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Quan%fying

 -­‐  Not  Assuming  


Making  Sense  of  Intangibles,  Uncertain%es  and  Risks  

Crea%ng  Value  in  IT  Design,  User  Adop%on,  Risk  Management    


Business  Performance  &  Return  on  Investment  

Gerald  A.  Bush,  Ph.D.  


Robert  D.  Brown  III  
What  OHen  Happens  in  Business?  
  The  largest  risks  and  most  uncertain  issues  get  the  least  quan%ta%ve  analysis  
  “It  can’t  be  measured,  anything  could  happen.”  
  “The  %me  and  cost  of  the  analysis  would  not  pay  for  itself.”  

  Time  and  effort  spent  on  improving  the  precision  of  available  data,  while  risks  
are  treated  using  broad,  ambiguous  assump%ons  

  Risk  scores  can  be  ambiguous  and  misleading,  but  using  them  creates  a  
placebo  effect  for  decision  makers  

The  result  is  that:  


  None  of  the  real  issues  get  quan%fied  (leading  to  real  risk)  
  Analysis  paralysis  occurs  when  issues  remain  unresolved  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   2  
An  Epiphany  for  Decision  Makers  
  Intangibles  can  be  measured  –  despite  the  objec%ons  
  “How  much  is  it  worth  to  assure  that  SLAs  are  met?”  
  “What  is  the  risk  vs.  savings  of  moving  into  the  cloud?”  

  A  first  pass  analysis  can  tell  you  the  value  of  informa%on,    i.e.  the  value  of  
learning  more  about  an  uncertainty  or  risk.  
  Over  90%  of  the  variables  have  $0  value  of  informa%on,  you  are  
was%ng  your  %me  over-­‐analyzing  them.  
  But,  a  few  can  make  a  difference  with  huge  value,  and  focus  the  
analysis  where  the  %me  and  energy  are  worth  it.  
  The  goal  is  to  make  the  best  choice  among  your  op%ons,  not  to  
aaempt  to  prove  the  future.  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   3  
An  Epiphany  is  Worth  It    
  By  quan%fying  the  Value  of  Informa%on:  
  An  airline  saved  over  $360  MM/year  by  understanding  fuel  use  and  local  
pricing,  instead  of  doing  just  back  office  automa%on.  

  A  soHware  startup  created  $  Billions  in  value  by  understanding  the  whole  
market  instead  of  selling  a  “work  for  hire”  to  one  client.  

  An  oil  company  purchased  expensive  seismic  studies  and  shiHed  their  


drilling  site  to  a  huge  producer,  avoiding  many  dry  holes.  

  A  pharmaceu%cal  company  did  the  cri%cal  studies  first,  doubling  its  R&D  
efficiency  and  reducing  new  drug  development  %me.  
  A  chemicals  company  spent  3  months  studying  their  compe%%on,  
selec%ng  the  more  difficult  strategy  that  made  them  into  a  leader.  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   4  
How  Can  Intangibles  be  Quan%fied?  
Intangibles  can  be  measured  –  despite  objec%ons  

  Airline  problem  
  Tangible  benefit  of  fuel  system  ini%ally  focused  on  back  office  automa%on  and  
reduc%on  in  payables  errors.  
  Intangible  value  of  new  informa%on  use  for  decisions  was  not  allowed,  since  it  
could  not  be  proven  with  exis%ng  data.  

  Airline  epiphany  
  Total  cost  of  back  office  opera%on  -­‐  $720k  per  year  did  not  pay  for  the  $4.8  MM  
development  cost  of  new  system  
  Cost  of  the  pricing  and  route  planning  tools  plus  fuel  weight  carrying  costs  was  
$9.2  MM,  nearly  doubling  the  basic  project.  
  Value  of  “tankering”  to  selec%vely  purchase  fuel  in  lower  cost  airports  suggested  
a  range  of  $84MM  to  $420MM  per  year.  
  High  uncertainty,  but  with  more  than  enough  value  of  informa%on  to  pay  for  a  
study  of  the  market  and  route  impact.  
  Result  –  an  en%rely  different  design  and  $360  MM/yr  savings  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   5  
Case  Study  –  ERP  System  
Major  oil  company  approved  a  capital  spending  
project  of  $100  million  for  a  new  ERP  system.  

The  business  case  value  of  the  world-­‐wide  project  


was  assessed  to  be  a  whopping…  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   6  
What  went  wrong?  
  The  team  solved  the  wrong  problem  precisely,  framing  the  problem  
primarily  in  terms  of  cost  reduc%on,  not  system  performance  and  the  
company’s  strategic  objec%ves  

  The  team  performed  mul%ple  sensi%vity  analyses  on  inconsequen%al  


variables,  effec%vely  hiding  the  real  opportunity  for  value  improvement  
and  system  success  

  The  team  did  not  consider  the  underlying  connec%ons  between  key  
implementa%on  decisions  and  the  overall  system  performance  and  user  
adop%on  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   7  
Much  hand  wringing  ensued…  

How  can  we  jus%fy  the  spend?    


What  should  we  do?  

Maybe  we  should  cut  


capital  costs!  

Would  this  push  the  project  


NPV  back  into  the  black?  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   8  
Quan%fying  a  few  ranges  of  uncertainty  
showed  that  this  was  going  the  wrong  way  
simple  business  
case  value  =  $0   $80  =  informed  business  case  value  
NPV  $million  
Reducing  the  capital  investment   User  adop>on  
would  nega%vely  impact  user   System  reliability  
adop%on,  system  reliability  and  data  
integrity  –  killing  the  value.   Data  integrity  

The  range  of  CapEx  spending  was  


not  a  major  driver  of  value  by  itself,   CapEx  
since  it  would  be  a  one-­‐%me  cost.  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   9  
Analysis  of  alterna%ve  project  strategies  revealed  a  hybrid  
strategy  that  mi%gated  the  cri%cal  risks  and  found  new  value  

1  
0.9  
Cumula%ve  Probability  

0.8  
0.7  
Original  strategy   Hybrid  strategy  
0.6  
0.5  
0.4  
0.3  
0.2  
0.1  
0  
$0   $80   $380  

NPV,  $million  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   10  
Some  underlying  behaviors  and  tradi%ons  can  obstruct  
the  crea%on  of  value  in  technical  organiza%ons    

  Rather  than  quan%fying  the  high  value  (oHen  intangible)  business  factors,  
risk  assump%ons,  technical  arguments  or  cost  subs%tu%on  become  the  
basis  for  investment  decisions  
  Nego%a%ons  or  power-­‐plays  are  used  to  select  ventures  rather  than  
focusing  on  expected  value  or  fit  with  the  business  strategy  
  Bad  ventures  frequently  persist  for  too  long,  was%ng  %me  and  resources  
that  could  assure  the  value  is  achieved  in  good  projects  

The  key  to  understanding  and  ac%ng  on  these  issues  is…  
 quan&fying  the  value  of  the  intangibles  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   11  
Management  of  complex  technical  ini%a%ves  requires  a  
collabora%ve  method  for  making  high  quality  decisions  
  Frame:  Focused  on  the  right  goals  and  
issues  for  stakeholders  

  Informa>on:  Understanding  the  range  of  


possible  outcomes  (quan%fying  the  few  
issues  that  impact  the  value  of  the  
decision)  

  Alterna>ves:  Crea%ng  and  structuring  a  


wide  array  of  contras%ng  alterna%ves  

  Values:  Evalua%ng  within  the  context  of  


stakeholder  interests,  using  appropriate  
metrics  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   12  
Increasing  complexity  due  to  ambiguity  and  uncertainty  
increases  the  need  for  a  structured  methodology  

Unclear  
Future  
  Mul%ple  stakeholders  with  
Increasing  
complexity   increasingly  ambiguous  goals  
Uncertainty  

  Mul%ple  moving  parts  (external  


&  internal)  with  increasingly  
uncertain  outcomes  

Clear  
Future  
Clear  Goals   Ambiguity   Conflic%ng  
Goals  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   13  
Essen%al  warran%es  that  decision-­‐makers  need:  
Warranty  of  Clarity  
• The  terms  are  well  defined  
• The  right  problem  has  been  iden%fied   Avoids  garbage  in  

Warranty  of  Coherence  


• Reasoning  is  logical  
• Preferences  do  not  violate  transi%vity  
Avoids  garbage  in  
• Evalua%ons  cohere  with  the  best  knowledge  of  the  day  
between  

Warranty  of  Thoroughly  Considered  


Consequences  
• A  crea%ve  set  of  alterna%ves  are  considered   Avoids  garbage  out  
• Implica%ons  of  choosing  are  clear  
• The  best  alterna%ve  is  revealed  
Adapted  from  Howard,  Ronald  A.    “Heathens,  Here%cs,  and  Cults”.    Interfaces  22:6.    November-­‐December  1992.    pp.  15-­‐27.    

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   14  
Each  stage  of  the  process  resolves  key  ques%ons  for  
managers  prior  to  making  a  financial  commitment  

Discovery   Framing   Evalua>on   Agreement  


 What  is  the  real    What  are  the  decision    What  are  the  effects  of    Which  path  best  meets  
situa%on?   boundaries  and  open   uncertain%es  on   our  objec%ves?  
decisions?   solu%on  goals?  
 What  is  the    How  much  should  we  
opportunity?    What  are  the  sources    What  is  the  difference   spend  to  control  
of  uncertainty?   in  value  among  the   uncertain%es?  
 What  are  our  goals   alterna%ves?  
and  objec%ves?    Can  we  develop  an    What  are  the  keys  to  
80%  confidence  range    How  much  risk  do  we   implementa%on?  
for  the  uncertain%es?   face  with  each  
alterna%ve?    What  resources  will  
 Is  value  of  informa%on   we  need  for  
worth  the  %me  and    What  insights  can  we   implementa%on?  
cost  of  analysis?   create  for  con%ngency  
plans  or  op%ons?    What  con%ngent  
ac%ons  should  we  
take?  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   15  
Focusing  on  the  desired  objec%ves  is  more  produc%ve  
than  arguing  the  pros/cons  of  advocated  ac%ons  
Maximize  
Primary   stakeholder  
Value  

Capital   Opera%onal   Service  


Fundamentals   Costs   Costs   Execu%on  
Excellence  

System   System   System   Data   Service   Appropriate  


Means   Arch.  
Hardware   SoHware  
Overhead   Complexity   Integrity   Reliability   Tools  

  Reveal  and  priori%ze  ambiguous  or  conflic%ng  goals  and  sources  of  poten%al  trade-­‐offs  
  Agree  on  the  clearly  defined  scope  of  decision  
  Iden%fy  the  objec%ve  basis  for  making  a  decision  and  the  metric  by  which  compe%ng  
alterna%ves  are  compared  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   16  
Establishing  boundaries  clarifies  the  important  choices  
to  be  made  now  as  the  focus  for  the  analysis  work  

  Generate  a  wide  array  of  crea%ve,  


Policy  (givens,  boundaries)   doable  alterna%ves  that  are  
Decisions  already  made,  foregone   consistent  with  objec%ves  
  Create  alterna%ves  as  a  coherent  
set  of  ac%ons,  usually  one  op%on  
Strategic  (focus,  open  op&ons)   from  each  decision  category  
Team Focus
for Analysis Decisions  categories  with  sub-­‐op%ons  
  Alterna%ves  should  represent  
to  be  considered  now  
strategically  different  themes  
versus  the  full  combina%on  of  all  
Tac&cal  (execu&on  dependent)   op%ons  
Decisions  to  be  made  later,  deferred     Sets  the  stage  to  consider  
opportunity  costs  thoroughly  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   17  
Clarifying  sources  of  uncertainty  and  their  interac%ons  
helps  us  explore  quan%ta%ve  effects  of  decisions  

  Captures  the  essence  of  the  problem  


and  facilitates  the  dialog  between  
the  team  members  

  Becomes  a  well  defined  model  of  the  


situa%on,  containing  all  the  
necessary  and  relevant  informa%on  
needed  to  assess  the  situa%on  

  Used  as  a  means  to  communicate  


the  shared  knowledge  of  the  team  to  
the  organiza%on  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   18  
Quan%fying  uncertain%es  with  an  80%  confidence  
interval  helps  us  avoid  the  blind  spots  of  assump%ons  

We  recognize  assump%ons   We  observe  results  


are  really  uncertain%es   as  distribu%ons  

Uncertainty  

Uncertainty  

Probability  
Simulation Objective
Uncertainty  
Engine!

Uncertainty  

$0   $  NPV  
Uncertainty  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   19  
The  right  type  of  expert  can  explore  the  causes  of  
uncertainty  and  avoid  unpleasant  surprises  

•  Tradi%onal  Analysis  (Forecaster)  


–  Understand  the  assump%ons  around  a  
forecast  value  
–  Focus  on  what  has  to  go  right  (wrong)  for  
success  (failure)  
–  Assess  a  risk  factor  for  the  forecast  

•  Uncertainty  Analysis  (Desired  Expert)  


–  Explore  the  factors  that  create  extreme  
outcomes  or  contribute  to  uncertainty  
–  Understand  what  could  go  wrong  and  what  
the  upside  and  downside  may  be  
–  Develop  a  range  of  possible  outcomes  and  the  
shape  of  the  probability  distribu%on  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   20  
Monte  Carlo  simula%on  reveals  the  full  range  of  
varia%on  of  value  given  the  ranges  of  uncertain%es  

1  
A   B   C     Demonstrates  the  aggregate  
0.9  
effect  of  all  the  uncertain%es  
0.8  
Cumula%ve  Probability  

0.7   by  both  their  impact  &  


0.6   prevalence  
0.5  
0.4  
  Shows  the  probability  of  
0.3   important  intervals  and  the  
0.2   opportunity  for  op%miza%on  
0.1   &  tradeoffs  
0  
  Shows  if  one  decision  
Value  Measure  of  Primary  Objec>ve   dominates  another  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   21  
Sensi%vity  analysis  of  uncertain%es  enables  quan%fying  
the  value  of  informa%on  for  risk  management  
Value  Measure  of  Primary  Objec>ve  
0  

Effect  of  Uncertaintyi  on  Value  Measure  

Cri>cal  
Value  
Drivers  

Minor  
Value  
Drivers  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   22  
Two  tools  to  deal  with  uncertain%es  and  risks  can  
create  tremendous  value  in  a  decision  

Value  of  Informa&on  (the  clairvoyant)  quan%fies  


the  trade-­‐offs  of  gathering  more  informa%on  to  
insure  that  you  will  not  regret  commitng  to  a  
given  decision;  i.e.,  the  price  of  choosing  clearly.  

Value  of  Control  (the  wizard)  quan%fies  the  max  


value  for  taking  certain  ac%ons  to  control  your  
outcome;  i.e.,  the  price  of  conver%ng  an  
uncertainty  into  a  decision.  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   23  
Value  of  Control  leads  to  the  formula%on  of  hybrid  strategies  
that  capture  the  best  elements  of  compe%ng  alterna%ves  

Hybrid  
1  
0.9   B   C     Captures  risk  limita%ons  
0.8   of  Alterna%ve  B  
Cumula%ve  Probability  

0.7  
0.6     Captures  value  poten%al  
0.5   of  Alterna%ve  C  
0.4  
0.3  
0.2  
0.1  
0  
Value  Measure  of  Primary  Objec>ve  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   24  
Using  an  objec%ve  decision  process  provides  your  
organiza%on  with  numerous  qualita%ve  benefits  
Decisions  will  be…  
•  Tenable  
–  Resolves  ambiguous  and/or  conflic%ng  values  
–  Clearly  communicates  the  purpose  and  aims  of  the  
decision  
–  Aligns  with  fiduciary  requirements  including  duty  of  care  
•  Transparent  
–  Based  on  collabora%ve  exper%se  and  ra%onale  
–  Aligns  personal  &  organiza%onal  agendas  
–  Clearly  iden%fies  the  implica%ons  of  uncertainty,  
tradeoffs,  complexity,  and  risk  
•  Transferable  
–  Does  not  rely  on  one  individual's  special  insight  
–  Promotes  systemic  thinking  and  comprehension  
–  Builds  an  environment  for  effec%ve  and  ethical  
collabora%on  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved   25  
A  London  Business  School  study  found  objec%ve  
evidence  of  the  value  of  this  approach  

Set  Direc>on   Iden>fy  Op>ons   Do  Evalua>on   Implement  Ac>on  

100%  
%  Successful  A_er  2  Years  

Key  findings:  
Improvement  

Dialog  (internal  experts)  or    Pilot  


Crea>ve  Synthesis  of  Op>ons  

Collabora>ve  Par>cipa>on  
in  understanding,  
par%cipant  buy-­‐in,  
50%  
use  of  crea%ve  ideas  
Framing  

and  achievement  of  


Data  and   business  results.  
Idea   Simula>on   Edict  or  
Jus>fica>on   Single  
Persuasion  
Op>on  

0%  

Frequency  of  Use  (bar  width)  of  each  Method  


Out  of  the  127  cases  studied  in  North  America  
(by  Paul  Nu\,  Ph.D.,  Ohio  State  University)  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved  
Page  26  
Ques%ons?  
Robert  D.  Brown  III  
Tel:    (678)  947-­‐5997  
Email:  rdbrown@incitedecisiontech.com  

Gerald  A.  Bush,  Ph.D.  


Tel:    (678)  641-­‐6254  
Email:  gabush@mac.com  

Web:  www.  incitedecisiontech.com  

Robert  D.  Brown  III  and  Gerald  A.  Bush      Copyright  ©  2010  All  Rights  Reserved  
Page  27  

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