German Trade Unionism Between Society and Market

German Trade Unionism Between Society and Market
In both Germany and Italy, modern trade unionism is in many respects a product of the second
half of the twentieth century. Under Hitler and Mussolini, free trade unionism was brutally
suppressed; in each country a new movement was created by design and from above after the
defeat of the dictators. This does not mean that nothing of the former traditions survived to
inform post-war identities and actions; but in contrast to the British case, it makes sense for the
following two chapters to focus on the post-war era. Accordingly, each will be substantially
shorter than the last. The theme of the present chapter is the shifting geometry of German trade
unionism. 1 In the immediate phase of post-war reconstruction there was an uneasy tension
between a vision of trade unions as vehicles of class mobilization which could build a society
and economy of a new type on the ruins of the old; and a conception of unions as a force for
social integration with the capacity and the duty to avoid the destructive cleavages of the
Weimar period. Initially there was a strong communist presence within the newly re-emerging
labour movement, as well as a substantial marxist-oriented left among the social democrats;
with the collapse of the Third Reich, a non-capitalist route to reconstruction seemed conceivable
– perhaps even inevitable. But such a course faced powerful – and ultimately overwhelming –
resistance both within the German labour movement itself and from outside. Following the
political defeats suffered by the labour movement in the early post-war years, and in a climate of
cold war anti-communism (the communist party (KPD) was outlawed in 1956), it was the
integrative view which came to predominate. As the German ‘economic miracle’ unfolded, so
this approach appeared to yield material beneWts. The idea of a ‘social market economy’,
originally a conservative slogan, became for several decades a stable point of reference for
trade union identity. But as the economic and political environment became less favourable, so
the balance between social regulation and market forces encountered new tensions and issues
of class identity resurfaced.
Hyman, Richard. Understanding European Trade Unionism : Between Market, Class and Society.
London, , GBR: Sage Publications, Incorporated, 2001. p 115.
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/unisouthernqld/Doc?id=10080905&ppg=123
Copyright © 2001. Sage Publications, Incorporated. All rights reserved.
Understanding European Trade Unionism The Reconstruction of Trade Unionism and the
Eclipse of Radicalism
The economic history of the post-war decades centres around the rapid transformation from
massive devastation to unexpected success. Following Germany’s unconditional surrender, the
country was divided into occupation zones governed by the four victorious powers (Britain,
France, the USA and the USSR). Roughly a third of the country’s former territory disappeared
from the map of Germany, 2 and economic relations across the zonal boundaries were diYcult;
hence former production chains were disrupted. Some Wve million Germans had died in the
hostilities or had perished in the concentration camps. Bombing had destroyed much of the
industrial infrastructure; some of what remained was seized by the victors as reparations.
Dislocation was increased by a massive inXux of refugees and of those expelled from the
countries of central and eastern Europe; roughly one person in Wve was homeless. There were
desperate shortages of food, fuel and other necessities (Krips, 1958: 101– 3). Initially, each of
the four occupying powers developed its own political and economic regime within its speciWc
zone. With the emergence and intensiWcation of the cold war in 1947– 48, the four-way division
was succeeded by a two-way polarization: the three western zones were integrated within the
new Federal Republic (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, BRD) in 1949, followed by the constitution
of the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR) in the east. The
inclusion of (west) Germany in the European recovery programme (Marshall aid) contributed
signiWcantly to economic revival. So did the rearmament boom at the time of the Korean war.
German trade unionism was reconstructed through the interaction of pressure from below and
from above. In many workplaces, unoYcial works councils created some kind of order out of
chaos, helping oversee the renewal of production and addressing workers’ lack of the
necessities of life. For many on the left, such councils could form the embryo of a new social
order: a vision which perturbed the occupying powers, who attempted to formalize and
domesticate them. At the same time, former oYcials and activists who were released from the
prisons and camps, who returned from exile, or who had simply kept their heads down during
the Nazi years, rebuilt the labour movement within each zone and devised blueprints for an
integrated German trade unionism. It was generally agreed that the new structure should
transcend the former ideological divisions which had seriously weakened the labour movement
in the Weimar era. The principle of trade union unity (the idea of the Einheitsgewerkschaft – a
single union in each workplace) was taken further by some who advocated the formation of ‘one
big union’ organized into industrial sections. This was a model implemented in east Germany
(and also in many respects in Austria) but was viewed with suspicion by the occupying powers;
in the British case, the TUC was persuaded to add its own opposition (MacShane, 1992: 218–
19). The outcome was the formation in 1949, soon after the BRD itself, of a structure of sixteen
industrial unions largely autonomous in the formulation of their own policy but united in a central
confederation, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
German Trade Unionism 117 Wve (DGB).
The total membership was roughly million, covering about a third of the labour force: a density
level signiWcantly higher than that of all the main unions immediately before the Nazi era.
Though the new unions were largely run by social democrats, the corollary of the principle of
unity was that they should avoid too close a formal identiWcation with the revived social-
democratic party (SPD) so as to prevent a breach with the christian-democratic minority among
their members and activists. But conversely, they could not ignore the strong left-socialist or
communist sympathies of many rank-and-Wle militants; and this was reXected in the relatively
radical ‘basic programme’ (Grundsatzprogramm) – calling for the reorganization of the economy
and society on the basis of social ownership – adopted by the founding conference in Munich. In
many respects this was in tune with a widespread popular mood: even the christian democrats
(CDU), at their 1947 Ahlen congress, approved an economic programme (soon abandoned in
practice) with strong socialist overtones, rejecting the proWt motive and demanding the
socialization of the basic industries. 4 Ambitions for a new social and economic order were
encouraged by the shadow of the past. The industrial tycoons who had made their peace with
Hitler – indeed had helped him to power – were discredited, and initially there was consensus
among the occupying powers that the former concentration of economic ownership in private
hands must never again be permitted. The trade unions were seen as the most reliable
guarantors of a new, democratic Germany, not least by the Labour government in Britain.
Hence the socialization of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy seemed a realistic
objective; and the struggle over ownership and control was to be the overriding issue for the
new DGB. During the years of allied occupation, the conglomerates which had dominated the
strategic industries of iron and steel and coal (the so-called Montan industries) were broken up
into separate companies under tight control by the occupying authorities. Particularly in the
British zone – which included the main centre of these industries in the Ruhr area – the principle
of codetermination or Mitbestimmung was implemented, with employee representation on the
company supervisory boards 5 and the appointment of a trade unionist as ‘labour director’ in the
management team (Spiro, 1958: 32– 5). The ‘basic programme’ adopted by the DGB in Munich
in October 1949 called both for the public ownership of all key industries (mining, iron and steel,
chemicals, energy, transport and Wnance) and for ‘codetermination of the organized workers in
all the personnel, economic and social questions of economic policy and management’
(Schneider, 1989: 457). In May 1950 it elaborated its demands: a universal system involving
parity representation for union nominees on supervisory boards. But the political climate was
unfavourable: at the parliamentary elections in September 1949 the SPD had won just under 30
per cent of the vote, less than the CDU, and Adenauer headed a conservative government
committed to economic deregulation and privatization. This policy was consistent with the goal
of ‘normalizing’ capitalist production relations which underlay the Marshall plan. The demand for
board-level parity codetermination, strongly resisted by the employers, received a cool response
from the new government.
Understanding European Trade Unionism The unions of steel and coal workers, fearing the loss
of the rights which they had gained during the period of allied occupation, held strike ballots in
late November 1950 and early 1951 respectively, in both cases winning over 90 per cent
support for industrial action. A compromise was then reached in direct negotiations between
DGB president 6 Hans Böckler and chancellor Adenauer: a special law would be passed
conWrming parity codetermination in these two industries. 7 This was implemented in May 1951
(Schuster, 1974: 37– 8). By then Böckler – already aged 74 when elected to head the new DGB
– had died. Under new leadership, the unions pressed strongly to extend the Montan scheme to
the whole economy. Again there were threats of militant action, and protest stoppages and
demonstrations indeed took place – including a strike by newspaper printers. But within the
DGB itself there was opposition to the use of industrial militancy for seemingly party-political
ends; while the miners and metal workers, the vanguard of the movement, were in practice
disinclined to risk the settlement already achieved in their own industries by pursuing a general
strike. The government proceeded with legislation in July 1952 giving a token one-third
employee representation on supervisory boards in with over 500 workers outside the Montan
industries; there was no provision for a labour director. The same Works Constitution Act
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) gave a legal foundation to works councils, but again on a basis
opposed by the DGB. In particular, the government rejected its demands that trade unions
should have a direct input to works council proceedings, and that the councils should have
signiWcant veto power over management decision-making. The new law largely reaYrmed the
relatively modest framework introduced in 1920. The unions had been ‘tamed’ (Pirker, 1960: ch.
6). Following the failure of its ‘half-hearted resistance’ to the government’s plans (Otto, 1975:
124), the DGB sacriWced a scapegoat; at its congress in October 1952 its president, Christian
Fette, failed to achieve re-election. The DGB went on to campaign against the government in
the 1953 elections, causing protests from its christian-democrat wing; Adenauer was re-elected
with an increased majority. There was then a marked shift away from political radicalism. An
important symbol of this reorientation was the dismissal in 1955 of Viktor Agartz, the popular
left-wing head of the DGB economic research institute (Mühlbradt and Lutz, 1969: 74– 6;
Niethammer, 1975: 357). The action programme adopted by the DGB in the same year
concentrated on pragmatic immediate demands; structural changes to the economy and society
were retained as at best a distant goal. In 1959 the SPD adopted the ‘Godesberg programme’
which abandoned its former commitment to the socialization of industry and accepted the
capitalist market economy; in the same year the DGB initiated a revision of its own constitution,
and agreed changes on similar lines four years later in its ‘Düsseldorf programme’ to replace
that of 1949. Ironically, the consequence of this depoliticization was to downgrade the DGB’s
own status: the main focus of trade union activity was now the collective bargaining undertaken
by the individual industrial unions. The latter allowed the DGB no effective role in shaping their
goals and tactics in this sphere; indeed in 1959 its president complained that he discovered their
initiatives only from what
he read in the newspapers (Mühlbradt and Lutz, 1969: 81). Hans Böckler, who had emerged
from ‘hibernation’ at the end of the Nazi era (Borsdorf, 1982: 323) to play a key role in the
reconstruction of the movement, was among the most prominent of all German trade unionists
when elected Wrst president of the DGB; his successor was head of the printing union, followed
in turn by the leader of the metalworkers. Thereafter, no president of an important industrial
union would regard election to head the DGB as a promotion.

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