Sendero Luminoso Re-Lighting the Path of Peruvian Terrorism By Jeff Randall

On May 17, 1980, a small band of rogue warriors calling themselves Sendero Luminoso attacked the Peruvian town of Chuschi, in the southern province of Ayacucho. Unknown to anyone at the time, this attack would mark the beginning of one of the most brutal guerilla wars in South American history. Founded in the remote department of Ayacucho by Abimel Guzmn Reynoso, a philosophy professor at the University of Huamanga, Sendero Luminoso blended Marxism, Leninism and Maoism into a killing machine that would reign for 12 years and create a wake of bodies numbering in the tens of thousands. In 1992, Guzman, also known as Comrade Gonzalo, was arrested and the Sendero Luminoso seemed to dwindle away. For the next 10 years Peru enjoyed relative safety with the exception being an occasional violent act committed by organized drug traffickers. However, the last five years has seen authorities once again turning their attention to those Spanish words Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) as a resurgence of this terrorist group appears to be forming. Between August and September of 2007 more than 40 members of Sendero Luminoso (SL) have been captured, revealing a new strength and organizational structure thats worrying law enforcement officials. In an internal intelligence report released in 2004, Peruvian officials listed a guerilla fighter simply named Artemio as the current head of SL. According to more recent reports, Artemio is currently operating in Perus central jungle with an insurgency force of 200-300 men known as Proseguir (meaning to carry on or continue). These fighters make their living serving as bodyguards to drug traffickers and smugglers, as well as cultivating their own plots of illicit coca and processing labs. Intelligence reports and witnesses also indicate that in September of 2007, a summit of SL leaders was held in Huanuco, Peru, where it is believed that at least two high-level leaders, Comrade Lee and Comrade Maradona, attended this meeting with as many as 25 guerilla fighters serving as a security detail. SL groups have also come out of the shadows in Ayacucho (birth place of Shining Path), committing random acts of terrorism and violence. It is believed that this Southern Company of SL has about 80 men, moving in units of 10-20 rebels each in the regions surrounding Ayacucho. This leaner version of Shining Path has managed to create havoc and inflict some damage on military and police forces through hit and run tactics. In December 2006, SL killed 5 police officers and 2 workers of the National Coca Company (the only authorized dealer in coca leaves and rival to illegal coca plantations). In January 07, SL ambushed two National Police officers in Churcampa resulting in the death of one officer and the serious injury of the other. Later in the year, SL used sniper rifles taken from previously attacked police and military personnel to snipe at army bases in Junin and Ayacucho. In November, a police station was attacked in Perus southern highlands, resulting in one officer death and two wounded. Another attack in the same month left four officers dead and two wounded in Huancavelica when as many as 30 terrorists ambushed a group of 10 police officers by throwing dynamite and grenades into their vehicles, and then opening fire on the convoy. Perus official response to these attacks is to write them off as revenge attacks due to tougher law enforcement measures taking away profits from the narco-terrorists. And while this may be true to some extent, the one thing we know for

sure is SL is once again becoming an offensive force and taking the fight to their enemy, instead of merely serving in a defensive role, protecting smugglers and traffickers. The new Shining Path has also changed its political war tactics. In the past they would come into town to rob, rape and pillage what they wanted, then murder the whole village if they didnt join the insurgency. Nowadays they merge with the local populace making it extremely difficult for police to identify who they are. Some SL members are nomadic and move from town to town, tasked with identifying future allies as well as enemies. When SL does come to town for recruiting purposes, they enter peacefully; paying for the goods and services they take (instead of paying by gunpoint) and quietly leave after distributing pamphlets that encourage the local populace to join the fight against government corruption. This tactic seems to be working, especially with locals who are upset about the Peruvian governments crackdown on private coca cultivation. For most farmers, coca is nothing more than another agricultural product. Simply put, its just a higher paying form of corn, rice or yuca. For years, many families have depended on the profits of growing and selling coca to illegal processors to make their living. Even with the government introducing and paying for alternative crop production, the coca growers are finding it very hard to make the change, and in many cases warring with their neighbors and other farmers who have accepted the alternative crop plan. Some of the largest protests, roadblocks and violence have resulted from the war between the cocaleros and the agri-growers. Shining Path has recognized this resistance to government policy and seems to be successfully utilizing it to grow their insurgency. Ironically, you might say that the resurgence of Shining Path can be attributed in part to the success of Plan Colombia and the Andean Initiative. As more successes are gained by military and police in Colombia against the FARC guerilla movement and more coca fields eradicated, the cocaleros and terrorists are simply moving their operations to countries that are easier to operate in. Police and military reports that FARC patrols constantly cross over the Putumayo River border between Peru and Colombia to work with Peruvian coca growers and narco-terrorists. While the Peruvian government has made no official statement indicating that FARC and Shining Path are working in unison, the officers on the ground will tell you that its so. Couple this with Interior Minister Luis Alva revelation that drug gangs and Mexican cartels, including the violent Sinaloa gang, are starting to operate in Peru and you have all the ingredients for a substantial increase in violence, as well as illicit drug production. While all of this may sound bad, the Peruvian government has had its share of successes. In October 2007 an army patrol killed seven Shining Path guerillas. Earlier in the year in the now infamous drug smuggling town of Tingo Maria, National Police arrested Jimmy Rodriguez, a top SL leader and close confidant of Artemio. In addition to this arrest, Comrade Alex, Comrade Huaman and Comrade Shego, all member of SLs death squad have been captured. Even with these successes, Artemio is still at large and still recruiting. And from the latest intel reports it appears that SLs numbers may be larger than originally estimated only time will tell. In an attempt to curb the violence and halt an organized resurgence of SL, the Peruvian government is dispatching more police officers into conflict regions and looking to other countries for increased funding, technology and training. The government is also ramping up intelligence operations and becoming more

public on the current state of Shining Path. In November 2007 Peruvian President Alan Garcia made a controversial decision to release the names of some 2,000 people who had been previously imprisoned on terrorism charges, so everyone knows exactly who their neighbors are." Garcia hopes to prevent these former prisoners from creating new terrorist cells or from being recruited into existing cells by shining a public light on them. Whether anyone agrees with former President Alberto Fujimoris tactics, it should be noted that his administration did manage to take down the old, and very strong, Shining Path guerilla movement. As of this writing, Fujimori is on trial in Peru for murder, corruption and other charges related to his method of doling out justice during his administration. Off the record, some police and military still support Fujimori with a few calling for the current President to up the anty in Fujimori style on the current acts of terrorism. Another issue that has contributed heavily to Shining Paths ability to make a comeback is the sheer remoteness of most of Peru. Its very hard to develop or improve many of these areas and a lot of people feel their government has forgotten about them. Couple this with SLs new friendly approach at winning the hearts and minds of the locals, and its easy to see how SL is re-gaining a foothold. I guess the best question at this point is why we (Americans) should even be concerned about a small guerilla insurgency in a far-away Republic named Peru? The answer is this encompasses much more than the country of Peru. With Peru surrounded by increasingly anti-American and socialist leaning countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela who often turn a blind eye to narco-terrorism, and with the increasing spill-over of narcotics and terrorism from these countries into Peru, the insurgency known as Shining Path is definitely a group to watch. It is a known fact that SL is beginning to merge with other terrorist groups and cartels and its only a matter of time before the whole region is in jeopardy. A larger, more organized Shining Path could upset the balance of power in surrounding countries, such as Colombia, and bring about further escalation from other extremist groups in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador. Even the successes weve made in Colombia have the potential of being toppled by a large SL insurgency due to the government not controlling much of its own territory outside of the capital city. So, in a nutshell, any new organized insurgency in the NW region of South America should be considered a threat to US national security interests. Fixing this problem is not out of bounds by any stretch. Having spent a considerable amount of time with the Peruvian populace and police of the coca growing regions of Tingo Maria, Huanuco and other central jungle towns, its obvious the National Police are under-staffed, under-equipped and in many cases under-trained to deal with a terrorist attack of any size. Even the special units such as DIRANDRO (the Peruvian DEA equivalent) are hungry for increased funding and training to make them more successful over the long haul. Now may be the time for United States to invest more money and resources in Peru, especially with Ecuadorian President Rafael Correas insistence on terminating an agreement that allows the US military to use one of their air force bases for anti-drug operations in the Andes, and Bolivian President Evo Morales stating he will not cooperate with the USG on any anti-narcotics operations.