Lawrence Muskitta 1

Nature in Turmoil

It is commonly assumed that the theories of Aristotle and Hobbes are in contention with one another and that they cannot both be right in the subject of nature and politics. Theorists that adopt this view often characterise Aristotle s view as nature and politics working together and Hobbes as nature and politics in conflict. This is not exactly the case. I would argue that though these views are antagonistic in first reading, they could be quite harmonious if we understand what each mean by nature . The reason why this has caused so much confusion, I believe, is that both philosophers, wrongly, assume a causal relation between human nature and the state of nature. Let me explain these two distinct concepts before moving on to outline and analyse Hobbes and Aristotle s positions. The term human nature describes the innate character and predispositions of humankind, particularly in relation to its m oral inclinations and is often spoken about in such common maxims like humans are naturally good/evil/selfish/loving etc . The state of nature, on the other hand, is a more enigmatic concept. In a commonsensical sense, it denotes the condition of the world as it naturally occurs without human interference. But this definition implies that human activity is in some way contrary to nature and by extension, that humanity is also somehow set aside from the rest of nature. This assumption, I think, is a major flaw in Hobbes argument and leads him to think of politics as hostile to nature, which I think is false and will explain why later in this essay. Another way of thinking about the state of nature, however, is to say that the state of nature is the order things in nature ought to be in. But this, like Aristotle s teleological argument assumes that what is natural must have a good purpose. It is this definition of the state of nature and its significance to politics that I think is the crucial problem in this debate; a problem that will be developed as we examine it from the two aforementioned positions. For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war. His argument begins with the premise that all men are fundamentally equal in that none are able obtain everything they desire. Everyone, then, has the same hope to get what they want and because of the limit of resource, every man [becomes] enemy to every man . As a result, Hobbes says, humans are reluctant and even averse to acting socially or politically unless it is in their selfinterest. Thus it is against human nature to live together with other humans but they do so because it is needed for their self-preservation. The only way to assuage this violent competition among men, Hobbes suggests, is to put in place a sovereign as an arbitrator

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and authority supreme over them to ensure covenants are upheld. The state, subsequently for Hobbes, is an artificial but necessary structure used to pacify the state of nature and prevent war. Aristotle, on the other hand, sees family as the basis of the state of nature and the state as the natural evolution the family unit. In his teleological argument, he narrates the family s progression into small community of families, that community to a village and the village into the state. With each progression, the capabilities of both the ind ividual and the collective increases. Unlike Hobbes, Aristotle sees no contradiction with politics and nature working together but rather thinks that humans are intrinsically political animals and the formation of the state is both rational and natural. As sociation with others, he insists, does not contain primitive desire but facilitates its actualisation by giving the individual more power to access resources. The polis, therefore, is human nature and the state of nature fully realised. As you can see, the two positions seem very different but once we inspect possible arguments against both and look at the practical implications of the theories on political life, we may begin to see some similarities. Firstly though, let us look at some holes in their arguments. Hobbes makes a hefty presupposition in saying that there is no authority in the state of nature to keep one s desires in check. This is untrue considering all men are born into a family, the first natural and inescapable association, of which the patriarch is the authority. Much like in a state, in this family there are certain basic rules like not killing other family members and eating too much of the family s food, which are enforced with punishment from the patriarch or other family members. These rules curb primitive desire and maintain order but seem to be somewhat instinctive. Admittedly, Hobbes acknowledges the family structure as part of the state of nature but I feel, greatly underestimates its importance and instead he overstates the role of selfinterested rationality to the decision-making of the individual. As he says, Cities and Kingdomes are but greater Families (for their own security) . The family, for Hobbes, is reduced to another artificial structure maintained for the interests and protection of its members. There is no mention of eudemonia, the development of a richer, more fulfilling life within society, only that association with others robs the individual of their autonomy but is nonetheless required for continued existence. He seems to be implying that survival is as good as it gets and we shouldn t ask for more. But for some reason, that doesn t feel right for me.

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Aristotle, likewise, says little about important issues like conflict between factions. How are members of different families meant to relate? Despite there being a natural order within a family, outside this structure, without an overarching sovereign to mediate conflict, it would seem that anarchy reigns. For instance, in the state of nature, if I were to meet a stranger that did not belong to my family while walking in neural land, would it be rational for me to kill him in the first opportune moment? I suspect not. Although I do not know his intentions and that there is no authority to stop him from killing me, or me him, murder is not always the answer. Aristotle talks substantially about another capacity by which I can discern his intentions and possibly avoid conflict and death; that is, the ability to communicate through speech. If our interests align, we may be able to help each other. If our interests are unrelated, we ignore each other. This is interesting because it implies that humans can, to some extent, be self-governing without a sovereign. But what happens in the instance that our interests conflict? What if he had something I wanted? Or if I had something he wanted? Or even better, if there was something we both wanted lying between us, an object we couldn t or didn t want to share, say, a nugget of gold? Would it be rational, in the state of nature, to kill the other? Hobbes would say yes but Aristotle seems to neglect issue. He also doesn t mention the possibility of deception, manipulation or coercion in forming of covenants. Perhaps he thinks that all conflict can be solved by fair, rational discussion. This too is unconvincing. In summarizing the two views on the state of nature, I think it comes down to this: both believe that the state is the family somehow expanded. Aristotle believes this is because people naturally come together under common values and a desire to have a better life and their capacity to reason and communicate through speech allows them to live peacefully. Whereas Hobbes would say in the state of nature violence is inevitable among factions with conflicts of interest and the only way to secure peace is to create a sovereign with the power to enforce contracts and punish transgressors. The main dissonance between the two views is that Aristotle thinks that political structures are natural and Hobbes does not. The reason for this, I think, lies in their views on human nature. Hobbes paints a dark picture of human nature as it is affected by the state of nature. Humans, for him, are instinctively amoral and egotistic, looking out only for their own self-interests. This isn t because humans are morally corrupt, but because Hobbes thinks that without a state, morality doesn t exist. Without laws there can be no injustice. In his

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words The Desires and other Passions of man are in themselves no Sin. No more are Actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a Law that forbids them . Besides laws made in the state, Hobbes Laws of Nature, roughly paraphrased, are to endeavor for peace and to be peaceful to those who intend peace. This implies that human nature is peacefully reactive but violently pre-emptive, that is, it only has peace when the other offers it first otherwise it assumes a state of war. This is interesting in contrast to Aristotle s notions of human nature. One of Aristotle s first statements is that in all their actions all men do in fact aim at what they think is good . But what does he mean by good ? Is it good for the individual or good in an objective moral sense? I think the latter because for Aristotle, everything in nature has a natural function and the realisation of this function is good; the moral and the natural are synonymous. He also believes that function and identity are inextricably linked, that for an object to that object it must be able to p erform its function. For instance, the function of a chair is to be sat on, but if the chair is unable to be sat on, say, because it was missing a leg, then it is no longer considered a chair. In the same way, for Aristotle, to be fully human is to make use our exclusively human capabilities, namely our ability to reason in the social and political spheres. Someone incapable of participating in the state is a dumb animal and someone who has no need for the state is a god . Practically, I interpret Aristotle s definition of a human s function as the ability exercise autonomy over our lives within a collective life, that is, to engage with democracy enough to at least be aware of what s happening in government and how its actions affect your life and, if the need arises, have the capacity to protect your interests. Similar to women and slaves in Aristotle s time, who were unable to do this due to their state due to social barriers, today s long-term unemployed, working class and even portions of the bourgeois can t be active in political discourse because financial constraints, particularly debt, consume too much of their lives. These people are therefore inferior human beings, not because they were naturally inferior, as some elitist would like to think, but because they physically can t exercise their own natural potential and are thus made inferior. So, bringing it back to the first premise, does this mean that these people are also exempt from the intrinsic morality that comes with being human and does their poverty, if we can call it that, merit self-interested amorality? On the other side of the spectrum,

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if we look at the corporate conglomerates and Rockefellers of the world, the gods that seem to transcend the need for a state, does their self-sustainability give them license to indulge in depravity? If this is true, and it seems to be, then fo r Aristotle, much like Hobbes, justice and morality can only exist within and is dependent on political structure. When you look at Hobbes and Aristotle from a teleological and moral sense, they are quite similar. Both believe that the state was born from the family unit but they disagree on the reasons why the state was formed and sustained. Both believe that morality is a function of civil society but they disagree on why morality is important. And in both cases, Aristotle believes the reason is to have a better life whereas Hobbes thinks it is for self-preservation. This difference of values, I think, is a result of their different contexts. Hobbes wrote in a time of social turmoil, under a despotic sovereign, and was shaped by deprivation to write a somewhat gloomy account of politics whereas Aristotle, living in the idyllic democracy of Athens, had the luxury to write a more positive narrative of the state. In a sense, they are both right, relative to the circumstances.