1.

Abstract

The detente between Germany and the USA over the Iraq war between 2002 and 2003 consituted a

shock to the international community of academics and analysts following German foreign policy

and Atlantic relations. Efforts to clarify German behavior have, in the main, focused on either an

anti-American or pacifist streak in German society. There is more than a little truth in these

explanations, but they do not go much towards explaining the timing of the change, its rapid

development and its focus on the Iraq issue. This essay argues that the salient driver behind the

change was neither anti-Americanism nor pacifism, but Germany’s political emancipation. The

Germans had been slowly developing into their role as an eminent power in Europe that is prepared

to adopt greater international responsibility. When Germany felt excluded from consultation in the

decision-making process, it reacted robustly. The question at stake was the nature of the world

order and the relations of the USA to its allies, and no longer the single issue of Iraq.

2. Foreign Policy Decision Making of the US

2.1 Constitutional Conditions

The debate over Iraq presented an interesting triad in the realm of foreign policy, with the

President, the Congress, and the people all vying for power and influence. According to the

Constitution, the Congress has the "power to legislate, provide for the common defense, to declare

war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy... and to make all laws which are

necessary and proper to execute the foregoing powers." On the other hand, "The executive power

shall be vested in a President... [and he] shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the

United States, and of the militia of the several states . . . [and he] shall have power, by and with the

advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present

concur."1 Edward S.Corwin has argued, "the Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants

of powers capable of affecting the issue(s), is an invitation to struggle [between the President, the
Congress, and the people] for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."4 With this

struggle in mind, it is instructive to review a few of the most relevant legal precedents in Supreme

Court decisions and Congressional resolutions.

There are three types of resolutions. First, a simple resolution is a statement of fact or opinion by one of

either the Senate or the House of Representatives and is binding only on that House of Congress; it is

frequently used as an internal procedure for housekeeping, administrative, or legislative purposes. Second,

a concurrent resolution is a simple resolution that passes both Houses (also normally used for

housekeeping, administrative, or legislative purposes) and is binding on both Houses. However, a

precedent has been set to use this for legislative or executive purposes as in the War Powers Resolution.

Third, a joint resolution is a concurrent resolution that goes on to the President to be signed into public law

or vetoed; it is usually used as a means of expeditious legislation to bypass the normal legislative process,

as in the annexation in Texas in 1845.

In the course of the Vietnam Conflict ("war" is no longer declared) the struggle between Congress and the

President returned to where it left off in the 1930s concerning the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, 1937, and

1939. Congress initially attempted to cut off the funding for Vietnam; when that failed the desired effect,

Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was re-passed by a two-thirds majority over

President Nixon's veto to become law (PL93-148). The War Powers Resolution states in part that:

"It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United

States, and to insure the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply

to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent

involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of

such forces in hostilities or in such situations." 7 (Emphasis added.) In the most controversial part of the

War Powers Resolution, Section 5 (c) states: "Not withstanding subsection (b), at any time that the United

States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and

territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by
the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution."1 8 (Emphasis added.) The second

controversial part of the War Powers Resolution is Section 8 (d) (1 & 2): "Nothing in this joint

resolution ... is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the congress or of the President, or the

provisions of existing treaties [e.g., NATO] .. ."19-although that is exactly what it did. The President is

now restricted in his freedom of action as the embodiment of state sovereignty (the sole organ) and as

commander in chief

of the armed forces. Congress has aggrandized unto itself the power to order the President by concurrent

resolution to remove armed forces from hostilities. This places Congress in a superior legal position in

relation to the President and violates the principle of co-equal branches of government

and the separation of powers. In 1983, the Supreme Court held, in INS v. Chadha, 20 that Congress could

not stop the deportation of a nonresident because that was an executive function not permissible under the

principle of the separation of powers between the President and Congress,

2.2 Participating Institutions

In the early years of the 21st century, Iraq became a major issue of U.S. foreign policy and in the

deliberations of the UN Security Council. After the United States and its allies drove the Iraqi Republican

National Guard out of Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, President George H.W Bush (in

concert with his advisors) opted not to totally defeat the Iraqi army and march on to Baghdad to remove

Saddam Hussein. They believed, in part, that a completely defeated Iraq would be a greater

liability than a contained one that left Saddam Hussein in power. The concern was that a totally defeated

Iraq would create a political vacuum that could draw in all the surrounding states seeking power, territory,

oil, and regional influence. Further complicating this scenario was a concern about international terrorism,

specifically Islamic extremism. Additionally, there was some concern that Saddam Hussein harbored

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a consequence, the United States decided to utilize the UN

system for weapons inspection and to ground the Iraqi air force through the imposition of "no-fly zones,"
which would help to protect the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. An intervening event in

national and international politics was the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States on

September 11, 2001, at the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington,

DC. These were catalytic factors that changed both the substance and processes of U.S. foreign policy. Not

since the War of 1812 had the United States been attacked on its mainland-and at the centers of world

capitalism and American military power. The more immediate consequences were the creation of the

Department of Homeland Security, the declaration of the Global War on Terror, and a counterattack on Al

Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. After the Taliban were defeated, the long-term effect was to

transfer attention to Iraq as a possible source of terrorism in the Middle East and a major base of

operations for Al Qaeda.The on-site inspections in Iraq, along with aerial surveillance, did

not reveal any WMDs. Nonetheless, the United States pushed 14 resolutions through the UN Security

Council; the last one, UNSC 1441, which passed 15-0 on November 8, 2002, declared that there would be

"serious consequences" if Iraq did not come clean on WMDs. Saddam Hussein eventually complied with

this demand of the UN Security Council for further information by submitting a 1,200-page report to the

UN Secretary- General. This report did not satisfy the United States, however, which argued that it was too

general and did not sufficiently address the issue of WMD.

2.3 Interests and players

In the midst of all this military and political activity, Congress passed a legal structure which "authorized

[the President] to de facto amend the constitution use the Armed Forces of the United States

as he determines to be necessary and in a manner and fashion that is and appropriate in order to: 1) Defend

the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and 2) Enforce all

relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq." It is interesting to note that section

5 (c) (2) states: "Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.""

The significance of this is that Congress seems to be developing a legal structure that defacto is amending

the Constitution in a manner and fashion that is of dubious constitutionality. The public concern over Iraq
was the dominant feature of the congressional elections in November 2006. The Democrats gained a

substantial majority (233 to 202) in the House and a slim majority (51 to 49) in the main Democratic

resolution, which was voted in the House on February 16, 2007, passed by a vote of 246 to 182,

On the following Saturday, the Senate held a cloture vote on whether to debate the resolution on Iraq. This

vote failed by 56 to 34,24 because a closure vote requires a majority of 60 to proceed with debate on the

resolution similar to that passed by the House. An important point to mention here is that the House

resolution was a simple nonbinding resolution that expressed the opinion of only the House; if the Senate

had passed this simple resolution it would have become a simple nonbinding concurrent resolution. This

then might have been converted into a House Joint Resolution requiring the signature of the President.

However, the President would surely have vetoed such a resolution, and Congress did not have the

necessary two-thirds majority to override a veto. However, the Democrats' strategy to ram a simple or

concurrent resolution through the Senate failed on the cloture vote, and the Republicans

offered a counter resolution to fund the surge and related costs proposed by the President. This move

essentially checkmated the Democrats' strategy because they had threatened to restrict or restrain funding

the surge as a means of forcing the withdrawal of the armed forces. At the conclusion of the closure vote,

the Senate adjourned for the February recess, and little to nothing could be done during this period. But

Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, floated the idea

that Congress might repeal the resolution of October 2002 authorizing the use of force in Iraq.25 However,

such a step would require the signature of the President, who would certainly veto instead. If this drastic

step were taken, there is a contradiction it would be reminiscent of the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution on Vietnam.

3. Foreign policy decision-making of Germany

3.1 Constitutional Decisions

Under the Basic Law, decisions on war and peace are entrusted to the Bundestag, including the use of

armed forces within systems of collective security in the meaning of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law. A
parliamentary vote on the deployment of German soldiers would be required when the concrete

circumstances of the case warrant the assumption that a participation of German soldiers in armed

operations is to be expected. Some uses of armed forces clearly fall out of the category of “armed

operations”: relief missions do not need to be approved by Parliament provided that the soldiers carrying

out these missions are not involved in any kind of armed undertakings. A mere possibility that armed

operations will occur is also not sufficient to trigger the requirement of parliamentary consent. Rather, two

further conditions have to be met. First, there is the requirement of sufficiently concrete factual

indications that a mission will eventually entail the use of military force. In this regard, its purpose, the

concrete political and military circumstances as well as the rules of engagement would need to be taken

into account. Hence, a concrete situation of military danger (konkrete militärische Gefahrenlage) would

need to exist.Second, for this “qualified expectation” to materialize, it is required that there is a certain

imminence of the use of military force. Such imminence can either be given due to the time factor alone –

a military conflict being on the horizon – or to a more general assessment of the rules of engagement that

can indicate the probability of the use of military force.27 An indication that the German soldiers may

become engaged in hostilities can, inter alia, be found in the level of armament of the troops and the

authorization to make use of them. An authorization to self-defence (in the sense of self-defence of the

individual unit of the Federal Armed Forces) and the deployment of armed forces which is of a non-

military character does not require parliamentary approval. Yet, a mission has a military character if it has

been launched to defend a given territory against foreign attacks. Under these circumstances the military

operation has to be voted on by Parliament even if the soldiers are not armed and do not constitute part of

an integrated military unit. The decision whether or not an involvement in armed operations has taken

place, is subject to full judicial review by the FCC.

3.2 Participating institutions

Nurturing relations with foreign states is a matter for the Federation, and more specifically for the Federal

Government. However, regarding both the transfer of sovereign powers to international organisations, and
treaties that regulate the political regulations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation,

the Basic Law (Germany’s constitution) stipulates that Parliament must be involved. In practice, this

involvement takes place via the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Committee on Foreign Affairs is one

of the largest and most prestigious of the German Bundestag’s committees. It is one of only four of the

twenty-two specialised committees to be anchored in the constitution. Article 45 a of the Basic Law clearly

states that the Bundestag must appoint a committee on foreign affairs, and thus recognises Parliament’s

involvement in shaping foreign policy. The very fact that it is enshrined in the constitution ensures that the

Committee on Foreign Affairs has a high standing among the German Bundestag’s committees. Anyone

who wished to abolish the Committee on Foreign Affairs or even change its name would need to amend

the constitution, which would require the support of two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag as well as

two thirds of the votes in the Bundesrat.The tasks and powers of the Committee on Foreign Affairs match

its status and significance. The Committee on Foreign Affairs is the only committee of the German

Bundestag to scrutinise, monitor and guide the Federal Government’s actions in the field of foreign policy.

Naturally, international crisis areas are at the forefront of this: currently, the situation in Iraq, Iran and

Afghanistan, as well as the Middle East, but also in Kosovo and Africa, the conflicts in the Caucasus, in

North-East and South-East Asia, the situation of countries in transition in the territory of the former Soviet

Union, but also of Russia itself, and the impact on regional and global stability of the rise of new centres of

power like China and India. In addition, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for the

ratification of important treaties under international law. For these to apply in Germany, an “instruction

relating to the national application of law”, as the Federal Constitutional Court put it, is needed; these

instructions are prepared for the plenary by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

3.3 Interests and players

The Bundeskanzler (Federal Chancellor) heads the executive branch of the federal government. He is

elected by and responsible to the Bundestag, Germany's parliament. Germany, like the United Kingdom,

can thus be classified as a parliamentary system. The Chancellor cannot be removed from office during a
4-year term unless the Bundestag has agreed on a successor. This Constructive Vote of No Confidence is

intended to avoid the situation of the Weimar Republic in which the executive did not have enough support

in the legislature to government effectively, but the legislature was too divided to name a successor. So far,

the Chancellor has always been the candidate of the party with the most seats in parliament, supported by a

coalition of two or more parties with a majority in the parliament. He appoints a Vice-Chancellor

(Vizekanzler), who is a member of his cabinet, usually the Foreign Minister. When there is a coalition

government (which has, so far, often been the case), the Vice-Chancellor usually belongs to the smaller

party of the coalition. The heads of governments may change the structure of ministries whenever and

however they see fit. For example, in the middle of January 2001, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture was

renamed to Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture as a consequence of the BSE crisis.

For that measure, competences from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of

Health were transferred to the new Ministry of Consumer Protection. Subordinate to the cabinet is the

Civil service of Germany. By contrast, the duties of the Bundespresident (Federal President) are largely

representative and ceremonial; power is exercised by the Chancellor. The President is elected every 5 years

on May 23 by the Federal Convention (Bundesversammlung), a special body convoked only for this

purpose, comprising the entire Bundestag and an equal number of state delegates selected especially for

this purpose. In 1999, Johannes Rau of the Social Democratic Party was elected. The fact that the

President is not popularly elected is to prevent him from gaining enough popular legitimacy to circumvent

the constitution, as occurred with the Weimar Republic. The Bundestag (Federal Assembly) is Germany's

parliament. It is elected for a 4-year term, consists of at least twice the number of electoral districts -- 328

in 1998, being reduced to 299 -- in the country. (More deputies may be admitted when parties' directly

elected seats exceed their proportional representation.) Elections for an all-German Bundestag were first

held on December 2, 1990, and again on October 16, 1994 and September 27, 1998. A total of 669

deputies were seated after the 1998 national elections. In order to prevent political fragmentation and

strong minor parties, a party must have 5% of the vote or at least three direct elected deputies to be
represented in the Bundestag. The Bundesrat (Federal Council) is the representation of the state

governments at the federal level. It consists of 69 members who are delegates of the 16 Bundeslander and

usually, but not necessarily include the 16 Minister Presidents themselves.

The legislature has powers of exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction with the Lander in areas

specifically enumerated by the Basic Law. The Bundestag bears the major responsibility. The necessity for

the Bundesrat to concur on legislation is limited to bills treating revenue shared by federal and state

governments and those imposing responsibilities on the states, although in practice, this is quite common.

Still, Germany's legislative branch cannot quite be considered bicameral.

4. Comparison of the decision-making processes of the United States and Germany in OIF

4.1 Comparison of the decision-making

The war on Iraq began to emerge onto the political agenda in the course of 2002, particularly after US

President George W. Bush’s ‘State of the Union’ address, in which he declared Iraq to be part of an ‘axis

of evil’. Germans, like most other Europeans, found the concept of three different states forming an axis

unfortunate and were critical of the idea of invading Iraq. They were also increasingly concerned that the

views of allies were being dismissed in Washington. Fischer (2002a) warned the US administration that

European allies did not want to be treated like satellite states. Even the Christian Democrats warned that ‘it

cannot be that you act on your own and we trot along afterwards’ (Erlanger, 2002). At this point, however,

Schröder remained accommodative and argued that ‘we should not slip back into the old mistrust of the

superpower and the Bush administration’ (Ford, 2002). Karsten Voigt (2002), coordinator of German–US

relations at the foreign ministry, argued that Bush was no cowboy and that Washington would take the

views of the Europeans into account. Indeed, when Bush visited Germany in May 2002, he made his case

against Iraq but gave reassurances that he would not act without consultation with allies. Moreover, it was

agreed that Bush would not start preparations for war before the German elections, and Schröder would

not ride on the antiwar issue during his election campaign (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004: 109).
The issue of the war on Iraq bounced back onto the agenda when US newspapers began to circulate stories

about war plans for Iraq: already at the beginning of June 2002, Bush (2002) had declared in his West

Point speech that ‘we must take the battle to the enemy’ and ‘be ready for preemptive action’. This

speculation was immediately picked up by Schröder’s campaign team, as the issue of war with Iraq was

identified as a potential vehicle with which the chancellor could still win the elections against the odds of

projected results. Public opinion polls showed that an overwhelming majority of Germans opposed the

war. This mattered especially in former East Germany, where the SPD had to compete with the PDS, the

former socialist party of the German Democratic Republic. When US Vice-President Dick Cheney

delivered a strong appeal for a pre-emptive regime change in August, the Iraq war became the dominant

theme of the Bundestag elections (Chandler, 2003).

Immediately after the start of the German election campaign in August 2002, Schröder stated explicitly

that he was not going to support a war on Iraq. He argued that it was a mistake to think about military

intervention and– returning to the message of his September 2001 warnings – declared that Germany was

not willing to play with war and to participate in military adventures (tageszeitung, 2002). In an unusually

patriotic declaration of his vision of Germany, Schröder (2002a) announced his faith in German society

and advocated a ‘German way’ that reminded many of the old German Sonderweg between East and West.

Fischer was also critical of the war on Iraq, describing it as a risky decision (though he was careful to

formulate his positions diplomatically).

Schröder’s political stance against the war on Iraq – as well as his rhetoric– put Washington on the alert,

but the real uproar was caused by Justice Minister Hertha Däubler-Gmelin’s gaffe in a small local

campaign event that was subsequently reported worldwide. Däubler-Gmelin suggested that Bush’s

preparation for war was comparable to Hitler’s policy of shifting attention from domestic problems to

international ones. The insult was simply too much for Washington: the White House announced that

German–US relations were poisoned. Schröder wrote to Bush, explaining that he believed the words of his
minister had been wrongly reported, but he did not apologize. Bush was offended: he did not congratulate

Schröder on the latter’s election victory and refused to talk to him at international meetings.

While the German government refrained from aggravating the issue, it was not prepared to make any U-

turns in its assessment of the Iraq war. In December, Fischer (2002c) continued to keep open the

possibility that Germany might eventually lend political support to the war, and he stated that nobody

could know how Germany would vote in the Security Council. But in January, a few weeks later, Schröder

declared at a regional election rally in Goslar that Germany would not support a UN resolution

legitimizing the war on Iraq (Die Welt, 2003a). Schröder’s statement seemed to come as a surprise to

Fischer, who disagreed with any categorical ‘no’ to the war. Schröder’s statement triggered a further

episode in the transatlantic drama, when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lumped Germany

together with France as ‘a problem’, arguing that they did not represent the whole of Europe but belonged

to the ‘old Europe’. Rumsfeld also grouped Germany together with Libya and Cuba, describing all three as

countries that were not willing to help the USA, thereby failing to acknowledge Germany’s solid

commitment to the Global War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and Kuwait, as well as the continuous support

given to US bases in Germany. Rumsfeld’s comments were dismissed by the German government, and

they also created irritation among traditionally US-friendly circles (Ford, 2002). Fischer (2003) defended

the German stance against the war in an emotional speech delivered at the annual Munich security

conference. In the presence of Donald Rumsfeld, he declared that he was not convinced of the case for the

war on Iraq: ‘Why now?’ In Fischer’s view, the more important task in the Middle East was to promote

reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. With regard to the war on Iraq, he reiterated that

diplomatic had not been exhausted and argued that there should be no automatism leading to the use of

military force. At the same time, Schröder (2003a) seemed to raise the stakes, defining the issue of Iraq as

the issue of the fate of the future world order: will decisions be made multilaterally or not?

4.2 Development of the central thesis

Although it is possible to explain German foreign policy using realist and liberal approaches, constructivist

explanations seem particularly relevant since European countries were so divided in their response to the

war (Rittberger, 2003). But what are the cultural factors that could explain Germany’s reactions to the war

on Iraq and the deterioration of German–US relations? Three cultural explanations can be given for

Germany’s behaviour. Some emphasize the antiAmericanism of Germans, others their pacifism, and a

third group their growing emancipation and self-assurance. I will look at each of these in turn, but

conclude that the third factor seems to have the strongest explanatory power, at least in this specific case.

Many political commentators and analysts have argued that Germany’s unwillingness to support the war

on Iraq was based on strong anti-American sentiment (Berman, 2004; Berendse, 2003; Markovits, 2004).

‘Anti-Americanism’, of course, is a contested and politically loaded concept, insofar as it is defined as a

prejudice that is based on ignorance, not justified criticism. What is indisputable is that the image of the

USA deteriorated radically after 9/11 in Germany. While nearly 80% of Germans had a positive opinion of

the United States in 1999, by summer 2002 the figure was down to 61%, and in spring 2003 only 23% of

Germans subscribed to a favourable view of the USA. The image of the United States had somewhat

improved by spring 2004, but still remained more negative than positive. At the same time, a majority of

Germans supported the US-led war on terrorism, but the level of support had decreased from 70% in 2002

to 55% in 2004 (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2004). However, public opinion ratings as such prove

nothing about cause and consequence. On the contrary, it seems that the US decision to go to war with Iraq

explains the increase of negative feelings towards the USA, rather than anti-Americanism explaining

opposition to the war in Germany (Noelle,2003). The swing in public opinion reflected dissatisfaction with

the Bush administration and its policies, not anti-Americanism as such. Indeed, public opinion polls

showed that Americans were not hated as a nation or people (Mertes, 2004). Moreover, as Elizabeth Pond

(2004), a long-time journalist based in Germany, witnessed, ‘to an American who lived in Germany

during the massive antimissile demonstrations in the 1980s what was new about the brief German antiwar

marches of 2003 was precisely the effort of protesters to differentiate between their opposition to the Iraq
war and their affection for the United States’. In Pond’s view, Schröder’s opposition to the war set off no

wave of popular anti-Americanism in Germany. On the contrary, the chancellor’s policy was widely

criticized for isolating Germany.

There are many who think that anti-Americanism is a persistent part of German culture. Dan Diner (2002),

for example, has argued that German anti-Americanism has deep historical roots and is a reflection of

German anti-Semitism. However, Diner’s evidence for contemporary antiAmericanism in Germany

remains fragmented. Moreover, the fact that parts of the cultural elite in Germany were vocally ‘anti-

American’ does not explain the policy change that took place, because such sentiments were expressed

frequently by the same groups long before the war on Iraq. Furthermore, ignorant and offensive anti-

Americanism – such as advocacy of the conspiracy theories about 9/11 that were supported by a

considerable number of Germans – was firmly resisted by those opinion leaders that were otherwise

critical of Bush and the war on Iraq (Der Spiegel, 2003). It is true that the political elite adopted a more

critical stance towards the USA than previously, and 2002 was therefore different from earlier transatlantic

clashes. The primary example of this critical approach was the Hitler–Bush comparison made by Däubler-

Gmelin. Yet, the overall negative response to Däubler-Gmelin’s utterance reveals far more about the

attitudes of the political elite than the original remarks themselves. Of course, in relation to this incident,

Schröder’s sin was that he did not fire his minister immediately but tried to argue that the reported

statement was a misunderstanding. Indeed, Schröder (2001a) has occasionally adopted what can be seen as

anti-American rhetoric himself, declaring for example that he disliked ‘American conditions’ in the labour

market. Fischer, for his part, was never caught using anti-American rhetoric before and during the war on

Iraq. In one interview (Fischer, 2002b), he noted that his image of America remained contradictory but

insisted that the positive sides were clearly dominant.

5. Conclusion

The clash between Berlin and Washington over the war in Iraq in 2002–03 came as a surprise to the

community of scholars and analysts watching German foreign policy and transatlantic relations. Following
unification and the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy seemed to be characterized by

considerable continuity, despite the dramatic changes in power relations, the subsequent move of the

capital to Berlin and the change of government into the Red–Green coalition run by the postwar

generation. Most attempts to explain German behaviour in the war on Iraq have focused on either the

anti-American or the pacifist nature of German society. However, while such explanations have some

relevance, they fail to explain sufficiently well the timing of the change, its sudden emergence and its

focus on the Iraq issue. In this essay, I have argued that the most important driving force behind

the change in German–US relations was neither anti-Americanism nor pacifism, but rather Germany’s

political emancipation. The Germans had been gradually growing into their role as a leading power in

Europe that was willing to take on greater international responsibility. Germany also expected that others

– most importantly, the United States – would listen to its concerns when making crucial decisions about

peace and war. When Berlin felt that it was not being consulted in the decision-making process, it reacted

strongly. Germany could not simply follow the US position when it felt that it had had no opportunity to

shape it. The question at stake was the nature of the world order and the USA’s relation to its allies, no

longer the single issue of Iraq.

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