factforcedin thepresentcase.30
For considera non-factualism solelyaboutmeaning-theviewthat,since
thereis no suchproperty as a word'smeaningsomething, and henceno
suchfact,no meaning-attributing sentencecanbe truth-conditional.Since
thetruth-condition ofanysentenceS is (in part,anyway)a function ofits
meaning,a non-factualism about meaningwill enjoina non-factualism
abouttruth-conditions: whattruth-condition S possessescouldhardlybe a
factualmatter ifthatin virtueofwhichit has a particular truth-condition
is notitselfa factualmatter.And so we haveit that(3) entails:
(5) For all S, p: rS has truth-condition
pl is nottruth-conditional.
However,since,courtesyof the disquotational properties of the truth
a sentenceoftheformrS has truth-condition
predicate, pl is trueifand
p, and since(5) has it that rS has truth-
onlyif S has truth-condition
conditionpl is neversimplytrue,it followsthat
(4) For anyS: rSi is nottruth-conditional
justas predicted.
It is, then, a fascinating consequenceof a non-factualism about
meaning, thatitentailsa globalnon-factualism;
in thisrespect,
ifno other,
a non-factualismaboutmeaningdistinguishes itselffroma similarthesis

30
Somewhatdifferent argumentsare givenforthisbothin CrispinWright's'Kripke'sAccount',
Ioc. cit.,pp. 769-70 and in my 'Meaning,Contentand Rules',in PartI of myPh.D. Dissertation
Essayson Meaningand Belief,Princeton, I986.
 525
Considerations
TheRule-Following

about any othersubject matter.CrispinWrighthas suggestedthatit also

rendersit irremediablyproblematic:
tosupposethatprojectivist
thatitis coherent
itis doubtful viewscouldbe applied
quiteglobally.For,howeverexactlythedistinctionbe drawnbetweenfact-stating
andnon-fact-stating willpresumably
theprojectivist
discourse, wantittocomeby
wayof a discovery failto qualifyfortheformer
thatcertainstatements class;a
statementoftheconclusion oftheskepticalargument, to
is notitself
forinstance,
be projective.31
It is hard not to sympathizewithWright'ssuggestionthattheremust be
somethingunstableabout a projectivistthesisthatis itselfwithinthescope
of theprojectivismit recommends.But it is also not entirelyclear to me in
whatthe instabilityconsists.To be sure,a global projectivismwould have
thatno sentencepossesses a truth
to admitthatit is no morethanassertible
condition.But whatis wrongwiththat?If thereis an instabilityhere,it is
not a transparentone.
i6. In fact,however,I do believe thata non-factualismabout meaningis
unstable,but not because of its global character.Rather,the reasonshave
to do with the clash between what you have to suppose about truthin
orderto framea non-factualist thesisabout anything,and whatyou have to
suppose about truth as a result of accepting a non-factualismabout
meaning. I have developed the argumentfor this in some detail else-
where;32here I have space only to sketchits outlines.
Consider a non-factualistthesisabout, say, the good:
(7) All sentencesof the form rx is goodl are not truth-conditional.
The pointthatneeds to be keptin focusis thatthesentenceof whichtruth
conditionsare being denied is a significantdeclarativesentence.For this
factimmediatelyimplies that the concept of truthin termsof which the
thesisis framedcannotbe thedeflationary
non-factualist conceptthatA. J.
Ayersuccinctly described as follows:
... to say that p is true is simply a way of assertingp.... The traditional
conceptionof truthas a 'real quality'or a 'real relation'is due, like most
philosophicalmistakes,to a failureto analyze sentencescorrectly. . .. There are
sentencesin whichtheword'truth'seemsto standforsomethingreal . . [but]
ouranalysishas shownthattheword'truth'does notstandforanything.33
If the concept of truthwere, as Ayer claims in this passage, merelythe
concept of a device for semantic ascent, and not the concept of some
genuineproperty some 'real relation' thata sentence(or thought)may
enjoy, then non-factualismis nowhere a coherent option. For on a
deflationaryunderstandingof truth,a sentencewill be truth-conditional
3" Ibid., p. 770. 32 In 'The Statusof Content',loc. cit.
33~ A. J.Ayer,Language, Truthand Logi'c,New York,Dover,I952, P. 89.
526 Paul A. Boghossian
providedonlythatit is apt forsemanticascent;and it will be apt for
semantic ascentprovidedonlythatit is a significant, declarativesentence.
But it is constitutiveofa non-factualist thesisprecisely thatit denies,of
sometargeted, significant,
declarativesentence, thatitis truth-conditional.
It follows,therefore, thata non-factualism about any subjectmatter
presupposesa conceptionof truthricherthan the deflationary: it is
committed to holdingthatthe predicate'true' standsforsome sortof
language-independent property,eligibilityforwhichwillnotbe certified
purelybythefactthata sentenceis declarative and significant. Otherwise,
therewill be no understanding its claim that a significant sentence,
declarative in form,failstc.possesstruth-conditions.
So we haveitthatanynon-factualist thesispresupposes thattruthis,as
I shallhenceforth put it,robust.But,now,noticethatjudgements about
whetheran objectpossessesa robustproperty could hardlyfail to be
factual.If P is somegenuinely robustproperty, thenit is hardto see how
therecouldfailtobe a factofthematter aboutwhether an objecthasP. It
does not matterif P is subjectiveor otherwisedependentupon our
responses.So long as it is a genuine,language-independent property,
judgements aboutit willhaveto be factual,willhaveto be possessedof
robusttruth-conditions. In particular,if truthis a robustproperty, then
judgements abouta sentence'struthvaluemustthemselves be factual.But
we sawearlier-see(5) above-thata non-factualist thesisaboutmeaning
impliesthat judgementsabout a sentence'struthcannot be factual:
whether a certainsentenceis truecannotbe a factualmatter ifitsmeaning
is not.And thisexposesthecontradiction we havebeenstalking: a non-
factualism aboutmeaningimpliesboththattruthis robustand thatit is
not.
I7 It is hardto do justiceto theissuesinvolved withintheconfinesofthe
presentessay.34I do hope,however,thatthe precedingdiscussionhas
succeededin sowingsomedoubtsaboutthecogencyof irrealist concep-
tions of meaning-whetherin the formof a non-factualism about
meaning, as in thescepticalsolution,or an errortheory, as suggested,
for
instance, by Churchland.
The uncompromising strength of theclaimis boundto arousesuspi-
cion. Irrealistconceptionsof otnerdomainsmay not be particularly
appealingor plausible,but theyare notincoherent. Whyshouldmatters
standdifferently withmeaningdiscourse?
The sourceoftheasymmetry is actuallynotthathardto trackdown.It
consistsin thefactthaterrorand non-factualist theoriesaboutany subject
matter presuppose certainclaimsabouttruthandtruth-conditions, thatan
errorornon-factualist conception directedpreciselyat ourtalkofmeaning
itselfendsup denying. Not surprisingly theensuingresultis unstable.
34 Again,fora moredetailedtreatment
see 'The Statusof Content',loc. cit.
 527
Considerations
TheRule-Following
Thus, an errorthesisaboutany subjectmatterpresupposesthatthe
targetsentencesare truth-conditional. But an errorthesis directed
preciselyat ourtalkaboutmeaningentailsthedenialofthatpresupposi-
tion.Thus,also,a non-factualism aboutanysubjectmatter presupposes a
robustconception oftruth.But a non-factualismdirectedpreciselyat our
talkaboutmeaningentailsthedenialofthatpresupposition.
if theseconsiderations are correct,then,theywould show thatthe
scepticalconclusioncannotbe sustained: thereappearstobe no stableway
of accommodating the claim thatthereare no truthsabout meaning.
Something mustbe wrong,therefore,withtheargument thatappearedto
lead us to it. Whatcouldit be?

V
REDUCTIVE ACCOUNTS OF MEANING
has beenfaultedon a numberofgrounds,
i8. The scepticalargument the
mostimportant being:
That its arguments againstdispositionalaccountsof meaningdo not
work.
facts.
That it neglectsto considerall theavailablenaturalistic
That itsconclusiondependson an unarguedreductionism.
The firsttwoobjectionsissuefroma naturalistic perspective:theyclaim
thatthe scepticalargument failsto establishits thesis,even granteda
factsandproperties.
tonaturalistic
restriction The finalobjectionconcedes
the failureof naturalism, but chargesthat the scepticalargumentis
powerlessagainstan appropriatelyanti-reductionistconstrualofmeaning.
In thispartI shallexaminethenaturalisticobjections,andin thenextthe
anti-reductionistsuggestion.
I should say at the outset,however,thatI see no meritto objectionsof
the secondkindand will not discussthemin any detailhere.All the
suggestionsthatI have seen to theeffectthatKripkeignoresvariousviable
reductionbases formeaningfactsseem to me to reston misunderstanding.
Colin McGinn, forexample, claims that Kripke neglectsto considerthe
possibilitythat possession of a concept mightconsist in possession of a
certainsort of capacity. Capacities, McGinn explains, are distinctfrom
dispositionsand are bettersuited to meet the normativityconstraint.35
This restson themisunderstanding outlinedabove. Warren
of normativity
Goldfarb charges that Kripke neglectsto consider causal/informational
accountsof the determination of meaning.36This derivesfroma failureto
see that,in all essentialrespects,a causal theoryof meaningis simplyone
species of a dispositionaltheoryof meaning,an account thatis, of course,

3 See McGinn,op. cit.,pp. I68-74. 36 See Goldfarb,

op. cit.,n. I3.
528 Paul A. Boghossian
extensivelydiscussed by Kripke. It is unfortunatethatthis connectionis
obscured in Kripke's discussion.Because Kripke illustratesthe sceptical
problem throughthe use of an arithmeticalexample, he tends, under-
standably,to focus on conceptualrole versionsof a dispositionalaccount
of meaning,ratherthan on causal/informational versions.This has given
rise to the impressionthat his discussion of dispositionalismdoes not
covercausal theories.But the impressionis misleading.For the root form
of a causal/informational theorymay be given by the followingbasic
formula:
0 means (property) P by predicate S iff (it is a counterfactual
supportinggeneralizationthat) 0 is disposed to apply S to P.

Dispositionsand meaning:finitude
19. The singlemostimportantstrandin the scepticalargumentconsistsin
the considerationsagainst dispositionaltheoriesof meaning.It would be
hard to exaggeratethe importanceof such theories for contemporary
philosophyof mind and semantics:as I have just indicated, the most
influentialcontemporarytheories of content-determination'informa-
tional' theories and 'conceptual-role' theories are both forms of a
dispositionalaccount.37In my discussionI shall tend to concentrate,for
the sake of concreteness,on informational
theoriesof thecontentofmental
symbols;but theissues thatariseare generaland applyto anydispositional
theorywhatever.
The root formof an information-style dispositionaltheoryis this:
My mentalsymbol'horse' expresseswhateverpropertyI am disposed
to apply it to.
Kripke's firstobjection amounts,in effect,to suggestingthat therewill
always be a serious indeterminacy in what my dispositionsare, thus
renderingdispositional propertiesan inappropriatereduction base for
meaningproperties.For, Kripke argues,if it is indeed the propertyhorse
thatI am disposed to applythetermto, thenI should be disposed to apply
it to all horses,includinghorsesso faraway and so farin the past thatit
would be nonsense to suppose I could ever get into causal contactwith
them.Otherwise,whatis to say thatmy dispositionis not a dispositionto
apply the termto the propertynearbvhorse,or some such?But no one can

37For correlational
theoriessee: F. Dretske,KnowledgeandtheFlowofInformation, Cambridge,
MIT Press,I98I; D. Stampe,'Towardsa Causal Theoryof LinguisticRepresentation', Midwest
Studiesin Philosophy,
vol.2, Minneapolis,Universityof MinnesotaPress, I977; JerryFodor,
Psychosemantics,
Cambridge, MIT Press,I987. For conceptualroletheoriessee: H. Field, 'Logic,
MeaningandConceptual Role',Journal ofPhilosophy,I977; Ned Block,'Advertisement
fora Semantics
forPsychology',
MidwestStudiesin Philosophy, vol.Io, Minneapolis,UniversityofMinnesotaPress,
I986.
 TheRule-Following
Considerations
529

have a disposition to call all horses 'horse', for no one can have a
dispositionwithrespectto inaccessibleobjects.
The argumentdoes not convince.Of course, the counterfactual
If I were now to go to Alpha Centauri,I would call the horses there
'horse',
is false.If I werenow to go to Alpha Centauri,I probablywould not be in
anypositionto call anythingby any name,forI would probablydie before
I got there.But that by itselfneed not pose an insuperableobstacle to
ascribingthe dispositionto me. All dispositionalpropertiesare such that
their exercise the holding of the relevant counterfactualtruth is
contingenton theabsence ofinterfering conditions,or equivalently,on the
presence of ideal conditions.And it certainlyseems conceivable that a
suitableidealizationofmybiologicalpropertieswillrenderthecounterfac-
tual about my behaviouron Alpha Centauritrue.Kripke considerssuch a
responseand complains:
But howcan we haveanyconfidence in this?How in theworldcan I tellwhat
wouldhappenifmybrainwerestuffed withextrabrainmatter?.. . Surelysuch
shouldbe leftto sciencefiction
speculation writers
and futurologists.38
If the pointis supposed to be, however,thatone can have no reason for
acceptinga generalizationdefinedover ideal conditionsunless one knows
exactly which counterfactualswould be true if the ideal conditions
obtained, then, as JerryFodor has pointed out, it seems completely
unacceptable.39For example,no one can claim to knowall of whatwould
be true if molecules and containersactuallysatisfiedthe conditionsover
which the ideal gas laws are defined;but that does not preventus from
claimingto knowthat,if therewere ideal gases, theirvolume would vary
inverselywiththe pressureon them.Similarly,no one can claim to know
all of whatwould be trueif I wereso modifiedas to survivea tripto Alpha
Centauri;but that need not preventus fromclaimingto know that,if I
were to survivesuch a trip,I would call the horses there'horse'.40
Still, it is one thingto dispel an objection to a thesis,it is anotherto
provethethesistrue.And we are certainlyin no positionnow to show that
we do have infinitarydispositions.The trouble is that not every true
counterfactual of the form.
If conditionswere ideal, then,if C, S would do A
can be used to attributeto S the dispositionto do A in C. For example,
one can hardlycredit a tortoisewith the abilityto overtakea hare, by
pointingout thatifconditionswereideal forthe tortoise if,forexample,
38 K., p. 27.
39 See 'A Theoryof Content',Part II, p. I5 (manuscript).
40 For a relatedcriticism op. cit.
ofKripkeon thisscoresee Blackburn,
530 Paul A. Boghossian
it weremuch biggerand faster-thenit would overtakeit. Obviously,only
certainidealizationsare permissible;and also obviously,we do not now
knowwhichidealizationsthoseare. The set of permissiblecounterfactuals
is constrainedby criteriaof whichwe currentlylack a systematicaccount.
In the absence of such an account,we cannotbe completelyconfidentthat
ascriptionsof infinitarydispositionsare acceptable,because we cannot be
completelyconfidentthatthe idealized counterfactuals needed to support
such ascriptionsare licit. But I thinkit is fairto say that the burden of
proofherelies squarelyon Kripke's shoulders:it is up to him to show that
the relevantidealizationswould be of the impermissiblevariety.And this
he has not done.

Dispositions
and meaning:
normativity
20. Few aspects of Kripke's argumenthave been more widelymisunder-
stood than his discussion of the 'normativity'of meaning and his
associated criticismof dispositionaltheories.This is unsurprisinggiven
the difficulty
and delicacyof the issues involved.In whatsense is meaning
a normativenotion?Kripke writes:
SupposeI do meanadditionby' + '. Whatis therelation ofthissupposition tothe
questionhowI willrespondto theproblem'68 + 57'?The dispositionalist givesa
descriptive if' + ' meantaddition,
accountofthisrelation: thenI willanswer'I 25'.
But this is not the rightaccountof the relation,whichis normative, not
The pointis notthat,ifI meantadditionby + ', I willanswer'I25',
descriptive.
butthat,ifI intendtoaccordwithmypastmeaning of' + ', I shouldanswer'I25'.
Computational error,finiteness
ofmycapacity, and otherdisturbing factorsmay
lead me notto be disposedto respondas I should,butifso, I havenotactedin
accordancewithmyintentions. The relationofmeaningand intention to future
actionis normative,
notdescriptive.4'
The fact that I mean somethingby an expression,Kripke says, implies
truthsabout how I oughtto use thatexpression,truthsabout how it would
be correctforme to use it. This much,of course,is incontestable.The fact
that'horse' means horseimpliesthat'horse' is correctlyapplied to all and
onlyhorses:the notionof the extensionof an expressionjust is the notion
of what it is correctto apply the expressionto. It is also truethatto say
that a given expressionhas a given extensionis not to make any sort of
simpledescriptiveremarkabout it. In particular,of course,it is not to say
that,as a matterof fact,the expressionwillbe applied onlyto thosethings
which are in its extension.Kripke seems to think,however,that these
observationsby themselvesought to be enough to show thatno disposi-
tional theory of meaning can work. And here matters are not so
straightforward.
41
K., p. 37-
 Considerations
TheRule-Following 53I

Let us beginwiththe verycrude dispositionaltheorymentionedabove:

'horse' means whateverpropertyI am disposed to apply it to. This is a
hopeless theory,of course, but the reasons are instructive.There are two
of them,and theyare closelyrelated.The firstdifficulty is thatthe theory
is bound to get theextensionof 'horse' wrong.Suppose I mean horseby it.
Then, presumably,I have a dispositionto call horses 'horse'. But it will
also be true that there are certain circumstances sufficientlydark
nights-and certaincows sufficiently horseylookingones such that,I
am disposed, under those circumstances,to call those cows 'horse' too.
Intuitively,this is a dispositionto make a mistake,that is, to apply the
expressionto somethingnot in its extension.But our crude dispositional
theory,giventhatit identifiestheproperty I meanbyan expression withthe
propertyI am disposedto apply the expressionto, lacks the resources by
which to effectthe requisite distinctionbetween correctand incorrect
dispositions.If whatI mean by an expressionis identifiedwithwhateverI
am disposed to apply the expressionto, theneverythingI am disposed to
apply the expressionto is, ipsofacto, in the extensionof that expression.
But thisleads to the unacceptableconclusionthat'horse' does not express
the propertyhorsebut ratherthe disjunctivepropertyhorseor cow.
There is a related conceptual difficulty. Any theorywhich, like the
crude dispositionaltheorycurrentlyunder consideration,simplyequates
how it would be correctforme to use a certainexpressionwithhow I am
the very
disposed to use it, would have ruled out, as a matterof definition,
possibilityof error.And as Wittgenstein was fondof remarking, ifthe idea
ofcorrectnessis to make sense at all, thenit cannotbe thatwhateverseems
rightto me is (by definition)right.
One would have thoughtthese points too crucial to miss; but it is
surprisinghow little they are appreciated. In a recent, comprehensive
treatmentof conceptualrole theories,Ned Block has written
ofa choicethatmustbe madeby [conceptual rolesemantics] one that
theorists,
has had no discussion(as faras I know):namely,shouldconceptualrole be
understoodin ideal or normative terms,or shouldit be tied to whatpeople
actuallydo? . .. I prefer
notto commenton thismatter... becauseI'm notsure
what to say . 42

This ought to seem odd. If conceptual role is supposed to determine

meaning,thentherecan be no question,on pain of fallingpreyto Kripke's
objection,of identifying an expression'sconceptual role with a subject's
actual dispositionswith respectto that expression.
2I. The objections from normativityshow, then, that no dispositional
theorythatassumes the simple formof identifying thepropertyI meanby
'horse'withthepropertyI am disposedto call 'horse',can hope to succeed.
But what if a dispositionaltheorydid not assume this simple form?What
42 Ned Block,op. cit.,p. 63I.
532 Paul A. Boghossian

if,insteadofidentifyingwhatI meanby'horse'withtheentire rangeofmy

dispositions in respectof 'horse',it identified
it onlywithcertainselect
dispositions. Providedthe theoryspecifieda principleof selectionthat
pickedoutonlytheextension-tracking dispositions;andprovidedalso that
it specifiedthatprinciplein termsthatdid notpresupposethenotionof
meaningor extension, wouldit notthenbe truethattheobjectionsfrom
normativity had beendisarmed?
Let us trytoputmatters a littlemoreprecisely.If a dispositional
theory
is to have any prospectof succeeding,it mustselectfromamongthe
dispositionsI have for 'horse',those dispositionswhichare meaning-
determining. In otherwords,it mustcharacterize, in non-intentionaland
non-semantic terms,a property M suchthat:possessionofM is necessary
andsufficient forbeinga disposition to applyan expression in accordwith
itscorrectness conditions.43Givensucha property, however, couldwe not
thensafelyequatemeaningsomething by an expressionwith:thesetof
dispositionswith respectto that expressionthat possess M? For, since
dispositions
withthatproperty will be guaranteedto be dispositionsto
applythe expressioncorrectly, bothof the objectionsfromnormativity
canvassedso farwouldappeartohavebeenmet.Therewillbe no fearthat
theequationwillissuein falseverdicts aboutwhattheexpression means.
And,sinceit is onlyM-dispositions thatare guaranteedto be correct,
it
willno longerfollowthatwhatever seemsrightis right:thosedispositions
notpossessingM willnotbe dispositions toapplytheexpression towhatit
meansand willbe free,therefore, to constitutedispositionsto applythe
expressionfalsely.
At thispointtwoquestionsarise.First,is therereallysucha property
M? And, second, supposingtherewere, is therereallyno more to
capturingthenormativity ofmeaningthanspecifying sucha property?
Now, Kripkeis clearlyscepticalabouttheexistenceof an appropriate
M-property. I will considerthatquestionbelow. But morethanthis,
Kripke seems to thinkthat even if therewere a suitablyselected
thatcapturedtheextensionof an expression
disposition that
accurately,
couldstillnotbe identified
disposition withthefactofmeaning, becauseit
stillremainstruethattheconceptof a disposition is descriptivewhereas
theconceptofmeaningis not.In otherwords,according toKripke,evenif
therewerea dispositional
predicatethatlogicallycovariedwitha meaning
theonefactcouldstillnotbe identified
predicate, withtheother,forthey
arefactsofdistinct
sorts.A numberofwriters havebeeninclinedtofollow
himin this.SimonBlackburn, forinstance,has written:

43 It is occasionally
suggestedthatit wouldbe enoughif possessionof M weresufficientforthe
disposition'scorrectness.
But thatis notright.If onlysufficiency
wererequiredwe wouldnotknow,
simplyby virtueof a definitionof M, theexpression's meaning.For althoughwe wouldknowwhat
propertiesweredefinitelypartoftheexpression's meaningwe wouldnotknowifwe hadthemall. And
so we wouldnothaveevena sufficient conditionfortheexpression'spossessinga givenmeaning.
 533
Considerations
TheRule-Following
I shareKripke'sviewthatwhatever we succeedin identifying
dispositions they
couldat mostgiveus standards whichwe mean.They
forselectionofa function
couldn'tprovideus withan accountofwhatit is to be faithfulto a previousrule.
areinadequatetothetask
It is justthat,unlikeKripke,I do notthinkdispositions
of providing standards.Indeed,I thinktheymustbe.44
Blackburnhere is explicitlyenvisagingthe successful,substantivespecifi-
cation of dispositionsthatmirrorthe extensionsof expressionscorrectly.
But he citesthe normativecharacterof factsabout meaningas groundsfor
denyinga dispositionalreduction.But what preciselyhas been leftover,
once the extensionshave been specifiedcorrectly?
One mighthave a thoughtlikethis.A properreductionof themeaningof
an expressionwould notmerelyspecifyits extensioncorrectly, it would also
reveal that what it is specifyingis an extension namely, a correctness
condition.And thisis whata dispositionaltheorycannotdo. There mightbe
dispositionsthatlogicallycovarywiththe extensionsof expressions;so that
one could read offthe dispositionsin questionthe expressions'correctness
conditions.But the dispositionalfactdoes not amountto the meaningfact,
because it never follows from the mere attributionof any disposition,
howeverselectivelyspecified,that thereare factsconcerningcorrectuse;
whereasthis does followfromthe attributionof an extension.To be told
that 'horse' means horseimplies that a speakerought to be motivatedto
apply the expressiononly to horses;whereasto be told, forinstance,that
thereare certainselectcircumstancesunderwhicha speakeris disposed to
apply the expressiononly to horses,seems to carryno such implication.
It is not clear thatthisis in generaltrue.Perhaps theM-dispositionsare
those dispositionsthat a person would have when his cognitivemechan-
isms are in a certainstate; and perhaps it can be non-question-beggingly
certifiedthatthatstatecorrespondsto a stateof theproperfunctioningof
thosemechanisms.If so, it is conceivablethatthatwould amountto a non-
circular specificationof how the person would ideally respond, as
comparedwithhow he actuallyresponds;and, hence,thatit would suffice
forcapturingthe normativeforceof an ascriptionof meaning.
There is clearly no way to settle the matter in advance of the
considerationof particulardispositional proposals. What we are in a
positionto do, however,is state conditionson an adequate dispositional
theory.First, any such theorymust specify,withoutpresupposingany
semantic or intentionalmaterials,propertyM. This would ensure the
theory'sextensionalcorrectness.Second, it must show how possession of
an M-dispositioncould amountto somethingthatdeservesto be called a
correctness condition, somethingwe would be inherentlymotivated to

"4 'The Individual aremadebyWrightin

StrikesBack',loc. cit.,pp. 289-9I. Similarconcessions
his 'Kripke'sAccount',10c.cit.,pp. 77I-2; and by JohnMcDowell,'Wittgenstein on Followinga
Rule',Synthese,I984, p. 329.
534 Paul A. Boghossian

satisfy. This would ensure the intensional equivalence of the two

propertiesin question, thus paving the way foran outrightreductionof
meaningto dispositions.
What propertymightM be? There are, in effect,two sortsof proposal:
one, long associated with Wittgensteinhimself,seeks to specifyM by
exploiting the notion of a community; the other, of more recent
provenance,attemptsto defineM in termsof the notionof an optimality
condition.I shall begin with the communitarianaccount.

The communitarian
account
22. The idea thatcorrectness
consistsin agreementwithone's fellowshas a
distinguishedhistoryin thestudyofWittgenstein. Even beforethe current
concern with a 'rule-followingproblem', many commentators-whether
rightlyor wrongly-identifiedcommunitarianism as a centralthesisof the
later writings.As a response to the problemabout meaning,it foundits
most sustained treatmentin Wright's Wittgenstein on the Foundationsof
Mathematics.45Which of the manydispositionsa speakermay have with
respect to a given expressiondetermineits meaning?Or, equivalently,
which of the many dispositionsa speaker may have with respect to an
expressionare dispositionsto use it correctly?Wright'scommunitarian
account furnishesthe followinganswer:
... it is a communityof assent which supplies the essential backgroundagainst
whichalone it makessense to thinkof individuals'responsesas corrector
incorrect. . .. None of us can unilaterallymake sense of correctemploymentof
languagesave by reference
to theauthority ofcommunalassenton thematter;
and forthecommunity itselfthereis no authority,
so no standardto meet.46
It is importantto understandthat,accordingto the proposal on offer,the
correct application of a term is determined by the totalityof the
community'sactual dispositionsin respectof thatterm.The theorydoes
not attempt,in specifyingthe communaldispositionsthatare to serve as
the constitutivearbitersof correctness,to select fromamong the commu-
nity's actual dispositionsa privilegedsubset. There is a reason forthis.
Communitarianismis a response to the perceived inabilityto definea
distinction,at the level of the individual,between correctand incorrect
dispositions.The suggestionthat correctnessconsistsin agreementwith
the dispositionsof one's communityis designed to meet this need. The
proposal will not serve its purpose, however,if the problemat the level
of the individual is now merely to be replayed at the level of the
4 Cambridge, HarvardUniversity
Press,i980. (His morerecentwritingssuggestthatWrightno
longerholds this view.) See also Christopher Peacocke,'Reply: Rule-Following:
The Natureof
Wittgenstein'sArguments', in Wittgenstein
on Following a Rule,ed. Holtzmanand Leich,London,
Routledgeand Kegan Paul, I98I.
46
Ibid., pp. 2I9-20.
 TheRule-Following
Considerations
535
community.A communitariandoes not want it to be a furtherquestion
whether a given actual communal disposition is itself correct. The
proposal must be understood,therefore,as offering the folowingcharac-
terizationof M: M is thepropertyofagreeingwiththeactual dispositions of
thecommunity.
How does the proposal fare with respect to the outlined adequacy
conditionson dispositionaltheories?
Consider firstthe 'intensional' requirement,that possession of the
favoured M-property appear intuitivelyto resemble possession of a
correctnesscondition. Does communalconsensuscommand the sort of
responsecharacteristicof truth?
A number of criticshave complained against communitarianism that
communalconsensusis simplynotthesame propertyas truth,thatthereis
no incoherencein the suggestionthat all the members of a linguistic
communityhave gone collectively,but non-collusively,off-track in the
applicationof a givenpredicate.47This is, of course,undeniable.But the
communitarianis not best read as offeringan analysis of the ordinary
notionof truth,but a displacement of it. His thoughtis thatthe emaciated
notionof truthyielded by communitarianism is the best we can hope to
expectin lightof the rule-following considerations.The crucial question,
then, is not whethercommunitarianism captures our ordinarynotion of
truth,forit quite clearlydoes not; it is, rather,whethercommunitarianism
offersany concept deservingof that name.
This is a large question on which I do not propose to spend a lot of
time.48Althoughthereare subtle questionsabout how much of logic will
be recoverablefromsuch a view, and whetherit can be suitablynon-
reductivelyarticulated(can 'non-collusiveagreement'be definedwithout
the use of intentionalmaterials?),I am preparedto grant,forthe sake of
argument,thatthe proposaldoes not fareall thatbadlyin connectionwith
the 'intensional'requirement.Non-collusive communal agreementon a
judgement does usually provide one with some sort of reason for
embracingthe judgement(even if,unliketruth,not witha decisiveone); it
thusmimicsto some degreethe sortof responsethatis essentialto truth.
Wherecommunitarianism fails,it seemsto me, is not so much hereas with
the extensionalrequirement.
Consider the term 'horse'. What dispositionsdo I have in respect of
this expression?To be sure, I have a dispositionto apply it to horses.
But I also have a disposition,on sufficiently dark nights,to apply it to
deceptivelyhorseylookingcows. Intuitively,the factsare clear. 'Horse'
means horseand my dispositionto apply it to cows on dark nightsis

4 See Blackburn,
op. cit.
48 For a moreextensivediscussionsee my Essayson Meaningand Belief,loc. cit.; see also
Blackburn,Spreading
theWord,Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press,I984, pp. 82ff.
536 Paul A. Boghossian
mistaken.The problem is to come up with a theorythat delivers this
resultsystematically and in purelydispositionalterms.The communitar-
ian's idea is that the correctdispositionsare constitutively those which
agree with the community's. What, then, are the community's disposi-
tions likelyto be?
The community,I submit, however exactly specified,is bound to
exhibitpreciselythe same dualityof dispositionsthat I do: it too will be
disposed to call both horsesand deceptivelyhorseylookingcows on dark
nights'horse'. Afterall, ifI can be takenin by a deceptivelyhorseylooking
cow on a dark night,what is to preventI7,000 people just like me from
being takenin by the same, admittedlyeffective, impostor?The point is
thatmanyof themistakeswe make are systematic: theyarise because of the
presenceof features bad lighting,effective disguises,and so forth-that
have a generalizable and predictable effecton creatures with similar
cognitive endowments. (This is presumably what makes 'magicians'
possible.) But, then, any of my dispositions that are in this sense
systematicallymistaken,are bound to be duplicated at the level of the
community.The communitarian, however,cannotcall themmistakes,for
they are the community's dispositions. He must insist, then, firm
convictionto the contrarynotwithstanding, that 'horse' means not horse
but, rather,horseor cow.
The problem, of course, is general. There are countless possible
impostorsundercountlesspossibleconditions;and thereis nothingspecial
about the term'horse'. The upshot would appear to be that,accordingto
communitarianism, none of our predicateshave the extensionswe take
themto have, but mean somethingwildlydisjunctiveinstead.Which is to
say that communitarianism is bound to issue in false verdictsabout the
meanings of most expressions,thus failingthe firstrequirementon an
adequate dispositionaltheory.
It seems to me thatwe have no optionbut to rejecta pure communitari-
anism. If we are to have any prospectof identifying the extensionsof our
expressions correctly,it will simply not do to identifytruth with
communalconsensus.Even fromamong the community ' dispositions,we
have to selectthosewhichmay be consideredmeaning-determining, ifwe
are to have a plausible theoryof meaning.Which is to say thatwe are still
lackingwhatcommunitarianism was supposed to provide:the specification
of a propertyM such that,possessionof M by a dispositionis necessary
and sufficient forthat disposition'scorrectness.
Of course, once we have abandoned communitarianism, we lack any
motive for definingM over communaldispositions; nothing-at least
nothingobvious-tells against definingAMdirectlyover an individual's
dispositions.Which is preciselythe way the voluminousliteratureon this
topic approachesthe problemand to a discussionof whichI now propose
to turn.
 TheRule-Following
Considerations
537
Optimaldispositions
23. The literaturesupplies what is, in effect,a set of variationson a basic
theme:M is thepropertyof: beinga dispositionto apply (an expression)in
a certain typeofstu 49 The idea behindsuch proposalsis thatthereis
a certainset of circumstances call them 'optimalityconditions' under
which subjects are, for one or another reason, incapable of mistaken
judgements;hence, we may equate what theymean by a given (mental)
expressionwith,the propertiestheyare disposed to apply the expression
to,underoptimalconditions.Differentproposalsprovidedifferent charac-
terizationsof the conditionsthatare supposed to be optimalin thissense.
Fred Dretske, forexample, holds that optimal conditionsare the condi-
tions under which the meaning of the expressionwas firstacquired. A
numberof otherwriterssubscribeto some formor otherof a teleological
proposal: optimalityconditionsare those conditions definedby evolu-
tionarybiology-under which our cognitivemechanismsare functioning
just as theyare supposed to.50
Now, Kripkeis veryshortwithsuchpossibleelaborations ofa dispositional
theory.He briefly considersthesuggestionthatwe attemptto defineidealized
dispositionsand says that'a littleexperimentation will revealthe futilitv
of
such an effort'." But, surely,this underestimates the complexityof the
problemsinvolvedand failsto do justiceto the influencethatsuch proposals
currently exert.WhatKripkeneeds,ifhisrejectionofdispositional accountsis
to succeed,but does not reallyprovide,is a set of principledconsiderations
againstthe existenceof non-semantically, non-intentionally specifiableopti-
malityconditions.What I wouldliketo do in theremainderof thissectionis
to beginto sketchan argumentforthatconclusion.Severalspecificproblems
forspecificversionsof an optimality theoryhave receiveddiscussionin the
literature.52Here, however,I want to attemptan argumentwith a more
generalsweep:I wantto arguethatwe havereasonto believethattherecould
not be naturalistically
specifiableconditionsunder which a subjectwill be
disposedto apply an expressiononlyto whatit means; and, hence,thatno
attemptat specifying such conditionscan hope to succeed.53

There is one exception to this generalization:JerryFodor's recent proposal has it that S's
meaning-determiningare those that serve as an 'asymmetric dependence base' for S's other
dispositions. See his 'A Theory of Content', Part II, forthcoming.In 'Naturalizing Content',
forthcomingin Meaning in Mind: EssaYs on the Wfork of/jerryFodor, Oxford,Basil Blackwell, I argue
that this theoryis subject to the same difficultiesas confrontstandard optimalityversions.
50 For theories of this form see: David Papineau, Reality and Representation,Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, I987; J. Fodor: 'Psychosemantics', .MS, MIT, I984. I shy awaayfromsaying whetherR.
Mlillikan,Language, Thoughtand OtherBiological Categories,Cambridge, MIT Press, I987, presentsa
theoryof this form.
51 K., p. 32.
52 Against Dretske see Fodor, Psjychosemantics, loc. cit.; against teleological theoriessee my Essays
on Meaning and Belief, and Fodor, 'A Theory of Conteint',Part I, loc. cit.
5 This amounts to saying that such theoriescannot meet the extensional requirement;so I shall
not even consider whetherthey meet the intensionalone.
538 Paul A. Boghossian
24. It willbe worthwhile to laytheproblemoutwithsomecare.Consider
Neil and a particular expression, say,'horse',in Neil's mentalrepertoire.
And supposethatNeil is disposedto tokenthatexpression 'in thebelief
mode' both in respectof horsesand in respectof deceptively horsey
lookingcowson darknights.Let it be clear,furthermore, that'horse'for
Neil meanshorse,and thaton thoseoccasionswhenhe applies'horse'to
cows,thisamountsto his mistaking a cow fora horse.Now, thethought
behindan optimality versionofa dispositional theory is thatthereis a set
of naturalistically specifiableconditionsunderwhichNeil cannotmake
mistakesin the identification of presenteditems.54Under thosecon-
ditions,then,he wouldbelievethatthereis a horsein front ofhimonlyif
thereis one.But thatin turnimpliesthat,underthoseconditions, 'horse'
willget tokened(in the beliefmode) onlyin respectof the property it
expresses.So, to figureout what any expressionmeans: look at the
properties Neil is disposedtoapplytheexpression to,whenconditions are
in thissenseoptimal.The end resultis a dispositional reconstruction of
meaningfacts:forNeil to meanhorseby'horse'is forNeil to be disposed
to call onlyhorses'horse',whenconditionsare optimal.Clearly,two
conditions mustbe satisfied: (i) the specifiedconditions mustreallybe
suchas to precludethepossibility oferror-otherwise, itwillbe falsethat
underthoseconditions 'horse'willgetappliedonlyto whatit means;(ii)
theconditions mustbe specified purelynaturalistically,without theuse of
anysemantic or intentionalmaterials-otherwise, thetheory willhaveas-
sumedtheveryproperties it was supposedto providea reconstruction of.
WhatI proposeto argueis thatit is impossible to satisfybothofthese
conditions simultaneously.

and objectivecontents
Optimaldispositions
is aftera non-semantically,
25. The dispositionalist non-intentionally
setofconditions
specifiable 0, whichwillbe suchas to yieldtrue,a priori
equationsof the form:
optimality
(8) For anysubjectS and conceptR: O-(S judgesRx-+Rx).
Could therebe sucha setof conditions?
Notice,to beginwith,thatwhereR is the conceptof an objective
property,we oughtnot to expectoptimality equationsforR, evenif 0
were not requiredto meet the ratherstiffconstraints imposedby a
reductivedispositionalism-namely, in non-semantic
specification and
non-intentional
terms.For,intuitively, theveryidea ofa whollyobjective
property (object,relation)
(or objector relation)is theidea ofa property

5 This restriction
toperceptually froma desiretosimplify
fixedbeliefsstemspartly exposition
and
partlyfroma desireto considersuchtheoriesat theirstrongest.
 539
Considerations
TheRule-Following
whosenatureis independentof any givenperson'sabilitiesor judgements:
forsuch a property,in otherwords,thereis no necessaryfunctionfroma
given person's abilitiesand judgementsto truthsabout that property.55
The contrastis witha class of contentsforwhichtheredoes exista range
of circumstancessuch that,appropriatesubjectsare necessarilyauthorita-
tive about those contentsunder those circumstances.Philosophersdis-
agree,ofcourse,about whatcontentsfallwhere,but it is typicalto thinkof
judgementsabout shape as whollyobjectiveand of judgementsabout pain
as representing an extremeexampleofthecontrasting class. Let us call this
a distinctionbetweenaccessibleversus inaccessiblecontents.56
We are now in a positionto see, however,thata dispositionaltheoryof
meaning, by virtue of being committedto the existence of optimality
equations for every concept, is committedthereby to treatingevery
concept as if it were accessible. It is thus committedto obliteratingthe
distinctionbetweenaccessible and inaccessiblecontents.
Of course, this objection will not impress anyone reluctant to
countenancewholly objective, inaccessible contentsin the firstplace. I
turn, therefore,to arguing against the dispositional theoryon neutral
ground:forany concept,subjectiveor objective,it is impossibleto satisfy
dispositionalism'sbasic requirement:the specificationof a set of condi-
and non-intentional
tions0, in non-semantic, such that,under0,
terms,
subjects are immune from error about judgements involving that
concept.

and beliefholism
Optimaldispositions
derivesfromthe holisticcharacterof the processes
26. The basic difficulty
which fix belief. The point is that, under normal circumstances,belief
fixationis typicallymediated by backgroundtheory-what contents a
thinkeris preparedto judge will depend upon what othercontentshe is
prepared to judge. And this dependence is, again typically,arbitrarily
robust: just about any stimuluscan cause just about any belief,given a
suitablymediatingset of backgroundassumptions.Thus, Neil may come
to believe Lo, a magpie,as a resultof seeing a currawong,because of his
furtherbelief that that is just what magpies look like; or because of his
beliefthatthe onlybirdsin the immediatevicinityare magpies;or because
of his beliefthatwhateverthe Pope says goes and his beliefthatthe Pope

5 See, forexample,TylerBurge,'CartesianErrorand theObjectivity in Subject,

ofPerception',
Thought and Context, ed. J. McDowell and P. Pettit,Oxford,ClarendonPress,I986, p. I25, fora
similarformulation oftheconceptof objectivean property.
56 It is important to appreciate thatthisis an epistemological
distinction, one. It
nota constitutive
does notfollowfromthefactthata contentis accessible,thatit is therefore by ourbest
constituted
judgements aboutit. (I takeit no one is temptedto concludefromthefactthatwe are authoritative
aboutour pains,thatpainsare constituted by thejudgements we makeaboutthem.We shallhave
occasionto discussconstitutive claimsofthissortlateron in thepaper.
540 Paul A. Boghossian
saysthatthispresented currawong is a magpie.And so on. The thought
thatsomething is a magpiecan gettriggered
bya currawong in anyofan
indefinite
numberof ways,corresponding to the potentially indefinite
numberof background beliefswhichcouldmediatethetransition. Now,
how does all this bear on the prospectsfora dispositional theoryof
meaning?
A dispositional theoristhas to specify,withoutuse of semanticor
intentional a situationin whicha thinker
materials, will be disposedto
think,Lo, a magpieonlyin respectof magpies.But theobservation that
beliefsarefixedholistically
impliesthata thinker willbe disposedto think
Lo, a magpiein respectofan indefinite numberofnon-magpies, provided
onlythatthe appropriate background beliefsare present.Specifying an
optimality conditionfor'magpie',therefore, willinvolve,at a minimum,
specifyinga situationcharacterizedbytheabsenceofall thebeliefswhich
could potentially mediatethe transition fromnon-magpiesto magpie
beliefs.Since, however,therelooks to be a potentialinfinity of such
mediating background clustersof belief,a non-semantically, non-inten-
tionallyspecifiedoptimalitysituationis a non-semantically,non-intention-
allyspecifiedsituationin whichitis guaranteed thatnoneofthispotential
infinityof background clustersof beliefis present.But how is such a
situationto be specified?Whatis neededis precisely whata dispositional
theorywassupposedtoprovide:namely, a setofnaturalistic
necessary and
sufficientconditionsforbeinga beliefwitha certaincontent.But, of
course,if we had thatwe would alreadyhave a reductivetheoryof
meaning-wewouldnotneeda dispositional theory!
Whichis to saythat,
ifthereis to be anysortofreductive storyaboutmeaningat all,it cannot
taketheformofa dispositional theory.

VI
ANTI-REDUCTIONIST CONCEPTIONS OF
MEANING

An argument
fromqueerness?
27. If theseconsiderationsare correct,
therewouldappearto be plentyof
reasonto doubt the reducibility of contentpropertiesto naturalistic
properties.But Kripke'sscepticdoesnotmerelydrawan anti-reductionist
conclusion;he concludes,farmoreradically, thattheresimplycouldnotbe
any contentproperties. Suppose we grantthe anti-reductionism; what
justifiesthe contentscepticism?Not, of course,the anti-reductionism
by
itself.At a minimumone of two further thingsis needed.Eitheran
independent argument totheeffectthatonlynaturalistic
properties
arereal.
Or, failingthat,a frontalassaulton theirreduciblepropertyin question,
showingthatit is, in Mackie'sphrase,somehowinherently 'queer'.
 Considerations
TheRule-Following 54I

The singlegreatestweaknessin Kripke's scepticalargumentis thathe

fails to bring offeitherrequirement.He does not even tryto defend a
reductionistprinciple about the intentional;and his brief attemptat a
'queerness' argumentis half-heartedand unconvincing:
Perhapswe maytryto recoup,by arguingthatmeaningadditionby 'plus' is a
stateevenmoresui generisthanwe havearguedbefore.Perhapsit is simplya
primitivestate,nottobe assimilated tosensationsorheadachesorany'qualitative'
states,nortobe assimilated todispositions, buta stateofa uniquekindofitsown.
Such a movemayin a sensebe irrefutable, and ifit is takenin an appropriate
wayWittgenstein mayevenacceptit.But it seemsdesperate: it leavesthenature
of thispostulatedprimitive state the primitive stateof 'meaningadditionby
"plus"'-completelymysterious. It is notsupposedto be an introspectible state,
yetwe supposedly are awareofit withsomefairdegreeofcertainty whenever it
occurs.For howelse can each ofus be confident thathe does,at present,mean
additionby 'plus'? Even more important is the logical difficulty implicitin
Wittgenstein'sscepticalargument. I thinkthatWittgenstein argues,notmerely as
we havesaid hitherto, thatintrospection showsthatthealleged'qualitative'state
ofunderstanding is a chimera, butalso thatit is logicallyimpossible(or at least
thatthereis a considerable forthereto be a stateof 'meaning
logicaldifficulty)
additionby "plus"' at all.
Such a statewouldhaveto be a finiteobject,containedin ourfinite minds.It
does notconsistin myexplicitly thinking of each case of theadditiontable....
Can weconceiveofa finite statewhichcouldnotbe interpreted ina quus-likeway?
How couldthatbe?57
There are several problems with this passage. In the firstplace, it
misconstruesthe appropriateanti-reductionist suggestion.I take it thatit
reallyis not plausible that there are 'primitivestates' of meaningpublic
languageexpressionsin certainways,one stateper expression.The process
by which the inscriptionsand vocables of a public language acquire
meaningis a manifestly complexprocess involvingan enormousarrayof
appropriatepropositionalattitudes the outlinesof which may arguably
be found in the writingsof Paul Grice and others.58A plausible anti-
reductionismabout meaning would not wish to deny that there is an
interestingstoryto be told about the relationbetweenlinguisticcontentand
mentalcontent;what it maintains,rather,is that there is no interesting
reduction of mental contentpropertiesto physical/functional properties.
Accordingto anti-reductionism, in otherwords,at some appropriatelevel
mental content propertiesmust simply be taken for granted,without
prospectof identification with propertiesotherwisedescribed.
Does Kripke manage to create a difficulty for this suggestion?The
passage containsa couple of considerationsthatmay be so construed.
The firstchargeis thatwe would have no idea how to explainour ability
"
K., pp. 51-2.
58
See thepaperscitedundern. 3 above.
542 Paul A. Boghossian

to knowour thoughts, if we endorseda non-reductionist

conceptionof
theircontent.Now, no one who has contemplated theproblemof self-
knowledge can failto be impressedbyitsdifficulty.59
But I thinkthatwe
wouldbe forgiven if,beforewe allowedthisto driveus to a dubiously
coherentirrealismaboutcontent, we requiredsomething on theorderofa
proofthatno satisfactory epistemologywas ultimately
to be had.
Kripke,however, providesno suchproof.He merely notesthatthenon-
phenomenalcharacterof contentful statesprecludesan introspective
accountof theirepistemology. And thisis problematicfortworeasons.
First,because theremay be non-introspective accountsof self-knowl-
edge.60And second,becauseit does notobviouslyfollowfromthe fact
thata mentalstatelacksan individuative phenomenology, thatit is not
introspectible.6'
Kripke'ssecondobjectionto theanti-reductionist suggestionis thatitis
utterlymysterious how therecould be a finitestate,realizedin a finite
mind,thatnevertheless containsinformation aboutthecorrectapplicabil-
ityof a sign in literallyno end of distinctsituations.But, again,this
amountsmerelyto insisting thatwe findthe idea of a contentful state
problematic, withoutadducinganyindependent reasonwhywe should.
We knowthatmentalstateswithgeneralcontents arestateswithinfinitary
normative characters; it is precisely
withthatobservation thattheentire
discussionbegan.WhatKripkeneeds,ifhe is topulloffan argument from
queerness,is somesubstantive argument,distinctfromhisanti-reduction-
istconsiderations, whywe shouldnotcountenance suchstates.Butthishe
does notprovide.
None of this should be understoodas suggestingthat an anti-
reductionism aboutcontentis unproblematic, forit is farfromit. There
are, forexample,familiar, and serious,difficulties
reconcilingan anti-
reductionism aboutcontent propertieswitha satisfyingconception oftheir
causal efficacy.62 But in the contextof Kripke's dialectic,the anti-
reductionist suggestionemergesas a stable responseto the sceptical
one
conclusion, thatis seemingly untouchedby all the considerations
adduced in the latter's
favour.
5 For discussionof someof thedifficulties
see my'Contentand Self-Knowledge',
Philosophical
Topics,SpringI989.
60 See, forexample,Tyler Burge,'Individualismand Self-Knowledge', of Philosophy,
_7ournal
NovemberI988, and D. Davidson,'KnowingOne's Own Mind', Proceedings oftheAPA, January
I987.
61 It is interestingto note,incidentally,
thatone ofthemorestrikingexamplesoftheintrospective
discernment of a non-qualitative mentalfeatureis providedby, of all things,an experiential
phenomenon. I havein mindthephenomenon, muchdiscussedbyWittgenstein ofseeing-as.
himself,
We see theduck-rabbit nowas a duck,nowas a rabbit;we see theNeckercube nowwithone face
forward, nowwithanother.And we knowimmediately preciselyhowwe are seeingtheseobjectsas,
whenwe see themnowin one way,nowin theother.But thischangeof'aspect',although manifestly
introspectible, nota changeinsomething
is nevertheless forthequalitative
qualitative, character
ofthe
visualexperience remainsthesameevenas theaspectchanges.
62 See below.
 543
Considerations
TheRule-Following

McDowell on privacyand community

conceptionof meaning,does that
28. If we endorsea non-reductionist
mean that the rule-followingconsiderationsdisturbnothingin our
ordinaryconceptionofthatnotion?A numberofwriters whohavefound
suggestion
an anti-reductionist have certainly
attractive not thoughtso;
theyhave discernedin thoseconsiderations important lessonsforthe
correctunderstanding of the possibilityof meaning,while rejecting
substantivereductiveanswersto the constitutivequestion:in virtueof
whatdo expressions possessmeaning?
JohnMcDowell,forexample,has written that:
lights,it is a mistaketo thinkwe can dig downto a levelat
By Wittgenstein's
whichwe no longerhave applicationfor normativenotions(like 'following
to therule').63
according
We haveto resistthetemptation, accordingto McDowell'sWittgenstein,
to forma pictureof'bedrock' 'of howthingsare at thedeepestlevelat
which we may sensiblycontemplatethe place of [meaning]in the
world' which does not alreadyemploythe idea of the correct(or
use ofan expression.
incorrect)
Oddly,however,McDowell does not takethis to commithim to a
aboutmeaning,
quietism a positionfromwhichno substantive resultsabout
the conditionsforthe possibility of meaningcan be gleaned.On the
contrary, moralof therule-following
he claimsthatit is the discernible
considerationsthatcorrectness,and hencemeaning, can existonlyin the
contextofa communal practice,thusprecluding ofa private
thepossibility
language.He writes:
Wittgenstein in
warnsus not to tryto dig below'bedrock'.But it is difficult,
readinghim,to avoidacquiringa senseofwhat,as itwere,liesdownthere:a web
without
offactsaboutbehaviorand 'inner'episodes,describable usingthenotion
of meaning.One is likelyto be struckby the sheer contingency of the
resemblancesbetweenindividualson which,in this vision,the possibility of
meaningseemsto depend
And:
below 'bedrock'would underminethe
It is truethata certaindisorderliness
So theunderlying
ofthenotionofrule-following.
applicability bear
contingencies
an intimaterelationto thenotionofrule-following
....65

of thefamiliar
This is, of course,McDowell'scharacterization Wittgen-
steinianclaimthata certainmeasureofagreementin communal responses
is a preconditionformeaning.But howis sucha thesisto be motivated?
answersto theconstitutive
How, in lightof therejectionof substantive
63 on Followinga Rule', loc. cit.,p. 34I.
'Wittgenstein
64 Ibid., p. 348. 65 Ibid., p. 349.
544 Paul A. Boghossian
question, is it to be argued for? The claim that communal practice is
necessaryformeaningis a surprising claim; merereflection on the concept
ofmeaningdoes notrevealit. And what,shortof a substantiveconstitutive
account,could conceivablygroundit?
Consider the contrastwith the communitarianview consideredabove.
That viewengagestheconstitutive question,offersa substantiveanswerto
it, and generates,thereby,a straightforward argumentforthe necessityof
a communalpractice:since correctnessis said to consistin conformity with
one's fellows,correctness,and with it meaning,are possible only where
thereare otherswithwhom one may conform.But McDowell, rightlyin
myview,rejectsthe suggestionthatcorrectapplicationmightbe analysed
in termsof communaldispositions.Indeed, as I have alreadynoted, he
rejectstheverydemandfora substantiveaccountofcorrectness:normsare
partof the 'bedrock',beneathwhichwe mustnot dig. But ifwe are simply
to be allowed to take the idea of correctnessforgranted,unreduced and
without any prospect of reconstructionin terms of, say, actual and
counterfactualtruthsabout communal use, how is the necessityof an
'orderlycommunal'practiceto be defended?From what does the demand
for orderliness flow? And from what the demand for community?
McDowell's paper containsno helpfulanswers.66

of meaning
Wrighton thejudgement-dependence
conceptionthat:
29. CrispinWrighthas writtenabout theanti-reductionist
[t]hissomewhatflat-footedresponseto Kripke'sScepticmayseemto providea
goodexampleof 'loss of problems.'. . . In fact,though,and on thecontrary, I
thinktherealproblemposed by theScepticalArgument is acute,and is one of
fundamental
Wittgenstein's concerns.Buttheproblemis notthatofanswering the
Argument.The problemis thatofseeinghowand whythecorrectanswergiven
can be correct.67

Wright's intriguingsuggestionis that there are importantconstitutive

resultsto be gleaned fromthe epistemologicalquestion we shelved some
pages back: namely,how, if contentpropertiesare simplyto be takenfor
66 Thoughsee hisremarks whichI am afraidI do notunderstandon a 'linguistic community
[that]is conceivedas boundtogether, notbya matchinmereexternals (factsaccessibletojustanyone),
butbya meetingofminds'.McDowell'sproblemshereecho,I think,Wittgenstein's own.The main
difficulty confronting a would-beinterpreter of Wittgensteinis how to reconcilehis rejectionof
substantive constitutiveaccounts especiallyofmeaning,see Zettel#i6:'The mistakeis to saythat
thereis anything thatmeaningsomething consists' withtheobviousconstitutive and transcendental
pretensions of the rule-followingconsiderations. It is fashionableto soft-pedalthe rejectionof
constitutive questions,representingit as displayinga mere'distrust'on Wittgenstein's part.But this
ignores thefactthattherejection ofanalysesandnecessary andsufficientconditonsis tiedtoextremely
important first-order
thesesaboutmeaning, including,mostcentrally,thefamily-resemblance viewof
concepts.
67 'Wittgenstein's Rule-Following consideration and theCentralProjectof TheoreticalLinguis-
tics', Ioc. cit., p. 237.
 545
Considerations
TheRule-Following
granted, without prospect of reconstructioneither in experientialor
dispositionalterms,can theybe known?As we saw, Kripke attemptedto
use this question to embarrasshis anti-reductionist opponent. Wright,
however,has a more constructiveprojectin mind. Pressingthe epistemo-
logical question will reveal, so he claims, that facts about content are
essentially'judgement-dependent'.
What does it mean for a class of facts to be judgement-dependent?
Wright'sexplanationis framedin termsof a failureto pass the 'order-of-
determination test':
The order-of-determination test concernsthe relationbetweenbest judge-
ments-judgements made in whatare, withrespectto theirparticular subject
matter,
cognitivelyidealconditionsofbothjudgerand circumstance-and truth.
... Truth, for judgementswhich pass the test, is a standardconstituted
independentlyof anyconsiderations concerning cognitivepedigree.For judge-
mentswhichfailthetest,bycontrast, thereis no distancebetweenbeingtrueand
beingbest;truth,forsuchjudgements, whatwe judgeto be true
is constitutively
whenwe operateundercognitively idealconditions.68
We may explain the contrastWrighthas in mind here by recurringto the
idea of an accessible content(see above). An accessible contentis one
about which subjects are necessarily authoritativeunder cognitively
optimalcircumstances.Now, a question may be raised about the correct
explanationfor this authority:is it that, under those optimal circum-
stances, subjects are exceptionallywell-equipped to track the relevant,
independentlyconstitutedfacts?or is it, rather,that judgementsunder
those circumstancessimply constitutethe facts in question? A fact is
judgement-independent if the former,judgement-dependent if the latter.
The contrast,then, is between facts which are constitutedindepen-
dentlyof our judgements,howeveroptimal,and factswhich are consti-
tutedpreciselyby the judgementswe would formunder cognitivelyideal
circumstances.And the claim is that facts about content have to be
construed on the latter model. Pace Kripke, the target of the rule-
followingconsiderationsis not the realityof contentfacts,but, rather,a
judgement-independent (or Platonist,if you thinkthesecome to the same
thing) conception of their constitution. Best judgements constitutively
determinethe truth-valueof sentencesascribingcontentto mentalstates;
theydo not trackindependentlyconstitutedstatesof affairswhich confer
truthor falsityupon them.
Wrightarguesforthis'judgement-dependent' conceptionof contentby
attackingthe epistemologiesavailable on the alternativemodel. Drawing
extensivelyon Wittgenstein'sactual text,Wrightreconstructs an interest-
ing set of considerationsagainstboth introspective and inferential
concep-
tions of self-knowledge,thus, presumably,exhaustingthe epistemologies
68 Ibid.,p. 246.
546 Paul A. Boghossian
available to his opponent. So long as facts about our mental states are
construedas independentof,and, hence, as trackedby our self-regarding
judgements,we can have no satisfactory explanationof our abilityto know
them.On the assumption,then,thatKripke's unstablecontentirrealismis
to be avoided at all costs,thatleaves the judgement-dependent conception
as the only contender.So goes Wright'sargument.
Wright'sdiscussion raises a number of interestingand difficultques-
tions.Is it reallytruethatWittgenstein'sdiscussiondestroysall 'cognitive
accomplishment'theoriesof self-knowledge? Supposing it does, does this
inevitablydriveus to a judgement-dependent conceptionof content?Are
therenot otherconceptionsthatwould equally accommodatethe rejection
of a trackingepistemology?Unfortunately, none of thesequestionscan be
adequatelyaddressedwithinthe confinesof the presentessay. Here I have
to settle for raising a question about whethera judgement-dependent
conceptionof contentcould everbe the cogentmoral of any argument.
30. The suggestionis thatwe must not construefactsconcerningmental
contentas genuineobjectsof cognition,and thatthisis to be accomplished
by regardingthem as constitutedby truthsconcerningour best judge-
ments about mental content. Well, what does this amount to? For
illustrativepurposes,Wrightoffersthe case of colour.What would have to
be true,iffactsabout colourare to judgement-dependent? We would need,
firstand foremost,to secure the accessibilityof colour facts,and so a
biconditionalof the followingform:
if C: S would judge x to be blue+-+xis blue.
But not just any biconditionalof this form will serve to secure the
accessibilityof colour. For example,unless restrictionsare placed on the
permissible specificationsof C, every propertywill turn out to be
accessible; just let C be: conditions under which S is infallibleabout
colour. So, it must be furtherrequiredthat C be specifiedin substantial
terms,avoidinga 'whatever-it-takes' formulation.
Now, whatit would taketo groundnotmerelythe accessibilityofcolour
facts,but theirjudgement-dependence? What is needed, as Wrightpoints
out, is that
thequestionwhether theC-conditions,
so substantially
specified,
aresatisfied
in a
case is logically
particular ofanytruths
independent concerning thedetailsofthe
extensionof colourconcepts.69
This seems right.For unless the specificationof the C-conditions,or,
indeed, of anythingelse on the left-hand-side,is precludedfrompresup-
posing facts about the colours of objects, it will remain entirelyopen
whethersubjects' judgements,formedunder the relevantC-conditions,
69 Ibid.,pp. 247-8.
 547
Considerations
TheRule-Following

reallydid determinefactsabout colour. For satisfactionof the conditions

described on the left-hand-sidewould always presuppose some antece-
dentlyfixedconstitutionof colourfacts,thusunderminingtheclaim thatit
is preciselytruthsabout best judgementthatfixthose facts.
No doubt, otherrequirementsare in orderas well.70 But it is, I trust,
alreadyclearthatthereis a seriousdifficultyseeinghow factsabout mental
contentcould conceivablysatisfythe statedrequirementson judgement-
dependence. For it is inconceivable,given what judgement-dependence
amountsto, that the biconditionalsin the case of mentalcontentshould
satisfythe requirementthat theirleft-hand-sidesbe freeof any assump-
tions about mental content. For, at a minimum, the contentof the
judgementssaid to fixthe factsabout mental contenthave to be presup-
posed. And thatmeans thatany such biconditionalwill alwayspresuppose
a constitutionof mentalcontentquite independentof constitutionby best
judgement.
should have been clear fromthe start.A
In a way,an intuitivedifficulty
'judgement-dependent'conception of a given fact is, by definition,a
conception of that fact according to which it is constitutedby our
judgements. The idea is clearlyappropriatein connectionwithfactsabout
the chic or the fashionable;familiar,though less clearly appropriate,in
connection with facts about colour or sound; and, it would appear,
impossibleas a conceptionof factsabout mentalcontent.For it cannotin
generalbe truethatfactsabout contentare constitutedby our judgements
about content: facts about content, constitutedindependentlyof the
judgements,are presupposedby the model itself.

Conclusion:robustrealism-problemsand prospects
3I. Let robustrealismdesignatethe view that judgementsabout meaning
are factual,irreducible,and judgement-independent. Then the moral of
this paper-if it has one-is thatthe major alternativesto robustrealism
are beset by veryserious difficulties.
Irrealism-the view, advocated by Kripke's Wittgenstein,that judge-
mentsabout meaningare non-factual-appears not even to be a coherent
option. (An error-theoretic variant,as promoted,for example, by Paul
Churchland,seems no better.)
Reductionistversionsof realism appear to be false. The proposal that
judgements about meaning concern communal dispositionsis unsatis-
factorynot merelybecause, implausibly,it precludes the possibilityof
communalerror,but because it appears bound to misconstruethemeaning
of every expression in the language. The rathermore promising(and
rathermore popular) proposal,thatjudgementsabout meaningconcerna
discussionof the conditionsthatwould have to be met,see ibid.,
70 For a veryilluminating
pp. 246-54.
548 Paul A. Boghossian
certainsort of idealizeddisposition,also appearsto confrontserious
it is hardto see howtheidealizations
difficulties: are to be specified in a
non-question-begging way.
And,finally, a judgement-dependent conception ofmeaningseemsnotto
be a stableoption,becausetheveryideaofconstitution bybestjudgement
appearsto presupposea judgement-independent conception ofmeaning.
It is sometimes said thatan anti-reductionistconception is too facilea
responseto theproblemaboutmeaning.It is hardnotto sympathize with
thissentiment. Butiftheconsiderations canvassedagainstthealternatives
arecorrect, andifitis truethatthe'rule-following' considerations leavean
anti-reductionist conception untouched, itis hard,ultimately, alsotoagree
withit.Meaningproperties appeartobe neither eliminable, norreducible.
Perhapsit is timethatwe learnedto livewiththatfact.
I do notpretendthatthiswillbe easy.Robustrealismharbourssome
unansweredquestions,the solutionsto whichappearnot to be trivial.
There are threemain difficulties. First:whatsortof roomis leftfor
theorizing aboutmeaning, ifreductionist programs areeschewed?Second:
how are we to reconcilean anti-reductionism aboutmeaningproperties
witha satisfying conception oftheircausalor explanatory efficacy? And,
finally: howare we to explainour (first-person) knowledge ofthem?
I cannot,ofcourse,hopeto addressanyofthesequestionsadequately
here.A fewbriefremarks willhaveto suffice.
To begin with the last questionfirst,I cannotsee that an anti-
reductionist conceptionof contenthas a specialproblemabout self-
knowledge. As faras I amconcerned, no onehasa satisfactory explanation
ofourabilityto knowourownthoughts.7' But I do notsee thattheanti-
reductionist needfeelanyspecialembarrassment aboutthis.If anything, it
seemsto me, theprospectsare betterforhimthanforhis opponent.A
reductionist would have it thatmeaningsare fixedby certainkindsof
dispositionalfact,thesortoffactthatcouldhardlybe knownobservation-
ally.It wouldappearto followthatthereductionist is committed, ifhe is
to have a substantial epistemology of self-knowledge, to an inferential
conception-aconception thatmaybe, as I havearguedelsewhere, worse
thanimplausible.72 The anti-reductionist laboursunderno comparable
burden.
As forthe chargethattherewould be nothingleftfora theoryof
meaningto be, ifreductionism is eschewed,it seemsto me simplyfalse.
Let me herementionjusta fewofthequestionsthatsurvivetherejection
of reductionist programmes. For one thing,as I have stressed,a non-
reductionism aboutmeaningis bestunderstood as a thesisaboutmental
meaning, notaboutlinguistic meaning.So anti-reductionism, as I under-
standit,is notonlyconsistent with,butpositively invites,a theory about

" See my'Contentand Self-Knowledge',

loc. cit. 72 Againsee myibid.
 549
Considerations
TheRule-Following
the relation between thought and language. How do public language
symbolscome to acquire meaningand whatrole does thoughtplay in that
process?Secondly,anti-reductionism in mysenseis consistentwithwanting
a generalaccountof the principlesby whichwe interpret otherpeople. The
importantwork of Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Grandy,and otherson the
theoryof radical interpretation neitherneeds, nor is best understoodin
termsof,reductionistaspirations.Its propergoal is the articulationof the
principleswe evidentlysuccessfullyemployin interpreting the speech and
mindsof others.And, finally,an anti-reductionism about mentalcontentis
perfectlyconsistentboth with substantivetheoriesof the nature of the
propositionalattitudes-thatis, of whatmakesa givenmentalstatea belief,
as opposed to a wish or a desire;and withthe claim thatthe graspingof
certainmental contentsdepends on the graspingof others,and so with
theoriesof the compositional structureof mentalcontent.
There is hardlyany fear,then,thatwe shall run out of thingsto do, if
we foregoreductionistprogrammesin the theoryof mentalcontent.
Finally,though,thereis thequestionofmentalcausation:how are we to
reconcilean anti-reductionism about contentpropertieswitha satisfying
conception of their causal efficacy?It is a view long associated with
Wittgensteinhimself,of course, that propositionalattitudeexplanations
are not causal explanations.But, whetheror not the view was Wittgen-
stein's, it has justifiablyfew adherentstoday. As Davidson showed, if
propositionalattitudeexplanationsare to rationalizebehaviourat all, then
they must do so by causing it.73 But propositionalattitudesrationalize
partlyby virtueof theircontent-it is partlybecause Neil's beliefis that
thereis winein his glass, that he reaches forit; so, propositionalattitude
explanationscommitus to holdingthatcontentpropertieshave a genuine
causal role in the explanationof intentionalaction. But, now, how is an
anti-reductionist about contentpropertiesto accord thema genuinecausal
role withoutcommittinghimself,implausibly,to the essentialincomplet-
eness of physics?
foran anti-reductionist
This is, I believe, the single greatestdifficulty
conceptionof content.It may be thatit will eventuallyproveits undoing.
But the subject is relativelyunexplored, and much interestingwork
remainsto be done.74
ofPhilosophy
Department PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN
University
of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI, USA 48109

73 See 'Actions,Reasons and Causes', in his Essays on Actionsand Events,Oxford,Oxford

UniversityPress,i980.
7' For somerecent papersseeE. LePoreandB. Loewer,'MindMatters',Journal ofPhilosphy,
I987,
andJerry Fodor,'MakingMind MatterMore',Philosophical Topics,SpringI989.