Issue Paper: The American War in Viet Nam and US Global Primacy

“Did the American War in Viet Nam show that US global primacy has limits? Why and how? OR
Why not?”

Daniel Hookins

The United States is recognised as the world's largest superpower. However, historic events, such as
the American war in Vietnam have demonstrated that US primacy is limited by a number of factors.
These factors include: The willingness of US citizens to support their government's decisions; the
willingness of foreign governments and citizens to accept change; the need to base foreign policy on
accurate theories; the nature and determination of enemy combatants; and finally the public and
media consensus back home. While one or more of these factors do not necessary restrict the
actions of the United States in conducting foreign policy – they have demonstrated to be
considerable factors in limiting the role of US global primacy. In the case of the war in Vietnam -
these combined factors contributed to the eventual loss of the war - and despite global primacy the
United States failed to achieve their foreign policy objectives.

The United States is the biggest power in the world - and as such has taken on a role of responsibility
in the international community. This means that the United States involves itself in the affairs of
other nations - in the interest of global security. However, becoming involved in international affairs
can incur a large burden on the American people - essentially, the tax payers who fund the
government's activities. Mandelbaum (2002) likens the politics of the American foreign policy to a
firm, whereby "the management - the foreign policy elite - has to persuade the shareholders - the
public - to authorize expenditures" (p.67). Thus there are potential limitations for the government -
and as such foreign policy objectives must be justified by those who bear the cost - the American
taxpayers. There is also the issue of liquidity. "The United States has the resources to do virtually
anything - although not to do everything. What is potentially scarce is the political will, in the form
of domestic political support, to use those resources" (p.71). The decisions of US foreign policy
officials must be justified - naturally insisting that there are limits placed on US global primacy. The
will of the US people is a potential limitation on global primacy - and so too is the will of foreign
citizens. During the cold war - US foreign policy reflected the "gap" between what the US want and
what it has the power to accomplish. The American war in Vietnam is an example of this - US global
primacy does not mean the United States can impose its ideals and objectives on unwilling foreign
nations. "In inducing the wish to establish peace, democracy, and free markets and the kind of state
that makes them possible, the American and Western example exercises a powerful effect. But in
bringing these ends about, American foreign policy is of little use" (p.72). This was particularly
evident in Vietnam - as the US remained ignorant of the perspective of the Vietnamese people.

It is important to understand the American war in Vietnam in the context of the cold war. The
United States emerged from the Second World War as a world superpower. Griffiths and
O'Callaghan (2002) state how, "although the United States lost 400,000 lives during the second

1 The American War in Viet Nam and limitations on US Global Primacy| Daniel Hookins
world war, the USSR lost 27 million lives. The American economy benefited from the war whilst the
Soviet economy was almost destroyed" (p.36). Essentially, the cold war was a period of US
dominance. The United States attempted to use this power and prevent the spread of communism.
After the communist leader Mao Zedong took control of China in 1949 there was a great incentive
for the US to prevent a communist victory in Vietnam. It is this fear of communism that gave rise to
the 'domino theory'. The domino theory suggests that - if Vietnam 'fell to communism' it would take
with it all the other nations of Southeast Asia - like a chain of toppling dominoes. US President
Eisenhower stated that, "strategically South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their
power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The freedom of 12 million people would be
lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered.
The loss of the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam, would have grave consequences for us and
for freedom" (quoted in Berman 1982: 13). Here lies another example of the limitations of US global
primacy - flawed theory. The domino theory ultimately proved to be incorrect - and despite
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia all becoming communist by 1975 - the other nations of Southeast Asia
- such as, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia - never become communist.

The American war in Vietnam demonstrates that despite the US military might - ultimately it was the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong who won the war. The United States had three major
constraints in implementing an effective military strategy, namely: the risk of escalation into a wider
war with China or the Soviet Union; guerrilla warfare whereby their enemy would only fight under
advantageous conditions; and finally, the weak military condition of the South Vietnamese forces
(Malkasian 2004). Due to these constraints the United States decide to implement a strategy known
as 'attrition'. This would mean a long term military commitment in Vietnam - and the potential for
high casualty rates on both sides. This type of attrition involved "Search-and-Destroy operations
sought to engage and force the enemy into battle by aggressively manoeuvring through the
countryside. Once found enemy forces would be pursued, intercepted and destroyed."
(Westmoreland's strategy as explained by Malkasian 2004: 935) The United States used the strategy
of attrition - and 'search and destroy' tactics - up until the Tet offensive in 1968. Ultimately it was an
ineffective strategy. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese would only fight under advantageous
circumstances. "The [North Vietnamese Army] and the Viet Cong excelled at exploiting the jungle
and mountains to evade U.S. sweeps and mount ambushes of their own" (p.938). Therefore despite
US military superiority - and even after having won the majority of battles - it was the Viet Cong and
the North Vietnamese who won the war. In addition to military strategy, attrition ignored the
domestic political situation. As Malkasian (2004) states, "It did not counter successive corrupt and
inefficient South Vietnamese governments, whose actions undermined popular support for the anti-
Communist cause" (p.938). In addition to this - it did not counter the determination of the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese who "were never willing to abandon their ultimate goal of controlling South
Vietnam" (p.938). Evidently - the nature of enemy combatants is a potential limitation for US global
primacy.

Images of war protesters are now synonymous with the war in Vietnam. There is much debate over
the impact of public opinion, protests and the anti-war movement. "Some scholars have argued that
citizen action and public opinion has an important bearing on policymakers, whereas others have
maintained that for the most part, the power elite is able to manipulate and control public opinion.
A plausible middle position is that policy elites require public support for major, long-term military

2 The American War in Viet Nam and limitations on US Global Primacy| Daniel Hookins
intervention but can and often do act without such support for the sort term" (Kimball 1995: 188).
When it comes to the war in Vietnam - there were suggestions that the anti-war movement actually
increased popular support for the war (Mueller 1984) - or that it was a "stab in-the-back notion" that
encouraged the enemy and undermined the US war effort (Kimball 1995). No matter how you look
at it - it is clear that public consensus and anti-war movements can affect the implementation of US
foreign policy - and are thus, a 'self-regulating' limitation on US global primacy. The tensions of the
Vietnam War were felt back home - particularly after the 1968 Tet offensive. Support for the war
was diminishing, and on April 30, 1970 when President Nixon announced that he was expanding the
war into Cambodia - immediately, college campuses across the United States rose in protest
(Lojowsky 2000). The tragic shooting of protesters at the Kent and Jackson State universities would
demonstrate that tensions at home put limits on the actions of the US overseas. The tensions
expressed by the anti-war movement - and the 'brutal' coverage of the Vietnam War by the media
essentially "contributed to a war weariness that helped bring the conflict to an end" (Kimball 1995:
194). Therefore we can see that without the support of public consensus and the media - there are
limitations on the ability to implement long-term foreign policy - and thus, places limits on the US
global primacy.

From these examples - we can see that there are limitations on US global primacy - and that these
limits were highlighted during the American war in Vietnam. Factors such as: The willingness of US
citizens to support their government's decisions; the willingness of foreign governments and citizens
to accept change; the need to base foreign policy on accurate theories; the nature and
determination of enemy combatants; and finally the public and media consensus back home - all
significantly affect the ability of the US government to conduct foreign policy - and as such,
demonstrate the limitations of US global primacy.

References

 Berman, L. and Routh, S. R. (2003) “Why the United States fought in Vietnam”, ‘Annual
Review of Political Science, 6 (1) 2003, pp.181-204.
 Griffiths, M. and O’Callaghan, T. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts, Routledge,
London.
 Kimball, J. (1995) “How Wars End: The Vietnam War”, ‘Peace & Change’, 20 (2), April 1995,
pp.183-202.
 Lojowsky, M. (2000) “Kent State Thirty Years Later: What We’re Still Fightin’ For”,
‘Humanist’, 60 (4) Jul/Aug 2000, pp.9-14.
 Malkasian, C. (2004) “Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam
Wars”, ‘The Journal of Military History’, July 2004, 68 (3), pp.911-942.
 Mansbach, R.W. and Rafferty, K.L. (2008) Introduction to Global Politics, Routledge, New
York
 Mandelbaum, M. (2002) “The Inadequacy of American Power: Alone at the Top”, ‘Foreign
Affairs’, 81 (5), Sep/Oct 2002, pp. 61-74.
 Mueller, J. (1984) "Reflections on the Vietnam Antiwar Movement and on the Curious Calm
at the War's End," in Vietnam as History: Ten Years After the Paris Peace Accords, Braestrup,
P. (ed.) 1984, University Press of America, Washington DC, pp.151-57.

3 The American War in Viet Nam and limitations on US Global Primacy| Daniel Hookins