May 31, 2011 1

NEVER AGAIN: Suggestions for Achieving the

Essential Goal of Nuclear Safety
Purpose of this document

In a statement “Never Again” of April 4, 2011,1 we, as an informal group of nuclear safety
veterans from several countries,2 expressed our conviction that only nuclear power that avoids
being a threat to the health and safety of the population and to the environment is acceptable to
society. Achievement of that goal requires that the nuclear power industry redoubles its efforts to
assure that there are no more accidents with such large offsite releases of radioactivity as
Chernobyl and Fukushima. In this paper, we wish to suggest safety issues that we believe need to
be reassessed in each country with nuclear power plants without waiting for a full analysis of
lessons learned from Fukushima, and without limiting these reassessments to specific events and
features leading to the situation at Fukushima. We see such reassessments as a demonstration of
the questioning attitude that is a key element of a high safety culture and a high quality of safety
management on the part of the industry and the safety authorities. We also discuss a number of
safety improvements that we believe need to be considered in the context of such reassessments,
keeping in mind that such improvements would, to a large extent, need to be design- and site-
specific. Although the issues we raise herein primarily relate to water-cooled and water-
moderated reactors, there are important ideas that would apply to other reactor types and other
nuclear installations

The issues we raise here are suitable for discussion at the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear
Safety to be convened in Vienna from 20 to 24 June, 2011, as well as other forthcoming
meetings on nuclear safety. These issues indicate the general directions we believe future work
should take, ranging from the scope of renewed safety assessments on a national level to
strengthening the international safety regime.

We have grouped our observations into the eight sections that follow. Each section starts with a
statement in italics of our main message, which is then developed and explained in somewhat
more detail in the following text.

1. Reassess the design basis assumptions for both new and existing plants

The events, features and processes taken into account in the design and the design objectives
should be reassessed for both new and existing nuclear power plants, including both their
reactors and their facilities for storing used fuel. The reassessments should include both of the
following types of events, which we call first and second level events:

• Events and conditions (internal and external) with which the plant shall be able to cope
without significant radioactive releases and without irreparable damage, thus enabling
return to power production in at most a year or two. Design objectives of these first level
events include protection of the public and of the national electricity supply.3

• Events and conditions that will likely lead to more severe damage to parts of the plant,
including the core, but with which the plant should be able to cope without requiring
May 31, 2011 2

significant off-site emergency response, such as evacuation up to tens of km from the plant.
The main design objectives of these second level events are protection of the public and the
associated societal structure. 4

The reassessments should include an extremely careful site- and design-specific search process
to ensure that extremely low-probability events and combinations of events have been identified
and taken into account in the safety analysis. There should be formal justification for any events
that are not taken into account. The plants should be provided with reasonably practical
defense-in-depth and associated margins to failure for any events that are taken into account.
Particular attention should be paid to events and conditions that could simultaneously affect all
reactor units and any storage facilities for used fuel on a site.

The reassessments that we have in mind are already getting underway in Europe. They are being
called “stress tests” or safety audits to identify which procedures and equipment, if any, should
be added to cope with extreme conditions not investigated fully in former safety analyses.
Protocols have been developed for these tests in light of the lessons learned from Fukushima5.
The tests are to be conducted by the plants’ owner-operators, reviewed by independent national
authorities and made public. The European Council has pledged to assess initial findings of these
stress tests by the end of 2011. We laud the European effort and recommend world-wide
performance of such safety audits. They should identify how nuclear power plants would react to
extreme situations so that national authorities and owner-operators can implement appropriate
counter measures to eliminate remaining risk where reasonably practicable by reducing the
likelihood of occurrence of such events, by preparing the plants to respond without significant
damage, and by limiting the potential consequences of severe accidents should they occur.

Early lessons learned from Fukushima indicate that the following should be included in the
reassessments of safety:

a. An earthquake much larger than was anticipated in the design of the plant;
b. A tsunami that greatly exceeded the flood protection measures of the plant;
c. A combination of such events, particularly for sites potentially affected by under-sea seismic
epicenters;
d. Simultaneous common mode failures of safety equipment in several plants at the same site;
e. Exceedance of the present design basis and severe accident coping capabilities of the reactors
and their facilities for storing used fuel; and
f. Loss of off-site and on-site power for a few days.

The reassessments should also consider the extent to which the conditions that arose at
Fukushima foretell other weaknesses in existing designs. Examples of other events that might be
indicated by site-specific analysis of the “extent of conditions” at Fukushima include damage of
redundant safety equipment by flooding or high wind from extreme hurricanes or by other
extreme weather conditions, as well as other potential causes of common mode failures of safety
systems. Simultaneous and prolonged loss of external supporting functions, such as the external
power grid and road transport of emergency equipment and supplies, also need to be considered.
Intentional creation of common mode failures should also be considered, but national security
implications argue for their assessment on a national level and preclude their listing here.
May 31, 2011 3

As these reassessments progress, questions will arise about the use of probabilistic safety
analysis (PSA) and the numerical goals against which the results should be compared.
Probabilistic safety analysis and numerical safety objectives should be treated with caution;
however, PSA is the best available method for estimating uncertainties in safety decisions based
on predictions of plant performance under abnormal conditions. As long as PSA results are
integrated with deterministic defense-in-depth considerations, as proposed in INSAG-25,6 the
end result should be more robust safety decisions. Generic, high level safety objectives for new
plants should be agreed internationally, with the aim of reducing the probabilities of core damage
accidents and limiting radioactive releases.
The site-specific safety audits should also address issues arising from the Fukushima events
concerning the management of used fuel, including design measures for confinement and for
protection against natural and manmade hazards and common mode failures of redundant safety
systems. The assessments should address practical measures for the timely removal of used fuel
from reactor buildings and for safely and securely storing or processing it so as avoid
exacerbating the consequences of any reactor accidents.

We encourage greater use of politically independent, multinational design reviews for future
plants, using international safety objectives and standards such as those discussed herein, so that
all plants sold on the international market meet high level requirements, subject to any
adjustments needed to satisfy local siting and operational constraints. The benefits of this
approach have been demonstrated in the aircraft industry.

The safety requirements for future nuclear power plants should be refined to assure that their
backup cooling systems are able to operate for a long enough time following a complete loss of
on-site and off-site power to prevent any damage to their reactor cores. These future plants
should thus be able promptly to restore or compensate for lost power. Passive systems and
advanced technologies for system engineering, materials, information management and
communications should be applied, with attention to uncertainties, to reach very high levels of
assurance of this capability. Furthermore, new plants should be sited away from areas of extreme
natural and manmade hazards.

Research and development should continue in order to further enhance the safety of nuclear
power plants. This research should be aimed at improving the fuel design and identifying better
cladding materials, strengthening protection barriers, increasing the reliability of passive and
active safety systems, and modeling fuel, reactor and containment behavior in severe accident
scenarios. Social sciences also deserve further research (e.g., organizational performance during
emergency situations), as do natural sciences (e.g., risks from natural events such as floods and
earthquakes.)

2. Reassess plant response to severe accidents that cause extensive reactor damage

After reassessing events, features and processes that could lead to reactor or used fuel damage,
plant-specific severe accident analyses should be performed (or existing ones reassessed) taking
into account best available models and data. The severe accident analyses should lead to the
May 31, 2011 4

identification of the actions needed to terminate various types of events and reach a stable state,
including critical times for establishing and maintaining key safety functions.

Extensive severe accident research was performed in the past, starting with the research
conducted in several countries after the 1979 accident at TMI and extending into the early years
of this century. However, additional research into severe accident phenomena may be needed in
order to carry out new analysis of severe accidents based on the knowledge gained from the
events at Fukushima. If so, international cooperation in such research should be organized in an
efficient and effective way, similar to that for the RASPLAV experiments conducted under the
auspices of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.7

The site- and design-specific assessments of severe accidents should help define what is needed
by the operating entity and by supporting societal entities (fire brigades and other rescue
organizations, including defense forces) in order to achieve high likelihoods of success in
arresting severe accidents and limiting their consequences. The assessments should consider
different periods up to several years (if decommissioning of a damaged plant is needed). The
assessments should define the capabilities required to handle various plant damage states
successfully, irrespective of the initiating events that led to these states. In addition, the
assessments should take account of the possibility that some support functions may be severely
affected by some initiating events (such as extremely severe weather, earthquake, tsunami or
other natural or manmade phenomena) for considerable lengths of time.

3. Develop and implement effective on-site accident management strategies

The general accident management objectives should be to reach a long term shutdown state with
the core of the nuclear power reactor (even if damaged) covered by coolant, preferably retained
in the reactor vessel, secured within an intact, depressurized containment, and cooled with
robust redundant trains of recirculation cooling that isolate any radioactivity, including
potential debris from a damaged core, from the environment. Effective accident management
strategies should be in place to meet these objectives. Such strategies should be based on careful
assessment and implementation of the capabilities needed, including:

a. Protection of key barriers to the release of radioactivity, such as the reactor vessel and the
containment.
b. Provision of equipment and materials to achieve key safety functions (reactor shutdown, core
cooling, containment cooling or venting, etc.) if normal safety equipment fails. Such backups
could be permanent, mobile on-site, or mobile offsite so long as they are able to be in
service, in time, when needed. The materials should include supplies of all essential
materials needed on site in case of prolonged breakdown of external supply chains. Some
existing safety equipment may be sufficient if hardened for more severe service conditions.
c. Associated power supplies, instrumentation and controls for the foregoing equipment,
hardened for severe accident conditions and remotely accessible.
d. Hardened facilities and instrumentation for monitoring radioactive releases from the site and
radiation levels inside key parts of the plant and reporting them to offsite authorities. Remote
accessibility and “black box” technology, as used for accident diagnosis in the airline
industry, should be provided.
May 31, 2011 5

e. Capability to estimate future releases of radioactivity to inform authorities responsible for

offsite emergency management.
f. Competent command and control organizations and staffing to ensure that necessary
accident management decisions can be taken at the right operational level in a timely
manner based on best available information. The operating entity must bear the full
responsibility for safety during severe accident management, taking all necessary decisions
to reduce the likelihood of fission product release outside the reactor complex. The interfaces
among the operator, the regulator, and the other governmental authorities may need to be
clarified for these circumstances.
g. Qualified and trained staff for extended, around-the-clock accident management, plus the
logistics needed to transport and support them and manage their health and safety in case
the site is isolated by extreme natural phenomena or high radiation releases.

Now that there have been three significant nuclear power plant accidents, it is critical to assure
that we have learned all the lessons they offer for accident management, not just those perceived
so far. There should be an international effort by qualified subject matter experts to review the
accident management lessons from TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima and recommend appropriate
accident management measures (equipment, procedures, training, staffing) for all nuclear power
plants, including those built to earlier safety standards, other operating plants, and plants yet to
be constructed. They should seek to describe the role of automated features in accident
prevention and response, the roles of operators, and the need to sense and respond in severe
accident situations. The experts should also consider the potential usefulness of and financial
support for an international cadre of experienced specialists trained and equipped to go to the aid
of any country experiencing a severe nuclear accident, upon request.
Effective human performance in accident situations does not just happen, it requires training and
forethought. For example, the procedures for transferring from normal operational instructions
(including those used for level-1 accidents) to severe (level-2) accident instructions should be
fully developed and rehearsed during training, and the level-2 instructions should address a wide
range of extreme plant damage states. During any crisis, nuclear or otherwise, in the midst of an
unforeseen catastrophe, technical specialists (such as the operating staff of a nuclear power plant)
need to act promptly with their best technical judgment. In the nuclear arena, this may involve
the resolution of conflicting priorities, such as those between radioactive dose reduction for
workers and dose reduction for the public. The capability to handle such unforeseen situations
requires clarity about the serious ethical issues that are involved. The events at Fukushima cause
us to think that there has not been adequate progress in this area to date anywhere in the world,
and we recommend further action within the international arena.
Examples of the kind of forethought we have in mind might include the following:

• Assuring that some senior plant operations staff who are trained in severe accident
management are always on site to handle the first hours of a plant damage sequence; and
• Providing on-call assistance of national and international experts with deep knowledge of
severe accident phenomena to give additional advice in the language of the operators. The
competence of such experts should be maintained through continued research and
development in severe accident phenomena.
May 31, 2011 6

4. Reassess capabilities for off-site emergency management

Capabilities, organization and training of local, regional and national authorities for off-site
emergency management should be reassessed. The reassessment should include the following:

• Clear command and communication protocols, including interagency agreements, and

associated decision-making criteria to ensure that necessary and timely emergency
management decisions can be taken based on the best available information from the plant
and communicated effectively to the public;
• The robustness of human organizations at the operator, safety authority and local civil
authority levels, including consideration of other factors (natural or hostile) that may render
local teams partly unavailable;
• Capabilities for measuring off-site radiation levels in difficult circumstances and forecasting
estimates of public contaminations and exposures;
• Capabilities for intervention measures, such as supplies of iodine tablets, control of drinking
water and foodstuffs, and any required relocation and housing of the population in affected
areas; and
• Robust communication networks that can function under extreme conditions with extensive
damage to normal communication infrastructures.

Emergency procedures cannot be expected to operate efficiently if they are not based on sound
science and practical experience. Past severe accidents, including the multi-unit severe accident
at Fukushima, show that exceptional circumstances can and do occur that severely test the plans,
training, and drills rehearsed beforehand. As an aid to improved emergency preparedness, there
should be an international effort to assess experience gained in past radiological accidents and
develop recommendations for improvements based on this experience. The effort should include
the development or refinement of criteria for worker exposure, population exposure, water
contamination and food contamination at different phases of severe accidents, including
conditions for public reentry to contaminated areas (e.g., decontamination of hard surfaces, such
as roofs, walls and roads) and for return of contaminated land to farming. Such an international
project would help to harmonize emergency procedures between neighboring countries, thus
improving operational efficiency, and would also improve public trust in the mitigation measures
implemented for any future major nuclear accident.

5. Approach to old and new nuclear power plants

Even if there are legal complications involved,8 we find it difficult to justify significant
differences in general safety objectives for new and existing plants. However, it may be
appropriate to consider different technical and organizational solutions to achieve these
objectives. Reasonably achievable backfits (upgrading of safety systems and associated
infrastructure), including accident management capabilities, should be required at plants built
and operated to earlier safety standards – otherwise they should only be allowed to operate for a
limited “grace period.”9 Moreover, the concept of continuous improvements of nuclear power
plants over their entire lifetime, possibly based on periodic safety assessments every ten years or
so, is attracting increasing support among the parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety10 and
should be implemented by all states with nuclear power plants.11
May 31, 2011 7

Governments and regulators should exercise great care in permitting any extension of the
operating life of the oldest nuclear power plants still in operation that were built to the earliest
safety standards. Continued operation of a few of the oldest plants for a few more years should
not be allowed to jeopardize the continued operation of newer and safer plants in the longer term.
In defining how safe is safe enough for these oldest plants still in operation, consideration should
be given to the following compensatory measures:

• Relicensing to current safety criteria with sound technical justification for any areas that fall
short of meeting current criteria;
• Performing plant-specific probabilistic safety assessments to aid in the specification of
additional safety equipment;
• Increasing severe accident management measures (e.g., equipment, procedures, training,
staffing) if more are needed beyond those required for newer plants; and
• Requiring use of best available technology for key safety systems (reactor shutdown, core
cooling and containment).

6. Reassess safety culture and quality of safety management

A high level of safety culture and a high quality of safety management are key prerequisites to
achieving and maintaining the high assurances of safety needed in nuclear activities. Therefore,
safety culture and safety management need to be under constant vigilance by means of rigorous
audits, including international peer reviews. These audits and reviews should address the
existence of a questioning attitude and a quest for excellence at least as much as formal
compliance with existing regulations and procedures. These audits and reviews need to be
applied to all parts of the nuclear sector in a country: plant management and corporate
management as well as the relevant government bodies, particularly the independent regulatory
authority. Needless to say, a high level of safety culture and a high quality of safety management
can only be achieved if all parts of the nuclear sector in a country are staffed in adequate
numbers with professionally mature people who exhibit a questioning attitude, have relevant
training and experience, and are provided with adequate authority and financial and other
resources.

Putting emphasis on safety culture and quality of safety management is necessary, but it may not
be sufficient. The IAEA’s guidance on Fundamental Safety Principles, which includes safety
culture and quality of safety management, constitutes a more holistic reference. It applies to both
the government, including the regulatory authority, and the owner-operators.12

We need to reinforce our dedication, not only in words but also in actions, towards a questioning
attitude, thereby assuring continuous improvement in safety. At the current time, attention is
focused on the consequences of events similar to Fukushima that involved severe core damage.
However, all serious accidents have resulted from a series of mistakes and events having roots in
routine design and operation. Thus, it is necessary to continue to pay attention to in-depth
assessment of such routine activities to develop measures that effectively prevent the progression
of minor mistakes or events into severe accidents. Additional research might assist a scientific
May 31, 2011 8

understanding of how organizations and societies influence the development and maintenance of
an adequate nuclear safety culture.

The events at Fukushima illustrate the need for those bodies and agencies involved in nuclear
power generation (utility, regulator, governmental authorities) to have the technical competence
and experience to not only “know what” and “know how” but also to “know why” in order to
deliver the difficult and critical decisions needed to deal with unforeseen circumstances in a
timely manner. To assure that such competence and experience exist in all nations using nuclear
power, countries that supply nuclear power equipment should establish centers to train nuclear
specialists and utility and governmental authorities in recipient countries. The objective should
be to prepare key leaders to make the appropriate decisions in response to challenging events.

National nuclear institutions, including nuclear safety regulators, should be accountable for their
actions and transparent in nuclear safety communications so that they receive and deserve the
trust of the public. It is necessary to ensure that national nuclear safety regulators in all countries
are fully independent in their decision-making on nuclear safety and that their competence,
resources and enforcement powers are assured.

7. Ways to strengthen the international safety regime

As we said in our earlier statement “Never Again,” the safety of nuclear power goes beyond
national boundaries. Appropriate measures to further strengthen the international nuclear safety
regime should be identified and implemented after proper discussions, whether they will be
within the framework of the Nuclear Safety Convention, the IAEA, the NEA/OECD, regional
bodies like the EU or industry organizations like WANO. A critical question should be what
measures would be most effective in further promoting a high level of nuclear safety worldwide.

Legally binding international safety standards deserve renewed consideration after Fukushima.
Evidently, they must be based on an international treaty or convention for countries to become
contracting parties. However, such standards usually represent a minimum level, as international
negotiations on legally binding standards have a natural tendency to result in “the least common
denominator” after a complicated and time-consuming process. They also risk fostering
complacency with the status quo, which is in conflict with the quest for excellence that is a key
element of a good safety culture and high quality of safety management. Consequently, we
believe such binding “minimum requirements” need to be complemented by “best international
practices” that have been demonstrated as reasonably achievable and that are periodically
updated by an independent group of international experts on nuclear safety.

We conclude that the most effective way to ensure compliance with such binding international
standards would be through the authority of national regulators provided with the necessary
independence, competence and regulatory powers. We judge that independent national regulators
with their own enforcement powers, such as administering fines and imposing restrictions on
operations, would be more effective than an international agency with equivalent powers. Thus,
we conclude that the present system of international peer reviews should be strengthened, rather
than setting up an international regulatory agency. We also recommend that the present
May 31, 2011 9

international peer review processes be reviewed to assure they have been effective in identifying
areas of weakness and initiating effective corrective actions.

National authorities, including electric utilities, nuclear equipment suppliers and national
regulators, must do their part to ensure nuclear safety in each country. The accidents at TMI,
Chernobyl and Fukushima occurred due to lapses in national systems and cannot be considered
as being inherent to nuclear technology. They demonstrate the difficulty of mastering a new and
developing technology and underscore the need to learn all that we can from such costly
experiences. They also illustrate the need for regulators, owners and operators to look beyond
routine compliance matters by honestly, continually and openly searching for early indicators of
low probability circumstances that could imperil their nuclear plants. Like the owners and
operators, national regulatory authorities should also be the subject of international peer reviews.

Consideration should be given to making international peer reviews compulsory under the same
international agreement that is used in the future to manage legally binding safety standards.
Such compulsory international peer reviews should as a main objective address compliance with
the binding standards by both the nuclear industry and its nuclear safety regulators within each
country that is a party to the agreement. A summary of key findings and recommendations from
such compulsory international peer reviews, as well as the corrective actions taken by the
reviewed parties, should be made public in order to create incentives to implement recommended
safety improvements and to gain the increase in public confidence that accrues to openness.13
Similarly, independent multinational professional groups could be organized to review the extent
to which “best international practices” are followed. The extent to which the outcomes of the
reviews against best practices are made public should be decided when the process for
performing them is established, giving due consideration to the importance of transparency in
nuclear safety matters and the effectiveness of the private consultative process. Other ways to
create incentives to assure nuclear safety should be examined, such as those that might come
from the underwriters of plant damage insurance and third party liability insurance.

As we noted in our first statement, requirements for new countries wishing to start using nuclear
power should be developed and incorporated into the international nuclear safety regime. Such
countries must demonstrate their ability to uphold high international standards with regard to
safety, security and non-proliferation over the lifetime of their nuclear power programs.

8. Better ways to inform the media and the public on the severity of an accident are needed.

The application of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) to the Fukushima accident did
not realize its main objective, i. e. to provide accurate, intelligible public information on the
severity of the accident. We believe that it is necessary to review and probably revise INES so
that the media and the public may have better information on the possible health hazards from
any future radioactivity releases.

Moreover, the skills required to communicate the effects of accidental radioactivity releases need
further development so that the public can be provided with correct and easily understandable
information and objective explanations of how such hazards relate to other health hazards.
May 31, 2011 10

The following people assisted in the formulation of this statement and concur in its issuance.

Adolf Germany Professor Emeritus, Technical University of Munich; former

Birkhofer member and chair, INSAG; former chair, German Reactor
Safety Commission; former chair, Committee on Safety of
Nuclear Installations of OECD
Agustin Spain Professor Emeritus, Technical University of Madrid, former
Alonso member, INSAG; former director and former commissioner of
Spanish Regulatory Institution; vice chair, Committee on
Safety of Nuclear Installations of OECD
Vladimir Russia Former deputy minister of the Russian Federation for atomic
Asmolov energy; former coordinating director of Kurchatov Institute;
current INSAG member; first deputy director general of
Rosenergoatom; electing chairman of WANO
KunMo Republic Former member, INSAG; former minister, Science &
Chung of Korea Technology, Republic of Korea; former president, Korean
Academy of Science & Technology; former president, General
Conference, IAEA; former vice chair, World Energy Council
Sam United Former member, INSAG; former Chief Inspector of UK
Harbison Kingdom Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
Lars Sweden Former member, INSAG; former director general, Swedish
Högberg Nuclear Power Inspectorate; former chair, steering committee,
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
Anil India Former member, INSAG, former chairman, Atomic Energy
Kakodkar Commission of India
Georgy Ukraine Former head, nuclear power and industry department, USSR
Kopchinsky Council of Ministers; former vice chair, Ukrainian nuclear
regulatory authority
Jukka Finland Vice-chair, INSAG; director general, Finnish Radiation &
Laaksonen Nuclear Safety Authority; chair, Western European Nuclear
Regulatory Association (WENRA); former chair, NEA
Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA)
Roger USA Former director of reactor systems safety division and leader,
Mattson TMI Lessons Learned Task Force, US NRC; working group
co-chair, INSAG-3
Victor Russia Professor, National Nuclear Research University; director,
Murogov Russian Association Nuclear Science and Education; former
director, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering; former
deputy director general for nuclear power, IAEA
Nikolai Russia Member, Russian Academy of Science; former deputy
Ponomarev- director, Kurchatov Institute
Stepnoy
May 31, 2011 11

Victor Russia Correspondent member of Russian Academy of Science;

Sidorenko former member, INSAG; former deputy director, Kurchatov
Institute; former deputy Chairman of USSR nuclear regulatory
authority; former deputy minister of nuclear power of USSR
and Russia
M. R. India Former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission of India;
Srinivasan former chairman, Nuclear Power Corporation of India; current
member, Atomic Energy Commission of India.
Nikolai Ukraine Former member, IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear
Steinberg Energy; former chief engineer, Chernobyl NPP; former deputy
chairman of USSR nuclear regulatory authority; former
chairman of Ukrainian nuclear regulatory authority; former
deputy minister of fuel & power of Ukraine
Ashok USA Former member, INSAG; former chairman, NEA Committee
Thadani for Safety of Nuclear Installations; former director, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research, US NRC.
Jurgis Lithuania Member of Lithuanian Academy of Science; former director,
Vilemas Lithuanian Energy Institute

Endnotes
1
“NEVER AGAIN: An Essential Goal for Nuclear Safety,” April 4, 2011, on the web at
http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/article1682986.ece.
2
See list at the end of this document
3
This first level of events roughly corresponds to the current realm of design basis accidents.
4
This second level of events roughly corresponds to the realm of “design extension conditions” used in the
European Utility Requirements for new reactors, which include specific design objectives for mitigating
releases to the environment.
5
The specifications for the EU stress tests are available on the web at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/doc/20110525_eu_stress_tests_specifications.pdf.
6
”A FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATED RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING PROCESS,” INSAG-25,
A report by the International Nuclear Safety Group, Final Draft, March 2011.
7
The RASPLAV project is reviewed on the web at http://www.oecd-nea.org/jointproj/rasplav.html.
8
Once a plant is licensed, introducing new requirements may be challenged as violating the rules that maintain
configuration control and introduction of unwarranted changes in requirements (i.e., backfits)
9
Cf. Convention on Nuclear Safety, Article 6. Existing Nuclear Installations.
10
See para. 36-37 in the Summary Report of the 5th Review Meeting under the Convention on Nuclear Safety
(http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cns-summaryreport0411.pdf)
11
Within the European Union, it is a legal requirement (Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009).
12
“Fundamental Safety Principles,” IAEA Safety Fundamentals, SF-1, 2006. See also “BASIC SAFETY
PRINCIPLES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS,” 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1, INSAG-12, A report by the
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, October 1999.
13
Moreover, regional bodies like the European Union can choose to implement legal enforcement mechanisms
available in their basic treaties.