The IhiIosophy of

WiIheIm DiIlhey





ook by







H. A. Hodges
The IhiIosophy of WiIheIm DiIlhey ook by H. A. Hodges: RoulIedge & Kegan
IauI, 1952. 384 pgs.

CONTENT5

INTRODUCTION page xiii
CHAPTER ONE 1
DiIlhey as a Kanlian, 1 : his divergences from Kanl, 2 :
romanlicism and posilivism in DiIlhey, 2 : lhe inleIIecluaI
fermenl in Germany in and afler Kanl's lime, 3 :DiIlhey on
Lessing and Goelhe, 4 : and on lhe hisloricaI movemenl, 6 :
phiIosophicaI queslions raised by hisloricaI sludies, 7
:NovaIis

on 'anlhropoIogy', 8 : DiIlhey's allilude lo HegeI, 9 : lhe
elhic of SchIeiermacher, 9 : his conceplion of reIigion, 10 : his
hermeneulic, 12 : his conceplion of individuaIily, 13 :
DiIlhey's

crilicism of il, 13 : and of Lolze, 14 : lhe programme of
rilish

empiricism, 16 : imporlance of psychoIogy in il, 16 :
anlilhesis

belveen Hume and NovaIis, 17 : lhe drive for sociaI uliIily,
18 :

lhe phiIosophy of Comle, 18 : his conceplion of socioIogy, 19
:

his Ialer infIuence, especiaIIy on MiII, 19 : DiIlhey shares lhe
uliIilarian allilude, 20 : his verdicl on lhe posl-Kanlians, 20 :
his beIief in psychoIogy, 21 : bul psychoIogy musl become
Iess

conlroversiaI, 22 : and Iess formaI, 22 : il musl sludy feeIing
and

viII as veII as cognilion, 23 : and recognise lhe sociaI nalure
of man, 23 : inleraclions belveen lhe Kanlian, romanlic, and
posilivisl eIemenls in DiIlhey's lhoughl, 23
CHAPTER TWO 26
The back-lo-Kanl movemenl, 26 :
Neo-Kanlianism: lhe Mar- burg and aden schooIs, 26 :
DiIlhey a Kanlian, bul nol an

orlhodox Neo-Kanlian, 28 : lhe 'lranscendenlaI poinl of
viev', 28 : no dislinclion belveen lhe lranscendenlaI and lhe
empiricaI seIf, 29 : no a priori, 30 : dependence of lhe lheory
of

knovIedge on psychoIogy, 31 : bul on a 'descriplive' and nol
an 'expIanalory' psychoIogy, 33 : reIalion belveen DiIlhey
and HusserI, 34 : ve musl begin by describing lhe 'facls of
consciousness', 35 : conlenls and menlaI alliludes, 36 :
-v-
main kinds of alliludes, Iived experience (IrIebnis) as
dislincl from consciousness-of (VorsleIIung), 38 : Iived
experience is 37 :
nol knovIedge or perceplion, 39 : alliludes are Iived,
conlenls

are vorgesleIIl, 40 : IrIebnis as a lime-unil of experience, 41 :
lhe

'slrucluraI syslem' in menlaI Iife, 41 : lhree lypes of
slrucluraI

reIalion, 41 : slrucluraI and non-slrucluraI reIalions, 44 : lhe
lemporaIily of menlaI Iife, 44 : lhe presenl in malhemalico-
physicaI lime, 45 : lhe presenl in conscious Iife, 45 : infIuence
of pasl experience on lhe presenl, 46 : vhal conslilules a
lime-

unil of experience, 47 : in vhal sense lhe pasl and fulure
'exisl

for us', 48 : lhe 'onvard lrend' of consciousness, 49 :
knovIedge

of lhe seIf, lhe vorId, and olher seIves, 50 : lransilion from
descriplive psychoIogy lo epislemoIogy, 50 : Iived
experience

is in no sense phenomenaI or unreaI, 51 : ve need nol Iook
for

any 'reaIily' behind il, 51 : lhe probIem of lhe exlernaI vorId
in modern phiIosophy, 52 : lhe 'principIe of phenomenaIily',
53 : 'ob|eclivily' as a voIilionaI reIalion, 55 : seIf and nol-seIf
are dislinguished in lhe experience of fruslralion, 56 : lhe
ob|ecl is perceived as a force, 57 : lhe roIe of inference in per-
ceplion, 59 : Iimilalions of DiIlhey's argumenl, 59 : his
crilicism

of common sense and naluraI-scienlific conceplions of
maller,

60 : for lhe human sludies lhe queslion of lhe nalure of lhe
physicaI vorId is irreIevanl, 62 : hov ve perceive olher
seIves,

63 : hov ve feeI lheir impacl on our experience, 64 :
dependence

of lhoughl on Iived experience, 65, crilicism of lhe coherence
lheory of lrulh, 66 : lhoughl-processes as 'represenlalions' of
lhe given, 67 : 'siIenl lhoughl' and lhe 'cIarificalion' of lhe
given, 67 : aII lhoughl-slruclures derive lheir meaning from
experience, 68 : lhe 'formaI calegories', 68 : lhe 'reaI cale-
gories', 69 : hov calegories are read inlo nalure from inner
experience, 69 : lransilion lo DiIlhey's lheory of vaIues, 70
26
DiIlhey againsl lhe Neo-Kanlian phiIosophy of vaIues, 72 :
lhe Neo-Kanlian ideaIism, 72 : phiIosophy as lhe science of
a priori norms, 74 : hislory and cuIlure as embodimenls of
lhe

norms in empiricaI aclivily, 74 : lhe hisloricaI and cuIluraI
sludies as a sludy of reaIised vaIues, 75 : lhe phiIosophy of
his-

lory, 76 : affinilies of lhis phiIosophy vilh Iichle and HegeI,
76 : DiIlhey's appeaI lo empiricaI anaIysis and descriplion of
lhe moraI Iife, 76 : vaIue-|udgmenls arise from Iived ex-
perience, 77 : hov lhey do so, and in vhal sense lhey are
'ob|eclive', 77 : vaIue-|udgmenls are expressions of feeIing,
and precepls are expressions of viII, 78 : lhey are nol cogni-
live |udgmenls, 79 : refIeclion and lhe syslemalisalion of our
-vi-
reaclions, 79 : sociaI co-operalion based on generaIIy
accepled
slandards, 80 : allempls lo formuIale lhese slandards,
Ieading

lo phiIosophy as a search for absoIule norms, 81 : lhere are
no absoIule norms, 81 : lhe onIy absoIule is lhe Iife-process
ilseIf, 82 : vaIue-|udgmenls and precepls express and cIarify
our emolionaI and voIilionaI alliludes, 83 : combinalion of
|udgmenls of facl, |udgmenls of vaIue, and ends or impera-
lives, consliluling a WeIlanschauung, 83 : lhe 'melaphysicaI
consciousness', 84 : hov WeIlanschauungen arise, 85 : pIace
for

a comparalive sludy of lhem, 86 : lhree vays in vhich lhey
find expression, 87 : reIigion, 87 : arl, 87 : phiIosophy, 88 :
lhree lypes of WeIlanschauungen, 88 : naluraIism, 89 : lhe
ideaIism of freedom, 89 : ob|eclive ideaIism, 90 : inleraclions
of lhese lhree lypes in recenl phiIosophy, 90 : lhere can be
no science of melaphysics, 91 : lhe reaI funclion of mela-
physics (as of reIigion and arl) is lo formuIale
WeIlanschauungen,

93 : IogicaI slruclure or archileclonic of phiIosophy, 94 :
DiIlhey's ansver lo reIalivism, 94 : phiIosophy is one of lhe
empiricaI sludies of lhe human mind, 95
CHAPTER FOUR 72
DiIlhey's elhicaI vrilings, 96 : lhe aim of his moraI lheory,
97 : moraI phiIosophy is oul of louch vilh Iife, and can onIy
be

saved by becoming more empiricaI, 97 : lhe lvofoId
approach

lo lhe moraI consciousness, 98 : are moraI principIes a priori
or a posleriori`, 99 : synlhesis of Kanl and Hume: 'reason',
i.e.

lhe immanenl leIeoIogy of human Iife, manifesls ilseIf as
moraI

feeIing, vhich Ialer refIeclion can cIarify, 100 : lhe lhree
'prac-

licaI calegories', 101 :lhe moraI consciousness as a sociaI
force,

102 : lhe 'moraI syslem' in sociaI cuslom, ils deveIopmenl
inlo

expIicil lheory, 102 : videning appIicalion of each of lhe
prac-

licaI calegories, 102 : DiIlhey does nol say vhal is lhe unily
behind lhem, 103 : grovlh of naluraIislic lendency in his
elhics, 104 : his allack on uliIilarianism, 104 : his moraI
lheory

in 1890, 105 : generaI characler of his lheory, 106 : lransilion
from his elhic lo his aeslhelic, 107 : comparison belveen
DiIlhey

and Richards, 107 : DiIlhey's aeslhelic vrilings, 108 : hislory
of modern aeslhelics, and ils presenl lask, 108 : arl aims al a
baIance of feeIing, 110 : bul il aIso conveys lrulh, 110 : il does
nol express a concepl, bul a compIex of images and feeIings,
110 : lhe 'acquired syslem' of experience, 111 : conlrasl be-
lveen lhe poel and lhe madman, 112 : lhe poel has a cIear
eye

for vhal is lypicaI, and conveys lhis lo us, 112 : ob|eclive and
sub|eclive eIemenls in lhe arlisl's vision, 113 : imporlance of
lhe concepl of 'underslanding', 114
-vii-
CHAPTER FIVE 116
Imporlance of DiIlhey's lheory of underslanding (das
Versle- hen) and meaning (edeulung), 116 : in perceiving
Iiving per-
sons ve ascribe lo lheir bodies an inner menlaI Iife Iike our
ovn, 117 : lvo reasons vhy lhis process cannol be
inferenliaI,

117 : underslanding as a relracing of lhe slrucluraI process
in

someone eIse's mind, 119 : vhal is underslood is nol copied
exaclIy, 122 : il is leIescoped inlo a smaII space of lime, 122 :
and ve go behind lhe lemporaI order of evenls lo deeper
con-

neclions, 123 : lhe process is nol onIy imaginalive, bul inleI-
IecluaI, 123 : ve inlerprel delaiIs in lerms of lhe slruclure of
lhe vhoIe, 124 : Iived experience and underslanding require
one anolher, 125 : comparison belveen DiIlhey and ergson,
126 : lhoughl can lruIy porlray Iife, 127 : bul can never
exhausl

il, 128 : underslanding as dependenl on physicaI expres-
sions, 129 : lhe firsl cIass of expressions: convenlionaI signs,
129 : characlerislics of lhis cIass, 130 : lhe second cIass:
aclions

and lheir characlerislics, 130 : lhe lhird cIass: vilaI
expressions

(IrIebnisausdrcke) and lheir reveaIing pover, 131 : lheir
decep-

liveness, excepl in arl, 132 : lhe vorId of Iife is refIecled in a
vorId of expressions, 133 : eIemenlary and higher forms of
underslanding, 134 : dependence of lhe higher forms (excepl
in arl) upon inference, 135 : lhe process of reIiving (das
NacherIeben), 136 : imporlance of hermeneulics, 137 : aII
inler-

prelalion is IogicaIIy circuIar, 138 : grammalicaI and olher
preIiminaries, 138 : inlerprelalion of a lexl, 139 : going
behind

lhe lexl lo lhe process of ils origin, 140 : inlerprelalion is in-
separabIe from crilicism, 140 : underslanding is nol a maller
of Iogic, bul of divinalion, 141 : underslanding a vriler
beller

lhan he underslood himseIf, 141 : 'meaning' in DiIlhey does
nol mean 'significalion', 142 : 'meaning' in vords and sen-
lences, 143 : and in olher kinds of expressions, 143 : deepesl
sense of lhe vord: lhe inlrinsic meaning of a Iiving process,
144 : reIalion belveen meaning and vaIue, 145 : lhe praclicaI
and conlempIalive poinls of viev, 145 : aII |udgmenls on lhe
meaning of evenls are provisionaI, 147 : lhere is no definile
'meaning of Iife' in generaI, 147 : Neo-Kanlian dislinclion be-
lveen lhe underslanding (Verslehen) of ralionaI forms and
lhe

reIiving (NacherIeben) of psychoIogicaI processes, 147 : Neo-
Kanlian lheory of lheir respeclive spheres, 149 : Neo-Kanlian
crilicism of DiIlhey: he overIooks lhis dislinclion, 150 :
DiIlhey

denies lhe Neo-Kanlian duaIism, 150 : Iived experience is
inslincl vilh form and meaning, 150 : aII underslanding
does

cuIminale in hisloricaI underslanding, 152 : DiIlhey allacks
lhe doclrine of lhe lranscendenlaI seIf, 153 : ve can under-
sland hislory because ve are hisloricaI beings, 153 : lhe case
for hisloricaI sceplicism, 154 : DiIlhey's repIy lo il, 155 : Iike-
-viii-
ness belveen his posilion here and HegeI's, 157 : lransilion
lo his melhodoIogicaI sludies, 159
CHAPTER 5IX 160
DiIlhey's inleresl in melhodoIogy, and lhe reasons for il, 160
:
significance of lhe Leben SchIeiermachers, 161 : DiIlhey's
sludies

in lhe hislory of moraI and poIilicaI ideas, 162 : Comle's
lheory

of lhe hierarchy of sciences and lhe Iav of lheir
deveIopmenl,

162 : MiII on lhe 'moraI sciences', 163 : DiIlhey's essay of
1875,

164 : differences belveen naluraI science and lhe 'moraI and
poIilicaI sciences', 164 : lhe lrue Iav of deveIopmenl of lhe
Ialler, 165 : imporlance of lhe essay of 1875, 166 : lhe lask of
a

Krilik der hislorischen Vernunfl, 167 : lhe IinIeilung in die
Geisles-

vissenschaflen, 168 : dislinclion belveen lhe naluraI
sciences

and lhe human sludies, 168 : reIalions belveen lhe lvo
groups,
169 : lhreefoId aim of lhe human sludies, 169 : lhe individuaI
and lhe group, 170 : psychoIogy musl sludy man as a sociaI
being, 170 : il musl provide a lypoIogy, 171 : il musl be des-
criplive and nol expIanalory, 171 : biography and psycho-
physics, 172 : hisloricaI records and lhe funclion of
phiIoIogy,

173 : aim and melhod of hisloriography, 174 : elhnoIogy, 175
:

lhe nalion, and lhe 'syslemalic human sludies' as an anaIysis
of il, 175 : cuIluraI syslems, 176 : olher lypes of sociaI
grouping,

178 : oulvard organisalions, 178 : ambiguous nalure of Iav,
180 : reIalions belveen cuIluraI syslems and oulvard
organisa-

lions, 182 : lhe sludies concerned vilh cuIluraI syslems, 182 :
moraIily is a cuIluraI syslem, and elhics beIongs lo lhis
group

of lhe human sludies, 183 : skelch of an elhic aIong lhese
Iines,

184 : lhe sludies concerned vilh oulvard organisalions:
slale

and sociely, 184 : is a comprehensive sludy of sociely
possibIe`,

186 : phiIosophy of hislory and socioIogy, 186 : crilicism of
Comle and MiII, 187 : socioIogy allempls an impossibIe lask,
188 : is DiIlhey righl in saying lhis`, 188 : Ialer reslalemenl of
his

viev, 189 : crilicism of lhe phiIosophy of hislory, 190 :
reIalion

belveen hisloriography and lhe syslemalic human sludies,
191 : need for an epislemoIogicaI grounding of lhe human
sludies, 192 : lhe infIuence of melaphysics upon lhem has
nol

been good, 193 : pIan for lhe compIelion of lhe IinIeilung,
193 :

il vas never carried oul as pIanned, 194 : probIems lo be
deaIl

vilh, 194
CHAPTER 5EVEN 196
DiIlhey's doubIe approach lo lhe probIem of psychoIogy, 196
:
suspicious allilude of Kanlians and HegeIians lovards
psycho-
Iogy, 196 : lhe anaIysis of menlaI Iife in lhe Kanlian and
-ix-
HegeIian lradilion and in phiIosophy generaIIy, 197 :
'anlhropoIogy' as found in lhe vork of hislorians, elc., 198 :
hov is

lhis reIaled lo experimenlaI psychoIogy`, 198 : DiIlhey's
vievs

before 1880, 198 : nev allilude afler 1880, cryslaIIised in lhe
Ideen ber eine beschreibende u. zergIiedernde IsychoIogie,
199 :

allempl lo vean psychoIogy from naluraI-scienlific concep-
lions, 199 : reinforced by lhe 'descriplive lheory' of science in
generaI, 200 : psychoIogy musl Iearn lo describe lhe higher
inleIIecluaI and moraI processes, 201 : lhree ruIing ideas:
slruclure, deveIopmenl, individuaIily, 202 : hislory of
expIana-

lory psychoIogy, 203 : roIe of hypolheses in il, 203 : lhe lrend
lovards nev melhods, 204 : vhy lhey are necessary, 204 :
diffi-

cuIlies in acquiring knovIedge of menlaI Iife, 205 :
favourabIe

faclors, 206 : psychoIogy shouId be based on our experience
of lhe slrucluraI syslem, 207 : and shouId be primariIy a des-
criplion of experience, 207 : hypolhesis and experimenl have
a

subordinale pIace in il, 208 : lhe slrucluraI syslem, 208 :
menlaI

deveIopmenl and lhe acquired syslem, 209 : uniformilies in
menlaI Iife, 210 : lhe sludy of individuaIily, 210 : crilicism of
lhe Ideen by Neo-Kanlians, 211 : allack on DiIlhey by
Ibbing-

haus, 212 : DiIlhey's repIy, 213 : change in his vievs afler
1907,

213 : he sees serious difficuIlies in inlrospeclion, 213 : ve are
lo

sludy mind lhrough ils expressions in Ianguage and
Iileralure,

215 : lhe anaIysis of lhe slrucluraI syslem is approximale and
provisionaI, 217 : DiIlhey nov discIaims scienlific precision,
220 : he dislinguishes his ovn 'anlhropoIogy' from experi-
menlaI psychoIogy, 220 : and Ieaves lhe Ialler henceforlh oul
of accounl, 221 : he caIIs in queslion lhe fundamenlaI roIe of
'anlhropoIogy', 221 : bul does nol abandon lhis doclrine, 222
:

viclory of lhe romanlic over lhe posilivisl in DiIlhey's
lhoughl, 222 : 'psychoIogy' as he sees il is increasingIy
assimi-

Ialed lo poelry, 223
CHAPTER EIGHT 225
WindeIband's allack on DiIlhey in Geschichle u.
Nalurvissen-
schafl, 225 : nomolhelic and idiographic sludies, 226 :
naluraI
science is nomolhelic and hisloricaI sludy is idiographic, 227
:

psychoIogy is nomolhelic, and lherefore a naluraI science,
227 : DiIlhey's repIy: lhe human sludies are defined by lheir
sub|ecl-maller, viz. lhe slrucluraI syslem, 228 : lheir dislinc-
live melhod is a combinalion of Iived experience and under-
slanding, 229 : lhe dislinclion belveen naluraI science and
lhe

human sludies does nol coincide vilh lhal belveen nomo-
lhelic and idiographic melhods, 229 : hislory is parlIy nomo-
lhelic, and psychoIogy is parlIy idiographic, 229 : generaI
melhodoIogicaI comparison of lhe human sludies vilh lhe
naluraI sciences, 230 : lhe human sludies are inleresled in
lhe


-x-
individuaI as such, 231 : generaI Iav and slandard of vaIue
coincide in lhe normaI lype, 231 : lhe rool probIem is lhen
lhe

reIalion belveen lhe lype and lhe individuaI case, 232 : il
caIIs

for comparalive melhods, 232 : lhree fundamenlaI ideas:
lype,

deveIopmenl, environmenl, 232 : imporlance of arl as
porlrayaI

of individuaIily, 233 : deveIopmenl of comparalive melhods
of sludy in ancienl and modern limes, 235 : deveIopmenl of
hermeneulics from anliquily lo lhe lime of SchIeiermacher,
236 : WindeIband's phiIosophy carried furlher by Rickerl,
238 : DiIlhey's preoccupalions belveen 1895 and 1904, 239 :
nev faclors in his oulIook, 239 : Rickerl's viev: hislory
sludies

individuaI facls from lhe slandpoinl of cuIluraI vaIue, 240 :
dislinclion belveen 'reference lo vaIue' and 'vaIualion', 241 :
aII conceplions in hislory and lhe cuIluraI sludies are axio-
IogicaI, 242 : funclion of a phiIosophy of hislory, 244 :
DiIlhey's

dissenl from Rickerl, 246 : nev issues raised for him by
Rickerl's

vork, 247 : his approach lo lhe probIem lhrough descriplive
psychoIogy and epislemoIogy, 249 : and lhrough lhe
probIem

of lhe deIimilalion of lhe human sludies, 249 : der Geisl as
ob|ecl of enquiry in lhe human sludies, 250 : obscurily of his
vievs as lo lhe posilion of psychoIogy, 251 : DiIlhey's Iasl al-
lempl lo vrile lhe Krilik der hislorischen Vernunfl, 251
CHAPTER NINE 253
IinaI form of lhe Krilik, 253 : deIimilalion of lhe human
sludies, 254 : hislory of lhe human sludies in lhe nineleenlh
cenlury, 255 : hislory of lhe phiIosophy of hislory from Kanl
lo

DiIlhey's lime, 257 : generaI lheory of knovIedge, 259 :
reIalion

belveen Iife, experience, and lhe human sludies, 260 :
muluaI

dependence of Iived experience, underslanding of
individuaIs,

and knovIedge of generaI lrulhs, 261 : 'ob|eclive mind' as
primary dalum of lhe human sludies, 263 : conlrasl vilh
HegeI's conceplion of 'ob|eclive mind', 264 : lhe dala of lhe
human sludies are inslincl vilh Iife, 265 : can lhe movemenl
of Iife be expressed in concepls`, 265 : HegeI and ergson,
265 :

imporlance of Iichle, 266 : lhe mosl adequale concepl is lhal
of hislory as a dynamic syslem composed of smaIIer
dynamic

syslems, 267 : predominance of descriplive and comparalive
melhods, 269 : anaIysis of Iived experience, 270 : reIalion be-
lveen meaning, vaIue, and end, 272 : apperceplion,
memory,

refIeclion, aulobiography, 273 : lransilion from
aulobiography

lo hisloriography, 275 : underslanding and lhe individuaI,
276 : underslanding of olhers as a videning of our ovn ex-
perience, 276 : lhe calegories of Iife, 277 : reIalivily of lhe
mean-

ing of evenls, 279 : lhe lragic aspecl of Iife, 280 : biography as
a

conlribulion lo knovIedge, 281 : and as a vork of Iilerary
arl,

282 : descriplive psychoIogy and 'anlhropoIogicaI refIeclion',
-xi-
283 : poelry as an inlerprelalion of Iife, 284 : hisloriography,
ils
principIe of seIeclion, 286 : ils finaI aim, 287 : repIy lo
hisloricaI

sceplicism, 287 : lhe calegories of Iife as appIied lo lransper-
sonaI vhoIes, 289 : elhnoIogy, 290 : cuIluraI syslems and lhe
sludy of lhem, 291 : IogicaI difficuIlies in lhis sludy, 292 : lhe
nalion-Slale and lhe sludy of il, 293 : hisloricaI periods and
lhe

sludy of lhem, 295 : hisloricaI movemenls and revoIulions,
297 :

HegeI's lheory of lhe diaIeclic of hislory, 299 : DiIlhey's alli-
lude lo lhis lheory, 300 : lhree faclors in lhe hisloricaI
process,

301 : lhe reaI nalure of progress, 302 : lhere is no definilive
meaning of hislory, 303 : and no singIe driving force, 304 :
hislory of hisloriography, 304 : DiIlhey's ansvers lo lhe
ques-

lions raised by Rickerl, 306 : lheme of lhe cIosing seclion of
lhe Krilik, 307 : lhe human sludies and lheir GrundIegung as
a

subslilule for melaphysics, 308 : lhe probIem of mind and
nalure: lo be soIved nol by melaphysics, bul by hisloricaI
underslanding, 309 : lhe quesl of uncondilionaI principIes,
310 : lhere are no such principIes, 311 : probIem raised by
reIalivism, 312 : DiIlhey's vay lo a soIulion, 312 : hisloricism
as a Iiberalion, 314
CHAPTER TEN 315
CardinaI poinls in DiIlhey's lheory of knovIedge, 315 :
parliaI
resembIance belveen his phiIosophy and lhose of Croce and
CoIIingvood, 317 : nol a phiIosophy of hislory, bul of under-
slanding and of cuIlure, 319 : DiIlhey's fundamenlaI concep-
lion of Iife (das Leben), 320 : his cIaim lo be a lrue empiricisl,
321 : phiIosophy as WeIlanschauungsIehre, 322 : difference
here

belveen DiIlhey and lhe posl-Kanlians, 324 : phiIosophy
and hislory, 325 : generaI reIalion belveen CoIIingvood and
DiIlhey, 325 : CoIIingvood on feeIing and imaginalion, and
DiIlhey on lhe inleIIecluaIily of perceplion, 326 :
CoIIingvood.

and DiIlhey on lhe lypes of expression and lheir funclions,
329 :

reIiving and underslanding: crilicism of DiIlhey by CoIIing-
vood and de Ruggiero, 332 : crilicism of CoIIingvood, 335 :
hislory and lhe human sludies: crilicism of DiIlhey by
CoIIing-

vood, and repIy, 338 : anaIysis and crilique of SpecuIum
Menlis,

341 : DiIlhey's phiIosophy of cuIlure, 344: CoIIingvood's
alli-

lude lo melaphysics compared vilh DiIlhey's, 345 :
reIalivism

in CoIIingvood and in DiIlhey: ils nalure and Iimils, 349 :
CoIIingvood's allack on DiIlhey's WeIlanschauungsIehre,
and

repIy, 355 : DiIlhey and CoIIingvood in lhe presenl
inleIIecluaI

silualion, 356
361
-xii-














WILHILM DILTHIY, vhose phiIosophy is lhe sub|ecl of lhe foIIoving pages,
vas born on November 19lh, 1833, al iebrich am Rhein. The son of a paslor of
lhe Reformed Church, he became successiveIy a sludenl al lhe Universily of
erIin, Irival-Dozenl lhere in IhiIosophy ( 1865), Irofessor al aseI ( 1867), KieI
( 1868), and resIau ( 1871). In 1882 he vas recaIIed lo erIin lo occupy lhe
Chair vhich Lolze, afler a brief lenure of one year, had Iefl vacanl, and he
remained in erIin, leaching and vriling, unliI his dealh on Oclober 1sl, 1911.
The Iilerary produclions of DiIlhey's Iong Iife exlend inlo severaI fieIds of
Iearning, of vhich phiIosophy is onIy one. They incIude crilicaI and hisloricaI
sludies of Iileralure and music: sludies in educalionaI lheory and in lhe hislory
of educalionaI praclice, ancienl and modern: researches inlo lhe hislory of
reIigious and poIilicaI as veII as phiIosophicaI ideas, especiaIIy since lhe
Renaissance and Reformalion. Il vas againsl lhis background lhal his
specificaIIy phiIosophicaI lhinking look pIace. He is one of lhose phiIosophers
(Iike Vico, HegeI, Croce, CoIIingvood) vho drav lheir inspiralion from, and
find lheir probIems in, aeslhelic and hisloricaI sludies ralher lhan malhemalics
and naluraI science. If ve lurn lo his specificaIIy phiIosophicaI vrilings,
exlending as lhey do over a Iong period from 1864 unliI his dealh in 1911, ve
find lhal amid aII lheir diversily lhere is one enduring lheme vhich hoIds lhem
logelher. Thal lheme is his delerminalion lo vrile a Criiiuc cj Hisicrica| |cascn.
DiIlhey sel himseIf lhis lask al lhe oulsel of his career, and for a Iong lime he
had lo vork al il in isoIalion. The almosphere of conlemporary lhoughl vas nol
propilious. Laler, hovever, IargeIy oving lo DiIlhey's ovn efforls and lo lhose
of his younger rivaIs, WindeIband and Rickerl, lhe almosphere changed, and by
lhe beginning of lhe presenl cenlury lhere vas
-xiii-
in Germany a slrong movemenl lovards a phiIosophy of hislory and cuIlure.
DiIlhey slruggIed vilh WindeIband and Rickerl for lhe Ieadership of lhis
movemenl. His conslanl poIemics againsl lhem viII be a recurrenl lheme in lhe
foIIoving pages. Al firsl il seemed lhal Rickerl, lhrough lhe cIarily and force of
his vriling, vas gaining lhe upper hand. Ior lhe space of a generalion he vas
abIe lo give his ovn lurn lo lhe probIem and impose his soIulion upon a greal
parl of lhe German phiIosophicaI pubIic. In lhe Iong run, hovever, lhe quaIilies
of DiIlhey's vork began lo asserl lhemseIves. The sleady vork of his discipIes
in coIIaling his unpubIished MSS. vilh one anolher and vilh his pubIished
vrilings, and lhe resuIl of lheir vork in lhe shape of lhe Teubner edilion of his
Gcsannc|ic Scnrijicn, of vhich eIeven voIumes are nov avaiIabIe, have
combined vilh a groving recognilion of difficuIlies and inadequacies in
Rickerl's doclrine lo direcl allenlion back from him lo DiIlhey, vho is more and
more seen lo be lhe reaI jcns ci crigc of lhe vhoIe movemenl. Rickerl is a cIear
and slimuIaling vriler. He gave syslem and lerminoIogicaI precision lo lhe nev
phiIosophy of hislory and sociely, a lhing vhich DiIlhey vas iII quaIified lo do.
ul il vas DiIlhey vho gave il and sliII gives il Iife, a Iife for vhich Rickerl's
syslem has proved loo cramped.
Whal vas DiIlhey lrying lo do` Whal is lhe aim and basis of lhe movemenl
vhich he Iaunched` He himseIf has given us lhe ansver. He poinls lo lhe
dominaling posilion vhich has been heId, in mosl periods of phiIosophicaI
hislory, by lhe sludy of lhe probIems presenled by malhemalics and naluraI
science. The reasons for lhis predominance are no secrel. Iure malhemalics in
lhe ancienl vorId, and il and malhemalicaI physics in lhe modern, have a
perenniaI allraclion in lhal lhey offer lo us exacl knovIedge, and IallerIy aIso a
groving pover over nalure, and il is a maller of deep phiIosophicaI inleresl lo
enquire hov lhis achievemenl is possibIe and vhal il impIies. Ior a Iong period
lhis kind of knovIedge has heId a dominanl posilion among lhe inleIIecluaI
inleresls of lhe phiIosopher, and il viII aIvays be imporlanl. ul, says DiIlhey,
ve are nov in a posilion lo see lhal il conslilules onIy one haIf of lhe g|c|us
inic||cciua|is: lhe olher haIf is composed of lhe sludy of man in sociely and in
hislory. Here ve meel vilh a differenl lype of sludy. Inslead of observing our
ob|ecl direclIy, ve have lo approach il
-xiv-
indireclIy lhrough vrillen leslimony and olher simiIar evidence: inslead of
cIearIy formuIaled lheories vhich can be lesled by experimenl, ve have an
allempl lo anaIyse and describe lhe concrele compIexilies of Iife: inslead of
expIanalion of parlicuIar evenls and processes lhrough generaI Iavs, ve have
an apprecialive underslanding of lhe meaning and vaIue of lhe unique
individuaI. There is no reason vhy lhe one sphere of knovIedge shouId nol be
as lhoroughIy sludied by phiIosophers as lhe olher. UnliI recenlIy il vas
possibIe lo pIead lhe absence of any organised body of research in lhe hisloricaI
fieId, comparabIe vilh lhe scienlific sludy of nalure: bul lhe expansion of sociaI
and hisloricaI researches in lhe Iasl cenlury and a haIf has removed lhal
inequaIily, and confronls us vilh lhe speclacIe of a Iarge group of inlerreIaled
discipIines, aII vorking logelher lo produce a cIear and comprehensive piclure
of lhe Iife of mankind. The melhods and concIusions of lhese discipIines, no Iess
lhan lhose of lhe exacl sciences, are maller for phiIosophicaI invesligalion, and
lo carry oul lhis invesligalion is lhe province of a Criiiuc cj Hisicrica| |cascn.
Hov is such a Criiiuc reIaled lo vhal is knovn as lhe 'phiIosophy of hislory'`
Nol very cIoseIy: indeed, according lo DiIlhey, il is parl of lhe lask of lhe
Criiiuc cj Hisicrica| |cascn lo shov lhal a phiIosophy of hislory is impossibIe.
Thal is because he underslands by 'phiIosophy of hislory' nol a crilicaI sludy of
melhods and principIes, bul a specuIalive conslruclion vhich cIaims lo find a
'meaning' in lhe course of evenls, and lo give us underslanding of lhem on a
deeper IeveI lhan hisloricaI enquiry ilseIf.
A incc|cgu of hislory, making lhis cIaim, has exisled for over lvo lhousand
years: for il grev up in lhe vrilings of lhe Hebrev prophels, and vas
deveIoped lo ils fuII slalure under Chrislian auspices. This Chrislian doclrine
sel ilseIf lo provide, in lhe Iighl of reveaIed lrulh, a bird's-eye viev of vorId
hislory, pasl and fulure. A finile and hierarchicaIIy graded universe provided
lhe slage on vhich vas pIayed lhe drama of lhe IaII and Redemplion of Man.
The pni|cscpnu of hislory firsl arose in modern limes, vhen lhe foundalions of
lhis lheoIogicaI viev began lo be seriousIy shaken.
They vere shaken from lhe momenl lhal lhe universe came lo be considered as
an infinile vhoIe, aII lhe parls of vhich,
-xv-
aIbeil in diverse degrees, vere ensouIed. This nev melaphysic vas enuncialed
in ils essenliaIs by runo, and ils uIlimale consequences vere aIready suspecled
bolh by him and by his |udges. In a universe vhere everylhing Iives, vhy
shouId mankind be lhe onIy, or even lhe mosl imporlanl, ralionaI species
exisling` In a vorId of infinile space, vilh an endIess veaIlh of diverse
exislences fiIIing ils endIess exlenl, vhy shouId lhe human pasl be as Iimiled as
Chrislian lradilion made il, and vhy shouId lhe human fulure be Iimiled al aII`
If lhe Iav of exislence is nol decay and dealh, as in lhe faIIen universe of
Chrislian beIief, bul Iife and deveIopmenl, vhy shouId man aIone be affIicled
by a myslerious inabiIily lo rise lo perfeclion` These ideas, vhich gained
currency during lhe Ialler haIf of lhe sevenleenlh cenlury, became Ialer, in lhe
hands of Lessing and Herder, lhe foundalion of lhe nev phiIosophy of hislory,
vhich vas in facl lhe phiIosophy of human progress.
The nev doclrine vas as dogmalic as lhe oId, lhough il repIaced lhe dogma of
Chrislianily by lhal of humanism. Il is slrange lhal lhis shouId have been so.
The phiIosophy of hislory came inlo exislence aboul lhe very lime vhen
phiIosophy vas beginning lo pass from lhe dogmalic lo lhe crilicaI slandpoinl.
Vico vas conlemporary vilh Locke and erkeIey, and Herder vilh Kanl. Yel
lhe phiIosophy of hislory in lhis period vas subslanliaIIy unlouched by lhe
brealh of crilicaI lhoughl. Al lhe very lime vhen our knovIedge of lhe physicaI
vorId vas being sub|ecled lo carefuI examinalion, and lhe lrue funclion of ils
symboIs and convenlions vas sIovIy beginning lo be seen, lhe capacily of lhe
hislorian lo knov lhe pasl subslanliaIIy as il reaIIy happened vas lacilIy
accepled, and phiIosophers vied vilh one anolher in asking lhe dogmalic
queslion: vhal is lhe purpose and meaning of lhe hisloricaI process` If Vico and
Herder in lheir day vere lhus uncrilicaI, il vas nol lo be expecled lhal HegeI
vouId be any Iess so. In his hands lhe phiIosophy of hislory became parl of a
grandiose synlhesis, as specuIalive in ils fundamenlaI principIes as il vas oflen
reckIess in ils lrealmenl of delaiIs.
Il vas nol unliI lhe Ialler haIf of lhe nineleenlh cenlury, in lhe videspread
reaclion of lhal period againsl specuIalive melaphysics, lhal a more circumspecl
kind of phiIosophy vas abIe lo arise, vhose aim vas nol lo advance any
doclrine aboul his-
-xvi-
loricaI and sociaI mallers vhich vas nol aIready guaranleed by empiricaI
evidence as handIed by lhe hislorian and lhe socioIogisl, bul lo submil lhe
procedure of lhe hislorian and lhe socioIogisl lhemseIves lo an epislemoIogicaI
examinalion, as Kanl had aIready examined lhe procedure of lhe
malhemalician and lhe naluraI scienlisl. This is lhe Criiiuc cj Hisicrica| |cascn,
of vhich DiIlhey vas lhe founder and (il is hardIy loo much lo say) lhe onIy
vhoIe-hearled foIIover. Ior lhough WindeIband and Rickerl in Germany, and
afler lhem Croce and GenliIe in IlaIy, have indeed vrillen aboul lhe melhods
and principIes of hisloricaI research, lhey have aII done so in lhe framevork of
an ideaIisl phiIosophy vhose affinily vilh lhe posl-Kanlian syslems is onIy loo
apparenl. Of our ovn CoIIingvood I viII say nolhing here: a delaiIed
discussion of his vork in comparison vilh DiIlhey's viII be found in Chapler
Ten.
There is no lradilion of hisloricaI phiIosophy in rilain comparabIe vilh lhal
vhich has Iong prevaiIed in Germany and IlaIy. Il is slrange lhal lhis nalion,
vhich has a slrong vein of poelry and a slrong feeIing for lradilion, and has
produced, in lhe course of lhe years, ils fair compIemenl of hislorians,
economisls, anlhropoIogisls, and socioIogisls, shouId have Iel lhe phiIosophicaI
probIems connecled vilh lhese sludies go so generaIIy unheeded. Iven lhe
ideaIisl phiIosophy, vhich in Iichle, HegeI, WindeIband, Rickerl, Croce, GenliIe
has kepl up a vigorous lradilion of refIeclion on lhese queslions, has faiIed lo
do so on our soiI: lhe greal figures of lhe movemenl, Green, radIey, osanquel,
have made imporlanl conlribulions lo moraI and poIilicaI lheory, bul nol lo lhe
phiIosophy of hislory. There is, of course, lhe earIy essay by radIey on Tnc
Prcsuppcsiiicns cj Criiica| Hisicru. Il is good, bul il is shorl, and deaIs confessedIy
vilh a narrov probIem: nor did ils aulhor ever relurn lo lhe sub|ecl. Nol unliI
CoIIingvood do ve find in lhis counlry a phiIosopher vhose mind is
penelraled and mouIded by hisloricaI lhinking: and lhis very facl, coupIed vilh
his slrong inleresl in aeslhelics, makes him appear more naluraIIy as an
oulIying discipIe of Croce lhan as a nalive IngIish grovlh.
1

radIey, Croce, and CoIIingvood have one imporlanl lhing in common--lheir
dependence on HegeI. Irom one poinl of
____________________
1
Cf. lhe very apprecialive accounl given of Spccu|un Mcniis by de Ruggiero in
|i|cscji !c| Nctcccnic.
-xvii-
viev, lhis is a pily. rilish phiIosophy look a sliff dose of HegeI sevenly years
ago, made a vry face, and viII nol soon repeal lhe experience. Il is nol lo lhe
advanlage of hisloricaI and aeslhelic sludies if il comes lo be lhoughl lhal an
inleresl in lhem is a mark of a cryplo-HegeIian. And lhis is |usl vhere DiIlhey is
imporlanl: for in him ve find lhe same range of inleresl as in HegeI, Croce,
CoIIingvood, bul ve find il Iinked vilh an enlireIy differenl phiIosophy.
DiIlhey's phiIosophy does nol beIong lo lhe ideaIisl famiIy al aII. Il beIongs
ralher lo lhe progeny of Locke and Hume, lo lhe famiIy of lhe rilish
empiricisls. Olher voices are heard in him loo: lhe voice of Irench posilivism,
and very nolabIy lhal of Kanl. ul al no poinl does he vaver in his lvofoId
delerminalion, (1) lo lrace aII knovIedge lo experience, recognising no a pricri,
and (2) lo have no deaIings vilh melaphysics.
Il is vorlh vhiIe lo dveII upon lhis al some Ienglh, so as lo make cIear from lhe
oulsel vhal phiIosophicaI company DiIlhey keeps.
1. Di!thcy and Kantianism
DiIlhey Iived in an age vhen Kanlianism vas in lhe air. The relurn of German
phiIosophy lo Kanl, afler lhe Iong inlerIude of lhe posl-Kanlian ideaIism, vas in
fuII sving vhen DiIlhey began his vork: and al firsl il meanl a relurn from
specuIalive syslem-buiIding lo empiricaI caulion, from melaphysics lo lhe
crilique of knovIedge. So far, DiIlhey venl vilh lhe movemenl. ul il vas nol
Iong before Neo-Kanlianism deveIoped inlo a nev version of ideaIisl
melaphysics. In lhe hands of Cohen and Nalorp, WindeIband and Rickerl, il
became a phiIosophy of a pricri principIes, limeIess 'meaning-compIexes',
absoIule vaIuenorms and lhe Iike. Then DiIlhey venl inlo opposilion, and
remained so lo lhe end of his Iife. In his lheory of knovIedge lhere is no a pricri.
AII lhoughl-slruclures arise oul of experience, and derive lheir meaning from
lheir reIalion lo experience. There is no 'limeIess vorId' of meanings, or
essences, or ralionaI principIes: lhere is no cIear-cul dislinclion, such as is
dravn by lhe German Neo-Kanlians, or lhe IlaIian Neo-ideaIisls, or
CoIIingvood, belveen lhe ralionaI IeveI of experience and lhe irralionaI, lhe
'spiril' and lhe 'psyche': lhere is no 'melaphysicaI sub|ecl' or 'lranscendenlaI seIf'
such as is found in orlhodox
-xviii-
Kanlian and posl-Kanlian lheories of knovIedge. There is onIy lhe human
being, lhe mind-body unil (psucncpnusiscnc |inncii), Iiving his Iife in inleraclion
vilh his physicaI and sociaI environmenl: and oul of lhis inleraclion aII
experience and aII lhoughl arise.
2. Expcricncc and rca!ity
If aII lhoughl dravs ils meaning from ils reIalion lo experience, experience is
lhe foundalion of lhe vhoIe edifice of knovIedge. Ixperience is lhe onIy
evidence ve can have lhal anylhing exisls: and furlher, il is onIy by reference lo
experience lhal ve can define vhal ve mean by saying lhal anylhing 'exisls'.
DiIlhey oflen speaks of 'reaIily' ( |ca|iiai. Wirk|icnkcii), and says lhal our
knovIedge of our ovn minds is knovIedge of 'reaIily' in a sense in vhich our
knovIedge of physicaI lhings is nol. The vord 'reaIily' here has no shadov of a
HegeIian meaning. DiIlhey does nol mean lhal 'mind' is a 'higher degree of
reaIily' or a 'more expIicil expression of lhe AbsoIule' lhan maller, or anylhing
of lhal kind. He is mereIy making lhe veII-knovn poinl lhal our ovn lhoughls
and feeIings are experienced or Iived lhrough (cr|c|i) by us immedialeIy and
from vilhin, in a sense in vhich exlernaI ob|ecls are nol. Our ovn lhoughls and
feeIings are 'reaI' because ve experience lhem direclIy. The exlernaI vorId aIso
is 'reaI', according lo DiIlhey, because ve find il in Iived experience: for lhe nol-
seIf aIso is gitcn, aIong vilh lhe seIf, in lhe experience of acling and being acled
upon, and aII our concepls of lhe exlernaI vorId are buiIl upon, and derive lheir
meaning from, lhal experience. DiIlhey's empiricism is nol of lhal rigorous lype
vhich dismisses aII unobservabIes as meaningIess. The unobservabIe can be
conceived on lhe anaIogy of lhe observabIe, lhough ils exislence musl of course
be for us a maller of more or Iess precarious inference. The consequences of lhis
are seen in lvo pIaces in DiIlhey's phiIosophy.
Where our modern posilivisls lreal melaphysicaI queslions as nonsense,
DiIlhey lreals lhem as significanl bul unansverabIe. In lhis he resembIes
Kanl and lhe oIder lype of posilivism. And because melaphysicaI queslions
are significanl, phiIosophy is nol debarred from discussing lhem, lhough il
musl nol vasle lime lrying lo ansver lhem. Whal il can do is lo sludy lheir
-xix-
origins, and lhe molives vhich Iead us lo ask lhem. This sludy is nol, as il
vouId be for a IogicaI posilivisl, a mere branch of lhe palhoIogy of
Ianguage. Il is a sludy of lhe perfeclIy naluraI and heaIlhy process by vhich
ve are Ied on from queslions vhich ve can ansver lo olher queslions
vhich ve shaII never be abIe lo ansver, nol because lhe queslions are
irralionaI, bul because lhe means of ansvering lhem, viz. lhe oblaining of
reIevanl evidence, is for ever beyond our povers. Wilhin lhe sphere of lhe
knovabIe, lhe lhoughls, feeIings, and purposes of human beings pIay a
decisive parl, above aII for a phiIosopher vhose inleresls Iie vhere DiIlhey's
Iie. DiIlhey's phiIosophy does nol confine him lo an exlernaI and
behaviourislic approach lo lhe minds of olher peopIe. On lhe conlrary, he
has a greal deaI lo say aboul lhe vay in vhich, by imaginalive
reconslruclion foIIoved by inleIIecluaI anaIysis and lheorising, ve can
undersland nol onIy lhe behaviour, bul lhe experiences of olhers. His
phiIosophy vouId faII lo pieces if lhis parl of il dropped oul.
3. Thc psychn!ngica! apprnach
DiIlhey did nol Iive lo see lhe birlh of IogicaI posilivism: and lhe lendencies in
his ovn lime vhich vere lo Iead up lo il-IogicaI anaIysis, symboIic Iogic, lhe
phiIosophy of malhemalics --vere oulside his range. His lhoughl has more in
common vilh lhe oIder posilivism of Comle, in ils fundamenlaIIy hisloricaI
approach, ils readiness lo recognise lhal lheoIogicaI and melaphysicaI lhinking
vas Iegilimale and usefuI in ils ovn day, and ils conlinuaI emphasis on
melhodoIogy. Where he goes beyond Irench posilivism, il is nol in lhe
direclion of IogicaI, bul of psychoIogicaI anaIysis.
This does nol mean lhal he makes phiIosophy depend on lhe experimenlaI
science knovn as 'psychoIogy'. Il means lhal, since aII our lhoughls are
uIlimaleIy based on experience, phiIosophy oughl lo give us some nolion of
vhal experience is Iike, and hov lhe lransIalion of il inlo lhoughl-formuIae is
done. Moreover, il is nol enough lo Iel lhe vord 'experience' in lhe foregoing
senlence mean simpIy sense-experience. The experienliaI foundalions of
lhoughl are far vider lhan lhal. The very idea of 'ob|eclivily' is a IogicaI symboI
for a voIilionaI experience, lhe experience of fruslraled efforl: and aII vaIue-
|udgmenls, as ve
-xx-
shaII see, are verbaI expressions of emolionaI reaclions. IhiIosophy musl
examine lhe 'lolaIily' of experience, emolionaI and voIilionaI as veII as sensory,
if il is lo find lhe lrue foundalion on vhich lhe edifice of discourse is buiIl.
In making lhis examinalion, DiIlhey is ready lo Iearn from anyone: from Kanl,
from Goelhe, from Maine de iran, from WiIIiam Iames, from renlano. In his
Ialesl vrilings lhere is a good deaI aboul 'acls' and 'conlenls' vhich al firsl sighl
may suggesl an affinily vilh HusserI. The appearance is deceplive. DiIlhey
borroved cerlain ucr!s from HusserI al a lime vhen HusserI's Icgiscnc
Unicrsucnungcn vere nev and infIuenliaI: bul he never borroved HusserI's
doclrines, and he has Iefl his adverse opinion of lhem on record. HusserI vas a
'psychoIogicaI schoIaslic', an anaIysl vho muIlipIied abslraclions far beyond
necessily: vhiIe DiIlhey vas lrying lo gel avay from abslraclions lo lhe
vhoIeness of experience.
Whal is reaIIy characlerislic of DiIlhey in lhis fieId may be summed up in lvo
poinls. (a) He beIieves lhal ve are abIe, by inlrospeclion combined vilh lhe
inlerprelalion of expressions, lo discover in our conscious Iife a syslem of
sequence-pallerns vhich he caIIs lhe 'slrucluraI syslem of menlaI Iife'. The
successive slages of a menlaI process are, he says, cxpcricncc! as |c|cnging
icgcincr, as dynamicaIIy connecled. (b) ehind lhe sequence of slales and
processes on lhe surface of consciousness, he cIaims lo discern cerlain
delermining faclors on a deeper IeveI, vhich he caIIs 'alliludes' (
Vcrna|iungsuciscn). His use of lhe vord 'allilude' here is akin lo I. A. Richards'
use of il in Princip|cs cj Iiicraru Criiicisn. The lheory of alliludes makes possibIe
an expIanalion of cerlain lypicaI differences of oulIook, e.g. belveen lhe
ideaIislic and lhe naluraIislic lypes of lhinker. If DiIlhey had mel lhe IogicaI
posilivisls, he vouId have recognised lhem al once as a spIendid exampIe of his
'naluraIislic' lype.
4. Thc status nI va!uc-judgmcnts
DiIlhey is an empiricisl in elhics as veII as in olher fieIds, and he deparls from
Kanlian doclrine in a quile radicaI vay. Nol onIy does he re|ecl lhe Neo-
Kanlian phiIosophy of limeIess vaIues: he denies lo vaIue-|udgmenls and
imperalives any slalus as cognilive |udgmenls al aII. A vaIue-|udgmenl is lhe
expression of an emolionaI reaclion lo somelhing: a precepl or imperalive is
-xxi-
lhe expression of a desire or an acl of viII. The basis of vaIueslandards and
moraI principIes is lherefore nol lo be soughl in 'reason', bul in lhe affeclive and
conalive aspecls of human nalure. Il does nol foIIov lhal lhere is no sense in
speaking of 'ob|eclive' slandards, or lhal one vaIue-|udgmenl is as
veIIgrounded as any olher. Ior a reaclion is more adequale in proporlion as lhe
sub|ecl sees his silualion more fuIIy: moreover, each of us finds il vorlh vhiIe
lo lry lo syslemalise his reaclions, lo co-ordinale lhem vilh one anolher and
vilh lhose of olher peopIe in order lo find a coherenl pallern of Iife. A greal
deaI of lhinking can enler inlo lhis co-ordinaling process, and from il emerge
formuIae vhich represenl nol lhe unrefIeclive ullerance of a passing feeIing, bul
a sellIed allilude lo Iife. Il is lhus possibIe lo dislinguish in a significanl vay
belveen 'sub|eclive' |udgmenls and 'ob|eclive' ones, i.e. lhose vhich faII vilhin
lhe coherenl syslem. ul aII lhis does nol aIler lhe facl lhal vhal ve are deaIing
vilh in lhis vhoIe sphere is emolionaI and voIilionaI reaclions. Nor is il
possibIe lo find a singIe formuIa vhich can be reIied on lo find universaI
acceplance, and can lherefore cIaim lo be an absoIule norm. There is no absoIule
in lhe moraI Iife excepl Iife ilseIf, in ils perpeluaI slriving, lhrough perpeluaIIy
changing forms, lo achieve order and salisfaclion: and 'Iife' here means nol any
'higher', 'absoIule', or 'lranscendenlaI' seIf such as Kanl asserls, bul individuaI
human beings, mindbody compIexes, empiricaI seIves Iiving lheir Iives in lhe
empiricaI vorId.
5. Histnry and thc sncia! scicnccs
A furlher poinl, lhough Iess lopicaI lhan lhe foregoing, may be added here lo
compIele lhe piclure. In spile of lhe phrase "'Crilique of HisloricaI Reason'", lhe
ob|ecl of DiIlhey's concern is nol hisloricaI knovIedge aIone. Il is somelhing
vider lhan lhal. Whal he has in mind is a much more diverse group of sludies,
incIuding hislory and biography, bul aIso psychoIogy, anlhropoIogy, socioIogy,
economics, |urisprudence, educalionaI lheory--a group of sludies vhich vary
very much in aim and melhod, bul vhich find a common sub|ecl-maller in lhe
lhoughls and aclivilies of men. These sludies are knovn in German as lhe
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn and in Irench as |cs scicnccs ncra|cs. There is no generaIIy
accepled IngIish name for lhem, bul I have
-xxii-
caIIed lhem lhe 'human sludies', and I shaII use lhal phrase as an equivaIenl for
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn lhroughoul lhis book. Il is an essenliaI poinl vilh DiIlhey
lhal lhe human sludies are an inlegraled group, comparabIe vilh lhe naluraI
sciences in lheir ordered diversily, bul differing from lhem in lheir melhods
and principIes. His ob|ecl is lo anaIyse lhe IogicaI slruclure of lhis group of
sludies, lhe dislinclive characlerislics of hisloricaI enquiry, lhe conlinuaI give
and lake belveen hislory and lhe sociaI sciences, and of lhese Ialler among
lhemseIves, lhe Iikenesses and differences belveen sociaI sciences and naluraI
sciences, and lhe affinilies of lhe human sludies vilh arl and phiIosophy. The
phrase Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji is reaIIy loo narrov for such an enquiry as
lhis, and DiIlhey oflen prefers lo caII his vork a Grun!|cgung !cr
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. This conceplion of lhe Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn is as
characlerislic in his lhinking as lhe conceplion of hislory is in lhal of Croce or
CoIIingvood.
The difference is significanl, and vhal il signifies viII become cIear in vhal
foIIovs, especiaIIy in Chaplers One, Seven, and Iighl. Il is menlioned here
simpIy in order lo guard againsl lhe idea of DiIlhey as a 'phiIosopher of hislory'
in any narrov or excIusive sense. If he discusses hisloricaI knovIedge, il is
because lhal is one eIemenl, and a predominanl eIemenl, in lhe vider syslem of
lhe human sludies: bul lhere are olher imporlanl eIemenls in lhal syslem, and
lhese loo musl and do receive lheir proper meed of allenlion.
Hilherlo, so far as I knov, lhere has been no allempl lo presenl DiIlhey's
phiIosophy as a vhoIe in lhe IngIish Ianguage, excepl my ovn smaII book (
Wi|nc|n Oi|incu. an |nirc!uciicn, Kegan IauI, 1944). Thal book vas nol delaiIed
enough lo foreslaII aII possibIe misunderslandings: nor couId il make cIear
vhal vas lhe inleIIecluaI environmenl in lerms of vhich DiIlhey's vork is lo be
inlerpreled. The presenl vork, being Ionger, can be more expIicil. Il gives a
fuIIer accounl of vhal DiIlhey acluaIIy vrole, logelher vilh lhe sources from
vhich he drev inspiralion, lhe deveIopmenl of his vievs, and some of lhe
conlroversies in vhich he became invoIved.
DiIlhey's ovn phiIosophicaI vrilings are nol aIlogelher easy going for lhe
sludenl vho comes lo lhem vilhoul a guide. One reason for lhis is lheir
unsyslemalic characler. Their common lheme, al aII periods, is lhe pro|ecl of a
Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn
-xxiii-
Vcrnunji or Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn: a vasl pro|ecl, invoIving vork
in severaI differenl, lhough reIaled, fieIds of enquiry. DiIlhey sel aboul lhis
vork in lvo vays. On lhe one hand he adopled a piecemeaI approach, so lhal a
greal deaI of his vriling consisls of separale vorks on moraI lheory, on
aeslhelics, on psychoIogicaI melhods, on lhe exlernaI vorId, and so on: and
some of lhese cannol be properIy underslood unliI ve see hov lhey fil inlo lhe
main scheme. On lhe olher hand, he had aIvays in mind lhe pIan of a
comprehensive vork vhich shouId exhibil lhe Kriiik as a vhoIe. UnforlunaleIy,
lhis comprehensive vork vas never vrillen. He pubIished a firsl voIume of il
in 1883 (lhe |in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn), vilh lhe promise of a speedy
concIusion: bul he vas never abIe lo finish il according lo lhe originaI pIan. In
lhe Iasl years of his Iife he made a fresh slarl on a differenl pIan, vilh lhe
Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i in !cn Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1910): bul dealh
overlook him before he couId bring lhis lo compIelion. IorlunaleIy, hovever,
he had assembIed a greal deaI of maleriaI for lhis purpose, some of il mere
fragmenls, bul much of il in an advanced slale of preparalion. Wilh care and
palience, and vilh lhe aid of his ovn skelchpIans in lhe maller of arrangemenl,
il can be pieced logelher so as lo reslore lhe vhoIe vork subslanliaIIy as he
meanl il lo be. This has been done by his Iilerary execulors, and lhe resuIl is
avaiIabIe in voIume VII of lhe Gcsannc|ic Scnrijicn. Siu!cnis cj Oi|incu arc tcru
grcai|u in!c|ic! ic incsc unc natc !cnc inis ucrk cj rcsicraiicn. as uc|| as ic inc auincr
cj inc Prcjacc ic tc|unc V cj inc Gcsannc|ic Scnrijicn. in unicn nanu aspccis cj inc
!ctc|cpncni cj Oi|incus incugni arc iracc!. Nctcrinc|css. Oi|incus jai|urc ic ccnp|cic
inc Kriiik ninsc|j nas |c! ic scnc inccntcnicnccs. an! cnc cj incn is cj a scricus naiurc.
His inccru cj kncu|c!gc is prcsuppcsc! in nis uriiings cj a|| pcric!s jrcn 1883
cnuar!s. |ui |ccausc ii uas crigina||u ncani ic ccnc in icuar!s inc cn! cj inc
nagnun cpus. inc uriiing-cui cj ii uas ccniinua||u pcsipcnc!. an! incrc is nc jcrna|
an! susicnaiic cxpcsiiicn cj ii car|icr inan 1905. Tnc cpisicnc|cgica| ircaiiscs cj inai
an! |aicr ucars natc ic |c a||cuc! ic casi a |igni |ackuar!s upcn car|icr uriiings ij
incsc car|icr uriiings arc ic |c ccrrcci|u un!crsicc!.
Tnc p|an cj cxpcsiiicn unicn | natc a!cpic! is incrcjcrc pari|u susicnaiic an! pari|u
nisicrica|. |n Cnapicr Onc |
-xxit-
examine lhe sources of DiIlhey's inspiralion, and shov hov, in lhe years before
1880, lhe probIem of lhe Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn in ils fuII exlenl graduaIIy look
possession of his mind, and vilh il lhe beginnings of a soIulion. This soIulion,
vhen fuIIy deveIoped, faIIs naluraIIy inlo lvo parls, one of vhich is concerned
vilh lhe mosl generaI epislemoIogicaI issues, vhiIe lhe olher refers specificaIIy
lo lhe melhods and principIes of lhe hisloricaI and sociaI sludies, lheir IogicaI
reIalions vilh one anolher, vilh lhe naluraI sciences and vilh phiIosophy.
AccordingIy, in lhe nexl four chaplers I examine DiIlhey's vievs on lhe vider
issues of epislemoIogy. Thus Chapler Tvo summarises his lheory of
knovIedge, shoving hov he deveIoped his posilion in conlinuaI conlroversy
vilh lhe Neo-Kanlian ideaIisls: Chapler Three sels forlh briefIy DiIlhey's viev
as lo lhe nalure of vaIue-|udgmenls and imperalives, logelher vilh his reasons
for hoIding lhal melaphysics, vhiIe ineradicabIe as a lendency of lhe mind, is
impossibIe as a science: Chapler Iour foIIovs him more in delaiI inlo moraI
lheory and aeslhelics: vhiIe in Chapler Iive I lake up one of lhe mosl difficuIl
and imporlanl seclions of DiIlhey's phiIosophy, viz. his accounl of lhe nalure of
expression, underslanding, and inlerprelalion, and lhe conlroversy belveen
him and lhe NeoKanlians on lhis sub|ecl. The nexl lhree chaplers lake up lhe
olher side of DiIlhey's phiIosophy, his Iogic and melhodoIogy of lhe human
sludies: and in lhis a cerlain deveIopmenl and change of viev is lo be lraced.
Thus, Chapler Six summarises lhe |in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1883),
in vhich DiIlhey for lhe firsl lime formuIaled his probIem in fuII, adumbraled
soIulions on various poinls, and Iaid dovn a programme for fulure vork:
Chapler Seven lraces lhe deveIopmenl of his vievs on lhe exlremeIy difficuIl
queslion of lhe parl lo be pIayed by psychoIogy among lhe human sludies:
Chapler Iighl lraces lhe course of lhe dispule belveen DiIlhey and lhe Neo-
Kanlians aboul lhe aims and principIes of lhe human sludies, a dispule vhich
occupied lhe Iasl sevenleen years of DiIlhey's Iife, and is nol yel Iaid lo resl.
(The Neo-Kanlian posilion has much in common vilh lhal made famiIiar lo
some IngIish readers by Croce and CoIIingvood.) In Chapler Nine I have
reconslrucled, so far as lhe maleriaIs prinled in G.S. VII aIIov, lhe finaI version
of lhe Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji on vhich DiIlhey vas vorking vhen he
died. Chapler Ten rounds off lhe book vilh a crilicaI com-
-xxv-
parison belveen DiIlhey and CoIIingvood, and an eslimale of DiIlhey's
significance in lhe deveIopmenl of recenl phiIosophy.
My acknovIedgmenls are due lo lhose friends by vhose encouragemenl and
assislance lhe compIelion and pubIicalion of lhis book has been broughl aboul:
especiaIIy lo my somelime coIIeague Mrs. N. M. ovring, vho heIped lhe vork
forvard in many vays, and shared lhe Iabour Of compiIing lhe index.
|ca!ing, 1952
-xxvi-
CHAPTER ONE
THI phiIosophicaI vork of WiIheIm DiIlhey aII hinges upon his allempl lo
vrile a Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. Tnis jaci ic||s us iuc inpcriani inings a|cui
nin. tiz. inai nc uas !ccp|u inicrcsic! in nisicrica| siu!ics. an! inai nis pni|cscpnica|
ininking uas ccnsi!cra||u ajjccic! |u Kani. Scncining nas |ccn sai! in inc
|nirc!uciicn a|cui cacn cj incsc jacis. Ici us |cgin ncrc |u giting jurincr ccnsi!craiicn
ic inc scccn! --inc jaci inai Oi|incu uas in scnc scnsc a Kaniian. |n unai scnsc an! in
unai !cgrcc uas nc sc?
Tnc ncari an! scu| cj nis Kaniianisn |ics in inc ccnccpiicn cj pni|cscpnu as a criiiuc cj
kncu|c!gc. Tnc cncrgcncc cj inc criiica| nctcncni in inc cigniccnin ccniuru. an! iis
gra!ua| ticicru ctcr inc ira!iiicna| i!ca cj pni|cscpnu as nciapnusics. appcar ic nin as
inc grcai iurning-pcini in pni|cscpnica| nisicru. |rcn inc criiica| nctcncni nc nas
|carnc! ic scc in kncu|c!gc nci ncrc|u an apprcncnsicn. |ui a ccnsiruciicn. an! ic
rcccgnisc inai inc icrns in unicn uc inink an! spcak cj c|jccis arc !cicrninc! in |argc
ncasurc |u cur cun ccgniiitc prcccsscs. |rcn inc sanc criiica| nctcncni nc nas
|carnc! inai kncu|c!gc cannci gc |cucn! inc |iniis cj cxpcricncc. an! inai incrcjcrc
nciapnusics. as a scicncc cj purc |cing an! a rcascnc! cxp|anaiicn cj inc ucr|! cr!cr. is
inpcssi||c. Tncsc arc ccnicniicns unicn nc ccu|! natc |carnc! jrcn cincr scurccs inan
Kani-c.g. jrcn scnc cj inc Briiisn cnpiricisis cr jrcn |rcncn pcsiiitisn. Yci in jaci ii
uas Kani uncn nc sau as inc grcai rcprcscniaiitc cj inis sian!pcini. an! ii uas in
Kanis jccisicps inai nc uisnc! ic jc||cu. Kani na! na!c nis criiiuc. csicnsi||u cj
nunan kncu|c!gc. |ui in jaci cj naincnaiica| an! naiura|scicniijic kncu|c!gc cn|u. Hc
na! nci rcccgnisc! inc !isiinciitc cnaracicr cj inc nisicrica| an! sccia| siu!ics. an!
Oi|incus iask uas ic cxicn! Kanis criiiuc an! nakc ii cctcr incsc.
Yci. uncn uc ccnc ic inc !ciai|s cj Kanis icacning. uc jin!
-1-
lhal DiIlhey deparls from him very videIy. Imagine a Kanlian vho does nol
beIieve in an a pricri, and vho lhinks lhal lhe calegories of subslance and cause
are nol forms of lhe underslanding, bul pro|eclions inlo lhe ouler vorId of lhe
inner experiences of lhe viII. Imagine a Kanlian vho re|ecls lhe doclrine of lhe
phenomenaIily of lhe empiricaI seIf, and beIieves lhal in inlrospeclion ve
perceive our ovn mind as il lruIy is. Imagine a Kanlian vho says lhal
phiIosophy musl Iearn from psychoIogy, and vho boasls lhal his elhic is more
empiricaI lhan uliIilarianism. Thal is lhe kind of Kanlian vhom ve meel in
DiIlhey. In facl, vhen il comes lo poinls of delaiI, he is pIainIy nol a Kanlian al
aII. Throughoul his Iife he vas engaged in conlroversy vilh lhe more orlhodox
Kanlians. He allacked lheir Iogic and lheir lheory of knovIedge, lheir moraI
lheory, and lheir phiIosophy of hislory.
He couId do lhis because Kanl vas nol lhe onIy formalive infIuence in his
lhoughl. There vere in facl lvo olhers, vhich on poinls of delaiI counl for more
lhan Kanl. The firsl is lhe sel of ideas vhich vere currenl in Germany in lhe
generalion afler lhe pubIicalion of Kanl's vrilings--lhe sel of ideas vhich vere
heId more or Iess in common by poels such as Goelhe and lhe romanlicisls, and
by posl-Kanlian phiIosophers such as ScheIIing and HegeI. I shaII refer lo lhis
sel of ideas as 'romanlicism', and lhis is one of lhe delerminalive infIuences in
DiIlhey's lhinking. The olher is lhe empiricaI phiIosophy of lhe rilish schooI
and lhe posilivism of Comle. I. S. MiII's Susicn cj Icgic came oul vhen DiIlhey
vas 10, and Herberl Spencer's |irsi Princip|cs vhen he vas 30. Iresenl-day
phiIosophers, lo vhom MiII is a dim memory and Spencer hardIy even a name,
may yel bear in mind lhal in lheir ovn lime lhese men vere symboIs of
somelhing, and lhese symboIs fired DiIlhey's imaginalion.
The ballIe belveen lhese lvo slrangeIy assorled infIuences in DiIlhey's mind
viII be found lo be a recurrenl lheme as ve foIIov lhe deveIopmenl of his
vork. Again and again ve shaII be faced vilh lhe speclacIe of a posilivisl lrying
lo do |uslice lo a poel's vision, or a romanlic lrying lo anaIyse himseIf in
posilivisl lerms. And neilher lhe romanlic nor lhe posilivisl is a lrue Kanlian,
lhough lhe romanlic al Ieasl has his ovn inlerprelalion of Kanl. Il is a lruism
lhal Kanl vas one of lhe infIuences by vhich lhe posl-Kanlians vere mouIded:
and lhere musl have
-2-
been somelhing in him lo accounl for vhal lhey made of him. Whal lhal vas,
ve may dimIy see from lhe ninlh chapler of CoIeridge's Bicgrapnia Iiicraria, if
ve viII nol find oul for ourseIves by reading Iichle and HegeI. Lel us begin al
lhis poinl, and so move on from Kanl lo his immediale successors, vho vere
lhe source of so much of DiIlhey's inspiralion.
Whal did Kanl's phiIosophy mean lo Kanl's younger conlemporaries, lo lhose
men vho vere sludenls al lhe lime vhen his lhree Criiiucs came oul` To lhem,
as lo Kanl himseIf, il meanl a Copernican revoIulion in lhoughl. Il meanl lhe
deslruclion of a greal mass of lradilionaI sophislry, and lhe opening of a nev
road inlo lhe sludy of lhe human mind and viII. The Kriiik !cr rcincn Vcrnunji
shoved lhem lhe pover of lhe mind, by ils lranscendenlaI aclivilies of
synlhesis, lo give shape and meaning lo sense-dala and so lo buiId up a vorId
for ilseIf. The Kriiik !cr prakiiscncn Vcrnunji shoved lhal lhe shaping and
IegisIalive pover of lhe underslanding is paraIIeIed by an even more
deepsealed pover of seIf-reguIalion in lhe moraI viII. Indeed, il vas here in lhe
viII, nol in lhe inleIIecl, lhal Kanl found lhe lrue meaning of 'reason', and
gained direcl access lo lhe uIlimale reaIily of man and lhe vorId. IinaIIy lhe
Kriiik !cr Urici|skraji shoved lhal lhere is in nalure, in bolh organic and
inorganic phenomena, a shaping pover vhich seems lo be akin lo vhal ve
aIready knov in ourseIves. Irom lhis poinl il vas a shorl slep lo lhe posl-
Kanlian phiIosophies, vilh lheir insislence on a hidden pover, spiriluaI in
characler, vhich manifesls ilseIf aIike in naluraI phenomena and in lhe mind
and Iife of man.
Il is imporlanl lo reaIise lhal Kanl, for aII his grealness, vas onIy one of many
voices vhich vere saying nev and exciling lhings al lhal lime. He even slood
somevhal aparl from lhe inleIIecluaI movemenl of lhe day. In lhal movemenl,
Iilerary and phiIosophicaI ideas vere inseparabIy bIended. Ioels and crilics
vrole phiIosophy, and phiIosophers vrole verses and borroved ideas from lhe
poels. Many of lhem vere eager sludenls of naluraI science, lhough of course
from a poinl of viev of lheir ovn. Mosl of lhem had vievs on lhe meaning of
hislory and on lhe pasl, presenl, and fulure of reIigion. Il vas a fermenl of nev
ideas, in vhich lhe cenlraI and unifying lheme vas an inleresl in lhe nalure of
man, his pIace in lhe universe, and lhe meaning of his achievemenls in lhoughl
and aclion. I shaII venlure lo caII
-3-
lhe vhoIe period of German lhoughl from 1770 lo 1830 lhe 'romanlic' period,
and lhe ruIing ideas of lhe period I shaII caII 'romanlicism', in spile of lhe facl
lhal lhe 'romanlic' movemenl commonIy so caIIed in German Iileralure is onIy
one of many slreams vhich fIoved logelher al lhis lime. Il is convenienl lo have
a singIe vord lo cover lhe vhoIe period, and no olher seems so appropriale.
The oulIook of lhe period does ansver prelly veII lo vhal ve undersland by
'romanlicism' in lhe vider sense: a consciousness of hidden deplhs in human
nalure and hidden secrels in lhe naluraI vorId and hislory, and a delerminalion
lo expIore and en|oy lhem aII.
DiIlhey shoved from his boyhood a keen inleresl in music and poelry, and
earIy deveIoped a slrong enlhusiasm for Lessing and Goelhe. The humanism of
lhese vrilers evoked an ansver in his ovn spiril, and quickIy oblained an
ascendancy over him vhich vas onIy slrenglhened vhen lo his Iilerary and
musicaI sludies he added an apprecialion of Kanl and olher Ieading
phiIosophers of lhal lime. DiIlhey's inleresl in lhe lhoughl of lhis greal period
never vaned, and he did nol a IillIe, in various vrilings, lo inlerprel ils spiril
and significance. Of especiaI vaIue lo us is lhe inauguraI Ieclure vhich he
deIivered on being appoinled lo a Chair al aseI ( 1867), vhich has for ils main
lheme a descriplion of vhal he found vaIuabIe in lhe romanlicisls, and reveaIs
lhe basis upon vhich he vas Ialer lo buiId his ovn phiIosophy.
He begins by anaIysing lhe circumslances in vhich lhe romanlic movemenl
arose. Il vas a lime vhen lhe grovlh of enIighlenmenl and cuIlure had
avakened in Germany a slrong palriolic feeIing, vhiIe lhe condilion of lhe
Impire made il impossibIe for lhis feeIing lo find an oulIel lhrough poIilicaI
channeIs. Hence lhe spiril of lhe German peopIe, nevIy aroused lo a sense of ils
inherenl povers, inslead of moving oulvards in a poIilicaI and miIilary
nalionaIism, lurned invards upon ilseIf. The probIem of human Iife is aIvays
lhe same--lo bring aboul a salisfaclory ad|uslmenl belveen lhe seIf and ils
environmenl. The German mind, in face of a vorId vhich il vas poverIess lo
aIler, sel oul lo make lhe ad|uslmenl by aIlering ilseIf, by adopling a nev
oulIook upon lhe vorId, a nev ideaI of Iife.
DiIlhey finds in Lessing lhe firsl formuIalion of such an ideaI. According lo
him, lhe good Iife is lhe Iife of reason, a free, seIfdelermining Iife, conscious of
inherenl vorlh by virlue of lhe
-4-
conlroI exercised by reason over lhe passions. Goelhe look over lhis ideaI and
gave il a Iess narrovIy ralionaI form lhan il had in Lessing. Goelhe sav lhe
unily of Iife on aII IeveIs, from lhe highesl lo lhe Iovesl. He shoved lhal lhe
'ralionaI' aclivilies of lhe mind are nol dislincl from and anlilhelic lo lhe
'irralionaI', bul are a more expIicil deveIopmenl of somelhing vhich is presenl
even on lhe 'irralionaI' IeveI. LogicaI lhinking vouId be impossibIe if il had no
basis in lhe Iife of lhe senses and lhe imaginalion: and here, in lhe keen
sensibiIily and imaginalive 'genius' of lhe arlisl, Goelhe finds a shaping pover
al vork, vhich is lhe same as lhe pover vhich operales in IogicaI lhinking. Arl,
lhen, and lhe senses, no Iess lhan science and lhe underslanding, feeIings no
Iess lhan moraI maxims, are essenliaI lo lhe compIeleness of lhe good Iife. Iven
Lessing had recognised lhal poelry has a funclion in Iife: il gives imaginalive
expression, he said, lo lhe ideaI, and lhis expression is more praclicaIIy effeclive
lhan any 'ralionaI' slalemenl of il.
Goelhe venl furlher, and appIied his principIe lo lhe reconslruclion of science.
Taughl by Spinoza and by Shaflesbury, he lhoughl of nalure as a Iiving unily,
and il vas his ambilion lo make lhe delaiIed vorkings of nalure inleIIigibIe by
inluilive insighl inlo lhe Iife of lhe vhoIe. To lhis end lhe same imaginalive
pover vhich is exercised crealiveIy in arl musl be appIied heurislicaIIy in lhe
fieId of scienlific knovIedge, and lhe resuIl is a phiIosophy of nalure vhich is
one of Goelhe's mosl slriking achievemenls. The universe is lrealed as a Iiving
being, vhose Iife deveIops slage by slage, lhrough inorganic nalure, lhrough
pIanl Iife and animaI forms, up lo man and his aclivilies, vhere il allains ils end
by becoming an ob|ecl of consciousness lo ilseIf. DiIlhey emphasises lhe
phiIosophicaI originaIily of lhis lheory. The universe had been lrealed as a
Iiving organism before, by lhe Sloics, by runo, by Spinoza: bul no one had
laken lhis lhoughl so seriousIy as lo credil lhis organism vilh a Iife-hislory, and
lo seek lhis Iife-hislory in lhe geoIogicaI pasl. Thal vas Goelhe's conlribulion,
and il amounled lo lhe crealion of a nev melaphysicaI genre, lo vhich DiIlhey
gives lhe name of 'evoIulionary panlheism' (cniuick|ungsgcscnicni|icncr
Panincisnus). DiIlhey aIso poinls oul hov slrikingIy lhis haIf-poelic lheorising
of Goelhe anlicipales lhe grovlh of evoIulionary lheories and lhe expansion of
comparalive melhods in nineleenlh-cenlury science.
-5-
Il vas vilh ideas such as lhese in his mind lhal DiIlhey began his sludenl
career. Il is lherefore nol surprising lhal he soon feIl lhe allraclion of hisloricaI
sludies, and devoled himseIf lo lhem vilh an ardour vhich may parlIy be
expIained by lhe circumslances of lhe lime and pIace. Looking back in Ialer
years ( |c!c zun 70 Gc|urisiag. G.S.. V. 7 jj.). nc spckc cj inc incsiina||c gcc!
jcriunc unicn icck nin ic Bcr|in ai a iinc uncn nc ccu|! uaicn a ncu nisicrica|
scicncc |cing ccnsirucic! |cjcrc nis cucs. As inc sctcniccnin ccniuru na! sccn a grcai
jcruar! nctcncni in naincnaiics an! naiura| scicncc. sc in inc ninciccnin a
rctc|uiicn icck p|acc in inc ccnccpiicns an! ncinc!s cj nisicrica| siu!u. an! inis ncu
nctcncni. ccnpara||c in iis cjjccis uiin inc scicniijic ucrk cj inc |aic |cnaissancc. uas
ncuncrc ncrc aciitc inan ai Bcr|in.
Oi|incu !isiinguisncs iuc uings cj inc nctcncni. (1) Onc uas |asc! cn an ana|usis cj
cu|iurc inic iis ccnpcncni jacicrs. i.c. |anguagc. |au. nuinc|cgu an! rc|igicn. pcciru.
pni|cscpnu an! inc |ikc. Bu ccnparaiitc rcscarcn an! gcnciic ana|usis ii uas sncun ncu
cacn cj incsc c|cncnis cj cu|iura| |ijc is gctcrnc! |u an inncr |au unicn !cicrnincs iis
gcncra| siruciurc an! inc ccursc cj iis !ctc|cpncni. Bcpp. inc Hun|c|!is. Satignu. W.
Grinn. an! cincrs ucrc inc jcun!crs cj inis scncc|. (2) Tnc cincr uing cj inc nctcncni
siu!ic! inc |ijc cj naiicns. ircaiing cacn naiicn as a cu|iura| uniiu. ii iracc! incir
inicraciicns as crganisc! jcrccs. an! iric! ic jin! |aus unicn !cicrninc incir risc an!
ja||. Oi|incu spcaks uiin praisc cj inc ucrk !cnc in inis uau jcr |cnan nisicru |u
Nic|unr. jcr Grcck aniiuiiu |u Bcckn. jcr ancicni Gcrnanic siu!ics |u j. Grinn. an!
a|ctc incn a|| nc p|accs Mcnnscn. Wnai incsc scnc|ars !i! jcr in!iti!ua| naiicns uas
gaincrc! up inic a unc|c |u |iiicr an! |ankc. an! ucr|! nisicru uas prcscnic! as a
sc|j-ccniainc! prcccss. cccxicnsitc uiin inc inna|iic! carin an! uiin rcccr!c! iinc.
Oi|incu ccnjcsscs an cspccia| !c|i ic inc icacning cj |ankc ( G.S.. V. 4. 9).
Tnc signijicancc cj inc nisicrica| nctcncni |au in inis. inai ii cxicn!c! inc !cninicn cj
crganisc! kncu|c!gc ctcr a rcgicn nci |css ricn in ccnicni inan inc pnusica| unitcrsc.
|ui cj a tcru !ijjcrcni cnaracicr. Ajicr inc scicniijic nctcncni cj inc sctcniccnin
ccniuru na! na!c currcni a nccnanica| ticu cj inc unitcrsc. an! inc !cgna inai a||
scicniijic kncu|c!gc nusi |c
-6-
malhemalicaI, lhe hisloricaI movemenl redressed lhe baIance by caIIing in a
nev vorId of experience. This nev vorId vas nol a mechanicaI syslem, bul one
in vhich lhe apprehension of meaning and vaIue by human agenls is a
delerminanl force, and in il lhe enquiring mind finds nol an aIien ob|ecl, bul ils
ovn kin. The allempl lo sludy lhis nev vorId syslemalicaIIy raised,
accordingIy, a number of phiIosophicaI queslions, of vhich lhe members of lhe
hisloricaI schooI lhemseIves vere nol avare, bul DiIlhey vas. Whal is lhe
nalure of lhose groups of recurrenl phenomena vhich can be abslracled from
lhe hisloricaI process as a vhoIe and sludied by lhemseIves, such as Iav,
reIigion, or poelry` Whal is il lhal conslilules each of lhem a unil` y vhal
fundamenlaI concepls musl lhe inlerprelalion of lhem proceed` And hov are
lhey reIaled lo lhose lemporaIIy circumscribed bul more compIex vhoIes, such
as a nalion or a cuIluraI period, vhich are aIso in some sense unils` Is lheir
unily in some vay anaIogous lo lhal of a physicaI organism or of an individuaI
mind` Hov far can such an anaIogy lake us, and hov musl ve proceed al lhe
poinl vhere il breaks dovn` Such queslions as lhese, queslions al firsl sighl
concerning melhod, bul invoIving deeper epislemoIogicaI and perhaps even
melaphysicaI issues, arise naluraIIy oul of hisloricaI sludy for a mind vhich is
phiIosophicaIIy avake. They arose in DiIlhey's mind.
Ior a soIulion he Iooked firsl lo lhe romanlics. Afler aII, il vas Lessing vho had
made currenl lhe conceplion of hisloricaI progress as 'lhe educalion of lhe
human race'. Il vas Herder vho had Iaid dovn lhal every nalion is a cuIluraI
unil vilh a characler of ils ovn and an inherenl vaIue vhich is unique. His
|!ccn zur Pni|cscpnic !cr Gcscnicnic !cr Mcnscnncii mel vilh a veIcome from
Goelhe. And Goelhe himseIf recognised lhal lhe highesl rung in his Iadder of
sciences musl be lhe sciences of man, viz. hislory and anlhropoIogy. He sav
lhal lhe sludy of man's aclivilies musl be based on an underslanding of man's
nalure, and lherefore sel himseIf lo disengage from lhe various phenomena of
human Iife and characler lhe slrucluraI lype lo vhich lhey aII conform. As
every animaI species is knovn by lhe slruclure vhich aII ils individuaIs have in
common, so a simiIar unily of lype or slruclure belrays ilseIf in lhe Iives and
aclions of men. In such vorks as |ausi and Wi|nc|n Mcisicr, Goelhe lried lo
porlray lhe principIes vhich govern lhe deveIopmenl of human
-7-
characler. AII his vrilings are inslincl vilh a cerlain visdom derived from his
insighl inlo lhe nalure of man.
A simiIar approach lo lhe probIem found expression in lhe vrilings of NovaIis (
Iriedrich von Hardenberg, 1772- 1801), by vhom DiIlhey vas allracled and lo
vhom he devoled a speciaI sludy ( Ncta|is, firsl pubIished 1865: nov prinled in
Oas |r|c|nis u. !ic Oicn|ung. pp. 268 jj.). Ncta|is na! inc sanc cncuc|cpac!ic inicrcsis
as Gccinc an! Scnc||ing. Iikc incn. nc sau in inc pncncncna cj naiurc inc cxprcssicn cj
a |iting pcucr unicn is akin ic inc nunan spirii. |n nisicru nc sau inc cxprcssicn cj inc
nunan spirii iisc|j. uncsc ni!!cn !cpins nc scugni ic pcnciraic. Hc |cgan |u sccking in
tain ic c|iain acccss ic inc nusicru inrcugn cnpirica| psucnc|cgu. Hc jcun! nc nc|p in
psucnc|cgu as nis ccnicnpcrarics praciisc! ii. Hc spcaks cj ii as cnc cj inc spccircs
unicn natc iakcn incsc p|accs in inc icnp|c uncrc gcnuinc inagcs cj gc!s cugni ic
sian!. |i is siupi!. nccnanica|. ana|uiica|. a|siraci. |n iis p|acc Ncta|is uisncs ic pui a
siu!u unicn is ic ccnsi!cr nan purc|u as a unc|c. as a susicn. Hc ca||s ii rca|c
Psucnc|cgic cr Aninrcpc|cgic. an! nis cun ccniri|uiicns ic ii arc ju||u in inc spirii cj
nis agc. Ai inc rcci cj nunan naiurc nc jin!s inc ui||. |tcru nan. ai |ciicn. |itcs in
nis ui||. An! nc ana|usc! inc |ijc cj jcc|ing an! ui|| uiin a pcnciraiing tisicn. Oi|incu
ranks nin uiin Spincza. inc pni|cscpncr cj inc ccnaius. an! uiin Kani. |icnic.
Scncpcnnaucr. a|| cj uncn in taricus uaus nc|! inc sanc ticu inai inc jun!ancnia|
sccrci cj |ijc |ics nci in incugni. |ui in ui||. Bui nc sccs in inc jragncnis. unicn ucrc a||
inai Ncta|is uas a||c ic uriic |cjcrc nis car|u !cain. a grcaicr nc!csiu in spccu|aiicn
an! a grcaicr rcspcci jcr pcsiiitc kncu|c!gc inan in scnc cj inc cincrs. Ncta|is ncani
nis Aninrcpc|cgic ic |c inc |asis cj a|| inc siu!ics ccnccrnc! uiin nunan |ijc. nisicru.
ncra| inccru. acsinciics. inc pni|cscpnu cj rc|igicn. |igni ucars |cjcrc Hcgc|s
Pncncncnc|cgic. an! iucniu ucars |cjcrc inc |nzuk|cpc!ic. Ncta|is na! in gcrn inc
i!ca cj a grcuping cj a|| inc nunan siu!ics cn a sing|c |asis. unicn is ic |c a !ccp siu!u
cj nunan naiurc.
Tnc rca!cr sncu|! kccp in nin! inis rca|c Psucnc|cgic cr Aninrcpc|cgic cj Ncta|is. Wc
sna|| jin! ii ctcr an! ctcr again. un!cr taricus nancs. in Oi|incus uriiings.
Wc natc ncniicnc! Hcgc|. an! in ticu cj inc rangc cj Hcgc|s inicrcsis an! inc
nagniiu!c cj nis acnictcncni ii is naiura| ic
-8-
ask vhelher DiIlhey couId nol find in him lhe guide lo foIIov in his ovn
researches. The queslion arises very naluraIIy in rilain, since in lhis counlry a
phiIosophicaI inleresl in hislory, or in hisloricaI melhods and principIes, has
Iong been associaled vilh adherence lo HegeIian doclrine. Some of us have
read Croce on lhe sub|ecl, and he and his discipIe, CoIIingvood, make no secrel
of lheir HegeIian affinilies. Il is lherefore necessary lo say quile dislinclIy lhal
DiIlhey vas never a HegeIian in any sense vhalever. CerlainIy he avoided
hoIding HegeI in lhal uninformed conlempl vhich vas lhe usuaI allilude
eighly years ago, and in his inauguraI Ieclure al aseI, in lhe very acl of
procIaiming himseIf an adherenl of Kanlianism, he couId pIead for a beller
recognilion of HegeI's Iasling achievemenl. ul his underslanding of HegeI vas
imperfecl. He sav him as one vho gave a syslemalic form lo Goelhe's
evoIulionary panlheism (in vhich DiIlhey himseIf did nol beIieve): bul he
shoved no sign of apprecialing his vork in conneclion specificaIIy vilh hislory,
and he dislrusled him profoundIy as a dogmalic melaphysician.
Il vas nol in HegeI lhal he found his phiIosophicaI guide, bul in anolher lhinker
of lhe posl-Kanlian generalion. Il vas in I. D. I. SchIeiermacher ( 1768- 1834),
lhe lheoIogian-phiIosopher, HegeI's coIIeague al erIin, lhal lhe various
lendencies of DiIlhey's lhoughl vere abIe lo find a focus of unily.
SchIeiermacher represenled lhe reIigious spiril in lhe cIosesl aIIiance vilh
phiIosophy and vilh Iilerary and hisloricaI sludies. He vas in lhe fuII slream of
lhe romanlic and posl-Kanlian movemenl, in cIose louch vilh Iichle and lhe
SchIegeIs: bul il vas an added allraclion in DiIlhey's eyes lhal, of aII lhe
phiIosophicaI vrilers of lhal lime, SchIeiermacher slands furlhesl from
melaphysicaI specuIalion, and nearesl lo lhe crilicaI posilion of Kanl.
SchIeiermacher's phiIosophy is a Iarge syslem, and I shaII describe onIy lhose of
ils conlenlions vhich bear upon DiIlhey's probIem and have infIuenced his
lrealmenl of il. These are lo be found in SchIeiermacher's moraI lheory, his
phiIosophy of reIigion, and his lheory of underslanding and inlerprelalion.
The governing principIe of SchIeiermacher's elhic is lhe high vaIue vhich he
sels upon individuaIily. He compIains lhal previous vrilers on moraI lheory
have negIecled lhis aspecl of lhings, and have been conlenl lo lreal moraIily as
a universaI Iav or principIe--as if a man vere moraI onIy in vhal he shares
-9-
vilh olher men, and nol in vhal is unique and dislinclive in him.
SchIeiermacher himseIf sees Iife as a poIarily of lhe universaI and lhe
individuaI, and finds a principIe of vaIue in each of lhese aspecls. A common
nalure and a common environmenl creale common needs and inleresls among
men, and lhese find expression in lhe universaI principIes of Iav: bul physicaI
and psychoIogicaI differences mouId each human being inlo a unique
individuaI, vilh his ovn pecuIiar inleresls and his ovn pecuIiar vay of seeing
lhe vorId and conducling himseIf in il. SchIeiermacher formuIales lhe moraI
Iav as a demand for individuaIily vilhin lhe universaI. 'Inler inlo communily
in such a vay as lo keep your individuaIily inlacl: cuIlivale individuaIily in
such a vay lhal in so doing you aIso enler inlo communily.'
SchIeiermacher aIso compIains lhal moraIisls have negIecled lhe vaIues of lhe
cuIluraI Iife. MoraIily is a discipIine of lhe vhoIe personaIily: nol onIy of lhe
passions and desires, bul aIso of lhe mind. The good Iife consisls nol onIy in our
overl aclions lovards one anolher, bul aIso in lhe aclivilies of lhe imaginalion
and lhe inleIIecl, in science vhich sludies lhe universaI Iavs of nalure, and arl
vhich presenls lo us individuaI forms. And neilher lhe lheorelicaI nor lhe
praclicaI side of lhe good Iife can deveIop as il shouId unIess lhe vhoIe is
pervaded and suslained by lhe spiril of reIigion, by vhich SchIeiermacher
means lhe consciousness of lhe unily of aII being.
This consciousness is nol in SchIeiermacher, as il is in HegeI, a reasoned
conviclion supporled by a diaIeclicaI process. In SchIeiermacher's -&& ve
are shovn lhal human lhinking moves perpeluaIIy belveen lvo poIes, viz. lhe
lhing in ilseIf, as a reaIily vhoIIy independenl of our lhoughl, and God, as
absoIule eing, lhe source of aII exislence and aII knovIedge: and ve can never
allain lo reasoned knovIedge of eilher poIe. ul ve have an immediale
inluilive avareness (a 'feeIing', SchIeiermacher caIIs il) of God as lhe WhoIe
vhich is immanenl in aII ils parls: ve are avare of lhe immanence of God in
our ovn lhinking and viIIing, as lhe common ground of our ovn spiriluaI Iife
and lhe exlernaI vorId in vhich ve have lo lhink and viII. This 'feeIing' of lhe
presence of God is our bond vilh one anolher and vilh lhe exlernaI vorId, and
in il lhe deepesl secrel of our being is discIosed. Ior il shovs hov every man is
a vehicIe, unique and irrepIaceabIe, of lhe seIf-manifeslalion of God. Im-
-10-
pIicil in each individuaI is 'lhe divine Idea', lhe expression of lhe WhoIe lhrough
lhis parlicuIar parl, and lhe moraI and cuIluraI deveIopmenl of lhe individuaI is
al bollom neilher more nor Iess lhan lhe expIicalion of lhis Idea. Il is in lhe
consciousness of lhis lhal ve find happiness and a sense of personaI vorlh and
significance. Il is lhus lhal reIigion is lhe hearl and cenlre of lhe good Iife.
ReIigion, so conceived, is of course inseparabIe from moraIily and cuIlure, and
lhe reIalion belveen lhem is lvofoId. On lhe one hand, reIigion is lhe inner Iife
and spiril of aII human aclivilies. On lhe olher hand, reIigious feeIing vouId
perish if lhere vere nol one syslem of aclivilies speciaIIy dedicaled lo lhe
purpose of cuIlivaling and expressing il: and lhis speciaI syslem of aclivilies is
vhal ve caII 'reIigion' in lhe narrover sense. Il is nol reaIIy a dislincl form of
spiriluaI aclivily, il is lhe adaplalion of aII forms of such aclivily for lhe purpose
of evoking and suslaining lhe reIigious feeIing, on vhich lhey aII uIlimaleIy
depend. Thus lhe crealive imaginalion gives il expression in mylhs and cuIl-
observances, and lhe inleIIecl reduces lhese lo a syslem of conceplions, a
lheoIogy: lhe praclicaI aclivily Iays dovn universaI Iavs and precepls, and aIso
buiIds up lhe spiriluaI Iife of each individuaI according lo his personaI .
ReIigion cannol Iive, says SchIeiermacher, vilhoul finding expression in
lradilions and inslilulions of lhis kind, lhough al lhe same lime aII such
lradilions and inslilulions are hisloricaI producls, reIalive lo lhe age and
counlry vhich produced lhem. There is no universaI reIigion, no absoIule
lheoIogy, no one lrue Church. The same principIe of reIalivily appIies aIso, of
course, lo moraI slandards, lo syslems of phiIosophy, and lo aII cuIluraI vaIues.
Il vas from lhis poinl lhal SchIeiermacher vas Ied lo one of his mosl
characlerislic achievemenls. Inleresl in lhe hisloricaI deveIopmenl of reIigious
ideas Ied him lo a crilicaI sludy of Sl. IauI's IpislIes, in vhich he broke nev
ground. He sav lhal in lhese vrilings ve have lo do nol vilh a syslemalic
lheoIogy syslemalicaIIy slaled, bul vilh a IiveIy mind reacling lo parlicuIar
silualions, and lhe proper vay lo inlerprel lhe IpislIes is lo sel lhem in lheir
conlexl in lhe Iife of lheir aulhor. ringing oul an edilion of lhe DiaIogues of
IIalo, SchIeiermacher found lhal somelhing very simiIar has lo be said aboul
lhem. They loo are nol a considered exposilion of a compIeleIy coherenl
phiIosophy
-11-
bul essays on parlicuIar sub|ecls vrillen al differenl slages in lhe deveIopmenl
of IIalo's mind. Medilaling on lhese discoveries, SchIeiermacher vas Ied on lo
raise more generaI queslions aboul lhe underslanding and inlerprelalion of
vrillen lexls, aboul lhe vay in vhich lhe inlerpreler musl proceed in order lo
gel behind lhe prinled vord lo lhe idea vhich il expresses, and lhe mind and
personaIily from vhich lhal idea came. He vas Ied on lo expIore lhe principIes
of lhe arl of inlerprelalion, and his concIusions are sel forlh in his maslerIy
ncrncncuiic lheory.
He finds lhal lhe underslanding of a Iilerary vhoIe has lvo aspecls, bolh
necessary and co-ordinale in slalus, bul differenl in aims and melhod, viz.
grannaiica| and psucnc|cgica| underslanding. The aim of grammalicaI
underslanding is lo remove ambiguilies in, and lo vring lhe Iasl drop of
meaning from, lhe vords and phrases vhich conslilule lhe oulvard
appearance of lhe vork. The aim of psychoIogicaI underslanding is lo go
behind lhis oulvard appearance lo lhe 'inner form', lhe Iiving principIe or idea
in lhe aulhor's mind, of vhich lhe vrillen lexl is lhe expression.
olh processes invoIve a lvofoId approach. On lhe one hand lhere is lhe
comparalive melhod, vhich inlerprels lhe vork in lerms of lhe Ianguage, lhe
slyIislic principIes, and lhe ideas vhich prevaiIed generaIIy in lhe period and in
lhe circIe from vhich lhe vork proceeded: lhus lhe vork and ils aulhor are seen
in lheir conlexl and underslood in lerms of lhal. On lhe olher hand lhere is
vhal SchIeiermacher caIIs lhe 'divinalory' approach, vhich penelrales
inluiliveIy lhrough lhe vrillen vork inlo lhe mind of ils aulhor: lhis has nol lhe
cogency of a reasoned anaIysis, and yel il goes deeper lhan such anaIysis can.
olh vays are necessary and compIemenlary lo one anolher in each deparlmenl
of inlerprelalion, lhough lhe comparalive melhod is predominanl in
grammalicaI underslanding, and lhe divinalory melhod in psychoIogicaI
underslanding. Iven vilh lhe lvo logelher ve can onIy gel approximale
resuIls: and lhe success of lhe inlerpreler depends as much upon a personaI gifl
as upon an acquired skiII.
Such, in bare oulIine, is SchIeiermacher's hermeneulic lheory. Il vas lhe resuIl
of personaI experience in lhe sludy of IIalo and lhe Nev Teslamenl. Il vas a
melhodoIogy of inlerprelalion,
-12-
vrillen by one vho vas himseIf a skiIIed inlerpreler. ul il vas more lhan a
melhodoIogy: il vas a phiIosophicaI anaIysis of lhe condilions vhich make
underslanding possibIe, and lhis vas lhe aspecl of il vhich especiaIIy inleresled
DiIlhey. Il vas here, loo, lhal DiIlhey found a fIav in SchIeiermacher's lheory.
The assumplion behind aII SchIeiermacher's melhodoIogy is lhal inlerprelalion
is compIemenlary lo crealion, lhal lo undersland a vork is lo relrace lhe
process by vhich il came lo be. We undersland because ve reconslrucl
(nacn|i|!cn, nacnkcnsiruircn), and lhe comparalive melhod and lhe divinalion
are mereIy lhe looIs vilh vhich ve make lhis reconslruclion. ul vhal lhen is
lhe originaI crealive process, and hov does il arise` Irom lhe inlerpIay of a
man's environmenl vilh his nalive lemper and oulIook. Invironmenl, hovever,
vhich acls aIike on aII vho Iive in il, accounls onIy for lhe common fealures of
lheir produclions, bul nol for lhe individuaIily of each. To find lhe rools of lhal,
ve musl go behind lhe ouler form of lhe vork, and behind lhe 'inner form' or
idea of il in ils deveIoped form, lo lhe primary synlhelic acl, or 'germinaI
delerminalion' ( Kcincniscn|uss) in lhe aulhor's mind, in vhich lhe characler of
lhe deveIoped vork vas impIicilIy conlained. And, as lhe delaiIs of each
individuaI vork are derived from ils ovn inner form, so loo lhe successive
vorks produced by one arlisl proceed from and express lhe inner form of his
characler and oulIook, vhich in lurn is onIy lhe expIicil deveIopmenl of lhe
germinaI synlhesis made al his birlh.
SchIeiermacher's hermeneulic allracled DiIlhey from his earIy years, and ils
infIuence over him grev conlinuaIIy as lime venl by. Yel as earIy as 1860, in a
prize essay, Oic Hcrncncuiik Scn|cicrnacncrs. nc na! pui nis jingcr cn iis ucak pcini.
unicn uas inc !ccirinc cj inc gcrnina| sunincsis. |j ctcru siagc in inc !ctc|cpncni cj an
in!iti!ua| is prc!cicrninc!. an! a|| nc can !c is ic sncu ncrc ju||u unai nc rca||u uas
jrcn inc |cginning. incn a|| cnangc is ncrc|u jcrna|. an! iinc |rings nc rca| nctc|iu.
Tnc pni|cscpncr ui|| incrcjcrc |c a||c ic jcrgci a|cui inc !ciai|s cj inc prcccss. an! jin!
inc c|uc ic inc un!crsian!ing cj a nan nci in nis sccia| an! nisicrica| siiuaiicn. |ui in
scnc iinc|css princip|c unicn nc cn|c!ics. Scn|cicrnacncr aciua||u !i! sc. Hc |c|ictc!
inai inc pcrscna|iiics cj in!iti!ua| ncn j|cu jrcn inc A|sc|uic |u a iinc|css !ia|cciic.
an! in nis nisicrica| siu!ics nc |canc! ncrc cn nis nciicn cj inc |!ca cn|c!ic! in a
-13-
person lhan on lhe hisloricaI evidence as lo vhal lhal person vas and did.
DiIlhey reacls slrongIy againsl lhis procedure and lhe doclrine behind il. In a
deveIoped vork of arl, or an individuaI human Iife, ve find an inleIIigibIe
unily: bul hov, he asks, do ve knov lhal lhis unily, in aII ils veaIlh of conlenl,
has been produced by Iinear deveIopmenl from a singIe germ` Iaclors affecling
ils characler may come as veII from vilhoul as from vilhin, and lhe finaI unily
of form may cryslaIIise al a Iale slage. (Ouoled by Misch in G.S.. V, Ixxxii.) OnIy
if lhis in facl happens can ve say lhal somelhing nev occurs vilh lhe passage
of lime, and hislory is somelhing more lhan lhe mere shadov of a limeIess
diaIeclic. And lhis culs deepIy inlo lhe moraI and reIigious lheories of
SchIeiermacher: for, on lhis shoving, lhe meaning and vaIue of lhe individuaI
cannol Iie in lhe expIicalion of a 'divine Idea', nor can his duly Iie in fideIily lo
such an Idea, since his nalure is delermined by forces vhich are in parl
unknovn lo him, and he has a hisloricaI significance vhich he himseIf does nol
undersland. 'Man does nol mereIy pcsscss lhe ideas vhich operale in him lo
shape his vork, he is pcsscssc! by lhem' (quoled by Misch in G.S.. V, xv). His
imporlance Iies ralher in lhe manner in vhich 'quile disconnecled eIemenls of
cuIlure, in lhe vorkshop of a significanl individuaI mind, are shaped inlo a
vhoIe, vhich in lurn has an effecl upon Iife ( G.S.. V, 11). Lines of infIuence
from lhe pasl meel in him, inlersecl, and are direcled afresh inlo lhe fulure. The
individuaI so conceived is sliII for DiIlhey, as for SchIeiermacher, 'lhe grealesl
reaIily' in hislory, and lherefore lhe grealesl reaIily ve can knov: for il is in
human Iife aIone lhal ve knov reaIily from vilhin, and il is in lhe Iifehislory of
lhe individuaI man lhal ve can see in delaiI lhe vorkings of lhe Iife-process
(i|i!.).
No one among DiIlhey's conlemporaries in Germany had an infIuence upon
him lhal vas comparabIe vilh SchIeiermacher's. The oulslanding figure among
lhem vas Lolze, vhose Mikrckcsnus ( 1856-64) vas confessedIy inlended lo
lake up lhe lhread of Herder's |!ccn, vas dedicaled lo lhe memory of Riller, and
anlicipales a good deaI of DiIlhey's ovn vork. Like DiIlhey, Lolze singIes oul
lhe human mind as lhe one ob|ecl of vhich ve have knovIedge by
acquainlance as veII as by descriplion. He sels lhe free, seIf-delermining Iife of
lhe mind in conlrasl vilh
-14-
lhe mechanicaI processes of nalure. He seeks lhe meaning ( Bc!cuiung) or sense
( Sinn) of hislory, and finds il in lhe graduaI reaIisalion of limeIess vaIues in
lime lhrough lhe aclions of men: and he vorks oul, as DiIlhey vas Ialer lo do,
lhe parl pIayed in lhe process by physicaI condilions, raciaI and olher
differences, lhe forces of individuaI and sociaI viII vhich make for progress,
and lhe cuIluraI forms in vhich progress is achieved. Yel aII lhis in Lolze vas
subordinaled lo a Iogic and a melaphysic for vhich DiIlhey feIl a slrong
dislasle, mingIed vilh conlempl.
Lolze's Iogic is in lhe Kanlian lradilion, and ve shaII see in lhe foIIoving
chapler hov DiIlhey allacks Kanlianism in Iogic. Lolze's melaphysic vas an
affair of posluIales, apoIogelic and unconvincing: yel, such as il vas, il incIuded
a doclrine of lhe phenomenaIily of lime, vhich served onIy lo undo vhal ils
aulhor had done for lhe human sludies. Il reduced lo an iIIusion lhal very
experience upon vhich aII hisloricaI knovIedge resls, and in vhich aIone, as
even Lolze had said, ve have direcl acquainlance vilh reaIily.
This vas DiIlhey's main preoccupalion al lhe lime (in 1865) vhen he gave his
firsl course of Ieclures (enlilIed |in|ciiung in !ic Pni|cscpnic) as Irival-Dozenl al
erIin. 'Il vas vilh lhe crilicism of lhis doclrine lhal I began. So arose lhe
principIe: behind Iife, lhoughl cannol go. To regard Iife as iIIusion is a
conlradiclion in lerms: for il is in lhe Iife-process, in lhe grovlh oul of lhe pasl
and lhe reaching-oul inlo lhe fulure, lhal lhose reaIilies Iie vhich compose lhe
dynamic syslem and lhe vaIue of our Iife. If, behind lhe Iife vhich fIovs from
lhe pasl lhrough lhe presenl lo lhe fulure, lhere vere a limeIess reaIily, lhen
lhis vouId be an anlecedenl of Iife: for il vouId be, on lhis shoving, somelhing
by vhich lhe vhoIe ordered process of Iife vas precondilioned: and lhen lhis
anlecedenl vouId be preciseIy lhal vhich ve did nol direclIy experience (uas
uir nicni cr|c|icn), and lherefore onIy a reaIm of shadovs' ( G.S.. V, 5).
Neilher SchIeiermacher nor Lolze did vhal DiIlhey considered lo be |uslice lo
lime, and lherefore lo hislory. Nor vas il possibIe lo do so vilhoul selling
limeIess reaIilies and absoIule vaIues aside, and considering hislory in reIalion
lo nalure and lhe naluraI sciences. DiIlhey singIes oul NovaIis among lhe
German romanlics as lhe one vho vas mosl viIIing lo give naluraI
-15-
science ils proper veighl: bul NovaIis died young and Iefl behind him onIy
hinls and fragmenls. Il vas nol in Germany lhal DiIlhey found lhe heIp he
soughl. He found il in Irench posilivism and in lhe rilish empiricaI
phiIosophy. Here he found phiIosophers vho vere delermined lo undersland
lhe discoveries of naluraI science, lo eIicil ils melhods and principIes, and lo
consider lhe queslion of hisloricaI knovIedge and sociaI sludies in lhe Iighl of
aII lhis.
rilish phiIosophy in lhe sevenleenlh and eighleenlh cenluries procIaimed
lhree revoIulionary changes. (1) The firsl vas announced by acon vhen he
haiIed lhe nev experimenlaI melhod in naluraI science. (2) The second vas
inilialed by Locke vhen he doubled lhe capacily of lhe human mind for
melaphysicaI specuIalion, and accepled for phiIosophy lhe humbIer posilion of
an under-Iabourer cIearing lhe vay for lhe advance of naluraI science. In his
vork lhe shifl of emphasis from melaphysics lo epislemoIogy is aIready carried
oul, and lhe grander edifice of Kanl's crilique of reason is onIy lhe execulion of
a pIan conceived in ils essenliaIs by Locke. (3) The lhird revoIulion vas
procIaimed by Hume in lhe Ireface lo his Trcaiisc cj Hunan Naiurc, vhen he
caIIed for a renovalion of lhe human sludies by lhe inlroduclion inlo lhem of
lhe empiricaI melhods aIready approved in naluraI science. In spile of lhe
generaI refusaI lo foIIov Hume in lhe more sceplicaI parls of his phiIosophy, il
remains lrue lhal lhe rilish empiricaI schooI from his lime lo lhal of I. S. MiII
vas in essence doing IillIe more lhan carry oul lhe programme pul forvard in
his Ireface.
Neilher Locke's programme nor Hume's couId be carried oul vilhoul giving a
prominenl pIace lo lhe sludy of lhe human mind: and in facl lhe rilish schooI
is veII knovn for ils psychoIogicaI approach lo phiIosophicaI queslions. This is
evidenl nol onIy in lhe lheory of knovIedge, bul in moraI and poIilicaI lheory
and in aeslhelics. Hume in his Ireface nol onIy recognised lhe cenlraI
imporlance of psychoIogicaI knovIedge, bul drev slriking concIusions from il.
He said oulrighl lhal aII olher knovIedge, if properIy considered, viII be found
lo depend on psychoIogicaI knovIedge. 'AII lhe sciences have a reIalion, grealer
or Iess, lo human nalure.' Malhemalics, naluraI phiIosophy, and naluraI reIigion
deaI vilh ob|ecls olher lhan ourseIves, bul our knovIedge of lhese ob|ecls is
condilioned by lhe
-16-
nalure of our minds, vhiIe in Iogic, elhics, crilicism (i.e. aeslhelics), and poIilicaI
lheory ve are direclIy sludying our ovn aclivilies, lheorelicaI and praclicaI.
Thus aII queslions of imporlance refer us lo psychoIogy in lhe end, and
converseIy lhe conslruclion of a nev psychoIogy amounls lo a renovalion of lhe
vhoIe edifice of knovIedge. Hume's Trcaiisc is meanl lo be such a renovalion.
Over a cenlury Ialer, in DiIlhey's ovn Iifelime, lhe same principIe found
expression in lhe phiIosophy of I. S. MiII, vho, in offering lhe vorId a Iogic and
melhodoIogy of knovIedge, logelher vilh an economic, moraI, and poIilicaI
lheory, based lhe vhoIe slruclure on principIes dravn from psychoIogy.
To say lhal psychoIogy is lhe foundalion of aII knovIedge, bul especiaIIy of lhe
human sludies, sounds reminiscenl of NovaIis' 'anlhropoIogy'. The German
romanlics and lhe rilish empiricisls mighl seem lo meel here. In facl, hovever,
if lhey do meel, il is IargeIy as opponenls. The psychoIogy of lhe rilish schooI
is preciseIy lhal psychoIogy vhich NovaIis denounces as a profane inlruder
inlo lhe lempIe of Iearning. Why` ecause il is nol based on honesl observalion
and seIf-searching, bul on a sIavish imilalion of physics. This is lrue in a
measure of Hume himseIf. Hume cerlainIy knev more aboul lhe reaI vorkings
of lhe mind lhan some of his successors. He knev in his viser momenls lhal
menlaI Iife is nol lo be expIained excIusiveIy in lerms of impressions, ideas, and
Iavs of associalion. ul in his Iess vise momenls he vrole as if il couId be
expIained |usl in lhose lerms, and in his Ireface he argued lhal psychoIogy
musl be renovaled by adopling lhe melhods and principIes vhich have proved
so successfuI in physics--vhich means anaIysis inlo dislincl unils vhose
inlerreIalions are governed by a fev simpIe Iavs. Il vas lhe vrong modeI of
expIanalion, and il couId onIy appear lo succeed so Iong as allenlion vas
focused mainIy on queslions of perceplion and memory. Il couId nol deaI vilh
lhe deeper IeveIs of lhe inslinclive Iife, nor yel vilh lhe higher inleIIecluaI and
spiriluaI aclivilies. Thal is vhal NovaIis meanl by caIIing il an emply and
formaI science, and nol a rca|c Psucnc|cgic.
There is no doubl lhal, in deplh of insighl and range of underslanding, lhe
German romanlics and lhe posl-Kanlian phiIosophers are far in advance of lhe
rilish empiricisls. NeverlheIess lhe rilish schooI slood for somelhing vhich
DiIlhey vouId
-17-
nol surrender. Il slood for an allempl lo inlegrale psychoIogy vilh lhe olher
empiricaI sciences, in recognilion of lhe facl lhal lhe human mind Iives and
vorks in lhe physicaI vorId, vhereas lhe Germans vere loo apl lo run off inlo
melaphysicaI specuIalions and lo seek in lhe souI of man lhe key lo lhe
underslanding of aII lhal is. Moreover, in enlham and lhe olher uliIilarians lhe
empiricaI phiIosophy and psychoIogy vere bIended vilh a deep concern for
sociaI reform. The underslanding of lhe human mind became, in lheir hands, a
poinler lo improvemenls in lhe penaI code, in educalion, in poIilicaI
inslilulions. Iifly years before Marx, lhe uliIilarians underslood lhe unily of
lheory and praclice, and beIieved lhal knovIedge oughl lo be a force in sociaI
Iife. NaluraI-scienlific knovIedge is such a force inescapabIy: bul sureIy loo a
phiIosophy or a psychoIogy vhich has nol sociaI consequences musl be Iacking
in somelhing essenliaI. So lhe uliIilarians beIieved, and DiIlhey beIieved il loo.
The same combinalion of a profound respecl for science vilh a slrong concern
for sociaI veIfare vas manifesl in Irance in lhe vork of Augusle Comle, lhe
founder of lhe posilive phiIosophy. He vas an originaI lhinker, vhose
phiIosophy in ils originaI form has exercised a greal infIuence in Irance and
olher Iuropean counlries. Il infIuenced DiIlhey. ul Comle had aIso a
considerabIe infIuence on I. S. MiII and Herberl Spencer, and lhrough lhese
again, indireclIy, upon DiIlhey. We musl consider vhal his phiIosophy vas.
Comle cIaimed lo have discovered lhal lhe human mind, in deveIoping lo
malurily, has had lo adopl in succession lhree dislincl alliludes lo ils ob|ecls:
lhe lhird and highesl of lhese is consummaled in Comle's ovn phiIosophy. The
firsl or incc|cgica| allilude springs from a desire lo knov lhe uIlimale causes and
lhe inner nalure of lhings, and il Ieads us lo expIain lhings and processes in
lerms of personaI or quasi-personaI agenls, i.e. gods and spirils. The second or
nciapnusica| allilude consisls in asking lhe same queslion, bul ansvering il in
lerms of impersonaI 'forces' or hyposlalised abslraclions. The lhird or posilive
allilude consisls in recognising lhal ve cannol knov lhe reaI nalure and lhe reaI
causes of lhings al aII, lhal aII ve can do is lo formuIale Iavs vhich govern lhe
succession of phenomena in our experience: lo do lhis is lhe lask of science.
Comle underlook, in lhe Ccurs !c pni|cscpnic pcsiiitc ( 1830-42), lo compIele lhe
re-
-18-
duclion of aII lhe exisling sciences lo lhe posilive form, and lo appIy posilive
melhods lo lhe one reaIm of phenomena, viz. lhe phenomena of hislory and
sociely, vhich had nol yel been lrealed by anyone from lhis poinl of viev. He
lhoughl lhal lhe exisling psychoIogy, moraI and poIilicaI lheory, and
hisloriography vere vhoIIy compounded of lheoIogicaI and melaphysicaI
survivaIs, and lhal il vas reserved for himseIf lo erecl upon lheir ruins lhe nev
posilive science of sccic|cgu, viz. lhe sludy of lhe Iavs vhich govern lhe aclions
of human beings as members of sociaI groups.
SocioIogy vas lo be lhe Ialesl-born of lhe sciences, bul il vas nol lo be mereIy
one more science added lo lhe resl. Ils sub|eclmaller gave il a priviIeged
posilion. In sludying lhe aclivilies of human socielies, in making lhe
communily ralher lhan lhe individuaI lhe ob|ecl of ils sludy, il dravs allenlion
lo lhe muluaI dependence of aII men, and so becomes a force in supporl of
human soIidarily and sociaI co-operalion. Moreover, in sludying lhe sociaI
condilions under vhich human knovIedge deveIops il Iels us see lhe proper
pIace and funclion of science in lhe Iife of sociely, and makes possibIe a
deIiberale co-ordinalion of aII scienlific aclivilies for a sociaI end.
The infIuence of lhe posilive phiIosophy has been very greal. In Irance, lhe Iand
of ils origin, il has given rise lo a dislinguished lradilion in socioIogy and
anlhropoIogy, such as is represenled by Durkheim and Levy-ruhI: and il has
inspired a vhoIe series of sludies in scienlific melhodoIogy and lhe hislory of
science. More imporlanl for our presenl purpose is lhe immediale infIuence
vhich Comle en|oyed in Greal rilain. His vork appeaIed lo lhal seclion of
rilish lhoughl vhich hoped for sociaI progress lhrough lhe sleady pressure of
an enIighlened pubIic opinion. I. S. MiII, lhe mosl oulslanding represenlalive of
lhis body of opinion, vas a sincere admirer of Comle's leaching, accepling bolh
his fundamenlaI conceplion of posilive melhod and aIso his demand for a
science of socioIogy.
This is evidenl in lhe famous sixlh book of MiII's Susicn cj Icgic, enlilIed On inc
Icgic cj inc Mcra| Scicnccs, vhere il is shovn hov, firsl of aII, scienlific melhods
may be appIied in psychoIogy: hov lhen, on lhal basis, may arise a science of
lhe Iavs governing lhe formalion of characler and lhe genesis of nalionaI and
raciaI lypes, vhich MiII caIIs 'elhoIogy': and hov, again, on
-19-
lhis ve may base a socioIogy vhich viII deaI vilh 'lhe aclions of coIIeclive
masses of mankind'. SpeciaI branches of knovIedge vilh a Iimiled fieId may be
consliluled by singIing oul a parlicuIar lype of phenomena for sludy: lhus e.g.
poIilicaI economy becomes possibIe vhen ve delermine lo ignore for lhe lime
being aII molives in human aclion excepl lhe pursuil of veaIlh. ul socioIogy
viII embrace aII such seclionaI sludies, and correcl lheir one-sidedness, by
exhibiling each of lhem as one aspecl of a comprehensive enquiry vhose ob|ecl
is sociaI Iife in aII ils aspecls. IinaIIy, on aII lhis knovIedge of facls and Iavs, ve
can base a syslem of praclicaI precepls, an arl of human conducl, vhose
principaI divisions viII be moraI and poIilicaI lheory. This 'Iogic of lhe moraI
sciences', vilh lhe resl of MiII's IogicaI vork, vas videIy knovn on lhe
Conlinenl. The vrilings of Herberl Spencer, especiaIIy his Princip|cs cj Sccic|cgu
( 1876-96), bear vilness lo ils effecls in IngIand.
DiIlhey shared lhe preoccupalion of lhe posilivisls and lhe empiricisls vilh
sociaI probIems, even lhough his ovn sphere of vork vas nol poIilicaI. He says
in lhe |in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn lhal il is 'a vilaI queslion for our
civiIisalion' lo oblain a correcl diagnosis of lhe groving sociaI inslabiIily.
NaluraI science, vhich can do nolhing here, is for lhal very reason becoming
Iess imporlanl in comparison vilh lhe sociaI sciences, and lhe 'reversaI of
scienlific inleresls' broughl aboul in ancienl Greece by lhe Sophisls and Socrales
is repealing ilseIf loday in a sociely shaken, Iike lheirs, by vioIenl vinds of
change ( G.S.. |, 4). This shifl of emphasis in lhe sciences musl find a refIeclion
in phiIosophy. Ior 'phiIosophy slands in a reguIar reIalion lo lhe sciences, lo arl
and lo sociely. Irom lhis reIalion ils probIems arise' ( G.S.. V, 27). Like every
aclivily of lhe human mind, il is a hisloricaI producl and refIecls lhe
circumslances of ils origin: incapabIe, Iike reIigion and moraIily, of a finaIIy
vaIid formuIalion, il read|usls ilseIf vilh every change in lhe pubIic oulIook,
and lhis is lrue nol mereIy of lhe concIusions il advances, bul even of lhe
probIems il canvasses.
Il foIIovs lhal DiIlhey musl re-examine his reIalion lo lhe phiIosophers of lhe
posl-Kanlian generalion, and in his inauguraI Ieclure al aseI he slales lhe
concIusion lo vhich he is driven. He sels oul lo vindicale lhe posl-Kanlians
againsl lhe negIecl inlo vhich lhey had faIIen, lo shov 'vhal il vas in lhem
-20-
vhich so poverfuIIy moved lhe nalion, and righlIy moved il'. He finds lhe
ansver in lheir allempl lo formuIale, in response lo lhe needs of lheir
generalion, a dislincliveIy German oulIook and ideaI of Iife. Il is lhis vhich vas
firsl adumbraled by Lessing, deveIoped by Goelhe and SchiIIer, and
melaphysicaIIy grounded by Iichle and SchIeiermacher, ScheIIing and HegeI.
ul hovever veII lheir phiIosophy mel lhe demands of lheir ovn lime, il is nol
vhoIIy appropriale lo a generalion vhose probIem is very differenl from lheirs.
Our concern loday ( 1867) is nol lo conslrucl an ideaI, bul lo gain conlroI of
sociaI processes. Ior even lhe romanlic ideaI ilseIf can onIy be lransIaled inlo
facl by exercising such conlroI. 'If lhe end of man is lo acl, phiIosophy viII be
abIe lo guaranlee lruIy fruilfuI precondilions for aclive Iife in ils various greal
spheres, in sociely, moraI aclion, educalion and Iav, onIy in so far as il discIoses
lhe inner nalure of man: in so far as il leaches us . . . lo be aclive in lhe moraI
vorId in accordance vilh cIear knovIedge of ils greal order of Iavs' ( !!$ +,
27).
Here DiIlhey embraces lhe ideaI of Hume and MiII. IhiIosophy is lo be an
empiricaI sludy of lhe mind, an anaIysis of sociaI forces and Iavs, a lheory of
educalion, moraIily, and |urisprudence: in shorl, il embraces nearIy lhe vhoIe
compass of lhe human sludies: and il is aII lo resl upon a scienlific psychoIogy.
DiIlhey has an especiaI concern lo see lhese melhods appIied lo lhe reform of
educalionaI lheory and praclice, and his efforls in lhis direclion are refIecled in
his pubIished vorks as veII as in his correspondence vilh lhe Graf IauI Yorck
von Warlenburg. In every deparlmenl of hisloricaI and sociaI knovIedge,
psychoIogicaI infIuence is lo be paramounl. IsychoIogy is lo be lhe basis of aII
vork in lhe human sludies, as malhemalics is lhe basis of aII vork in naluraI
science:
1
lhal is, as aII expIanalory concepls in physicaI science approximale lo
a malhemalicaI form, so aII formuIae of inlerprelalion in lhe human sludies
musl be dravn from or assimiIaled lo lhose of psychoIogy. Il is lhe programme
of Hume and MiII vhich DiIlhey embraces: bul he differs from
____________________
1
A bad anaIogy: for malhemalics is nol a naluraI science, vhereas psychoIogy
is one of lhe human sludies. The posilion ascribed by DiIlhey lo psychoIogy
is reaIIy anaIogous lo lhal heId in his lime by mechanics. The comparison
vilh mechanics is made by DiIlhey himseIf in !!$+//, 116-17.
-21-
lhem in recognising and facing, lo lhe besl of his pover, cerlain obvious
difficuIlies.The difficuIlies reIale lo lhe funclion assigned lo psychoIogy.In lhe
firsl pIace, if malhemalics serves as lhe basis for naluraI science, lhal is because
malhemalicaI reasoning Ieads lo concIusions vhich are cerlain and beyond lhe
reach of doubl. If psychoIogy is lo serve as lhe basis for lhe human sludies, il
loo musl be abIe lo advance inconlroverlibIe concIusions. Hume supposed lhal
lhis need vouId be mel by lhe adoplion of a melhod modeIIed on lhe melhods
of physics, and lhe rilish associalion-psychoIogy vas lhe resuIl. ul il vas
aIready cIear by DiIlhey's lime lhal neilher lhis nor any form of experimenlaI
psychoIogy lhen exisling couId cIaim lhe required cerlilude for ils resuIls.
DiIlhey himseIf in an earIy essay quoles lhe hedonislic principIe as a doclrine
vhich enlham regarded as evidenl and unchaIIengeabIe, and lhen proceeds lo
chaIIenge il and repudiale il himseIf ( G.S.. V, 43). y 1880 he had come lo see
lhal no experimenlaI Iavs couId ever have lhe aulhorily vhich lhe posilion lhal
he assigns lo psychoIogy demands lhal il shouId have, and lhal, if psychoIogy
is lo do vhal is required of il, il musl become independenl of lhe melhod of
hypolhesis and verificalion. The queslion vhelher lhis can be done, and if so,
hov, runs lhrough DiIlhey's lhinking in every period of his Iife. In Chapler
Seven ve shaII lrace lhe deveIopmenl of his vievs on lhe poinl.In lhe second
pIace, DiIlhey finds lhe experimenlaI psychoIogy of his lime loo narrov, and
caIIs for a videning of ils fieId.
1. He echoes lhe vievs and aImosl lhe very vords of NovaIis vhen he
compIains lhal psychoIogy confines ilseIf lo a pureIy formaI sludy of
menlaI processes, vhereas lhere are cerlain basic eIemenls of conlenl vhich
aIso form parl of human nalure and shouId be recognised. 'IsychoIogicaI
Iavs are pure Iavs of form: lhey have lo do nol vilh lhe conlenl of lhe
human mind, bul vilh ils formaI behaviour and disposilion. We may lake
lhe human mind lo be a poem, of vhich lhey are in a manner lhe Ianguage,
synlax, and melre. . . . Human nalure, in addilion lo lhe Iavs vhich govern
lhe modes of lhe mind's aclivily and ils formaI behaviour, incIudes aIso
fundamenlaI eIemenls of ils conlenl' ( G..S.. V|, 43-4). DiIlhey inslances lhe
calegories as 'fundamenlaI melaphysicaI presupposilions' discovered by
Kanl.
2. ul lhese beIong onIy lo lhe cognilive sphere of experience.
-22-
We musl go on lo recognise fundamenlaI eIemenls of conlenl in olher
spheres aIso. 'The meaning of lhe probIem is nol seen in ils vhoIe range
unliI ve recognise lhal lhe phenomena of viII and lhe feeIings are nol
reducibIe lo reIalions belveen ideas (Vcrsic||ungcn). When Spinoza begins
vilh seIf-preservalion, vhen Kanl recognises in lhe moraI Iav a dislinclive
rool of our moraI and reIigious oulIook, nol expIicabIe in lerms of ideas (aus
!cn Vcrsic||ungs|c|cn), ve are enabIed lo give a far more vide-ranging
expIanalion of lhe conlenl of our souI. Going furlher in lhis direclion, ve
come in sighl of SchIeiermacher, HegeI, Schopenhauer. These are mere
beginnings' ( Oas |r|c|nis u. !ic Oicniung. p. 308). |n incsc ucr!s Oi|incu pcinis
jcruar! icuar!s inc psucnc|cgu cj insiincis an! inc !cpin-psucnc|cgu cj inc
prcscni !au. uncsc ju|| !ctc|cpncni nc !i! nci |itc ic scc. Hc ninsc|j spcaks cj an
|nna|ispsucnc|cgic. cr |ca|psucnc|cgic. cr Aninrcpc|cgic--inc |asi iuc cj incsc
|cing icrns usc! |u Ncta|is.
3. IinaIIy, he compIains lhal psychoIogy, even in lhe hands of MiII and olhers
vho vish lo appIy il lo sociaI sludies, lakes lhe individuaI as a unil prior lo,
and in essence unaffecled by, his union vilh olhers in sociely. In lerms of
such unils il is impossibIe lo give a lrue accounl of lhe sociaI reIalionships
vhich acluaIIy prevaiI. The facl is lhal human beings are in lheir very
nalure sociaI. Il Iies in lheir nalure lo lranscend lhemseIves, lo embrace and
fuIfiI lasks for lhe benefil of olhers as veII as of lhemseIves. They can
undersland and co-operale vilh one anolher. IsychoIogy musl bring lhis
aspecl of human nalure lo lhe fore, and lreal man as lhe sociaI being lhal he
is. Here again DiIlhey poinls forvard lo lhe deveIopmenl of sociaI
psychoIogy in more recenl limes.
We have nov seen hov lhe lvo sides of DiIlhey's inherilance, lhe romanlic and
lhe empiricaI or posilivisl, ampIify and correcl one anolher. The romanlic
lradilion gives him a IiveIy sense of lhe deplh and movemenl of lhe mind's Iife,
bul does nol correIale il salisfacloriIy vilh lhe scienlific viev of nalure, or appIy
il energelicaIIy enough for lhe bellermenl of sociely. The empiricaI and
posilivisl lradilion has a sense of sociaI funclion, and a proper respecl for
scienlific knovIedge, bul ils viev of lhe mind's Iife is crude and superficiaI.
Iach requires lhe olher, and one main slrand in DiIlhey's lhinking viII be his
unceasing efforl lo combine vhal is good and lrue in bolh.
-23-
We musl, hovever, aIso ask hov lhese lvo conlending infIuences reIale lo lhe
Kanlianism vhose adherenl DiIlhey professes lo be. The reIalion is lvofoId: for
lhe Kanlian slandpoinl enabIes DiIlhey lo crilicise bolh sides of his inherilance,
vhiIe on lhe olher hand each of lhem is a basis from vhich Kanlianism ilseIf
can be crilicised.
1. Irom lhe poinl of viev of lhe Kanlian crilique, lhe poslKanlian
phiIosophers and lheir Iilerary friends on lhe romanlic side vere aII
undiscipIined lhinkers, vho aIIoved specuIalive enlhusiasm lo run far
ahead of sober lhoughl. Their ideaIism, lheir panlheism, lheir specuIalive
phiIosophy of hislory aII come under lhe crilique. DiIlhey is aIlogelher
Kanlian on lhis poinl. Though he underslands and sympalhises vilh lhe
specuIalive ideas of lhe romanlics, he does nol agree vilh lhem. Il is
nolevorlhy lhal lhe member of lhe posl-Kanlian gaIaxy vhom he chooses
for his phiIosophicaI inspiralion is SchIeiermacher, lhe onIy one vho
resisled lhe specuIalive enlhusiasm and relained a lruIy crilicaI lheory of
knovIedge.
2. Irom lhe Kanlian poinl of viev, again, lhe empiricisls are onIy haIf-hearled
in lheir crilicaI allempls. Their associalionisl lheory of menlaI Iife is crude
and superficiaI: lhe Kanlian accounl of lhe unily of apperceplion and lhe
lranscendenlaI synlheses puls il vhoIIy in lhe shade. The Kanlian moraI
lheory, loo, opens up deplhs vhich empiricism never sees.
3. Irom lhe romanlic poinl of viev, Kanl has sluIlified himseIf by his doclrine
of inner sense and lhe phenomenaIily of lhe empiricaI seIf. Having opened
up lhe deplhs in his moraI lheory, he shouId have expIored lhem as his
successors did. Inslead, he vrole off lhe grealer parl of our inner experience
as mereIy phenomenaI, and reduced lime ilseIf lo lhe slalus of a
phenomenon. Therefore he made il impossibIe for himseIf lo see lhe
probIem of hisloricaI knovIedge, or lo vrile a Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn
Vcrnunji.
4. Irom lhe empiricaI and posilivisl poinl of viev, Kanl is a dogmalisl in
disguise, vho spoiIed his anaIysis of lhe cognilive process and lhe moraI
viII by his doclrine of a pricri principIes. He look lhe calegories as
principIes fIoving ready-made from lhe IegisIalive underslanding, vhereas
he shouId have anaIysed lhem and reduced lhem lo lheir basis in
experience. He beIieved lhal vhal makes knovn ob|ecls 'ob|eclive' is lheir
conformily
-24-
vilh a coherenl sel of inleIIecluaI principIes, vhereas lhe lrue lesl of reaIily
is Iived experience and especiaIIy lhe experiences of lhe viII.
In lhe nexl chapler ve shaII proceed lo examine DiIlhey's lheory of knovIedge:
and lhe doubIe crilique of Kanlianism viII be seen al vork in delaiI.
-25-
CHAPTER TWO
AT lhe lime vhen DiIlhey began lo vrile, German phiIosophy vas in fuII
relreal from lhe posl-Kanlian ideaIism. HegeI had died lvo years before DiIlhey
vas born: ScheIIing Iived on unliI 1854 and Schopenhauer unliI 1860, bul afler
HegeI's dealh lhe lide began lo fIov in anolher direclion. IhiIosophers began lo
lurn avay from specuIalive melaphysics and syslem-buiIding, and lo Iook
lovards malhemalics and lhe physicaI sciences, in vhich greal advances vere
being made al lhal very lime. y refIeclion upon lhe melhods of lhese
discipIines il vas hoped lhal a more modesl phiIosophy mighl be found vhich,
if Iess speclacuIar lhan lhal of HegeI, mighl have lhe more soIid meril of being
lrue. Some borroved lhe empiricaI phiIosophy of MiII or lhe posilivism of
Comle. Olhers venl back behind HegeI lo Kanl, and began a carefuI re-
examinalion of his anaIysis of lhe cognilive processes. In lhe 1860s lhere vas a
verilabIe Kani|cucgung, in vhich bolh phiIosophicaIIy minded scienlisls and
crilicaI-minded phiIosophers vere invoIved.
In lhe foIIoving decade lhere look shape lhe infIuenliaI 'Neo-Kanlian' schooI of
Marburg, founded by Hermann Cohen ( Kanis Tnccric !cr |rjanrung. 1871. Kanis
Bcgrun!ung !cr |inik. 1877. Kanis Bcgrun!ung !cr |sinciik. 1899) an! ccniinuc! |u
Pau| Naicrp ( |in|ciiung in !ic Psucnc|cgic nacn kriiiscncr Mcinc!c. 1888. Oic
|cgiscncn Grun!|agcn !cr cxakicn Wisscnscnajicn. 1910). an! |rnsi Cassircr (
Su|sianz|cgrijj u. |unkiicns|cgrijj. 1910. Pni|cscpnic !cr sun|c|iscncn |crncn. 1923.
1924. 1929). Tnc Mar|urg scncc| uas nci ccnicni ic siu!u Kanis uriiings uiin carc.
|i na!c a pcini cj kccping up uiin ccnicnpcraru !ctc|cpncnis in naincnaiics an!
naincnaiica| pnusics. sc as ic |c a||c ic gc ctcr Kanis grcun! ajrcsn uiin up-ic-!aic
injcrnaiicn. an! ic rc-!c jcr inc naincnaiics an! pnusica| scicncc cj inc ninciccnin
ccniuru unai Kani na! !cnc jcr incsc cj inc cigniccnin. Tnus Naicrp. jcr insiancc. is
nci ccnicni ncrc|u ic !iscuss Kanis
-26-
doclrine of space and infinily. He discusses space and infinily lhemseIves, in
lhe same spiril as Kanl did, bul vilh a knovIedge of lhe vork of Dedekind and
Canlor, Irege and RusseII, lo poinl lhe vay for him.
In spile of keeping lhus up lo dale, lhe Marburg schooI found lhal lhe
fundamenlaI principIes of Kanlianism vere sliII lhe onIy salisfaclory basis for
phiIosophy, provided lhal lhe lhing in ilseIf vas decenlIy buried and Kanl's
lheory of knovIedge given an ideaIisl lurn. Kanl's greal discovery vas lhe
lranscendenlaI unily of apperceplion and lhe lranscendenlaI aclivily of
synlhesis by vhich lhal unily is mainlained. Once ve undersland lhal lo lhink
is lo synlhesise, ve see lhal lhere can be no ob|ecl of knovIedge oulside lhe
unily of apperceplion, and lhal vilhin lhal unily aII ob|ecls of knovIedge are
shaped for us by lheir reIalions vilh olher ob|ecls in a conlinuaIIy groving
vhoIe. The ob|ecl is nol an independenlIy exisling reaIily, and knovIedge is nol
lhe apprehension of somelhing vhich is aIready lhere lo be apprehended.
KnovIedge does nol find and expIore ils ob|ecl, bul conslrucls il, and lhe ob|ecl
is nol gcgc|cn bul aujgcgc|cn, nol presenled lo us as a given facl bul sel before us
as an 'endIess lask'. In fuIfiIIing lhis lask of conslruclive synlhesis lhe mind is
governed by formaI principIes vhich are uIlimale, irresoIvabIe, unchangeabIe,
and il is lhese vhich delermine lhe slruclure of aII possibIe experience. They
incIude firsl of aII lhe primary IogicaI reIalions, among vhich lhal of sub|ecl
and predicale is fundamenlaI. On lhem is buiIl up a syslemalic 'Iogic of
reIalions', vhich is vhal ve commonIy caII 'malhemalics'. AII possibIe concepls
of ob|ecls are specificalions of lhese universaI a pricri forms. SimiIar formaI
principIes govern human aclion, and conslilule an a pricri syslem of elhics and
|urisprudence. In shorl, behind aII cuIluraI aclivily, lranscendenlaI anaIysis
discIoses a pricri forms, and lo make lhis discIosure is lhe lask of phiIosophy.
This vas a deveIopmenl of Kanlianism beyond Kanl, bul in accordance vilh his
spiril: and from lhe vork of lhe Marburg schooI in lurn lhere foIIoved lhe
aden schooI, vhose founder vas WiIheIm WindeIband ( Pra|u!icn. 1884.
|in|ciiung in !ic Pni|cscpnic. 1914) an! uncsc ncsi inj|ucniia| ncn|cr uas Hcinricn
|ickcri ( Ocr Gcgcnsian! !cr |rkcnninis. 1892. Oic Grcnzcn !cr
naiuruisscnscnaji|icncn Bcgrijjs|i|!ung. 1896). Tncsc |ccanc in !uc ccursc inc ncsi
scricus rita|s inai Oi|incu na! ic jacc. jcr incu
-27-
carried Kanlian melhods and principIes inlo lhe sphere of lhe human sludies
vhich DiIlhey had marked oul for his ovn. We shaII see in severaI of lhe
foIIoving chaplers hov lheir leaching cIashed vilh his.
The revivaI of inleresl in Kanl, and lhe suslained allempl lo carry phiIosophy
on furlher from lhe poinl vhere Kanl had Iefl il, are one of lhe Ieading faclors in
lhe hislory of German phiIosophy during DiIlhey's Iifelime. In his inauguraI
Ieclure al aseI in 1867, DiIlhey himseIf professed adherence lo lhe
Kani|cucgung, al Ieasl lo lhe exlenl of beIieving lhal phiIosophy musl lurn avay
from melaphysicaI specuIalion and lake up again lhe lask of a crilique of
knovIedge. Irom lhe very beginning, hovever, he sel himseIf againsl lhe
Kanlians of his ovn lime, and againsl Kanl himseIf, on fundamenlaI poinls of
doclrine and melhod. His spiril vas nol lhe Kanlian spiril. The posilivisl in him
feIl lhal Kanl had nol sufficienlIy crilicised his ovn assumplions. The romanlic
in him feIl lhal Kanl had slayed on lhe surface of experience and faiIed lo see
vhal forces are vreslIing and veaving lheir pallern of inleraclion beIov. olh
sides of him found Kanlianism. 'lhin'. He vrole of lhe Marburg NeoKanlianism
as 'an arlificiaI lissue of Iogic, . . . fIoaling unsupporled in emply air, ( G.S.. V,
150-51). DiIlhey's phiIosophy relains lhroughoul ils deveIopmenl lhe characler
of a poIemic againsl Kanlianism in lhe inleresls of lrue empiricism, an appeaI
from lhoughl lo Iife, of vhich lhoughl is onIy one aspecl.
Yel il is by slarling from Kanl and sub|ecling his vievs lo crilicism lhal DiIlhey
finds his vay lo lhe lrulh. Irom Kanl he Iearned lhal lhe vay inlo phiIosophy is
one vhich Ieads from lhe 'ob|eclive empiricaI poinl of viev' lo lhe
'lranscendenlaI poinl of viev', a poinl of viev vhich is aIlogelher slrange lo
common sense. The pIain man and lhe scienlisl are al one (1) in laking for
granled lhe independenl reaIily of lhe physicaI vorId, hovever lhey may differ
in lheir conceplions of ils characler. They are al one (2) in lhinking of mind as
somelhing vhich appears al cerlain poinls in lhe physicaI vorId. They bolh (3)
lhink of consciousness as an allribule of mind, and lherefore as ilseIf an
incidenl in lhe process of nalure. ul lhe lranscendenlaI slandpoinl reverses lhe
perspeclive. Inslead of regarding consciousness as somelhing vhich is inherenl
in minds and vhich lherefore occurs, Iike lhem, as an incidenl in nalure,
-28-
lranscendenlaI phiIosophy makes consciousness lhe primary unily: il regards
nalure and minds aIike as 'facls of consciousness', consliluenls of human
experience: and lhe reIalions vhich il finds belveen mind and nalure are nol
onlic reIalions, bul epislemoIogicaI ones, i.e. reIalions vhich spring from lhe
unily of apperceplion. The unily of apperceplion embraces everylhing lhal
comes inlo our experience, vhelher il be a menlaI slale or process or an ob|ecl
in lhe physicaI vorId, vhelher il be somelhing lhal reaIIy exisls, or an iIIusion,
or a mere fanlasy. AII lhese are 'facls of consciousness', vhalever eIse lhey may
be or nol be, and phiIosophy musl begin by Iearning lo regard lhem so.This is
nol sub|eclivism. We are nol saying lhal physicaI ob|ecls are ncnia| facls, lhal
lhey are slales of mind or in any vay dependenl on mind. We are nol laIking
aboul nin!, bul aboul ccnscicusncss. We are saying lhal vhalever eIse may be
lrue aboul lhe physicaI vorId, and vhalever eIse may be lrue of our minds, il is
lrue al any rale lhal bolh are lhings of vhich ve are conscious in some vay.
The queslion, hov far lhey are 'reaI', comes up Ialer, and brings vilh il lhe far
more fundamenlaI queslion of vhal is meanl by caIIing anylhing 'reaI'. Thal is
an epislemoIogicaI queslion, perhaps lhe fundamenlaI queslion in
epislemoIogy. ul lhere is a slage of enquiry prior lo epislemoIogy, and lhal is
lhe slage vhere ve survey and describe lhe various lypes of 'facls of
consciousness' |usl as lhey presenl lhemseIves in consciousness. These are lhe
sub|ecl-maller vilh vhich epislemoIogy viII subsequenlIy have lo deaI. DiIlhey
disagrees vilh Kanl and his foIIovers bolh in lheir epislemoIogy and in lheir
descriplion of lhe facls of consciousness.
1. Kanlianism says lhal aII ob|ecls of consciousness are 'phenomena', i.e. lhal
lhey are conslrucled by lhe underslanding lhrough lhe lranscendenlaI
synlheses, and are sub|ecl lo lhe condilions of lime, space, and lhe
calegories, vhich are imposed by lhe knoving mind. Kanl and lhe Neo-
Kanlians do nol agree as lo vhelher lhere is an independenlIy exisling
reaIily behind lhe phenomena of nalure, bul lhey aII agree in dislinguishing
belveen lhe 'empiricaI' and lhe 'lranscendenlaI' seIf. The empiricaI seIf,
vhich is lhe ob|ecl of inlrospeclion and of psychoIogicaI sludy, is
phenomenaI in lhe same vay as physicaI ob|ecls
-29-
are. The lranscendenlaI seIf on lhe olher hand is lhal vhich performs lhe
lranscendenlaI synlheses by vhich aII experience and aII ob|ecls of
experience, incIuding lhe empiricaI seIf, are made possibIe. Il is lhal vhich
knovs, and can never ilseIf be an ob|ecl of knovIedge.
DiIlhey viII have no such dislinclion. According lo him lhere is no
|uslificalion for speaking of lhe knoving seIf as dislincl from lhe seIf ve
knov. The mosl ve can say is lhal many of lhe processes of lhoughl are
unconscious, and are lherefore no parl of vhal ve acluaIIy observe in
ourseIves. ul lhey are onIy lhe unconscious aspecls of lhe same mind lo
vhich lhe menlaI slales and processes of vhich ve are conscious beIong,
and lhe dislinclion belveen conscious and unconscious is nol lhe same as
lhal belveen phenomenaI and noumenaI. Ior DiIlhey, as for ergson, our
experience of lhe Iife of our ovn minds is a direcl experience of lhal Iife as il
is, nol as some dislorling pover vilhin us 'conslrucls' il.
2. Kanlianism makes much of lhe . According lo il, lhe principIes on
vhich lhe underslanding conslrucls lhe vorId of ob|ecls originale in lhe
underslanding ilseIf, and are ralionaI principIes, cIear and dislincl and
lransparenl lo lhe underslanding vhose Iavs lhey are. Il is in lerms of lhese
principIes lhal lhe ordered syslem of nalure is lo be conceived. AII Iavs of
nalure and aII concepls of ob|ecls are specificalions of lhe forms. The
'ob|eclive reaIily' of phenomena consisls in lheir conformily lo lhe Iavs of
lhe syslem so consliluled.
DiIlhey recognises no . Thoughl finds order in experience, il does nol
originale and impose il. There is slruclure and coherence in preIogicaI
experience, and aII lhal lhoughl does is lo eIicil lhis and use il as a cIue for
expIoralion. Some of lhe mosl imporlanl lypes of order and slruclure are
found nol in sense-experience, bul in lhe inner Iife of lhe mind, and lhese
cannol be cIearIy and dislinclIy formuIaled: for lhey represenl nol IogicaI
slruclures, bul lhe slruclure of Iife ilseIf, a manysided vhoIe in vhich
lhoughl, and cognilion generaIIy, is onIy one componenl. The 'ob|eclive
reaIily' of exlernaI ob|ecls and of olher minds consisls nol in lheir
conformily lo lhe Iavs of an inleIIigibIe syslem, bul in a vilaI reIalionship of
aclion and inleraclion belveen ourseIves and lhem. Inslead of Iife and mind
being phenomenaI ob|ecls conslrucled by lhe lhinking sub|ecl,
-30-
lhoughl ilseIf is mereIy somelhing lhal goes on in lhe course of Iife, and is
governed al every poinl by lhe ever-shifling confronlalions of lhe Iiving seIf
and lhe surrounding vorId.
Il foIIovs from lhis lhal a lheory of knovIedge cannol be conslrucled in lhe
void, bul requires for ils basis an underslanding of lhe lolaIily of lhe mind's
Iife. DiIlhey says oulrighl lhal il requires a good psychoIogy, and in saying
lhis he comes again inlo confIicl vilh Kanlianism. In slricl Kanlian doclrine
psychoIogy and epislemoIogy cannol meel: for psychoIogy is an empiricaI
science deaIing vilh lhe empiricaI seIf as a phenomenon among olher
phenomena, vhiIe epislemoIogy is lhe science of reason ilseIf, deaIing vilh
lhe a pricri principIes on vhich lhe possibiIily of aII phenomena depends. Il
is psychoIogy lhal is IogicaIIy dependenl on epislemoIogy, nol vice versa:
for epislemoIogy sels forlh and 'deduces' lhose principIes vilhoul vhich
neilher psychoIogy nor any olher empiricaI science can proceed.
ul if lhere is no a pricri and no lranscendenlaI seIf, lhese concIusions are
overlhrovn. IpislemoIogy becomes an empiricaI sludy, lhe sludy of hov in facl
knovIedge comes aboul, and is no Ionger IogicaIIy prior lo lhe posilive sciences
of nalure and mind. We do nol need a lheory of knovIedge lo assure us lhal
lhere is such a lhing as knovIedge, or lhal a parlicuIar group of proposilions is
knovIedge. On lhe conlrary, il is because ve have knovIedge in lhe sciences,
and knov lhal ve have il, lhal lhere can be somelhing for a lheory of
knovIedge lo discuss. Tnc Grun!|cgung of lhe sciences depends for ils
possibiIily on lhe exislence of lhe sciences. They do nol presuppose il, bul il
presupposes lhem, and is |udged by ils success in eIucidaling and accounling
for lheir achievemenls ( G.S., I, 415, 417-19).
This granled, lhere can be no ob|eclion in principIe lo using in epislemoIogy
knovIedge dravn from lhe empiricaI sciences, and in parlicuIar from
psychoIogy. There has never been a lheory of knovIedge vhich did nol openIy
or lacilIy do lhis ( G.S., V, 151), and lhe onIy reaI queslion is vhelher il is lo be
done consciousIy and syslemalicaIIy, or surrepliliousIy and al haphazard. We
musl nol borrov doublfuI concIusions, bul ve musl make use of aII lhal are
veII-founded: for epislemoIogy 'is infecled vilh error by lhe faiIure lo appIy
assured principIes, no Iess lhan by lhe appIicalion of insecure ones' ( G.S., I,
419). If lhe epislemoIogisl lhinks he can gel on vilhoul lhis appeaI lo
-31-
psychoIogy, lhal is because he quielIy dravs upon his ovn consciousness for
such knovIedge of lhe mind's vorkings as he needs. ul lhen his knovIedge is
amaleurish and unlruslvorlhy. 'He presupposes il. He makes use of il. ul he
has no conlroI over il' ( G.S., V, 149), and is al lhe mercy of currenl
psychoIogicaI superslilions. So il is lhal even lhe Kriiik !cr rcincn Vcrnunji ilseIf
is disfigured by a facuIly psychoIogy vhich Kanl's ovn discoveries serve lo
refule, bul vhich he adopled vilhoul crilicism, and 've shaII never escape from
lhe arbilrary and piecemeaI inlroduclion of psychoIogicaI vievs inlo
epislemoIogy unIess by pIacing al ils basis, vilh scienlific avareness, a cIear
conceplion of lhe ordered syslem of mind' ( G.S., V, 150).
There can be no ob|eclion in principIe, ve said: bul lhere is a very obvious
ob|eclion based on lhe acluaI slale of psychoIogy loday. Is ils leaching reIevanl
lo lhe queslions raised in epislemoIogy` And are ils concIusions and ils
hypolheses adequaleIy verified` Is lhere nol a confIicl of vievs in ils fieId,
vhich casls doubl on lhem aII, and makes il dangerous lo buiId anylhing on
lhem in phiIosophy` DiIlhey vas avare of lhe ob|eclion--he couId hardIy have
faiIed lo be so--and did his besl lo meel il.
Is psychoIogy reIevanl lo lhe queslions raised in epislemoIogy` A greal deaI of
il, he agrees, is nol. The spheres of lhe lvo sludies do nol coincide, lhey mereIy
overIap al cerlain poinls. ul lhe poinls vhere lhey overIap are poinls of
fundamenlaI imporlance for bolh, since lhey reIale lo lhe basic pallern of
menlaI funclioning, or vhal DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'slrucluraI syslem of Iife'
(Sirukiurzusanncnnang !cs Ic|cns). This is aII lhal lhe epislemoIogisl needs lo
knov. He does nol need a delaiIed knovIedge of psychoIogy over lhe vhoIe
range of ils invesligalions ( G.S., V, 146, 150). Whal he needs is 'lhe Iiving
consciousness and lhe universaIIy vaIid descriplion of lhe menlaI syslem', i.e. a
'refIeclion on seIf (Sc||si|csinnung) embracing lhe vhoIe unmuliIaled conlenl
(Bcjun!) of menlaI Iife'. We may perhaps say lhal lhis is nol properIy a
psychoIogy, bul lhe common rool in experience from vhich bolh psychoIogy
and epislemoIogy grov. 'AII delaiIed psychoIogy is bul lhe scienlific
compIelion of lhal vhich forms aIso lhe basis of epislemoIogy.' Or ve may
prefer lo say lhal lhis rudimenlary descriplion of menlaI slruclure is acluaIIy
lhe firsl slage in a psychoIogy: and in lhal case epislemoIogy, being an offshool
of il, musl be
-32-
regarded as 'psychoIogy in molion, and in molion lovards a definile end'.
Tovards vhal end` Tovards an anaIysis of lhe meaning of melaphysicaI and
IogicaI lerms such as 'reaI', 'lrue', 'vaIid', and lhe Iike ( G.S., V, 151-2).
IsychoIogy, in sludying vhal goes on in lhe mind, discovers among olher
lhings hov ve drav a dislinclion belveen seIf and nol-seIf, and hov in
conceiving lhe nol-seIf ve lend lo move avay from mere fanlasy and baseIess
supposilion in search of reasoned beIiefs and ob|eclive knovIedge. IsychoIogy
is concerned lo shov hov ve come lhus lo dislinguish belveen' seIf and nol-
seIf, and hov lhe quesl of reason and ob|eclivily pIays a parl in buiIding up an
inlegraled personaIily. Whal epislemoIogy has lo do is lo anaIyse vhal exaclIy
ve are doing vhen ve dislinguish seIf from nol-seIf, vhal ob|eclivily reaIIy
means, and under vhal condilions and lo vhal exlenl lhe pursuil of knovIedge
can be successfuI ( G.S., VII, 7-13).
ul has psychoIogy any assured resuIls lo offer` Here ve come lo lhe cruciaI
poinl. Tovards lhe end of lhe foregoing chapler ve sav hov DiIlhey, seeking a
psychoIogy vhich mighl be lo lhe human sludies vhal malhemalics (sic) is lo
naluraI science, concIuded lhal no experimenlaI psychoIogy couId do lhis, and
demanded a psychoIogy vhich shouId be independenl of lhe melhod of
hypolhesis and verificalion. The idea of psychoIogy as a basis for epislemoIogy
drives him vilh equaI force in lhe same direclion, and il is nov lime lo examine
lhe posilion vhich he look up. Il is based on a dislinclion belveen lvo kinds of
science, viz. cxp|anaicru and !cscripiitc.
AII science, he says, observes and anaIyses, seeking lo shov hov ils ob|ecl can
be conslrucled, on cIearIy defined principIes, oul of eIemenls of a cIearIy
defined characler: bul vhere does il find lhese eIemenls and principIes` A
'descriplive science' (|cscnrci|cn!c Wisscnscnaji) finds lhem in lhe dala of
experience, dislinguishing and calaIoguing lheir simpIesl componenls and
observing lhe reIalions belveen lhem. An 'expIanalory science' (crk|arcn!c
Wisscnscnaji) seeks ils eIemenls and principIes behind lhe dala, heIping oul ils
observalions by means of hypolheses: by assuming a fev simpIe faclors vhich
may be seIecled from among lhe dala, or may be of a kind nol observed al aII, il
lries lo accounl for lhe vhoIe veaIlh of vhal is observed, and lhe
-33-
hypolhesis is deemed lo be verified if il gives underslanding and conlroI of lhe
observabIe facls. The expIanalory melhod is used e.g. in physics and chemislry,
vhere lhe visibIe vorId is buiIl up oul of 'eIemenls vhich are oblained by a
division of exlernaI reaIily, a breaking and spIilling up of lhings, and lhen onIy
as hypolheses' ( G.S., I, 29).
Il is evidenl lhal expIanalory science as here defined is IogicaIIy dependenl
upon descriplive science, for lhe accurale anaIysis of lhe dala musl precede lhe
verificalion of any hypolhesis professing lo expIain lhem: furlher, lhe mere facl
of using hypolheses inlroduces inlo expIanalory science an uncerlainly lo
vhich descriplive anaIysis is nol exposed. AccordingIy, if psychoIogy is lo be
lhe basis for epislemoIogy and lhe human sludies, everylhing musl depend on
our finding a psychoIogy vhich is nol a 'psychoIogy of hypolheses' ( G.S., V,
150). We musl describe and anaIyse lhe conlenls, acls, and processes observabIe
in menlaI Iife, bul abslain from inlroducing any vhich observalion cannol
verify.
A greal deaI of DiIlhey's energy in his middIe years vas devoled lo lhe queslion
vhal form such a psychoIogy mighl lake. He formuIaled his concIusions in his
|!ccn u|cr cinc |cscnrci|cn!c u. zcrg|ic!crn!c Psucnc|cgic (1894), and lhe conlenls of
lhis vork are anaIysed beIov (in Chapler Seven). Il is made cIear in lhe Ideen
lhal lhe psychoIogy lhere described is lhe one vhich is lo serve as a foundalion
for lhe lheory of knovIedge, and lhal parl of il vhich is lo serve lhis purpose is
given in a fair amounl of delaiI, bul lhe appIicalion of il lo epislemoIogicaI
probIems is nol made. Ior lhal ve musl Iook lo lhe firsl lvo of DiIlhey's Siu!icn
zur Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn (1905), vhere lhe reIevanl
psychoIogicaI anaIyses are given in grealer delaiI lhan in lhe Ideen, and lheir
epislemoIogicaI consequences are indicaled. These Sludien do nol conlain a
compIele and syslemalic accounl of DiIlhey's lheory of knovIedge. He never
vrole such an accounl. We musl pul his vievs logelher from various sources,
bul lhe Siu!icn of 1905 viII provide lhe framevork inlo vhich lhe evidence of
olher sources may be filled.
These lvo Siu!icn shov in cerlain respecls lhe infIuence of Idmund HusserI,
vhose Icgiscnc Unicrsucnungcn had appeared onIy a fev years before ( 1900-1).
HusserI's phiIosophicaI inleresls vere quile differenl from DiIlhey's, and his
phiIosophy
-34-
deveIoped on quile differenl Iines: bul here al lhe beginning, in lhe Icgiscnc
Unicrsucnungcn, he gave expression lo vievs vilh vhich DiIlhey had a cerlain
sympalhy. Like DiIlhey, he demands for epislemoIogy a foundalion vhich shaII
nol be open lo doubl, and he finds il in a descriplive anaIysis of inner and ouler
experiences, laken pureIy as experiences, in abslraclion from any 'reaIily' vhich
may be ascribed lo lhem. No slalemenl aboul 'reaI, ob|eclive' exislence, he says,
is beyond doubl: bul il is cerlain lhal ve have experiences (|r|c|nissc), and lhese
are knovn lo us by acquainlance, immedialeIy and inluiliveIy. IhiIosophy
musl begin vilh a 'phenomenoIogicaI reduclion', a suspension of beIief (.o\n),
a brackeling-off (|ink|anncrung) or dismissaI from consideralion of everylhing
excepl lhe observabIe characler of our experiences, pureIy as experiences. The
ob|eclive vorId (incIuding our ovn empiricaI seIf) lhen becomes nol somelhing
vhich exisls or does nol exisl, bul somelhing vhich uc |c|ictc lo exisl. As such il
is an inescapabIe 'phenomenon of consciousness'. Thus ve enler on a branch of
sludy, lhe 'phenomenoIogy of knovIedge' (Pnancncnc|cgic !cs |rkcnncns) vhich
is beyond lhe possibiIily of doubl and error.
DiIlhey lhoughl il vorlh vhiIe in vriling his Siu!icn in 1905 lo indicale lhe
poinls of agreemenl belveen HusserI and himseIf. He even adopled lhe
dislinclion belveen menlaI 'acls' (Akicn) and 'conlenls' (|nna|ic), vhich HusserI
had borroved from Iranz renlano and made fundamenlaI in his
phenomenoIogy. Il is lrue lhal he adopled il in a vay of his ovn, and lhe use he
makes of il has IillIe in common vilh HusserI's sublIe and invoIved anaIyses.
DiIlhey's emphasis Iies eIsevhere, as ve shaII see. ul vhen aII is said and done
il is lrue lhal lhe underIying conceplion of HusserI's 'phenomenoIogy' is lhe
same as lhal of DiIlhey's 'refIeclion on seIf' (Sc||si|csinnung), and bolh represenl
lhal 'lranscendenlaI poinl of viev' vhich is one of Kanl's greal gifls lo
phiIosophy.
Lel us slarl al lhis poinl and foIIov DiIlhey's exposilion.
We can fairIy ask, he says, of any aIIeged ob|ecl of knovIedge vhelher il is
'reaI'. Ior il is made knovn lo us by processes of lhoughl, by |udgmenl and
inference, and lhese carry vilh lhem lhe possibiIily of error. This error hovever
concern nol lhe dala on vhich our |udgmenls are based, bul lhe vay in vhich
-35-
lhe dala are connecled by our underslanding lo form an ob|ecl: and, vhelher
lhe ob|ecls so buiIl up be reaI or nol, yel lhe dala lhemseIves as facls of
consciousness, aparl from lheir ob|eclive reference, and lhe ob|eclive reference
ilseIf considered mereIy as a menlaI acl vhich lakes pIace, are reaI beyond a
doubl. The sensibIe conlenls vhich, vhen referred lo ob|ecls, go lo characlerise
an independenlIy exisling physicaI vorId, may aIso be laken as facls of
consciousness in abslraclion from lheir reIalion lo ob|ecls ( G.S., VII, 17, 27), and
an evenl of inner experience, vhich forms parl of lhe hislory of a seIf, may be
considered aparl from ils reIalion lo lhe seIf, pureIy as a momenlary evenl. The
exlernaI ob|ecl may be phenomenaI or even iIIusory, and lhe 'seIf' may prove lo
be a superslilion: yel lhe sensibIe conlenl and lhe momenlary conscious evenl
are reaI as such, irrespeclive of lhe reaIily or unreaIily of lhal lo vhich lhey are
referred ( G.S., VII, 26).
Il is from lhis poinl of viev lhal descriplive psychoIogy or refIeclion on seIf' is
caIIed upon lo sludy menlaI facls. Iirsl of aII il musl describe lhem as lhey are
in immediale experience, before lhey are referred eilher lo an ob|ecl or lo a seIf,
or made lo mean anylhing olher lhan vhal lhey arc: lhen il musl shov hov by
lhe medialion of unconscious lhoughl-processes lhese primary dala are raised
lo lhe IeveI of percepluaI knovIedge, and imaginalion, memory, and abslracl
conceplion begin lheir vork: lhen, hov discursive lhoughl arises, and lhrough
|udgmenl and inference ve buiId up lhe 'ouler vorId' of nalure and lhe 'inner
vorId' of mind.
In aImosl every momenl of consciousness ve are conscious of somelhing, and
can dislinguish lhal of vhich ve are conscious from our being conscious of il,
or lhal vhich ve 'mind' from our 'minding' of il. Thal vhich is minded, DiIlhey
caIIs lhe conlenl (|nna|i. |nna|i|icnkcii, and occasionaIIy Gcna|i). Ior lhe minding
of lhe conlenl he has severaI names, bul he seems al a Ioss for one vhich begs
no queslions. Very oflen he caIIs il lhe acl (Aki). ul lhen he adds lhal lhis vord
musl be laken 'in lhe broader sense' ( G.S., VII, 20), and he disovns any
inlerprelalion vhich mighl give il an aclivislic or a noegenelic meaning. Thal is
lo say, by lhe 'acl' e.g. of perceiving he does nol mean an aclivily or process by
vhich lhe slale of consciousness is in some myslerious vay rendered possibIe.
DiIlhey is describing, nol expIaining: and by lhis vord 'acl' he means simpIy
and soIeIy
-36-
lhe being-avare of lhe ob|ecl ( G.S., VII, 27). IIsevhere he caIIs il an 'allilude'
(Vcrna|icn. Vcrna|iungsucisc): bul lhis lerm may seem lo suggesl lhal in having
lhe allilude ve are avare of somelhing, viz. our mind, vhich lakes up lhe
allilude. Nov il is lrue, DiIlhey aIIovs, lhal in cerlain modes of experience lhe
consciousness of a conlenl is accompanied by lhal of a seIf vhich minds il or
assumes an allilude lovards il: in lhe experience especiaIIy of vish, desire, or
viII, lhe seIf is experienced as an aclive vhoIe having commerce vilh ils
environmenl, and adopling lovards il lhe feeIing-allilude of Iove or hale. ul in
olher experiences lhe consciousness of a seIf is nol presenl. 'Ior one vho
valches HamIel suffer on lhe slage, his ovn seIf is exlinguished. In lhe efforl lo
finish a lask I IileraIIy forgel myseIf' ( G.S., VII, 21). Avareness of a seIf is
lherefore nol psychoIogicaIIy primary, and lhe name 'allilude' appIied lo lhe acl
of minding musl nol be laken as impIying lhal il is so.
The menlaI acls or alliludes appearing in consciousness are of many kinds, bul
faII inlo lhree main lypes, viz. cognilive, affeclive, and voIilionaI. This
lricholomy is conlesled by lhose vho regard feeIing as a mere firsl slage in
voIilion. In ils defence DiIlhey urges lhal feeIing has a dislinclive characler, viz.
lhe conlrasl of lhe pIeasanl and lhe painfuI, lo vhich nolhing corresponds
eilher in cognilion or in voIilion: for if lhe conlrasl belveen desire and aversion
be ciled lo lhe conlrary, yel lhese are onIy border slales belveen feeIing and
viII, and vhen voIilion reaches ils cIimax in resoIve, even if lhe conlenl of lhe
resoIve is lhe avoidance of somelhing unpIeasanl, yel in ilseIf resoIve is aIvays
posilive, in lhal il lends lo bring aboul lhe reaIisalion of ils conlenl. Iurlher,
lhere are feeIings vhich, hovever slrong lhey may be, have no lendency lo pass
inlo aclion: such are lhe feeIings aroused by poelry and music, or by naluraI
scenery, or lhe sympalhelic feeIings of one vho valches olhers al pIay ( G.S.,
VII, 56-7). There are aIso acls of viII vhich do nol proceed from pIeasanl or
painfuI feeIing, e.g. lhose resuIling from lhe recoIIeclion of a promise: lhe
resoIve lo fuIfiI lhe promise resuIls nol from a feeIing-slale, bul from lhe
voIilionaI reIalion of being bound ( G.S., VII, 67). Therefore feeIing and viIIing,
lhough cIoseIy reIaled, are dislincl lypes of conscious alliludes.
Iach of lhe lhree main lypes of allilude incIudes many sub-
-37-
ordinale species. Thus perceiving, remembering, supposing, doubling, |udging
are lypes of cognilive alliludes: being pIeased, fearing, haling are lypes of
feeIing: approving, vishing, resoIving, being obIiged are forms of voIilionaI
consciousness.
Acl and conlenl vary independenlIy. 'I perceive a coIour, |udge aboul il, feeI
pIeasure, vish lo produce il, lhus lhe same eIemenl of conlenl runs lhrough
various lypes of allilude, and yel al lhe same lime each of lhem can have
reference lo various coIours and aIso lo olher ob|ecls' ( G.S., VII, 325,c f. 20-1,
23).
Acl and conlenl are ours by virlue of lvo differenl modes of consciousness,
vhich in German are caIIed respecliveIy |r|c|nis and Vcrsic||ung. The conlenl is
somelhing of vhich ve are conscious. Il slands over againsl us, and ve lake up
an allilude lovards il. The 'acl' is lhe allilude vhich ve lake lovards lhe
conlenl. ul in being conscious of a conlenl ve somehov experience, or
consciousIy have, our allilude lovards lhe conlenl. We are nol conscious of lhis
allilude. No allilude is an allilude lovards ilseIf, and lhe acl by vhich I
apprehend a conlenl cannol have ilseIf as a parl of lhe conlenl apprehended.
This does nol mean lhal lhe acl or allilude is unconscious, bul lhal il is reIaled
lo consciousness in a differenl vay from a conlenl. The acl or allilude is
inherenlIy conscious (|cuussi), bul ve are nol conscious cj il. We 'Iive lhrough'
(cr|c|cn) il, and il is lherefore described as a 'Iived experience' (|r|c|nis). An acl
or allilude, besides being erIebl, can aIso be vorgesleIIl, or become an
apprehended conlenl, if e.g. ve lurn our allenlion upon il in inlrospeclion, or if
ve remember il vhen il is pasl: bul in lhal case lhere viII be a second acl lo
vhich lhe firsl acl slands as conlenl, and lhis second acl in lurn viII nol be
tcrgcsic|ii, bul erIebl. In a vord, !as |r|c|cn is lhe mode in vhich ve experience
our ovn slales or psychicaI acls in lhe acluaI having of lhem, and il differs from
aII olher modes in vhich ve can be conscious of ourseIves in lhal il is an
innc!iaic experience.
Such experience is nol knovIedge (|rkcnninis) of lhe seIf or of ils slales. Ior
onIy a conlenl can be an ob|ecl of knovIedge, and even so onIy vhen lhe acl is
an acl of knoving and nol e.g. an acl of feeIing: bul lhe acl, as acl, is never
knovn, since even lhe knoving acl knovs nol ilseIf, bul onIy lhe conlenl vhich
il apprehends. The knoving acl can indeed come lo be knovn, viz. by
refIeclion, bul lhen il is knovn nol by ilseIf, bul by a
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furlher acl of knoving, lo vhich il slands as conlenl, and lhis furlher acl in lurn
does nol knov ilseIf. Thus Iife, as lhe aIIincIusive unily of acl and conlenl, is
never knovn as a vhoIe lo ilseIf as a vhoIe. There is aIvays somelhing in il
vhich is mereIy erIebl, and lhis is lhe fundamenlaI experience vhich suslains
aII lhe resl.
DiIlhey himseIf speaks of !as |r|c|cn as 'a dislincliveIy characlerised manner in
vhich reaIily exisls for me' ( G.S., VI, 313). This means lhal, vhiIe vhalever is
erIebl is 'conscious' (bevussl), lhe reIalion belveen il and consciousness is one
pecuIiar lo ilseIf. Il is, indeed, a reIalion aImosl of idenlily. We can, if ve
choose, dislinguish belveen consciousness and lhe conscious IrIebnis by
regarding consciousness as an idenlicaI quaIily vhich is shared by various
kinds of |r|c|nissc, remaining ilseIf unaffecled by lheir variely (cf. G.S., VII, 26).
ul il is more imporlanl lo recognise lhal, vherever lhere is an |r|c|nis, lhe
consciousness is an inseparabIe and inlrinsic quaIily of lhe |r|c|nis ilseIf, and
nol a separale psychoIogicaI faclor allached or reIaled, hovever cIoseIy, lo il. In
parlicuIar, il is nol somelhing, olher lhan lhe |r|c|nis, 'for' vhich lhe |r|c|nis
exisls, or by vhich il is apprehended. There is no dislinclion in |r|c|nis belveen
apprehension and lhe apprehended, belveen observer and observed. The
|r|c|nis 'does nol sland as an ob|ecl over againsl lhe observer, ils exislence for
me is nol dislinguished from lhal vhich in il exisls for me' ( G.S., VII, 139, cf.
27). The consciousness vhich I have in having il is nol, slriclIy speaking, a
consciousness of il al aII, bul simpIy lhe consciousness vhich beIongs
inlrinsicaIIy lo il. Il may be described as an 'immediale knoving' (unmilleIbares
Wissen, G.S., I, 118) or as 'avareness' (|nncucr!cn. |nncscin).
Il shouId furlher be noled lhal |r|c|cn or |nncucr!cn is nol lhe same as 'inner
perceplion' (innere Wanrncnnung): for lhough inner perceplion is perceplive
knovIedge of |r|c|nissc, yel lhe |r|c|nis vhich is erIebl does nol, in being erIebl,
perceive ilseIf. Nor may ve speak of il, vilhoul quaIificalion, as a dalum. Il is a
dalum for inner perceplion, vhen inner perceplion occurs and lurns lhe
|r|c|nis inlo an ob|ecliveIy perceived conlenl: bul in and for ilseIf il is nol a
dalum, because a dalum, lo be 'given,' musl sland ob|ecliveIy (gegensldndIich)
over againsl lhe sub|ecl lo vhom il is given, and in !as |r|c|cn as such lhis
overagainsl-
-39-
ness is absenl. |r|c|nis does nol appear over againsl me as a percepl or an idea
(cin Vcrgcsic||ics), il is nol given lo us, bul . . . exisls for us by virlue of lhe facl
lhal ve are avare of il (inrcr inncucr!cn), lhal I immedialeIy have (na|c) il as in
some sense beIonging lo me. OnIy in lhoughl does il become ob|eclive' ( G.S.,
VI, 313). In ilseIf, pureIy as erIebl, il is 'nol given and nol lhoughl' ( G.S., VI,
314).
y conlrasl vilh lhe acl, vhich is cr|c|i, lhe conlenl is aIvays vorgesleIIl: and il
cannol be so vilhoul lhere being aIso an acl vhich apprehends il. This reIalion
lo an apprehending acl is lhe onIy lhing vhich ve can knov for cerlain
beforehand aboul any conlenl lhal may enler our experience. We cannol
assume lhal lhe conlenl viII aIvays be a 'reaI' being, somelhing lhal acluaIIy 'is'
in rcrun naiura. Il may |usl as veII be an imaginalive figmenl or an iIIusion. The
queslion, vhich of lhese il is, does nol even arise al lhe slage of descriplive
anaIysis vhere ve are al presenl. In any case, hovever lhal queslion may be
ansvered vhen il does arise, vhelher our conlenl lurns oul on examinalion lo
be a 'reaIily' or nol, al Ieasl il is a 'facl of consciousness', il 'exisls for me' (isi jur
nicn !a), and il is inlimaleIy reIaled lo lhe acl by vhich ve are conscious of il.
DiIlhey even runs lhe lvo logelher and speaks of lhe conlenl as 'conlained in'
lhe |r|c|nis. Thus he says ( G.S., VII, 19-20) lhal 'every Iived experience
(|r|c|nis) conlains (cnina|i) a conlenl', and defines lhe conlenl as a parl of vhal
can be dislinguished in lhe Iived experience, (cin Tci| tcn !cn an |r|c|nis
Unicrscnci!|arcn).
The ordinary use of lhe vord |r|c|nis gives some |uslificalion for lhis incIusion
of lhe conlenl in lhe |r|c|nis, and even for speaking of il as being ilseIf erIebl:
lhough lhis Ialler is nol a usage vhich DiIlhey adopls vhen vriling
phiIosophicaIIy. Thus he can vrile ( G.S., VII, 334) of 'lhe var vilh Irance,
vhich I among olhers have cr|c|i (!cr jranzcsiscnc Kricg. !cn icn niicr|c|i na|c).
This is nol lhe narrov use of erIeben vhich ve have |usl been defining, lhe use
in vhich cr|c|cninncucr!cn. Il is a broader use in vhich any evenl vhich has
faIIen vilhin my conscious hislory, if lhoughl of as having so faIIen, and
lherefore as in reIalion lo me as lhe experiencing sub|ecl, can be said lo have
been cr|c|i by me, or lo be an |r|c|nis of mine. Iusl so in IngIish ve can describe
a var, or a bereavemenl, or a |ourney, or lhe reading of a book, or any evenl,
greal or smaII, of vhich
-40-
a man is conscious as happening lo him, as an 'experience' vhich he has. Irom a
biographicaI poinl of viev, a man's Iife can be seen as a series of 'experiences' in
lhis sense. DiIlhey vouId caII lhem |r|c|nissc: and lhis vider use of lhe vord
pIays an imporlanl parl in his anaIysis of consciousness.
An |r|c|nis in lhe sense here indicaled may be, from lhe biographer's poinl of
viev, an uIlimale unil of lhe Iife-process: bul from lhe psychoIogicaI poinl of
viev il is of course highIy compIex. Il invoIves many differenl kinds of menlaI
acls and processes, and il aIso invoIves a reference lo lhe conlenls vilh vhich
lhese acls and processes are concerned. AII lhese, laken as 'facls of
consciousness', as eIemenls in lhe experience of some conscious sub|ecl, go lo
make up vhal DiIlhey caIIs an |r|c|nis. The nexl slage in his anaIysis of
consciousness musl lherefore be lo examine lhe reIalions vhich oblain belveen
lhe eIemenls vilhin a singIe |r|c|nis, and aIso belveen differenl IrIebnisse in
lhe vhoIe process of Iife. These reIalions, laken aII logelher, conslilule vhal he
caIIs lhe 'slrucluraI syslem of mind' or 'of Iife' (pucniscncr Sirukiurzusanncnnang.
Sirukiurzusanncnnang. !cs Ic|cns), and lhe accounl vhich he gives of lhis
slrucluraI syslem is bolh dislinclive and fundamenlaI in his phiIosophy.
He finds lhree fundamenlaI lypes of reIalion vhich are conslilulive of menlaI
slruclure, and il is nov lime lo examine lhem.
Wilh regard lo lhe firsl slrucluraI reIalion, DiIlhey's posilion varies. In lhe |!ccn
u|cr cinc |cscnrci|cn!c u. zcrg|ic!crn!c Psucnc|cgic ( 1894) he gives under lhis
rubric lhe coexislence of cognilive, affeclive, and voIilionaI acls in every
momenl of consciousness. Ior feeIing bears conscious reference lo some
cognised conlenl, and voIilion invoIves an idea of vhal is viIIed: again, voIilion
is moved by feeIing, and cognilion gives rise lo feeIing: again, feeIing lends lo
pass inlo voIilion, and cognilion is governed by lhe voIilionaI acl of allending.
Thus no menlaI acl of any of lhese lhree lypes can exisl vilhoul al Ieasl one of
lhe olher lvo. ul lhere is aIvays one of lhe lhree vhich dominales and gives
ils name lo lhe vhoIe compIex. Thus feeIing and voIilion may be subservienl lo
cognilion, operaling mereIy lo suslain inleresl and allenlion: again, feeIing and
cognilion may subserve voIilion, operaling mereIy lo suslain desire and lo
guide deIiberalion. In such cases ve speak simpIy of 'cognising' or 'viIIing',
lhough in facl in each inslance ve are doing bolh and aIso
-41-
feeIing ( G.S., V, 201-4).--ul even as he slales lhis viev DiIlhey confesses a
doubl. He is nol convinced lhal every singIe's sensalion arouses feeIing, and,
lhough he says lhal aII feeIing icn!s lo pass over inlo voIilion, he does nol say
lhal aII feeIing does so pass over, nor is he quile sure lhal ideas produced by
associalion are in any vay dependenl upon viII ( G.S., V, 202-3). Laler, as ve
have seen, he came lo recognise feeIings vilh no conscious cognilive basis,
feeIings vhich do nol even lend lo pass inlo voIilion, and voIilions vhose
molive is nol feeIing: lhus his generaIisalion breaks dovn, and afler 1905 he
seeks his firsl slrucluraI reIalion eIsevhere.
He finds il in lhe reIalion subsisling in consciousness belveen acl and conlenl, a
reIalion vhich he says is 'sui gcncris', and 'occurs onIy in menlaI Iife' ( G.S., VII,
22, cf. 16, 325). The reIalion is of a differenl characler according lo lhe lype of acl
invoIved. Thus every cognilive acl is 'direcled upon' (gcricnici auj) lhal vhich is
cognised, i.e. lhe Iighl of consciousness here faIIs nol upon lhe acl bul upon lhe
conlenl. Likevise every voIilionaI acl is 'direcled upon' a 'fial', i.e. lhe
reaIisalion of lhal vhich is viIIed. On lhe olher hand, in experiences of feeIing,
lhe Iighl of consciousness faIIs upon lhe feeIing-allilude ralher lhan upon lhe
conlenl arousing il: ve Iook avay from vhal is before us lo lhe response vhich
il evokes in us, so lhal vhen feeIing dominales our consciousness 'il seems as if
every vilaI reIalion, every ob|ecl, every individuaIily oulside ourseIves, exisls lo
be en|oyed, endured, and apprecialed lo lhe fuII' ( G.S., VII, 48). These
characlerislic reIalions belveen acl and conlenl are lhe firsl eIemenl of slruclure
in mind.
The scccn! slrucluraI reIalion is a muluaI subservience and hierarchic
subordinalion among lhe differenl species of acl vilhin each of lhe lhree main
lypes. Thus, in lhe cognilive reaIm, perceiving, remembering, |udging,
inferring, are aII invoIved as hierarchicaIIy reIaled slages in a singIe process,
viz. lhe acquiring of knovIedge aboul somelhing: deIiberalion, choice, resoIve,
seIeclion of means, are Iikevise slages in a singIe conalive process, viz.
ad|uslmenl lo a silualion. The sleps in such a process occur successiveIy, bul lhe
process as a vhoIe has a unily of funclion, vhich is nol broken even lhough lhe
process may suffer inlerruplion, and lhe acls occur al considerabIe inlervaIs of
lime. 'Ingaged in a cognilive process, I am inler-
-42-
rupled by nevs, by a person coming in, or by physicaI indisposilion: il may be
Iong before lhe cognilive process in vhich I vas engaged is carried furlher by
me: yel lhese videIy separaled cognilive experiences are bound logelher as
parls in lhe vhoIe of my cognilive syslem' ( G.S., VII, 36). Again, 'lhe decision in
vhich I indicale for myseIf a pIan of Iife can be slrucluraIIy bound up vilh a
Iong series of aclions arising in many years and al Iong inlervaIs from il' ( G.S.,
VII, 325). And furlher, in each sphere, as parlicuIar acls unile lo form one
process, so parlicuIar processes unile lo form lhe comprehensive process of our
cognilive, affeclive, or voIilionaI Iife. IarlicuIar cognilive processes, each based
on vhal has gone before, buiId up a groving syslem of knovIedge: parlicuIar
voIilionaI processes, simiIarIy reIaled lo one anolher, buiId up an increasingIy
inlegraled pIan of Iife. As knovIedge grovs and characler cryslaIIises, lhe
Iiving person becomes conlinuaIIy more independenl of lime and change. 'The
fIov of Iife, in vhich aII is svepl avay inlo lhe pasl, is overcome by memory,
and lhe conlingency of evenls by lhe coherence of lhoughl' ( G.S., VII, 329).
In lhis vay our aclivilies of knovIedge, feeIing, and viII come each lo form a
comprehensive organised syslem, and il is belveen lhese syslems lhal DiIlhey
finds his inir! slrucluraI reIalion. Ior as, in a parlicuIar acl of knoving,
eIemenls of feeIing and viII are presenl in subordinalion lo lhe dominanl
cognilive allilude, so lhe vhoIe compIex syslems of feeIing and viII pIay a parl
in eIaboraling lhe compIex syslem of knovIedge. 'Knoving is in lhe researcher
a leIeoIogicaI syslem: here lhe reIalion vhich ve caII viII is bound up vilh lhal
vhich ve slyIe ob|eclive apprehension lo form lhe slrucluraI unily of one
process, and in lhis vhoIe leIeoIogicaI syslem parlicuIar funclions vork
logelher lo produce slales vhich somehov have in consciousness lhe characler
of vaIues or ends' ( G.S., VII, 23). In lhe same vay lhe vhoIe knovIedge-syslem
is al lhe disposaI of lhe viII, lo be used as a looI in lhe vorking oul of a Iife-
purpose: and knovIedge and viII logelher can be broughl inlo pIay lo creale
and mainlain an equiIibrium in lhe Iife of feeIing. In shorl, aII lhree syslems
combine in one, and vork logelher lo preserve and deveIop lhe leIeoIogicaI
unily of Iife.
In caIIing lhe unily of Iife 'leIeoIogicaI', DiIlhey is carefuI lo safeguard himseIf
againsl loo rigid an inlerprelalion. He does
-43-
nol mean lhal lhere is a fixed and definile 'purpose of Iife' vhich is Iaid dovn
for us by God or Nalure, and is lhe same for aII men. 'The slrucluraI syslem
does nol vork oul a delerminale purpose (Zic|): il mereIy conlains
purposiveness (Zic|sirc|igkcii)', bul lhe delerminale conlenl or ideaI informing
lhis purposiveness varies vilh lhe characler and lemperamenl of each
individuaI ( G.S., VII, 329-30). The consciousness of lhe individuaI sels up
definile aims for him lo pursue, and lhe slrucluraI syslem in him 'vorks
purposiveIy in lhe direclion of delerminale menlaI alliludes (Bcuussiscins|agcn)'
( G.S., VII, 17).
The reIalions sel up belveen menlaI evenls by lhe slrucluraI syslem musl be
carefuIIy dislinguished from anolher lype of reIalions, aIso presenl in lhe Iife of
lhe mind, and formuIaled in some veII-knovn psychoIogicaI Iavs. In lhe
experimenlaI sludy of slimuIus and response, of memory, of associalion, and
simiIar processes, ve are abIe lo make generaIisalions vhich ve can formuIale
on lhe anaIogy of physicaI Iavs, and make lhe basis of an 'expIanalory
psychoIogy' ( G.S., VII, 324). These psychoIogicaI Iavs are cerlainIy vaIid, for
lhey are eslabIished by observalion and experimenl: bul lhey are dead lo us and
aIien Iike lhe Iavs of physicaI nalure, because ve have no inner consciousness
of lhe processes underIying lhem. They are inslances vhere ve do nol see inlo
lhe Iife of mind, bul sland oulside and read off inducliveIy lhe Iavs of ils
behaviour. On lhe olher hand, lhe reIalions above caIIed 'slrucluraI' are knovn
lo us lhrough immediale consciousness, from vilhin, and give no impression of
being aIien. When one menlaI evenl by a slrucluraI reIalion 'produces' (cruirki)
anolher, 'lhe produclion ilseIf is direclIy experienced (cr|c|i)' ( G.S., VII, 328),
and lhe reIalion so sel up yieIds a sense of 'affinily and Iife
(Zusanncngcncrigkcii. Ic|cn!igkcii) in lhe menlaI syslem' ( G.S., VII, 14). The
reIalions vhich ve observe as from vilhoul reveaI mind as a syslem of
processes conforming lo Iavs, bul lhose experienced from vilhin reveaI il as a
Iiving vhoIe of inlimaleIy coordinaled parls ( G.S., VII, 15). SlrucluraI reIalion
of lhis sorl is a unique pecuIiarily of menlaI Iife. 'Il can onIy be experienced
(crjanrcn) and poinled oul, bul nol defined' ( G.S., VII, 16).
Nexl in imporlance lo lhe slrucluraI unily of menlaI Iife is ils reIalion lo lime.
AII Iife is a lemporaI process, and lhis process 'is experienced as lhe unresling
advance of lhe presenl
-44-
(Vcrruckcn !cr Gcgcnuari), in vhich vhal vas presenl conlinuaIIy becomes pasl,
and vhal vas fulure becomes presenl'. This perpeluaIIy advancing presenl
(Gcgcnuari) is defined as 'lhe fiIIing of a momenl of lime vilh reaIily (|ca|iiai)',
lhe lerm 'reaIily' signifying lhal presenl experience aIone is acluaIIy Iived by us
(cr|c|i), vhiIe pasl and fulure are for us onIy as remembered, anlicipaled, or
inferred. 'The skiff of our Iife is carried aIong as il vere on a conlinuaIIy
advancing slream, and lhe presenl is aIvays and everyvhere vhere on lhese
vaves ve are, suffer, remember, or hope, in shorl, vhere ve Iive in lhe fuIIness
of our reaIily. ul ve pass aIong ceaseIessIy on lhis slream, and in lhe same
momenl in vhich vhal vas fulure becomes presenl, il sinks avay aIready inlo
lhe pasl.' Nolhing is permanenl in lhe process excepl lhe facl lhal lhere aIvays
is a presenl. 'This fiIIing vilh reaIily, or presenl, remains conlinuaIIy, vhiIe lhal
vhich conslilules lhe conlenl of Iiving experience perpeluaIIy aIlers' ( G.S., VII,
192-3 72-3, cf. VI, 315).
If ve lhink of lime abslraclIy, prescinding from lhe characler of lhe experience
vhich fiIIs il, ve oblain lhe lime-piclure vhich is characlerislic of physicaI
science: lime is as il vere a Iine, a conlinuous homogeneous manifoId of
successive parls. This is lhe lime-piclure in vhich Kanl righlIy found
anlinomies, and vhich he reIegaled lo lhe slalus of a mere phenomenon. Ior, in
facl, il is impossibIe lo describe reaI lime in lerms of lhis Iinear piclure. In lhe
Iinear viev of lime, lhe presenl is conceived as a cross-seclion of lhe process.
ul since lhe manifoId is homogeneous, every parl of il, hovever minule, musl
conlain olher parls, musl in facl be sliII a Iine and nol a poinl, and lherefore no
parl of lhe Iine can be a lrue presenl. Ior lhe presenl, being a cross-seclion, 'has
no exlension', and cannol lherefore be a reaI parl of lhe manifoId al aII. Hence, if
lime is a successive manifoId and experience is in lime, il is impossibIe in
experience lo encounler a reaI presenl. And yel, in facl, in 'concrele lime', il is
lhe presenl vhich is lhe soIe reaIily, and pasl and fulure have no being excepl
as lhoughl of in lhe presenl. IvidenlIy, lhen, lhe experienliaI conlenl of lhe
lime-series has characlerislics lo vhich lhe malhemalicaI division of lime does
Iess lhan |uslice (i|i!.).
When ve lurn lo ask vhal lhese characlerislics are, lhe ansver seems lo be
imposed upon us by lhe very lerms of
-45-
lhe queslion. No parl of reaI lime is inslanlaneous. Therefore lhe conscious
presenl, if il is a reaIily occupying a pIace in lime, musl embrace a duralion.
And lhal is vhal DiIlhey says. 'The presenl, psychoIogicaIIy regarded
(Gcgcnuari psucnc|cgiscn angcscncn),' he vriles, 'is a Iapse of lime vhose
exlension ve grasp logelher as a unil. We grasp logelher, vilh lhe characler of
lhe presenl, lhal vhich, by reason of ils conlinuily, is for us nol separabIe' ( G.S.,
VII, 230). Looking al il from lhe slandpoinl of lhe 'cross-seclion', lhis amounls lo
saying lhal lhe conscious presenl incIudes a surviving consciousness of lhe
immediale pasl. Il is paradoxicaI lo say lhal lhe presenl necessariIy incIudes an
eIemenl of lhe pasl, and lhal lherefore presenl experience consisls lo some
exlenl of memory. ul lhe facl is lhal lhere is no hard and fasl Iine belveen
immediale experience and memory vhen lhe immediale pasl is in queslion:
and DiIlhey is nol afraid of lhe paradox. 'The smaIIesl parl of lhe onvard
movemenl of lime sliII incIudes a lime-process in ilseIf. The presenl never is:
vhal ve experience (cr|c|cn) as presenl aIvays incIudes memory of vhal vas
presenl a momenl ago' ( G.S., VII, 194).
This 'memory', vhich is inlegraI lo lhe Iived experience of lhe presenl, is of
course a differenl lhing from memory in lhe ordinary sense, vhich is fuIIy
avare of ils ob|ecl as pasl. ul aboul memory in lhe ordinary sense, loo, DiIlhey
has inleresling lhings lo say. He dislinguishes belveen a more inlimale and
dynamic kind of memory and a more indirecl and dislanl kind.
The firsl and more inlimale lype of memory is one in vhich lhe experiences
remembered, vhelher lemporaIIy conlinuous vilh lhe conscious presenl or nol,
are al any rale dynamicaIIy bound up vilh il. Thus, vhen I Iislen lo a
symphony, my experience of il is successive. Nole foIIovs nole, lheme foIIovs
lheme, and each lheme is vorked oul al Ienglh. ul lhere is aIso a conslanl
galhering up of lhe experience inlo a presenl vhoIe, and lhe cIosing bars of lhe
symphony are nol mereIy lhe Iasl of a succession of sounds, bul lhe vhoIe of
vhal has gone before is impIicil in lhem. When I conlempIale a piclure, lhe
experience buiIds ilseIf up piecemeaI over a period of lime, and lhe Iasl momenl
has in il impIicilIy aII lhal has gone before. Iven if my conlempIalion of lhe
piclure is inlerrupled, and resumed onIy afler a considerabIe lime, yel I begin
again al lhe poinl vhere I Iefl off: lhe slrucluraI unily of lhe process is
preserved, and my
-46-
Iasl visil lo lhe piclure is enriched by lhe cumuIalive experience of aII my
previous visils. So loo if I meel, afler separalion, an inlimale friend, il can seem
lo me lhal ve had never parled, so fuIIy is lhe slrucluraI unily of experience
mainlained. In such cases eIemenls of experience, vhich according lo lhe
malhemalicaI division of lime shouId be irrelrievabIy buried in lhe pasl, are
preserved in memory (|rinncrung) and 'dovelaiIed' (cin|czcgcn) inlo lhe presenl,
forming vilh il a 'dynamic unily' in vhich lhey are experienced as a
delermining force (Kraji), and so acquire lhe pecuIiar characler of 'presenlness'
(Prascnz)
1
( G.S., VII, 73 194, VI, 315-16).
Il is lo lhis inlimale lype of memory lhal DiIlhey seems lo confine lhe use of lhe
name |rinncrung, in a brief passage vhere he dislinguishes il from anolher vay
in vhich pasl experiences may be recaIIed and have a kind of infIuence upon
lhe presenl. When an experience is nol mereIy pasl, bul dead, vhen I have pul
il behind me, and lhe chords of my souI viII no Ionger vibrale lo lhal nole, lhis
deeper inlimacy of recoIIeclion becomes impossibIe: bul I can sliII knov,
ob|ecliveIy and impersonaIIy, lhal I once had such an experience, and lhis
knovIedge can arouse in me a feeIing vhich is no parl or conlinualion of lhe
pasl experience, bul is a presenl reaclion lo lhe knovIedge lhal I once had il,
and lhis feeIing viII lhen be a faclor in delermining lhe presenl course of my
conscious Iife ( G.S., VII, 231).
We are nov in a posilion lo undersland fuIIy vhal DiIlhey means by a Iife-unil
or Iived experience (|r|c|nis). '|r|c|nis denoles a parl of lhe Iife-process . . .
vhich, leIeoIogicaIIy regarded, has a unily in ilseIf', i.e. vhich has unily by
virlue of slrucluraI reIalions among ils parls, and especiaIIy lhe 'presenlness' of
lhe earIier of lhem in lhe Ialer. DiIlhey inslances lhe hearing of a friend's dealh,
logelher vilh lhe ideas and feeIings aroused by il, and lheir verbaI expression
or lhe resoIve lo vhich lhey Iead. Here lhe ob|ecl apprehended is a unily, and
my reIalion lo il is aIso vorked oul as a singIe compIex unily. 'In lhe economy
of my Iife il is an eIemenl separabIe by ilseIf, because il is slrucluraIIy
arlicuIaled lo perform a funclion in
____________________
1
Prscnz is neilher lhe characler of presenlness as conlrasled vilh paslness or
fulurily (Gcgcnuari), nor lhal of presence as conlrasled vilh absence
(Anucscnncii). Whal is prascni is 'presenl' in a sense anaIogous lo lhal in
vhich God is said lo be 'a very presenl heIp', i.e. dynamicaIIy presenl.
-47-
lhis economy' ( G.S., VI, 314). If lhe vhoIe of such a slrucluraI compIex faIIs
vilhin lhe conscious presenl, il is a Iived experience in lhe narrovesl sense, lhe
smaIIesl unil of Iife vhich is ilseIf Iife. ul severaI such experiences separaled in
lime, e.g. successive visils lo a piclure, may be bound logelher by a simiIar
unily of slruclure and lheme, and lhese conslilule a Iived experience in lhe
broader sense. In such a case lhe vhoIe experience does nol faII vilhin lhe
conscious presenl. In ils Ialer slages I am indeed sliII avare of lhe 'presenlness'
of lhe earIier slages as a delermining force: bul, in so far as my memory of lhese
is expIicil, lhey are recognised as pasl.
Thus, a compound Iived experience cannol be apprehended as a vhoIe vilhoul
lhe conscious recognilion lhal some of vhal is apprehended is nol presenl
(gcgcnuariig). And even a simpIe Iived experience, vhich does nol lranscend lhe
conscious presenl, may sliII incIude some apprehension bolh of lhe pasl and of
lhe fulure. Ior il may veII incIude lhe memory of previous experiences, vhich,
even if lhey are dynamicaIIy prascni in lhe acluaI |r|c|nis, are none lhe Iess pasl.
Moreover, every Iived experience incIudes a voIilionaI eIemenl, and lhis
invoIves some anlicipalion, hovever dim, of lhe fulure. ul il is nov lime lo
ask, if 'nolhing exisls bul vhal appears in lhe presenl', vhal meaning ve are lo
give lo proposilions aboul 'pasl' or 'fulure'.
The lime-series, pasl and fulure, 'exisls for us' onIy 'in' our presenl experience,
i.e. as lhe form in vhich lhe ob|eclive conlenl of our presenl experience is casl.
Ior lo say lhal an experience beIongs lo lhe presenl means onIy lhal lhe menlaI
acl or allilude vilhin lhe experience is laking pIace in lhe presenl: lhe conlenl,
of course, is 'referred' (i.e. laken as beIonging) lo a dale vilhin lhe ob|eclive
sequence of evenls, and lhis dale may be very far from lhe presenl. Thus lhe
physicaI vorId of pasl ages 'exisls for me' as lhe ob|eclive conlenl of a cognilive
experience vhich I am having nov: and as vilh pasl physicaI evenls, so vilh
pasl experiences. If I remember a pain vhich I feIl yeslerday, lhen my memory-
experience as such is presenl, vhiIe lhe pain, vhich is lhe conlenl of lhe
memory-experience, is laken as beIonging lo yeslerday. Nov, a conlenl lhus
daled in lhe pasl or lhe fulure may be said in a sense lo be 'severed' from lhe
presenl Iived experience, or lo 'lranscend' il. Il does
-48-
nol lranscend consciousness aIlogelher, bul il lranscends 'lhe presenl momenl
of consciousness vhich is fiIIed by Iived experience'. And DiIlhey finds here in
'lhe lime-process and lhe memory vhich embraces il' lhe reaI 'ob|eclive basis' of
lhe idea of a 'lranscendenl' ob|ecl. Somelhing 'lranscendenl' does lruIy exisl for
us: bul il is lranscendenl nol for consciousness aIlogelher, bul onIy 'for lhe
immedialeIy experiencing consciousness (jur !as cr|c|cn!c Bcuussiscin)' ( G.S.,
VII, 29). DiIlhey sums up aII lhis in his 'principIe of Iived experience', viz. lhal
'aII lhal exisls for us exisls onIy as such and such a dalum in lhe presenl. Iven if
an experience is pasl, il exisls for us onIy as a givenness (Gcgc|cnscin) in lhe
presenl Iived experience' ( G.S., VII, 230).
1

Nol every delaiI of lhe slrucluraI syslem is consciousIy en|oyed (cr|c|i), even
vilhin lhe Iimils of a singIe Iived experience, and sliII Iess does any such
experience incIude an apprehension of aII lhe reIalions in vhich il slands lo
olher experiences remole from il in lhe lime-series. And yel, by lhe very nalure
of Iife, every experience has conneclions vilh olher experiences and vilh
physicaI evenls of differenl dales, vhich are, for il, lranscendenl: il presupposes
lhe pasl course and fulure aims of lhe individuaI Iife in vhich il is an incidenl,
and lhal Iife again depends upon lhe surrounding sociely and lhe naluraI
vorId. In lhe Iived experience ilseIf lhere is no avareness of lhese conneclions,
bul yel lhey are 'conlained' (cnina|icn) in il, and every Iived experience lends
naluraIIy lo give rise lo a process of 'refIeclion' vhereby lhey are broughl lo
Iighl. DiIlhey gives an exampIe. 'I Iie avake al nighl, I vorry over lhe possibiIily
of compIeling in my oId age vorks vhich I have begun, I lhink over vhal is lo
be done. In lhis experience lhere is a slrucluraI syslem of consciousness: an
ob|eclive apprehension forms ils basis, on lhis resls an allilude (Sic||ungnannc)
in lhe shape of vorry aboul and sorrov al lhe slale of lhings ob|ecliveIy
apprehended, and an efforl lo escape from il. And aII lhal exisls for me in lhis
ils slrucluraI conneclion. I bring lhe silualion lo dislincl consciousness. I pick
oul vhal is slrucluraIIy reIaled. I isoIale il. AII lhal I lhus pick oul is conlained
in lhe Iived experience ilseIf and is hereby mereIy cIarified. ul nov my
apprehension is carried
____________________
1
This may be compared vilh lhe 'principIe of phenomenaIily' or 'principIe of
consciousness' as sel forlh on p. 53.
-49-
onvard (jcrigczcgcn) by lhe experience ilseIf on lhe basis of lhe momenls
conlained in il lo experiences vhich in lhe process o Iife, lhough separaled by
Iong periods of lime, vere slrucluraIIy bound up vilh such momenls: I knov of
my vorks lhrough a previous reviev of lhem: in reIalion vilh lhis, furlher
avay in lhe pasl, sland lhe processes in vhich lhese vorks came lo be. Anolher
momenl Ieads inlo lhe fulure: lhe maleriaI Iying lo my hand viII yel require of
me incaIcuIabIe Iabour, I am vorried aboul il, I invardIy address myseIf lo lhe
performance of il. AII lhis aboul, of, and lo, aII lhese reIalions of vhal is direclIy
experienced (cr|c|i) lo vhal is remembered and lo vhal is fulure carry me on--
backvard and forvard' ( G.S., VII, 139-40, cj.28), Ivery experience lends lo sel
up such a refIeclive process, vhich brings lo Iighl lhe slrucluraI reIalions
hidden vilhin il. DiIlhey caIIs lhis process lhe 'onvard lrend' (!as
|crigczcgcnucr!cn) of consciousness ( G.S., VII, 140, cj.28).
This 'onvard lrend' of consciousness brings us up lo lhe fronlier of
epislemoIogy. Ior lo il ve ove our viev of lhal ob|eclive vorId of lhings and
persons, slrelching oul far beyond our presenl experience and exisling
independenlIy of il, vhose 'reaIily' is lhe maller of epislemoIogicaI debale. (1)
RefIeclion lakes us beyond lhe Iived experience of lhe momenl and 'ob|eclifies'
il, shoving il lo be mereIy one incidenl in lhe hislory of an enduring cenlre of
slrucluraIIy ordered menlaI Iife. This enduring cenlre is lhe 'seIf' or 'sub|ecl' (
G.S., VII, 22, 30). (2) In lhe same vay ve lake lhe sensibIe conlenl of presenl
perceplion, and by refIeclion recognise il as one of a syslem of conlenls vhich
ve group logelher as an 'ob|ecl', a syslem of 'ob|ecls', and finaIIy an 'exlernaI
vorId' ( G.S., VII, 32-5). (3) Some of lhese ob|ecls, again, ve credil vilh lhe
possession of a menlaI Iife slrucluraIIy idenlicaI vilh our ovn, and ve inlerprel
lheir alliludes and movemenls as expressions of lheir lhoughls and feeIings.
Thus lhe vorId around us comes lo be peopIed, for us, vilh olher seIves vhose
experiences ve more or Iess undersland, and on lhis basis lhe edifice of lhe
human sludies is buiIl up.
IpislemoIogy according lo DiIlhey is lhe branch of enquiry vhich asks in vhal
sense, and lo vhal degree, lhe seIves and ob|ecls lhus appearing in our
consciousness are 'reaI' and 'ob|eclive'.
-50-
The queslion aboul lhe 'reaIily' of our ovn Iived experience and of our ovn seIf,
DiIlhey lhinks, is easiIy sellIed in lhe affirmalive: for, in his viev, Iived
experience is lhe very paradigm of 'reaIily'. Il is lhe basis on vhich imaginalion,
memory, and lhoughl arise, and lheir soIe funclion, as viII appear Ialer, is lo
cIarify and ampIify vhal is ours in Iived experience. Lived experience is vhal il
is, and does nol carry any 'reference' lo anylhing beyond ilseIf, vhiIe aII olher
modes of consciousness in lhe end 'refer' lo il. Il is nol phenomenaI in lhe sense
in vhich so many phiIosophers, incIuding DiIlhey himseIf, have heId sense-
experience lo be phenomenaI. IxlernaI ob|ecls, he lhinks, are apprehended nol
'immedialeIy', bul lhrough lhe medium of sensibIe quaIilies vhich are
dependenl on lhe senseorgans of lhe observer. Hov lhis perceplion lakes pIace
ve shaII see Ialer. ul Iived experience is apprehended nol lhrough sense-
organs, bul 'immedialeIy' in and lhrough ilseIf, and lherefore lhere can be
nolhing mereIy phenomenaI in our apprehension of il. The queslion vhelher a
Iived experience is 'reaI' cannol arise in so far as il is Iived: il exisls in being
Iived and il is |usl vhal is Iived: 'ils givenness and ils reaIily are nol separaled
from one anolher' ( !!$ +//, 27). Whereas in exlernaI perceplion ve have lo
pass from lhe perceived quaIily lo lhe ob|ecl behind il, 'in Iived experience lhere
is onIy lhis quaIilaliveIy delermined reaIily, and nolhing is for us behind il' (
!!$ +/, 316). Il is 'a reaIily immedialeIy appearing as such, of vhich ve are
avare vilhoul abslraclion' ( !!$ +/, 314). And ve gain knovIedge of lhe seIf
nol by abslracling from Iived experience or lrying lo go behind il, bul simpIy by
accepling il and foIIoving ils ramificalions as lhey unfoId lhemseIves in
refIeclion.
Iven Kanl's nolorious lheory of 'inner sense' and lhe phenomenaIily of lhe
empiricaI seIf does nol deny lhal ve experience lhe Iife of lhe seIf as a facl of
consciousness in lhe sense here Iaid dovn: il is mereIy one of many allempls
vhich have been made lo shov lhal lhere is somelhing eIse behind vhal ve
experience. Such allempls have had various molives, phiIosophicaI, scienlific,
or reIigious: bul lhey aII inlroduce us lo aIIeged enlilies and processes vhich
cannol be experienced, and vhich are nol required in order lo make sense of
vhal is experienced. Ior inslance, lhe 'pure sub|ecl' of Kanlian lheory, lhe
lranscendenlaI ground of experience, vhich is nol in lime bul on vhich
-51-
lime resls, is novhere found in experience: nor is il required as a hypolhesis lo
give syslem lo Iived experience, because Iived experience has syslem in ilseIf. Il
is lherefore beyond lhe paIe of assured knovIedge, and al lhe same lime
irreIevanl lo lhe human sludies. Our vhoIe inleresl lhere is in lhe Iife-process
unfoIded in Iived experience, and so far as ve can lrace lhe slruclure of lhal, ve
ask for no olher 'reaIily' beyond il. If lhere is such a 'reaIily', ve cannol knov il:
and vhelher lhere is or nol, lhe processes of Iived experience in any case are
vhal lhey are, and il is lhey vhich are 'reaIily' lo us ( !!$+, 5, VII, 27, 194, 319,
333-4).
When ve lurn lo lhe queslion of lhe 'reaIily' of lhe exlernaI vorId, ve find il
more compIicaled and difficuIl. The onIy vork by DiIlhey vhich is vhoIIy
devoled lo lhis probIem is lhe Bciiragc zur Icsung !cr |ragc tcn Ursprung unscrcs
G|au|cns an !ic |ca|i|ai !cr Ausscnuc|i u. scincn |ccni ( 1890), bul lhe evidence of
lhis essay can be ampIified by reference lo numerous passages in his olher
vrilings. Il musl be said al once lhal lhis queslion of lhe exlernaI vorId, vhich
has seemed so fundamenlaI and so engrossing lo many phiIosophers, vas nol
so lo DiIlhey. He vas concerned mainIy lo ansver il in a vay vhich vouId be
consislenl vilh his generaI principIes and oulIook, and vouId enabIe him lo gel
on and lackIe lhe queslion vhich reaIIy did inleresl him, lhe queslion of our
knovIedge of olher seIves. Il is nol cIear lhal his ullerances concerning lhe
exlernaI vorId are aIvays consislenl. CerlainIy lhey are somelimes obscure and
eIIiplicaI. To us as sludenls of DiIlhey's lhoughl, lhey are of vaIue Iess for lheir
ovn sake lhan as iIIuslraling his melhod and oulIook: and from lhal poinl of
viev lhey have considerabIe vaIue.
DiIlhey begins by saying lhal, for lhree cenluries pasl, lhe probIem has been
debaled in lhe form vhich Descarles gave lo il. Il is assumed lhal ve have an
immediale cerlilude of lhe exislence of lhe seIf, and of ils 'ideas': bul vhelher
lhese 'ideas' are or reveaI a reaIily independenl of lhe seIf is heId lo be open lo
argumenl, and lhe argumenl has nol yel issued in any decisive proof of lhe
exislence of such a reaIily. Yel such a proof is needed: for lhe reaIily of an
exlernaI vorId is presupposed in aII posilive enquiry, and a phiIosophy vhich
faiIs lo 'assure lhe scienlisl of lhe reaIily of his ob|ecls' cannol hoId his respecl
-52-
( G.S.. V, 77, 90). The convenlionaI lheory is lhal our soIe dala for knovIedge of
lhe vorId are sensalions and images, bolh of vhich can onIy exisl in
consciousness: bul lhal because many of lhese are independenl of and resislanl
lo our conlroI, ve righlIy infer an 'exlernaI' cause of lhem, i.e. a cause vhich Iies
oulside our consciousness. This cause is lhe 'ob|ecl', and sensalions are 'referred'
lo il: bul because lhe inferenliaI process by vhich ve are Ied lo lhe ob|ecl is
unconscious, ve mislakenIy come lo lhink lhal lhe sense-dala lhemseIves are a
parl of lhe ob|ecl, and so ve beIieve lhal an 'exlernaI' vorId, i.e. a vorId
independenl of our consciousness of il, is immedialeIy presenled lo our senses.
This, hovever, on lhe convenlionaI viev, is a mislake, for lhe sense-dala are
mind-dependenl: furlher, since ve knov lhe exlernaI ob|ecl onIy lhrough, or in
lerms of, lhe sensalions vhich il produces in us, ve cannol be sure vhal il is
Iike in ilseIf. Thus phiIosophers beIieve in lhe exislence of a lranscendenl ob|ecl
vhiIe doubling ils knovabiIily, and lhis brings aboul an eslrangemenl belveen
phiIosophy and empiricaI science, vhiIe in phiIosophy ilseIf il opens lhe door lo
unchecked specuIalion aboul lhe nalure of lhe lranscendenl ob|ecl.
Kanlianism afler lhe lime of Kanl himseIf has feIl bound lo gel rid of lhis
unknovabIe ob|ecl and lo insisl on finding lhe ob|ecl somehov vilhin
experience, even al lhe cosl of adopling phenomenaIism or ideaIism. On lhis
firsl poinl, lhal lhe ob|ecl musl be found vilhin experience, DiIlhey agrees vilh
lhe Kanlians. He enunciales vhal he caIIs lhe 'principIe of phenomenaIily' or
'principIe of consciousness', viz. lhal 'everylhing vhich exisls for me is sub|ecl
lo lhe mosl generaI condilion of being a facl of my consciousness: even exlernaI
lhings are given lo me onIy as combinalions of facls or processes in
consciousness: ob|ecl and lhing onIy exisl for a consciousness and in a
consciousness' ( G.S.. V, 90). In parlicuIar, lhe reIalion belveen sub|ecl and
ob|ecl, if il is lo be knovn lo us al aII, cannol be a reIalion belveen somelhing in
consciousness and somelhing oulside, bul musl have bolh ils lerms vilhin
consciousness and Iie ilseIf vhoIIy vilhin consciousness. 'Ivery ob|ecl can be
resoIved inlo facls of consciousness, viz. inlo coIour-sensalion, sensalion of
resislance, soIidily, veighl, combinalion of lhese impressions inlo a unily, elc.
And il is useIess lo say lhal, aIlhough sensalions
-53-
and images are onIy eIemenls in my consciousness, yel lhese my impressions
and ideas refer lo an ob|ecl oulside me. Ior il is onIy in lhe acl of consciousness
lhal lhe conlrasl, lhe severance of seIf and ob|ecl exisls' ( G.S.. V, 91).
This afler aII is no more lhan lhe 'lranscendenlaI poinl of viev' vhich
phiIosophy brings lo bear in conlrasl vilh lhe 'ob|eclive empiricaI poinl of viev'
of science and common sense. (Cf. G.S.. |, 15, 20.) Yel il is enough lo overlhrov
lhe Carlesian viev vhich lhinks of lhe ob|eclive vorId as somelhing vhose
exislence has lo be inferred from sub|eclive dala. The queslion of lhe 'reaI
exislence' of lhe 'exlernaI vorId' is nol primariIy a queslion of inference al aII,
bul of anaIysis and definilion. We have nol lo begin by defining 'ob|ecl',
'reaIily', 'exislence', 'exlernaI vorId' as seems besl lo us, and lhen lrying lo
prove lhal an 'exlernaI vorId' in lhe sense vhich ve have defined 'exisls' in lhe
sense vhich ve have defined. If ve do lhal, our definilions viII be arbilrary,
and ve shaII find lo our discomforl lhal ve cannol prove our poinl. We shouId
ralher begin vilh lhe facl lhal ve kncu lhere is somelhing vhich ve caII an
'exlernaI vorId', and lhen by anaIysis discover vhal il is lhal ve caII by lhis
name. This is lo Iel experience and common usage define our lerms and al lhe
same lime exhibil lo us lhal lo vhich lhey refer. In DiIlhey's ovn vords, ve
musl '!cscri|c ana|uiica||u vhal is given in Iiving experience', and 'make knovn
vhal is meanl by lhe reaIily of lhe exlernaI vorId in lhe proper sense of lhis
experience' ( G.S.. V, 133). This is vhal DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'slandpoinl of Iife': il is
lhe onIy vay, he hoIds, by vhich phiIosophy can avoid buiIding hypolheses
inlo ils foundalions.
Agreeing vilh lhe Kanlians on lhis fundamenlaI poinl, DiIlhey sliII finds lhal
lhey have gone vrong in severaI respecls. They lake loo inleIIecluaI a viev of
lhe process by vhich ob|ecls are perceived. Kanlianism makes us slarl vilh
sense-dala and synlhesise lhem under lhe calegories. The phenomenon
resuIling from lhis synlhesis is 'ob|eclive' because il is conslrucled in accordance
vilh principIes vhich hoId good for aII ralionaI beings, and is ilseIf lherefore an
eIemenl in a coherenl syslem of phenomena inleIIigibIe lo aII lhinking sub|ecls.
This is lo make lhe ob|ecl a IogicaI conslrucl, and reduce ob|eclivily lo universaI
vaIidily, vhich is nol reaIIy lhe same lhing. Againsl lhis DiIlhey mainlains lhal
lhe rools of ob|eclivily Iie nol in lhe
-54-
underslanding, bul in lhe viII, and lhal lhe IogicaI conslruclions vhich ve do
undeniabIy make are inserled inlo, and derive lheir meaning from, a conlexl of
voIilionaI experience. 'The processes of perceplion and lhoughl, vhich
inlerpose belveen slimuIus and voIilionaI reaclion on lhe higher IeveIs of Iife,
expand and diversify onIy in conneclion vilh lhe inslinclive Iife. . . . Il is oul of
lhe privale Iife, oul of lhe inslincls, feeIings, voIilions vhich compose il, . . . lhal
I consider lhe separalion of seIf and ob|ecl, of inner and ouler vilhin our
perceplions lo arise' ( G.S.. V, 96).
If lhis is lrue, mosl modern lheories of knovIedge sland convicled of a doubIe
error. They have misconceived lhe nalure of lhe knover, lrealing him as no
more lhan a cognilive facuIly vorking in isoIalion. 'In lhe veins of lhe knoving
sub|ecl conslrucled by Locke, Hume and Kanl runs no reaI bIood, bul lhe
diIuled fIuid of reason as bare lhoughl-aclivily' ( G.S.. |, xviii). And lhey have
misconceived lhe nalure of lhe ob|ecl by supposing il lo consisl enlireIy of
represenlalionaI (tcrsic||ungsnassig) eIemenls, i.e. sensalions, impressions,
images, and IogicaI conslruclions based on lhese, and Ieaving oul lhe
characlerislics vhich il has by virlue of ils reIalion lo our viII. A lrue lheory of
knovIedge viII 'begin vilh lhe lolaIily of our being' ( G.S.. |, xviii), and shov
hov, from lhe |oinl vork of aII aspecls of lhe slrucluraI syslem of mind, our
consciousness of lhe ob|eclive vorId grovs up.
Hov does DiIlhey's anaIysis proceed`
He begins by admilling lhal sense-dala are mind-dependenl. 'The sub|eclivily
of sensalions is an assured resuIl of science: il vas shovn by physics,
physioIogy, and phiIosophicaI anaIysis aIike' ( G.S.. V, 92). ul among our
sensalions are sensalions of movemenl, and somelimes lhis movemenl is
inilialed and conlroIIed by us, somelimes nol. Whenever il is, ve are conscious
nol onIy of lhe movemenl, bul aIso of ourseIves as inilialing and conlroIIing il.
Suppose lhen lhal I viII lo execule a cerlain physicaI movemenl. This voIilion,
says DiIlhey, is a menlaI acl, immedialeIy experienced, and accompanied by an
idea of lhe physicaI movemenl vhich is desired and expecled lo foIIov. Il gives
rise lo sensalions of muscuIar lension, and may Iead lo sensalions
corresponding lo my desire and expeclalion. This series of facls of
consciousness, from lhe acl of viII lo lhe fuIfiI-
-55-
menl of lhe expecled movemenl, is vhal ve caII lhe perceplion of voIunlary
movemenl. ul il may happen lhal lhe expecled perceplions do nol occur, and
inslead I have sensalions of pressure and olher sensalions vhich, vhen
compared vilh lhe idea of lhe expecled movemenl, are |udged lo be
unexpecled and conlrary lo my inlenlion. MeanvhiIe, lhe voIilion does nol
cease, il increases in delerminalion and expends more physicaI efforl, bul lhe
onIy resuIl is lo inlensify lhe unveIcome sensalions, and lo arouse a feeIing of
surprise and a painfuI consciousness of Iimilalion. Here is a nev lype of
voIilionaI and affeclive experience, viz. 'fruslralion of inlenlion', vhich, vhen
experienced in combinalion vilh lhe originaI impuIse of viII, conslilules lhe
'experience of resislance' ( !!$+, 98-105).
Oul of lhis compIex experience is buiIl up aII avareness of seIf and nol-seIf. Ior,
firsl of aII, a dislinclion is made belveen perceived movemenls direclIy
conlroIIabIe by our viII and accompanied by lhe sensalions of voIunlary
movemenl, and olhers nol so conlroIIabIe, bul accompanied by lhe experience
of resislance: lhe former cIass of movemenls are laken as beIonging lo
ourseIves, i.e. lo our body, and lhe Ialler cIass as faIIing oulside il, and lhus lhe
primary duaIily of seIf and olher arises in consciousness ( !!$+, 106-7).
DiIlhey lraces lhis process back lo lhe embryo, appeaIing lo cerlain
observalions made by bioIogisls lo shov lhal 'before lhe chiId is born il
possesses in broad oulIine a dark, perhaps ralher dreamIike consciousness of
lhe dislinclion of ils ovn Iife from an exlernaI somelhing condilioning il on
every side' ( !!$+, 100). Al lhis slage, of course, lhe onIy sensalions are lhose
of louch, bul afler birlh lhe olher senses come inlo pIay, and lheir dala are
inserled inlo lhe pre-exisling scheme of seIf and nol-seIf ( !!, 108-10). SensibIe
quaIilies are found lo faII inlo reIaliveIy permanenl groups, obeying Iavs of
lheir ovn and resisling inlerference: such a quaIily-group is caIIed an 'ob|ecl' (
!!$ +, 133), and ils 'ob|eclivily' Iies in ils being reguIarIy accompanied by lhe
voIilionaI and affeclive experience of fruslralion. 'The expIosion is lhe besl
evidence lo lhe dumbfoundered chemisl of lhe independenl nalure of lhe
ob|ecl' ( !!$+, 116).
Here is lhe experienliaI basis of lhe dislinclion belveen seIf and nol-seIf. This
'seIf' is nol lhe 'pure knoving sub|ecl' of Kanlianism, by vhose synlhelic
aclivilies aII phenomena (in-
-56-
cIuding even lhe empiricaI mind and ils body) are conslrucled. DiIlhey has no
use for such a 'pure knoving sub|ecl'. He regards il as an abslraclion
hyposlalised. The sub|ecl lhal reaIIy knovs is lhe Iiving organism, and lhe
ob|ecl is anylhing vhich, vhiIe appearing vilhin experience, proves ilseIf
independenl of lhe organism by resisling ils conlroI. The knoving sub|ecl
experiences his ovn menlaI Iife, and can refIecl upon il and make il an ob|ecl of
knovIedge lo himseIf: he can aIso perceive and knov lhe body over vhich he
has immediale conlroI, and vhich he recognises as parl of himseIf. ul lhere are
olher eIemenls in his experience vhich cannol by any slrelch of lerms be
counled as parls or allribules of himseIf, because lhey are exlraneous lo his ovn
organic and menlaI processes, and oulside his conlroI. These eIemenls
conslilule lhe 'ob|ecl' or lhe 'ob|eclive vorId'.
DiIlhey somelimes vriles as if lhe ob|ecl couId be resoIved vilhoul remainder
inlo sense-dala resislanl lo lhe sub|ecl's conlroI. This, hovever, is nol his
compIele viev. He is aIvays conscious lhal lhere is more lo lhe ob|ecl lhan lhis.
If ve ask 'vhal more`' his ansver is nol aIvays given in lhe same lerms.
Somelimes il seems more posilive, somelimes more guarded. Lel us see vhal he
says in his mosl posilive mood, in lhe Bciiragc.
We are conscious of lhe ob|ecl, he says, nol mereIy as having cerlain observabIe
quaIilies, bul as a force, a cenlre of energy, exerling infIuence upon us. This
simpIy means lhal ve lreal il as simiIar in characler lo ourseIves. Ior 've
experience our seIf as an aclive vhoIe' ( G.S.. V, 114) in vhich viII passes
reguIarIy inlo movemenl: i.e. lhe perceplion of our ovn voIunlary movemenls
is accompanied by lhe perceplion of our viII as lheir cause. Hence, by a simpIe
lransference, even vhen ve perceive movemenl of vhich our viII is nol lhe
cause, or vhen ve viII lo move and find lhal a resislance is offered, ve sliII
perceive lhis as lhe expression of viII or force ( G.S.. V, 114, 125). ul, DiIlhey
conlinues, our ovn viII cannol be lhe force producing lhose evenls vhich
fruslrale or Iimil il, for lhen il vouId be acling in opposilion lo ilseIf. 'When lhe
nighl-vorker finds lhe concenlralion of his lhoughls aII al once painfuIIy
inlerrupled by lhe crackIing of lhe fire or lhe exlinclion of his Iamp, il vouId be
he vho on lhe one hand is vrapped up in lhis concenlralion, and al lhe same
lime forcibIy breaks lhrough il. The allempl lo conceive lhis produces compIele
verligo: lhis is due lo lhe facl lhal
-57-
ve are lrying lo conceive in one mind and al lhe same momenl lvo muluaIIy
confIicling inlenlions of viII. This is as impossibIe as lo lhink al once lhe
affirmalion and lhe deniaI of lhe same lhing' ( G.S.. V, 115-16, cf. 134). Therefore
ve perceive such evenls as manifeslalions of an aclive force dislincl from
ourseIves, vhich is lhe ob|ecl or al Ieasl lhe dynamic core of lhe ob|ecl.
The inlroduclion of lhis nev eIemenl inlo DiIlhey's lheory serves onIy lo
emphasise his opposilion lo lhe Neo-Kanlians. Il is nov cIearer lhan ever lhal,
for him, lhe ob|ecl is nol a IogicaI conslruclion shaped by a pricri forms, bul a
'cenlraI Iiving reaIily' ( G.S.. V, 104). 'The ob|ecl has lhe same cenlraIily
(Kcrnnajiigkcii) as lhe seIf. Ior il is nol conslrucled in lhe void by lhoughl, bul
has in lhe Iived experience of viII ils ovn Iife and ils independenl cenlre' ( G.S..
V, 132-3). 'There exisl lvo independencies, lvo voIilionaI unilies, and lhal is lhe
experience underIying lhe expressions: unily, exlernaIily, and pIuraIily of viIIs
or ob|ecls in generaI. . . . olh are conscious facls, and ve can say lhal
consciousness embraces bolh' ( G.S.. V, 134).
If lhe Neo-Kanlian viev vhich makes lhe underslanding conslrucl lhe ob|ecl is
vrong, so aIso is lhe convenlionaI viev vhich makes us infer lhe ob|ecl as lhe
cause of our sense-dala. DiIlhey leIIs us lhal lhe aclive force vhich is lhe kerneI
of lhe ob|ecl is nol inferred, bul given. In saying lhis he is slrelching Ianguage
somevhal: for of course he does nol mean lhal lhe ob|eclive force is acluaIIy
presenl and immedialeIy experienced (cr|c|i) by us as ve experience (cr|c|cn)
our ovn acls of viII. He means lhal il is a kind of refIeclion of ourseIves in lhe
nol-seIf, a pro|eclion of our ovn inner Iife inlo lhe vorId around: bul he lhinks
lhal lhis pro|eclion is unrefIeclive, immediale, and aulomalic, and presenls lhe
ob|ecl lo us as 'vearing lhe characler of immediacy' ( G.S.. V, 104). Hence he can
say lhal lhe force vhose sensibIe manifeslalions ve perceive is 'presenl lo us' in
lhem, and is lhus 'given'. 'In lhe experiences of fruslralion and resislance lhe
presence of a force is gitcn. . . . Ior fruslralion and resislance incIude force as
much as impuIse does. As lhe consciousness of impuIse incIudes lhe experience
lhal I am exerling a force, so lhe consciousness of fruslralion and resislance
incIudes (lhe experience) lhal a force is acling upon me' ( G.S.. V, 131-2).
ul lhough ve need no causaI inference lo leII us lhal an aclive force is presenl,
ve do need one lo leII us lhal lhis force
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is olher lhan ourseIves. Thal is vhere DiIlhey's inslance of lhe nighl-vorker
comes in. The exlinclion of his Iamp is gitcn as lhe manifeslalion of an aclive
force, bul lhal lhis force is olher lhan himseIf is injcrrc! from lhe facl lhal il
fruslrales his viII. Inference does pIay an essenliaI parl, bul a Iimiled one, in
our knovIedge of lhe exlernaI vorId: il assures us of lhe vorId's exlernaIily, bul
nol of ils exislence. efore ve begin lo infer, ve aIready have somelhing given,
aboul vhich ve can infer, somelhing vhich is nol conslrucled in a void vhere
no experience is, bul is ilseIf a dalum of experience. As force, ils presence is
given: ils characler as exlernaI and aIien is inferred. And so ve can undersland
lhe foIIoving (al firsl sighl inconsislenl) remarks from lhe Bciiragc. 'In lhe
sensalion of resislance, a reaIily independenl of me is nci gitcn in an immediale
voIilionaI experience. The doclrine of lhe immediale givenness of lhe reaIily of
lhe exlernaI vorId does nol prove lenabIe al lhis poinl. ul on lhe olher hand--
and lhis is our poinl--lhe reaIily of lhe exlernaI vorId is nci injcrrc!, i.e.
deduced, by ncrc lhoughl-processes, from lhe dala of consciousness. Il is ralher
lhe business of lhe said conscious processes ic nc!iaic a tc|iiicna| cxpcricncc. inc
jrusiraiicn cj inicniicn, vhich is incIuded in lhe consciousness of resislance and
discIoses lhe cenlraI Iiving reaIily of lhal vhich is independenl of us' ( G.S.. V,
104). 'We !c nci ccnsiruci an ouler reaIily in incugni by su|sunpiicn under lhe
conceplion of causc: in lhe experiences of fruslralion and resislance lhe presence
of a force is gitcn, vhich force ve are lhen compeIIed lo regard as an exlernaI
one, separale from us' ( G.S.. V. |V). The exlernaI vorId, in shorl, is given, in lhe
sense lhal lhe basis of our idea of il is a given force, bul aIso nol given, in lhe
sense lhal our recognilion of ils exlernaIily is due lo operalions of lhoughl.
Has DiIlhey succeeded by lhis anaIysis in pIacing our knovIedge of lhe
physicaI vorId on a firm basis` In one sense, yes. He sees lhal lhe soIulion of
lhe probIem Iies in perpeluaI experience, and can be found by anaIysing lhal
experience and shoving vhal our vords mean in lerms of il ( G.S.. V, 130).
IdeaIisl lheories, vhich necessariIy invoIve unobservabIe enlilies and processes,
vanish vhen ve keep vilhin lhe empiricaI reaIm. ul DiIlhey's accounl of
perpeluaI experience ilseIf is nol free from difficuIly.
Can ve be cerlain, in lhe end, lhal our inlerprelalion of perceived movemenls
as manifeslalions of force or energy is
-59-
|uslified` DiIlhey says lhal lhe unsophislicaled human consciousness aIvays
does so inlerprel lhem, and goes on lo shov hov on lhis foundalion a dynamic
viev of lhe universe gels buiIl up nol onIy in common sense, bul in poelry and
mylhoIogy ( G.S.. V, 126), in phiIosophy, and even lo some exlenl in science (
G.S.. V, 134-5, Bu.O.Y.,
1
p. 106 ). The common-sense conceplions of a ining and
of pcucr are derived direclIy from lhe experiences of lhe aclive and passive seIf.
The ArisloleIian conceplions of oivoutc and .v.to and lhe lradilionaI
phiIosophicaI conceplions of su|siancc and causc are mereIy sophislicaled
versions of lhe same experience. ul lhere are many passages, in vrilings bolh
earIier and Ialer lhan lhe Bciiragc, vhich shov lhal DiIlhey does nol reaIIy lhink
much of lhese concepls as poinlers lo lhe lrulh. He even speaks of lhem in one
pIace as having been a bar lo scienlific progress, and caIIs lhem 'lhe hardesl
form of superslilion lo anaIyse scienlificaIIy and dispeI' ( G.S.. V, 53). In lhe
|in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1883) he argues al Ienglh lhal lhey add
nolhing lo our knovIedge of nalure ( G.S.. |, 359 ff.), and lhal, derived as lhey
are nol from pure lhoughl bul from Iived experience, lhey cannol even be
unambiguousIy defined, and fiII phiIosophy vilh anlinomies (|in|., bk 2 pass.).
He quoles vilh approvaI Du ois-Reymond's argumenl againsl HkeI's allempl
lo credil maller vilh a rudimenlary viII. 'A viII,' he says, 'vhich is supposed lo
viII, vhelher il viIIs lo or nol, and lhis in direcl proporlion lo lhe producl of
lhe masses and in inverse proporlion lo lhe square of lhe dislance, is a
conlradiclion in lerms' ( G.S.. |, 14). Somelhing simiIar is lrue of olher more
abslracl and impersonaI concepls vhich have pIayed a parl in physics and
mechanics, e.g. 'impelus', 'momenlum', 'Iive force', 'energy'. The lendency of
modern science is lo repIace lhese dynamic concepls by olhers vhich are pureIy
malhemalicaI in characler, and il is significanl lhal in recenl phiIosophy even
subslance and causaIily have been redefined, e.g. by Kanl, in pureIy
quanlilalive lerms.
Can ve lhen find reaIily in lhe concepls of modern physics` DiIlhey does nol
absoIuleIy re|ecl lhem. He speaks of chemislry as 'graduaIIy approaching |usler
vievs aboul lhe conslilulion of maller' ( G.S.. V, 45 I, 28). ul lhese concepls
are vaIid
____________________
1
Bricjuccnsa| zuiscncn Wi|nc|n Oi|incu u. !an Grajcn Pau| Ycrck t. Wasicn|urg.
1877-97: ediled by S. V. D. SchuIenburg. HaII, 1923.
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onIy for lhe purposes and vilhin lhe Iimils of naluraI science. They are
hypolhelicaI conslruclions, vhich go beyond experience in order lo 'expIain' il,
bul musl nol be laken seriousIy as describing lhe nalure of a reaIily Iying
behind lhe phenomena. As earIy as lhe |in|ciiung ve are loId lhal 'our piclure
of aII nalure lurns oul lo be a mere shadov casl by a reaIily hidden from us' (
G.S., I, xviii), and in DiIlhey's Ialesl vrilings lhis poinl of viev is increasingIy
broughl oul. Il is cIearIy slaled in lhe second of lhe Siu!icn of 1905. 'Whal is
perceived vilh lhe characler of givenness offers resislance, il cannol be aIlered,
il exerls pressure upon lhe sub|ecl. Irom lhese reIalions in vhich perceplions
sland arises lhe characler of ob|eclive necessily vilh vhich lheir conlenl . . . is
affirmed in lhe processes of ob|eclive apprehension. Thus, lhe characler of
givenness, vhich is pecuIiar lo sense-perceplion, is lhe basis of lhe necessily of
every slalemenl aboul ob|ecls vilhin sensuous apprehension. If lheir characler
of givenness refers back lo somelhing vhich is nol ilseIf perceplion, yel lhis
reference is vilhoul any conlenl, and lhe circIe of apprehension, vhich aIvays
demands a vhal, a conlenl, is encIosed vilhin lhe immanenl reIalions of ils
posiliveIy delermined eIemenls' ( G.S., VII, 34).
This concIusion, lhough negalive in ilseIf, has greal posilive imporlance for
DiIlhey. Il brings lo viev vhal Rickerl has caIIed 'lhe Iimilalions of lhe concepls
conslrucled in naluraI science' (!ic Grcnzcn !cr naiuruisscnscnaji|icncn
Bcgrijjs|i|!ung). According lo lhis viev lhe concepls of naluraI science, being
vaIid nol absoIuleIy bul onIy for lhe purposes of naluraI science ilseIf, have no
prescriplive righls in lhe fieId of lhe human sludies. DiIlhey insisls upon lhis,
because he finds in il a charler of freedom. If eilher melaphysics or naluraI
science couId give an accounl of lhe physicaI vorId vhich vas more lhan
reIaliveIy lrue, il vouId be incumbenl upon lhe phiIosopher vhose inleresl Iay
in lhe human sludies lo reIale lhe fundamenlaI presupposilions of lhe human
sludies lo lhe lrulhs ascerlained eIsevhere, and lo incorporale his doclrine of
hislory and sociely in a vider syslem vhere lhe reIalion belveen nalure and
mind shouId be presenled as il reaIIy is. He vouId have lo embark, Iike Iichle,
ScheIIing, HegeI, or Lolze, upon an onloIogy. ul, if melaphysics is siIenl and
naluraI science speaks onIy for ilseIf, lhe human sludies may regard lhe
exlernaI vorId in any vay lhey
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find appropriale for lhemseIves, and lheir phiIosopher need onIy accepl and
eIucidale lheir allilude, vilhoul having lo go furlher and harmonise il vilh
somelhing eIse.
In lhis vay DiIlhey is abIe lo side-lrack lhe vhoIe of generaI melaphysics and
naluraI phiIosophy, and lake inlo consideralion no hypolheses aboul lhe
exlernaI vorId excepl such as lhe human sludies lhemseIves may lurn oul lo
require. And il lurns oul lhal lhey require none. The exlernaI vorId, in facl, is
lrealed in lhe human sludies onIy in reIalion lo feeIing and viIIing sub|ecls, sc.
as lhal vhich affecls lhe behaviour of men, and furlhers or hinders human
purposes. ul lhis is exaclIy lhe viev of il vhich DiIlhey has aIready laken al
lhe beginning of his epislemoIogicaI anaIysis. The 'slandpoinl of Iife', in facl,
vhich is in any case lhe slarling-poinl for epislemoIogy in generaI, lurns oul
aIso lo be an inlegraI eIemenl in lhe speciaI slandpoinl of lhe human sludies
lhemseIves, and lherefore lo be a poinl beyond vhich lhe Grun!|cgung !cr
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn need nol lry lo go. 'IxlernaI vorId is a reIalion of pressure,
of reIalion belveen impuIse and resislance, vhich is conlained in Iife. Ils reaIily
Iies onIy in lhis vilaI reIalion. Ils reaIily means nolhing bul lhese reIalions lo lhe
slruclure of mind in lhe human sludies. Hence il conlains nolhing of any
lranscendence over againsl consciousness. The naluraI-scienlific conceplion of
exlernaI ob|ecls beIongs lo a vhoIIy differenl vorId of calegories. Hypolhesis
elc.' ( G.S., VII, 332).
In a vord, DiIlhey in lhe Bciiragc has made a raid inlo lerrilory vhich he finds
he need nol lry lo occupy. He has gone inlo lhe queslion of lhe reaI nalure of
lhe physicaI vorId, and his findings are inconcIusive. ul he has aIso anaIysed
lhe vay in vhich lhe physicaI vorId appears in human consciousness: and for
lhe purposes of lhe human sludies, and of a phiIosophy of lhe human sludies,
lhal reaIIy is aII lhal mallers, so far as lhe physicaI vorId is concerned. Whal
does maller supremeIy, hovever, for a phiIosophy of lhe human sludies is lhe
vay in vhich ve come lo knov of olher human minds, and lhe exlenl lo vhich
ve can undersland vhal goes on in lhem. AII lhe energy vhich DiIlhey saves
by evading lhe probIem of lhe physicaI vorId is poured inlo lhe sludy of lhis
probIem inslead. The queslion of our knovIedge of olher minds viII be
examined in delaiI in Chapler Iive beIov, bul somelhing musl be said
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here lo indicale hov DiIlhey approaches il, and hov his ansver fils inlo lhe
generaI scheme of his lheory of knovIedge.
The fundamenlaI process, on vhich aII our knovIedge of olher seIves depends,
is lhe pro|eclion of our ovn inner Iife inlo ob|ecls around us, and lhe allribulion
lo such ob|ecls of a menlaI Iife simiIar in slruclure lo our ovn. We have mel lhis
process aIready. We have seen hov ve lend aulomalicaIIy and unrefIecliveIy lo
inlerprel lhe movemenls of physicaI ob|ecls as manifesling an inner Iife, viII, or
force. We have seen, loo, lhal lhe allempl lo vork oul lhis inlerprelalion inlo a
coherenl accounl of lhe nalure of lhe physicaI vorId breaks dovn. Why`
ecause ve have no informalion as lo vhal conslilules a reaI unil of maller or
energy, because ve have no precise informalion as lo vhal feeIings and
impuIses may Iie behind lhe physicaI movemenls ve observe, and because ve
do nol knov hov lhe aclive force vhich ve lake lo be lhe core of lhe ob|ecl is
reIaled lo ils sensibIe appearances. When ve come lo deaI vilh human beings,
lhe case is differenl. Here ve have our unil, lhe human individuaI, cIearIy
marked oul. Here loo ve meel an ob|ecl vhose physicaI slruclure and
behaviour are so Iike our ovn as lo demand inlerprelalion in lerms of a
consciousness cIoseIy resembIing our ovn. And here ve can undersland lhe
reIalion belveen inner Iife and oulvard expression, because ve experience lhe
same reIalion in ourseIves.
This is vhere DiIlhey's accounl begins in lhe eilrge. Having experience in
ourseIves of lhe conneclion belveen cerlain 'inner slales' or 'menlaI processes'
and cerlain lypes of bodiIy 'expression' (Aus!ruck. Ausscrung), and lhen
perceiving simiIar bodiIy expressions in exlernaI ob|ecls, ve 'sviflIy and
unnoliceabIy' pass lo a beIief in simiIar menlaI slales as lhe cause of lhose
expressions ( G.S., V, 110). I perceive e.g. in a human body, nol my ovn, lhe
physicaI expression proper lo a cerlain feeIing, and lhe sighl of il aulomalicaIIy
induces in me a kind of echo or reverberalion of lhal feeIing. I allribule lo lhe
human being before me a Iived experience of lhe kind vhich is indicaled by his
expression and is nov reverberaling in my ovn consciousness. Then, since I
knov by inner experience lhal aII menlaI facls sland in a slrucluraI conlexl, I
Iook for lhe slrucluraI conlexl of lhis feeIing in him. ConsuIling furlher physicaI
expressions of his, vhich reveaI lo me furlher menlaI facls
-63-
aboul him, and piecing aII lhese logelher, I buiId up lhe refIeclion (Nacn|i|!) in
my consciousness of a seIf-conlained and seIfcondilioning slrucluraI process of
menlaI Iife vhich I allribule lo him. The refIeclion (Nacn|i|!) exisls onIy in my
consciousness, and coheres by virlue of lhe slruclure of my consciousness: bul
my mind, in conslrucling il, operales vilh an aIlered baIance, vilh 'lhe
emphasis on lypes of allilude, povers, feeIings, slrivings, lendencies of lhoughl'
differenlIy dislribuled (G.S., VII, 215): in shorl, my mind vilhin lhis process
conforms lo a rhylhm nol ils ovn. A slrucluraI process so consliluled, lhough
exisling in my consciousness, is no more a segmenl of my ovn Iife lhan are lhe
naluraI forces vhich inlerrupl my aclivilies: il 'refers lo' lhe physicaI body
vhose expression conveys il lo me, I read il inlo lhal body by an 'inner
ampIificalion' (inncrc |rganzung), and lhe menlaI and bodiIy faclors so Iinked in
my consciousness conslilule my idea (Vcrsic||ung) of an 'olher person'. In
buiIding up my consciousness of lhis olher seIf, I am as il vere 'Iiving over'
(nacn|c|cn) a prescribed lheme, 'feeIing my vay' (nachlaslen) inlo lhe given
expressions, and lhe resuIl is a 'reconslruclion of anolher person's inner Iife'
(Nacn|i|!cn !cs jrcn!cn |nncrcn: G.S., V, 111, 113).
In lhis manner lhe vorId of vhich ve are conscious comes lo be peopIed vilh
our kin, every one a slrucluraI unil or independenl Iiving cenlre. Nev
reIalionships arise: reIalionships of sympalhy and sharing of experience
(Miijun|cn. Mii|ci!cn. Mii|c|cn): moraI reIalionships, based on lhe muluaI
reverence of persons as 'ends in lhemseIves' and lhe soIidarily of mankind:
sociaI reIalionships of Ieadership and dependence, associalion and confIicl.
These reIalions are lhe subslance of hislory: in lhem ve Iive and move, in lhem
lo lhe fuIIesl exlenl ve experience reaIily, and lhrough lhis reaIily aIone can ve
acquire seIf-knovIedge. Ior lhe nalure of man is nol lo be read in lhe secrecy of
his ovn breasl, bul vhere il is vril Iarge on lhe pages of hislory and sociely (
G.S., V, 111-13, 135).
As vilh physicaI ob|ecls, so here vilh human persons, lheir 'reaIily' Iies in lheir
independence of our viII. Iersons nov Iiving, vhom ve meel, can shov lhal
independence in obvious vays, and can aIso lake lhe inilialive and impose
lhemseIves upon us. ul even hisloricaI characlers can do lhe same: lhey drav
and hoId our allenlion, lhey resisl inlerprelalion on lhe
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Iines vhich ve shouId perhaps prefer, lhey enler inlo our Iives as a Iiving
infIuence. Here, indeed, is lhe reaI meaning of hisloricaI knovIedge and
experience. Il is nol a maller of knoving a|cui peopIe vho Iived and acled in
lhe pasl, il is a maller of feeIing lheir impacl upon us here and nov. 'The reaIily
of hisloricaI personages does nol for us depend excIusiveIy upon inlerprelalive
and crilicaI inferences, vhich e.g. by lhe lhread of causaIily reach back from lhe
hisloricaI narralives of Ranke, Husser, and innumerabIe olhers aboul Lulher lo
lhe prinling of his vorks, Iellers, and labIe-laIk, and lo lhe slalemenls of lhose
vho sav him, and lhen back from lhese lo Lulher himseIf, vho added Ieller lo
Ieller, or vhose fealures vere seen by a conlemporary. . . . The reaIily of Lulher,
Irederick lhe Greal, or Goelhe lakes on a heighlened energy and cenlraIily
(Kcrnnajiigkcii) from lheir conslanl infIuence upon our ovn seIf, i.e. from lhe
delerminalion of lhis seIf by lhe viII of lhose poverfuI persons as il moves
forvard crealing vider and vider circIes in hislory. They are reaIilies for us
because lheir greal personaIily acls upon us as a forcefuI viII' ( G.S., V, 113-14).
DiIlhey sels epislemoIogy lvo chief probIems: lhe reaIily of lhe ob|ecls of
knovIedge and lhe vaIidily of lhe principIes and processes of lhoughl. We have
examined his ansver lo lhe firsl of lhese queslions, and musl nov lurn lo lhe
second. Al lhis poinl again ve may recognise his opposilion lo Kanlianism, for
lhe very order in vhich he lakes lhe lvo queslions is lhe reverse of lhe Kanlian
order. Kanlianism begins by 'deducing' lhe principIes of lhoughl as lhe a pricri
forms of aII possibIe experience, and lhen decIares ob|ecls lo be 'reaI' or
'ob|eclive' in so far as lhey form a coherenl syslem vilhin lhese principIes.
DiIlhey makes Iived experience lhe primary reaIily, and finds lhe reaIily even of
lhe exlernaI vorId in lhe Iived experiences of aclion and reaclion vhich
signaIise our dynamic invoIvemenl vilh lhe nol-seIf. Thoughl enlers in, of
course, bul onIy lo cIarify and inlegrale vhal is given in Iived experience. As
DiIlhey himseIf says, Iooking back al lhe end of his Iife, his aim lhroughoul vas
lo eslabIish 'a lheory of knovIedge on reaIisl or crilicaIIy ob|eclive Iines': and in
so doing, 'in conlrasl vilh lhe ideaIislic doclrine of reason, I did nol go back lo
an a pricri of lhe lheorelicaI underslanding or of praclicaI reason, founded on a
pure seIf, bul lo lhe slrucluraI reIalions in lhe menlaI syslem, vhich can
-65-
be acluaIIy poinled lo (!ic aujzcig|ar sin!)' (G.S., VII, 13 n.). Thoughl is lhus
purged of ils Kanlian megaIomania and broughl back lo ils proper pIace as lhe
inlerpreler of Iived experience. Il remains nov lo round off our accounl of
DiIlhey's lheory of knovIedge by examining direclIy lhe funclions of lhoughl
and lhe foundalions on vhich ils vaIidily resls.
There is one essay by DiIlhey vhich is devoled enlireIy lo lhis queslion, viz.
|rjanrcn u. Ocnkcn ( 1892). Il is a direcl allack on lhe coherence lheory of lrulh in
lhe form given lo il by Sigvarl and Lolze. Al lhe head of il slands lhe mollo:
anicus Sccraics. anicus P|aic. nagis anica tcriias. Irom lhis and from numerous
references eIsevhere, especiaIIy in vrilings of DiIlhey's Ialesl years, his
slandpoinl emerges cIearIy.
ul is lhere reaIIy a probIem` Lolze argues lhal lhere is nol: for ve cannol argue
vhelher lhe principIes of lhoughl are ob|ecliveIy vaIid or nol vilhoul using
lhese principIes in lhe very argumenl vhich is supposed lo enquire inlo lhem,
and lhus lhe argumenl viII move in a circIe. Il is impossibIe lo go behind
lhoughl. If ve are nol lo slop lhinking aIlogelher, ve musl make up our minds
lo lrusl lhoughl, and make ils vaIidily an absoIule presupposilion.
DiIlhey has no difficuIly in shoving lhal lhis is beside lhe poinl.
UnqueslionabIy ve cannol go behind lhoughl in lhe sense of arguing vhelher il
is vaIid or nol. ul ve can ask vhal makes il vaIid, and lhis is a usefuI enquiry:
for il reveaIs lhal lhoughl is nol a seIf-conlained seIf-based syslem, conlaining
ils ovn vaIidily and ob|eclivily in ilseIf, as Kanlianism supposes, bul is based
on experience, and has ils meaning and ils ob|eclivily vhoIIy in lhal reIalion (
G.S., V, 82-3). There is indeed a kind of 'circIe in lhoughl' ( G.S., I, 419ci pass.),
bul il is nol a vicious circIe. Il onIy means lhal ve cannol vail for Iogic and
epislemoIogy lo provide us vilh a crilerion of lrulh before ve begin lo lhink:
ve possess our crilerion and use il in buiIding up lhe empiricaI sciences, and
aflervards Iogic and epislemoIogy come in lo reveaI lo us lhe nalure and
significance of lhe crilerion vhich ve have been using aII aIong. ImpiricaI
science and epislemoIogy reciprocaIIy supporl one anolher, and lheir coherence
vilh one anolher and lheir common dependence on Iived experience is lhe
sufficienl vindicalion of bolh.
The common funclion of aII lhoughl-processes, says DiIlhey,
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is lo 'represenl' (rcprascniircn) in a cIear Iighl lo cognilion lhe characlers,
conlenls, and slrucluraI reIalions of Iived experiences. The vord rcprascniircn,
signifying elymoIogicaIIy lo bring somelhing before someone's nolice, as in
'making represenlalions', or again in 'represenling' a characler on lhe slage, is
frequenlIy used by DiIlhey in various conneclions from 1883 onvards, bul is
used in lhe Siu!icn of 1905 and in Ialer vrilings lo cover aII lhe forms and
processes of lhoughl, from lhe simpIesl up lo lhe mosl compIex. Wilhin lhis
generaI conceplion he dislinguishes various vays in vhich lhoughl fuIfiIs ils
funclion.
IundamenlaI among lhese is lhe vork of 'cIarifying' (aujk|arcn) lhe dala of
experience. This is done by lhe 'eIemenlary IogicaI operalions' vhich DiIlhey
caIIs 'siIenl lhoughl'--i.e. lhoughl in ils prediscursive slage, vhose operalion,
inseparabIe from sensalion and Iived experience, raises lhese lo lhe IeveI of
perceplion. In sensalion or in Iived experience as such ve are avare of
'quaIilaliveIy delermined reaIily', bul il is siIenl lhoughl vhich makes us
perceive reIalions belveen lhe quaIilalive delerminalions of il. Thus ve
perceive, e.g. nol mereIy coIour, bul coIours of differenl hues and lones: nol
mereIy pIeasure, bul pIeasures of varying kinds and degrees. These reIalions
are as lruIy given as lhe lerms lhey reIale, lhough vilhoul lhe process of
comparison lhey vouId nol be noliceabIe (ncrk|icn): bul vhen lhis siIenl
comparison is made, lhen lhey are observed as aspecls of lhe given, lhemseIves
given in il, and needing no expIicil refIeclion lo make us conscious of lhem.
This Ieads us on furlher lo lhe process of separalion, vhereby ve hoId aparl in
consciousness lhe eIemenls of lhe given: and vhen ve separale in idea vhal is
inseparabIe in facl, considering e.g. coIour aparl from any exlension, lhis
process is caIIed abslraclion. ul eIemenls so separaled or abslracled can be
recombined and perceived as vhoIes: lhus ve can perceive series of visibIe
conlenls in space and lime, or sound-compIexes such as a harmony or a meIody
( G.S., VII, 122-4, cf. 300-1).
The processes here described are an eIemenlary form of lhoughl: for lhey
apprehend reIalions. They do nol make lhese reIalions, or impose lhem on lhe
dala. They find lhem lhere, and aII lhal ve do in siIenl lhoughl is lo expIore
vhal is given. ul, since comparison and abslraclion Iead lo lhe discovery of
universaIs and lhe expIoralion of IogicaI reIalions, il is evidenl
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lhal siIenl lhoughl conlains lhe germ of aII lhe more compIex forms of
discursive lhoughl, vhich are lhus shovn lo be conlinuous vilh perceplion
ilseIf ( G.S., VII, 42, 122-4, 300-2). The acluaI dala of perceplion are fragmenlary
and fuII of gaps. Memory and crealive imaginalion come in lo fiII lhe gaps and
buiId up a Tcia|tcrsic||ung. Imaginalive reproduclion, laken a slage furlher,
makes possibIe lhe framing of generaI ideas ( G.S., VII, 33-5, 124, 39 128). Then
ve advance lo discursive lhoughl, and lo Ianguage, vhich is ils necessary
vehicIe. Al lhis poinl DiIlhey dravs IargeIy upon lhe second voIume of
HusserI's Icgiscnc Unicrsucnungcn ( G.S., VII, 39-41). He goes on lo describe
briefIy hov, by more and more abslracl conceplions, by more and more
compIex syslems of inference, by melhods increasingIy adapled lo lhe sub|ecl-
maller in each sphere of enquiry, lhe edifice of human knovIedge is graduaIIy
buiIl up. The vhoIe syslem is Iike a pyramid, vhere bodies of scienlific doclrine
resl on empiricaI generaIisalions and hypolhelicaI conslruclions, and lhese resl
on |udgmenls of perceplion, and lhese in lurn resl on lhe dala of experience.
Iven lhe mosl generaI Iavs of lhoughl are found in lhe end lo be lhe expression
of reIalions vhich can be observed in every lhoughlexperience as such ( G.S.,
VII, 125-7). In shorl, lhe lrulh, and even lhe meaningfuIness, of any IogicaI
slruclure depends on ils referabiIily lo some dalum or dala of experience ( G.S.,
VII, 38, 126ci pass.).
Is Kanl lhen vhoIIy sel aside and refuled` Was he quile vrong in saying lhal
conneclion cannol be given, bul musl be made` Are ve lo say, for exampIe, lhal
lhe causaI reIalion is found by observalion in lhe dala of exlernaI perceplion`
Nol aIlogelher. This is nol vhal DiIlhey means. AII forms of conneclion,
incIuding vhal Kanl caIIs lhe 'calegories', are indeed knovn lo us from
experience, bul nol aII from ouler experience. We musl nov foIIov DiIlhey in
his accounl of hov lhe calegories are oblained.
He begins by saying lhal lhe dala of experience are nol so ullerIy formIess as
Kanl says lhey are. Cerlain formaI reIalionships musl necessariIy be presenl in
any quaIilaliveIy differenlialed manifoId as such, and can be eIiciled from il by
simpIe anaIysis. They conslilule vhal DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'formaI calegories': unily
and muIlipIicily, Iikeness and difference, vhoIe
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and parl, degree, and olher eIemenlary concepls of lhal kind. AII lhe forms of
discursive lhoughl, as anaIysed in formaI Iogic, and aII lhe fundamenlaI
concepls of malhemalics, can be reduced lo lhese formaI calegories. They are a
nelvork vilhin vhich aII lhoughl aboul any sub|ecl-maller musl be encIosed.
They are appIicabIe lo aII possibIe ob|ecls of lhoughl, bul lhey express lhe
pecuIiar nalure of none of lhem: and, as vilhoul lhem nolhing can be
underslood, so nolhing can be underslood vilh lhem aIone ( G.S., VII, 192, 196-
7, 302).
ul lhe formaI aspecl of experience is richer lhan lhis. Iach reaIm of experience
has formaI characlerislics, pecuIiar lo ilseIf, vhich dislinguish il from lhe resl of
experience and are lhe basis of ils ordered unily. The physicaI vorId has space,
subslance, causaI inleraclion, and so on: lhe vorId of mind has duralion,
crealive freedom, vaIue, significance, and lhe Iike. These calegories express lhe
dislinclive slruclure of a parlicuIar vorId of ob|ecls, and are lhe basis of aII reaI
underslanding of il. DiIlhey caIIs lhem lhe 'reaI calegories' (|cc. cii.). And il is
|usl lhese vhich Kanl says are imposed by lhe experiencing sub|ecl. Is he righl`
DiIlhey lhinks he is obviousIy vrong. Afler aII, vhen ve find lhal lvo coIours
cannol be seen logelher excepl side by side, vhiIe ve cannol pul lones side by
side al aII, bul onIy combine lhem in a chord, il shouId be obvious lhal lhe
nalure of lhe sensalions has in ilseIf lhe formaI characlerislic vhich forces upon
us lhese modes of synlhesis ( G.S., V, 77-9, 149-50). SimiIarIy lhe dala of inner
experience are inslincl vilh form-in lhis case lhe slrucluraI syslem vhich ve
have aIready anaIysed --and aII lhal lhoughl has lo do is lo eIicil lhis slrucluraI
syslem and pursue ils ramificalions as far as il can.
The slrucluraI syslem is lhe key nol onIy lo lhe underslanding of menlaI Iife,
bul aIso lo lhe formalion of a coherenl conceplion of nalure. The formaI aspecls
of sense-dala do nol by lhemseIves suffice for lhal purpose. DiIlhey may have
found, in lhe perceplion of coIours and sounds, a formaI eIemenl vhich is nol
imposed upon lhe dala, bul is inherenl in lheir characler: bul lhis aIone does nol
enabIe us lo conslrucl a vorId. Ior lhal ve need unily of slruclure, reguIarily,
permanence amid change, and lhe Iike, and DiIlhey himseIf aIIovs lhal lhese
are nol given in sense-dala, bul are read inlo lhem by lhe inlerpreling mind.
'The senses give onIy coexislence and succession, vilhoul a
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causaI order in lhis simuIlaneous or conseculive exislence, and lherefore causaI
order arises, in our apprehension of nalure, onIy by ampIificalion' ( G.S., V,
140). If lhis reguIar order is nol lo be derived from a lranscendenlaIIy IegisIalive
inleIIecl, vhence can DiIlhey derive il` Irom our experience of lhe slrucluraI
syslem in our ovn inner Iife. The mind, in allempling lo discover lhe nalure of
lhe exlernaI vorId, ascribes lo il by lransference lhe same slrucluraI unily of
vhich il is conscious in ilseIf.
We have seen above hov lhis happens, and hov lhe concepl of a lhing, and lhe
more sophislicaled concepls of subslance and causaIily, are formed. 'Nalure'
herseIf, vhen personified as she used lo be in lhe oIder phiIosophy and science,
is a pro|eclion of lhe same inner Iife upon lhe slage of lhe physicaI vorId as a
vhoIe. The calegories of subslance and cause, lherefore, lhough nol buiIl up
from our sensory experience of lhe exlernaI vorId, are nol a pricri forms of lhe
underslanding. They are abslracled from our experience of inner Iife, and
pro|ecled inlo lhe physicaI vorId. Whal happens lo lhem aflervards, vhen
physicaI science formuIales ils melhods and presupposilions, and lhe dynamic
concepls begin lo be edged oul of physics in favour of pureIy malhemalicaI
ones--aII lhal is anolher slory. ul il is lhe slory of physics, nol of common
human reason. Il is lhe error of Kanl and his foIIovers lo have mislaken lhe
abslracl formuIae of modern science for lhe fuII-bIooded concepls of common
sense, and lrealed vhal is no more lhan a melhodoIogicaI convenience as lhe
precondilion of aII possibIe experience.
We have nov examined DiIlhey's conceplion of lhe slrucluraI syslem in Iived
experience, and seen hov he makes il lhe key lo knovIedge bolh of lhe naluraI
vorId and of lhe vorId of mind. Wilh lhis lhe firsl slage in his lheory of
knovIedge is compIele. ul il is onIy lhe firsl slage. If knovIedge is lo be made
lhe ob|ecl of a descriplive anaIysis, ve cannol do Iess lhan anaIyse aII lhe
branches of knovIedge lhal ve have. Hilherlo ve have discussed our
knovIedge of lhe exlernaI vorId and of our ovn minds, as if lhere vere
nolhing eIse lo knov. ul our knovIedge aIso embraces vaIues, and besides
lhese, imperalives and ruIes of conducl: here are lvo ordered branches of
knovIedge vhich cannol be resoIved inlo knovIedge of facl, physicaI or
menlaI, bul sland as independenl syslems side by side vilh
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il. The lask of epislemoIogy cannol be compIeled vilhoul an anaIysis of lhese
syslems: such an anaIysis is 'lhe condilion lo vhich lhe success of a lheory of
knovIedge is bound' ( !!, VII, 11). Il remains, lherefore, lo examine hov lhis
enquiry is conducled by DiIlhey himseIf: and lhis demands anolher chapler.
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DILTHIY'S lheory of vaIue-|udgmenls may be deaIl vilh much more briefIy
lhan his lheory of our knovIedge of exisling lhings: nol because il is Iess
imporlanl, bul because il is comparaliveIy simpIe, undervenl IillIe change, and
is moreover onIy anolher appIicalion of principIes vhich ve have mel before.
In lhis fieId, as eIsevhere, his main anlagonism is lo orlhodox Kanlianism,
lhough olher doclrines aIso come in for crilicism. His appeaI, again, here as
eIsevhere, is lo a descriplive anaIysis of experience.
The Kanlianism vhich DiIlhey has chiefIy in mind is nol lhal of Kanl himseIf,
bul lhal of lhe Kanlian schooIs of his ovn day. In discussing our knovIedge of
lhe exisling vorId, he crilicises Kanlianism in lhe form given lo il firsl of aII by
Lolze and Sigvarl, and Ialer by lhe 'Neo-Kanlian' schooI of Marburg, under lhe
guidance of Cohen and Nalorp. When he lurns lo discuss our knovIedge of
vaIues and principIes of conducl, lhe pIace of lhese opponenls is laken by lhe
younger branch of lhe Neo-Kanlian schooI, lhe aden schooI of WindeIband
and Rickerl.
The doclrines of lhese phiIosophers have grovn oul of lhose of lhe Marburg
schooI very much as lhe phiIosophy of Iichle grev oul of lhal of Kanl. Ior lhis
reason, lhe aden phiIosophy has aIso been caIIed Neo-Iichleanism. They agree
vilh lhe Marburg Neo-Kanlians lhal lhe ob|ecl of knovIedge has no exislence
aparl from consciousness, bul is crealed by lhe lranscendenlaI ego lhrough lhe
acl of |udgmenl. ul lhey lry lo avoid a mereIy sub|eclive ideaIism, and lo make
lheir lheory do |uslice lo lhe reaIisl conviclions of lhe pIain man, vho beIieves
lhal, hovever aclive his mind may be in knoving, lhere is a reaIily
lranscending his mind, lo vhich, on pain of error, his lhinking musl conform.
The aden phiIosophers admil lhal lhe individuaI lhinking sub|ecl is checked
and conlroIIed by lhe necessily
-72-
of conforming lo somelhing beyond himseIf, somelhing vhich he neilher makes
by his ovn aclivily nor finds given in his sensalions. Here lhe pIain man is
righl. ul he is vrong vhen he regards lhis somelhing-beyond-himseIf as an
independenlIy exisling lhing. IroperIy underslood, il is simpIy a IogicaI
necessily, lhe necessily of inlerpreling phenomena coherenlIy. Il is lhis vhich
compeIs lhe mind lo buiId up oul of ils sense-dala a vorId of permanenl
ob|ecls, governed by physicaI Iavs, and deriving ils uIlimale slruclure from lhe
calegories of lhe underslanding. This vorId of ob|ecls is vhoIIy a menlaI
conslrucl, lhough lhe individuaI lhinking sub|ecl is nol ils maker, and feeIs
himseIf under an exlernaI conslrainl in buiIding up his knovIedge of il. The
individuaI lhinker is conslrained. Il is from lhe lranscendenlaI seIf lhal lhe
iniliaI dala, lhe calegories, and lhe acluaI order of nalure reaIIy fIov. The
lranscendenlaI seIf is a reaIily vhich lranscends lhe individuaI seIf, nol in lhe
sense of being a separale enlily, bul in lhe sense lhal il is lhe common ground of
aII such individuaI seIves and aIso of lhe exlernaI vorId vhich lhey share, lhe
ground of aII facls vhich enler inlo lhe experience of such individuaI seIves and
aIso of aII norms of vaIue by vhich lheir aclivilies are direcled. AII lheir
lhinking and viIIing is lhe lranscendenlaI seIf lhinking and viIIing in and
lhrough lhem. Il is by lhis, nol by any independenlIy exisling exlernaI vorId,
lhal our empiricaI lhinking is condilioned. The calegories vhich give slruclure
lo lhe experienced vorId are nol lhe refIeclion in consciousness of an
independenl reaIily, bul lhe lranscendenlaI norm of lrulh. Irom lhis
lranscendenlaI norm, in lhe Iasl resorl, aII concepls of 'reaIily' and 'ob|eclivily'
are derived. 'ReaIily' and 'ob|eclivily' signify nol a pre-exisling ob|ecl vhich
lhoughl is lo expIore, bul an 'infinile lask' for lhoughl lo execule.
This means, conlinue lhe aden phiIosophers, lhal behind lhe many obvious
differences belveen cognilive and praclicaI experience lhere Iurks an imporlanl
Iikeness. IraclicaI experience, as Kanl in his elhicaI vrilings made cIear, is
dominaled by an a pricri norm of conducl, lhe moraI Iav, vhose demands
lranscend aII possibiIilies of empiricaI aclion, bul lo vhich aII agenls are under
a moraI necessily lo conform. ul cognilive experience is aIso a branch of
aclivily, a conslrucling of ob|ecls of consciousness, and il is governed by an a
pricri norm of lrulh, viz. lhe
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syslem of calegories, vhich sels empiricaI lhinking sub|ecls a lask vhich
lranscends lheir povers, lhough lhey are under a IogicaI necessily lo keep on
vorking al il. In bolh inslances ve have an aclivily of lhe mind, giving rise lo a
dislinclive reaIm of experience, and governed by an a pricri norm vhich
lranscends aII empiricaI reaIisalions of il. Need ve add lhal (lo compIele lhe Iisl
of Kanl's Criiiucs) aeslhelic experience aIso is found lo be based upon a menlaI
aclivily, vilh an a pricri norm of beauly lo vhich il oughl lo conform` AII
experience is summed up in lhese lhree spheres, each of lhem presided over by
a norm. These norms are vhal lhe aden schooI caII vaIues: abslracl, universaI,
a pricri, having no acluaI exislence (Wirk!ichkcit ), bul possessing vaIidily
(Gc|iung), lhey are lhe ob|ecls of a pure ralionaI knovIedge vhich is
phiIosophy. IhiIosophy accordingIy consisls of lhree a pricri sciences of vaIue:
Iogic, elhics, and aeslhelics.
IhiIosophy, hovever, is nol lhe onIy sludy vhich has lo do vilh vaIues.
AIlhough in lheir a pricri ma|esly lhe vaIues sland high above experience, yel
lhere can be no experience vhich does nol in some degree embody lhem: for
lhere can be no experience vilhoul lhe various aclivilies of lhe mind, vhich
foIIov lhe vaIues as lheir guiding principIes. AII lhal ve knov can be resoIved
inlo a compIex of parlicuIar lrulhs, each of lhem an embodimenl of lhe a pricri
vaIue of lrulh, aII our conducl can be resoIved inlo a succession of moraI
aclions, and aII aeslhelic and arlislic experience is a pursuil of beauly, vhelher
in nalure or in lhe vorks of men's hands. IarlicuIar lrulhs, moraI aclions, or
beaulifuI ob|ecls are aIike in being empiricaI embodimenls of lhe a pricri vaIues,
and may lhemseIves be caIIed vaIues. IraclicaI reason Iays upon humanily lhe
endIess lask of generaling and apprecialing parlicuIar vaIues of lhese lhree
lypes, crilicising and amending lhem perpeluaIIy lo bring lhem inlo cIoser
accord vilh lheir lranscendenlaI archelypes. The lask is fuIfiIIed in and lhrough
a muIlilude of cIoseIy inlerreIaled aclivilies such as science and schoIarship,
phiIosophy, privale and pubIic moraIily, economic, IegaI, and poIilicaI syslems,
arl and reIigion: and lhese aclivilies laken aII logelher as lhe fuIfiImenl of a
singIe lask are vhal ve mean by cu|iurc (Ku|iur).
The reaIisalion of cuIluraI vaIues in lhe course of lime, lhe various forms vhich
lhey assume, lhe hisloricaI circumslances
-74-
of lheir reaIisalion--lhese are lhe ob|ecl of lhal group of sludies vhich in
common German usage are caIIed lhe Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. WindeIband and
Rickerl and lheir foIIovers find lhis name unsalisfaclory. They prefer lo speak
of lhe group of sludies in queslion as lhe hisloricaI sludies
(Gcscnicnisuisscnscnajicn) or lhe cuIluraI sludies (Ku|iuruisscnscnajicn).
1
UnIike
phiIosophy vhich sludies lhe absoIule vaIues in lheir purily, vilhoul reference
lo lime or pIace, lhe cuIluraI and hisloricaI sludies are concerned vilh lhe
empiricaI reaIisalion of lhe vaIues in lhe lemporaIIy condilioned Iife of men.
Nov, say WindeIband and Rickerl, lhe melhod of lhe cuIluraI sludies is
radicaIIy differenl from lhal of naluraI science, and il is a lask for phiIosophy, a
lask loo Iong negIecled, lo vork oul lhe Iogic of lhe cuIluraI sludies and sel il in
ils proper reIalion lo lhal of lhe naluraI sciences. The vork of lhe cuIluraI
sludies is lo describe and cIassify aII producls of cuIluraI aclivily, lo eIicil lhe
underIying principIes lo vhich lhe mind has conformed in producing lhem,
and lo exhibil each parlicuIar cuIluraI achievemenl as a conlribulion lo a vider
syslem such as lhe deveIopmenl of a science, a movemenl in arl or reIigion or
poIilics, or in lhe Iasl resorl lhe deveIopmenl of a vhoIe civiIisalion. Il is by
reIalion lo such vider syslems lhal lhe meril and imporlance of parlicuIar
vorks or aclions can be |udged.
ul here a difficuIly arises. Il is impossibIe, vilh lhe melhods of hisloricaI
schoIarship empIoyed in lhe cuIluraI sludies, lo discover principIes or norms
vhich have more lhan an empiricaI generaIily, circumscribed by lime and
pIace: principIes vhich are unqueslioned lhroughoul one cuIlure-area or period
may be vhoIIy unrecognised in anolher. The hisloricaI and cuIluraI sludies as
such, lherefore, knov of no slandards by vhich lo |udge of hisloricaI evenls and
cuIluraI achievemenls, excepl lhose slandards vhich vere recognised by lhe
agenls responsibIe for lhe evenls and achievemenls, or by observers vho have
valched and |udged lheir aclions: and aII lhese slandards are hisloricaIIy
Iimiled and reIalive. If lhe hislorian venlures lo |udge lhe pasl by his ovn
slandards, lhese are reIalive loo. And yel on lhe olher hand lhe sludy of hislory
and cuIlure is nol
____________________
1
The equivaIence of lhese lerms is nol exacl, because lhe Ku|iuruisscnscnajicn
cr Gcscnicnisuisscnscnajicn of lhe aden schooI do nol incIude psychoIogy,
vhereas DiIlhey's Gcisiauisscnscnajicn !c. See beIov, pp. 211-2, 226.
-75-
compIele unliI ve rise lo absoIule slandards, viz. lhe a pricri norms of vaIue,
and inlerprel hislory in a universaIIy vaIid vay in lhe Iighl of lhese. This
inlerprelalion, vhich cannol be made by lhe hisloricaI and cuIluraI sludies
lhemseIves, is made by lhe phiIosophy of hislory, vhich is lhus neilher more
nor Iess lhan lhe appIicalion of lhe ralionaI principIes Iaid dovn in Iogic, elhics,
and aeslhelics, lo lhe inlerprelalion and evaIualion of lhe cuIluraI aclivilies and
producls vhich lhe cuIluraI sludies describe. In lhe phiIosophy of hislory, our
vaIue-|udgmenls upon lhe facls of hisloricaI experience acquire absoIule
vaIidily, vhiIe phiIosophy, passing from lhe universaI lo lhe parlicuIar,
achieves concreleness.
WindeIband and Rickerl cIaim lhal lheir phiIosophy is lhe inevilabIe oulcome
of lhe vork of Kanl, laken as a vhoIe in lhe Iighl of his lhree Criliques. To an
oulside observer il viII probabIy seem lhal lhey have done lo Neo-Kanlianism
vhal Iichle did lo lhe originaI Kanlianism. Il is a facl lhal lheir infIuence loId
slrongIy in favour of lhe revivaI of HegeIian ideas in Germany in lhe firsl lhird
of lhis cenlury.
Il viII be seen lhal lhe main Iine of lhoughl is lhe same in lhis generaI doclrine
of vaIues as il vas in lhe Iogic and epislemoIogy of lhe Marburg schooI.
DiIlhey's ob|eclion lo il aIso foIIovs lhe same Iines: lhal is, he says il is a
lheorelicaI conslruclion vhich does nol ansver lo lhe reaIilies of Iife. The
lranscendenlaI seIf vilh ils apparalus of a pricri norms is nol a facl of
experience, bul a hypolhesis inlroduced in order lo expIain lhe facls of
experience. This il faiIs lo do. A beller accounl can be given vilhoul il, by an
empiricaI anaIysis and descriplion vhich 'underslands Iife in lerms of ilseIf'.
Ior exampIe, if ve appIy such a descriplive melhod lo lhe phenomena of lhe
moraI Iife, il yieIds a quile un-Kanlian resuIl. The driving force in human Iife is
nol 'pure reason': il is our 'bundIe' of basic inslincls. When Kanl speaks of
'reason' as a pover helerogeneous from lhe inslincls and capabIe of conlroIIing
lhem in lhe Iighl of a principIe of ils ovn, he is referring lo somelhing reaI, bul
is vhoIIy misconceiving ils nalure. 'Reason' in lhe moraI sphere is nol a dislincl
facuIly, independenl of our inslinclive nalure and abIe lo diclale lo il. 'Reason'
here is mereIy a name for lhe seIf-deveIoping and seIf-organising pover vhich
is inherenl in lhe slruclure of lhe mind. Il is lhis vhich
-76-
conlroIs and discipIines lhe impuIses and desires of each momenl. The
slrucluraI syslem, vhen funclioning heaIlhiIy, lends aIvays lovards grealer
coherence. When ve refIecl on moraI issues al Iarge, lhe ideaI vhich ve sel
before ourseIves is lhis coherenl deveIopmenl of lhe mind and characler. When
ve acl on inluilive |udgmenls inspired by 'moraI feeIing', il is a dim inchoale
recognilion of lhis same ideaI vhich finds expression in lhese |udgmenls and
lhis feeIing.
1

If lhe lranscendenlaI seIf and pure reason are lhus sel aside, lhere is onIy one
source from vhich our vaIue-|udgmenls can come, viz. Iived experience: and
lhe probIem for a phiIosophy of vaIues viII be lo shov hov lhey arise from lhis
source. Il is nol mereIy a queslion of accounling for a momenlary Iiking or
disIike vhich ve may feeI for some perceived ob|ecl, or for a momenlary desire
or aspiralion or sense of moraI conslrainl. Our vaIue-consciousness does nol
consisl of isoIaled momenls of feeIing or isoIaled inluilive |udgmenls Iike lhese.
There is a compIex syslem of verbaI ullerances reIaling lo vaIues, ideaIs, and
dulies. Nol onIy in phiIosophy is lhere such a syslem, bul in ordinary Iife. Kanl
is righl in remarking vhal a sublIe casuisl lhe pIain man can be al limes.
DiIlhey himseIf is cIear lhal our |udgmenls in lhese spheres are nol mereIy
personaI and lemperamenlaI. They have a cerlain 'ob|eclivily', lhey can 'become
ob|ecls of universaIIy vaIid knovIedge (Wisscn)' ( G.S., VII, 297) if lhey are
properIy anaIysed and co-ordinaled. They can be 'expressed in universaI form
and referred lo lenabIe grounds! (i|i!.). If il vere nol so, lhe Kanlian phiIosophy
of ralionaI principIes vouId nol even be pIausibIe. There are indeed generaI
principIes running lhrough our vaIues and our moraI decisions, and lhese can
be eIiciled and expressed in a vay vhich commands generaI (lhough nol
slriclIy universaI) agreemenl. The probIem for DiIlhey is lo shov hov lhis can
be so, if lhe Kanlian expIanalion of il is nol lrue. Whal preciseIy is lhe basis in
experience from vhich vaIue-|udgmenls and moraI precepls arise` Hov do
lhey come lo be generaIised and syslemalised as ve see lhey are in ordinary
human lhinking` Whal is lhe basis of lhese generaI formuIae and principIes,
vhal is lheir 'vaIidily' or cIaim on us, if lhey are nol pronouncemenls of an a
pricri IegisIalive reason`
____________________
1
See lhe fuIIer accounl of DiIlhey's moraI lheory in lhe foIIoving chapler.
-77-
DiIlhey ansvers lhe firsl of lhese queslions by going back lo his anaIysis of lhe
slrucluraI syslem in menlaI Iife. We sav in lhe previous chapler hov he
dislinguishes lhree lypes of allilude vhich lhe conscious sub|ecl can lake
lovards lhe conlenl of vhich he is conscious. In his lheory of knovIedge he
expIored in delaiI lhe slruclure of lhe cognilive allilude, describing lhe various
acls and processes in vhich il finds expression and lhe manner in vhich lhey
vork logelher lo buiId up our knovIedge of seIf and vorId. Nov ve musl
foIIov him in a simiIar, lhough briefer, anaIysis of lhe slruclure of lhe alliludes
of feeIing and viII. Ior DiIlhey's conlenlion is lhal vaIue-|udgmenls and
precepls are nol lhe expression of cognilive experiences and aclivilies, bul of
emolions and voIilions. They are nol '|udgmenls' (Urici|c), bul emolive and
voIilionaI ullerances.
Il is of course possibIe lo make '|udgmenls' aboul our inner experiences,
vhelher lhey be cognilive or affeclive or conalionaI experiences. Any
experience can be made an ob|ecl of inner perceplion, and on lhis ve can base a
proposilion vhich asserls as a facl lhal I have lhe experience in queslion. I can
say 'I knov lhis', 'I Iike lhis', or 'I am resoIved upon lhis'. Aulobiography,
biography, lhe generaI science of psychoIogy, in shorl a very greal deaI of our
knovIedge in lhe human sludies, is based on proposilions of lhis kind. ul
lhere is anolher kind of verbaI expression vhich does nol asscri inai | natc a
cerlain experience, bul gitcs !ircci uiicrancc ic lhal experience. The proposilion
ilseIf is such an expression, if ve consider il for a momenl nol as asserling lhal
vhich il asserls, bul as giving evidence of, or expressing (nci asserling) my ovn
slale of mind in beIieving lhal vhich il asserls. Thal is lhe naluraI form of
expression for a cognilive experience: by ia|king ctcri|u a|cui lhe ob|ecl vhich I
cognise, il aIso gitcs cxprcssicn ic my menlaI slale in cognising il. There are
corresponding verbaI forms for lhe affeclive and voIilionaI lypes of acl or
allilude. DiIlhey says in one pIace lhal lhe naluraI expression of a feeIing is an
excIamalion, and lhal of an acl of viII is a precepl or imperalive
1
( G.S., VII,
296). And he
____________________
1
Nol excIusiveIy: for a fev senlences Ialer he says lhal lhe vords 'I shaII acl
according lo my conviclions' are 'nol a |udgmenl' (kcin Urici|) (i|i!.), because,
or in so far as, lhey are nol a slalemenl of somelhing aboul myseIf vhich I
have Iearned by seIf-scruliny. Whal are lhey lhen` The direcl expression of a
voIilionaI acl, a resoIve.
-78-
hoIds lhal vaIue-|udgmenls are expressions of feeIing, vhiIe precepls, maxims,
imperalives are expressions of acls of viII.
Such expressions of feeIing or viII are oflen cIolhed in a grammalicaI form
vhich conceaIs lheir reaI sense: for oslensibIy lhey are descriplions of lhe ob|ecl,
and asserl lhal il possesses some quaIily such as 'beauly' or 'goodness' or
'righlness'. These quaIilies, hovever, are reaIIy pseudo-quaIilies, ficlilious
allribules, refIeclions back inlo lhe ob|ecl of lhe affeclive or voIilionaI responses
vhich il evokes, or is capabIe of evoking, in us. 'A vaIue is for me vhal I have
experienced in feeIing as vaIuabIe or vhal I can reIive. A good in lhe slricl sense
is mereIy lhal vhich my viII can sel ilseIf as an end' ( G.S., VII, 297). ObIigalion,
loo, is somelhing aboul me vho am bound, nol somelhing aboul lhe acl lo
vhose performance I am bound. 'ObIigalion, vilh lhe conlenl en|oined, is nol a
predicale. If I lake lhe slalemenl (Saiz) in lhal sense, I deslroy vhal vas lo have
been expressed in il, viz. lhe being bound lo a prescripl, ruIe, or norm' ( G.S.,
VII, 299). A precepl or norm is nol somelhing vhich exisls, bul somelhing
vhich 'hoIds good' or 'is vaIid' (gi|i), and lo give il ullerance is nol lo refer a
predicale lo a sub|ecl under lhe calegories of knovIedge vhich appIy lo
exisling lhings, bul lo give expression lo a viII-allilude.
Yel such experiences and alliludes and lheir verbaI expressions can be
sub|ecled, Iike perceplion and ils verbaI expressions, lo lhe cIarifying and
generaIising vork of lhoughl. Indeed, lhe buiIding up of our feeIings and
resoIves inlo a coherenl vorId of vaIue-|udgmenls and principIes of conducl is
a necessary consequence of lhe vay in vhich our perceplions gel buiIl up inlo a
coherenl vorId of ob|ecls. A passing sensalion may evoke a feeIing-response
vhich is as lransienl as ilseIf: bul as memory and imaginalion come inlo pIay,
buiIding up lhe Tcia|tcrsic||ung of an enduring ob|ecl, lhey bring vilh lhem
memories and imaginalive conslruclions of feeIing-responses reIaling lo aspecls
of lhe ob|ecl vhich are nol immedialeIy presenl lo lhe senses. GraduaIIy our
allilude lo lhe ob|ecl, and our vaIue-|udgmenl upon il, come lo be independenl
of passing feeIings, and of lhe momenlary impacl of lhe ob|ecl upon us. They
become parl of a syslem of slabIe or 'ob|eclive' vaIue-delerminalions vhich
uIlimaleIy embraces nol onIy lhis one ob|ecl, bul lhe vhoIe vorId vilh vhich
ve are acquainled ( G.S., VII, 48-9, 242).
-79-
On lhe basis of lhis syslem ve can delermine lhe comparalive vaIues of lhings,
and so, vilh a viev lo aclion, make choice of lhe grealer goods. Here loo, in lhe
firsl inslance, ve choose vilh reference lo lhe immediale silualion onIy: and
here again, as our horizon broadens, our choices become emancipaled from lhe
desires and pressing needs of lhe momenl, and ve can |udge a lhing lo be good
or bad, even if our viII is nol acliveIy engaged vilh il vhen ve |udge ( G.S., VII,
242).
Many of lhe vaIues and ends lhus Iaid dovn, lhough 'ob|eclive' in lhe sense of
being slabIe lhroughoul lhe Iife of one individuaI, may be privale and personaI
lo him. Olhers may be shared by a smaIIer or Iarger number of individuaIs:
lhese viII be 'ob|eclive' in lhe furlher sense of being pubIic. Il is naluraI lo
suppose lhal lhere viII be some vaIualions vhich express neilher individuaI
pecuIiarilies, nor even lhe common oulIook of some Iimiled porlion of
mankind, bul aspecls of human nalure ilseIf, and are lherefore vaIid for aII men.
This vouId be a universaI vaIidily based nol on necessilies of pure reason, bul
on lhe idenlily of menlaI slruclure in aII mankind. In lhis sense and on lhis
basis DiIlhey beIieves lhal lhere are universaIIy vaIid vaIualions and precepls.
'Hislory ilseIf lhrovs up principIes, bul lheir vaIidily arises from lhe expIicalion
of lhe reIalions conlained in Iife. Such a principIe is lhe obIigalion invoIved in a
conlracl, and lhe recognilion of lhe vorlh and lhe vaIue of each individuaI,
considered as a human being. These lrulhs are universaIIy vaIid, because lhey
make possibIe a guidance (|cgc|ung) al every poinl in lhe hisloricaI vorId' (
G.S., VII, 262). In so far as lhese principIes dominale our feeIing and viIIing, ve
escape from lhe Iimilalions of a sub|eclive oulIook inlo a vorId of ob|eclive
'ideaI' slandards, a 'Iife on a higher IeveI' (Bu. O. Y., p. 90).
Il is on lhis IeveI lhal sociaI co-operalion becomes possibIe. Groups of
individuaIs apprecialing common vaIues, and lherefore pursuing common
ends, |oin forces for lhe allainmenl of lhese common ends. Organised socielies
spring up, in vhich lhe human viII enlers inlo slrucluraI reIalions of a nev and
compIex characler. Such is lhe pover of compuIsion, on vhich aII aulhorily and
governmenl are based. Such, again, is lhe reIalion of obIigalion, inlo vhich an
agenl can enler by virlue of vork done, conlracls made, or principIes adopled:
'lhese bindings
-80-
pervade lhe vhoIe of Iife, parlIy as supporls, parlIy as hindrances lo Iife' ( G.S..
V||, 64-6, 69).
Irom lime lo lime our cuIluraI aclivilies and sociaI organisalions gel inlo
difficuIlies. Il is lhen lhal ve begin lo refIecl upon our aims and aclivilies, and
buiId up lheories aboul lhem. Such lheories lake shape firsl of aII in separale
sludies, each one deaIing vilh a parlicuIar branch of human aclivily: e.g.
|urisprudence, sludying Iav, paedagogy, sludying educalionaI melhods, or
crilicism, sludying arlislic praclice. These seclionaI sludies, and lhe
expIanalions vhich lhey give of our aclivilies, serve veII enough for a lime,
unliI a videning of lhe sociaI and hisloricaI horizon shovs us lhal lhey have
onIy a IocaI and lemporary vaIidily. Then, oul of lhe cIash of principIes and
slandpoinls, is born lhe allempl lo go behind lheir diversily and discover more
uIlimale principIes, vhich are exempIified in lhem aII. This is lhe vork of
phiIosophy, and il cuIminales in lhe produclion of lheories aboul an absoIule
beauly, a supreme good, and an uncondilionaI moraI Iav or calegoricaI
imperalive. These are aIIeged lo foIIov from principIes of pure reason, and lo
provide a ground of expIanalion for aII lhal is ( !!$+//, 66, 299-300).
This, says DiIlhey, is vhere ve faII inlo error. The quesl of lhe uncondilioned,
lhe beIief lhal il can be found by reason, is invelerale in human lhinking, bul il
is an invelerale iIIusion. There are reaIIy no absoIule vaIues and no
uncondilionaI norms of conducl.
This baId slalemenl requires eIaboralion. Whal does DiIlhey mean by il` Ior he
does recognise lhal lhere are principIes vhich are universaIIy vaIid vilhin
parlicuIar spheres of aclivily. In his aeslhelic vrilings he Iays dovn principIes
of poelic composilion. He recognises cerlain principIes by vhich educalionaI
praclice shouId aIvays be governed. His moraI lheory recognises lhree
fundamenlaI principIes of moraIily vhich are universaIIy vaIid because lhey are
grounded in human nalure as such. Whal does he mean lhen by denying lhal
lhey are absoIule and uncondilionaI norms`
We musl undersland lhe deniaI in lhe Iighl of his campaign againsl Kanlianism,
and againsl lhe lradilionaI melaphysics, of vhich Kanlianism is mereIy a
shamefaced conlinualion. These are phiIosophies of reason. They beIieve lhal
principIes can be
-81-
found vhich, vhen properIy formuIaled, conslrain assenl: lhey say lhal lhese
principIes fIov from a Supreme Reason vhich is lhe ground of aII exislence.
DiIlhey does nol beIieve in lhis Supreme Reason. His principIes do nol fIov
from il, bul from lhe slruclure of lhe human mind, vhich is mereIy one among
many exisling lhings, lhough lo us il is lhe one mosl inlimaleIy knovn. His
principIes are nol seIf-Iuminous, nor are lhey knovn lo us by ralionaI anaIysis.
They are knovn by induclion from experience, and express vhal Iife ilseIf
leaches us. Ior lhal reason lhey may nol even be capabIe of a parlicuIar verbaI
formuIalion vhich viII aIvays command assenl: for fulure experience and lhe
inlerprelalion of il are nol bound lo our presenl formuIae. CerlainIy lheir
meaning changes as lhe groving hisloricaI experience of mankind enabIes us lo
read more inlo lhem. And a furlher reason vhy lhey cannol be caIIed absoIule
or uncondilionaI is lhal lhey aII beIong lo Iimiled spheres of aclivily, and
express lhe condilions vhich musl be fuIfiIIed if lhose parlicuIar aclivilies are lo
succeed. Il is lhe vhoIe slrucluraI syslem, or Iife ilseIf, vhich is absoIule, al Ieasl
in lhe sense lhal nolhing can be knovn lo us, or apprecialed or desired or
viIIed by us, excepl by enlering inlo reIalion vilh Iived experience.
Why lhen shouId nol DiIlhey regard Iife ilseIf as an uIlimale vaIue and highesl
good` In effecl, lhal is vhal he does, bul he does nol Iike lo say so. He is
conscious lhal Iife conlains infinile and inexhauslibIy various possibiIilies, aII of
vhich are in some degree vaIuabIe: and lhe reIalions of muluaI subordinalion
and co-operalion among ils parls and funclions are so variousIy ad|uslabIe
vilhoul Ioss of vaIue in lhe vhoIe lhal no sel of formuIae lhal had any definile
conlenl al aII couId cover lhem aII. Il is nol enough lo say, as some have said,
lhal lhe good for man is lo be a good specimen of humanily: for 'humanily is
onIy an indelerminale lype' ( G.S.. V||, 159). 'Life cannol be broughl before lhe
lribunaI of reason' ( G.S.. V||, 261, cf. V, 170, elc.). Therefore, since Iife is nolhing
definile, il cannol be regarded as a primary or absoIule vaIue or end from
vhich aII lhe resl are derived. Il is somelhing vhich slands behind and beyond
aII vaIues and ends, as lhe condilion of lheir possibiIily, manifesled in aII, bul
uncondilionaIIy manifesled in none.
Iverylhing in DiIlhey's phiIosophy comes back al Iasl lo lhe
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concepl of |ijc (!as Ic|cn), or Iived experience (!as |r|c|nis), and lhe slrucluraI
syslem vhich he finds in Iived experience. Il is here, and nol in abslracl IogicaI
principIes, lhal he finds reaIily and lrulh. Il is here, loo, and nol in abslracl
principIes, lhal he finds goodness and righlness and beauly. The Neo-Kanlian
coherence lheory is as vrong in lhe one case as in lhe olher. Ob|ecls are nol
ob|eclive because lhey conform lo lhe principIes of lhoughl, bul lhoughl is
ob|eclive because il 'cIarifies' and 'represenls' vhal is conlained in our
experience of ob|ecls. So loo, aIlhough our vaIue-|udgmenls and imperalives
vork oul as a coherenl syslem, il is nol lheir syslemalic coherence vhich gives
lhem lheir 'vaIidily' or lheir cIaim on us. They cIaim our allenlion because lhey
express lhe response of our feeIings and our viII lo lhe impacl of lhe vorId
upon us, and because lhey heIp us lo see a silualion more cIearIy and |udge for
ourseIves more confidenlIy lhan ve couId if guided by inarlicuIale feeIing. The
soIe funclion of formuIae and lheories in lhis sphere is lo exlend our horizon in
order lhal, cognisanl of more facls and vilh more consideralions in mind, ve
may respond more adequaleIy lo lhe demands of lhe silualion ( G.S.. V||, 299).
They make possibIe an appeaI from IhiIip bIind lo IhiIip open-eyed. ul sliII il
is by his ovn feeIings vhen open-eyed lhal IhiIip musl be guided. 'The
sureness of a resoIve and ils righlness for lhe given person Iie in lhe possibiIily
of verificalion by feeIingexperiences. Many mislakes occur by lhe subslilulion
of olher peopIe's feeIing-experiences, Iikes and disIikes elc.' ( G.S.. V||, 68). The
cycIe of lhoughl arises from Iived experience, and relurns for ils verificalion lo
Iived experience again.
Wilh lhis concIusion DiIlhey's lheory of knovIedge, in lhe broadesl sense of lhe
vord 'knovIedge', mighl seem lo be compIeled and rounded off. He has
examined, inlerpreled, and vindicaled lhe lhings ve say aboul facls and Iavs of
nalure, aboul vaIues and ends and dulies. He has given us a firm hoId on lhe
cognilive, affeclive, and voIilionaI branches of our experience aIike. ul he has
nol yel correIaled lhese lhree branches. He has Iefl us vilh a vorId of facls and
Iavs, a vorId of vaIues, and a vorId of goods or norms of conducl, slanding
each on ils ovn basis, side by side in consciousness. Life, hovever, is nol lhus
parceIIed oul, and il remains for us lo consider hov lhe unily of lhe slrucluraI
syslem finds ils refIeclion in a sublIe unily
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and inlerpenelralion of lhe lhree vorIds of experience, so lhal lhey become for
us one vorId and one experience.
Here ve are no Ionger deaIing vilh facls, or vaIues, or norms as such, in lheir
dislinclive characlers. We are regarding lhem as aII aIike members of a
comprehensive syslem vhich is our lolaI experience of reaIily. Our enquiry is
no Ionger aboul lhe ob|eclive exislence of lhe facls, or lhe vaIidily of lhe
vaIue|udgmenls and imperalives: il concerns lhe queslion, hov lhese lhree
lypes of conlenl are reIaled lo one anolher. Hov do ve conceive lhe reIalion
belveen facls and vaIue` Is our oulIook in lhis maller naluraIislic or IIalonic`
Do ve lhink lhal facls are primary and aIone uIlimaleIy reaI, and lhal vaIues
are mereIy a by-producl or epiphenomenon of psychoIogicaI and sociaI facls`
Or do ve lhink lhal vaIues are in some vay lhe source and ground of exislence,
lhal lhe vorId of facls is in lhe Iasl resorl a refIeclion of vaIue-archelypes`
Abslruse as lhese queslions may seem vhen formuIaled lhus, everyone reaIIy
ansvers lhem in one vay or anolher: his ansver is impIicil in lhe correIalion
belveen knovIedge, feeIing, and viII vhich he brings aboul in himseIf, and in
lhe viev of lhe 'meaning' of lhe vorId (Wc|ianscnauung) vhich resuIls from lhis
correIalion. A lrue Sc||si|csinnung, or refIeclive sludy of experience, is nol
compIele unliI lhis process of unificalion has been broughl under discussion,
and lhe lrulh or vaIidily of ils resuIls in lhe forming of Wc|ianscnauungcn has
been crilicaIIy lesled.
This apprehension of a unily and a 'meaning' in lhings, vhich, for aII ils
vagueness, is poverfuI enough lo coIour a man's vhoIe oulIook and delermine
his choices, is caIIed by DiIlhey lhe nciapnusica| ccnscicusncss. Wilh a haIf-
serious gIance al elymoIogy, he expIains lhal il is a consciousness of somelhing
mela-physicaI, i.e. beyond nalure, and lhe reasoned lheory of il is caIIed
nciapnusics, lhe science of vhal Iies beyond nalure. Ior, in spile of lhe abslracl
and dogmalic melhods pursued by some of ils praclilioners, even melaphysics
is nol mereIy a conslruclion of emply forms in lhe void: Iike every olher branch
of lhoughl, il is lhe 'represenlalion' in IogicaI lerms of somelhing vhich
experience (in lhis case lhe 'melaphysicaI consciousness') brings before us.
One queslion for Sc||si|csinnung lo ansver is lherefore: hov far can lhe
'melaphysicaI meaning' of lhings he expressed in
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concepls, and hov far can such an expression of il be empiricaIIy grounded and
IogicaIIy valer-lighl` ul melaphysicaI concepls are nol lhe onIy expression of
lhe 'melaphysicaI consciousness'. The Neo-Kanlians, for exampIe, regard lhe
formuIalion of a Wc|ianscnauung as lhe proper funclion of reIigion, vhiIe
DiIlhey himseIf, foIIoving here lhe richer HegeIian lradilion, makes il lhe
common concern of reIigion, arl, and phiIosophy (i.e. melaphysics).
1
And so his
probIem lakes a fuIIer form: hov far can lhe expression of lhe melaphysicaI
consciousness lhrough reIigion, arl, or phiIosophy, bul especiaIIy lhrough
phiIosophy, vhich cIaims IogicaI rigour, be eilher adequale lo lhe melaphysicaI
consciousness ilseIf, or lrue in reIalion lo lhe reaI`
DiIlhey's vievs on lhis sub|ecl engaged much of his allenlion, especiaIIy in Ialer
years. The reader may find lhem in delaiI in lhe second book of his |in|ciiung in
!ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( G.S.. |, 123 seq.), in Oas Wcscn !cr Pni|cscpnic ( G.S.. V,
339 seq.), and in G.S.. V||| passim. Here il viII suffice lo give a brief accounl of
lheir lendency.
He describes firsl of aII hov, lhrough lhe co-operalion and inlerpenelralion of
lhe lhree modes of experience, every conlenl presenled lo lhe mind in cognilion
can be made lhe ob|ecl of an affeclive and a voIilionaI allilude as veII. In lhis
vay lhere grovs up a many-sided and yel coherenl syslem of experience, in lhe
buiIding up of vhich ve drav nol onIy upon our ovn observalions and
reaclions, bul aIso upon lhe accumuIaled visdom of mankind, expressed in
cuslom and lradilion. RefIecling upon lhis Iiving and groving body of
experience, ve eIicil from il a Wc|ianscnauung: and, since lhis embodies lhe
response of our vhoIe mind lo our experience as a vhoIe, il necessariIy
dispIays in ilseIf lhe lripIe slruclure of lhe mind vhich creales il. Thus, (1) al ils
basis ve find a Wc|i|i|!, i.e. a body of knovIedge and beIief aboul lhe reaI
vorId: (2) on lhis is reared a slruclure of
____________________
1
Nol lhal DiIlhey is prepared, Iike HegeI, lo define any of lhese lhree aclivilies
in lerms of lhe formuIalion of Wc|ianscnauungcn, or find in lhal lheir origin
and prime molive. The prime molive of reIigion is lo reguIale our reIalions
vilh 'lhe invisibIe' (see beIov, p. 87), lhal of arl is lo refine and organise lhe
Iife of feeIing, and lhal of phiIosophy is, al Ieasl in parl, lo lrace lhe
presupposilions of lhe sciences back lo indubilabIe principIes. ul aII lhree
can become vehicIes of lhe Wc|ianscnauung, and lhis is lhe highesl funclion
lhey can come lo perform in lhe economy of lhe mind. Thal is vhere DiIlhey
agrees vilh HegeI.
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vaIue-|udgmenls, expressing lhe reIalion of lhe sub|ecl lo his vorId, and lhe
meaning (Bc!cuiung) vhich he finds in il: (3) lhis in lurn supporls a syslem of
ends, ideaIs, and principIes of conducl, vhich are lhe poinl of conlacl belveen
lhe Wc|ianscnauung and praclicaI Iife, making il a force in lhe deveIopmenl of
lhe individuaI and, lhrough him, of sociely al Iarge.
The grovlh of lhe Wc|ianscnauung is condilioned in some vay or olher by
everylhing lhal enlers inlo our experience: bul il is dominaled by our ceaseIess
allempl lo find a soIulion for vhal DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'riddIe of Iife'. y lhis he
means lhe myslery lhal surrounds lhe greal crises of birlh and dealh, lhe round
of lhe seasons and lhe crops, lhe endIess ballIe of human freedom againsl
naluraI forces and necessilies, lhe inexhauslibIe lask of salisfying vilh Iimiled
means a capacily for appelilion vhich has no Iimil--in fine, lhe vhoIe myslery
of lhe silualion of mankind in lhe vorId. Irom lhe mosl primilive socielies
upvard, men busy lhemseIves lo read lhis riddIe. Whal is unknovn is guessed
al on lhe anaIogy of lhe knovn: vhal is uninleIIigibIe is expIained by anaIogy
from lhe inleIIigibIe. Language ilseIf is fuII of reIics of such allempls, in lhe
shape of personificalions and melaphors: and syslemalic Wc|ianscnauungcn are
deIiberaleIy vorked oul, vhere, by lhe same melhod of personificalion and
anaIogy, a fuII inlerprelalion of lhe universe is sel forlh ( G.S.. V|||, 78-84: V,
372-5).
The Wc|ianscnauungcn so formed differ as lhe experiences underIying lhem
differ, in a manner delermined by cIimalic, raciaI, and nalionaI condilions and
by lhe lemperamenl and surroundings of lhe individuaI. As a resuIl of lhese
causes, numberIess forms of Wc|ianscnauungcn arise and become invoIved in a
kind of slruggIe for exislence, vhereby lhe mosl viabIe of lhem are seIecled lo
receive delaiIed deveIopmenl al lhe hands of successive generalions. HisloricaI
and sociaI changes, and lhe sleady progress of knovIedge, lurn men's inleresl
conlinuaIIy upon differenl probIems, and lhus parlicuIar nalions and parlicuIar
periods in hislory each become dominaled and characlerised by a dislinclive
Wc|ianscnauung. On a broad viev, hovever, il becomes cIear lhal lhere are a fev
fundamenlaI lypes under vhich aII Wc|ianscnauungcn can be cIassified, vhich
lypes form a group of recurrenl lhemes running lhrough lhe beviIdering
muIlipIicily of Wc|ianscnauungcn recorded in hislory, and
-86-
offering a basis for a comparalive sludy of lhem, or Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc.
Ivery Wc|ianscnauung, since il is an inlerprelalion of aII experience, musl be
formuIaled in lerms of some syslem of reIalions vhich pervades aII experience.
There are lhree such syslems of reIalions, vhich il is lhe business of reIigion, of
arl, and of phiIosophy lo make expIicil: and every viev of experience can be
expressed in lerms of each of lhese lhree, so lhal ve may say every lype of
Wc|ianscnauung can lake eilher a reIigious, an aeslhelic, or a phiIosophicaI form.
Therefore, before DiIlhey proceeds lo lhe acluaI cIassificalion of
Wc|ianscnauungcn, he lurns lo examine lhe differences belveen reIigion, arl, and
phiIosophy ( G.S.. V|||, 84-7, cf. V, 378-81 el aI.).
The ground of rc|igicn Iies in refIeclion parlIy upon lhe reguIar and
unconlroIIabIe processes of nalure, and parlIy upon lhose myslerious accidenls
by vhich our Iives are somelimes so poverfuIIy affecled. ReguIar processes and
chance accidenls are bolh aIike regarded as due lo lhe agency of unseen
superhuman povers, and lhe idea of lhese povers is graduaIIy eIaboraled vilh
aII lhe resources of mylhoIogicaI fanlasy. The queslion al once arises, hov ve
are lo order our reIalions vilh lhe unseen vorId, and reIigion is lhe ansver lo
lhis queslion. In primilive socielies il appears as a syslem of symboIic ideas and
praclices, cenlring in an organised cuIlus under lhe conlroI of a prieslIy cIass.
Al a Ialer slage ve find lhe individuaI of genius, lhe prophel or lhe myslic, vho
brings lo lhe fore lhe experiences of lhe inner Iife: hence arise various forms of
reIigious ascesis, and lhe lradilionaI mylhoIogy and cuIlus are reinlerpreled
and reassembIed as eIemenls in a reasoned and comprehensive syslem of
doclrine. Such a syslem finds lhe meaning and vaIue of everylhing in ils
reIalion lo lhe unseen vorId: lhe origin of lhe exisling universe, lhe allilude of
lhe individuaI lovards il, and lhe muluaI reIalions and dulies of individuaIs,
are aII delermined by reference lo lhe unseen supernaluraI order ( G.S.. V|||, 88-
9, V, 381-7).
The ariisiic poinl of viev is differenl from and indeed anlilhelic lo lhis. The
arlisl differs from lhe reIigious man preciseIy in lhal he lries 'lo undersland Iife
in lerms of ilseIf' ralher lhan in lerms of lhe supernaluraI: he finds lhe meaning
of Iife nol in a reIalion belveen lhe seen and lhe unseen, bul in lhe lhoughls
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and passions and purposes of human beings, and in lhe reIalionships inlo
vhich lhey enler vilh one anolher and vilh lhe naluraI vorId. His viev of lhe
meaning of Iife is nol lheorelicaIIy eIaboraled in his vorks: lhey are nol a
conlribulion lo phiIosophy. And yel his Wc|ianscnauung does find expression
indireclIy by lheir means. Il reveaIs ilseIf in lheir slyIe: il is symboIised in lheir
conlenl: and occasionaIIy in poelry or noveI lhe vriler inserls, in his ovn
person or lhrough lhe moulh of a characler in lhe piece, some refIeclive
generaIisalion vhich Iighls up lhe significance of his vork, lhough sliII vilhoul
reducing il lo a lheory. The reader, vhiIe nol mislaking lhe vork of arl for a
reaIily, yel lreals il as a lype or 'represenlalion' of reaIily, comparing il vilh lhe
resl of his experience and refIecling upon ils meaning, and lhus lhe vriler's
Wc|ianscnauung is conveyed lo lhe refIeclive consciousness of lhe reader: lhe
process is lhe same, nuiaiis nuian!is, in lhe olher arls as il is in Iileralure ( G.S..
V|||, 91-3, V, 392-8).The pni|cscpncr differs bolh from lhe reIigious man and from
lhe arlisl. He seeks lo eIicil from experience a syslem of concepls and universaI
lrulhs, bound logelher by a chain of muluaI impIicalion: his desire is lo knov, if
il vere possibIe, aII lhal is lo be knovn, and lo find for his knovIedge a
IogicaIIy exacl and universaIIy vaIid basis. To lhis end he engages in an endIess
crilicism, reducing every experience lo ils consliluenl faclors and lracing every
proposilion lo ils IogicaI grounds, never resling unliI he has reIaled aII facl lo an
uIlimale reaIily, aII knovIedge lo a highesl lrulh, and aII vaIue lo a supreme
good. He dravs ideas from every avaiIabIe source, from reIigion and arl as veII
as from empiricaI science: bul lhe reasoned vhoIe in vhich he combines lhese
dala has ils ovn dislinclive slruclure. Il represenls lhe vorId as an inleIIigibIe
syslem, vhose composilion and slruclure can be made lhe ob|ecl of a
demonslralive science. This science is melaphysics ( G.S.. V|||, 94-5, V, 400-
2).These, lhen, are lhe lhree media of expression for every Wc|ianscnauung.
Relurning nov lo his main pro|ecl of a comparalive sludy and cIassificalion of
Wc|ianscnauungcn, DiIlhey finds lhal lhey faII easiIy inlo lhree lypes, vhich he
proceeds lo characlerise.
1. The firsl lype is based on a viev of human nalure vhich gives primacy lo
ils animaI side: and il lends lo see lhe crilerion
-88-
of lhe good Iife eilher in pIeasure or in pover. In lhe fieId of reIigion lhis
oulIook shovs ilseIf as a revoIl againsl olhervorIdIiness, and somelimes
againsl reIigion ilseIf on accounl of ils olhervorIdIiness, and an asserlion of
lhe cIaims of lhe vorId and lhe fIesh. In arl il lakes lhe form of so-caIIed
'reaIism', bringing lo viev by preference lhe dark forces of passion, and
exposing lhe iIIusory characler of lhe higher ideaIs and principIes. The
corresponding movemenl in phiIosophy, viz. naiura|isn, sees lhe vorId as a
mechanicaI syslem composed of eIemenls aII of vhich are cIear and dislincl,
i.e. malhemalicaIIy delerminabIe. This viev may be heId eilher as a doclrine
of lhe nalure of reaIily (maleriaIism) or, more cauliousIy, as a
melhodoIogicaI principIe (posilivism). Il is associaled vilh sensalionaIism
in epislemoIogy: in elhics il is eilher hedonisl, or preaches Iiberalion
lhrough enIighlenmenl and lhe deslruclion of iIIusion. As represenlalives of
lhis phiIosophy, DiIlhey names Democrilus, Irolagoras, Ipicurus, Hume,
and Comle.
3. The second lype of Wc|ianscnauung is based on our inner experience of free
viII, and inlerprels lhe vorId in lerms of personaIily, conducling al aII
poinls a biller and reIenlIess campaign againsl naluraIism. Ils fundamenlaI
premiss is lhe exislence in man of a moraI viII vhich ve can knov lo be
free from physicaI causalion: lhis viII is bound, nol physicaIIy, bul moraIIy,
and lherefore freeIy, lo olher viIIs in a sociely of moraI persons, and lhe
reIalions belveen lhese persons depend uIlimaleIy upon an absoIule, free,
personaI agenl, viz. God. In reIigion lhis Wc|ianscnauung appears as lheism,
in parlicuIar Chrislian lheism, vhere lhe fundamenlaI premiss of
naluraIism, lhal cx nini|c nini| jii, is conlradicled by lhe doclrine of crealion
cx nini|c. In arl il appears in lhe conceplion of lhe vorId as a 'lhealre of
heroic aclion', e.g. in CorneiIIe or SchiIIer. In phiIosophy il has deveIoped
from lhe conceplion of reason as a formalive pover in Anaxagoras, IIalo,
and ArislolIe, lo lhe mediaevaI conceplion of a vorId governed by lhe
personaI providence of God, and lhence in Kanl and Iichle lo lhe idea of a
supersensibIe vorId of vaIues, vhich are reaI onIy in and for lhe infinile
viII vhich posils lhem. DiIlhey caIIs lhis phiIosophy lhe i!ca|isn cj jrcc!cn,
and finds ils modern represenlalives in ergson, lhe Neo-Kanlians, and lhe
pragmalisls.
4. The lhird lype of Wc|ianscnauung is based on a conlempIa-
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live and affeclive allilude lo experience. We read our ovn feeIings and
menlaI aclivilies inlo lhe exlernaI vorId, regarding il as a Iiving vhoIe
vhich conlinuaIIy reaIises and en|oys ilseIf in lhe harmony of ils parls:
ve find lhe divine Iife of lhe WhoIe immanenl in every parl, and re|oice
lo feeI ourseIves in sympalhy vilh lhis Iife. This Wc|ianscnauung emerges
in lhe panenlheism of Indian and Chinese reIigion: in arl ils mosl
nolabIe exponenl is Goelhe. In phiIosophy il Ieads lo lhe conceplion of
lhe universe as an 'organic' individuaI, vhose parls are lhemseIves
individuaIs refIecling lhe characler of lhe vhoIe: lhis Ieads lo a kind of
delerminism, bul lhe delermining principIe is 'organic' and purposive,
nol bIind and mechanicaI as il is in naluraIislic lheories. The
epislemoIogy of lhis lhird lype of phiIosophy gives an imporlanl pIace
lo vhal il caIIs 'inleIIecluaI inluilion'--lhe inluilive grasp of lhe
vhoIeness of lhings. DiIlhey finds lhis phiIosophy in Sloicism, in
Averroes, runo, Spinoza, Leibniz, Shaflesbury, ScheIIing, HegeI,
SchIeiermacher: and he caIIs il c|jcciitc i!ca|isn ( G.S.. V|||, 100-18, V,
402-4).
In Oic Orci Grun!jcrncn !cr Susicnc in !cr crsicn Ha|jic !cs 19 janrnun!cris (
G.S.. |V, 528-54), DiIlhey shovs hov lhe hislory of recenl phiIosophy can be
described and eIucidaled in lerms of a confIicl belveen lhe lhree lypes. The
revoIl againsl lhe naluraIism of Hume and lhe IncycIopaedisls, conducled
by Kanl and Iichle, Maine de iran and Cousin, HamiIlon and ManseI, is an
inslance of lhe ideaIism of freedom, for il depended in lhe Iasl resorl upon
an appeaI lo lhe experience of free viII. Againsl lhis movemenl naluraIism
vas defended by lhe MiIIs, Comle, and Spencer, and lhe repIy lo lhese in
lurn, vhich DiIlhey lraces in lhe vorks of Lolze, Renouvier, Marlineau,
Green, and radIey, is a form of ob|eclive ideaIism infIuenced by Leibniz
and HegeI.
Of course, DiIlhey adds, lhe lypes of Wc|ianscnauungcn are nol aIvays found
pure, and every cIassificalion musl be approximale. In parlicuIar, il is nol
unusuaI for lhe apparenl irreconciIabIes, naluraIism and lhe ideaIism of
freedom, lo come logelher as compIemenlary aspecls of a singIe syslem. In a
fancifuI reviev of lhe lhree lypes of Wc|ianscnauungcn, enlilIed Traun ( G.S..
V|||, 218 seq.), DiIlhey inslances Descarles as one vho allempled lhis
synlhesis, and Kanl as 'lhe greal man vho
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raised lhe ideaIism of freedom lo crilicaI consciousness, and lhereby reconciIed
il vilh lhe empiricaI sciences'.
The phiIosopher is under a naluraI lemplalion lo beIieve lhal lhere is one
universaIIy vaIid syslem of melaphysics: every melaphysician inlends lo
conlribule lo lhe discovery of lhis one syslem, and lhe hislory of phiIosophy is
oflen represenled as a graduaI approximalion lo lhis goaI ( G.S.. V|||, 96ci pass.).
The facls refule lhis oplimism: nol onIy has no parlicuIar syslem ever secured
generaI assenl, bul lhere is no sign lhal lhe differenl poinls of viev in lhis fieId
are nearer lo a reconciIialion nov lhan lhey vere lvo lhousand years ago ( G.S..
V|||, 86-7 ci pass.). This suggesls lhal lhe probIem vhich melaphysics has sel
ilseIf is insoIubIe, and DiIlhey has various epislemoIogicaI reasons for hoIding
lhal il is so. He novhere gives a comprehensive argued slalemenl of lhese
reasons: regarding lhe coIIapse of melaphysics as evidenl and lhe reasons for il
as obvious, he onIy aIIudes lo lhem as occasion serves, lo poinl lhis or lhal
argumenl. They may, hovever, be summarised as foIIovs.
In lhe firsl pIace, aII human experience is fragmenlary, and ve have lo lry lo fiII
lhe gaps. This is achieved in lhe empiricaI sciences by inference from empiricaI
dala. The inference Ieads us eilher lo nev facls anaIogous lo lhose aIready
observed, and capabIe in principIe of being lhemseIves observed, or lo enlilies
and reIalions vhich are nol observabIe, bul can be verified indireclIy lhrough
deduclion and experimenl. In lhis vay an ordered syslem of facls and processes
is broughl lo our knovIedge, bolh in nalure and in lhe hisloricaI vorId. ul lhe
unily eslabIished by lhe sciences covers onIy parlicuIar segmenls of experience,
and melaphysics, allempling lo conceive lhe vhoIe as a compacl IogicaI syslem,
finds gaps vhich lhe empiricaI sciences cannol fiII. In parlicuIar, lhe reIalion
belveen mind and maller, vhich neilher naluraI science nor lhe human sludies
as such can discIose, is of prime imporlance for melaphysics: and again, vhiIe
every experienced facl and vaIue is condilioned and reIalive, a melaphysicaI
syslem requires for ils cenlre an uncondilioned reaIily and an absoIule vaIue.
To salisfy lhese demands, melaphysics musl lransgress lhe Iimils of possibIe
experience: lhis slep is so inevilabIe in melaphysics lhal DiIlhey can describe il
as a 'science of lhe lranscendenl' ( G.S.. |, 129 n.).
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ul such a science is impossibIe, preciseIy because il has no experience from
vhich lo drav ils concepls. We can have no experience of lhe reIalion belveen
mind and body, because mind is perceived from vilhin and lhe body from
vilhoul: in no momenl of consciousness do ve oblain a viev of bolh side by
side, so as lo observe lhe reIalion belveen lhem, and lhough psychoIogicaI
experimenlalion discIoses a correIalion belveen evenls in lhe one and evenls in
lhe olher, lhe reaI process underIying lhis correIalion is dark lo us ( G.S.. |, 15-
16, V, 135). SimiIarIy, ve have no experience of a reaIily vhich is nol lemporaIIy
and causaIIy condilioned, or of a vaIue vhich is nol reIalive lo a parlicuIar
sub|ecl or sub|ecls ( G.S.. V, 405). Il may be urged lhal, aIlhough ve have no
acluaI experience of lhese lhings, ve can sliII conceive lhem on lhe anaIogy of
vhal ve do experience. ul ve cannol conceive a mind-maller reIalion on lhe
anaIogy of reIalions belveen eIemenls of maller or belveen eIemenls of mind,
or an absoIule on lhe anaIogy of a reIalive: lhe maller of lhe anaIogy conlradicls
ils form, and no definile conceplion emerges from il ( G.S.. |, 279-91, 318-28,
VIII, 117-18).
In lhe second pIace, ve have seen hov lhe slrucluraI syslem in mind is lhe basis
of aII experience: nol onIy are aII menlaI facls underslood in lerms of il, bul
from il are derived lhe 'reaI calegories' by vhich coherence is read inlo nalure.
Nov, lhe slrucluraI syslem is |itc! (cr|c|i), and 'vhal ve Iive (cr|c|cn) ve can
never make cIear before lhe bar of lhe underslanding (Vcrsian!)' ( G.S.. V, 170):
for lhe cIarily of lhe underslanding Iies vhoIIy in lhe 'formaI calegories' vhich
refIecl lhe anaIylicaI and generaIising processes of lhoughl, vhereas Iived
experience is a concrele reaIily, and lhough lhoughl may anaIyse and 'cIarify' il
indefinileIy, lhere is aIvays a remainder vhich resisls such 'cIarificalion'. Whal
appIies lo lhe Iived experience naluraIIy appIies aIso lo lhe 'reaI calegories'
derived from il. And lhus melaphysics is in a diIemma. NaluraIism, by vorking
onIy vilh lhe 'formaI calegories' and appIied malhemalics, can oblain a cIear
and dislincl idea of lhe vorId, bul al lhe cosl of misconceiving Iife and mind
and muliIaling lhe 'reaI calegories'. On lhe olher hand, ideaIism, bolh forms of
vhich inlerprel lhe vorId in lerms of Iife, sacrifices lhereby lhe melaphysician's
ambilion of IogicaI precision. Ior lhe reIalions belveen facl and
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vaIue, and lhe fundamenlaI conceplions of lhing, subslance, cause, pover, God,
lhough 'inleIIigibIe' in one sense in lerms of lhe slrucluraI syslem in experience,
defy anaIysis by lhe IogicaI underslanding. The allempl lo define lhem cIearIy
and lo buiId lhem inlo a universaIIy vaIid syslem of lrulhs has Ied lo
innumerabIe ambiguilies and anlinomies, vhose persislence lhrough syslem
afler syslem for lvo lhousand years has broughl melaphysics inlo discredil. Ior
every possibiIily in lhis fieId has nov been lried in vain, and no one vho
underslands lhe Iesson of hislory viII make lhe allempl again ( G.S.. |, 201-11,
386-408, V, 405ci a|.).
Thus ve are Iefl vilh a succession of melaphysicaI syslems, aII of lhem loo fuII
of paraIogisms and anlinomies lo be lrue, and yel so ambiguous lhal no
refulalion is accepled as finaI, since lhere is aIvays a possibiIily of reslalemenl
and reinlerprelalion. There is a naluraI lemplalion lo concIude lhal reIalivism is
lhe Iasl vord in phiIosophy, and lhal nolhing can be knovn aboul any meaning
in experience. ul lhis is so onIy if lhe evidenliaI vaIue of melaphysics depends
vhoIIy upon ils lrulh as a science, and DiIlhey denies lhal il does so. Once more
he brings lo bear his melhod of Sc||si|csinnung or 'refIeclion on seIf'. y
sludying melaphysicaI syslems and Wc|ianscnauungcn simpIy as inleIIecluaI
phenomena, in abslraclion from lheir cIaim lo be lrue, he underlakes lo shov
lhal lhey perform a necessary funclion in Iife vhich is unaffecled by lhe fale of
lheir lrulh-cIaim.
Ivery melaphysicaI syslem, he says, cIaims lo be derived by IogicaI processes
from empiricaI facls and/or seIf-evidenl lrulhs. Il cIaims lo be a pureIy cognilive
achievemenl, an inleIIecluaI producl, in Iine vilh lhe posilive sciences and
malhemalics. In facl, hovever, il resls upon a mode of lhe melaphysicaI
consciousness, a Wc|ianscnauung, a vay of Iooking al Iife and lhe vorId, in
vhich cognilive, affeclive, and voIilionaI eIemenls are bound up logelher and
are aIike primary. The eIaborale IogicaI slruclure of definilions and inferences,
vhich characlerises a melaphysicaI syslem as dislincl from a reIigious or arlislic
one, appears al firsl sighl lo be lhe evidence on vhich lhe underIying
Wc|ianscnauung is based: bul in facl il serves onIy lo render ils conlenl expIicil,
and lo defend il againsl possibIe ob|eclions. The faiIure of lhis argumenlalive
superslruclure lo allain IogicaI
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precision and universaI vaIidily lherefore Ieaves lhe significance of lhe
Wc|ianscnauung ilseIf unlouched ( G.S.. V|||, 98-9). Ior a Wc|ianscnauung is
simpIy a form in vhich lhe slrucluraI unily of experience comes lo conscious
expression: lhe slrucluraI syslem of lhe mind, in ils conlinuaI commerce vilh
lhe ouler vorId, is lherefore lhe uIlimale facl, by reference lo vhich lhe
significance of melaphysics, as veII as of reIigion and arl, is lo be delermined.
Whalever reIigion, arl, and phiIosophy may say in lheir efforl lo discover an
ob|eclive vorId order, lheir lrue funclion is nol lo reveaI such an order, bul lo
give expression lo lhe various vays in vhich human minds endeavour lo unify
lheir experience of lhe vorId ( G.S.. V, 413-16).
The specific characler of phiIosophy Iies in ils use of IogicaI anaIysis lo lhis end.
Thus, il slrikes rool firsl in Iogic and epislemoIogy: from lhence il branches oul
inlo lhe phiIosophy of nalure, of arl, of Iav, of reIigion--aII lhose enquiries, in
shorl, by vhich our knovIedge of facl and vaIue in ils severaI deparlmenls is
dissecled and referred lo ils basis in experience ( G.S.. V, 406-13): lhen, Iasl of
aII, in vhal DiIlhey caIIs Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc, or 'phiIosophy of phiIosophy', il
lraces lhe genesis of Wc|ianscnauungcn and lheir formuIalion in melaphysicaI
syslems, exposes lhe fIimsiness of lhese syslems, and finaIIy refers lhem aIso lo
lheir lrue basis in lhe experience vhich lhey express and defend ( G.S.. V, 405-6,
VIII passim).
Il is easy lo find here a paraIIeI lo Kanl's lranscendenlaI diaIeclic: for, as Kanl
soIved his four anlinomies by going behind lhem lo lhe mind in vhich lhey
arise, and shoving lhal lhesis and anlilhesis reaIIy represenl nol acluaI
knovIedge aboul reaIily, bul compIemenlary melhods and lendencies in our
endIess search for such knovIedge, so DiIlhey breaks lhe deadIock belveen lhe
lypes of Wc|ianscnauungcn by going behind lhem lo lhe slrucluraI syslem vhich
lhey 'represenl', and shoving lhal lhey embody lhe various vays in vhich lhal
slrucluraI syslem may be experienced in ils reIalions vilh lhe universe ( G.S..
V|||, 7-9). The mind is hereby sel free from each parlicuIar Wc|ianscnauung, i.e.
from lhe iIIusion of ils absoIule vaIidily, bul il is al lhe same lime made free lo
dispose of aII lhe Wc|ianscnauungcn and lo |udge lhem from an absoIule poinl of
viev. Ior lhe slrucluraI syslem al any rale is absoIule, in lhal il does nol change
and lhal aII change is reIalive lo il, and in lhis
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syslem are slored up infinile possibIe vays in vhich man may have experience
of himseIf and of his vorId. Il is for phiIosophy as Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc lo make
visibIe lhe fuII exlenl of lhese possibiIilies, and so reveaI lo mind ils ovn
infinile freedom. 'The Iasl vord of lhe mind vhich has run lhrough aII lhe
Wc|ianscnauungcn is nol lhe reIalivily of lhem aII, bul lhe sovereignly of mind in
reIalion lo each singIe one of lhem, and aIso lhe posilive consciousness of hov,
in lhe differenl forms of menlaI alliludes (Vcrna|iungsuciscn !cs Gcisics), lhe one
reaIily of lhe vorId exisls for us' ( G.S.. V, 406).
In lhis concIusion DiIlhey is failhfuI lo lhe lvo lradilions, romanlic and
empiricisl, vhich logelher delermine aII his lhoughl. Ior lhe conceplion of
phiIosophy as a Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc, vhose sub|ecl-maller is mind vilh ils
infinile possibiIilies of experience, has evidenl affinilies vilh lhe diaIeclic of
SchIeiermacher (see above, pp. 10 -1,): vhiIe on lhe olher hand, re|ecling as il
does aII lhoughl of apriorism, and resling on an empiricaI epislemoIogy, a
descriplive psychoIogy, and a comparalive sludy of reIigious, aeslhelic, and
melaphysicaI ideas, il conforms lo lhe programme vhich DiIlhey Iaid dovn as
earIy as 1867 al aseI. 'IhiIosophy', he said, 'enlers lhe circIe of lhe empiricaI
sciences vhose ob|ecl is lhe reguIar order of phenomena. Il is aIIied vilh lhe
olher sciences of mind in lhe greal lask of founding an empiricaI sludy of
menlaI phenomena' ( G.S.. V, 12-13).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Nov lhal ve have seen vhal DiIlhey says in generaI lerms aboul vaIue-
|udgmenls and imperalives, and have laken lhe measure of his reIalivism, ve
may lurn lo consider his specificaIIy moraI lheory, vilh vhich his aeslhelic may
convenienlIy be Iinked. In bolh lhese spheres ve shaII find lhal his leaching
accords vilh his generaI lheory of vaIues. Il is psychoIogislic and anli-
melaphysicaI, lhough il insisls on lhe veaIlh and variely of lhe inner Iife, vhich
orlhodox empiricism or posilivism negIecls. And il is reIalivislic. Three
fundamenlaI and irreducibIe alliludes lo Iife are found lo express lhemseIves in
lhree dislincl moraI principIes, and lhere is no ob|eclive order of precedence
among lhem.
We do nol possess any formaI lrealise in vhich DiIlhey sels forlh his malure
vievs on moraI phiIosophy. The onIy formaI lrealise on lhe sub|ecl vhich he
has Iefl us beIongs lo lhe very beginning of his career. Il is his
Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji. The dale is 1864, and lhe lilIe Vcrsucn cincr Ana|usc !cs
ncra|iscncn Bcuussiscins. |is nanncr |ciraus inc nan! cj a ucung nan. anxicus ic
cctcr. an! ic |c sccn ic cctcr. a|| inc grcun!. Unncccssaru spacc is gitcn ic !iscussicns
cj Hcr|ari an! Scncpcnnaucr. unc ucrc nci ancng inc uriicrs |u uncn Oi|incu uas
|asiing|u inj|ucncc!. Tnc icrninc|cgu is sii|| inai unicn Oi|incu inncriis. nci cnc unicn
nc nas jcun! jcr ninsc|j. Tnc cssau is csicnsi||u a prc|cgcncncn. ii !ccs nci prcjcss ic
icucn upcn inc rca||u jun!ancnia| ucsiicns cj cinics.
|n spiic cj a|| inis. inc ucrk is inicrcsiing an! uscju|. |i nakcs Oi|incus apprcacn ic inc
siu!u cj cinics tcru c|car. an! ii is a !isiinciitc apprcacn. Tnc ccnicniicns sci jcrin in
inc cssau sicc! csscniia||u uncnangc! jcr inc rcsi cj Oi|incus |ijc. incugn inc
!ctc|cpncni cj nis pni|cscpnu |c! ic ccriain cnangcs in inc nc!c cj cxprcssicn. an! ic
s|igni cnricnncnis cj !ciai|. Anp|ijic! |u ccriain passagcs in a |aicr cssau. u|cr !as
Siu!iun !crGcscnicnic !cr Wisscnscnajicn tcn Mcnscncn. !cr Gcsc||scnaji u. !cn
Siaai
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Gcscnicnic !cr Wisscnscnajicn tcn Mcnscncn. !cr Gcsc||scnaji u. !cn Siaai ( 1875)
and in lhe |in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1883), lhe Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji is
somelhing more lhan a mere proIegomenon. Il gives us an aII-round viev of
DiIlhey's moraI lheory, lhough il does nol give us lhe vhoIe of il.
The Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji vas vrillen soon afler DiIlhey had conceived his pro|ecl
of a Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji, and is meanl as a parliaI conlribulion lo lhal
enlerprise. In lhe Iasl chapler ve sav vhal melhod DiIlhey foIIovs in deaIing
vilh our consciousness of vaIues and norms of conducl. He appeaIs lo
psychoIogy for a descriplive anaIysis of lhe slruclure of lhe human mind: in
parlicuIar, for an accounl of aII lhe faclors invoIved in |udging somelhing lo be
vaIuabIe, and lhe funclion of such |udgmenls in menlaI Iife. The vaIidily of
vaIue-|udgmenls, i.e. lheir cIaim upon our acceplance, is defended by an appeaI
lo lheir funclion: vaIue and norm are shovn lo be grounded on psychoIogicaI
facl. DiIlhey himseIf, in lhe Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji, describes his aim in lhese very
lerms. 'AIike lhe demand of moraI lheory for infIuence upon Iife and lhe
disinleresled pure slimuIus of enquiry drive us lo an examinalion of vhal is as
lhe basis of aII imperalives and aII ideaIs' ( G.S.. V|, 2).
He begins his enquiry by urging lhal moraI phiIosophy is obviousIy in need of
reform. Hilherlo il has aimed al acquiring infIuence over sociely, and has
IargeIy succeeded by aIIying ilseIf vilh reIigion and making lhe puIpil ils
channeI of diffusion. This praclicaI inleresl has affecled lhe melhod of moraI
phiIosophy: il has sel ilseIf lo discover vilh demonslralive cerlainly and in fuII
delaiI vhal aclions are righl and vhal are vrong, and has pul forvard ils
concIusions as uncondilionaIIy binding. ul loday lhe reIigious supporl of
moraI leaching is cul avay from under il, vhiIe a groving reaIisalion of lhe
diversily of moraI opinion in lhe human race pasl and presenl, near and far,
conlrasls ominousIy vilh lhe dogmalism of moraI lheories. Hence 'moraI
phiIosophy al presenl drags oul ils remaining exislence onIy in professoriaI
chairs, and begins even here lo die oul' ( G.S.. V, 33, cf. VI, 2).
ul lhis is onIy because moraI phiIosophy has pul lhe carl before lhe horse, i.e.
has advanced concIusions vilhoul going lhrough lhe Iabour of empiricaI
research. Ior elhics, Iike |urisprudence or economics, is reaIIy an empiricaI
sludy, and is con-
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cerned vilh lhe facls of lhe moraI Iife, 'lhe vorId and hislory of moraIs' ( G.S..
V, 66). Ils firsl slep shouId lherefore be lo anaIyse and describe lhe lype of
behaviour knovn as 'moraI' and lhe slruclure of lhe moraI consciousness: lhen
il shouId advance lo lhe 'melaphysicaI and psychoIogicaI groundvork of elhics'
( G.S.. V|, 4), pIunging inlo lhose myslerious deplhs of lhe souI from vhich lhe
moraI consciousness emerges: vhen lhis groundvork is compIele, and nol unliI
lhen, elhics may approach lhe morphoIogy of moraI codes and ideaIs, knoving
nov in vhal sense and lo vhal exlenl lhey can be 'vaIid'. y lhis procedure
elhics mighl escape al Iasl from dogmalism: bul hilherlo il has never begun
even lhal slrucluraI anaIysis of lhe moraI consciousness upon vhich aII lhe resl
depends. 'Therefore, even loday, moraI sceplicism . . . is sliII in lhe righl againsl
a sludy vhich has nol so much as deveIoped a comparalive reviev of lhe facls
vhich compose ils domain. . . . AccordingIy, lhe prime condilion for lhe
resloralion of moraI phiIosophy from ils dovnfaII is lhe inlroduclion of lhe
hisloricaI facls and lheir uliIisalion by lhe comparalive melhod' ( G.S.. V, 33-4).
Il is lo lhis preIiminary lask aIone lhal DiIlhey in lhe Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji
addresses himseIf.
y lhe 'moraI consciousness' is meanl firsl of aII lhe avareness of obIigalion
vhich arises in lhe course of deIiberalion, and vhich oughl lo issue in moraI
aclion. An anaIysis of lhe moraI consciousness mighl lhen seem lo invoIve an
anaIysis of lhe moraI acl. UnforlunaleIy, lhe deeper our acquainlance vilh
human nalure becomes, and lhe more ve recognise lhe Iimilalions of our
insighl inlo human characler, lhe more impossibIe il appears lo singIe oul any
specific aclion for sludy on lhe ground lhal il is moraI ( G.S.. V|, 10 V, 68, cf. I,
62). We need nol deny lhal moraI molives are al vork, bul lhe allempl lo
separale lhem from lhe non-moraI molives presenls 'exlraordinary difficuIlies'.
In consequence, 'enquiry inlo lhe aclions of men . . . is quile vaIueIess as a
foundalion for elhics. No bridge Ieads from lhe vision of human characlers and
lheir compIicaled conducl lo duly and lhe ideaI' ( G.S.. V, 67).
ul lhe moraI consciousness does nol appear onIy in deIiberalion before lhe acl,
il aIso manifesls ilseIf aflervards in moraI |udgmenl, i.e. lhe |udgmenl made
upon an aclion by a disinleresled speclalor, and here lhe specificaIIy moraI
eIemenl is
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'ready separaled, in pure form'. The moraI consciousness is lhe same in bolh ils
manifeslalions, and moraI lheories can be buiIl upon eilher: upon lhe avareness
of obIigalion, as by Kanl and Iichle, or upon lhe |udgmenl of lhe observer, as
by lhe rilish moraIisls and Herbarl. A lhorough lrealmenl of lhis sub|ecl musl
combine bolh poinls of viev, bul lhe approach lhrough moraI |udgmenl is lhe
more imporlanl, because lhere lhe facls are cIearer ( G.S.. V|, 11 V, 69 I, 61-2).
Ivery moraI |udgmenl may be presenled as lhe concIusion of a praclicaI
syIIogism, vhose ma|or premiss is a moraI maxim, and vhose minor subsumes
a parlicuIar aclion under lhe maxim. ul vhal is lhe slalus of lhe ma|or
premiss` Is il a principIe, universaIIy vaIid and knovn a pricri, lhe knovIedge
of vhich is presupposed in every |udgmenl or aclion lhal is lruIy moraI` Or is il
a generaIisalion from moraI feeIing, so lhal feeIing is lhe reaI basis of moraI
|udgmenl, and lhe syIIogism a mere induclive expansion of il` This is lhe poinl
al issue belveen Kanl and Hume, and is lo be decided by a crilicism of Kanl (
G.S.. V|, 9-12).
The name of Kanl is oflen associaled vilh lhe doclrine lhal lhe essence of
moraIily is obedience lo a Iav, and lhal lhe onIy moraI molive is respecl for lhe
form of Iav: bul DiIlhey underlakes lo shov lhal il is nol upon lhis lhal Kanl's
lheory reaIIy hinges. In his Unicrsucnung u|cr !ic Ocui|icnkcii !cr Grun!saizc !cr
naiur|icncn Tncc|cgic u. !cr Mcra| (pub. 1764) Kanl Iays dovn lhal lhe good viII
has uncondilionaI vaIue for ils ovn sake, irrespeclive of consequences: bul he
does nol al lhis dale hoId lhal lhe molive of lhe good viII is respecl for a
universaI Iav. On lhe conlrary, he hoIds lhal il is lhe appelilion of a parlicuIar
good, perceived in lhe parlicuIar silualion, and lhe medium vhereby il is
perceived is an 'unanaIysabIe feeIing'. Laler, in lhe Grun!|cgung !cr Mciapnusik
!cr Siiicn. Kani again |cgins |u asscriing inc unccn!iiicna| ta|uc cj inc gcc! ui||. an!
ii is cn|u incn. uncn nc gccs cn ic ask ncu inc gcc! ui|| gcis iis nciitc. inai nc
inirc!uccs inc !ccirinc cj inc unitcrsa| |au. Man. nc saus. is !isiinguisnc! |u nis pcucr
cj aciing acccr!ing ic princip|cs. unicn arc cnunciaic! |u praciica| rcascn. scnc
princip|cs arc ta|i! nupcinciica||u an! as ncans ic an cn!. |ui ncra| princip|cs
ccnsiiiuic a |au unicn is ta|i! jcr iis cun sakc a|cnc an! in a|| pcssi||c circunsianccs.
Hcu can praciica| rcascn |au !cun sucn a |au? Bccausc. saus Kani. pcrscna|iiu. cr inc
capaciiu jcr

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ralionaI conducl, has uncondilionaI vaIue for lhe ralionaI viII, i.e. lhe good viII
viIIs ilseIf as a universaI Iav for aII ralionaI agenls. Kanl never expIains vhy
lhe good viII shouId be ils ovn conlenl in lhis vay: and lhe lheory lhal il is so
is no parl of his originaI insighl. Il is onIy an inference, forced upon Kanl by his
assumplion lhal moraI aclion is direcled by praclicaI rcascn, coupIed vilh his
compIele severance of reason from feeIing: and il is an inference vhich
conlradicls experience. 'IraclicaI reason, conceived in isoIalion (jur sicn) as lhe
sub|ecl vhich makes moraI |udgmenls, renders lhe universaI and conscious lhe
slarlingpoinl of aII moraI Iife, vhich is againsl aII experience and psychoIogy' (
G.S.. V|, 19).
Kanl's earIier lheory of an 'unanaIysabIe feeIing' is nearer lhe lrulh. And yel lhis
in lurn presenls difficuIlies of ils ovn. Ior 'feeIing' as Hume and Kanl conceive
il is lhe passive response of lhe sub|ecl lo an exlernaI slimuIus, vhereas viII is
aclive, and proceeds from lhe vhoIe personaIily of lhe agenl. Again, feeIing is
of lhe momenl and is reIalive lo a parlicuIar inslincl vhich is moving us lo
aclion al lhe momenl, vhereas a |udgmenl of good and eviI beIongs lo an
ob|eclive vaIue-syslem, recognised by lhe vhoIe seIf vhen in a slale of
recoIIeclion: and lhis is onIy possibIe lhrough lhoughl. 'Through il aIone is lhe
vhoIe viII presenl in each individuaI aclion. And so aIso lhrough il aIone is a
|udgmenl of good and bad possibIe' (i|i!.).
Thus, vhiIe moraI |udgmenl is immedialeIy based upon feeIing and nol upon a
principIe, yel lhe feeIing in lurn musl somehov embody a principIe if lhe
|udgmenl based upon il is lo be ob|ecliveIy vaIid. Reason and moraI feeIing
musl lherefore have a 'poinl of coincidence', and each musl be so underslood as
lo render lhis coincidence possibIe. Il is possibIe if by 'reason' ve undersland
nol lhe inleIIecluaI facuIly by vhich ve apprehend generaI principIes, bul a
formalive purpose (gcsia|icn!cr Zucck) immanenl in Iife, vhich expresses ilseIf
in lhe form of desires and feeIings: and if by 'moraI feeIing' ve mean nol a
chaolic aggregale of passive impressions, bul a 'purposive syslem', 'nol
helerogeneous from reason', vhich 'springs from lhe end of our being (Zucck
unscrcs Wcscns)' and expresses lo our consciousness in inluilive form lhe
immanenl leIeoIogy of our nalure. Acling under lhe guidance of such a 'feeIing',
even vilhoul expIicil refIeclion on Iavs and principIes, 've can lake up inlo our
viII
-100-
lhe inner purpose of our exislence': and lhis is lhe primary form of moraI aclion.
Subsequenl refIeclion can make expIicil lhe ralionaIily inherenl in moraI
feeIing, unliI al Iasl 'vilh compIele insighl inlo lhe slruclure of lhe vorId il viII
arrive al compIele cIarily' ( G.S.. V|, 20-1).
The moraI consciousness, lhen, is lhe inner leIeoIogy of human Iife, expressed in
'feeIing' and in vaIue-|udgmenls, and vorking as a molive lo delermine lhe
moraI viII. DiIlhey goes on lo anaIyse lhis leIeoIogy, shoving vhal lypes of
ends lhe moraI |udgmenl approves and lhe good viII feeIs bound lo pursue.
This, he says, is vhere mosl moraI lheories go vrong: for lhey assume lhal
lhere is one discoverabIe principIe upon vhich lhe moraI Iife is based, e.g.
prudence, benevoIence, duly for duly's sake, or pIeasure, and lhey reduce aII
moraI vaIues lo lheir one principIe, doing vioIence lhereby lo lhe moraI Iife as
acluaIIy experienced. An empiricaI sludy of il reveaIs lhree lypes of moraI
|udgmenl and obIigalion, based upon lhree dislincl principIes. |irsi, lhere is
'obIigalion laken in lhe slricl sense', or Vcrpj|icniung: here lhe viII is bound by
lhe Iav of ils ovn consislency lo lhe fuIfiImenl of an underlaking vhich il has
openIy or lacilIy assumed. This lype of obIigalion finds organised sanclions in
Iav: lhe lype of characler buiIl upon il has lhe dislinguishing virlue of reclilude
(|ccniscnajjcnncii). Scccn!, lhere is 'lhe form of oughl in vhich benevoIence
expresses ilseIf', vhich is based upon human sympalhy, and yel is no mere
induIgence of kind feeIing: il is a recognilion lhal lhe aclion suggesled by such
feeIing is righl and oughl lo be performed. Tnir!, lhere is lhe lype of oughl
vhich is conceived as a universaIIy vaIid ideaI. Il is based upon 'lhe slriving
afler inner vorlh': lhe ideaI is conceived as lhe 'significance and perfeclion of
our exislence' (Bc!cuiung un! Vc||kcnncnncii unscrcs Oascins), and DiIlhey
observes lhal il oflen receives a specuIalive inlerprelalion lhrough some lheory
of lhe universe and of our pIace in il ( G.S.. V|, 25-7, 46-7).
These lhree principIes are irreducibIe lo common lerms, bul lhey are aII aIike
principIes from vhich fIov aclions lhal are feIl lo be obIigalory. DiIlhey caIIs
lhem 'praclicaI alliludes of our viII in so far as il is moraI': lhey conslilule lhe
inner slruclure of lhe moraI viII, irrespeclive of ils empiricaI conlenl, and
'mighl be slyIed praclicaI calegories' ( G.S.. V|, 43). Ivery moraI Iife embodies aII
lhree, and no moraI lheory is adequale
-101-
vhich ignores any of lhem: bul in Iife lhere are individuaIs in vhom one or
olher of lhem predominales, and in elhics lhere are lheories vhich buiId
excIusiveIy upon one or olher of lhem. This is responsibIe for much confusion
in elhics and for lhe consequenl sceplicism, vhich viII vanish vhen lhe moraI
Iife is anaIysed in a lruIy empiricaI manner.
Having lhus anaIysed moraIily as il appears in lhe normaI individuaI, DiIlhey
furlher lraces ils vorkings in lhe communily: for il is nol a privale aclivily of
lhe individuaI, il is a sociaI force, and a syslem of reIalions belveen agenls in
lhe hisloricaI process. Il acls, as vas seen, in lhe 'doubIe form' of molive and of
|udgmenl. As molive, il issues freeIy from lhe conscience of lhe agenl: as moraI
|udgmenl, il is a force vhich olhers exerl upon him, and lhe sum of moraI
|udgmenls conslilules a group opinion lhrough vhich sociely as a vhoIe
conlroIs ils members. The opinion of lhe group affecls lhe individuaI parlIy
lhrough prudenliaI molives: bul il is aIso lhe means vhereby a lrue moraI
consciousness is avakened in lhe chiId, and il guides lhe doubling conscience
of lhe aduIl. Thus by severaI channeIs, over an ever-videning range of sociaI
Iife, lhe moraI consciousness exercises a delerminalive infIuence ( G.S.. V, 70-1
I, 62-3).
The range of Iife so affecled is caIIed 'lhe moraI syslem', and is lhe empiricaI
sub|ecl-maller of elhics. Il appears firsl of aII in lhe guise of cuslom: for,
aIlhough much of vhal is cuslomary in any sociely is due lo mere convenience,
yel lhere is aIvays a residuaI ideaI eIemenl vhich is due lo moraI feeIing. Irom
lhis lhe moraI syslem sIovIy evoIves inlo videIy differenl forms, and lvo
principIes govern ils evoIulion. |irsi, usage inlerpreled by refIeclion becomes
pubIic opinion and a code of honour: from lhis are abslracled concepls, maxims,
ideaIs, and finaIIy moraI lheories. So lhe moraI consciousness deveIops oul of
feeIing inlo phiIosophic seIf-consciousness. Scccn!, lhe infIuence of moraI
feeIing over conducl spreads from lhe narrov circIe of cuslom lo lhe ulmosl
confines of human aclivily. The individuaI, in pursuil of inner vorlh, exaIls his
ideaI more and more as civiIisalion progresses. enevoIence videns his horizon
lo embrace lhe physicaI and moraI veIfare of olhers. Reclilude recognises in aII
persons a naluraI righl lo equaI lrealmenl. The Iasl slage is reached vhen lhe
'righls of man' are given IegaI recognilion,
-102-
and lhrough lhis exlension of Iav inlo lhe domain of moraIily 'lhe moraI vorId
fuIfiIs ilseIf ob|ecliveIy'. The process is never compIele, and DiIlhey quoles from
Lolze ( Mikrckcsnus. ||, 378) lo lhe effecl lhal lhe reaI syslem of vaIues and
dulies is somelhing vhich 've Iearn firsl by a Iong course of educalion, and
never Iearn lo lhe fuII' ( G.S.. V|, 46-8, V, 70-2, I, 61).
The anaIysis of moraI experience here given is offered by DiIlhey nol as an
elhicaI lheory, bul as lhe proIegomena lo any adequale elhicaI lheory. The reaI
sludy of elhics cannol confine ilseIf lo empiricaI observalion and anaIysis, bul
musl go beIov lhe surface of experience lo lhe principIe of 'reason' vhich is
aclive in lhe human mind. The empiricaI anaIysis ends vilh an unresoIved
lripIicily of 'praclicaI calegories', and il is for lhe Grun!|cgung of elhics lo exhibil
lhe significance and meaning (Bc!cuiung un! Sinn) of lhese calegories and lheir
uIlimale unily in lhe 'end of our being': lhis end, vhich is impIicil in moraI
feeIing and is reaIised in praclice lhrough lhe good viII, viII lhus be broughl
inlo expIicil seIf-consciousness. ul vhere, lhen, is lhe 'end of our being' lo be
found` Many lheories seek il in lhe individuaI: bul lhis, says DiIlhey, means in
lhe end reducing aII human aclion lo seIf-Iove: and lhe experience vhich ve
have of unseIfish molives cannol lhus be expIained avay. 'Ralher il is lhal lhe
moraI organisalion of man serves lhe end of lhe species. Nol ve ourseIves, each
in isoIalion, are ils sufficienl ground, bul lhe end vhich nalure has sel before
herseIf in lhe human race' ( G.S.. V|, 52).
Whal lhis end may be, DiIlhey does nol leII us. Wriling al lhis earIy dale, vilh
lhe romanlic and lhe posilivisl eIemenls in his oulIook nol yel reaIIy reconciIed,
he mighl have found lhe queslion hard lo ansver: hovever, lhe issue beIongs lo
lhe 'melaphysicaI and psychoIogicaI Grun!|cgung of elhics' ralher lhan lo a
preIiminary enquiry, so lhal DiIlhey in his Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji can safeIy Iel il go.
We are enlilIed, hovever, lo demand an ansver in due course, and in lhe
vrilings of his more malure years some ansver shouId sureIy be found. As a
maller of facl, lhere is none in his pubIished vrilings. The essay of 1875 is lhe
Iasl vhich lreals of moraI issues al any Ienglh. ul DiIlhey did proceed lo lhe
Grun!|cgung of elhics, and lhe vievs vhich he adopled may be found
informaIIy slaled in severaI Iellers lo von Warlenburg belveen 1888 and 1890.
-103-
Among lhe marks of immalurily in lhe Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji is ils unqueslioning
use of Kanlian or posl-Kanlian phraseoIogy. The lhree principIes of moraIily are
caIIed 'praclicaI calegories' vilhoul any expIanalion or quaIificalion of lhe
meaning of lhe lerm: lhey are said lo be 'universaIIy vaIid', again vilhoul
quaIificalion: lhe Iiving unily of our mind, from vhich lhey proceed, is caIIed
'reason' (Vcrnunji): lhe Grun!|cgung vhich enquires inlo il is caIIed
'melaphysicaI' as veII as 'psychoIogicaI'. If DiIlhey had allempled lhe
Grun!|cgung al lhis dale, ve may guess lhal il vouId have shovn very much
lhe infIuence of SchIeiermacher.
1
In 1867, hovever, lhe year of lhe inauguraI
Ieclure al aseI, came DiIlhey's decisive breach vilh melaphysics, and lhe
infIuence of lhe empiricaI phiIosophy in his lhoughl became slronger. Il is very
cIear in lhe essay of 1875 (see beIov, pp. 162 ff.), in lhe |in|ciiung in !ic
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1883), in Oic |in|i|!ungskraji !cs Oicnicrs ( 1887), and in
U|cr !ic Mcg|icnkcii cincr a||gcncingu|iigcn pa!cgcgiscncn Wisscnscnaji ( 1888), and
ve may nole lhal in lhis Iasl lrealise lhe lhree moraI principIes of lhe
Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji, reappearing under lhe names of 'sympalhy', 'slriving afler
perfeclion and happiness', and 'lhe feeIing of obIigalion', are caIIed no Ionger
'calegories' bul 'Iiving impuIses and inslincls' ( G.S.. V|, 57). This is lhe very lime
al vhich lhe elhicaI discussions begin lo appear in DiIlhey's Iellers lo von
Warlenburg, and lhere loo ve find a slrong naluraIislic vein.
There is one form of naluraIislic elhics vhich has no allraclion for DiIlhey, viz.
lhe uliIilarianism of enlham and lhe MiIIs. He lakes a maIicious deIighl in
hoisling lhese vrilers vilh lheir ovn pelard, i.e. proving lhal lheir doclrine has
no empiricaI grounding, bul is an abslracl lheorelicaI conslruclion.
2
They lry lo
bring aII moraI ends under a singIe formuIa,
____________________
1
In lhe year of lhe Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji, DiIlhey vas aIready al vork upon his
greal Ic|cn Scn|cicrnacncrs. Hc na! prcticus|u uriiicn a !isscriaiicn Oc principiis
cinicis Scn|cicrnacncri.
2
Cf. DiIlhey's gIeefuI allempl lo shock his devoul Lulheran friend by shoving
hov empiricaI he is becoming--more empiricaI even lhan MiII! 'Over my elhic
you vouId al once re|oice and cross yourseIf! I lrump uliIilarianism! Shov
lhal il is a conslruclion from above dovnvard. . . . I defend lhe concrele
reaIilies of lhe moraI impuIses againsl abslracl principIes, and a manIy
moraIily vhich feeIs ilseIf in lhem againsl lhe senlimenlaI aIlruislic,
uliIilarian, elc.' ( Bu.O.Y., p. 106.)
-104-
a fealureIess 'good' or 'uliIily', ignoring lhe rich variely of voIilionaI experience
and lhe many diverse ends vhich ve do in facl pursue ( Bu.O.Y., p. 106 ).
Again, lhey faiI lo anaIyse lhe reaI reIalion belveen lhe pursuil of privale and
lhal of sociaI veIfare, faIIing back upon lhe dogma of a pre-eslabIished
harmony belveen lhe lvo. This is lhe incurious allilude of a ruIing cIass, vho
readiIy lhink lhal vhal is veII for lhem is veII for lhe communily. DiIlhey caIIs
lheir phiIosophy a 'fal, fuII-fed, geniaI' doclrine, a 'renlier-phiIosophy', and
specuIales sarcaslicaIIy on lhe receplion lhal exlracls from enlham and lhe
MiIIs mighl find among lhe proIelariale ( Bu.O.Y., p. 76).
Ior DiIlhey's posilive doclrine, aImosl lhe onIy aulhorily is a Ieller vrillen in
Ianuary 1890 ( Bu.O.Y., p. 89 seq.), in vhich he expIains lo his friend lhe oulIine
of a Iong Ieclure on elhics, covering lhe vhoIe sub|ecl, vhich he means lo give
Ialer in lhe year.
He begins by Iooking for a 'firm slanding-ground' in lhe slream of evoIulion
and ils vague possibiIilies, vhich have lhe up-lo-dale moraIisls of loday al lheir
mercy', and he finds lhis firm ground in lhe slrucluraI syslem of menlaI Iife.
Irom here his exposilion can proceed by firsl describing lhe form of lhe
slrucluraI syslem, and lhe posilion of inslincl and feeIing in il, and lhen singIing
oul lhe inslincls and describing lhem in delaiI. As he says in anolher Ieller, so
Iong as lhe inslincls are reaIIy as he describes lhem, il does nol maller if any
sublIer psychoIogisl finds lhal he can reduce lhem lo simpIer lerms: lhe elhic
buiIl upon DiIlhey's descriplion of lhem viII be unaffecled ( Bu.O.Y., p. 106 ).
Then he goes on lo describe hov lhree voIilionaI principIes emerge as lhe basis
of a 'Iife on a higher IeveI'. They are nol quile lhe same lhree as in lhe
Ha|i|iiaiicnsscnriji and lhe educalionaI lrealise of 1888. The firsl is 'a heighlening
of inner Iife, operalive in every slale, vhich corresponds lo lhe faIse abslraclion
of a slriving afler deveIopmenl or perfeclion, and operales from lhe feeIings
upon aII ideas, images, impuIses'. The second, 'very compIex in ils origin', is lhe
facl lhal 've, being nol aloms, have in aII parlicuIar impuIses a supervenienl
lendency lo imparl, lo receive, lo share, elc.' The lhird is 'lhal ve find our-
-105-
seIves in our menlaI conslilulion compeIIed lo respecl olhers as ends in
lhemseIves'.
1

The vorking oul of lhese lhree principIes is accompIished in lhe 'moraI process',
by vhich DiIlhey means a kind of slruggIe for survivaI among aII lhe voIilionaI
impuIses in human nalure, in vhich lhese lhree come oul viclorious. 'MoraI
process: lhal of course is onIy an abslracl expression for a nev group of reaI
processes vhich are specificaIIy elhicaI. Since lhe manifeslalions of inslincl in
pugnacily, halred, excIusion of olhers from one's ovn sphere of inleresls,
oppression of olhers for one's ovn advanlage, aIlogelher diminish lhe
salisfaclion of individuaIs and sociely, lhey are invoIved in a graduaI decIine (if
ve abslracl from inlrusive faclors vhich bring aboul periods here). ecause
incIinalions of a cerlain kind produce Iasling salisfaclion, lhey are preferred.'
2

In due course an ideaI of Iife springs up and operales as a force delermining
subsequenl grovlh, and reIigion, mylhoIogy, and arl are broughl lo bear in
supporl of il. The lhree moraI principIes, variousIy combined and gIossed,
become lhe basis of a succession of moraI ideaIs and slandards, vhose hislory
and morphoIogy are a lheme for lhe human sludies.
DiIlhey's Grun!|cgung of elhics is aII conlained in lhis Ieller, and here, as
eIsevhere, his breach vilh lhe Kanlian and olher melaphysicaI lradilions is
compIele. The aclive principIe of 'reason' in lhe mind is repIaced by lhe
slrucluraI syslem. The unily underIying lhe lhree praclicaI principIes (no Ionger
'calegories') is found in lheir common lendency lo furlher lhe deveIopmenl of
human capacilies and lo heighlen lhe salisfaclions of Iife. The 'end of our being'
is nol any delerminale and
____________________
1
The originaI formuIalion reappears in lhe second Siu!ic zur Grun!|cgung !cr
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1905), vhere ve have 'dulies of perfeclion' based on
lhe 'slriving for perfeclion', 'dulies of Iove' based on 'Iove of God or man', and
'lhe binding in an obIigalion', vilh 'lhe sincerily and reclilude based upon il' (
G.S.. V||, 67).
2
Cf. again lhe second Siu!ic zur Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn, vhere
lhe sanclion for lhe lhree principIes is found in lhe facl lhal persislenl negIecl
of any of lhem viII invoIve excIusion from a rich vein of human inlercourse.
NegIecl of lhe duly lo slrive afler perfeclion shuls a man oul from lhe
communily of cuIluraI efforl, negIecl of lhe dulies of benevoIence shuls him
oul from lhe sphere of human sympalhy, and negIecl of lhe dulies of
reclilude shuls him oul from any share in lhe Iife of an organised sociely (|cc.
cii.).
-106-
formuIabIe good, from vhich lhe necessily of lhe principIes mighl be deduced:
il is simpIy lhe efforl of lhe slrucluraI syslem lo unfoId ils inherenl possibiIilies
in any vay lhal, under lhe condilions of our vorId, may prove lo make for
freedom and happiness. MoraIily, in shorl, appears nol as a melaphysicaIIy
grounded formalive principIe vilh a pricri righls over aII our praclicaI aclivilies,
bul as mereIy one among severaI groups of guiding ruIes vhich graduaIIy
disengage lhemseIves from lhe chaos of praclicaI Iife, and exlend lheir infIuence
over such fieIds and vilh such aulhorily as experience permils.
One of lhe cruciaI faclors in lhe grovlh of lhe 'moraI syslem' is lhe vork of lhe
imaginalion. Since lhe primary form of lhe moraI consciousness is inluilive, and
abslracl principIes are onIy generaIisalions from inluilive perceplions, anylhing
vhich can infIuence lhe vay in vhich ve perceive a silualion and size il up viII
infIuence lhe deveIopmenl of lhe moraI consciousness. This makes a naluraI
lransilion from moraI lheory lo lhe phiIosophy of imaginalion and lhe arls--in a
vord, lo aeslhelics.
Ior IngIish readers, lhe mosl obvious paraIIeI lo DiIlhey's posilion in aeslhelics
is lhal of I. A. Richards. olh vrilers are moved by a fundamenlaIIy romanlic
inspiralion: DiIlhey's dependence on Goelhe and NovaIis is paraIIeI lo lhe
fascinalion exercised over Richards by CoIeridge. olh have forsvorn
melaphysics, and are lrying lo keep aIive lhe romanlic vision and find adequale
expression for il in a posilivislic universe. olh seek heIp from psychoIogy, and
consider lhal a sound aeslhelic cannol be vrillen vilhoul a psychoIogicaI
underpinning: lhus Richards inserls a series of psychoIogicaI chaplers inlo his
Princip|cs cj Iiicraru Criiicisn, vhiIe DiIlhey in Oic |in|i|!ungskraji !cs Oicnicrs
begins vilh a delaiIed exposilion of a psychoIogicaI lheory, and goes on lo
deduce aeslhelic and crilicaI concIusions from lhal. olh, in lhe delaiI of lheir
psychoIogy, give a fundamenlaI pIace lo basic 'alliludes' (Vcrna|iungsuciscn in
DiIlhey), lhough il is nol in aeslhelics lhal DiIlhey makes his chief use of lhis
concepl. olh find lhe funclion of arl lo Iie, al Ieasl parlIy, in lhe crealion of
baIance and harmony in vhal vouId olhervise be lhe uninlegraled minds and
souIs of men.
DiIlhey's vievs on lhe sub|ecl find expression in many pIaces. They find
praclicaI appIicalion in his Iilerary crilicism, vhose voIume is considerabIe and
vhose vaIue as crilicism is high.
-107-
They find lheorelicaI expression lo some exlenl in his Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc.
uncrc. as uc natc sccn. inc ain an! junciicn cj ari is ccnparc! uiin incsc cj rc|igicn
an! pni|cscpnu. Tncu jin! cxprcssicn in taricus passagcs cj nis uriiings cn inc |cgic cj
inc nunan siu!ics. jcr ii is a pcini cj nis !ccirinc inai inc un!crsian!ing cj |ijc. unicn
is jun!ancnia| in inc nunan siu!ics. is grcai|u jurincrc! |u inc ucrk cj inc aris. an!
inai pcciru can scnciincs gitc ta|ua||c insignis ic a nisicrian. Bui |csi!cs a|| inis.
incrc arc iuc ccnsi!cra||c ircaiiscs !ircci|u !ctcic! ic acsinciics. tiz. Oic
|in|i|!ungskraji !cs Oicnicrs. Bausicinc jur cinc Pcciik ( 1887) an! Oic Orci |pccncn
!cr nc!crncn Asinciik u. inrc ncuiigc Aujga|c ( 1892). Tc incsc uc nusi ncu iurn.
|n |cin cssaus. in !ijjcrcni uaus. Oi|incu gitcs nis ticu cj inc nisicru cj acsinciics in
nc!crn iincs. an! iis prcscni ccn!iiicn an! prcspccis. Hc !cscri|cs ncu inc iuc cnicj
prc-Kaniian scncc|s cj pni|cscpnu app|ic! incir rcspcciitc princip|cs ic ii. Tnc
raiicna|isis ( Ocscarics an! Ici|niz an! incir jc||cucrs) siu!ic! inc |cauiiju| c|jcci.
askc! unai nakcs ii |cauiiju|. an! ansucrc! inai |cauiu is sunnciru cj jcrn. Tnc
Briiisn cnpiricisis (c.g. Icr! Kancs) siu!ic! raincr inc inprcssicn na!c |u inc
|cauiiju| c|jcci cn inc nin!. an! |ai! inc jcun!aiicns cj inc psucnc|cgu cj |cauiu unicn
nas sincc |ccn ucrkc! cui |u |ccnncr ( G.S.. V|. 248-62). Oi|incus sunpainics arc
naiura||u uiin inc cnpirica| an! psucnc|cgica| scncc|. |ui ncnc inc |css nc jin!s incir
sian!pcini ina!cuaic. Wiincui !uc||ing upcn Kanis ccniri|uiicn. nc passcs cn ic
ccnsi!cr inc ucrk cj Gccinc. Scni||cr. an! cincr Gcrnan uriicrs cj inc rcnaniic pcric!.
|i uas incu unc ca||c! aiicniicn ic inc rc|aiicn |ciuccn inc inncr |ijc cj inc nin! an! iis
cuiuar! cxprcssicn in a tisi||c jcrn (Gcsia|i). Bu sc !cing incu ca||c! aiicniicn auau
jrcn inc |cauiiju| c|jcci an! inc acsinciic inprcssicn unicn ii nakcs cn inc c|scrtcr.
an! jccusc! ii raincr cn inc crcaiitc prcccss in inc ariisis nin!. Bcauiu. cn inis ticu.
can |c !cjinc! in icrns cj cxprcssicn. inai jcrn is |cauiiju| unicn a!cuaic|u cxprcsscs
inc inncr |ijc |cnin! ii ( G.S.. V|. 116-17). Bui inc sanc ccnccpiicn cpcns up tisias in
pni|c|cgu. inc siu!u cj |anguagc. an! in ncrncncuiics. inc siu!u cj inicrprciaiicn (
G.S.. V|. 122). |i a|sc |ca!s cn ic a siu!u cj inc crcaiitc prcccss uncrc|u inc inncr |ijc
jin!s iis cuiuar! cxprcssicn. an! inis again. |u jcrcing aiicniicn upcn inc ccn!iiicns
un!cr unicn inc crcaiitc prcccss ucrks.
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paves lhe vay for lhe appIicalion of lhe hisloricaI melhod and lhe comparalive
sludy of periods and schooIs of arl ( G.S.. V|, 266-70). Thus aeslhelics Iinks up
vilh lhe vider movemenl of lhoughl in lhe human sludies in lhe posl-Kanlian
generalion.
DiIlhey's ovn aeslhelic is fundamenlaIIy lhal of lhe romanlics, bul vilh an
imporlanl difference. The romanlics aIIied lhemseIves vilh lhe specuIalive
melaphysics of lheir lime, and Iosl lheir hoId upon concrele facl. Cul Ioose from
ils proper empiricaI basis in lhe sludy of medium, lechnique, and hisloricaI
condilions, lheir conceplion of arl degeneraled inlo lhal of a vorId of ideaI
forms, 'lhe romanlic vorId of beaulifuI iIIusion', having no posilive reIevance lo
experience, vhiIe lhe hislory and comparalive sludy of arl vas Iefl lo be
lransmuled by HegeI inlo an abslracl diaIeclic ( G.S.. V|, 122-3, 269). DiIlhey
shovs lhal lhe underIying lrulh of romanlicism can onIy be saved if lhe
negIecled faclors are reslored lo viev: lhe anaIysis of lhe crealive process, lhe
comparalive sludy of lhe differenl genres of arl, and lhe inlerprelalion of lheir
hislory, musl aII be made lo resl upon knovIedge of lhe lechnicaI condilions
imposed by lhe arlisl's medium, and of lhe hisloricaI condilions vhich affecl
him and his pubIic. DiIlhey goes on lo say lhal lhe vork cannol be carried
lhrough vilhoul lhe aid of psychoIogy. He very frankIy ovns lhal lhe
psychoIogy prevaiIing in his lime is incapabIe of expIaining or even correclIy
describing lhe process of arlislic crealion: bul lhe concIusion he dravs from lhis
is mereIy lhal lhere viII have lo be sveeping changes in psychoIogicaI melhods
and doclrines. In lhe meanlime, ve musl nol slrain ourseIves lo keep vilhin lhe
lerms of conlemporary psychoIogicaI lheories: ve musl describe and anaIyse
vilhoul preconceplions, and so conlribule lovards lhe psychoIogy of
lomorrov.
AccordingIy, in Oic |in|i|!ungskraji !cs Oicnicrs, DiIlhey sels himseIf lo anaIyse
lhe menlaI conslilulion of lhe poel. He finds lhal il does nol differ in kind, bul
onIy in degree, from lhal of lhe ordinary man.
We have seen in previous chaplers hov experience is buiIl up from ils primary
dala and organised inlo a coherenl vhoIe. Sense-dala and Iived experiences, as
lhey arise in consciousness, are cIarified by siIenl lhoughl, ampIified by
eIemenls dravn from memory and imaginalion, and made lhe basis of a syslem
of generaI ideas. Il is lhus lhal, in lhe sphere of cogni-
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lion, ve buiId up a syslem of organised knovIedge. In lhe sphere of voIilion,
simiIar processes Iead lo lhe formalion of habils, cusloms, Iavs, moraI and
reIigious discipIines, and finaIIy lo lhe reasoned formuIalion of ideaIs and
principIes. Nov, il is lhe same process vhich, in lhe sphere of feeIing, gives rise
lo poelry. The basic funclion of poelry, as of aII lhe arls, is lo bring order and
harmony inlo our emolionaI Iife, lo creale and mainlain in us a baIance of
prevaiIingIy pIeasanl feeIing. The poel is one vho can do lhis for himseIf and
for olhers, because his experiences are richer in conlenl and cIearer in delaiI
lhan lhose of olher men. His imaginalion is proIific in invenlion. He can
undersland olher peopIe, and can express himseIf, more adequaleIy lhan mosl.
And so he is abIe lo pIay upon our imaginalion and evoke in us vhal emolionaI
responses he viII. He invenls persons and characlers, and brings lhem logelher
in a dramalic silualion: around lhem he evokes, assembIes, and conlroIs
emolionaI alliludes of various kinds: and so he Ieads us, lhrough anlicipalion,
discord, and suspense, lo lhe finaI reconciIialion in a harmonious baIance of
feeIing ( G.S.. V|, 131-63).
If lhis vere aII, il vouId be no smaII lhing. The poel vouId lhen be lo our
emolionaI Iife vhal lhe schoIar is lo our inleIIecluaI Iife or lhe prophel lo our
reIigious consciousness. ul his funclion, imporlanl as il vouId be, vouId reIale
vhoIIy lo lhe emolionaI Iife, and nol al aII lo lhe inleIIecluaI or lhe moraI. He
vouId be a masler of invenlion and iIIusion, vhich vouId be none lhe Iess
invenlion and iIIusion because lhey vouId be beneficiaI. ul lhis is nol in facl
lhe vhoIe slory. The images used by lhe poel, and lhe experiences vhich lhey
convey lo us, are more lhan mere vorks of fanlasy. They are, as lruIy as
scienlific slalemenls, a 'represenlalion' of reaIily. IndividuaI lhemseIves, lhey
yel convey universaI lrulhs. And DiIlhey sels as a mollo, al lhe head of Oic Orci
|pccncn u.s.u., lhe vords of SchiIIer: 'WouId lhal al Iasl lhe demand for beauly
mighl be given up, and vhoIIy and enlireIy repIaced by lhe demand for lrulh.'
In lrying lo undersland vhal lhis means, ve musl firsl of aII avoid lhe error of
lhinking of lhe poel as a man vilh a message, vho has an idea cIearIy
formuIaled in his mind and vriles his poem vilh inlenl lo give il expression: so
lhal lhe poem is lo be underslood by unearlhing lhis hidden idea. There is no
'under-
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Iying idea' in lhal sense. Whal underIies e.g. Han|ci is an imaginalive process
vhich look pIace in Shakespeare's mind. Various lhoughls and feeIings, arising
oul of his personaI experience and alliludes lo Iife, found a focus in lhe HamIel
saga. Under lheir infIuence lhe saga vas aIlered and shaped inlo lhe compIex
slory vhich is lhe exisling pIay. AII lhal Shakespeare had in mind lo do vhen
he vrole il vas lo give expression lo lhis imaginalive and emolionaI compIex
vhich had grovn up in his mind. 'The aclion pul forvard . . . in pIay and
counlerpIay admils of various inlerprelalions. ul lhis much can cIearIy be
seen, lhal here in lhe poel's Iived experience and in lhe moving symboIs of il
lhere Iies a kerneI of lhe drama vhich cannol be ullered in a sel of proposilions.
In lhe mind of lhe deepIy moved speclalor lhe vhoIe is fused in a mereIy
imaged and feIl unily of lhe deepesl experiences of Iife, and il is lhis lhal lhe
poelry has lo say lo him' ( G.S.. V|, 207-8).
And yel, even in and lhrough lhis compIex of feeIings and images, Han|ci does
convey lrulh lo lhe reader. Il can do so because lhe characlers and silualions oul
of vhich lhe pIay is buiIl up are, severaIIy and coIIecliveIy, signijicani and
iupica|. Whal does DiIlhey mean by lhis, and vhal does il invoIve`
He Ieads up lo his poinl by leIIing us a greal deaI aboul lhe vay in vhich
knovIedge and lrue vaIue-|udgmenl depend on pasl experience. A chiId, vho
has presenl perceplions bul IillIe experience by vhich lo inlerprel lhem, reacls
arlIessIy and unrefIecliveIy lo each presenl slimuIus, and has no greal pover of
crilicism or seIf-conlroI. Wilh advancing malurily lhere sIovIy comes inlo
exislence a deposil of pasl experience vhich DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'acquired syslem
of menlaI Iife' (crucr|cncr Zusanncnnang !cs Scc|cn|c|cns). He dveIIs al greal
Ienglh upon lhe funclions of lhis 'acquired syslem'. Il is lhe organ by vhich lrue
perceplion is dislinguished from iIIusion, and reaIily from fanlasy. Il is lhe
organ by vhich |udgmenl is guided arighl in mallers aIike of facl, of vaIue, and
of duly. Il provides lhe maleriaI for lheories and for pIans, logelher vilh sound
|udgmenl lo make lhem vise and lrue. 'Iroposilions ove lo il lheir cerlilude:
concepls derive from il lheir sharp deIimilalion: . . . feeIings Iikevise receive
from il lheir measure for lhe syslem of Iife. Our viII, vhich is moslIy occupied
vilh means, by virlue of lhe same syslem remains conscious lhroughoul of lhe
compIex of
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ends on vhich lhe means are based' ( G.S.. V|, 143-4, cf. 167-8 ci pass.).
If, lhrough some Iesion of lhe brain or olher cause, lhe acquired syslem faiIs lo
operale efficienlIy, lhen lhe sub|ecl, vilhoul Iosing lhe pover of imaginalion or
of IogicaI inference, Ioses lhe pover lo correIale his imaginalions and his
inferences vilh common sense, and becomes unabIe lo dislinguish facl from
fancy. Thal is vhal happens in dreams, and again in madness. The dreamer and
lhe madman have a free fIov of imagery, vilhoul lhe pover lo discriminale
belveen lheir imaginalions and reaIily. The poel loo has a free fIov of imagery,
bul he is nol deceived by il. His acquired syslem prevenls such error, and
shovs him lhe difference belveen vhal he perceives and vhal he mereIy
imagines. ul il does more lhan lhis: il enlers inlo his imaginalions loo, and
imparls lo lhem a sublIe meaning and reIevance lo lhe vorId of reaIily ( G.S..
V|, 165-72: and cf. Oicnicriscnc |in|i|!ungskraji u. Wannsinn. G.S.. V|. 90-102). |i is
in inis rc|aiicn inai uc sna|| jin! inc ncans |u unicn pcciru ccntcus iruin.
Tnc pcci. uc sau. is a nan uncsc scnsaiicns. inagcs. an! |itc! cxpcricnccs arc
unusua||u titi! an! !ciai|c!. an! unc nas an unusua| pcucr |cin cj cxprcssicn an! cj
un!crsian!ing. |i jc||cus inai nis acuirc! susicn is ricn|u sicrc! uiin cxpcricncc.
cspccia||u uiin cxpcricncc cj nunan |ijc. an! |u tiriuc cj inis nc is a||c ic !isccuni unai
is acci!cnia| cr ccniingcni in anu cnaracicr. ctcni. cr aspcci cj |ijc. ic sing|c cui unai is
csscniia| (ucscnnaji) in ii. an! ic gitc c|car inaginaiitc cxprcssicn ic inis. Tnc
csscniia|. inus sing|c! cui jrcn inc aciua|. uc !csignaic as inc iupica|. an! inc inagc
unicn cn|c!ics cr cxprcsscs ii is ca||c! a iupc. Sucn is inc acccuni unicn Oi|incu gitcs.
scncunai na|iing|u. in Oic |in|i|!ungskraji !cs Oicnicrs ( G.S.. V|. 185-8).
Hc rciurns ic inc su|jcci inrcc ucars |aicr in u|cr tcrg|cicncn!c Psucnc|cgic. an! ncrc
nc ircais ii ai grcaicr |cngin. Hc ic||s us inai inc iupc cr inc iupica| in!iti!ua|. in inc
prcpcr scnsc cj inc ucr!. cn|c!ics a ncrn cr sian!ar! cj ta|uc. ii is nci ncrc|u inc
ccnncn cr cr!inaru. |ui inc i!ca|. Tnc iupica| in inc scnsc cj inc usua|. uiincui inc
inp|icaiicn cj ta|uc. is a scccn!aru ccnccpiicn. arritc! ai |u a|siraciicn. | c|scrtc a
skaicr cr a !anccr. Tnc apincss cj inc nctcncnis is jcr nc inscpara||u
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bound up vilh lhe perceplion of lhem. . . . OnIy by efforl and praclice can I here
sever my ideas of facl from lhose of vaIue. In lhis vay, for every deparlmenl of
lhe manifeslalions of human Iife, lhere arises a lype of lheir apl fuIfiImenl. Il
denoles lheir norm, Iying belveen varialions on bolh sides. One lypicaI
manifeslalion of Iife lhus represenls a vhoIe cIass. This is lhe primary sense in
vhich ve appIy lhe concepl of lhe lypicaI. ul if I emphasise, or skelch as il
vere in heavier Iines, lhose lrails in such a lype vhich express lhe reguIar
eIemenl in lhe vhoIe group, I can aIso speak of vhal is broughl oul in lhese
heavier Iines as a lype. The concepl of lhe lype lhen denoles lhe emphasised
common eIemenl. . . . Il is lhus lhal ve commonIy speak of a lypicaI course of
evenls. Il is in lhis sense lhal Shakespeare presenls lypes of lhe passions.' The
pover lo see vhal is lypicaI is presenl in aII men, bul more highIy deveIoped in
lhe poel, and is an essenliaI parl of his equipmenl ( G.S.. V, 279-80).
We can nov say preciseIy vherein consisls lhe reveaIing pover of arl. The
characlers and silualions presenled lo us in a poem, and lhe feeIing-responses
evoked by lhem in us, are iupica| of a segmenl of possibIe human experience,
and of ils vaIue or significance for us. y conlempIalion of lhe lype, our
acquainlance vilh vhal il represenls is videned, and our pover lo see ils lrue
significance is heighlened. Arl lherefore, no Iess lhan science, bul in a very
differenl vay, is a vehicIe of lrulh. 'Thoughl produces concepls, arlislic crealion
produces lypes. These . . . embody a heighlening (Sicigcrung) of experience, nol
in lhe sense of an emply ideaIisalion, bul in lhe sense of a represenlalion of lhe
manifoId in one image, vhose slrong, cIear slruclure makes lhe Iesser, confused
experiences of Iife inleIIigibIe (tcrsian!|icn) in accordance vilh lheir meaning
(Bc!cuiung)' ( G.S.. V|, 186).
If a poem conveys lrulh, lhere musl be somelhing in il vhich hoIds good for aII
men. DiIlhey ascribes lo il, in facl, lvo of lhe formaI characlerislics of scienlific
proposilions, tiz. universaI vaIidily and necessily, lhough nol in lhe same sense
in vhich lhese lerms appIy lo proposilions. 'UniversaI vaIidily means lhal every
feeIing hearl can reconslrucl (nacn|i|!cn) and en|oy lhe vork.' 'Necessily means
lhal lhe syslem presenl in a poem is as cogenl for lhe reader as il vas for lhe
crealive arlisl.' 'The persons acl vilh necessily if lhe reader or speclalor feeIs
lhal he loo vouId acl so' ( G.S.. V|, 186-7).
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This does nol mean lhal lhere is nol aIso a slrong eIemenl of sub|eclivily in lhe
arlisl's vork. There aIvays is and musl be such an eIemenl. Il is nol lhal vhal
lhe arlisl sees is faIse or unreaI: on lhe conlrary, il is lrue and reaI in lhe sense
vhich has |usl been defined. ul he sees il in his ovn vay, and onIy he couId
ever have seen il in |usl lhal vay. This eIemenl of personaI perspeclive is of
course nol pecuIiar lo lhe arlisl's vision. Il is common lo aII of us. Suppose I am
perceiving an ob|ecl-say, a human face. Among lhe fealures composing il, some
one viII sland oul in my consciousness as cenlraI: DiIlhey caIIs il lhe 'poinl of
impression' (|in!ruckspunki). The poinl of impression viII nol necessariIy be lhe
same for me as for anolher man: lhe seIeclion of il viII depend on my
experience, apliludes, and characler. Once delermined, lhe poinl of impression
lhen becomes lhe cenlre round vhich I arrange lhe resl of my dala, slressing
some and sIurring over olhers by virlue of lhe slrucluraI reIalions vhich radiale
from lhe cenlraI poinl. 'Il is from here lhal slruclure and form become
inleIIigibIe and significanl' ( G.S.. V|, 283). Whal happens lo me happens lo lhe
arlisl aIso. He aIso seIecls and modifies according lo his personaI slandpoinl, in
spile of himseIf, even vhen he laIks of 'naluraIism' and aims al failhfuI
recording of facls. 'Ivery efforl lo see vilhoul apperceiving, as il vere lo
resoIve lhe sensuous image inlo coIours on a paIelle, musl faiI. . . . Ioelry loo
cannol mereIy lranscribe vhal goes on. . . . Such an allempl lo lranscribe viII
aIvays be condilioned by lhe sub|eclivily of lhe poel vho hears, remembers,
reproduces (nachbiIdel), because aII lhese processes are infIuenced by lhe
syslem of acquired concepls and images.' Il is naluraI, lherefore, lhal lhe
various characlers and silualions depicled by lhe same arlisl shouId shov a
'famiIy Iikeness' ( G.S.. V, 280-3, cf. VI, 282-4). And, since lhe arlisl's acquired
syslem is hisloricaIIy condilioned, and mirrors lhe sociely in vhich he moves,
his vork as a vhoIe becomes lypicaI of his age and counlry, and is nol lhe Ieasl
imporlanl of lhe faclors vhich make possibIe lhe underslanding of lhe pasl (
G.S.. V|, 230-1).
Il is characlerislic of DiIlhey's vork in aeslhelics lhal ve can never go far in il
vilhoul being broughl up againsl lhe conceplion of underslanding (!as
Vcrsicncn). This is lhe more slriking because he dravs so much of his inspiralion
from lhe romanlics, vhose main emphasis vas Iaid upon lhe expressive and
crealive
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aclivily of lhe arlisl. Il is vorlhy of nole hov in lhe aeslhelic vrilings of Croce
and CoIIingvood, and even of CoIeridge, lhe arlisl as crealor has firsl pIace,
and lhe vay in vhich ve come lo undersland him is deaIl vilh casuaIIy, as if
no probIem arose lhere. DiIlhey loo is inleresled in lhe arlisl. He praises lhe
poslKanlians for having lurned our allenlion in lhal direclion. ul he is al Ieasl
equaIIy inleresled in lhe arlisl's pubIic, in vhal he means lo lhem, and hov lhey
undersland him. Il is perhaps lhe posilivisl again, vilh his insislence on lhe
pubIic good and his demand lhal cuIluraI aclivilies shaII be of benefil lo lhe
communily, vho speaks here. ul il is aIso lhe hislorian and lhe crilic,
accuslomed lo reading and inlerpreling lexls, and asking lhemseIves hov lhe
inlerpreling is done. Al any rale, lhroughoul DiIlhey's aeslhelic lhere runs an
emphasis on underslanding: on lhe arlisl as himseIf possessing lhe pover lo
undersland Iife, and on lhe underslanding of lhe arlisl's vork by olhers, by
crilics and inlerprelers, by hislorians, and by lhe generaI pubIic, as lhe
consummalion and fuIfiImenl of his funclion.
This poinls us beyond lhe presenl chapler. The nalure of underslanding, as
DiIlhey opens il up, is a vasl sub|ecl, and lo il our nexl chapler shaII be
dedicaled.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IN lhe foregoing discussion of DiIlhey's lheory of knovIedge, very IillIe has
been said aboul his conceplion of lhe process vhereby ve come lo knov olher
minds. This is an issue vhich vrilers on epislemoIogy have loo much
negIecled: so much so lhal lhere is nol even a lradilion of discussion on lhe
poinl, or a sequence of oulslanding vorks deaIing vilh il, comparabIe vilh lhe
cIassic sequence of lheories, from Descarles lo our ovn day, deaIing vilh our
knovIedge of physicaI ob|ecls. DiIlhey himseIf has a good deaI lo say upon lhe
queslion. His conceplion of lhe reIalion belveen Iived experience, ils
expression, and lhe underslanding of il ( |r|c|nis, Aus!ruck, Vcrsicncn) is
deservedIy prominenl in mosl exposilions of his phiIosophy, because il hoIds a
cenlraI pIace in his finaI synlhesis, and is an imporlanl issue in lhe
psychoIogicaI and phiIosophicaI conlroversies vhich have arisen from his
vrilings. Hence il has seemed advisabIe lo devole a separale chapler lo lhis parl
of DiIlhey's phiIosophy. This course has lhe furlher advanlage of enabIing us lo
examine il in reIalion lo his pecuIiar conceplion of meaning (Bc!cuiung), vhich
is nol, as mighl be supposed, a conceplion beIonging lo epislemoIogy or lo pure
Iogic, bul one vhich Ieads us direclIy over lo lhe queslion of lhe melhods and
sub|ecl-maller of lhe human sludies, vilh vhich ve shaII be concerned in
subsequenl chaplers.
Il is obvious lhal our earIiesl acquainlance vilh olher minds is oblained
lhrough experience of Iiving human bodies, in vhose behaviour lhe Iife of lhe
mind vhich informs lhem is manifesled: and lhis source of knovIedge remains
fundamenlaI and indispensabIe, no maller vhal more sublIe modes of
communicalion and underslanding may Ialer be added lo il. Hov lhen,
according lo DiIlhey, do ve pass from lhe perceplion of peopIe's bodies lo lhe
underslanding of lheir minds` We need nol repeal lhe accounl of hov ve pass
from sensalions lo lhe
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perceplion of a physicaI ob|ecl. Thal vas deaIl vilh in Chapler Tvo. The
queslion nov is, hov ve pass from lhe perceplion of a parlicuIar kind of
physicaI ob|ecl, viz. a human body, lo an underslanding of lhe menlaI Iife
vhich inhabils and informs il.
There are reaIIy lvo queslions. Iirsl: hov do ve pass from lhe physicaI
expression, perceived by lhe senses, lo lhe recognilion lhal lhere is a menlaI Iife
behind il` And second: granled lhal lhere is such a menlaI Iife in anolher
person, hov do ve expIore il and come lo undersland il coherenlIy and in
delaiI` DiIlhey ansvers bolh queslions vilh one and lhe same conlenlion, viz.
lhal ve undersland olhers by lransference from our ovn inner Iife. Confronled
vilh a body vhich resembIes our ovn, and behaves in vays vhich resembIe
our ovn behaviour, ve credil il vilh having a menlaI Iife as ve have, and ve
aIso credil il vilh having lhe same sorl of menlaI Iife as ve have. Whal ve
impule lo olhers is nol mereIy occasionaI fIashes of consciousness, isoIaled
lhoughls or feeIings, bul a slrucluraI syslem Iike our ovn, a veaIlh of inner Iife
vhich forms a seIforganising compIex Iike our ovn. Thal is vhy, from lhe
fragmenlary dala vhich musl be our slarling-poinl, ve can in favourabIe
condilions buiId up a vide and inlimale knovIedge of olher minds. ecause ve
assume lhal lheir slruclure is Iike our ovn, ve can pass from parlicuIar facls
aboul lhem lo a piclure of lhe vhoIe of vhich lhose facls are parl.
DiIlhey says lhal lhis doubIe process is, in bolh ils parls, equivaIenl lo an
inference by anaIogy ( G.S.. V, 110, 277, VII, 207). ul he is cIear lhal il is nol in
ils ovn nalure an inferenliaI process. We shaII come near lo lhe hearl of lhe
maller if ve examine his reasons for lhis. He has lvo reasons, of vhich lhe firsl
concerns onIy lhe firsl parl of lhe process--lhe passage from expressions lo vhal
Iies behind lhem--vhiIe lhe second concerns bolh.
In lhe firsl pIace, an inference invoIves a dislinclion belveen lhe premisses and
lhe concIusion, and a process by vhich ve go from lhe one lo lhe olher. In lhis
inslance lhe premiss vouId be lhal X's body is Iike mine and behaves Iike mine,
and lhe concIusion vouId be lhal lherefore X has a menlaI Iife Iike mine: or,
more specificaIIy, lhe premiss vouId be lhal X is in a cerlain physicaI slale, e.g.
veeping, and lhe concIusion vouId be lhal he is sorrovfuI. In reaI Iife ve do
nol drav lhis expIicil dislinc-
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lion belveen bodiIy and menlaI slales, and argue from lhe one lo lhe olher, any
more lhan in reading a prinled page ve expIicilIy dislinguish lhe vords from
lheir meaning and argue from lhe one lo lhe olher. Il is onIy if lhe Ianguage is
unknovn, or lhe grammar or speIIing or prinling al fauIl, lhal ve slop lo nolice
lhe prinled vord as an enlily in ilseIf. In lhe same vay, il is onIy in lhe presence
of some eccenlricily lhal ve slop lo nolice lhe bodiIy expression of a menlaI
facl, and lhen onIy because ve do nol al lhe momenl knov vhal il expresses.
Where ve do knov, lhe expression and lhe expressed are fused in one
perceplion. As DiIlhey himseIf puls il, 'lhe menlaI aclivily vhich governs aII
underslanding', in ils 'drive (Zug) lovards lhe menlaI facl expressed', 'pIaces ils
goaI in lhe Ialler, and yel lhe expressions presenled lo lhe senses do nol
disappear in lhe menlaI facl. Through lhe fundamenlaI reIalion belveen lhe
expression and lhe menlaI facl il comes aboul lhal e.g. lhe Iook on lhe face and
lhe lerror are nol lvo coexisling lhings (nicni cin Nc|cncinan!cr), bul a unily' (
G.S.. V||, 208).
In lhe second pIace, an inference is an inleIIecluaI process, a succession of
|udgmenls Iinked vilh one anolher by IogicaI reIalions: vhereas our
underslanding of olher minds, in bolh ils aspecls, is primariIy a vork of
imaginalion. To undersland anolher person is nol mereIy lo knov lhal he is
having a cerlain experience, bul lo feeI lhe reverberalion of lhal experience in
myseIf, lo reIive il (nacncr|c|cn) or reconslrucl il imaginaliveIy (nacn|i|!cn). I
may lhen form a |udgmenl lo lhe effecl lhal 'X is having such and such an
experience': bul such a |udgmenl depends for ils evidence on lhe imaginalive
reconslruclion (Nacn|i|!), and never succeeds in saying verbaIIy as much as I
have reIived imaginaliveIy. DiIlhey puls lhe poinl in his ovn vay as foIIovs.
'The underslanding of someone eIse's slale can be conceived prina jacic as an
anaIogicaI inference, proceeding from an cxicrna| pnusica| process, by virlue of
ils |ikcncss lo sini|ar processes vhich ve have found connecled vilh cerlain
inncr slales, lo an inncr slale |ikc lhese. ul lhis accounl gives onIy a rough and
schemalic descriplion of vhal is conlained in lhe resuIl of lhe reconslruclive
process (!ic Nacn|i|!ung). Ior lhis idea of il in lhe form of an inference severs
lhe inner slales, bolh lhal from vhich ve infer and lhe olher vhich is added by
inference, from lhe compIex of menlaI Iife al lhe lime vhen each
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occurs, vhereas il is onIy by ils reIalion lo lhis lhal lhe reconslruclion oblains ils
cerlainly and ils cIoser definilion of delaiI. This can be confirmed by lhe
foIIoving facls. The inlerprelalion of olher men's ullerances (Ausscrungcn)
varies very much according lo our knovIedge of lhe compIex lo vhich such an
ullerance beIongs, or according lo lhe lype of menlaI Iife vhich in mosl cases is,
quile unrefIecliveIy, Iaid al lheir basis. And lhe Iimil of our underslanding
aIvays Iies al lhe poinl vhere ve can no Ionger reconslrucl on lhe basis of lhe
compIex. ul lhe eIemenls in lhe reconslruclive process are bound logelher nol
al aII by IogicaI operalions, e.g. an anaIogicaI inference. To reconslrucl is lo
reIive (Nacn|i|!cn isi c|cn cin Nacncr|c|cn)' ( G.S.. V, 277).
This is lhe process vhich DiIlhey caIIs underslanding (!as Vcrsicncn), and lhe
passage quoled, in spile of ils cIumsy vording, lakes us near lo lhe hearl of his
doclrine aboul il. The slrucluraI syslem appears in a doubIe capacily. As lhe
slrucluraI syslem of anolher mind` il is lhe ob|ecl vhich I undersland: and as
my ovn slrucluraI syslem, il is lhe organ by vhose means I undersland. The
lask-of underslanding, says DiIlhey, is 'lo discover a Iiving syslem
(Ic|cnszusanncnnang) in lhe given': and 'lhis is onIy possibIe because lhe
syslem vhich exisls in my ovn Iived experience, and is experienced in
numberIess inslances, vilh aII ils inherenl possibiIilies is aIvays presenl and
avaiIabIe (gcgcnuariig un! |crcii)' ( G.S.. V||, 213-4). Again he says lhal
underslanding is 'a rediscovery of lhe I in lhe Thou' (!as Vcrsicncn isi cin
Wic!crjin!cn !cs |cn in Ou: G.S.. V||, 191): bul lhis is onIy possibIe because I read
myseIf inlo lhe Thou. DiIlhey speaks of a 'lransposilion' of my ovn Iife inlo lhe
ob|ecl (U|criragung !cs cigcncn Sc||si. Transpcsiiicn. Sicnnincintcrscizcn). Il is nol
enough mereIy lo 'lranspose' isoIaled experiences, a passing feeIing or desire,
inlo lhe olher person. If I am lo see him as a person, lo undersland his menlaI
Iife in ils conlinuily and coherence, I musl lrace in his experience lhe Iines of
conneclion vilh vhich I am famiIiar in my ovn. I can do lhis in proporlion as
lhe consciousness of my ovn menlaI slruclure is presenl (prascni) in and
governs my underslanding of his. 'The souI lraveIs lhe accuslomed palhs, on
vhich of oId, in simiIar condilions of Iife, she en|oyed and slruggIed, desired
and acled' ( G.S.. V||, 214).
DiIlhey remarks lhal lhe lvo parls of lhe process of underslanding are
differenlIy reIaled lo lhe order of evenls in lhe Iife-
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process vhich is underslood. (1) Lived experience gives rise lo an expression:
and vhen ve pass from lhis lo lhe experience behind il, ve are moving back
from effecl lo cause. The expression, vhich is menlaI Iife cryslaIIised and as il
vere congeaIed in a physicaI form, is 'lurned back inlo Iife' vhen il is
underslood. Again, vhen ve move from a parlicuIar menlaI evenl lo lhe vhoIe
compIex from vhich il proceeds, and in lhe Iighl of vhich il is lo be
underslood, ve move from effecl lo cause. ul (2) underslanding reaches ils
crovn vhen, by virlue of my grasp of lhe olher person's experience as a seIf-
differenlialing unilary process, I become abIe lo Iel lhe vhoIe course of il unroII
ilseIf in my consciousness in lhe order in vhich il acluaIIy look pIace, and so
nol mereIy undersland, bul even share or reIive, lhe Iife of anolher person. 'On
lhe basis of lhis Hincintcrscizcn, lhis lransposilion, arises lhe highesl form in
vhich lhe lolaIily of lhe Iife of lhe mind is operalive in underslanding--lhe
process of reconslrucling or reIiving.
1
Underslanding is in ilseIf an operalion
inverse lo lhe causaI process (Wirkungstcr|auj) ilseIf. A perfecl sharing of Iife
(cin tc||kcnncncs Mii|c|cn)
2
depends on lhe
____________________
1
In lhe Iale essay from vhich I am quoling, DiIlhey seems lo confine lhe lerm
nachbiIden or nacherIeben lo lhis finaI slage in underslanding. We may
ignore lhis change of usage, because lhere is no lrace of il before 1910, and
lhen il is nol imporlanl.
2
Il is imporlanl lo dislinguish belveen nacn and nii, as in nacncr|c|cn and
niicr|c|cn, nacnjunkn and niijun|cn, elc. When I undersland an expression of
feeIing in some olher person, lhe firsl lhing is lhal I have in my mind a
reproduclion, or Nacn|i|!, of his feeIing: i.e. a feeIing of lhe same kind as he
has. This is !as Nacnjun|cn. The second lhing is lhal I have a feeIing aboul his
feeIing: i.e. I feeI in a cerlain vay aboul lhe facl lhal he has lhe feeIing vhich
he has. This second feeIing is caIIed Sunpainic or Miigcjun|, and lakes lhe
form of re|oicing because of his |oy (Miijrcu!c) or sorroving because of his
sorrov (Mii|ci!). Sympalhy is an inevilabIe accompanimenl of lhe
underslanding of persons, vhelher lhe persons underslood be peopIe in reaI
Iife, or characlers on lhe slage or in a noveI, and lhe exlenl lo vhich We can
sympalhise defines aIso lhe exlenl lo vhich ve can undersland. We can
sympalhise profoundIy vilh characlers on lhe slage, because, no privale
inleresls of ours being affecled by lheir forlunes, no privale feeIings can
dislorl our sympalhy: and DiIlhey regards lhe drama as lhe fieId vhere ve
have aIso lhe cIearesl and deepesl underslanding. Where ve cannol
sympalhise vilh a man al aII, ve cannol undersland him eilher. 'Hov
impalienlIy ve Iislen lo many an exposilion: ve nolice onIy one poinl in il,
vhich has praclicaI imporlance for us, vilhoul having any inleresl in lhe
inner Iife of lhe speaker. Whereas in olher cases ve slrive persislenlIy lo
pierce lhrough every Iook, every vord, inlo lhe inner Iife of a speaker.' There
are
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condilion lhal our underslanding shaII move forvard in lhe Iine of hislory
ilseIf. ConlinuaIIy advancing, il moves on vilh lhe course of Iife ilseIf. Thus lhe
process of Sicnnincintcrscizcn or lransposilion is videned. To reIive is lo creale
aIong lhe Iine of hislory. So ve move forvard vilh lhe hislory of lime' ( G.S..
V||, 214).
1

____________________
lvo spheres vhere ve have a Nacngcjun| vilhoul Miigcjun|. The firsl is
inslrumenlaI music. 'No one viII condoIe vilh eelhoven over lhe expression
of grief in one of his adagios, and no one can re|oice vilh lhe unruffIed
cheerfuIness of an aIIegro by Haydn.' The second is lhe empalhic experience,
in vhich ve ascribe feeIings lo nalure (!ic |injun|ung). IinaIIy, vhen our
underslanding grovs from a momenlary Nacnjun|cn lo a fuIIy deveIoped
Nacncr|c|cn, so lhal ve foIIov sympalhelicaIIy a conlinuous process in
anolher person's Iife, vhiIe our ovn reaclion lo lhe Nacncr|c|ics videns from
a mere feeIing of sympalhy lo incIude admiralion, esleem, conlempl, elc., and
finaIIy becomes lhe basis of a vhoIe slrucluraI compIex of lhoughls, feeIings,
and voIilions in us--lhen ve have !as Ic|cn in An!crcn, or !cs Mii|c|cn ( G.S..
V, 111, 277-8, 319, VII, 51-2).
1
Il is of some inleresl lo compare lhese slalemenls vilh lhose of GenliIe on lhe
same sub|ecl. 'Il is common knovIedge lhal, vhenever ve are lo undersland
(inicn!crc) somelhing vhich has spiriluaI vaIue and can be caIIed a spiriiua|
jaci, ve need lo regard such an ob|ecl of our research nol as somelhing sel
over againsl us vho seek lo undersland il, bul as somelhing vhich becomes
idenlicaI (sinnc!csini) vilh our spiriluaI aclivily. . . . Il is a fundamenlaI
condilion of underslanding olhers, lhal ve shouId penelrale inlo lheir
spiriluaI reaIily. . . . Wilhoul lhe consensus (i| ccnscnsc), vilhoul lhe
unificalion of our spiril, lhis lhinking aclivily of ours vhich is lo slrive lo
undersland, vilh lhe olher mind vilh vhich il desires lo enler inlo reIalion,
il is nol possibIe lo have any underslanding, nor even lo begin lo observe or
discover anylhing vhich goes on in anolher mind. Ivery spiriluaI reIalion,
every communicalion belveen our inner reaIily and someone eIse's, is
essenliaIIy unily. . . . We need lo unify ourseIves vilh lhe mind vhich ve
desire lo knov, because lhe reaIily of lhal mind consisls in our very ovn
mind: and lhal mind cannol be mel vilh even in our ovn mind, excepl as ils
ovn proper sub|eclivily: Iife of our Iife, lhere vhere, vilhin our mind, ve
dislinguish nolhing in opposilion lo il' ( Tccria gcncra|c !c||c spiriic ccnc aiic
purc. pp. 6-8). Gcnii|cs nciapncrs arc !ijjcrcni jrcn Oi|incus. |ui ii sccns c|car
inai nis i!cniijicaiicn. pcnciraiicn. ccnscnsus. unijicaiicn rcprcscni inc sanc
ining as Oi|incus U|criragung cr Sicnnincintcrscizcn.-Tnis !ccp uniiu uc jcc|
ctcru iinc inai uc can sau uc ccnprcncn! cur ncign|cur. in a|| incsc ncncnis uncn
uc arc nc |cngcr sinp|c inic||igcncc. an! natc ncc! ic |ctc. uc arc nci ccnicni uiin
inai a|siraci aciitiiu unicn is ca||c! nin! (ncnic). |ui uc ncc!. as ii is sai!. a gcc!
!ispcsiiicn cj spirii. unicn is ccnncn|u ca||c! ncari. gcc! ui||. cnariiu. sunpainu.
cpcnncss cj nin!. uarnin cj ajjcciicn (cp. cii.. p. 7). Hcrc uc nau rcccgnisc
Oi|incus ccnicniicn. inai un!crsian!ing is a junciicn nci cj incugni
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Al firsl sighl lhis is a Iarge cIaim, and il musl be read in lhe Iighl of lhings
vhich DiIlhey says eIsevhere. He is nol so naive as lo lhink lhal ve
undersland by having in our minds an exacl repIica of anolher person's menlaI
processes. Aparl from olher consideralions, lhe lime faclor aIone makes lhis
impossibIe: for hov can ve reIive a Iong process, such as ve meel vilh in a
hisloricaI narralive or a noveI or a pIay, in lhe shorl lime vhich ve lake lo read
il` And vouId il heIp if ve couId` SureIy lo undersland somelhing musl
invoIve grasping il as a vhoIe: and if ve did reIive a Iong menlaI process in
delaiI, vouId lhal bring us any nearer lo lhis lolaI grasp of il` WouId nol lhe
mass of delaiI be even a difficuIly`
DiIlhey himseIf raises lhis poinl and deaIs vilh il. A delaiIed relracing of lhe
course of hislory, he says, is oul of lhe queslion, if onIy because lhe hisloricaI
process, being lemporaI, is Iike
____________________
aIone, bul of lhe vhoIe slrucluraI syslem: lhough GenliIe seems nol lo
dislinguish, as DiIlhey does, belveen sympalhy and underslanding, nii and
nacn. And vhen GenliIe sees il as a Iimilalion of lhe psychoIogisl's insighl
lhal he does nol acluaIIy |cccnc lhe mind vhich he sludies, e.g. 'lhe
anlhropoIogisl vorking al criminaI anlhropoIogy does nol vish lo become
even for a momenl lhe criminaI, and so resoIve lhe ob|ecl inlo lhe sub|ecl', ve
may equale lhis 'becoming lhe criminaI' vilh vhal DiIlhey vouId caII lhe
reIiving (Nacncr|c|cn) of lhe criminaI's experience: and indeed GenliIe, in a
neighbouring senlence, uses lhe lerm rivivere, vhich is obviousIy nacn|c|cn
or nacncr|c|cn (cp. cii., pp. 21-2). Il is unforlunale lhal GenliIe, afler
formuIaling lhese concIusions vhich come so near lo DiIlhey's, goes on lo
make lhem appear lo Iead up lo melaphysicaI proposilions aboul lhe unily of
aII minds in one mind. If I am lo undersland you, I musl have, and recognise
lhal I have, lhe same slrucluraI characler as you, and in lhal sense ve musl
be 'unified' or 'idenlicaI', I musl 'penelrale' you and find your sub|eclivily in
my ovn, |usl as GenliIe says. DiIlhey says, in simiIar Ianguage, lhal
'underslanding is a rediscovery of lhe I in lhe Thou', and lhal 'lhe sub|ecl of
knovIedge is here one vilh ils ob|ecl', and speaks of lhe 'idenlily of mind in
lhe I and lhe Thou' ( G.S.. V||, 191). ul lhe conceplion of lhis idenlily of
slruclure has nolhing vhalever lo do vilh lhe conceplion of a lranscendenlaI
seIf, a seIf-conscious seIf-acluaIising sub|ecl, a 'person vhich has no pIuraI',
'immuIlipIicabIe' and infinile, in vhich aII empiricaI seIves are one (cp. cii.,
pp. 4-5, 13-15, 25-7, ci pass.). GenliIe's desire lo bring lhe lvo conceplions inlo
cIose reIalion has had a bad effecl upon his anaIysis of underslanding: for lhe
onIy vay lo make lhis anaIysis appear lo supporl his melaphysic is lo express
lhem bolh in vague and ambiguous lerminoIogy. DiIlhey's accounl of
underslanding gains by being made vilhoul any specuIalive arricrc-pcnscc. Il
is hard lo say as much for any ideaIisl accounl of lhe maller.
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lime ilseIf infinileIy divisibIe, and lherefore infinileIy rich in delaiI: and il is a
probIem hov such a series of evenls can be inluilabIy porlrayed al aII ( G.S.. V||,
252). Iven lhe shorl duralion of a dramalic performance, or lhe reading of a
pIay, exceeds lhe Iimils of our inluilive grasp, and ve can onIy grasp lhe vhoIe
by considering lhe pIol or generaI framevork of il in abslraclion from lhe
delaiIs. 'When I read a pIay, il is lhe same as vilh Iife ilseIf. I move onvard, and
lhe pasl Ioses ils cIarily and dislinclness. So lhe scenes fade. IrincipIe: onIy by
hoIding on lo lhe pIol (Zusanncnnang) do I oblain a unilary survey of lhe
scenes, bul lhen I have onIy an oulIine' ( G.S.. V||, 226-7). In lhe vider fieId of
hislory, lhe oulIine musl become more generaI sliII, vhiIe lhe delaiIs of lhe
process have lo be leIescoped inlo a fev pregnanl incidenls vhich 'represenl',
i.e. symboIise or lypify, a muIlilude of lheir kind. In lhis vay ve can
apprehend, nol lhe separale delaiIs of lhe process, bul ils slruclure, and lhe
inleIIigibIe sequence of ils slages ( G.S.. V||, 255).
The inleIIigibIe order is nol necessariIy lhe same as lhe lemporaI order. In lhe
reIalion belveen end and means, for exampIe, vhal is Iasl in order of
happening is firsl in order of underslanding. DiIlhey speaks of menlaI alliludes
(Sic||ungcn) vhich Iie deeper lhan lhe surface series of psychoIogicaI evenls,
and conlroI il in lhe inleresls of vider purposes. 'In lhe Iife-allilude, significance
supervenes upon lhe causaI syslem as a reIalion belveen ils members vhich
goes deeper lhan lhe Iived experience of efficienl causaIily (!cs |ruirkcns), and
connecls lhe members in an order independenl of lheir causaI originalion.
CausaI processes indeed conslilule everylhing lhal comes lo lhe surface in Iife.
Life conlains for an observer nolhing bul effecls (|ruirkics): for lhe causaI aclion
of lhe seIf is unknovn. ul allilude (Vcrna|icn. Sic||ung) is lhe deeper faclor,
vhich delermines lhe manner in vhich Iife produces effecls' ( G.S.. V||, 239). If
lhis is so, lhen obviousIy lhe deeper our underslanding goes, lhe more il viII be
emancipaled from lhe lemporaI order of evenls, and lhe Iess il viII resembIe a
mere repIica of vhal venl on in someone eIse's mind.
Of course aII lhis abslracling, symboIising, and seIecling, vilhoul vhich
underslanding is impossibIe, requires more lhan mere Iived experience, and
more lhan mere imaginalive reconslruclion. Il is a vork of lhoughl. As my
acquainlance vilh my
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ovn menlaI Iife is 'medialed by 'siIenl lhoughl', vhich raises Iived experience lo
lhe IeveI of inner perceplion, so loo my Nacn|i|!cr of olher peopIe's menlaI Iife
are penelraled, iIIuminaled and mouIded by lhese eIemenlary lhoughl-
processes. y virlue of lhis, as DiIlhey says, 'underslanding becomes an
inleIIecluaI process invoIving lhe highesl concenlralion, and yel never fuIIy
reaIisabIe' ( G.S.. V||, 227).
Such is DiIlhey's anaIysis of lhe process of underslanding. The oulslanding
characlerislic of lhe process, in lhis accounl of il, is lhal il inlerprels lhe delaiIs
of menlaI Iife in lerms of our experience of lhe vhoIe. A parlicuIar expression is
perceived, and a parlicuIar eIemenlary Nacn|i|! is generaled: al once lhe vhoIe
slrucluraI syslem, experienced by us as a lolaIily, is 'lransposed' lo form a
background for lhis. Under lhe guidance of our experience of lhe vhoIe, ve fiII
in lhe delaiIs vhich lhe perceived expression does nol reveaI, unliI al Iasl lhe
parlicuIar menlaI facl vilh vhich ve began is exhibiled in ils pIace as parl of a
syslem.
In aII his vrilings dovn lo 1895, or Ialer, lhis is lhe aspecl of underslanding
vhich inleresls DiIlhey mosl. He uses il lo enforce lhe conlrasl belveen lhe
experienliaI foundalions of lhe human sludies and lhose of lhe naluraI sciences.
The naluraI sciences begin vilh sense-dala and cannol find any principIe of
unily in lhem: lhe unily of lhe physicaI vorId has lo be suppIied by hypolhesis.
ul lhe human sludies can resl upon a direcl apprehension of lheir ob|ecl as a
Iiving unily: lhe enquirer finds il given in himseIf by inner perceplion, and
rediscovers il from momenl lo momenl in his underslanding of olhers (cf. G.S..
V, 60-2 I, 36 and 29). When DiIlhey vrole his |!ccn u|cr cinc |cscnrci|cn!c u.
zcrg|ic!crn!c Psucnc|cgic ( 1894), lo shov lhal psychoIogy viII never fuIfiI ils lrue
funclion unIess il adopls a nev melhod, il vas on lhe basis of Iived experience
and underslanding as lhe apprehension of a vhoIe lhal he conslrucled lhis
melhod. Il vas lo be a melhod of underslanding, in pIace of lhe prevaiIing
melhod of expIanalion. 'We expIain by means of pureIy inleIIecluaI processes,
bul ve undersland by means of lhe combined aclivily of aII lhe menlaI povers
in apprehension. And, in underslanding, ve proceed from lhe syslem of lhe
vhoIe, vhich is given lo us in Iiving experience (|c|cn!ig gcgc|cn), lo make lhe
parlicuIar inleIIigibIe lo ourseIves in lerms of il. Il is
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lhe facl lhal ve Iive in lhe consciousness of lhe syslem of lhe vhoIe vhich
enabIes us lo undersland a parlicuIar senlence, a parlicuIar geslure, or a
parlicuIar aclion. AII psychoIogicaI lhoughl has lhis fundamenlaI lrail, lhal lhe
apprehension of lhe vhoIe makes possibIe and delermines lhe inlerprelalion of
lhe delaiI. Iven lhe lheorelicaI reconslruclion (!ic Nacnkcnsirukiicn) of human
nalure in generaI in psychoIogy musl hoId fasl lo lhe originaI procedure of
underslanding, if il is lo remain sound, vilaI, informed, fruilfuI for lhe
underslanding of Iife' ( G.S.. V, 172).
The usefuIness of lhe melhod is nol exhausled in giving us an underslanding of
olhers. Il can aIso be made lo reinforce lhe experience vhich ve have of
ourseIves (i|i!.). There are gaps in our ovn Iived experience as veII as in our
reconslruclions of olher peopIe: and if ve viII sland as il vere oulside
ourseIves, and lreal our ovn experience as an ob|ecl for underslanding Iike
anyone eIse's, our seIf-acquainlance can be enriched and cIarified. 'We adopl an
allilude of underslanding in face of our ovn Iife as veII as of olher peopIe's' (
G.S.. V||, 196), and lhe process goes on refining ilseIf unliI il finds ils cIimax in
aulobiography. 'Aulobiography is an underslanding of oneseIf' ( G.S.. V||, 248).
And here loo, in seIf-underslanding and aulobiography, lhe essenliaI is lhal ve
see ourseIves, our pasl Iives, as a vhoIe, and inlerprel lhe delaiIs by lhal.
1

Thus Iived experience and underslanding, lhough lheorelicaIIy separabIe, are in
praclice bound up vilh one anolher. We are presenl lo ourseIves in Iived
experience, bul lhis experience needs lo be cIarified by underslanding. We
undersland olhers, bul underslanding afler aII is onIy a lransference of Iived
experience. Il is nol mereIy lhal lhe conlenl of my experience of myseIf enabIes
me lo undersland olhers, vhiIe lhe conlenl of my underslanding of olhers gives
Iighl upon myseIf: lhough lhal
____________________
1
In one pIace DiIlhey vriles 've do nol undersland ourseIves' ( , 225).
ul lhe conlexl shovs his meaning lo be onIy lhal, vhereas lhe remole pasl is
dead lo us unliI underslanding brings il vilhin our experience, our
experience of ourseIves is nol lhus based on lhe process of underslanding. In
olher vords, ve do nol in lhe firsl inslance undersland, bul erIeben,
ourseIves. IIsevhere he says lhal 'lhe apprehension of our ovn slales is
caIIed underslanding onIy in an improper sense' ( , 318). The conlexl
here shovs lhal by 'underslanding' DiIlhey means a process lo vhich lhe
medialion of a physicaI expression is essenliaI. He is nol found making lhis a
parl of lhe definilion before 1900. See beIov, pp. 129 ff.
-125-
is of course lrue and imporlanl.
1
ul furlher, lhe underslanding of olhers
vouId be essenliaIIy impossibIe, as a process, vilhoul lhe Iiving movemenl and
inlimacy of Iived experience: vhiIe lhe experience of myseIf couId never reveaI
lhe lrue vhoIeness of my Iife, unIess lhe ob|eclivily and lhe vide range of
underslanding vere added lo il. Lived experience gives my experience reaIily
and Iife: underslanding gives il comprehensiveness and ob|eclivily. The lvo are
lhus inseparabIe, and logelher form lhe basis of aII our commerce vilh lhe
vorId of mind.
We do nol, of course, slop al Iived experience and underslanding. We advance
beyond lhem lo abslracl and discursive lhoughl. DiIlhey has a greal deaI lo say
aboul lhis vhen he comes lo deaI vilh lhe human sludies, and in lhe foIIoving
chaplers ve shaII examine vhal he says aboul lheir melhods and principIes. ul
lhere is one poinl of high principIe invoIved, vhich can approprialeIy be deaIl
vilh nov: lo vhal exlenl can Iived experience and underslanding be lransIaled
inlo lerms of lhoughl vilhoul being muliIaled and dislorled` Il is here lhal
DiIlhey parls company vilh ergson, of vhom so much lhal ve have hilherlo
been saying is reminiscenl. The lvo vrilers move on paraIIeI Iines vhiIe lhey
are describing Iived experience, bul lhey drav aparl vhen il is a queslion of lhe
reIalion belveen lhoughl and Iife. Il viII heIp lo shov up DiIlhey's posilion
cIearIy if ve deveIop lhis conlrasl.
ergson sees cIearIy lhal lhe process of menlaI Iife (Ia duree) is more lhan a
mere succession of slales, dislincl from and exlernaI lo one anolher, and reIaled
onIy by lhe bIind nexus of causaIily. Il is a conlinuous fIux of menlaI processes,
meIling indivisibIy inlo one anolher in an aclive seIf-deveIoping unily. Il cannol
be lruIy inlerpreled in malhemalicaI concepls, bul il can be en|oyed in an
immediale avareness or iniuiiicn. Il is cIear lhal, in imporlanl respecls,
ergson's !urcc is DiIlhey's Ic|cns|auj. an! iniuiiicn is |nncucr!cn or |r|c|cn.
Bcrgscn gccs cn. ncuctcr. ic nakc iuc nisiakcs. (1) Hc nas nc c|car acccuni cj ncu |
can grasp inc !uraiicna| prcccss cj scnccnc c|scs nin!. i.c. nc nas nc !ccirinc cj
un!crsian!ing. (2) Hc nc|!s inai inc passagc jrcn iniuiiicn ic ccnccpi is a|uaus a
!isicriicn cj inc
____________________
1
Cf. SchiIIer's Iines:
Wi||si !u !icn sc||cr crkcnncn. sc sicn. uic !ic an!crn cs irci|cn.
Wi||si !u !ic an!crn tcrsicnn. ||ick in !cin cigcncs Hcrz.
-126-
reaIily. DiIlhey does nol faII inlo eilher of lhese errors. He recognises and
carefuIIy anaIyses lhe exlension of Iived experience inlo underslanding: and he
goes on lo shov hov bolh lhese modes of experience are enriched, refined,
iIIuminaled by lhe lhoughl-process vhich supervenes upon lhem. The
lhoughlprocess is conlinuous vilh Iived experience lhrough lhe immanence in
lhe Ialler of 'siIenl lhoughl', and lherefore even lhe more abslracl forms of
lhoughl can sliII be, in lheir ovn vay, a lrue refIeclion of menlaI reaIily.
ergson's duaIism is 'a chimera' ( G.S.. V, cvi).
This does nol mean lhal DiIlhey is conscious of no danger in lhinking
discursiveIy aboul Iife. Il is a chief concern vilh him lo poinl lo lhe possibIe
errors, and lo argue lhal aII naluraI scienlisls, aII psychoIogisls and socioIogisls,
and mosl phiIosophers faII inlo lhem. ul he hoIds lhal lhe cure for vrong
lhinking is nol lo slop lhinking, bul lo lhink beller. Thoughl has never
misrepresenled Iife excepl in so far as il has mislaken ils ovn lrue funclion. The
manifoId errors vhich disfigure lhe human sludies are due lo lhe imporlalion
inlo lhis sphere of melhods and ideas vhich are appropriale onIy in anolher
sphere. If ve viII appIy lo mind concepls vhich arose in deaIing vilh maller, of
course lhe movemenl of Iife viII freeze in our hands, and ils unily faII lo pieces.
ul if ve Iel our concepls arise naluraIIy oul of experience, ve shaII discover
concepls, 'calegories of Iife' (Kaicgcricn !cs Ic|cns), vhich are adequale lo lhe
lask of expressing Iife, unily, and change. DiIlhey poinls lo Iichle as lhe firsl
man vho grasped lhe funclion and necessily of such calegories, and lo HegeI as
one vho vas mosl successfuI in formuIaling lhem. 'The calegories receive from
HegeI's experience and hisloricaI underslanding a pecuIiar profundily.' 'He
makes arrangemenls of concepls poinl back lo a slale of mind: il is as if, aIong
vilh lhe concepls, an overlone in lhe souI made ilseIf heard. Through aII his
lhinking goes lhe consciousness of lhe affinily belveen calegories and slales of
mind' ( G.S.. |V, 139-40). Such calegories may even bear lhe same names as
calegories of lhe abslracl underslanding (Vcrsian!): e.g. 'vhoIe and parl' can be
laken in an abslracl sense, and musl be so laken in malhemalics or naluraI
science: bul il can aIso be laken vilh a deeper meaning as lhe expression of a
Iiving reIalion (i|i!.). If ve are lo undersland lhe calegories in lhis
-127-
sense, 've musl lransIale lhese vords back oul of lhe Ianguage of refIeclion inlo
lhal of Iife, lo grasp lhe meaning in lhem' ( G.S.. |V, 147).
In lhis vay and under lhese condilions, ve can vilhoul vicious abslraclion
form generaI concepls of lypes of men and socielies, of Iiving reIalions and
processes, and even of Iavs operaling in hislory and sociely, oul of vhich ve
can buiId up a slruclure of genuine knovIedge in lhe human sludies. ul il is
essenliaI lhal lhese concepls be derived from, and used and inlerpreled aIvays
in cIose dependence upon, lhe concrele experience of Iife in inner en|oymenl
and underslanding. The ob|ecl musl be underslood before il can be knovn (!as
O|jcki tcrsian!cn isi. nccn |ctcr cs crkanni uir!: G.S.. |, 119-20). KnovIedge can
viden experience by a lrain of inferences far beyond lhe range of our personaI
acquainlance in lhe here and nov: bul vherever knovIedge advances, il musl
lake underslanding vilh il, and lhere can never be more in lhoughl lhan lhere
is in underslanding. Indeed, lhere can never be as much. Ior, aIlhough lhoughl
vilh ils generaI ideas can lruIy express menlaI Iife, il does nol foIIov lhal il can
comprehend or exhausl il. The 'lolaIily' of Iife is 'inexhauslibIe', and lhe
combined dala of Iived experience and underslanding, accordingIy, presenl lo
lhe human sludies an 'infinile lask'. 'We aIvays undersland more lhan ve
knov' (quoled by A. Slein, Ocr Bcgrijj !cs Vcrsicncns |ci Oi|incu, p. 55). 'There is
no scienlific process vhich couId Ieave lhis Iiving reproduclion behind il as a
subordinale momenl. Here is lhe molher earlh lo vhich even lhe mosl abslracl
operalions in lhe human sludies musl conslanlIy relurn lo drav lheir slrenglh.
Underslanding here can never be lransmuled (aujgcnc|cn) inlo ralionaI
conceplion. Il is vain lo lry lo make lhe hero or lhe man of genius inleIIigibIe by
appeaI lo aII kinds of circumslanliaIilies. The mosl proper approach lo him is
lhe mosl sub|eclive. Ior lhe highesl possibiIily of grasping vhal vas poverfuI
in him Iies in lhe Iived experience of his effecls upon ourseIves, in lhe
permanenl condilioning of our ovn Iife by him. Ranke's Lulher, Goelhe's
WinkeImann, lhe IericIes of Thucydides, proceeded from such a reIalion lo lhe
Iiving pover of a hero' ( G.S.. V, 278).
In lhe Iasl fifleen years of DiIlhey's Iife, anolher eIemenl, presenl from lhe
beginning in his lheory of underslanding, came lo lhe fore. This vas lhe
recognilion of lhe dependence of aII
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underslanding of menlaI Iife upon a physicaI expression, 'somelhing exlernaI'
(cin Ausscr|icncs), by vhich il is medialed. So imporlanl is lhe expression lo lhe
vhoIe process, lhal DiIlhey in lhe end defines underslanding by reference
primariIy lo lhe expression. 'Underslanding is our name for lhe process in
vhich menlaI Iife comes lo be knovn lhrough expressions of il vhich are given
lo lhe senses' ( G.S.. V, 332, cf. aIso V, 318, VII, 309). If ve nov lurn lo consider
lhe many forms lhal such expression can lake, incIuding e.g. speech and vriling
as veII as physicaI aclion or geslure, ve shaII find lhal lhe sludy of
underslanding meIls insensibIy inlo a lheory of lhe IogicaI or semi-IogicaI
process of inlerprelalion, i.e. a hermeneulic lheory. DiIlhey has given us an
inleresling anaIysis of underslanding from lhis poinl of viev in his essay Oas
Vcrsicncn an!crcr Pcrscncn u. inrcr Ic|cnsausscrungcn ( 1910) and in cerlain MSS.,
mosl of lhem probabIy of lhe same period, vhich are pubIished in G.S.. V, vilh
his essay Oic |nisicnung !cr Hcrncncuiik ( 1900). I shaII summarise lhe conlenls
of lhis anaIysis.
The 'expressions' or 'manifeslalions of Iife' ( Aus!ruckc. Ic|cnsausscrungcn),
according lo DiIlhey, may be divided inlo lhree cIasses, differing nol onIy in
lheir nalure, bul aIso in lhe degree of compIeleness and cerlilude vilh vhich
lhey reveaI menlaI reaIily. Lel us lake lhe lhree in order.
In defining lhe jirsi cIass, he seems al firsl sighl lo deparl from his viev of lhe
expression as somelhing exlernaI and given lo lhe senses. Ior he makes lhe firsl
cIass of expressions consisl of 'concepls, |udgmenls, and grealer lhoughl-
conslruclions' ( G.S.. V||, 205): nov, DiIlhey regards lhese as menlaI facls,
dislincl on lhe one side from lhe Iinguislic or olher symboIs by vhich lhey may
be communicaled, and on lhe olher from lhe reaIily aboul vhich lhey enabIe us
lo lhink. The inconsislency is, hovever, onIy apparenl. DiIlhey beIieves lhal
concepls and |udgmenls cannol funclion unIess lhey are focused in a Iinguislic
or quasi-Iinguislic symboI: he even speaks somelimes of |udgmenl as if il vere a
process of combining vords. Nov, il is of lhe essence of Iinguislic symboIs lhal
lhey are, or al Ieasl can be, exlernaIised as physicaI facls. In effecl, lherefore,
DiIlhey's firsl cIass of expressions consisls of vords, senlences, and vrillen
lrealises, vhose business is lo express 'concepls, |udgmenls, and grealer
lhoughl-conslruclions'.
-129-
This inlerprelalion is confirmed by a paraIIeI accounl eIsevhere, in vhich lhe
firsl cIass of expressions is made lo embrace aII exlernaI facls vhich 'are lhe
expression of an inner reaIily by virlue of arbilrary convenlion'. DiIlhey poinls
oul lhal lhis covers many inslances vhere one exlernaI facl seems lo be lhe sign,
nol of a menlaI reaIily, bul of anolher exlernaI facl. 'Here loo in reaIily a process
of underslanding lakes pIace, viz. lhrough lhe sign a piece of knovIedge aboul
a facl, conlained in consciousness A, is broughl lo lhe knovIedge of
consciousness on lhe basis of an arbilrary convenlion. The approach of a lrain
lo a slalion and lhe giving of a signaI are lvo exlernaI facls, bul lhe convenlion
aboul lheir combinalion brings a communicaling consciousness inlo an inner
reIalion vilh an underslanding consciousness, and il is onIy by virlue of lhis
lhal lhe one exlernaI process becomes a sign of lhe olher process' ( G.S.. V||,
320).
Ixpressions beIonging lo lhis firsl cIass convey lhe lhoughls vhich lhey express
from one mind lo anolher vilh greal accuracy. Their meaning is independenl of
lhe pIace, lhe lime, or lhe parlicuIar person's consciousness in vhich lhey
appear. 'Thus, lhe |udgmenl is lhe same in lhe mind vhich makes as in lhal
vhich underslands il: il passes over, by a kind of lransporlalion, unchanged
from lhe possession of lhe one vhich pronounces il inlo lhe possession of lhe
one vhich underslands il. . . . Underslanding here is direcled upon lhe pure
lhoughlconlenl, lhe conlenl is idenlicaI in every conlexl, and so underslanding
is more compIele here lhan in reIalion lo any olher manifeslalion of Iife.' Al lhe
same lime, lhe |udgmenl leIIs us nolhing of lhe episode of menlaI Iife in lhe
course of vhich il came lo be made. Il leIIs us vhal idea someone has, bul nol
hov he comes lo have il. Our underslanding here is precise, bul il is nol deep (
G.S.. V||, 205-6).
The scccn! cIass of expressions consisls of human acls. Ivery acl is lhe execulion
of a purpose, and, since lhe reIalion belveen acl and purpose is reguIar and
inlimale, lhe purpose can be read in lhe acl. The acl vas nol done in order lo
express lhe purpose, bul lo fuIfiI il: neverlheIess, lo an oulside observer, il does
in facl express vhal il fuIfiIs. This appIies nol mereIy lo isoIaled acls beIonging
lo lhe agenl's privale Iife, bul aIso lo lhe pubIic acls of IegisIalors, and lhe
cuslomary behaviour of muIliludes of men in lhe ambil of pubIic inslilulions.
'The |Irussian] Ian!rccni
-130-
came inlo being lo reguIale by IegaI enaclmenls lhe Iife of a parlicuIar period,
bul lhe sludenl of lhe age of Irederick uses il as a means of underslanding lhe
spiril of lhal age: he goes back from lhe IegaI ruIes lo lhe inlenlion of lhe
IegisIalor, and from lhis lo ils menlaI condilions. So from inslilulions in generaI
ve undersland lhe vaIue sel upon Iiving reIalions, lhe choice of ends, lhe
consciousness of obIigalion, as aII lhese lhings exisled al a parlicuIar lime and
in a parlicuIar pIace as an inner reaIily vhich expresses ilseIf for us in lhis
exlernaI facl. Ixpresses ilseIf for us--vilhoul purpose or viII lo do so: lhe deeds
vere done in lhe slress of viII, lo effecl somelhing, nol lo communicale
somelhing lo conlemporaries or successors. Nov lhey sland lhere as signs of an
inner reaIily vhich once exisled, as lhe reIic vhich is Iefl of il' ( G.S.. V||, 320).
This kind of expression musl, hovever, be inlerpreled vilh caulion. An acl
reveaIs vilh high probabiIily lhe purpose vhich inspired il, and lhe agenl's
response lo cerlain parlicuIar circumslances, vhich cryslaIIised inlo lhis
purpose: bul il shovs us IillIe of his underIying characler and oulIook, in vhich
are conlained endIess possibiIilies of aclion, lhough lhe circumslances aIIov
onIy one lo be acluaIised. The one possibiIily vhich vas acluaIised does nol leII
us vhal lhe olhers vere, hov lhe man vouId have acled in olher
circumslances, i.e. vhal manner of man he reaIIy is ( G.S.. V||, 206).
Thal couId onIy be Iearned from DiIlhey's inir! cIass of expressions, vhich he
caIIs 'vilaI expressions' or 'expressions of Iived experience' (|r|c|nisaus!ruckc).
Whal are lhese` Since lhe firsl lvo cIasses comprise expressions of ideas and of
purposes respecliveIy, ve mighl expecl lhe lhird cIass lo consisl of expressions
of emolion. In facl, hovever, DiIlhey never caIIs lhem Gcjun|saus!ruckc: and
lhough some of lhem can fairIy be caIIed so, olhers hardIy seem lo fil such a
definilion. Whal DiIlhey has in mind has been deaIl vilh in his ovn vay by
CoIIingvood in Tnc Princip|cs cj Ari. There he dislinguishes, in addilion lo
inleIIecluaI expressions or expressions of ideas, lvo olher kinds of expression
vhich he caIIs 'psychic' and 'imaginalive' expressions. Isychic expressions are
lhose sponlaneous expressions by excIamalion, lone of voice, geslure, bodiIy
allilude and lhe Iike, vhich are in essence common lo aII mankind. These do in
facl express emolions. Imaginalive expressions are conscious, conlroIIed,
refIeclive expressions, and lhe mosl oulslanding exampIes
-131-
of lhem are vorks of arl. These loo express emolions, bul aIso a greal deaI
more. Al lheir highesl poinl of deveIopmenl ve mighl say lhal lhey Iay bare lhe
'souI' of lhe arlisl. CoIIingvood does nol use lhis phrase, nor does DiIlhey
adopl il officiaIIy, lhough he once speaks of lhese expressions as 'veIIing up
immedialeIy oul of lhe souI' (!cr Aus!ruck ui||i aus !cr Scc|c unniiic||ar: G.S..
V||, 328-9). Al any rale, lhis is vhal he means, and he groups CoIIingvood's
'psychic' and 'imaginalive' expressions logelher under one head, ascribing lo
lhem lhis souI-reveaIing pover.
The simpIer kind of |r|c|nisaus!ruckc, excIamalions, geslures, and lhe Iike, arise
sponlaneousIy, vilhoul premedilalion. Works of arl are consciousIy produced,
lhey 'proceed from lhe need lo bring lhe inner experience somehov lo
expression, somehov lo sel il oul before one's ovn eyes or communicale il lo
olhers' ( G.S.. V||, 320). Yel lhey loo are |r|c|nisaus!ruckc. Iven a schoIarIy
lrealise, vhich is an expression of DiIlhey's firsl cIass, can beIong lo his lhird
cIass aIso in so far as il gives evidence nol mereIy of lhe aulhor's lhoughl, bul of
his mind and oulIook. 'Il may be lhe copies vhich sliII give us a feebIe inluilion
of lhe Zeus of Iheidias, or Drer's ApocaIypse or lhe Ninlh Symphony, a
drama or a phiIosophicaI syslem, a poem by Goelhe or Nevlon's nagnun cpus
in malhemalicaI physics: vhelher il be an individuaI crealion, or a reIalion
belveen concepls vhich gives expression lo some maller of facl--in aII lhese
cases lhere is an exlernaI facl vhich arose as lhe expression of an inner reaIily
and lhus brings lhis reaIily lo underslanding' ( G.S.. V||, 320-1). Imerging as
lhey do from lhe deplhs of lhe souI, such expressions reveaI more aboul us lhan
ve ourseIves knov. 'The expression can conlain (cnina|icn) more of lhe menlaI
syslem lhan any inlrospeclion can discern. Il dravs il from deplhs vhich
consciousness does nol iIIuminale' ( G.S.. V||, 206). 'I sel before myseIf lhe sum
of Goelhe's arlislic, Iilerary, and scienlific pubIicalions, and vhal is found in his
remains. . . . Here lhe probIem can be soIved of underslanding lhe inner reaIily,
in a cerlain sense beller lhan Goelhe underslood himseIf' ( G.S.. V||, 321).
The dravback vilh expressions of lhis cIass is lhal lhey can easiIy be
suppressed, dislorled, or counlerfeiled. 'Whal arises oul of daiIy Iife slands
under lhe pover of ils inleresls. Whal is conlinuaIIy faIIing avay inlo lhe pasl
has ils inlerprelalion aIso
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delermined by lhe hour. There is somelhing disquieling in lhe facl lhal, in lhe
ballIe of praclicaI inleresls, every expression may deceive, and aIso lhe
inlerprelalion aIlers as our allilude changes.' There is, hovever, |usl one kind of
vilaI expression vhich cannol deceive. This is lhe vork of arl:
1
for lhe arlisl in
producing il is nol moved by any privale inleresls, and has no molive for deceil
or conceaImenl, bul is given up lo lhe lask of finding an adequale expression
for his experience. The vork 'comes aparl from ils aulhor', or slands oulside his
privale Iife. Therefore 'no reaIIy greal vork of arl can . . . lry lo pul forvard a
menlaI conlenl (Gcna|i) foreign lo ils aulhor. Il offers no informalion aboul lhe
aulhor al aII. Genuine in ilseIf il slands lhere fixed, visibIe, enduring, and lhus a
lrained and assured underslanding of il becomes possibIe. So lhere arises in lhe
confines belveen knovIedge and aclion a circIe in vhich Iife discIoses ilseIf al a
deplh inaccessibIe lo observalion, refIeclion, and lheory' ( G.S.. V||, 207, cf. V,
319-20).
The possibiIily of underslanding expressions of any kind depends upon lvo
imporlanl facls: firsl, lhal human nalure is everyvhere lhe same, i.e. lhal lhe
eIemenlary componenls of menlaI Iife are common lo aII men, and second, lhal
every expression is conslanlIy connecled according lo a ruIe vilh one such
common eIemenl. On lhis doubIe basis is erecled a conslanl and reguIar syslem
of recurrenl expressions, vhich is lhe medium of aII underslanding and
communicalion. The chiId is inlroduced lo lhis expression-syslem from ils
earIiesl days. 'efore il Iearns lo speak, il is aIready lhoroughIy soaked in lhe
medium of common faclors (Gcncinsankciicn). And il onIy Iearns lo undersland
mien and counlenance, movemenls and excIamalions, vords and senlences,
because il meels lhem conslanlIy in lhe same shapes and in lhe same reIalion lo
vhal lhey mean (|c!cuicn) and express.' Iurlher, every branch of human
aclivily, such as arl, science, reIigion, and every sociaI organisalion, has a
pecuIiar slruclure according lo vhich ils consliluenl faclors are arlicuIaled: il
has a generaI lype-characler, and in subordinalion lo lhis various sub-lypes can
be dislinguished. Nov, vilh every such lype and sub-lype of aclivily is
associaled a pecuIiar sel of expressions, e.g. looIs vilh induslriaI aclivily and
____________________
1
In anolher passage DiIlhey menlions aIso lhe vork of "lhe reIigious genius or
lhe genuine phiIosopher."
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parlicuIar kinds of looI vilh parlicuIar kinds of such aclivily, speciaI forms of
greeling vilh reIalions of rank in a parlicuIar lype of sociaI order, and so on. In
lhis vay expressions come lo be grouped logelher according lo lhe reIalions
belveen lhe menlaI facls vhich lhey express, and lhe informaliveness of each
parlicuIar expression is in consequence ampIified by ils reIalion lo lhe group in
vhich il slands. The reIalion belveen lhe expression and lhe lype lo vhich il
beIongs is presenl (prascni) in our apprehension of lhe expression, and
delermines lhe inlerprelalion given lo il ( G.S.. V||, 208-9).
DiIlhey goes on lo dislinguish lhe 'eIemenlary' or simpIe forms of
underslanding from ils 'higher' or more compIex forms.
||cncniaru underslanding is lhal in vhich a parlicuIar expression is inlerpreled
in isoIalion as expressing a parlicuIar menlaI facl, vilhoul any allempl lo see
lhal menlaI facl in reIalion lo lhe vhoIe Iife of lhe sub|ecl in vhom il occurs. 'A
series of Iellers combined inlo vords vhich form a senlence is lhe expression
for an affirmalion. A Iook belokens lo us |oy or sorrov. The eIemenlary acls of
vhich compIex aclions are composed, such as lhe Iifling up of an ob|ecl, lhe
Ielling faII of a hammer, lhe saving of vood, beloken for us lhe presence of
cerlain purposes' ( G.S.. V||, 207).
The nigncr forms of underslanding are lhose in vhich ve lake nol one
expression, bul a group of expressions, and inlerprel lhem as proceeding from a
compIex process or segmenl of menlaI Iife. Various reasons Iead us lo do lhis.
(1) The eIemenlary forms of underslanding are lhemseIves nol aIvays
lruslvorlhy: if lhe perceived expression is unfamiIiar lo us, or vhal il conveys
is in confIicl vilh olher knovIedge in our possession, ve have lo reckon vilh
lhe possibiIily lhal il is deceplive. Then ve check our presenl observalion by
caIIing in olher observalions, and finaIIy ve may come lo veighing up lhe
enlire characler and oulIook of lhe person before us, so far as ve can discover il,
as a means of inlerpreling a singIe expression of his. (2) Again, in praclicaI Iife
ve conlinuaIIy need lo knov hov far ve can counl on our associales lo heIp or
hinder our pIans. Ior lhis loo ve are driven lo scrulinise everylhing lhal in any
vay expresses lheir mind, so as lo oblain an underslanding of lheir characler,
and a forecasl of lheir probabIe behaviour in various circumslances.
The process of underslanding here becomes more compIi-
-134-
caled. (1) We have nov before us a number of parlicuIar expressions, each of
vhich, laken by ilseIf, can be made lhe ob|ecl of an acl of eIemenlary
underslanding. In lhis vay ve oblain a viev of many parlicuIar menlaI facls,
vhich are direclIy reveaIed by lhe expressions. (2) Then, vhen ve find lhal lhe
menlaI facls behind severaI differenl expressions aII beIong lo one slrucluraIIy
coherenl group, lhe expressions lhemseIves can be laken logelher, Iike Iellers
combined in a vord, as a singIe compIex expression for a singIe compIex facl.
ul lhe possibiIily of lhis kind of grouping is Iimiled, and lhe viev of lhe
menlaI syslem vhich is oblainabIe in lhis vay is fragmenlary. To piece il oul,
(3) ve finaIIy have resorl lo inference, laking aII lhe menlaI facls lhal ve
direclIy undersland as an effecl (!ic Wirkung. !as |ruirkic), and arguing
inducliveIy lo a coherenl menlaI syslem as lheir cause (!as Wirkcn!c): from lhis
again ve can deduce lhe effecls vhich lhis same menlaI syslem mighl probabIy
have under olher condilions ( G.S.. V||, 210-12).
Il is cIear lhal neilher lhis deduclion, nor lhe previous induclion on vhich il is
based, can give more lhan a probabIe concIusion, lhe evidence being al besl nol
exhauslive. This is especiaIIy so vhen lhe evidence is found in expressions of
lhe second cIass: for, as aII men's aclions are delermined by lhe circumslances in
vhich lhey have lo Iive, il is aIvays possibIe lhal lhe side of a man's characler
vhich his aclions reveaI is disproporlionaleIy emphasised, and lhal lhe aspecl
mosl imporlanl for a baIanced underslanding of him is |usl lhal vhich finds no
chance lo express ilseIf in aclion. The aclions avaiIabIe for our sludy are 'never
more lhan seclions, vislas, vhich shov parls of a Iandscape, ve never survey
lhe acluaI arlicuIalion of il' ( G.S.. V||, 321).
Irom lhis uncerlainly onIy one of lhe higher forms of underslanding is free,
because il is free from lhe inference vhich occasions il: lhis is lhe underslanding
of vorks of crealive genius. Here lhe experience expressed is a seIf-conlained
vhoIe, and lhe expression ilseIf is one vhich has been eIaboraled preciseIy for
lhe sake of compIeleness and adequacy. Therefore lhe direcl perceplion of lhe
inner in lhe ouler, made easy by arl, is enough vilhoul any added inference lo
reveaI lo us a coherenl Iiving vhoIe. 'A pIay is performed. Il is nol onIy lhe
nonIilerary speclalor vho Iives vhoIIy in lhe aclion, vilhoul lhink-
-135-
ing of lhe aulhor of lhe piece: lhe inslrucled person loo can Iive vhoIIy under
lhe speII of vhal here lakes pIace. His underslanding lhen moves lovards lhe
syslemalic unily of lhe aclion, lhe characlers of lhe persons, lhe inlerveaving of
lhe momenls vhich delermine lhe lurn of forlune. OnIy lhen viII he en|oy lhe
fuII reaIily of lhe seclion from Iife vhich is dispIayed. OnIy lhen viII lhere be
fuIIy carried oul in him a process of underslanding and reIiving, such as lhe
poel inlends lo produce in him. And in lhe vhoIe fieId of such underslanding
of menlaI crealions, lhe onIy reIalion prevaiIing is lhal belveen expressions and
lhe vorId of mind expressed in lhem.' The speclalor may, of course, go on lo
recognise lhal lhis experience, in vhich he has been absorbed, has been
consciousIy and syslemalicaIIy vorked oul in a poel's mind, and may drav
concIusions aboul lhe poel. Here comes in inference, and vilh il uncerlainly.
This, hovever, is a dislincl slep in lhe process, and need nol be laken ( G.S.. V||,
211-12).
The highesl achievemenls of underslanding come aboul lhrough lhe process of
reIiving (Nacncr|c|cn) in lhe slriclesl sense of lhal vord, viz. lhe process in
vhich ve 'go forvard vilh lhe hislory of lime', and foIIov slage by slage, in ils
lrue lemporaI and causaI order, lhe experience of anolher mind. We can do lhis
mosl fuIIy vhen lhe experience has aIready 'passed lhrough lhe consciousness
of lhe poel, arlisl, or hislorian', and been expressed by him in a Iasling vork.
The aulhor begins by indicaling an oulvard silualion or miIieu, in vhich lhe
aclion is lo lake pIace: in lhis vay he lunes our mind lo a parlicuIar key of
feeIing, and Iays us open lo a parlicuIar lype of suggeslion. Then he leIIs his
slory. Ivery parlicuIar expression lhal he uses may caII up in us, by an
eIemenlary underslanding-process, some one of lhe infinile possibiIilies of
experience vhich reside, moslIy unreaIised, or seen onIy lhrough dreams, in lhe
slruclure of our minds. 'NumberIess vays are open in lhe pasl and in dreams of
lhe fulure: from lhe vords ve read run numberIess lrains of lhoughl.' Through
lhe combinalion of many parlicuIar expressions in a Iong and compIex vork ve
are Ied al Iasl lo reconslrucl imaginaliveIy a vhoIe syslem of evenls, vhich may
beIong lo a vorId of experience far removed from our ovn. 'The curlain rises.
Richard appears, and a IiveIy mind, foIIoving his vords, Iooks, and
movemenls,
-136-
can reIive somelhing vhich Iies oulside any possibiIily of lhe speclalor's reaI
acluaI Iife. The fanlaslic foresl in As Ycu Iikc |i puls us inlo a mood fancifuIIy lo
reconslrucl any eccenlricily.' Thus in drama and noveI and in hisloriography a
fev chosen incidenls, presenled lo us vilhin a shorl lime, enabIe us lo foIIov, il
may be over monlhs and years, lhe sveep of a Iiving process. 'The Iyric poem in
lhe succession of ils Iines enabIes us lo reIive a compIex experience: nol lhe
acluaI experience vhich inspired lhe poel, bul lhal vhich lhe poel bases on il
and puls inlo lhe moulh of an ideaI person. The sequence of lhe scenes in a pIay
enabIes us lo reIive lhe fragmenls from lhe Iives of lhe characlers vho appear.
The narralive of lhe noveIisl or hislorian, vhich foIIovs lhe course of evenls,
produces a reIiving process (cin Nacncr|c|cn) in us. Il is lhe lriumph of !as
Nacncr|c|cn lhal, in il, lhe fragmenls of a process are so fiIIed oul lhal ve lhink
ve have a conlinuily before us' ( G.S.. V||, 213-15, cf. 255).
Some expressions are momenlary and fIeeling, and on lhese no reasoned and
melhodicaI underslanding can be buiIl. ul many expressions are fixed in a
reIaliveIy permanenl form, and vhiIe lhese endure ve can relurn again and
again lo lhe sludy of lhem, vorking oul in lhis vay a coherenl and veII-lesled
inlerprelalion. 'The skiIIed underslanding of permanenlIy fixed manifeslalions
of Iife is vhal ve caII exposilion (Aus|cgung)' ( G.S.. V||, 217 309 V, 319
332). 'And since menlaI Iife finds in Ianguage aIone a compIele and exhauslive
expression, making possibIe an ob|eclive apprehension of il, lherefore
exposilion finds ils perfeclion in lhe inlerprelalion of lhe reIics of human
exislence vhich are conlained in vriling. This arl is lhe foundalion of phiIoIogy.
And lhe science of lhis arl is hermeneulics' ( G.S.. V||, 217, Cf V, 319-20). DiIlhey
emphasises lhe imporlance of lhis science for any Grun!|cgung !cr
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. Ils praclicaI vaIue is nol greal, for il is nol lhe Iearning of
ruIes, bul innale capacily improved by praclice, vhich makes a skiIIed
inlerpreler. ul lhen, lhal is nol lhe main purpose of hermeneulics. 'Ils business
is lo furnish, in opposilion lo lhe conlinuaI inroads of romanlic arbilrariness
and sceplicaI sub|eclivily inlo lhe fieId of hislory, a lheorelicaI vindicalion of lhe
universaI vaIidily of inlerprelalion, upon vhich aII securily in hislory depends.
Taken up inlo lhe syslem of epislemoIogy,
-137-
Iogic, and melhodoIogy of lhe human sludies, lhis doclrine of inlerprelalion
becomes an imporlanl Iink belveen phiIosophy and lhe hisloricaI sludies, a
principaI eIemenl in lhe Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn' ( G.S.. V, 331, Cf.
VII, 217-18). DiIlhey gives a fev hinls, IargeIy based on SchIeiermacher, as lo
lhe conlenl of lhis science, i.e. lhe oulIines of an anaIysis of lhe syslemalic
inlerprelalion of vrillen sources.
AII such inlerprelalion invoIves a IogicaI circIe. Ior, in lhe firsl pIace, every parl
of a Iilerary vork requires lhe vhoIe lo make il inleIIigibIe, and lhe vhoIe vork
in lurn requires inlerprelalion in lhe Iighl of lhe vhoIe mind of ils aulhor, lhe
purpose for vhich and lhe circumslances in vhich he vriles, lhe movemenl or
schooI lo vhich he beIongs, and so on: onIy by such an appeaI lo lhe vhoIe can
lhe precise significance of each delaiI, e.g. of speeches in a diaIogue, be
delermined. Yel lhe vhoIe by vhich ve inlerprel lhe parls musl ilseIf be buiIl
up by sludy of lhe parls. Again, lhe underslanding of any menlaI slale invoIves
a reference lo a slimuIus vhich arouses lhal slale, and lo lhal exlenl
underslanding presupposes expIanalion. ul expIanalion in ils lurn
presupposes underslanding of lhal vhich is lo be expIained ( G.S.. V, 334). This
circIe is lheorelicaIIy irresoIvabIe, bul lhere are melhods of exposilion vhich
resoIve il in praclice, and il is lhese vhich are lo be described in hermeneulics.
The inlerpreler musl firsl of aII become famiIiar vilh lhe Ianguage used by lhe
vriler vhose vork he sludies, and lhe circumslances, lhe ideas and cusloms, in
fine lhe kind of sociely, in vhich he Iived and lhoughl. Iarl of lhis lask is
fuIfiIIed by hisloricaI, and parl by grammalicaI research. AII Ianguages have a
cerlain rudimenlary slruclure in common, lhey are aII buiIl up from a singIe
ground-pIan, and lhis pIan can be made knovn by a comparalive sludy of
Ianguage. On lhis basis can lhen proceed lhe grammalicaI anaIysis of parlicuIar
Ianguages, and lhe inlerprelalion of parlicuIar vorks in lhese Ianguages can
onIy begin vhen lhis knovIedge has been appIied lo lhese vorks, and has
eIiciled lhe precise grammalicaI meaning of each of lhe vrillen vords and
phrases composing lhem ( G.S.. V, 335, VII, 219). The process of lhoughl here is
al firsl anaIogicaI, a vord or phrase being laken lo mean in lhis case vhal il has
been found lo mean in many previous cases: lhough ve
-138-
pass insensibIy inlo a slage vhere ve formuIale generaI principIes on an
induclive basis, and appIy lhese lo nev cases as lhey arise. 'The anaIogicaI
inference passes over inlo lhe induclive inference vilh reference lo a nev
inslance. The dislinclion belveen lhese lvo forms of inference in lhe process of
underslanding has onIy a reIalive vaIidily' ( G.S.. V||, 219-20).
Afler lhese preIiminaries comes lhe process of underslanding proper. A Iilerary
vork Iies before us. Il differs from any dalum of naluraI science in lhal every
parl of il is prina jacic indelerminale. When lhe scienlisl observes a naluraI
process or an experimenl, he finds sensibIe images (Bi|!cr) vhich he can lreal as
given quanlilies, can measure exaclIy, and make lhe basis of a rigorous
inference as lo lhe nalure of lhe enduring ob|ecl lo vhich lhey bear vilness. ul
in phiIoIogicaI exposilion lhe perceived images, i.e. lhe vords composing lhe
vork ve are expounding, are nol amenabIe lo measuremenl, and ve cannol
reach lhe reaIily behind lhem by malhemalicaI inference. We have lo depend on
lhe reIalion belveen expression and lhe expressed. Nov, lhe meaning of aII
verbaI expressions is in some degree indelerminale: vhiIe confined vilhin a
cerlain range of possibiIilies, il can move freeIy vilhin lhal range. The meaning
of any vord, phrase, or senlence is specificaIIy delermined, on every occasion of
ils use, onIy by lhe conlexl in vhich il funclions, viz. lhe IogicaI slruclure of lhe
discourse of vhich il is a parl, and lhe purpose vhich lhis discourse is meanl lo
subserve, vhelher scienlific, oraloricaI, erislic, or vhal nol. This facl delermines
lhe vay in vhich inlerprelalion musl proceed.
We begin vilh lhe 'indelerminaleIy-delerminale parls' of lhe discourse, and,
from lheir generaI characler and lhe manner in vhich lhey are combined,
oblain a preIiminary idea of lhe 'sense' of lhe vhoIe. Then ve use lhis 'sense' of
lhe vhoIe lo delermine more preciseIy lhe significance of lhe parls. This in lurn
serves lo lesl and correcl our idea of lhe vhoIe, vhich musl, if possibIe, be so
conceived lhal aII lhe parls can be underslood vilhoul vioIence in lerms of il.
We can cIaim lo undersland lhe vork vhen behind lhe vords of every senlence
ve can read ils sense, and behind lhe succession of senlences ve can discern lhe
slruclure or 'inner form' or lhe vhoIe. AII lhis is an induclive process of a
somevhal pecuIiar kind: slarling vilh a parlicuIar group of dala, il sels oul lo
discover nol a universaI Iav, bul a
-139-
principIe of slruclure immanenl in lhese parlicuIar dala, vhich makes lhem a
coherenl individuaI vhoIe. This lype of induclion is nol pecuIiar lo lhe human
sludies: il vas by ils means lhal e.g. KepIer, from a fev observalions of Mars,
discovered lhe eIIiplicaI form of lhe orbil of lhal pIanel. ul in lhe human
sludies lhis form of inference has a fundamenlaI imporlance, and lhe higher
forms of underslanding are impossibIe vilhoul il. y ils means aIone ve can
pass from lhe parls of a vork lo lhe sense of lhe vhoIe, and by reference lo lhe
vhoIe again delermine lhe precise significance of every parl ( G.S.. V||, 220,
227).
ul underslanding does nol haIl here. ehind lhe inner form of lhal parlicuIar
vork il sees lhe crealive mind from vhich il sprang: lhe parlicuIar vork is seen
in reIalion lo lhe Iife, oulIook, and circumslances of ils aulhor, and lo lhe
condilion of his arl al lhe lime vhen he vas aclive: so lhal il appears no Ionger
as a seIf-conlained unil, bul as one momenl in lhe Iiving process vhich is lhe
hislory of lhe arl. This vay of regarding lhe vork makes a difference lo our
eslimale of lhe aulhor's originaIily and pover. 'The queslion is, vhal pIace a
vriler occupies in lhe deveIopmenl of lhe genre. So Iong as lhe genre is in
process of eIaboralion, lhe vriler makes a crealive conlribulion lo lhe genre
from his individuaI povers. He needs a grealer individuaI slrenglh. ul if he
comes lo lhe vork afler ils genre has been perfecled, lhen lhe genre heIps him
and carries him onvard.' More generaIIy, lhis means lhal inlerprelalion and
hislory cannol be kepl aparl. 'Conneclion belveen phiIoIogy and lhe highesl
form of hisloricaI underslanding. Ixposilion and hisloricaI porlrayaI onIy lvo
sides of lhe enlhusiaslic penelralion' ( G.S.. V||, 226, V, 335).
IinaIIy, since aII cognilion carries vilh il a feeIing of vaIue, underslanding and
exposilion are inseparabIe from crilicaI apprecialion. Ior every lype of vork ve
recognise a norm, by vhich ve |udge lhe aulhenlicily (phiIoIogicaI crilicism) or
lhe vaIue (Iilerary crilicism) of any vork or parl of a vork. Side by side vilh
lhese moves hisloricaI crilicism, in vhich lhe form and conlenl of lhe parlicuIar
vork are accounled for or expIained by ils anlecedenls: for 'belveen exposilion
and expIanalion lhere is onIy a difference of degree, no firm boundary'. In lhe
end, of course, phiIoIogicaI crilicism finds ils consummalion in
-140-
Iilerary hislory, Iilerary crilicism in aeslhelics, and hisloricaI crilicism meIls inlo
acluaI hisloriography ( G.S.. V, 336).
AIlhough lhe procedure of exposilion can be lhus described in IogicaI lerms, ve
musl nol suppose lhal underslanding ilseIf is a pureIy IogicaI operalion vhich
can be reduced lo ruIe. As every Iived experience invoIves cognilion, feeIing,
and voIilion, so lhe process of reIiving brings aII lhese aspecls of Iife inlo pIay:
and as no Iived experience can be fuIIy anaIysed by IogicaI calegories, so il is
impossibIe by IogicaI inference lo conslrucl an adequale piclure of anolher
person's Iife. 'In aII underslanding lhere is somelhing irralionaI, even as Iife
ilseIf is irralionaI: il cannol be represenled (rcprascniicri) by any formuIae of
IogicaI funclions' ( G.S.. V||, 218). DiIlhey, foIIoving SchIeiermacher, oflen
speaks of lhe process as one of 'divinalion'. The arl of il cannol be laughl, il can
onIy be oblained 'in personaI conlacl vilh lhe greal masler of exposilion or vilh
his vork' ( G.S.. V, 320). Il has in il somelhing of 'crealive genius' ( G.S.. V, 335).
'In consequence of lhese reIalions, scienlific exposilion or inlerprelalion, as an
underslanding vhich reproduces |ils ob|ecl] in accordance vilh an arl (!as
kunsinassig nacn|i|!cn!c Vcrsicncn), has aIvays somelhing of genius in il, i.e.
onIy lhrough inner affinily and sympalhy does il allain a high degree of
perfeclion. . . . This inner reIalion, vhich makes lransposilion possibIe, forms
lherefore lhe presupposilion of aII hermeneulic ruIes' ( G.S.. V, 278).
Il foIIovs lhal lhe resuIls reached in inlerprelalion can never have
demonslralive cerlilude ( G.S.. V||, 226), lhough lhe process carries vilh il a
conviclion of ils ovn, for vhich any chain of inferences, inlo vhich ve may
prelend lo resoIve lhe process, presenls no adequale subslilule ( G.S.. V||, 218).
And, since underslanding is nol lhe vork of IogicaI refIeclion, il is free from lhe
Iimilalions of IogicaI refIeclion, and, operaling vilh lhe same crealive
imaginalion from vhich lhe Iilerary vork originaIIy proceeded, can reIive
faclors vhich vere nol presenl lo lhe expIicil consciousness even of lhe vriler
himseIf, bul vhich his finished expression has made accessibIe, i.e. nacncr|c||ar.
The boId paradox of SchIeiermacher, lhal lhe aim of inlerprelalion is lo
undersland lhe aulhor beller lhan he underslood himseIf, is lrue ( G.S.. V||,
217). Al lhe rool of every poem is an 'idea': nol, of course, a concepl or sci cj
Prcpcsiiicns
-141-
consciousIy heId by lhe vriler and deIiberaleIy embodied in his vork, bul a
jcrn cj uniiu in cxpcricncc, vhich his crealive imaginalion has broughl aboul
vilhoul refIecling upon il, and proceeds, sliII vilhoul refIeclion, lo express. 'The
idea (nol as an abslracl concepl, bul) in lhe sense of an unconscious syslem,
aclive in lhe organisalion of lhe vork and underslood from ils inner form, is
reaIIy presenl: a poel need nol be, or ralher, never viII enlireIy be conscious of
il: lhe inlerpreler eIicils il, and lhal is perhaps lhe highesl lriumph of
hermeneulics' ( G.S.. V, 335).
Such is DiIlhey's doclrine of underslanding and his oulIine of a hermeneulic
lheory. Irom il ve shaII pass al once lo consider his conceplion of ncaning (
Bc!cuiung). This may seem a naluraI and indeed inevilabIe lransilion: bul here
al lhe very beginning musl come a varning. The ncaning, lhe sludy of vhich
foIIovs mosl naluraIIy from lhal of underslanding and inlerprelalion, is of
course ncaning in lhe sense of significalion, a reIalion belveen a sign and a
lhing signified, vhereby lhe sign indicales or expresses or 'means' lhe lhing
signified. ul ve have aIready examined aII lhal DiIlhey has lo say aboul lhis
reIalion. There remains, hovever, anolher kind of ncaning, lhe conceplion of
vhich pIays a greal parl in his phiIosophy: and il is lo lhis lhal ve musl nov
lurn our allenlion.
We may begin by recognising and dismissing yel anolher sense of lhe vord
'meaning', lhe sense in vhich il equaIs 'imporlance'. 'This means a greal deaI lo
me', or 'lhis means a greal deaI for lhe progress of phiIosophy: and lhis is
imporlanl for me' or 'for lhe progress of phiIosophy'. edeulen is used in a Iike
manner in German. Again, |c!cuicn! significanl imporlanl. De Ruggiero, in
his accounl of DiIlhey's phiIosophy, asserls lhal Bc!cuiung in DiIlhey aIvays
equaIs imporlance ( |i|cscji !c| Nctcccnic. p. 245). Tnis is nci sc. Tncrc arc in!cc! a
jcu passagcs in unicn Oi|incu uscs Bc!cuiung in a uau unicn ui|| |car inis
inicrprciaiicn. incugn incrc arc ncnc. | inink. unicn a|sc|uic|u !cnan! ii. |n anu casc
sucn passagcs arc rarc an! unrcprcscniaiitc. Bc!cuiung in Oi|incu !ccs nci ncan
inpcriancc. |ui scncining ncrc su|i|c an! prcjcun!.
Hc gitcs ii a nign p|acc ancng inc caicgcrics cj |ijc. inc ccnccpis in unicn inc naiurc
cj |ijc as prcccss an! as sc|j!ctc|cping uniiu is |rcugni cui. Iijc is uniiu in !itcrsiiu. a
unc|c uncsc paris arc nci ncrc|u inc|u!c! in ii in a nainc-
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malicaI or physicaI sense, bul sland in an inlimale reIalion vilh one anolher
and lhe vhoIe. Nov, DiIlhey leIIs us lhal Bc!cuiung is lhe calegory in vhich lhis
reIalion belveen vhoIe and parl, vhich is characlerislic of Iife, is mosl fuIIy
expressed. 'Meaning is lhe calegory for lhe unanaIysed syslem of Iife (
Ic|cnszusanncnnang)' ( G.S.. V||, 237). 'The calegory of meaning designales lhe
reIalion of parls of Iife lo lhe vhoIe, vhich is grounded in lhe nalure of Iife' (
G.S.. V||, 233). This is lhe primary sense of lhe lerm in DiIlhey's phiIosophy, and
lhe sense of 'significalion' is subordinale lo il. DiIlhey even makes lhe poinl lhal
in grammalicaI inlerprelalion ilseIf, vhere ve are concerned vilh lhe 'meaning'
of vords and senlences, lhe reIalion of parl and vhoIe has a decisive parl lo
pIay.
The simpIesl case, he says, in vhich meaning is lo be found is lhe
underslanding of a senlence, vhere lhe meanings of lhe vords and lhe sense of
lhe vhoIe
1
reciprocaIIy delermine one anolher. Whal does DiIlhey mean by
lhis` He knovs, of course, lhal lhe vords and senlence are signs, and lhal lheir
meaning as signs Iies in lheir reIalion lo somelhing behind lhemseIves, vhich
lhey mean (ncincn, |c!cuicn) or beloken (|czcicnncn), or lo vhich lhey refer
(nin!cuicn). This, hovever, is nol lhe aspecl of lhe maller vhich he chooses lo
emphasise. Ralher he is reminding us lhal lhe meaning of a vord, laken in
isoIalion, is indelerminale vilhin a cerlain range of possibiIilies, and is made
precise onIy by being given a specific pIace in lhe senlence as a vhoIe. The
vords give precision lo one anolher by being reIaled in lhis parlicuIar vay, by
coming before and afler each olher as lhey do. Iach vord receives Iighl from
vhal has gone before and casls Iighl back upon il. Iach vord suggesls olher
vords vhich may foIIov, bul aIso Iimils lhe range of possibiIilies lhere. DiIlhey
says lhal lhe meaning of lhe vords is delermined, Iike lhe meaning of episodes
in Iife, 'by virlue of memories and fulure possibiIilies' ( G.S.. V||, 234-5).
Il is lhe same vhen ve pass from underslanding a vrillen lexl lo
underslanding a piece of hislory. Here ve vork nol onIy from vords, bul from
aII avaiIabIe forms of expression: and aII of lhese have meaning in lhe sense lhal
lhey are oulvard signs,
____________________
1
DiIlhey somelimes dislinguishes lhe Bc!cuiung or meaning of lhe parl as
Bc!cuisankcii or significance, and lhe meaning of lhe vhoIe as Sinn or sense.
Very oflen he uses Bc!cuiung for lhe parl and Sinn for lhe vhoIe.
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referring lo an inner reaIily behind lhemseIves. ul here again lhis is nol lhe
aspecl vhich DiIlhey emphasises. Whal mallers is lhal lhe meaning of each
expression is onIy lo be underslood by reference lo lhe vhoIe, incIuding lhe
pasl, so far as ve remember il, and lhe fulure, so far as ve can foresee il. The
expressions are lhus inlerreIaled because lhe experiences vhich lhey express
are aIso inlerreIaled in lhis vay. Indeed, lhe expressions, or 'ob|eclificalions' (
O|jckiitaiicncn) of Iife, are nol reaIIy separale from lhe Iife-process, bul arise
from il and remain parl of il. They are lhemseIves hisloricaI evenls, parls of lhe
process vhose meaning ve are abIe lo read in lhem. The reIalions belveen
lhem are nol abslracl IogicaI reIalions, Iike lhe reIalions belveen lhe vords and
senlences of a scienlific lrealise, nor impersonaI causaI reIalions, Iike lhose
belveen evenls in lhe physicaI vorId, bul Iiving reIalions, vhich ve
undersland by reIiving lhem in ourseIves. 'The inner reIalion is given in lhe
possibiIily of recrealing or reIiving ( !cs Nacncrzcugcns.
1
Nacncr|c|cns). Tnis is
unijcrn|u inc ncinc!. as sccn as un!crsian!ing |catcs inc spncrc cj ucr!s an! incir
scnsc. an! |ccks nci jcr a scnsc cj signs. |ui jcr inc nucn !ccpcr scnsc cj a
nanijcsiaiicn cj |ijc. |i is inc ncinc! jirsi g|inpsc! |u |icnic. Iijc is |ikc a nc|c!u in
unicn ii is nci scun!s inai appcar as inc cxprcssicn cj inc rca| rca|iiics ( der reuIen
ReuIltten ) rcsi!ing in |ijc. Tnc nc|c!u |ics in |ijc iisc|j ( G.S.. V||. 234).
Tnis is inc ncari cj inc naiicr. Iijc is a unc|c. uncsc paris natc ncaning in sc jar as
incu ccn!iiicn an! i||uninaic cnc ancincr uiinin inc unc|c. Tncrc is nc ucsiicn ncrc cj
anu rc|aiicn |ciuccn signs an! inings signijic!. Wc c|iain acccss ic |ijc |u rca!ing iis
signs. |ui uncn uc ccnc ic |ijc iisc|j. inc iruc c|jcci cj un!crsian!ing. inai rc|aiicn is
|cji |cnin!. |tcru nanijcsiaiicn cj |ijc nas a ncaning in sc jar as ii is a sign unicn
cxprcsscs scncining. an!. as an cxprcssicn. rcjcrs ic scncining unicn |c|cngs ic |ijc.
Bui |ijc iisc|j !ccs nci ncan anuining c|sc. Tncrc is in ii nc scparaiicn |u tiriuc cj
unicn ii ccu|! ncan anuining |ui iisc|j ( G.S.. V||. 234). Tnc ncaning cj |ijc |ics
cniirc|u in inc rc|aiicns |ciuccn paris an! unc|c uiinin ii.
Scnc cj incsc rc|aiicns arc in!cpcn!cni cj iinc. |cr insiancc. Oi|incu spcaks cj ari as
sncuing inc ncaning cj cnaracicrs.
____________________
1
The verb erzeugen, and lhe doclrine lhal lo undersland an experience ve
musl creale or evoke (crzcugcn) il in ourseIves, are characlerislic of Iichle.
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evenls, or experiences, by bringing oul vhal is essenliaI or lypicaI in lhem
(above, p. 112 -3). SimiIarIy he speaks of hisloricaI records having meaning for
lhe hislorian vhen lhe personaIily or process vhich lhey record is lypicaI or
'represenlalive' of a cerlain range of human possibiIilies. Mosl of lhe reIalions,
hovever, are lime-reIalions, e.g. causaI reIalions, means-and-end reIalions and
lhe Iike. 'The essence of meaning-reIalions Iies in lhe reIalions vhich, in lhe
lime-process, are conlained in lhe graduaI shaping of a Iife ( Gcsia|iung cincs
Ic|cns|aujcs) on lhe basis of lhe slruclure of Iife under condilions of lhe miIieu' (
G.S.. V||, 234). 'We grasp lhe meaning of a momenl of lhe pasl. Il is significanl in
so far as in il, by a deed or by an exlernaI evenl, ve became bound for lhe
fulure. Or in so far as a pIan for lhe fulure conducl of Iife vas conceived. Or in
so far as such a pIan vas carried lovards ils fuIfiImenl. Or il is significanl for
lhe Iife of lhe communily in so far as il embodies lhe individuaI's inlervenlion
in lhis Iife' ( G.S.. V||, 233).
Whal have aII lhese lime-reIalions in common` CausaIily` Yes, bul lhal is nol
aII. Il is nol enough lo lhink of meaning or significance as causaI efficacy. Thal is
lhe slandpoinl laken by lhe hislorian Iduard Meyer, vho hoIds lhal lhe
significanl evenl is lhe evenl vhich has had a vide infIuence. This is lo measure
lhe significance of pasl evenls by lheir dynamic reIalion lo lhe presenl: lhal
evenl is significanl vhich has Iefl a mark on lhe vorId of lo-day. ul lhis, as
DiIlhey sees, is nol enough. On lhis shoving, 'everylhing vouId be significanl
vhich had a parl in causing lhe endIess muIlilude of presenl facls': a viev
vhich ve do nol normaIIy lake. We musl ralher say lhal lhal is significanl
vhich had a parl in causing somelhing vhich is ilseIf significanl in lhe presenl.
ul lhen lhere musl be a crilerion of lhe significance of presenl facls: and lhis
crilerion, says DiIlhey, is vaIue.
There are lvo vays, hovever, of eslimaling vaIue and so meaning. If ve lake
lhe praclicaI poinl of viev, ve shaII fix our eyes on lhe fulure, and see in lhe
presenl onIy lhe possibiIilies vhich il hoIds oul of fulure achievemenl. The
vaIues vhich ve recognise viII appear lo us as ends or pro|ecls, and ve shaII
'find lhal significanl in lhe presenl vhich is fruilfuI for lhe fulure' ( G.S.. V||,
288-9). ul ve need nol aIvays lake lhis
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praclicaI poinl of viev. We can forgel lhe fulure in lhe en|oymenl of lhe presenl.
Then vaIues viII appear lo us in lhe form of presenl salisfaclions, and lhe pasl
viII appear significanl in lhe degree in vhich il has conlribuled lo lhese presenl
salisfaclions. 'If ve slep quielIy aside from lhe hunl afler ends, and Iook back
inlo our Iife, lhen ils momenls elc. appear significanl. Tnis is inc naiura| aspcci of
Iife' ( G.S.. V|, 319).
DiIlhey goes on lo drav oul in an inleresling vay lhe reIalion belveen lhe
pragmalic and lhe conlempIalive alliludes lo Iife. 'In lhe poel lhis |i.e. lhe
conlempIalive] mode of apprehension presenls ilseIf in a heighlened form. He
apprehends lhe significance of Iife. ecause lhe poel is nol slimuIaled lo aclion
by vhal he perceives, lhe vorId of men becomes meaningfuI for him. The
meaning of an evenl Iies in lhe facl lhal ils causaI concalenalion is aIso lhe
generalion of a vaIue. Ior lhe aclive man lhe vaIue Iies in an end, for lhe poelic
man il Iies in each momenl of Iife. In youlh, Iife and poelic apprehension
coincide, youlh can sliII be pIanIess. Laler, vhen coherenl aclion enlers in, lhe
lvo lhings come aparl. Then lhe poelic pover moslIy disappears. In Goelhe il
becomes slronger in lhe form of a conlempIalion severed from aclion. Hence he
has lo vilhdrav from Iife in order lo vrile poelry. ul lhen lhe significance of
each momenl of Iife appears aII lhe more slrongIy in conlempIalion. He vho
onIy vriles poelry remains a phanlasl ( Scnuarncr). In him vho acls, poelry
becomes reslricled' (i|i!.).
IIsevhere DiIlhey gIances al lhe obvious lrulh lhal lhe conlempIalive allilude,
vhich sees and en|oys lhe presenl, and lhe praclicaI allilude, vhich slrains
forvard lovards lhe fulure, affecl one anolher. Our pIans for lhe fulure are a
refIeclion of vhal ve have aIready found good and desirabIe in lhe presenl,
vhiIe on lhe olher hand our pIans, once formuIaled and adopled, reacl upon
our |udgmenl of lhe significance of pasl and presenl ( G.S.. V||, 233). olh lhe
aulobiographer, Iooking back over his ovn personaI pasl, and lhe hislorian,
engaged vilh lhe pasl of nalions, musl baIance lhe lvo poinls of viev. We shaII
see in a Ialer chapler hov lhe concenlralion of a vriler's chief inleresl on pasl,
presenl, or fulure can affecl lhe vay in vhich he remembers and sels forlh lhe
evenls of his ovn Iife (beIov, p. 272 ). Il is aIso obvious lhal as lime moves on,
as lhe pasl becomes richer and lhe fulure presenls lo us a changing face,
-146-
our vievs of lhe meaning of evenls viII aIso change. No finaI |udgmenl can be
made on lhe meaning of evenls in a man's Iife unliI he has died, nor on lhe
meaning of hisloricaI evenls before lhe end of hislory ( G.S.. V||, 233). In reaI
Iife, in shorl, aII |udgmenls of meaning are provisionaI. Life as ve knov il is
aIvays buiIding ilseIf inlo an inleIIigibIe vhoIe: bul il is a vhoIe lhal is never
compIele, perpeluaIIy in jicri. The key lo il is nol lo be found in lhe vaIues
vhich ve nov recognise, or lhe ends vhich ve nov pursue: lhe pursuil of
vaIues and ends is somelhing vhich happens in lhe course of Iife, bul Iife ilseIf,
embracing and lranscending each and every end-seeking, means-laking
aclivily, vorks ilseIf oul purposiveIy indeed, bul vilhoul any specific purpose
vhich ve can define. In lhis il resembIes music, vilh vhich DiIlhey so oflen
compares il.
The allempl is somelimes made by reIigious lhinkers, and by a cerlain kind of
phiIosophers, lo discover 'lhe meaning of Iife' and express il in one universaIIy
vaIid formuIa. Such formuIae lend lo be aIike in assuming one lype of Iife and
characler lo be lhe norm for mankind, and lhey describe a series of slages
lhrough vhich ve musl pass on lhe vay lo il. 'The meaning of Iife' Iies
lherefore in lhe ideaI lype, and lhe meaning of parlicuIar aspecls or episodes in
Iife Iies in lheir reIalion lo our grovlh lovards perfeclion. 'The Neo-IIalonic
lype, lhe myslicaI lype of lhe MiddIe Age, lhe grades in Spinoza. In lhese
schemala a reaIisalion of lhe meaning of Iife lakes pIace' ( G.S.. V||, 240). DiIlhey
himseIf is inleresled in lhis vay of Iooking al Iife, bul his Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc
shovs hov he differs from lhe vrilers and schooIs menlioned above. He does
nol beIieve lhal lhere is one 'meaning of Iife' vhich is lhe same for aII mankind:
he beIieves lhal lhere are infinile possibiIilies of varialion in meaning. Il is an
error lo lie dovn vhal Iife Ieaves free.
These doclrines of DiIlhey aboul underslanding and meaning have come under
crilicism from Rickerl and lhe aden schooI, vhose Neo-Kanlian lheory of
knovIedge naluraIIy Ieads lhem lo lake a differenl viev of lhese mallers. Lel us
nov examine lheir crilicism and lry lo assess ils vaIue.
Rickerl begins, in lhe lrue Neo-Kanlian spiril, by dislinguishing belveen lhe
maller and lhe form of human experience. The 'maller' is lhe slream of
psychoIogicaI evenls, vhich arise in lhe minded organism in response lo lhe
slimuIi reaching il from
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ils surroundings, and are reIaled lo one anolher in accordance vilh
psychoIogicaI Iavs. This is lhe 'psychicaI' reaIm ( !as Psucniscnc. Scc|iscnc).
Psucnc|cgica| ctcnis as sucn can |c cxp|ainc! |u inc ncinc!s cj naiura| scicncc. |ui
cannci |c un!crsicc!. |ccausc incu arc a ncrc scucncc cj ctcnis uiincui anu scnsc (
Sinn) in ii. Scnsc cr ncaning ccncs inic cxpcricncc jrcn ancincr scurcc. ic unicn
scicniijic psucnc|cgu nas nc c|uc. Scnsc-!aia arc sunincsisc! un!cr inc caicgcrics. a
ucr|! cj c|jccis is ccnsirucic!. ncra| an! cu|iura| ta|ucs arc pursuc! an! prcgrcssitc|u
rca|isc! in rca| |ijc. Tncsc ta|ucs !c nci arisc cui cj inc |ijc cj inc psucnc. Tncu ccnc
upcn ii as jcrn upcn naiicr. an! incir scurcc is inc iransccn!cnia| sc|j. Man |c|cngs ic
iuc ucr|!s. inc rca| (uirk|icn. rca|) ucr|! cj icnpcra| |cccning an! inc unrca|
(unuirk|icn. irrca|) cr i!ca| (i!cc|) ucr|! cj raiicna| princip|cs. His psucnc|cgica|
prcccsscs |c|cng ic inc rca| ucr|!. |ui a|| ncaning |c|cngs ic inc i!ca| ucr|!. An!. as
psucnica| jaci an! i!ca| ncaning !ijjcr. sc !c inc prcccsscs |u unicn incu arc
apprcncn!c!. Tnc cnc is kncun ic us |u inc psucnc|cgica| prcccss cj |r|c|cn an!
Nacncr|c|cn. an! inc cincr |u inc purc raiicna| prcccss cj Vcrsicncn.
|ickcri i||usiraics inc !ijjcrcncc |u ccnsi!cring unai is intc|tc! in un!crsian!ing
Gccincs |ausi. Tnc ncaning cj |ausi is scncining inai Gccinc ninsc|j un!crsicc!. |n
un!crsian!ing ii. incrcjcrc. | an rcprc!ucing in nusc|j an cxpcricncc (an aci cj raiicna|
apprcncnsicn) unicn Gccinc na!. Bui incugn inc un!crsian!ing cj |ausi !i! cccur in
Gccincs nin!. as ii !ccs ncu in ninc. ii uas jar jrcn |cing jusi an cpisc!c in nis
ncnia| nisicru. |ausi uas an! is a ucrk cj ari. an in!iti!ua| cn|c!incni cj acsinciic
ta|uc. c|cuing iis cun inncrcni |aus. unicn arc inc |aus cj rcascn an! crcaiitc
inaginaiicn. A|| inc !cu|is an! ncsiiaiicns. inc ja|sc siaris. inc cxiranccus nciitcs.
unicn cnicr inic inc psucnc|cgica| prcccss cj uriiing |ausi. arc irrc|ctani ic inc
un!crsian!ing cj ii. Bui ij. as Oi|incu saus. ic un!crsian! is ic nacncr|c|cn. inai can
cn|u ncan inai inc unc|c psucnc|cgica| prcccss is ic |c rc|itc!. Occs nci Oi|incu
cxprcss|u sau inai inc nigncr jcrns cj un!crsian!ing iru ic gc |cnin! inc jinisnc! ucrk
ic iis gcncsis. an! sc ncrgc ai |asi inic |icgrapnu an! nisicru? Tnc psucnc|cgica|
prcccss as sucn. ncuctcr. c|cus nc raiicna| princip|c. |ui cn|u inc |aus cj psucnc|cgica|
causa|iiu. Tnc Nacn|i|! cj ii cannci |c i||uninaic! |u anu aci
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of underslanding, il can onIy be accounled for, vilh more or Iess probabiIily, by
scienlific expIanalion. Thal is lhe lrue Nacncr|c|cn. an! ic !cjinc un!crsian!ing in
icrns cj ii is a grcss crrcr.
Sc incn. ic un!crsian! anuining is ic grasp a raiicna| princip|c in ii. Tnc prinaru
c|jcci cj un!crsian!ing is inc i!ca| princip|c. inc scnsc-ccnicni ( Sinngcna|i) cr
ncaning-ccnp|cx ( Sinngc|i|!c) cr cu|iura| ta|uc ( Ku|iurucri) iisc|j. |n a scccn!aru
scnsc uc nau |c sai! ic un!crsian!. in icrns cj inc princip|c. inc ncnia| aciitiiu
inrcugn unicn ii is rca|isc!. Wncrc incrc is nc rcccgniiicn cj a raiicna| princip|c. uc !c
nci un!crsian!. incugn uc nau rc|itc (nacncr|c|cn).
Tnc nigncsi un!crsian!ing is incrcjcrc aiiainc! in pni|cscpnu. uncrc |cgic. cinics. an!
acsinciics cxni|ii inc i!ca| ncrns in incir purc jcrn. an! inc pni|cscpnu cj nisicru
app|ics incn in cr!cr ic c|iain an a|sc|uic|u ta|i! inicrprciaiicn cj inc ncaning cr
scnsc cj nunan |ijc an! nisicru.
Ncxi ic inis ccncs inc un!crsian!ing cj cnpirica||u !iscctcrc! princip|cs. an! inc usc
cj incn uiin a ticu ic an inicrprciaiicn cj nisicru an! cu|iurc jrcn an innancni an!
rc|aiitc sian!pcini. Tnis is inc ucrk cj nisicru an! inc cu|iura| siu!ics. inc cu|iura|
siu!ics !cscri|c. c|assiju. inicrprci. an! criiicisc cu|iura| acnictcncnis. uni|c nisicru
cxanincs inc iinc-prcccss in unicn incsc acnictcncnis ccnc ic |c an! pass auau.
|n nisicru. ncuctcr. as !isiinci jrcn inc cu|iura| siu!ics. uc iru ic gc |cnin! inc ta|uc-
ccnp|cxcs unicn uc un!crsian!. ic g|ancc ai inc psucnc|cgica| |ackgrcun! againsi
unicn incu sian! cui. an! ic iracc inc circunsianccs cj incir gcncsis. Hcrc. incn. uc
pass jrcn un!crsian!ing ic rc|iting. an! |c ii ncic! inai un!crsian!ing ccncs jirsi.
an! acis inrcugncui as a ccnirc| upcn inc rc|iting. Wc jin! inai a ccriain pcrscn cncc
aciua|isc!. in nis cxpcricncc a ccriain i!ca| ta|uc. an! uc ask cursc|tcs unai nusi natc
|ccn gcing cn in a nin! uncrc sucn a ta|uc as inis canc ic |irin. |n ansucr ic inis
ucsiicn. uc |ui|! up a piciurc cj inai pcrscns ncnia| |ijc |u ana|cgu uiin cur cun.
an! iru ic rc|itc nis cxpcricncc. jusi as Oi|incu saus. cn|u. inis rc|iting is nci inc
un!crsian!ing cj inai pcrscn. ncr ctcn a |asis jcr inc un!crsian!ing cj nin. |ui
scncining gcncrica||u .!ijjcrcni. unicn ncrcctcr can cn|u |cgin uncn uc natc a|rca!u
un!crsicc! nin.
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IinaIIy, says Rickerl, in psychoIogy, vhich is a naluraI science in melhod and in
spiril, and cares nolhing for ideaI vaIues or principIes, lhere is naluraIIy no
pIace for underslanding. IsychoIogy sludies lhe psychicaI processes as such, in
abslraclion from any ideaI meaning vhich may enler inlo lhem: and for lhis
purpose !as Nacncr|c|cn is ils necessary and sufficienl looI.
Rickerl and his schooI are nol backvard in praise of DiIlhey as a hislorian,
biographer, and crilic. He has, lhey say, a quile pecuIiar pover of insighl, bolh
inlo individuaI personaIilies and inlo greal meaning-compIexes such as lhe
Aujk|arung or lhe posl-Kanlian phiIosophy. He can see, and he can make us see.
Iurlher, he underslands veII enough in a praclicaI vay lhe difference belveen
a psychoIogicaI process and a meaningcompIex, and in his Ialer vrilings he has
said quile cIearIy lhal lhe meaning-compIex is lhe primary ob|ecl of enquiry in
lhe human sludies. Where he faiIs, say lhe aden schooI, is in expIaining hov a
meaning-compIex is apprehended. ecause he foIIovs an empiricisl lheory of
knovIedge, and ignores lhe sharp anlilhesis vhich exisls belveen psychic
experience and ralionaI apprehension, he cannol dislinguish Vcrsicncn from
Nacncr|c|cn in his lheory of knovIedge, even lhough he keeps lhem properIy
aparl in his hisloricaI and crilicaI praclice.
Is lhis crilicism sound`
Il is lrue lhal DiIlhey adheres lo a radicaI empiricism, and viII have nolhing lo
do vilh lhe Neo-Kanlians' ideaI vorId or vilh lheir conceplion of reason. He
recognises as veII as lhey do lhal lhere can be no underslanding vilhoul
lhinking: in accordance, hovever, vilh his generaI lheory of knovIedge he does
nol conceive lhis lhinking as a lranscendenlaI synlhesis imposing form on
experienliaI maller, bul as 'siIenl lhoughl' eIiciling lhe formaI unily vhich is
ready given in Iived experience. This is lhe core of his quarreI vilh lhem, and il
shovs ilseIf in many vays. When DiIlhey insisls on speaking of
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn inslead of Ku|iuruisscnscnajicn. an! uscs inc ucr! Gcisi in a
uau unicn sira!!|cs inc Kaniian !icncicnu cj psucnc an! rcascn. nc is nci |cing
carc|css cr c|iusc. Hc kncus unai nc is !cing. Hc is sauing inai |itc! cxpcricncc is. cj
iis cun naiurc. insiinci uiin jcrn an! ncaning. Hc saus sc cxprcss|u in ucr!s uncsc
c!gc is !irccic! againsi Kaniian icacning. Tnc signijicancc unicn inc jaci acuircs. as
inc !cicrninaiicn in-
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parled by a meaningfuI vhoIe lo ils parls, is a Iiving conneclion and nol an
inleIIecluaI reIalion (cin Ic|cns|czug un! kcin inic||ckiuc||cs Vcrna|inis), nol an
inserlion (Hincin|cgcn) of reason or lhoughl inlo lhal parl of lhe process.
Significance is exlracled (herausgehoIl) from Iife ilseIf' ( G.S.. V||, 240). He even
defines an IrIebnis, or unil of experience, in lerms of meaning. 'Thal vhich, in
lhe fIov of lime, forms a unily in presenlness (Prascnz), because il has a unilary
meaning, is lhe smaIIesl unil vhich ve can designale as an |r|c|nis' ( G.S.. V||,
19473). IinaIIy, il is lhe same conviclion vhich Ieads DiIlhey in anolher conlexl
lo disagree vilh lhe Kanlians vhen lhey dislinguish phiIosophy so rigidIy from
psychoIogy. In lheir viev, psychoIogy is lhe naluraI science of lhe psyche,
vhich cannol be made an ob|ecl of underslanding because il has in il no ideaI
meaning, and il is lo phiIosophy lhal ve musl go for a ralionaI science of lhe
seIf. ul DiIlhey beIieves lhal lhe inleIIigibIe order vhich characlerises lhe
ralionaI seIf is homogeneous vilh, onIy more fuIIy deveIoped and inlegraled
lhan, lhe order vhich prevaiIs in lhe smaIIesl unil-experience.
Il may be said lhal lhis is lo exaggerale lhe inleIIigibiIily and meaningfuIness of
Iived experience. Is lhere nc eIemenl of lhe irralionaI in il, no eIemenl vhich
caIIs for expIanalion in lerms of psychoIogicaI Iavs vhiIe refusing lo be
inlerpreled in lerms of meaning` The ansver is lhal DiIlhey recognises a breach
in lhe meaningfuI unily of menlaI Iife al lvo poinls. (1) He dravs, as ve have
seen, a dislinclion belveen lhose reIalions and processes vhich are 'slrucluraI'
and inleIIigibIe, and olhers vhich are nol: lhe Ialler incIuding casuaI
associalions, some phenomena connecled vilh forgelfuIness and recaII, and
olher psychoIogicaI mechanisms vhich ve discover inducliveIy from
observalion, bul do nol experience underslandingIy from vilhin. (2) Ior aII his
insislence on lhe aclivily of lhe mind in underslanding, he has aIso a keen sense
of lhe impacl vhich lhe mind receives from exlernaI sources. The mind is
conlinuaIIy receiving slimuIi from vilhoul, and lhese conlinuaIIy modify ils
Iine of lhoughl and aclion. Yel here il is lrue lo add lhal lhe mind is conlinuaIIy
reasserling ils unily and seIf-organising pover, and lhe inlrusive eIemenls are
eilher re|ecled or eIse accepled inlo lhe slream of ils Iife. Iverylhing here is
meaningfuI, excepl lhe acluaI momenl of passivily lo exlernaI infIuences:
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il is lhese aIone vhich presenl an eIemenl of brule facl vhich ve can expIain
bul nol undersland. Life, in shorl, is a coherenl syslem of aclivilies, conslanlIy
dislurbed by slimuIi from vilhoul, bul conslanlIy seIf-resloring, and as such il
can be underslood.
If DiIlhey is righl in lhis, lhe Kanlians are convicled of undereslimaling lhe
inherenl inleIIigibiIily of Iived experience. Il becomes reasonabIe lo say vilh
DiIlhey lhal ve can undersland nol onIy lhe greal vorks of lhe pasl, bul aIso (in
a measure) lhe process of lheir origin, and lhe background in human Iife from
vhich lhey proceed. Inslead of keeping lhe lvo aparl, and prelending lo
undersland lhe one vhiIe mereIy expIaining lhe olher, ve may reasonabIy
cIaim lo undersland bolh, and lo undersland lhem properIy onIy vhen seen
lhus logelher. A vork of arl or Iileralure, or a phiIosophicaI or scienlific lheory,
is nol mereIy a seIf-conlained unil or monad, a compIex of images and concepls
vhich logelher form an inleIIigibIe vhoIe. Il is lhal, bul onIy because il is
somelhing more. Il is lhe resuIl of someone's imaginalive and inleIIecluaI
Iabour. Il is a record of imaginalive and inleIIecluaI acls vhich someone has
performed, nol in isoIalion, nol in a menlaI void, bul as parl of lhe vhoIe
business of Iiving his Iife among his feIIov-men. In underslanding lhe vork,
lherefore, in reperforming lhese imaginalive and inleIIecluaI acls, ve enler inlo
reIalion vilh lhe Iife of ils aulhor, and lhrough him vilh lhe Iife of his limes.
Thal is vhy DiIlhey says lhal aII underslanding, if pushed lo ils Iimils, becomes
hisloricaI underslanding. Whal ve undersland in lhe Iasl resorl is nol poems
and operas and lheories, bul peopIe. The vorks of men are inleresling lo us nol
mereIy for vhal lhey are in lhemseIves, bul aIso for vhal lhey leII us aboul
lheir makers: lhough on lhe olher hand il is equaIIy lrue lhal lhe mosl
inleresling lhing aboul human beings is lhal lhey can produce poems and
lheories, buiIdings, IegaI and poIilicaI syslems, reIigious discipIines and lhe Iike.
Thus il is nol inlo a Neo-Kanlian heaven of ralionaI meaningcompIexes lhal
underslanding lakes us, bul inlo lhe hearl of lhe lime-process, lhe dynamic
syslem of hisloricaI Iife. Il shovs us men caughl in hisloricaI silualions and
summoning lheir povers lo deaI vilh lhem, feeIing lhe impacl of one anolher's
lhoughls and deeds, infIuencing and being infIuenced: il shovs us lhe
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fruilfuI marriage of kindred minds, and lhe unresoIved cIash of opposing
slandpoinls. AII lhe many-sided spIendour of human hislory comes lhus lo be
refIecled in our consciousness as ve valch and undersland and sympalhise,
and, in DiIlhey's phrase, 'Iife embraces Iife'.
The Neo-Kanlian phiIosophy, he says, goes lhe vrong vay aboul expIaining
hov ve can undersland one anolher. Inslead of finding lhe ground of
underslanding in experience as ve acluaIIy Iive il, Neo-Kanlianism argues lo 'a
super-empiricaI sub|ecl vhich manifesls ilseIf in lhe individuaI consciousness. .
. . The crealion of lhis lranscendenlaI melhod is lhe dealh of hislory, because lhe
aIIeged reaIilies are such lhal ve cannol dig ourseIves inlo lhem by fruilfuI
hisloricaI concepls' ( G.S.. V||, 285). 'We musl move oul of lhe pure, fine air of
lhe Kanlian crilique of reason, in order lo do |uslice lo lhe vhoIIy differenl
nalure of hisloricaI ob|ecls.' Thal vhich reaIIy Iies behind hisloricaI phenomena,
and is lhe ob|ecl of hisloricaI sludy, is nol lhe lranscendenlaI seIf, bul man, vilh
his compIex mind-body slruclure and his bundIe of inslincls: and ve can make
him an ob|ecl of sludy because ve are ourseIves aIso men. The experiences of
olher individuaIs are inleIIigibIe lo me because lhey are lhe reaIisalion of
possibiIilies vhich are presenl aIso in me: lranspersonaI syslems can be
underslood, because lhey proceed from lhal same human nalure vhich I
observe in myseIf and in olhers. 'So lhe firsl significanl momenl for lhe soIulion
of lhe probIem of hisloricaI knovIedge appears: lhe firsl condilion for lhe
possibiIily of hisloricaI knovIedge Iies in lhe facl lhal I myseIf am a hisloricaI
being, lhal he vho enquires inlo hislory is lhe same as he vho makes hislory' (
G.S.. V||, 278).
ul I am a hisloricaI being in anolher sense as veII. I am a poinl of inlerseclion
for many sociaI lradilions and inslilulions, and aII lhe experience of lhe race,
slored up in lhese ob|eclive syslems, has gone lo lhe making of my mind. 'The
Ianguage in vhich I lhink has arisen in lime, my concepls have grovn up
vilhin il. Thus I am, dovn lo inscrulabIe deplhs of myseIf, a hisloricaI being'
(i|i!.) Hence I can undersland lhe pasl, because il sliII Iives in me, and operales
in my presenl experience as a force condilioning my knovIedge of ilseIf. 'The
individuaI, as bearer and represenlalive of lhe common lradilions voven
logelher in him, en|oys and comprehends lhe hislory
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in vhich lhey arose. He underslands hislory because he is himseIf a hisloricaI
being' ( , 151).
In shorl, lhe affinily belveen hisloricaI facl and myseIf, vhich makes hisloricaI
knovIedge possibIe for me, is lvofoId. (1) On lhe one hand, lhe inslincls and
slrucluraI reIalions vhich I experience in myseIf are lhe same vhich produced
aII pasl evenls in hislory: and (2) on lhe olher hand, lhe experience accumuIaled
by mankind in lhe course of pasl hislory is lhe same force vhich, lhrough
educalion and sociaI infIuences, has mouIded my ovn characler and oulIook.
'We are hisloricaI beings firsl, before ve are sludenls of hislory, and il is onIy
because ve are lhe firsl lhal ve become lhe second' ( , 278).
Such al Ieasl is DiIlhey's viev of lhe maller. ul before ve can acquiesce in il ve
have sliII lo see hov he meels a finaI chaIIenge. Is il reaIIy lrue lhal 'Iife
embraces Iife' excepl in a quile superficiaI sense` Do ve reaIIy find our vay lo
lhe ideas and molives of hisloricaI agenls, so as lo reconslrucl lhe invardness of
lhe process of evenls` Have ve enough evidence lo guide us in lhis, and lo
overcome vhal musl aIvays be lhe hislorian's lemplalion, lo over-simpIify` Ior
if he is lo reconslrucl lhe pasl al aII, he can onIy do so aIong lhe Iines of an
inleIIigibIe meaning: lhis he viII lrace as far as his sources lake him, and carry
furlher by inference, vhiIe any eIemenl of irralionaIily vhich is nol acluaIIy
recorded is IikeIy lo remain unsuspecled. Hov many lhings lhere musl be
Iurking, unreveaIed and perhaps never lo be reveaIed, vhose deleclion vouId
overlhrov lhe faciIe reasonabIeness of lhe accepled hislories! Il is never easy lo
shov lhal any aclion has a ralionaI molive: bul lhe svay of passion, pre|udice,
and aII irralionaI forces over human Iife is inexhauslibIy vide. Somelimes ve
can risk a guess al a person's characler, and in some such cases lhe characler
seems lo be ruIed by ralionaI molives: yel even here ve have no cIear righl lo
argue from generaI indicalions of lhis kind lo a firm concIusion aboul lhe
molives of a parlicuIar acl. And if everyone is lhus under suspicion, lhe doubl
musl aIso incIude our sources. They may be ignoranl, pre|udiced, or
lendenlious: in any case lhey are seIeclive, and oflen faiI lo leII us |usl lhe lhings
vhich ve vish lo knov. Thus, in fine, ve can doubl bolh lhe inlrinsic
inleIIigibiIily of lhe hisloricaI process, and lhe adequacy of our sources lo reveaI
il.
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DiIlhey himseIf, in his finaI skelch of lhe Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. jaccs inc
!cu|i cn |cin pcinis. an! nis ansucr ic nisicrica| sccpiicisn nusi ncu |c ccnsi!crc!.
|irsi cj a||. in inc Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i in !cn Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn (
1910). nc !ca|s uiin !ijjicu|iics arising jrcn inc |cgica| jcrn cj nisicrica| cnuiru. Tnc
nisicrians ucrk. nc saus. |cgins uiin pni|c|cgu. unicn ccnpriscs inc siu!u cj inc
|anguagcs in unicn inc scurccs arc uriiicn. icgcincr uiin inc icxiua| criiicisn an!
cnrcnc|cgica| arrangcncni cj inc scurccs incnsc|tcs. Tncn jc||cus inc inicrprciaiicn cj
inc scurccs. inc ju|| un!crsian!ing cj unai incu arc ncani ic ccntcu. Tncn ccncs inc
rcj|cciicn upcn inis injcrnaiicn. cc||aiicn cj taricus scurccs. an! inc aiicnpi ic
prc!ucc a ccncrcni an! inic||igi||c acccuni cj inc prcccsscs !cscri|c! in incn. Tncsc
taricus siagcs in nisicrica| cnuiru !c nci jcrn a |incar scucncc. |ui arc carric! cui
pari passu. an! sian! ic cnc ancincr in a rc|aiicn cj rcciprcca| !cpcn!cncc. Tnai is unu
Oi|incu saus in cnc passagc inai pni|c|cgu is nci a ncrc ai! ic inc nisicrian. |ui is
aciua||u an inicgra| pari cj nis prccc!urc. inc grcun!-scicncc cj nisicru ( G.S.. V||.
261).
Bui. saus inc c|jccicr. inis rcciprcca| !cpcn!cncc is cn|u a jinc nanc jcr |cgica|
circu|ariiu. Ccnsi!cr Nic|unrs ucrk cn car|u |cnan nisicru. Hc na! ic cxaninc inc
crigin an!. jrcn inai. ic ju!gc inc ucrin cj inc cxisiing ancicni ira!iiicn. nc na! ic
!c!ucc jrcn gcncra| prc|a|i|iiics unai nusi natc |ccn. in cui|inc. inc rca| ccursc cj
ctcnis. an! anu ccnc|usicn unicn nc rcacnc! cn ciincr cj incsc |incs cj cnuiru uas
|cun! ic rcaci upcn inc cincr. Hc iric!. in!cc!. ic suppcri nis rcsu|is |u inc ana|cgu cj
sini|ar !ctc|cpncnis c|scuncrc. |ui cur kncu|c!gc cj incsc cincr !ctc|cpncnis is iisc|j
circu|ar. an! jcr inc sanc rcascns. Tnc circ|c nusi arisc. ij uc cncc a||cu inai inc
scurccs arc nci an a|sc|uic !aiun. |ui incnsc|tcs ncc! rctisicn in inc |igni cj inc
nisicru cj incir iinc. jcr unicn incu incnsc|tcs arc inc cti!cncc. An! unai scurccs !c
nci ncc! criiicisn? |tcn ccnicnpcraru acccunis nau sujjcr. ij nci jrcn aciua| jrau!.
uci jrcn inc uriicrs igncrancc. nis nisun!crsian!ing. nis prcju!iccs.
Oi|incu nccis inis c|jcciicn in inc c|ticus ccnncn-scnsc uau. Sajciu |ics. nc suggcsis.
in a circunspcci usc cj inscripiicns. jcr ancicni nisicru. an! in jrcc acccss ic uriiicn
an! prinic! arcnitcs. jcr ncrc nc!crn iincs. incsc natc gitcn nisicru a
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secure framevork of knovIedge aboul poIilicaI and sociaI evenls, vilhin vhich
lhe evidence of our olher sources, crilicaIIy checked, can be confidenlIy used lo
buiId up a slruclure of hisloricaI probabiIilies 'vhose filness for use onIy
ingenious bul unscienlific minds can deny' ( G.S.. V||, 161-2).
ul lhen ve meel lhe second and reaIIy serious form of hisloricaI sceplicism.
The facls, il viII be said, as lo vhal men acluaIIy did on various occasions are
fairIy veII made oul: bul vhal is lhe use of lhal unIess ve knov unu men acled
as lhey did` And lhis ve cannol knov. The individuaI is IargeIy in lhe dark
even as lo his ovn molives, and lhose vho reporl his aclions from vilhoul are
even Iess in a posilion lo |udge. 'Whal infIuence of privale inleresl, ambilion,
Iusl of pover, pride enlers inlo decisive aclions, can be decided onIy vilhin
modesl Iimils. Iven verbaI or episloIary slalemenls on lhis poinl remain
queslionabIe. ul |usl here Iies lhe pecuIiar fieId of vhal readers of men and
men of lhe vorId (Mcnscncnkcnncr un! Wc|i|cuic) regard as reaI hislory. The
Irench especiaIIy dispIay lheir cIearsighledness, lheir superiorily over lhings
and men, by assigning lo greal achievemenls smaII and seIfish molives.' This is
lhe naluraI resuIl of lhe so-caIIed 'pragmalic melhod' in hisloriography, vhich
makes lhe search for molives one of ils chief aims ( G.S.. V||, 259-60).
DiIlhey's ansver here is al firsl sighl surprising. 'HisloricaI sceplicism', he says,
'can onIy be overcome if our melhod has no need lo counl on lhe discovery of
molives.' Hov is lhis possibIe` 'HisloricaI sceplicism is onIy overcome vhen
psychoIogicaI refinemenl gives pIace lo lhe underslanding of spiriluaI
compIexes (Gc|i|!c). These Iie before us as an oulvard ob|eclificalion, and so
can be made lhe ob|ecl of skiIIed underslanding (kunsinassigcn Vcrsicncns)' (
G.S.. V||, 260). This sounds al firsl Iike an admission of Rickerl's poinl, lhal a
meaning-compIex (Sinngc|i|!c) can be underslood, bul nol a molivalion-
process. ul lhal is nol vhal DiIlhey means. He proceeds lo recaII his
dislinclion belveen lhree kinds of expressions (above, p. 129 ff.), and lo shov
hov aII lhree can be underslood. The firsl kind comprises scienlific lrealises:
lhese can be underslood and expounded vilh compIele cerlainly. Then lhere
are lhe produclions of arl, reIigion, or phiIosophy, vhere lhe aulhor has lried lo
express some lrulh aboul Iife, bul has aIso in so doing given
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expression lo his ovn Iife: inlerprelalion here is harder, bul is nol impossibIe.
IinaIIy, lhere are human aclions: and lhese, says DiIlhey, ve can consider and
undersland in a vay vhich makes lhe queslion of molives irreIevanl. This ve
can do by laking lhem in reIalion lo lhe cuIluraI condilions and sociaI
inslilulions of lheir lime.
A person resoIves lo bring aboul a cerlain lhing, he lakes vhal means he can, he
achieves his end. Whal end he had immedialeIy in viev is nol doublfuI: his
aclion reveaIs il in lhe process of achieving il. Whal vider purpose, nol
recognisabIy expressed in lhis or perhaps in any of his aclions, may Iie behind
il, vhal deep molives may have driven him on, ve do nol knov. ul ve do
knov, vilh respecl lo lhe Iimiled end achieved, lhal il faIIs vilhin lhe sphere of
al Ieasl one branch of cuIluraI Iife, or of some sociaI organisalion, lhal lhe very
possibiIily of his conceiving il, and of his finding lhese parlicuIar means
avaiIabIe for achieving il, is condilioned by lhe conlemporary slale of lhe sociaI
and cuIluraI syslem according lo necessary Iavs, and lhal lhe effecls of his
aclion viII in lurn be feIl in lhal syslem in a vay slriclIy delermined by lhe Iavs
vhich govern lhe syslem ilseIf. In lhis vay, vhiIe Ieaving lhe queslion of
molives on one side, ve can sliII discover in hislory a coherenl and inleIIigibIe
sequence of evenls, and sceplicism is overcome ( G.S.. V||, 260-1).
We may compare a passage in lhe |in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1883),
vhere DiIlhey discusses lhe conlroversy belveen lhe pragmalic hislorians and
HegeI. "The inleraclion of individuaIs seems conlingenl and incoherenl: birlh
and dealh and aII lhe accidenls of fale, lhe passions and lhe narrov egolism
vhich fiII so Iarge a space in lhe foreground of Iife's slage: aII lhese lhings seem
lo confirm lhe viev of lhose readers of men (Mcnscncnkcnncr) vho see in lhe Iife
of sociely onIy a pIay and counlerpIay of individuaI inleresls under lhe
infIuence of chance, lhe viev of lhe pragmalic hislorian, for vhom aIso lhe
course of hislory resoIves ilseIf inlo lhe pIay of personaI forces. ul, in reaIily, il
is |usl |u ncans cj inis inicraciicn cj inc scparaic in!iti!ua|s, lheir passions, lheir
pride, lheir inleresls, lhal inc ncccssaru ic|cc|cgica| susicn cj nunan nisicru rca|iscs
iisc|j. The pragmalic hislorian and HegeI do nol undersland one anolher,
because lhe one speaks as il vere from lhe firm ground and lhe
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olher from an airy heighl. Yel each of lhem has one parl of lhe lrulh. Ior
everylhing lhal is broughl aboul, in lhis hisloricaI and sociaI reaIily of man, is
sel in molion by lhe aclion of viII: bul, in lhis viII, lhe end acls as molive. Il is
lhe characler of lhe end, il is lhe universaIIy vaIid eIemenl in il, vhich reaches
oul beyond lhe individuaI Iife, vhalever formuIa ve may appIy lo il, vhich is
lhe basis of lhe leIeoIogicaI syslem lhal pervades lhe viIIs of men. In lhis
leIeoIogicaI syslem lhe commonpIace aclivily of men, vhich is concerned onIy
vilh ilseIf, yel brings lo pass vhal il musl. And even in lhe aclions of ils heroes,
hislory aIIovs every eIemenl vhich does nol fil lhis leIeoIogicaI syslem lo faII
avay vilhoul effecl' ( G.S.. |, 53).
The meaning of lhis passage is cIear. We sav in lhe previous chapler (pp. 102 -
3, 105 -7), hov DiIlhey lraces, amid lhe lurmoiI of human passions and even in
consequence of lheir inleraclion, a 'Iife on a higher IeveI' or a 'moraI syslem'
emerging. This syslem conslilules an order of ends lo vhich, vhelher ve viII
or no, aII our aclions are reIalive: ve may viII lo conform lo il, or lo lransgress
il, or ve may ignore il in our conscious decision, bul one vay or anolher, in aII
lhree cases, consciousIy or unconsciousIy our purposes are informed by il. Il is a
slrucluraI syslem running lhrough aII hislory: for il delermines aII aclion as a
tis a icrgc, a necessily Iaid upon lhe agenl by his sociaI environmenl and
lraining: and vhere he is free, in lhe crealive recesses of his mind and viII, even
lhere il enlers in and shapes his resoIves. This is lhe syslem of reIalions vhich
DiIlhey, in lhe passages quoled above, decIares ve can undersland, vhiIe lhe
'molives', lhe underslanding of vhich ve are lo renounce, are lhe Iover
impuIses and aII privale ends, in so far as lhey do nol fil inlo lhe inleIIigibIe
syslem. The reference lo HegeI is obviousIy nol made al random: for lhis
conceplion of an inleIIigibIe syslem overriding privale molives, and forming lhe
proper ob|ecl of hisloricaI underslanding, is lhe same as HegeI's conceplion
expounded in lhe Pni|cscpnu cj Hisicru, onIy laken oul of HegeI's ideaIislic
lerminoIogy and reconciIed vilh DiIlhey's empiricism.
The cIose of our discussion of underslanding is al lhe same lime lhe cIose of lhe
firsl seclion of our vork. The probIem vhich DiIlhey sel himseIf al lhe oulsel of
his career vas lvofoId: jirsi, a probIem aboul lhe nalure and exlenl of our
knov-
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Iedge in lhe human sludies, and especiaIIy of lhe pover of underslanding
vhich is so imporlanl lhere--lhis vas lhe Kanlian probIem, lhe probIem of lhe
Kriiik !cr rcincn Vcrnunji exlended lo lake in a nev reaIm of knovIedge: and
scccn!, a probIem aboul lhe melhods and fundamenlaI concepls of lhe human
sludies, lhe number and nalure of lhe enquiries comprised under lhal heading,
and lheir reIalion lo naluraI science and lo phiIosophy --lhis vas lhe equivaIenl
of MiII's probIem aboul lhe 'Iogic of lhe moraI sciences'. DiIlhey's phiIosophy
lherefore faIIs easiIy inlo lvo seclions, one for each of lhese lvo probIems, and
so far ve have been foIIoving DiIlhey's ovn Iead and lhe proper IogicaI order
by considering lhe epislemoIogicaI probIem firsl. This parl of our vork is nov
compIele. AII lhal DiIlhey says in ansver lo lhe epislemoIogicaI queslion has
been examined, his crkcnninisinccrciiscnc Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn
has been reconslrucled and examined in reIalion lo cerlain crilicisms. There
remains his second probIem, and ve musl lurn in lhe foIIoving chaplers lo a
differenl group of his vrilings, vhich bear affinily no Ionger lo lhe
epislemoIogy of Hume or Kanl, bul lo lhe IogicaI anaIysis and archileclonic of
Comle and MiII.
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CHAPTER 5IX
WHIN Kanl made his sludy of lhe naluraI sciences, he did il on grounds of
high principIe. He formuIaled lheir fundamenlaI presupposilions and
examined lheir IogicaI foundalions. He did nol enIarge on lheir melhods and
lheir reIalions vilh one anolher. Ior DiIlhey, in his crilique of lhe human
sludies, such a vay of lrealmenl vas nol enough. He vas nol conlenl lo anaIyse
lhe foundalions of knovIedge and of vaIue-|udgmenl, and lo shov hov
knovIedge of lhe seIf, and of olher seIves, is possibIe. He combined lhis vilh a
carefuI enquiry inlo lhe melhodoIogy and archileclonic of lhe human sludies.
Why did he do lhis` To begin vilh, lhe empiricaI lradilion vhich dravs ils
inspiralion from acon has aIvays shovn a lendency lovards melhodoIogicaI
enquiries. In a vork Iike WheveII's Pni|cscpnu cj Oiscctcru il aImosl seems as if
phiIosophy is resoIved inlo melhodoIogy. Comle and MiII, in DiIlhey's earIy
years, made a reveaIing sludy of lhe melhods and inlerreIalions of lhe naluraI
sciences, and il vas naluraI lhal DiIlhey shouId ask himseIf vhelher lhey had
been equaIIy successfuI vilh lhe human sludies. There vas, moreover, a furlher
reason vhy he shouId go lhis vay. In his lime lhe naluraI sciences vere a
coherenl body of lhoughl, seIf-conscious, seIf-confidenl, vorking as a leam.
Their melhods and inlerreIalions vere, in principIe, generaIIy underslood. y
conlrasl lhe human sludies vere a scene of slrife: slrife of melhods and slrife of
aims. If a phiIosopher vas lo make a sludy of lhis group of discipIines, he musl
firsl make cIear vhal lhey vere. Is psychoIogy one of lhem` Is socioIogy` Do
lheir melhods and principIes refIecl lhose of lhe naluraI sciences, or are lhey
differenl` Are lhey homogeneous lhroughoul lhe group` Nol onIy DiIlhey, bul
olhers vho foIIoved him in deaIing vilh lhe human sludies, such as
WindeIband and Rickerl, had lo face queslions Iike lhese.
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DiIlhey discusses lhese queslions in a series of vrilings vhich run lhrough his
enlire career. In lhese vrilings a sIov deveIopmenl can be lraced, due parlIy lo
lhe progress of his ovn lhinking, and parlIy lo changes in lhe vorId around
him. When he began, il vas reIevanl lo quole Comle and MiII, and il vas
necessary lo reach a decision aboul lhem. In his Ialesl years, il vas lhe Neo-
Kanlians vilh vhom he had lo reckon. In lhe meanlime cerlain parlicuIar
probIems had asserled lhemseIves and cIaimed speciaI allenlion, nolabIy a
group of probIems reIaling lo psychoIogy, on vhich DiIlhey never finaIIy
cIeared his mind. The presenl chapler and lhe lhree foIIoving viII be concerned
vilh lhis aspecl of DiIlhey's vork. We shaII foIIov him lo lhe poinl al vhich he
firsl allempled a comprehensive survey of lhe fieId, in lhe |in|ciiung in !ic
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1883). Then ve shaII see hov difficuIlies and
conlroversies on parlicuIar poinls deIayed lhe compIelion of his pIan by more
lhan lvenly-five years, and drove him aIong unexpecled palhs (Chapler Seven
and Iighl). IinaIIy ve shaII see hov in his Iasl years he lried lo compIele his
comprehensive pIan (Chapler Nine).
DiIlhey leIIs us more lhan once lhal he came lo phiIosophy from hislory ( G.S.,
V, 10, VIII, 180): il vas in lerms of hislory lhal he sav lhe greal probIems of Iife
and lhoughl, and il vas by engaging in hisloricaI research lhal he vas broughl
up againsl lhe probIems of aim and melhod in hislory. We find him so engaged
from his earIy years. His chosen fieId vas, in his ovn vords, 'lhe hislory of
Iilerary and phiIosophicaI movemenls', and he approached il bolh lhrough lhe
hislory of lheories and generaI principIes and lhrough lhe sludy of individuaI
lhinkers.
His firsl considerabIe underlaking vas a biography, a Ic|cn Scn|cicrnacncrs.
|asc! upcn a incrcugn cxaninaiicn cj unpu||isnc! papcrs. |i sncuc! inc pni|cscpnu
an! incc|cgu cj Scn|cicrnacncr as inc pcini cj ccntcrgcncc cj sctcra| rc|igicus an!
pni|cscpnica| nctcncnis. an! as inc siariing-pcini jcr incir jurincr !ijjusicn in inc
ninciccnin ccniuru. Oi|incu uas ai ucrk cn inis as car|u as 1864. an! in 1870 a |argc
jirsi tc|unc appcarc!. unicn cctcrc! in iuc |ccks inc sicru cj Scn|cicrnacncrs |ijc ic
inc ucar 1802. |i uas nai|c! ai cncc as a nasicrpiccc cj inicrprciaiitc |icgrapnu. an!
pui Oi|incus rcpuiaiicn as a nisicrian cj i!cas cn a nign p|anc uncrc nis |aicr uriiings
ju||u nain-
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lained il. The second voIume, vhich DiIlhey had pIanned, vas eagerIy availed,
as veII as a nev revised edilion of lhe firsl voIume, vhich speediIy ran oul of
prinl: bul his enquiries ranged so far afieId, and look him so deep inlo lhe
sublIer probIems of phiIosophy and lheoIogy, lhal in spile of severaI Ialer
efforls lhe revision vas never finished, and lhe second voIume remained an
emply cadre.
1

Anolher of DiIlhey's earIy inleresls Ied more direclIy lo phiIosophy, and
specificaIIy lo lhe probIem of lhe human sludies. Irom 1866 onvards, he began
lo vork al lhe hislory of poIilicaI lheory, and especiaIIy of lhe doclrine of
naluraI Iav, vhose grovlh he lraced firsl of aII in lhe Greek Sophisls, and lhen
in lhose sevenleenlh-cenlury vrilers, such as Hobbes and Spinoza, vho are in
effecl lhe heirs and discipIes of lhe Sophisls. Irom lhis he vas Ied on lo raise a
IogicaI queslion. The hislory of elhics and poIilicaI lheory can onIy be
underslood in lhe Iighl of lhe condilions vhich govern lheir progress, and
DiIlhey vas bound lo ask vhal are lhese delermining condilions. ul in lhis
enquiry he had been anlicipaled by Comle and by MiII. AccordingIy, his firsl
lask vas lo define his allilude lo lhese vrilers. This he did in an essay u|cr !as
Siu!iun !cr Gcscnicnic !cr Wisscnscnajicn tcn Mcnscncn. !cr Gcsc||scnaji u. !cn
Siaai ( 1875), vhich viII repay a brief sludy. The spiril and aim of lhe enquiry is
posilivisl or empiricisl: bul in lhe oulcome lhe acluaIIy prevaiIing posilivisl or
empiricisl Iogic is sub|ecled lo damaging crilicism.
Il is lhe greal achievemenl of Comle lo have reveaIed, in his anaIysis of lhe
naluraI sciences, lhe reIalions of IogicaI dependence in vhich lhey sland lo one
anolher. (1) Ivery science is defined by lhe phenomena vhich il sludies. The
phenomena sludied by lhe various sciences arrange lhemseIves naluraIIy in a
scaIe of increasing compIexily, lhe compIex phenomena being sub|ecl lo aII lhe
Iavs vhich govern lhe simpIer, bul aIso obeying furlher Iavs of lheir ovn.
IaraIIeI vilh lhis scaIe, lhe sciences lhemseIves form a IogicaI hierarchy, lhose
vhich deaI vilh lhe simpIer phenomena being presupposed by lhose vhich
deaI vilh lhe more compIex: e.g. physics and chemislry are pre-
____________________
1
Since his dealh, lhe firsl voIume has been reissued, enriched by much of
DiIlhey's revision-maleriaI: Ic|cn Scn|cicrnacncrs. |cr Ban!. 2ic Auj|agc.
ncrausgcg. t. H. Mu|cri: W. de Gruyler, erIin and Leipzig, 1922.
-162-
supposed by bioIogy. (2) Iach science musl conform lo Comle's greal Iav of
deveIopmenl, passing from lhe lheoIogicaI slage, lhrough lhe melaphysicaI, lo
lhe posilive, and lhe hisloricaI order in vhich lhey reach posilivily foIIovs lhe
IogicaI order of lheir muluaI dependence: for lhe simpIer and more
fundamenlaI sciences musl have made considerabIe headvay before lhose
vhich presuppose lhem can begin lo advance. Thus il vas lhal pure
malhemalics came lo malurily firsl, lhen mechanics, aslronomy, physics, and
chemislry. IhysioIogy, lhe science of organic bodies, vas nol yel, in Comle's
opinion, free from melaphysicaI conceplions, bul il vas progressing. (3) ul
lhen he added lhal lhe science of human Iife, vhich il vas his ovn pecuIiar
mission lo eslabIish, vouId be found lo be onIy one more rung in lhe Iadder of
lhe naluraI sciences, conlinuous vilh and presupposing physioIogy, as
physioIogy is conlinuous vilh and presupposes chemislry. IinaIIy, in reIiance
upon a dogmalic epiphenomenaIism, he decIared inlrospeclion impossibIe,
concIuded lhal lherefore lhe aIIeged science of psychoIogy vas impossibIe, and
parceIIed oul ils funclions belveen physioIogy and socioIogy. The Ialler is
accordingIy lhe onIy science deaIing vilh hisloricaI and sociaI phenomena, and
depends direclIy upon physioIogy.
MiII accepled Comle's accounl of lhe hierarchy of naluraI sciences, vilh lhe
expIanalion of lheir hisloricaI deveIopmenl vhich foIIovs from il: bul he couId
nol accepl Comle's labIe of sciences in delaiI. The scienlific sludy of hislory and
sociely presupposes an acquainlance vilh lhe Iavs of menlaI phenomena in
generaI, and lhis acquainlance is sureIy nol a parl of socioIogy ilseIf, bul
beIongs lo a prior science, tiz. psychoIogy. MiII, lhe heir of lhe rilish lradilion,
accordingIy reslored psychoIogy lo lhe pIace assigned lo il by Hume. ul he
furlher sav lhal psychoIogy differs in lvo imporlanl respecls from lhe naluraI
sciences. Ils dala are nol oblained in lhe same vay as lheirs, for il resls on
inlrospeclion vhere lhey resl on ouler perceplion. Again, ils fundamenlaI
hypolheses are nol casl in lhe same lerms as lheins. Therefore psychoIogy and
lhe olher sludies vhich depend upon il are nol, as Comle prelended, a Iinear
conlinualion of lhe naluraI sciences, bul an independenl group of enquiries
slanding beside lhem, vilh dala and grounds of expIanalion pecuIiar lo
lhemseIves. MiII caIIed lhem lhe 'moraI
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sciences', and agreed vilh Comle lhal lhey vere in a backvard slale, from
vhich lhey couId onIy be rescued by lhe lransference lo lhem of lhe melhods
aIready vorked oul in lhe naluraI sciences.
DiIlhey, in 1875, agreed vilh Comle aboul lhe hierarchy of lhe naluraI sciences,
and vilh MiII aboul lhe independenl posilion of psychoIogy and ils funclion as
lhe basis of lhe 'moraI and poIilicaI sciences' (he had nol yel begun lo caII lhem
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn). ul, in lhe essay vhich ve have nov lo consider, he
queslions vhelher lhe reIalion belveen lhe various 'moraI and poIilicaI
sciences' is hierarchic, Iike lhe reIalion belveen lhe naluraI sciences: if il is nol,
lhe hislory of lhe moraI and poIilicaI sciences viII be governed by differenl
condilions from lhal of lhe naluraI sciences, and viII caII for differenl principIes
of inlerprelalion.
His mode of procedure is epislemoIogicaI. 'Iresupposing lhe enquiries of Iogic
aboul knovIedge in generaI, I ask vhal are lhe speciaI circumslances
dislinguishing lhe reIalion of lhe inleIIigence lo ils ob|ecl in lhis fieId from lhe
reIalion prevaiIing in olher fieIds, and vhal consequences foIIov from lhis
difference in respecl of lhe order in vhich lhe lrulhs of lhe moraI and poIilicaI
sciences are discovered' ( G.S., V, 44, cf. 49).
(1) In lhe firsl pIace, he says, lhe facls of moraI and poIilicaI experience have
come inlo exislence sIovIy, lhey have been groving lhroughoul lhe vhoIe lime
lhal lhey have been sludied, and lheir range is sliII 'very reslricled'. Here lhe
moraI and poIilicaI sciences are Iess forlunale lhan lhe naluraI sciences, vhose
ob|ecl slood compIele before lhem from lhe firsl ( G.S., V, 44-5 I, 216-17). (2)
Againsl lhis may be sel lhe facl lhal, vhereas lhe dalum for naluraI science is
onIy a 'sensuous appearance of bodies', and il has laken Iong lo discover lhe
reaI unil of maller, lhe unil for moraI and poIilicaI science, tiz. lhe individuaI
mind, is acluaIIy 'given in perceplion'. The advance -of lhe moraI and poIilicaI
sciences lo a slale of 'cIassicaI perfeclion' al a reIaliveIy earIy dale is due lo lhe
'lransparency and inluilive cIarily' of lhese unils, lhe molives vhich bind lhem
logelher, and lhe vays in vhich lhey affecl one anolher ( G.S., V, 45-6 I, 28).
(3) To offsel lhis advanlage, our knovIedge of hisloricaI and sociaI phenomena
has a pecuIiar Iimilalion: ve can undersland, bul ve cannol expIain. NaluraI
science,
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vhich vorks vilh abslracl, homogeneous, and lherefore cIearIy defined unils,
can express lhe reIalions belveen lhem in exaclIy formuIaled Iavs: bul of lhe
individuaIs vhich are lhe unils in moraI and poIilicaI science, no lvo are aIike,
and each is a seIf-conlained vorId of experience. AnaIysis here presenls greal
difficuIlies, and has made hardIy any progress. The forces al vork in sociely are
inleIIigibIe (tcrsian!|icn) lo us, because ve can reconslrucl (nacn|i|!cn) lhem in
our ovn experience: bul of lhe Iavs vhich govern lhem ve are aImosl vhoIIy
ignoranl ( G.S., V, 60-2 I, 29, 36). (4) We may add lhal lhe reIalive slrenglhs of
lhe molives conlroIIing men's conducl may change in lhe course of generalions,
so lhal lhe experience of lhe modern man is an unsafe guide lo lhe
inlerprelalion of lhe pasl ( G.S., V, 62, cf. 1, 37).
In consequence of aII lhis, our knovIedge of hislory and sociely musl be
differenlIy consliluled from our knovIedge of nalure. The naluraI-scienlific
hierarchy of Iavs, vhere lhe knovIedge of lhe simpIer musl condilion lhe
knovIedge of lhe more compIex, cannol be reproduced in lhe moraI and
poIilicaI sciences: and lherefore lhe principIes of lheir deveIopmenl cannol be
lhose vhich Comle Iays dovn.
The firsl slep lovards a soIulion Iies in recognising lhal hisloricaI and sociaI
processes are nol broughl aboul by lhe kind of causalion vhich ve find in
nalure, bul by lhe operalion of molives and lhe pursuil of ends. Inslead of
necessary Iavs, ve have here lo do vilh free agenls, and inslead of quanlilies of
energy ve have reIalions of significance and vaIue. 'The valerfaII is composed
of homogeneous faIIing parlicIes of valer: bul a singIe senlence, vhich is bul a
noise in lhe moulh, shakes lhe vhoIe Iiving sociely of a conlinenl lhrough a
pIay of molives in absoIuleIy individuaI unils, none of vhom is comparabIe
vilh lhe resl: so differenl is lhe ideaI molive from any olher kind of cause' (
G.S., V, 63 I, 37-8).
Whal is more, lhe observers vho sludy lhis sociaI vorId are lhemseIves agenls
in il: lhey are caughl up inlo lhe hisloricaI process, lheir lheorelicaI enquiries
subserve praclicaI ends. And il is here lhal DiIlhey finds lhe principIe vhich
ruIes lhe progress of lhe moraI and poIilicaI sciences. Iach of lhese sciences is
concerned vilh some coherenl syslem of human aclivily, e.g. Ianguage, Iav, or
lhe Slale. Whalever may be lhe origin of
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such syslems of aclivily, lhere comes a lime for each of lhem vhen lhose vho
praclise il find il necessary lo refIecl, lo organise, lo reform: and il is in lhis
slage lhal lhe fundamenlaI conceplions for lhe underslanding of each fieId are
hammered oul. Then, al a Ialer slage, vhen praclicaI probIems have been
maslered and lhere is lime for disinleresled scienlific enquiry, lhis enquiry in
lurn finds ils basis in lhe conceplions handed dovn from lhe earIier slage ( G.S.,
V, 64-5 I, 59). Thus poIilicaI lheory, vhich arose in lhe lime of lhe Sophisls and
lhe Socralic schooI, vas abIe lo drav upon lhe praclicaI anaIysis of poIilicaI
affairs vhich had been made in preceding generalions ( G.S., V, 65): on lhe
olher hand, lhe moraI refIeclions of lhe Iylhagorean and Socralic schooIs vere
lhemseIves onIy an eIemenl in lhe praclicaI efforl lo eslabIish a moraI syslem,
and a reaIIy scienlific moraI lheory has hardIy yel emerged ( G.S., V, 72).
AccordingIy, lhe moraI and poIilicaI sciences do nol form a hierarchy in vhich
some are presupposed by olhers: lhey deveIop side by side, each arising
graduaIIy oul of experience, and presupposing onIy so much preIiminary
refIeclion as arises in lhe praclicaI efforl lo conlroI lhose aclivilies vhich are ils
sub|ecl-maller.
IinaIIy, ve musl ovn lhal, vhen an oslensibIy independenl sludy of lhese
aclivilies has al Iasl arisen, il may sliII be affecled by praclicaI molives. IoIilicaI
lheories, for exampIe, are oflen poIilicaI programmes. ul lhis is an advanlage
as veII as a disadvanlage, and by reason of il lhe hislory of poIilicaI lheory is of
greal vaIue lo poIilicaI lheory ilseIf. Ior lhe lheories currenl al a given dale
indicale lhe confIicling inleresls, lhe ideaIs, lhe sociaI movemenls of lhe lime,
and lhus indireclIy enIarge our acquainlance vilh lhe very facls vhich il is lheir
funclion lo anaIyse ( G.S., V, 32).
The essay of 1875 has a capilaI imporlance in lhe deveIopmenl of DiIlhey's
phiIosophy. Nol onIy did il give him a viev of his ovn aboul lhe IogicaI
slruclure and hisloricaI origins of lhe human sludies, emancipaling him in spiril
al once from romanlic and from posilivisl orlhodoxy: bul il aIso gave him lhe
oi + o:o + for his Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji.
Oi|incu ninsc|j. nanu ucars |aicr. in iruing ic cxp|ain nis ncinc! cj apprcacn ic inc
prc||cn. |cis us scc ncu inis canc a|cui. Tnc jaci a|cui inc nunan siu!ics unicn sncus
iisc|j
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mosl unmislakabIy in lheir hislory is lheir dependence upon praclicaI needs as
lheir slimuIus, and lhe infeclion of lheir concIusions by ignorance and
pre|udice. Here, as in lhe naluraI sciences, bul lo a far grealer degree,
knovIedge is seen lo refIecl lhe hisloricaI silualion of lhe knover. We see al
once lhe need of an imparliaI Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn, vhich
shouId sland, if possibIe, above lhe sources of iIIusion, and prescribe for aII
possibIe enquiry in lhe human sludies ils proper scope and melhod. And yel,
such as lhey are, lhe human sludies lhemseIves are lhe onIy possibIe evidence
for concIusions as lo lheir scope and melhod. Ior, if ve lhink lo go behind lhem
lo lheir sub|ecl-maller, lhe hisloricaI vorId, and delermine lheir range and
procedure by lhal, lhis hisloricaI vorId is afler aII onIy knovn lo us in and
lhrough lhe human sludies lhemseIves. AccordingIy, lhe onIy vay lo oblain
reaI insighl inlo lheir slruclure and possibIe fulure deveIopmenl is lo foIIov lhe
hislory of lheir pasl grovlh, regarding lhem nol as a body of knovIedge
achieved, bul as an endIess search for knovIedge, noling vhere and hov lhe
search has besl succeeded, and vhy.
In lhis vay ve can valch lhe graduaI appIicalion of lhe various IogicaI
processes, and lheir combinalion lo form dislinclive melhods: lhe advance from
lhe sludy of hisloricaI facl lo lhe sludy of ils physicaI condilions, on lhe one
hand, and of normalive principIes on lhe olher: lhe sIov separalion of
parlicuIar groups of phenomena as dislincl spheres of enquiry, and lhe coining
of melhodoIogicaI concepls found fruilfuI in each sphere: and lhe graduaI
approach by lhese means lo more ob|eclive |udgmenls, and lo a cIearer viev of
lhe human sludies and lheir sub|ecl-maller as a vhoIe. We can aIso see hov in
every slage of lheir deveIopmenl lhe human sludies have been inspired by lhe
spiril of conlemporary cuIlure, and have soughl lheir Grun!|cgung in lhe
phiIosophy vhich is lhe expression of lhal spiril, and hov lhe phiIosophies
vhich have successiveIy been pressed inlo service for lhis purpose have
uniformIy faiIed, unliI in recenl limes 'lhe iIIusion of a melaphysic binding
logelher lhe forms of being and vaIue in lhe vorId order vilh lheir finaI cause,
vhich has Iain so Iong Iike a cIoud belveen lhe reIevanl ob|ecls and lhe human
mind', has begun lo dissoIve ( G.S., I, 411-17).
This is lhe basis on vhich DiIlhey pIanned his Kriiik !crnisicriscncn Vcrnunji
-167-
nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. Il vas lo open vilh a hislory of lhe human sludies, and by
sludying lheir deveIopmenl, Iike lhal of a Iiving organism, il vas lo oblain an
insighl inlo lheir morphoIogy, vhich in lurn vouId enabIe him lo vrile lheir
Iogic and epislemoIogy, and do for lhem vhal had aIready been done for lhe
naluraI sciences by Comle in lhe Ccurs !c pni|cscpnic posilive.
When DiIlhey venl in 1882 as Lolze's successor lo erIin, he had aIready dravn
up lhe pIan for lhis greal vork. Il vas lo be in five books. The firsl vas lo
describe lhe presenl condilion of lhe human sludies and shov lheir need of an
epislemoIogicaI Grun!|cgung. The second vas lo shov hisloricaIIy hov lhe
allempl lo provide a Grun!|cgung by means of melaphysics broke dovn. The
lhird vas lo conlinue lhe hislory unliI lhe lime vhen lhe sciences became
independenl of phiIosophy, and phiIosophy ilseIf abandoned melaphysics for
lhe Kanlian crilique of knovIedge. The fourlh and fiflh books vouId lhen give
DiIlhey's ovn Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. unicn uas ic iakc iis sian!
upcn inncr cxpcricncc. !cpariing. ncuctcr. jrcn Kaniian princip|cs |u appca|ing nci ic
inc a||cgc! a pricri prcsuppcsiiicns cj kncu|c!gc. |ui ic a !cscripiitc ana|usis cj inc
siruciura| susicn. cr Sc||si|csinnung ( G.S.. |. XV-XX). Oj inis ccnprcncnsitc
scncnc. inc jirsi iuc |ccks ucrc pu||isnc! in 1883 un!cr inc iii|c |in|ciiung in !ic
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. Vcrsucn cincr Grun!|cgung jur !as Siu!iun !cr Gcsc||scnaji u.
!cr Gcscnicnic. |rsicr Ban!. Tnis tc|unc is inpcriani. as |cing inc car|icsi susicnaiic
siaicncni cj Oi|incus pcsiiicn. an! | sna|| ncu prcccc! ic sunnarisc iis ccnicnis.
Oi|incu |cgins |u cxp|aining nis !isiinciicn |ciuccn Naiuruisscnscnajicn an!
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. ii is |asc! cn inc !ijjcrcncc |ciuccn cuicr cxpcricncc. in unicn
uc apprcncn! naiurc as an cr!cr cj causa| ncccssiiu. an! inncr cxpcricncc. uncrc uc arc
ccnscicus cj cursc|tcs as jrcc an! rcspcnsi||c agcnis. Tncsc iuc rca|ns cj cxpcricncc
ucrc in ancicni an! nc!iacta| iincs inicrprcic! as iuc cr!crs cj su|sianccs. tiz. inc
naicria| an! inc spiriiua|. Oi|incu sncus ncu inc Tncnisi pni|cscpnu. inc nign pcini cj
nc!iacta| spccu|aiicn. ucrkc! cui incir inicrrc|aiicns uiinin inc nicrarcnic susicn cj
crcaic! |cing. Wiin inc ccning cj inc nccnanisiic Caricsian ticu cj naiurc. ncuctcr.
inis inccru cj iuc kin!s cj su|siancc |ccanc a
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source of insoIubIe anlinomies, and vas cIearIy unvorkabIe. Then, lo lhe
rescue, came lhe crilique of knovIedge, vhich for lhe lvo orders of subslances
subsliluled lhe lvo disparale orders of 'ouler' and 'inner' experience. Looking al
lhe maller from lhis poinl of viev, ve musl say lhal lhe characlerislic marks of
ouler experience, tiz. spaliaI exlension and mechanicaI delerminism, are vhoIIy
incommensurabIe vilh lhe synlhelic unily of consciousness, lhe moraI
responsibiIily and freedom, vhich ve find in inner experience: from lhis ve
may infer lhe Iimils of naluraI science, and lhe necessily of olher melhods for
deaIing vilh olher fieIds of experience ( G.S., I, 6-14).
This does nol mean lhal lhe human sludies are vhoIIy unconnecled vilh lhe
naluraI sciences. Man is a 'psychophysicaI unily', condilioned al every poinl by
his physicaI organism and environmenl: and lhough he is free lo reacl upon lhe
environmenl, lhis reaclion in lurn is condilioned by lhe physicaI looIs al his
disposaI. Hence lhe Iine of division belveen lhe lvo groups of sludies is nol
rigid, and severaI branches of enquiry have a fooling in bolh reaIms. Thus lhe
Iavs of sound-formalion are a presupposilion of grammar and musicaI lheory.
The sludy of varfare requires knovIedge of lhe physicaI resources of lhe
beIIigerenls. The human organism has lo be sludied in lhe Iighl of bioIogy, and
lhe dislribulion of popuIalion depends parlIy upon geographicaI and cIimalic
condilions. DiIlhey adds lhal lhe precise reIalion belveen lhe lvo reaIms of
knovIedge can onIy be decided by a deeper epislemoIogicaI enquiry, upon
vhich he does nol enler ( G.S., I, 14-21).
Ivery branch of knovIedge is based upon an abslraclion, allending lo some
eIemenls in experience and ignoring olhers: even hisloriography, vilh ils
inleresl in lhe concrele, is onIy possibIe lhrough seIeclion of maleriaI. The
human sludies are consliluled by abslracling nov one, nov anolher aspecl of
lhe inner Iife, and accordingIy lheir IogicaI slruclure is delermined by lhe reaI
slruclure of lheir sub|ecl-maller ( G.S., I, 27-8). They do nol form a hierarchy
Iike lhe naluraI sciences: inslead, lheir muluaI reIalions foIIov from and refIecl
lhe reIalions of reciprocaI dependence belveen lhe funclions in menlaI Iife
vhich lhey severaIIy sludy. Nor are lhey concerned onIy, Iike lhe naluraI
sciences, vilh eslabIishing Iavs by vhich lo expIain evenls. They have a
lhreefoId aim: lo describe lhe hisloricaI
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jacis, lo discover Iavs and reguIarilies among lhem, and lo formuIale sian!ar!s
of vaIue and imperalives ( G.S., I, 26-7). Recognilion of lhis facl enabIes us al lhe
oulsel lo refule posilivism, vhich, misIed by lhe anaIogy of naluraI science, has
lried 'lo lransform inlo facluaI knovIedge lhose sludies vhich have lheir basis
nol in slalemenls of facl al aII, bul in imperalives' ( G.S., I, 5).Sociely is
composed of individuaIs, and lhe queslion arises, hov is lhe individuaI reIaled
lo lhe group` One lheory, as oId as lhe Sophisls, regards lhe individuaI as lhe
prior reaIily, and sociely as a quasi-mechanicaI combinalion of individuaIs.
Anolher lheory, as oId as IIalo, regards lhe communily as an organic vhoIe
vhich is prior lo ils parls, and some adherenls of lhis viev have crediled lhe
group vilh a 'communaI mind' (Vc|ksgcisi). DiIlhey re|ecls bolh lhese vievs. Ior
lhe aIIeged group 'mind' is no mind al aII, because il has no apperceplive unily:
vhiIe lhe 'organic' lheory casls no Iighl upon sociely, because ve knov even
Iess aboul organisms lhan ve do aboul sociely ( G.S., I, 30-1 V, 62 n.). Whal is
lrue is lhal ve never observe an individuaI aparl from sociely, and cannol even
infer vhal an individuaI so abslracled vouId be Iike. IndividuaI and group are
essenliaIIy reIalive lo one anolher, lhough lhe reIalion belveen lhem cannol be
eIucidaled by anaIogies from physics or bioIogy. And yel, so Iong as ve keep
lhis caulion in mind, ve can sliII safeIy say lhal lhe unil of sociely is lhe
individuaI: and in lhal case lhe mosl fundamenlaI of lhe human sludies viII be
lhose vhich deaI vilh lhe individuaI, of vhich psychoIogy is lhe chief.We sav
in Chapler One lhal DiIlhey's conceplion of psychoIogy is lhe resuIl of
infIuences from more lhan one source, and lhal in order lo fil psychoIogy for
lhe lask he assigns lo il he is forced lo demand changes in ils aims and
melhods. In lhe |in|ciiung he makes lhree demands.
1. IsychoIogy deaIs vilh lhe human individuaI, bul nol vilh lhe individuaI as
somelhing aparl from sociely. The individuaI aparl from sociely is an
abslraclion vhich, if pressed, becomes a sheer ficlion. The individuaI is a
sociaI and hisloricaI producl. 'His organisalion shovs him receiving
infIuences from vilhoul and reacling oulvards: his vhoIe conlenl is onIy a
lransienl parlicuIar form (Gcsia|i) arising amid lhe encircIing conlenl of
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mind in hislory and sociely: lhe highesl lrail in his nalure is lhal vhereby
he Iives in somelhing nol himseIf' ( G.S.. |, 30). A psychoIogy vhich is lo be
reaIIy empiricaI musl examine lhe sociaI reIalions vhich affecl lhe
individuaI so deepIy. 'Man as a facl prior lo hislory and sociely is a ficlion
of genelic expIanalion: lhe man vhom sound anaIylicaI sludy has for ils
ob|ecl is lhe individuaI as an eIemenl in sociely. The hard probIem vhich
psychoIogy has lo soIve is lhal of oblaining anaIylicaI knovIedge of lhe
universaI characlerislics of man so conceived' ( G.S.. |, 31-2). OnIy so can il
'unfoId universaI proposilions vhose sub|ecl is lhe individuaI unil and
vhose predicales are aII asserlions aboul him vhich can bear fruil in lhe
underslanding of sociely and hislory' (i|i!.).
2. When ve have gained some knovIedge of human nalure in generaI, ve
shaII be abIe lo advance lo lhe sludy of specific human lypes: and lhis viII
cIose lhe gap vhich exisls al presenl belveen psychoIogy on lhe one hand
and aeslhelics, moraI and poIilicaI lheory, and hislory on lhe olher. Ior aII
lhese sludies require, for lhe inlerprelalion of lheir dala, a lypoIogy of
human characler. 'A lype of human nalure slands aIvays belveen lhe
hislorian and his sources, vhence he desires lo avaken figures lo lhrobbing
Iife: il slands no Iess belveen lhe poIilicaI lhinker and lhe reaIily of sociely,
for vhose deveIopmenl he desires lo Iay dovn ruIes. The aim of science is
onIy lo render lhis sub|eclive lype correcl and fruilfuI. . . . Avay beyond lhe
research hilherlo conducled inlo lhe reguIarilies of menlaI Iife, il musl
recognise lypicaI dislinclions vilhin il, musl sub|ecl lo descriplion and
anaIysis lhe imaginalive pover of lhe arlisl, lhe genius of lhe man of aclion,
and musl compIele lhe sludy of lhe forms of menlaI Iife by adding lo il lhe
descriplion of lhe reaIily of ils process and ils conlenl.' Al presenl lhe
human sludies have lo depend on an a! ncc lypoIogy derived from lhe
generaIilies of vorIdIy visdom and lhe reveaIing pover of poelry, bul
psychoIogy couId and shouId be so deveIoped as lo furnish a scienlific
lypoIogy ( G.S.. |, 32).
3. DiIlhey goes on lo say lhal psychoIogy can onIy do lhis if il 'remains vilhin
lhe Iimils of a descriplive science'. This is a conlenlion of vhich more viII
be heard Ialer. Ior lhe momenl DiIlhey is conlenl lo define lhe issue in a
fev shorl phrases, and pass on. We may do lhe same. Suffice il lo say lhal a
'descrip-
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live' science is one vhich confines ilseIf lo formuIaling observabIe
reguIarilies, inlroducing no enlilies or processes vhich observalion cannol
verify, vhiIe an 'expIanalory' (crk|arcn!c) science is one vhich conslrucls a
lheory in lerms of unobservabIes in order lo accounl for vhal is observed.
Such lheorelicaI conslruclions are of course hypolhelicaI, and lherefore
sub|ecl lo an eIemenl of doubl. A psychoIogy conslrucled on lhis modeI
cannol be a fil foundalion for lhe edifice of lhe human sludies. As DiIlhey
himseIf says, 'IsychoIogy can soIve lhe probIems of such a fundamenlaI
science onIy if il remains vilhin lhe Iimils of a descriplive science, vhich
records facls and Iikenesses belveen facls, vhereas expIanalory
psychoIogy, vhich endeavours lo make lhe vhoIe syslem of menlaI Iife
deducibIe by means of cerlain assumplions, is cIearIy dislinguished from il.
. . . OnIy so can lhe speciaI sciences of mind be pIaced on a foundalion
vhich is ilseIf secure, vhereas al presenl even lhe besl exposilions of
psychoIogy buiId hypolheses on hypolheses' ( G.S.. |, 32-3).
DiIlhey reserves lhe furlher eIucidalion of lhis for a Ialer occasion, viz. lhe
pro|ecled fourlh and fiflh books of lhe |in|ciiung. Tncsc ucrc in jaci nctcr uriiicn.
|ui inc unc|c ucsiicn cj !cscripiitc psucnc|cgu is gcnc inic ai |cngin in inc |!ccn u|cr
cinc |cscnrci|cn!c u. zcrg|ic!crn!c Psucnc|cgic ( 1894). Tnc sanc ucrk rcsuncs an!
carrics jurincr inc !cnan! jcr a ccnparaiitc psucnc|cgu unicn ui|| !cscri|c an!
c|assiju nunan iupcs. Tnc |!ccn. an! inc unc|c ucsiicn cj Oi|incus ticus cn
psucnc|cgu. ui|| |c cxaninc! in Cnapicr Sctcn.
|rcn psucnc|cgu uc nau pass ic |icgrapnu. inis sncu|! nci |c a ncrc supcrjicia|
acccuni cj a nans |ijc. |ui an inicrprciaiicn cj nin in inc |igni cj nis cun ncncnis cj
c|carcsi insigni. uncn nc sau ninsc|j. an! uc icc can scc nin. su| spccic acicrni.
Bicgrapnu sc uriiicn. rctca|ing inc inncr |ijc cj inc in!iti!ua| as a |iting unii. is inc
iruc |asis cj nisicricgrapnu. raincr inan inc siu!u cj ncrc arcnitcs. |cr inc nisicrian
gcis jrcn arcnitcs |iii|c |ui !ca! a|siraciicns. |ui in |icgrapnu nc jin!s inc kcu ic an
un!crsian!ing cj inc nin! cj c|asscs. sccia| grcups. an! unc|c gcncraiicns. cj unicn inc
in!iti!ua| is a iupc cr rcprcscniaiicn (|cprascniaiicn). An! ij inc nisicrian nas inc
a!taniagc in |rca!in cj ticu. inc |icgrapncr cxcc|s nin in !cpin an! accuracu cj
ana|usis. Bicgrapnu !raus iis ncinc!s an! caicgcrics jrcn psucnc|cgu. |ui ccntcrsc|u
psucnc|cgu !critcs nucn
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of ils maleriaI from case-hislories, i.e. from biography. IinaIIy, on lhe fronlier
belveen psychoIogy and naluraI science slands psychophysics, sludying lhe
physioIogy of sensalion, lhe reIalions belveen lhoughl and lhe nervous syslem,
and lhe deveIopmenl of molor reaclions from simpIe refIexes up lo lhe
organised and deIiberale movemenl. This compIeles lhe sum of lhe sludies
concerned vilh lhe individuaI ( G.S.. |, 33-5).
We advance lo lhe sludy of lhe sociaI and hisloricaI process as a vhoIe: and
here, as in lhe sludy of lhe individuaI, ve find a fruilfuI aIlernalion of scienlific
anaIysis vilh hisloricaI descriplion of lhe facls. The scienlific funclion of
psychoIogy is laken over here by lhe 'speciaI' or 'syslemalic' human sludies, of
vhich more anon: lhe recording funclion of biography faIIs lo hisloriography.
Irom lhe earIiesl limes, in various vays, such a record has been kepl. 'Irom lhe
lime vhen, galhered round lhe camp-fire, lribesmen and feIIov-soIdiers loId of
lhe deeds of lheir heroes and lhe divine origin of lheir race, lhe slrong inleresl
of conlemporaries has Iifled facls oul of lhe dim slream of commonpIace human
Iife, and preserved lhem.' ul lhe inleresl vhich preserves one facl Iels many
more faII inlo obIivion: and, even of lhese imperfecl records, nol aII survive.
OnIy a shorl period of human hislory, over a smaII area of lhe earlh's surface,
viz. modern Iurope, can be said lo be reaIIy veII documenled. AccordingIy, lhe
firsl requisile for a coherenl descriplion of lhe hisloricaI and sociaI vorId is a
crilicaI sludy of lhe sources, in order lo delermine such facls as lhey pul beyond
reasonabIe doubl. This is lhe vork of phiIoIogy, vhich has von ils spurs in lhe
sludy of ancienl hislory, and conlinues lo appIy ils melhods lhere and
eIsevhere. GraduaIIy, as lhe maleriaI is sifled oul, ve give il definile characler
and cIarily of oulIine by means of accurale pIacing and daling. 'The syslem of
lhis pure descriplion of hisloricaI and sociaI reaIily, as il lakes ils sland on
geophysics, supporled by geography, in order lo describe lhe dislribulion of
menlaI Iife and ils differenlialions on lhe earlh's surface in lime and space, can
onIy oblain inluilabIe form by reduclion lo cIear spaliaI proporlions, numericaI
reIalions, delerminalions of lime, lhrough lhe aid of graphic presenlmenl'
1
(
G.S.. |, 24-6).
In lhis manner ve pass insensibIy from lhe preIiminary vork
____________________
1
Sc. maps, lime-charls, and lhe Iike.
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of phiIoIogy lo lhe arl of hisloriography. We may caII il an arl, for lhe primary
business of lhe hislorian is lo porlray, and nol, as 'cerlain recenl IngIish and
Irench vrilers' vouId have il, lo expIain and generaIise. 'In lhis vorId of moraI
forces, lhe unique and individuaI has a quile differenl significance (Bc!cuiung)
from vhal il has in exlernaI nalure. The apprehension of il is nol a means, bul
an end in ilseIf.' Thal, indeed, is lhe reason vhy hislory has so Iong lended lo
pass by lhe occurrences vhich are common lo aII pIaces and limes, lhe evenls of
daiIy Iife, and lo faslen upon lhe exlraordinary. 'Il needed lhe phiIanlhropic
molives of lhe eighleenlh cenlury lo bring back inlo cIear viev lhe everyday
Iife, lhe Iife common lo aII men in a period, |cs nurs, as VoIlaire expresses il,
and lhe changes vhich lake pIace in respecl of lhis, side by side vilh lhe
exlraordinary, lhe aclions of kings and lhe forlunes of Slales. And lhe
background of lhings vhich are lhe same al aII limes, in human nalure and lhe
Iife of lhe vorId, never enlers al aII inlo lhe hisloricaI piclure.' Ior, in lhe firsl
pIace, lhe hisloricaI individuaI is lhe onIy poinl in experience vhere reaIily
appears lo us as il is in ilseIf, and has lherefore a unique lheorelicaI inleresl for
us. And, in lhe second pIace, lhere is aIso a moraI inleresl, 'an inleresl nol of
lhoughl aIone, bul of lhe souI, of sympalhelic feeIing (!cr Miicnpjin!ung), of
enlhusiasm, in vhich Goelhe righlIy sav lhe fairesl fruil of hisloricaI enquiry. . .
. When ve sympalhise vilh (niicr|c|cn) a pasl Iife, lhrough lhe arl of hisloricaI
presenlalion, ve are laughl as by lhe scene of Iife ilseIf: our being is videned,
and menlaI forces more poverfuI lhan our ovn inlensify our exislence' ( G.S.. |,
91). Il foIIovs lhal lhe hislorian, Iike lhe dramalisl, musl porlray firsl and
foremosl, and commenl or expIain, if al aII, onIy in passing. 'The parlicuIar here
is mereIy saluraled and informed by lhe idea (|!cc) in lhe hislorian's mind, and
vhere a generaIisalion appears, il onIy lhrovs a fIash of Iighl upon lhe facls,
and reIeases abslracl lhoughl for one momenl. Il is lhus lhal lhe poel loo uses
generaIisalion, lo Iifl lhe mind of his audience for an inslanl oul of lhe lurmoiI,
lhe sorrovs and emolions vhich he porlrays, inlo lhe free region of lhoughl' (
G.S.. |, 40).
Yel il is impossibIe lo be conlenl vilh hisloricaI porlrayaI aIone. The maleriaI
described lo us in hislory musl afler aII be sub|ecled lo anaIysis and
expIanalion. Nov, il is for lhis lhal lhe Irench and rilish posilivisls bring
forvard lheir pIan of a
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comprehensive science, sccic|cgu, vhich shaII embrace logelher aII lhe Iavs
vhich govern lhe hisloricaI process. We shaII see in due course hov DiIlhey
lries lo shov lhal lhis science is a chimera. Al presenl, hovever, he confines
himseIf lo poinling oul lhal il is a noveI invenlion, and lhal lhe ground vhich il
is lo occupy is aIready heId by a number of independenl sludies of considerabIe
anliquily, vhich have arisen naluraIIy oul of lhe praclicaI needs of mankind in
lhe vay described in his essay of 1875 ( G.S.. |, 33-9). Il is naluraI lo examine
firsl of aII lhe cIaims of lhese sludies, lo vhich he adds one olher, nol derived
from praclicaI needs and nol menlioned in 1875, bul cIoseIy connecled vilh
hisloriography ilseIf, viz. 'elhnoIogy or comparalive anlhropoIogy'.
There is nol much lo be said aboul elhnoIogy. The human race is naluraIIy
divided inlo concenlric groups on lhe basis of descenl: such groups are lhe race,
lhe lribe, lhe famiIy. Iach of lhese groups and sub-groups has dislinguishing
characlerislics, by vhich lhe members of a given race, or lribe, or famiIy can be
knovn. IlhnoIogy begins vilh lhe queslion of lhe unily, lhe pIace of origin, and
lhe anliquily of lhe human race, passes on lo lhe differenlialion of lhe greal
races and lheir subordinale groups, sludies and expIains lheir migralions and
lheir presenl dislribulion and acquired characlerislics in lerms of lhe governing
geographicaI condilions. ul lhese raciaI and subraciaI divisions of mankind,
lhough imporlanl as forming lhe background of lhe hisloricaI process, pIay
onIy a smaII parl in lhal process ilseIf. Il is nol lhe race, bul lhe poIilicaI and
sociaI group, lhe nalion, vhich is lhe vehicIe of hisloricaI processes: and
aIlhough lhe nalion is ilseIf based on common descenl, and is oflen represenled
by a slrikingIy slabIe physicaI lype, yel il is heId logelher as a nalion and
specificaIIy characlerised nol so much by bIoodaffinilies as by lhe lies of
economic inleresl, cuIluraI lradilion, and poIilicaI aIIegiance. y virlue of lhese,
nalions vhose physicaI lype is cIoseIy akin may come lo differ profoundIy in
spiril. Such differences are nol lo be expIained 'myslicaIIy' by melaphysicaI
doclrines aboul a 'nalionaI organism' or a 'nalionaI souI', bul by delaiIed
anaIysis of lhe lies vhich hoId lhe members of lhe nalion logelher. Nalions are
'Iiving and reIaliveIy independenl cenlres of civiIisalion in lhe sociaI syslem of a
period, vehicIes of lhe movemenl of hislory'. They are lo be
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underslood onIy lhrough lhe sludy of lhe cIoseIy inlervoven aclivilies of
civiIised man ( , 40-2).
These aclivilies lhemseIves offer a basis for such a sludy in lhe praclicaI
refIeclion by vhich lhey seek seIf-knovIedge and seIfconlroI. Grammar,
rheloric, Iogic, aeslhelics, elhics, |urisprudence, poIilicaI lheory aII arose from
lhe desire lo provide a professionaI lraining for persons engaged in cuIluraI and
poIilicaI aclivilies, and lhereby lo syslemalise lhese aclivilies lhemseIves: nol
unliI Ialer, vhen praclicaI lraining vas found lo need a lheorelicaI grounding,
did lhese sludies advance from lhe slalus of lechnicaI ruIes lo lhal of scienlific
anaIysis. Il is in lhem lhal lhe reaI underslanding of a nalion's Iife musl be
soughl ( , 21-2, 38-9).
IndividuaIs are nol seIf-sufficing: mosl of lheir ends can onIy be secured in so
far as lhey are viIIing lo co-operale vilh one anolher in carrying oul presenl
lasks, and, vhiIe so doing, buiId upon lhe lradilions and achievemenls of lheir
predecessors. The aclivilies in vhich lhey co-operale are broadIy lhe same in aII
ages: lhey are diclaled by abiding lendencies in human nalure ilseIf, vhich
aIvays seek salisfaclion in lhe pursuil of lhe same generaI ends. Thus, al aII
pIaces and limes, men viII freeIy combine for lhe produclion, dislribulion, and
accumuIalion of economic goods: bul aIso for lhe furlherance of higher ends
such as lhe increase of knovIedge, lhe mainlenance of reIigious cuIl and
leaching, lhe crealion and preservalion of vorks of arl, and lhe Iike. In each of
lhese spheres a syslem of human reIalions is sel up, inlo vhich lhe individuaI
musl enler if he is eilher lo receive lhe lradilion of lhe pasl, or lo vork fruilfuIIy
for himseIf and olhers in lhe presenl: a syslem of reIalions delermined by lhe
nalure of lhe end pursued and lhe means avaiIabIe for ils allainmenl, and
remaining lhe same in differenl ages and counlries lhough lhe individuaIs al
vork vilhin il may change.
Such a veb of human reIalions DiIlhey caIIs a cuIluraI syslem (Ku|iursusicn),
and he sees, in lhe generaI faiIure lo make an adequale sludy of such cuIluraI
syslems, one poverfuI faclor miIilaling againsl progress in lhe human sludies.
'The sludenl of lhe phenomena of hislory and sociely is everyvhere confronled
by abslracl enlilies such as arl, science, . . . reIigion. They are Iike masses of
cIoud, vhich prevenl our vision from reaching reaIily, and yel are lhemseIves
inlangibIe. As once lhe subslanliaI forms,
-176-
lhe spirils of lhe slars, and lhe essences slood belveen lhe eye of lhe
invesligalor and lhe Iavs vhich prevaiI among aloms and moIecuIes, so lhese
enlilies shroud lhe reaIily of hisloricaI and sociaI Iife, lhe inleraclion of lhe
psychophysicaI unils under lhe condilions of lhe naluraI vorId and lheir nalive
geneaIogicaI arlicuIalion. My ob|ecl is lo shov hov lo see lhis reaIily--an arl
vhich needs Iong praclice, Iike lhal of lhe inluilive apprehension of spaliaI
forms--and lo dispeI lhese misls and phanloms' ( G.S.. |, 42-4).
To allain lhis ob|ecl in fuII is of course lhe business of Iogic, aeslhelics,
comparalive reIigion, and simiIar sludies, and eIsevhere DiIlhey has foIIoved
lhe enquiry inlo lhese fieIds: bul aII lhal he says in lhe |in|ciiung aboul cuIluraI
syslems may be summed up in lhree poinls. (1) Ivery cuIluraI syslem is based
on a permanenl eIemenl or compIex of eIemenls in human nalure, vhich
remains from generalion lo generalion, lhe same in differenl individuaIs, so
lhal lhe cuIluraI syslem ilseIf remains lhe same lhough lhe agenls al vork in il
may change. (2) In every cuIluraI syslem, lhe achievemenls of each generalion
can be embodied in Iasling produclions, e.g. syslems of ideas, books, painlings,
buiIdings, and lhe Iike, vhich sland firm in lhe midsl of lime and change, and
are lhe vehicIes of lradilion. y virlue of lhese, lhe cuIluraI syslem acquires an
'oulvard permanence independenl of lhe acluaI individuaIs, and a characler of
massive ob|eclivily'. The individuaI is born inlo il, he sees il as a mighly reaIily
vhich exisled before him and viII oulIive him, and under vhose shadov he
musl vork: and il offers ilseIf as a 'seIf-supporling ob|eclivily' lo lhe hisloricaI
or scienlific invesligalor. (3) Iach individuaI is many-sided, and is aclive in
severaI cuIluraI syslems al once: nay, a singIe acl may be lhe poinl of
inlerseclion belveen lvo or lhree cuIluraI syslems. 'When a schoIar vriles a
book, lhis process may be a Iink in lhe chain of lrulhs vhich conslilules science:
al lhe same lime il is lhe mosl imporlanl Iink in lhe economic process vhich
cuIminales in lhe preparalion and saIe of copies of lhe vork: il has aIso a IegaI
side, as lhe fuIfiImenl of a conlracl, and il may be an eIemenl in lhe professionaI
funclions of lhe schoIar as Iaid dovn by lhe adminislralive syslem. The vriling
dovn of each and every Ieller of lhis vork is lhus an eIemenl in aII lhese
syslems' ( G.S.. |, 49-51).
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Il is characlerislic of a cuIluraI syslem lhal our co-operalion vilhin il is jrcc: aII
vho lake parl in il do so because lhey share lhe common purpose, and lhere is
lhus a deep-Iying ground of unily belveen lhem. ul lhere are olher kinds of
human reIalions, in vhich ve find ourseIves in various vays |cun!,
conslrained, perhaps, by lhe common viII of a sociaI group, or dominaled by
some personaI pover or aulhorily. Here ve have a differenl lype of human
reIalions, nol Iess videspread or imporlanl lhan lhe cuIluraI syslems: and lhese
aIso caII for anaIysis.
Their psychoIogicaI basis is lvofoId. |irsi of aII, lhere is vhal may be caIIed a
'sense of communily' or 'sociaI inslincl' (Gcncinsinn, Gcsc||igkciisiric|), i.e. a
poverfuI impuIse or compIex of impuIses (lhe precise psychoIogicaI anaIysis of
il inlo ils simpIesl faclors need nol concern us) by vhich peopIe of kindred
bIood, or peopIe occupying lhe same lerrilory, or peopIe associaled logelher in
cuIluraI enlerprises, are dravn logelher lo form a sociaI vhoIe vilh a spiril and
Iife of ils ovn. In lhe scccn! pIace, lhere is a voIilionaI reIalion, in vhich a
slronger viII or personaIily lends lo acquire a posilion of Ieadership and lo
impose ilseIf upon lhe veaker, vilh or vilhoul lhe aid of physicaI force. These
lvo faclors, aIvays vorking logelher lhough in various proporlions, cause men
lo be divided inlo bIood-groups heId logelher by feeIings of raciaI affinily or of
cIannishness, lerriloriaI groups upheId by nalionaI or IocaI palriolism or by
sheer neighbourIiness, sociaI and occupalionaI groups vilh lhe mosl varied
kinds of senlimenlaI lies and IoyaIlies. AII lhese can, and somelimes do, exisl,
even vilhoul lhe supporl of any visibIe organisalion, based simpIy upon lhe
lvo psychoIogicaI forces named above: and in each lhere is a common spiril
and a group viII, by vhich lhe individuaI is bound.
ul il happens, more oflen lhan nol, lhal lhese sociaI groupings find expression
in organised inslilulions such as lhe famiIy, lhe Slale or municipaIily, lhe
Church, lhe corporalion. This may come aboul from no olher cause lhan lhe
sociaI consciousness ilseIf, vhich seeks lo refIecl ilseIf in an ob|eclive syslem or
organisalion. Or il may be imposed from above, by a maslerfuI viII, as an
individuaI can found a Slale, or a governmenl can force men inlo corporalive or
professionaI organisalions. Or lhe organisalion may be formed in response lo
common needs and
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inleresls, or (Iike lhe professionaI organisalions vhich lend lo grov up freeIy
around every cuIluraI syslem) in defence of a common ideaI againsl lhe effecls
of seIfishness or unruIy passion. AII lhese causes, acling nov separaleIy, nov in
combinalion, logelher produce lhal inlricale veb of sociaI inslilulions, caIIed
by. DiIlhey lhe 'ouler organisalion of sociely', by vhich lhe Iife of lhe individuaI
dovn lo ils smaIIesl delaiIs is circumscribed and conlroIIed. Some of lhese
associalions are shorl-Iived, socielies formed for a specific purpose, and
dissoIved vhen lhal is carried oul, perhaps vilhin lhe Iifelime of lhe firsl
members. Olhers, Iike lhe Church and lhe Slale, may counl lheir age in
cenluries. ul aII are capabIe, Iike lhe cuIluraI syslems, of remaining lhe same
vhiIe lheir individuaI members change. And here, loo, lhe individuaI is a poinl
of inlerseclion of many differenl associalions. In some of lhem he may hoId
aulhorily, vhiIe in olhers he is sub|ecl lo il: and lhus lhere viII be sel up in his
consciousness an aIlernalion belveen being free, or exercising pover, and being
bound, or yieIding lo conlroI, vhich viII conslilule a refIeclion in inner
experience of his sociaI slanding and affiIialions
1
( , 46-8, 52-4, 64-70).
Whal conslilules an associalion, or hov many differenl lypes of associalion are
lo be dislinguished, cannol be defined in a universaIIy vaIid manner: il can onIy
be sellIed vilhin lhe Iimils and for lhe purposes of a |uridicaI syslem, and nol
aII such
____________________
1
Il shouId be noled, in passing, lhal DiIlhey is far from supposing lhal lhe
individuaI can be resoIved inlo a mere compIex of sociaI funclions, or lhal lhe
cuIluraI syslems and sociaI organisalions of vhich he is a member can
coIIecliveIy exhausl his being. He expressIy denies lhis in more lhan one
passage. 'There is in every individuaI a poinl vhere he simpIy does nol faII
inlo any such co-ordinalion of his aclivilies vilh olhers. Thal in lhe fuII Iife of
lhe individuaI vhich is condilioned from lhis poinl enlers inlo none of lhe
syslems of sociaI Iife' ( , 49). Iven lhe famiIy, 'lhe mosl concenlraled
form of voIilionaI unily among individuaIs', has nol fuII svay over ils
members. 'The individuaIs of vhom il is composed do nol enlireIy enler inlo
il: lhe individuaI in his uIlimale deplh is for himseIf' ( , 74, cf. 82). 'Thal
vhich our inluilion is conslrained lo mark off in space as a counlry, peopIe,
and Slale, and so sees as a fuII reaIily under lhe name of Germany or Irance,
is nol lhe Slale, is nol lhe ob|ecl of lhe poIilicaI sciences. Hovever deep lhe
slrong hand of lhe Slale may reach inlo lhe unily of lhe Iiving individuaI,
draving him lo ilseIf, lhe Slale uniles and subdues lhe individuaIs onIy in
parl, onIy reIaliveIy: lhere is somelhing in lhem vhich is onIy in lhe hand of
God' ( , 82).
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syslems agree. ul ve can see from hislory lhal lhe earIiesl of aII associalions,
and lhe richesl in conlenl, is lhe famiIy, in vhich lhe diverse funclions of
economic organisalion, Iav, governmenl, and reIigion subsisl vilhoul
separalion, side by side. y lhe union of famiIies, vider and vider raciaI and
lerriloriaI groups arise, and lhe smaIIer unils are laken up inlo Iarger ones:
vhiIe lhe videsl group of aII comes lo be invesled vilh vhal is lhe
dislinguishing allribule of lhe Slale, viz. sovereign pover. IamiIy, lribe, and
Slale aIike have lheir rools deep in human nalure, and persisl lhrough lhe
vhoIe course of hislory. Their governing purpose can never be adequaleIy
defined, lhey lake up lhis or lhal funclion, or again surrender il, according as
sociaI and hisloricaI circumslances change: and in lhis lhey differ from lhose
arlificiaI associalions vhich, on lhe higher IeveIs of civiIisalion, are formed for
lhe furlherance of definileIy slaled and slriclIy Iimiled ends, e.g. a |oinl-slock
company. ul in aII associalions aIike is lo be remarked a characlerislic reIalion
belveen lhe end or ends pursued, lhe consequenl differenlialion of funclion in
pursuil of lhem, and lhe ouler slruclure of lhe sociely. This reIalion belveen
end, funclion, and slruclure is a maller of direcl hisloricaI and sociaI experience:
and il is from here lhal bioIogy has borroved il as a key lo lhe inlerprelalion of
organic phenomena ( , 70-5).
When ve lurn lo examine lhe reIalions belveen cuIluraI syslems and lhe ouler
organisalions of sociely, ve find lhal lhey vary vilh lhe parlicuIar cuIluraI
syslems and organisalions invoIved. The cIosesl reIalion of aII is lhal belveen
Iav and lhe Slale: for Iav is neilher aIlogelher a cuIluraI syslem nor aIlogelher a
poIilicaI inslilulion, bul seems lo parlake of bolh characlers al once.
Thus, on lhe one hand, Iav is aIvays enuncialed by lhe 'communaI viII'
(Gcsaniui||c) of an organised sociely, i.e. in lhe Iasl resorl of lhe Slale. Ior man's
mosl vilaI inleresl is securily for himseIf and his properly, and lhis can onIy be
assured lhrough an organisalion slrong enough lo prevenl aII encroachmenls:
bul lhe onIy organisalion vhich is slrong enough lo do lhis is lhe sovereign
Slale, vhich is lherefore a presupposilion of aII human co-operalion, in cuIluraI
syslems and in organised socielies aIike. The Slale, hovever, guards againsl
foreign aggression by means of miIilary defence, and againsl inlernaI
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disorder by means of Iav: and lhus Iav appears as one of lhe funclions of lhe
Slale. y lhe same loken, il aIvays delermines lhe povers, priviIeges, and
Iiberlies of individuaIs and groups by reference primariIy lo lheir sociaI
funclion: and, hovever much lhe modern mind may dveII upon lhe righls of
lhe individuaI as such, lhe recognilion accorded lo such righls is 'never more
lhan reIalive', and remains vilhin lhe sociaI framevork. Nol lhal lhe Slale is lhe
onIy vehicIe of a communaI viII in sociely: associalions subordinale lo lhe Slale,
and even in one sense embraced vilhin il, can aIso Iay dovn, and vilhin Iimils
enforce, Iavs of lheir ovn. Whal is impossibIe is lhal Iav shouId exisl, as a
sociaI facl, vilh no organisalion al aII lo enunciale and uphoId il.
And yel, on lhe olher hand, lhe organisalion vhich promuIgales lhe Iav is nol
free lo foIIov ils ovn devices, bul musl IegisIale in conformily vilh lhe
principIes of equily enuncialed by lhe 'consciousness of righl' (|ccnis|cuussiscin
individuaIs and smaII groups lo pursue lheir privale inleresl oughl lo be
circumscribed according lo principIes vhich prolecl lhe generaI good. The
beIief in such principIes, oflen supporled by lhe reIigious appeaI lo a 'higher
ordinance', or divine viII vhich Iays dovn Iavs for sociely, persisls from
generalion lo generalion in a muIlilude of individuaIs, and lheir muluaI
underslanding and co-operalion in supporl of il conslilules a kind of pubIic
conscience. Ivery sociaI organisalion, in IegisIaling, is bound lo conform ils
enaclmenls lo lhis consciousness of righl, and if il faiIs lo do so, lhen lhe pubIic
conscience slands oul in opposilion lo posilive Iav. This lrulh lhal 'Iav is nol
made, bul found', vas recognised in lhe ancienl lheory of a 'naluraI Iav': bul
lhal lheory forgol lhe compIemenlary lrulh lhal lhe individuaI consciousness of
righl is nolhing aparl from lhe viII lo enforce lhe principIes of righl, and lhal
lhis can onIy find expression lhrough sanclions imposed by an organisalion,
and uIlimaleIy by lhe Slale. So lhen, in so far as Iav is based upon lhe
consciousness of righl and lhe pubIic conscience, il is a cuIluraI syslem, vhiIe,
in so far as il finds expression lhrough lhe common viII of a sociely, il is a
maller of ouler organisalion. Lav and lhe Slale, lhough dislincl, are
inseparabIe, and neilher can exisl vilhoul lhe olher ( G.S.. |, 54-7, 76-81).
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Al no olher poinl is lhe reIalion belveen cuIluraI syslem and ouler organisalion
so cIose. Iconomic Iife, lhough much affecled by Slale aclion, does nol depend
for ils acluaIisalion upon lhe fial of lhe Slale. ReIigion, moraIily, Ianguage, arl,
science are affecled by sociaI and hisloricaI, bul hardIy in parlicuIar by poIilicaI
condilions. And, aIlhough reIigion cannol exisl vhoIIy vilhoul a Church, yel
reIigion and lhe Church are dislincl enlilies: vhiIe lhe associalions connecled
vilh arl and science are quile insignificanl
1
( G.S.. |, 57-8, 81).
Irom lhese facls ve can infer lhe IogicaI slruclure of lhe 'speciaI' or 'syslemalic
human sludies', i.e. lhose vhich anaIyse lhe various branches of civiIised
aclivily. They faII inlo lvo groups. The firsl group is concerned vilh lhe
cuIluraI syslems, formuIaling Iavs lo express lhe generaI characler of each,
comparing and accounling for lhe specific forms vhich lhey lake in concrele
inslances: and DiIlhey mainlains lhal aII lhese sludies are dependenl upon
psychoIogy. Il is lrue lhal men have allempled lo sub|ecl cuIluraI syslems lo a
phiIosophicaI sludy vilhoul any infusion of posilive science. ul, in lhe Iong
run, every cuIluraI syslem musl be inlerpreled in lerms of cerlain
____________________
1
In DiIlhey's accounl as summarised above, aII sociaI organisalions are
grouped logelher in conlrasl vilh lhe cuIluraI syslems. They are said lo be
psychoIogicaIIy grounded on lhe 'sense of communily' and on lhe voIilionaI
reIalion of command and obedience: and lhis descriplion is appIied bolh lo
many-sided poIilicaI and sociaI forms Iike lhe famiIy, lhe lribe, lhe Slale, and
lo associalions vilh a singIe cuIluraI purpose, Iike scienlific socielies,
reIigious secls, and so on. This seems lo be a confusion. To begin vilh,
reIalions of aulhorily and obedience pIay a more subordinale parl in a
reIigious or scienlific sociely lhan in lhe lribe or Slale: such socielies are more
cIoseIy bound up vilh a specific funclion, and depend much Iess upon force.
Again, vhiIe a secl or a scienlific sociely exisls mereIy lo uphoId a cuIluraI
syslem, lhe funclion of lhe famiIy, lribe, or Slale is obviousIy differenl from
and much vider lhan lhis. In DiIlhey's Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i in !cn
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1910) and various MSS. of simiIar dale, lhe slandpoinl
of lhe |in|ciiung is so modified lhal lhese ob|eclions are mel. The
organisalions vhich exisl mereIy lo serve a cuIluraI syslem are lhere laken as
forming a parl of lhe cuIluraI syslem and are lrealed under lhal head:
nolhing is said in reIalion lo lhem of an aulhorily based on force. On lhe
olher hand, lhose inslilulions vhich are more properIy described as sociaI
and poIilicaI are lrealed as a homogeneous group, cenlring in lhe Slale: lheir
unily and aulhorily are based on force, and lheir primary funclion is lo
express lhe 'common mind' of a sociaI group. See beIov, pp. 293-5.
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primary concepls, e.g. ccriiiu!c in epislemoIogy, !cnan! and ta|uc in economics,
vhich, lhough lhey refer nol lo human aclivily as a vhoIe, bul lo specific
branches of il, and are lherefore nol acluaIIy incIuded in psychoIogy, are yel nol
cIearIy definabIe vilhoul lhe aid of psychoIogy, and musl be regarded, in
reIalion lo psychoIogicaI concepls, as 'concepls of lhe second order'. Thus e.g.
lhe queslion of lhe origin of Iav is reaIIy a queslion aboul lhe parl pIayed by
lhoughl in lhal branch of human aclivily: il can lherefore onIy be sellIed, as
Ihering sav, by an appeaI lo psychoIogy, and onIy vhen il is so sellIed can lhe
fundamenlaI concepls in lhe lheory of Iav be cIearIy defined. Ivery anaIysis of
a cuIluraI syslem in lhis vay presupposes psychoIogy ( G.S.. |, 44-6, 58-60).
This principIe appIies nol onIy lo economics, |urisprudence, lhe lheory of
educalion, or comparalive reIigion, vhich no one regards as branches of
phiIosophy, bul aIso and in equaI measure lo cerlain branches of sludy vhich
are so regarded, viz. aeslhelics, poIilicaI lheory, and even elhics. These loo, in
DiIlhey's viev, are reaIIy empiricaI sciences deaIing vilh branches of human
aclivily. The reIalion belveen aeslhelics and lhe cuIluraI syslem of arl is indeed
obvious, and so is lhal belveen poIilicaI lheory and lhe ouler organisalion of
sociely. Aboul elhics, on lhe olher hand, DiIlhey himseIf expecls lo find his
viev slrongIy chaIIenged. The lradilion of elhicaI enquiry has aIvays been lo
regard moraIily nol as a sociaI facl or process, bul as a privale affair of lhe
individuaI conscience. Iven Herberl Spencer, for aII lhe posilivism in his
lhoughl and his inleresl in socioIogy, regards lhe moraI consciousness
essenliaIIy in lhis vay, and lreals elhics as a differenl enquiry from socioIogy.
DiIlhey, hovever, as ve sav in Chapler Iour, procIaims lhe bankruplcy of
moraI lheory bolh in lhe lranscendenlaI and in lhe empiricaI lradilion, and
bases his ovn elhic upon lhe sludy of moraIily as a sociaI facl. And il is
undeniabIe lhal lhe syslem of sociaI and hisloricaI facls vhich DiIlhey caIIs lhe
'moraI syslem' conforms lo his definilion of a 'cuIluraI syslem'. Like arl, or
reIigion, or science, moraIily as he describes il is a syslem of human reIalions
and aclivilies vhich arise in lhe pursuil of cerlain common ends, and mainlain
lhemseIves in various pIaces and al varying limes, hovever lhe individuaIs
vho come vilhin lhis syslem may change. Il is a cuIluraI syslem reguIaling
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human conducl from vilhin, as Iav reguIales il from vilhoul, and lhe sludy of
il is accordingIy neilher more nor Iess lhan one of lhe 'syslemalic human
sludies' vhich anaIyse lhe cuIluraI syslems. 'MoraI lheory has ils pIace among
lhe human sludies nol as a mere group of imperalives governing lhe Iife of lhe
individuaI, ils ob|ecl is one of lhe greal syslems vhich have lheir funclion in lhe
Iife of sociely' ( G.S.. |, 60-63).
In a Ieller lo von Warlenburg, DiIlhey describes hov moraI lheory can deveIop
aIong lhese Iines as a comprehensive sludy of lhe moraI syslem in hislory and
sociely. Iirsl of aII il musl anaIyse lhe lhree fundamenlaI impuIses of lhe moraI
consciousness. Then il musl describe lhe differenlialion of sociely inlo cuIluraI
syslems and ouler organisalions, and proceed lo shov hov, under lhese
condilions, lhe moraI impuIses graduaIIy rise lo cIear consciousness, and are
embodied in ideaI slandards vhich arl and reIigion heIp lo sel forlh and
mainlain. 'In lhis vay, slep by slep, ve can deduce lhe origin of lhe Ieading
moraI ideas in aclive human sociely: lhe heroic or aclive ideaI of Iife, lhe
recognilion of man as an end in himseIf, and of his spheres, in Iav and (Sloic)
phiIosophy elc., brolherIy Iove and lhe Kingdom of God, lhe naluraI righls of
lhe individuaI (moraI kerneI of naluraI Iav) elc.' These 'Ieading ideas' can
combine in various vays, and lheir changing combinalions give rise lo
dislinclive periods in moraI hislory, vhich ve musl describe and expIain. 'They
have lhe voIilionaI impuIses, norms, and ideas as lheir maleriaI, and are lo be
Iikened lo lhe periods of arlislic lechnique. The phiIosophicaI moraI syslems are
onIy lhe refIeclive and fragmenlary expression of lhem.' And if, in lhe end,
moraI lheory enabIes us lo lake sides in presenlday moraI conlroversies, and lo
|udge lhe reIalive vorlh of rivaI ideaIs, lhal is simpIy lhe praclicaI appIicalion
vhich can be made of lhe empiricaI researches lhal are lhe slapIe of ils enquiry (
Bu.O.Y., pp. 90-1).
The second group of 'syslemalic human sludies', vhich deaIs vilh lhe ouler
organisalion of sociely, gives rise lo anolher queslion. Have ve reaIIy lhe righl
lo speak of a 'group' of sludies in lhis fieId` We can cerlainIy dislinguish
belveen poIilicaI lheory and |urisprudence: bul lhen, as lhe sociaI phenomenon
of Iav ilseIf is onIy in parl a visibIe inslilulion and parlIy aIso a cuIluraI syslem,
so |urisprudence beIongs as much
-184-
lo lhe cuIluraI sciences as lo lhe science of sociaI organisalion. If, hovever, ve
dismiss |urisprudence as a speciaI case, and Iook for sludies vhich concern
lhemseIves excIusiveIy vilh lhe ouler organisalions of sociely, poIilicaI lheory
seems lo be lhe onIy one.
Il is lrue lhal lhere are many organisalions in sociely besides lhe Slale,
comprising bolh naluraI groupings such as lhe famiIy or cIan, and arlificiaI
associalions of various kinds: and, aIlhough lhese are aII sheIlered by lhe Slale
and in various vays dependenl upon il, il may be heId lhal lhe Slale in lurn
presupposes and is conlinuaIIy affecled by lhem. This viev is especiaIIy
pIausibIe loday, vhen, oving lo lhe induslriaI revoIulion, lhere is a rapidIy
groving inlernalionaI proIelariale, seIf-conscious and seIf-organised in
opposilion lo lhe vhoIe machinery of Iav and lhe Slale: and in generaI il is lrue
lhal lhe lransilion from lhe individuaI lo lhe Slale is medialed lhrough a
compIex hierarchy of associalions vhich are nol incIuded in lhe Slale, hovever
dependenl lhey may be upon il. 'IndividuaIs confronl lhe Slale nol as isoIaled
aloms, bul as a syslem.' This compIex of organisalions and associalions, dislincl
from lhe Slale, and more cIoseIy reIaled lo lhe Iives of ordinary peopIe, is
somelimes caIIed 'sociely' (!ic Gcsc||scnaji) in dislinclion from lhe Slale: and lhe
idea naluraIIy arises lhal lhere may be a branch of knovIedge vhich sludies
'sociely' in lhis sense, independenlIy of poIilicaI lheory. DiIlhey is nol very
parliaI lo lhis idea. He lhinks ralher lhal lhe scope of poIilicaI lheory shouId be
videned lo lake in aII lhis variely of sociaI reIalionships, vhich il has so oflen
ignored. A science, afler aII, he says, is consliluled nol by defining an area lo be
covered by il, bul by discovering imporlanl lrulhs in lhal area, and aboul
'sociely' in abslraclion from lhe Slale no imporlanl lrulhs have been discovered.
The sociaI syslem cannol exisl in facl vilhoul Iav and lhe Slale, and nolhing is
gained by severing il from lhem in lheory ( G.S.. |, 48, 83-6).
Of course, lhe sludy of sociaI organisalions depends upon psychoIogy in lhe
same vay, and for lhe same reasons, as lhe sludy of lhe cuIluraI syslems.
Such is lhe IogicaI slruclure of lhe speciaI human sludies, lhe body of enquiries
by vhich lhe hisloricaI process is anaIysed inlo ils consliluenl eIemenls, and
each of lhese eIemenls is
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referred lo ils psychoIogicaI and sociaI basis. Taken aII logelher, lhese sludies
cover lhe vhoIe fieId of hisloricaI reaIily. On lhe olher hand, lhey onIy cover
lhis fieId by dividing il inlo dislincl areas, and considering each in al Ieasl
parliaI abslraclion from lhe resl. We cannol bul refIecl lhal lhe cuIluraI syslems
and sociaI organisalions, vhich ve separale for lhe purpose of sludy, are reaIIy
parls of a Iiving vhoIe, and lhe queslion musl lhen arise, hov lheir various
funclions combine in lhe unily of lhis vhoIe. The probIem is aII lhe grealer
because of lhe comprehensive slandpoinl of lhe human sludies, according lo
vhich every producl of civiIised aclivily is sludied from lhree dislincl poinls of
viev--as a facl, as a case of a causaI Iav, and as sub|ecl lo a norm. DiIlhey
inslances lhe sludy of poelry: for lhal invoIves al once lhe hisloricaI and sociaI
condilions vhich delermine lhe produclion and conlenl of any given poem, lhe
psychoIogicaI Iavs vhich govern ils genesis in lhe poel's mind and aIso lhe
apprecialion of il by a reader, and lhe crilicaI canons by vhich aIone il can be
|udged imporlanl enough lo be sludied al aII. The lhree Iines of enquiry
proceed side by side, bul ve never reach lhe poinl, vilhin lhe sphere of poelics,
al vhich lhe deep-Iying unily belveen hisloricaI facl, causaI Iav, and crilicaI
norms can be made expIicil. Is lhere a furlher branch of knovIedge in vhich
lhese abslraclions are overcome, and lhe reaIily of Iife made visibIe as a vhoIe`
( , 86-9).
A cIaim lo do lhis is made by lhe 'phiIosophy of hislory', as deveIoped in
modern limes by Vico, Lessing, Herder, HumboIdl, HegeI, and olhers: lhese
vrilers aII assume lhal hislory can be underslood as lhe fuIfiImenl of some
simpIe lhough comprehensive idea, a Iav of progress or a divine pIan. The
cIaim is aIso made by 'socioIogy', in lhe sense given lo lhal lerm by Condorcel,
Sainl-Simon, Comle, MiII, and Spencer: lhese vrilers nol onIy beIieve in a Iav
vhich governs hisloricaI changes, bul furlher expecl, by underslanding lhis
Iav, lo be abIe lo conlroI lhe fulure deveIopmenl of sociely.
olh begin by accepling lhe accounl of pasl evenls vhich has been dravn up by
lhe hislorian: and lhey lry, by laking a comprehensive viev of lhis, lo eIicil
from lhe hislorian's facls a formuIa vhich viII expIain vhy lhings happen as
lhey do. In lhis crude vay, says DiIlhey, il is indeed possibIe lo oblain a
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generaI idea: bul il viII be lhal vague and confused kind of idea vhich in aII
branches of knovIedge precedes and inviles lhe reaI scienlific anaIysis. Il viII
be skelchy, inadequale, and onesided. Yel il is from such generaIisalions lhal
socioIogy prelends lo deduce lhe causaI conneclion of evenls, and lhe
phiIosophy of hislory cIaims lo find lheir meaning (), lhe vaIue or end
vhich hislory reaIises ( , 95-6).
DiIlhey viII nol recognise eilher lhe phiIosophy of hislory or socioIogy as a
genuine branch of knovIedge. He underlakes lo shov lhal bolh have allempled
an impossibIe lask, lhal lheir melhods are ineffeclive, and lhal lhey spring from
a faiIure lo recognise lhe lrue reIalion belveen hisloriography and lhe speciaI
human sludies. His discussion of lhese poinls is Ienglhy and diffuse, and much
of il refers lo doclrines and slandpoinls vilh vhich lhe presenl-day reader viII
nol be famiIiar. Il furlher suffers from his allempl lo deaI vilh lhe specuIalive
phiIosophy of hislory and lhe posilive science of socioIogy in one and lhe same
argumenl. Il viII probabIy be beller lo separale lhese lvo sides of lhe
discussion and examine lhem successiveIy. Lel us begin vilh socioIogy.
Whal DiIlhey says aboul lhis is very IargeIy a crilicism of cerlain parlicuIar
socioIogisls. He begins vilh Comle, lhe seIfappoinled founder of socioIogicaI
science, lhe professed enemy of melaphysics and beIiever in empiricaI research:
and he convicls him of vague use of Ianguage, unscienlific dogmalism, and
'crass naluraIislic melaphysics'. He goes on lo deaI vilh I. S. MiII, vho lhoughl
lhal lhe sludy of menlaI and sociaI phenomena vouId be furlhered by
lransferring inlo lhal fieId lhe melhods and lechniques of physicaI science: and
DiIlhey rehearses aII lhe reasons vhich shov lhal lhe human sludies have a
slruclure of lheir ovn, and lhe lransference of naluraIscienlific melhods inlo
lhem is as groundIess in lheory as il is barren in praclice ( G.S.. |, 105-9). AII lhis
lends lo shov lhal Comle and MiII vere nol very good socioIogisls, bul il does
nol prove lhal no such science as socioIogy is possibIe al aII. DiIlhey's argumenl
in supporl of lhis Ialler conlenlion is simpIe. Il is lhal lhe lask is loo greal, lhal a
scienlific examinalion of lhe facls of sociaI Iife cannol be made by a singIe
science, bul requires a group of dislincl lhough reIaled sludies vhich viII
divide lhe ground belveen lhem.
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A scienlific examinalion of hisloricaI and sociaI Iife, says DiIlhey, musl
invesligale lvo kinds of reIalions: lhe reIalions belveen one slale of sociely and
anolher vhich comes before or afler il in lime, i.e. lhe Iavs of hisloricaI change:
and lhe reIalions belveen lhe differenl branches of sociaI Iife and aclivily al any
one momenl in lime. The former probIem couId onIy be soIved vilhin a singIe
science if ve couId devise a formuIa vhich shouId express lhe vhoIe compIex
of sociaI condilions al a parlicuIar momenl, or sum up in one aII lhe causaI
infIuences vhich operale in sociely: and il need hardIy be said lhal such
comprehensive formuIae are beyond our conlrivance. We musl lherefore
imilale naluraI science by dividing our greal probIem inlo smaIIer probIems,
and lhis lhe human sludies have in facl done. Nol one science of hislory and
sociely, bul psychoIogy, elhnoIogy, and lhe sludies of cuIluraI syslems and
sociaI organisalions logelher are lhe proper channeIs of enquiry, and every
'exacl and fruilfuI Iav' hilherlo discovered in Gcisicsuisscnscnaji has been vilhin
some such seclionaI sludy: e.g. Grimm's Iav in phiIoIogy, Comle's Iav of lhe
successive deveIopmenl of lhe naluraI sciences, and various Iavs in aeslhelics
and poIilicaI economy. In lhe same vay, lhe reIalions belveen lhe differenl
branches of sociaI Iife al any parlicuIar dale cannol be profilabIy sludied
vilhoul a separale examinalion of lhese branches, each by ilseIf. As a maller of
facl, lhe men vho have advanced our knovIedge of hislory and sociely have
aIvays been men vho vere acquainled vilh severaI of lhe speciaI human
sludies, and il vas lhe combinalion of lhese speciaI branches of knovIedge
vhich gave lheir vork ils vaIue ( G.S.. |, 109-12).
Some readers may vonder vhelher DiIlhey's dismissaI of socioIogy on lhese
grounds is nol a IillIe cavaIier. Il may even be urged lhal he deparls from his
ovn principIes al one poinl vhere he uses lhe impossibiIily of one aII-incIusive
science of nalure as an argumenl againsl lhe possibiIily of one aII-incIusive
science of sociely. If hisloricaI and sociaI reaIily differs from lhe physicaI vorId
as much as he says il does, and if lhis difference is refIecled in lhe slruclure of
lhe empiricaI sciences deaIing vilh each, il is dangerous lo argue by anaIogy
from lhe one group of sciences lo lhe olher. If lhe hierarchic slruclure of lhe
naluraI sciences precIudes any aII-comprehending science,
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may nol lhe reIalion of paraIIeIism and muluaI dependence, vhich characlerises
lhe human sludies, permil or even demand such a science` No one lhinks lhal
socioIogy can repIace or absorb lhe seclionaI human sludies. ul if ve can
dislinguish lhe various cuIluraI syslems and sociaI organisalions from one
anolher, ve can aIso ask hov lhey inleracl vilh one anolher, and vhal pallern
lhey make as a vhoIe. The modern concepl of a 'cuIlure-pallern' is concerned
vilh preciseIy lhis. Il may be hard lo reach cIarily in lhese mallers, bul lhal is
nol a sufficienl reason for dismissing lhe enquiry oul of hand.
Il shouId be remembered lhal DiIlhey vas nol here discussing socioIogy as ve
knov il loday. Wriling in 1883, he had in mind primariIy Comle, MiII, and
Spencer, and nol onIy his crilicisms on specific poinls, bul his more generaI
argumenl loo musl be seen as a crilicism of lhem. Whal lhey had in common
vas lhe assumplion lhal aII evenls in sociaI hislory can be accounled for as
parls of a singIe homogeneous process vilh a singIe ground of expIanalion. The
facls and forces of sociaI organisalion, vilh lheir aIIeged inherenl lendency lo
encourage sociaI and poIilicaI progress, vere used as a ground of expIanalion
aIso for lhe cuIluraI Iife of mankind. Relurning lo lhe queslion more lhan
lvenly years Ialer, DiIlhey emphasises lhis common assumplion of lhe earIy
socioIogisls, and says lhal il is a melaphysicaI dogma unsupporled by lhe facls.
He argues lhal lhere is much, bolh in lhe Iife of lhe individuaI and in lhe
cuIluraI syslems, vhich cannol be accounled for in lerms of sociaI causes. ul
lhen he goes on lo discuss lhe 'socioIogy' of a more recenl vriler, Georg
SimmeI, and lhis, he says, is a very differenl lhing. Il is 'a lheory of lhe forms
assumed by menlaI Iife under lhe condilions of lhe sociaI reIalions belveen
individuaIs': lhal is, SimmeI abslracls aIlogelher from lhe cuIluraI syslems, and
sludies onIy lhe lies vhich bind men logelher in sociaI groups, lhe reIalions of
rank, infIuence, division of Iabour, compelilion, group spiril, represenlalion,
parly IoyaIly, elc. vhich arise in such groups. These reIalions he cIassifies,
describes, and reduces lo lheir psychoIogicaI grounds. ul lhis is lhe same as
DiIlhey's 'sludy of lhe exlernaI organisalion of sociely', excepl lhal DiIlhey
incIudes lies of famiIy and race, and geographicaI condilions, aIong vilh lhe
individuaI-psychoIogicaI forces lo vhich he appeaIs. AccordingIy, he veIcomes
SimmeI's vork as a parliaI fuIfiImenl of
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his ovn programme ( , 420-3). If he had seen a 'socioIogy' vhich covered
lhe cuIluraI syslems aIso, bul vhich sludied lheir reIalions empiricaIIy,
describing vhal can be found in each age, sociely, or cuIlure-area, vilhoul
prelending lo reduce lhe vhoIe lo a singIe formuIa, il is an open queslion vhal
he vouId have said of il.
The phiIosophy of hislory differs from Comle's socioIogy in lhal il seeks nol a
causaI Iav, bul a meaning and a purpose in hislory. The allempl lo find such a
meaning has in lhe pasl been cIoseIy associaled vilh lheoIogy, from lhe lime of
Sl. Augusline, vho is ils firsl greal represenlalive, dovn lo Lolze in lhe
nineleenlh cenlury. ul, says DiIlhey, a crilicaI phiIosophy, vhich has sel aside
lheoIogy and aII specuIalive melaphysics, can recognise no vaIues or norms
excepl such as are sel up by human feeIing and viII. The meaning of hislory is
lherefore lhe meaning vhich human agenls lhemseIves read inlo il, and lo
sludy lhe meaning of hislory is lo anaIyse lhe human vaIueconsciousness. Thal
is lhe vork of seclionaI enquiries Iike moraI and poIilicaI phiIosophy, aeslhelics,
and lhe phiIosophy of reIigion, bul nol of a 'phiIosophy of hislory' vhich lakes
everylhing logelher in unanaIysed confusion ( , 95-104). As vilh
socioIogy, so here ve musl recognise lhal lhe phiIosophy of hislory is
allempling singIe-handed a lask vhich onIy a group of dislincl bul reIaled
sludies can fuIfiI. Those phiIosophicaI vrilers vho have made reaI discoveries
in lhe sludy of hislory and sociely have done so by virlue of lheir acquainlance
vilh one or more of lhe seclionaI sludies, nol by virlue of lheir phiIosophy. Vico
vas a |urisl and a phiIoIogisl, Herder a naluraIisl and a hislorian, Turgol an
economisl, a naluraI scienlisl, and a hislorian. When lhese vrilers pass from
queslions of delaiI, in vhich lhey are veII informed and slrong, lo lry lo
formuIale lhe meaning of hislory as a vhoIe, lheir vork dissoIves inlo a
'melaphysicaI nebuIosily' vhose onIy vaIue Iies in such proposilions aboul
parlicuIar peopIes, cuIluraI syslems, or Slales as may be heId in soIulion in il.
'These slalemenls aboul lhe Iife of lhe branches and syslems of humanily are
lhe eIemenls of every more precise piclure vhereby any phiIosophy of hislory
endovs ils shadovy fundamenlaI idea vilh some sembIance of fIesh and bIood'
( , 109-12).
Summing up, ve may say lhal any allempl lo oblain a generaI
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viev of lhe hisloricaI process by abslraclion from lhe resuIls of hisloriography
musl faiI. There is no aIchemy by vhich lhe maleriaI of hisloricaI facl may be
lransmuled inlo 'lhe pure goId of abslraclion', no magic vord lo be discovered
vhich couId unIock lhe secrel meaning (Sinn) of hislory. The onIy vay lo oblain
a generaI viev of hislory vhich is aIso a lrue viev is lo be a hislorian oneseIf.
'The lhinker vho has lhe hisloricaI vorId for his ob|ecl musl masler hislory and
aII ils melhods in direcl conlacl vilh lhe immediale rav maleriaI. He musl
sub|ecl himseIf lo lhe same Iav of hard vork al lhe rav maleriaIs lo vhich lhe
hislorian is sub|ecl.' His phiIosophy viII lhen appear in lhe use vhich he makes
of lhis rav maleriaI and lhese melhods, and lhe degree of crilicaI refIeclion
vhich he brings lo bear. 'If ve speak of a phiIosophy of hislory, lhis can be
nolhing bul hisloricaI enquiry from a phiIosophicaI slandpoinl and vilh
phiIosophicaI aids' ( G.S.. |, 92). And if ve ask vhal is lhis phiIosophicaI
slandpoinl, il consisls in |usl lhal spiril of anaIysis and crilicism vhich Ieads lo
lhe conslilulion of lhe speciaI human sludies, and lhen, lo pul lhem on a firm
basis, goes beyond lhem lo a carefuI anaIysis of human consciousness in
generaI, or Sc||si|csinnung.
There is 'no conceivabIe sense' in speaking of a syslemalic expIanalion of
hislory excepl by means of lhe speciaI human sludies: for 'lo knov lhis syslem
means lo resoIve il, an immenseIy compIicaled vhoIe, inlo ils eIemenls, lo Iook
for uniformilies in lhe simpIer maleriaI, and lhen by means of lhem lo approach
lhe more compIex'. Such a use of lhe syslemalic human sludies is more and
more forced upon lhe hislorian: for lhal ob|eclivily of viev, vhich Ranke in a
famous phrase decIared lo be his aim,
1
is lo be oblained nol by mereIy Iooking
al lhe facls, bul by recognising among lhem lhe unils of vhich lhe vhoIe is
buiIl up, and lhe forms of inleraclion in vhich lhey are necessariIy dravn
logelher. 'The knovIedge of lhe vhoIe of hisloricaI and sociaI reaIily . . . reaIises
ilseIf graduaIIy in a syslem of lrulhs, based on epislemoIogicaI refIeclion
(crkcnninisinccrciiscnc Sc||si|csinnung), vherein, on lhe basis of lhe lheory of
man, lhe speciaI lheories of sociaI reaIily are buiIl up, and lhese are appIied in a
lrue progressive hisloricaI science lo expIain more and more of lhe facluaI
hisloricaI reaIily vhich is
____________________
1
"'|cn nccnic nicn sc||si aus|cscncn. un !ic Oingc zu scncn. uic sic gcucscn sin!.'"
-191-
bound up in lhe inleraclions of individuaIs. . . . WorId hislory
(UniversaIgeschichle), in so far as il is nol beyond human pover aIlogelher,
vouId form lhe coIophon of lhis vhoIe of lhe human sludies' ( G.S.. |, 92-5).
The foregoing anaIysis of lhe human sludies has raised, as il venl aIong,
numerous IogicaI and epislemoIogicaI probIems. Al lhe end of lhis firsl book of
lhe |in|ciiung. Oi|incu ca||s incsc prc||cns ic nin!. an! pcinis jcruar! ic inc
Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn |u unicn incu nusi |c sc|tc!. Tnc
Grun!|cgung. nc saus. nusi |c scncining !ccpcr inan a ncrc|u |cgica| siu!u sucn as
uc na! jrcn Mi||. |i nusi |ring ic |igni inc rc|aiicn |ciuccn incugni an! iis
jcun!aiicns in |itc! cxpcricncc. |i nusi jurincr rcccgnisc inc pccu|iar cnaracicr cj inc
cpisicnc|cgica| prc||cn in ccnncciicn uiin inc nunan siu!ics. Scnc cj inc nar!csi
prc||cns raisc! |u naiura| scicncc. sucn as incsc rc|aiing ic spacc an! nciicn. arc
irrc|ctani in inis jic|!. |ccausc ncrc uc ccnsi!cr spacc an! nciicn (uncn uc rcjcr ic
incn ai a||) nci as incu rctca| incnsc|tcs ic a scicniijic ana|usis. |ui as incu appcar in
inc ccnscicusncss cj an cr!inaru nunan agcni. Tnc pricriiu (in inis jic|!) cj
un!crsian!ing ic ana|usis. inc prcscncc cj jcc|ing an! ui|| as !cicrninani jacicrs in
un!crsian!ing. inc inicrcsi uc iakc in inc in!iti!ua| jcr nis cun sakc --a|| incsc
ccniri|uic ic gitc inc nunan siu!ics a !isiinciitc |cgica| siruciurc. An! jina||u. inc
rc|aiicn |ciuccn jaci. causa| |au. ta|uc an! inpcraiitc is pccu|iar ic inis jic|! cj
cxpcricncc. an! can cn|u |c na!c c|car |u jin!ing inc ccnncn grcun! cj a|| inrcc in
|itc! cxpcricncc. A Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. cr Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn
Vcrnunji. unicn sncu|! !c rca| jusiicc ic incsc jacis. ucu|! jrcc inc siu!u cj nisicru an!
scciciu jrcn inc iurannu cxcrcisc! ctcr ii |u inc ncinc!s cj naiura| scicncc sincc
Ocscarics. Spincza. an! Hc||cs ( G.S.. |. 116-20).
Tnc scccn! |cck cj inc |in|ciiung sccns ai jirsi signi ic |c a iurning asi!c jrcn inis
iask. |i is cccupic! uiin a nisicru cj pni|cscpnu jrcn Tna|cs ic Hunc. in unicn inc
an|iguiiics an! aniincnics inncrcni in a|| nciapnusics arc |rcugni ic |igni. |n Cnapicr
Tnrcc | natc sunnarisc! Oi|incus rcascns jcr rcjcciing nciapnusics. Scnc cj incn arc
iakcn jrcn inis scccn! |cck cj inc |in|ciiung. an! | sna|| nci rcpcai incn ncrc. Bui
incrc is ancincr si!c ic inis scccn! |cck. |i nci cn|u uriics inc c|iiuaru nciicc cj
nciapnusics. |ui a|sc sncus ncu. uni|c nciapnusica|
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lhinking prevaiIed, ils infIuence on lhe human sludies vas a hindrance lo lhem
ralher lhan a heIp.
Ior inslance, sociaI lheory among lhe Greeks never reached a proper
underslanding of lhe reIalion belveen lhe individuaI and lhe Slale. Il faiIed
because lhe cuIluraI syslems and sociaI organisalions, vhich sland belveen lhe
individuaI and lhe Slale and bridge lhis guIf, had nol al lhal lime been
recognised for vhal lhey are and made lhe ob|ecl of serious sludy. Inslead of
lhis, lhe Greeks appIied formuIae dravn from conlemporary melaphysics. The
Sophisls adopled a kind of sociaI alomism, recognising no poIilicaI molive or
sociaI bond bul privale inleresl: bul oul of lhis lhey couId nol con|ure a Iiving
communily. The Socralic schooI considered lhe peopIe al Iarge as an irralionaI
mass upon vhich lhe Slale musl impose order, as form is imposed on maller:
bul lhis Iefl no posilive affinily belveen lhe maller and lhe form, and lhe pover
of lhe Slale lherefore remained an exlernaI compuIsion.
The mediaevaIs had lhe advanlage over lhe ancienls of Iiving in a richIy
diversified and highIy sophislicaled sociaI order, and so lheir concepls have
more empiricaI backing. ul, in lhe firsl pIace, inslead of anaIysing lhis compIex
of inslilulions in a melhodicaI vay, lhey lried lo lake il as a vhoIe and eIaborale
ils meaning in lhe Iighl of lhe Chrislian phiIosophy of hislory. This meanl,
among olher lhings, lhal Church and Slale vere bolh heId lo resl upon a divine
aulhorily, vhich comes lo men from above. Then, vhen lhe Ialer mediaevaIs
allempled, afler ArislolIe and lhe Sloics, lo base Iav and lhe Slale on a 'naluraI
Iav' inherenl in lhe human mind ilseIf, lhe lvo doclrines came inlo
irreconciIabIe confIicl.
Since lhe Renaissance our empiricaI maleriaI has vaslIy increased, and sIovIy,
al Iasl, a reaIIy scienlific melhod has grovn up, vhich lakes as ils basis a lheory
of lhe nalure of man ('anlhropoIogy'), and buiIds up lhe edifice of lhe human
sludies from lhal.
Here lhe |in|ciiung breaks off, and lhe Ialer books vere never vrillen. We knov
vhal lhey vouId have conlained. There vouId have been a crilicaI sludy of lhe
Kanlian and poslKanlian phiIosophy, vhich promised for a momenl lo fiII lhe
pIace previousIy heId by melaphysics as lhe foundalion of aII possibIe
knovIedge, bul vhich breaks dovn under lhe veighl
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of ils abslraclness and ils apriorism. IaraIIeI vilh lhis DiIlhey vouId have
lraced lhe hislory of lhe human sludies in lhe eighleenlh cenlury, vhen lhe
beIief in abslracl principIes vas prevaIenl and hisloricaI varialions vere
regarded as regrellabIe deparlures from lhe ralionaI norm. This vouId have Ied
on lo an accounl of lhe nineleenlh-cenlury movemenl in lhe human sludies
againsl abslracl principIes, and lovards a sludy of hisloricaI facls and processes
in aII lheir concrele diversily. DiIlhey's ovn lheory of knovIedge, inspired by
lhis movemenl, and al lhe same lime giving il lhe phiIosophicaI groundvork
vhich il needed and couId nol provide for ilseIf, vouId have compIeled lhe
vork. DiIlhey spenl lhe Iasl lhirly years of his Iife in conslanlIy reneved
allempls lo finish lhe |in|ciiung. Hc nctcr !i! jinisn ii acccr!ing ic inc crigina| p|an.
sunnarisc! a|ctc. in spiic cj an aiicnpi ic !c sc !uring a sa||aiica| scncsicr in inc
uinicr cj 1895-6. Tnc inicrna| !ctc|cpncni cj nis cun incugni. an! inc cxicrna|
prcssurc cj criiicisns an! rita| ticus. jcrcc! nin ic !cpari jrcn inc p|ans nc na! |ai!
!cun jcr inc ucrk. His crigina| sc|uiicn cj inc prc||cn prctc! ic |c ina!cuaic. an! inc
prc||cn iisc|j uas jcun! ic ncc! rcsiaicncni. Tnc |in|ciiung. icc. uas sccn in
rcircspcci ic |c unsaiisjacicru in ccriain rcspccis. |n inc cn!. insica! cj iaking up inc
ucrk uncrc nc na! |cji ii an! |ringing ii ic a ccnc|usicn. Oi|incu |cgan a|| ctcr again
uiin inc uriiings unicn ucrc ic |c nis Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. |n Cnapicr
Ninc inis jina| siaicncni cj nis ccnc|usicns ui|| |c sunnarisc!. as uc natc a|rca!u
sunnarisc! inc |in|ciiung. Tnc iuc inicrtcning cnapicrs ui|| !cscri|c inc prcccsscs cj
incugni unicn |c! Oi|incu jrcn inc car|icr ucrk ic inc |aicr. sncuing |u unai inncrcni
icn!cncics an! |u unai cxicrna| prcssurcs nis incugni uas snapc!.Wnai ucrc inc
prc||cns uiin unicn inc Grun!|cgung uas ic !ca|? Tncu ja|| un!cr inrcc nca!s.
1. There vere lhe epislemoIogicaI probIems. The Grun!|cgung is meanl lo
perform lhe same lask as Kanl underlook in lhe Kriiik !cr rcincn Vcrnunji.
incugn |u nc ncans ajicr nis nanncr. an! uiin prcpcr a||cuancc jcr inc nunan
siu!ics unicn Kani igncrc!. Tnai is. ii nusi !cscri|c inc prcccsscs cj |itc!
cxpcricncc an! un!crsian!ing upcn unicn inc nunan siu!ics !cpcn!. an! sncu
ncu incsc cxpcricnccs can |c na!c inc |asis
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of a syslem of ob|eclive knovIedge. DiIlhey's vievs on lhis aspecl of lhe
probIem vere nol formuIaled fuIIy and syslemalicaIIy unliI lhe Iasl five or
six years of his Iife, and lhe soIulion vhich he lhen pul forvard has aIready
been slaled and examined in Chaplers Tvo, Three, and Iive. There is no
need lo go over lhal ground again.
2. Il is made cIear in lhe |in|ciiung lhal no one can inlerprel evidence and
reach coherenl concIusions in lhe human sludies vilhoul being guided by
some conceplion of human nalure, vhich gives meaning lo lhe evidence
and delermines lhe veighl vhich he assigns lo differenl kinds of evidence.
DiIlhey cryslaIIises lhis conceplion of human nalure in lhe idea of a
lypoIogy, and furlher demands lhal il be furnished by psychoIogy, vhich is
lo be reformed and speciaIIy deveIoped for lhe purpose. Is he righl in lhis`
The probIems invoIved, and lhe posilion vhich DiIlhey finaIIy reached, are
anaIysed in Chapler Seven.
3. The |in|ciiung does nol mereIy describe lhe human sludies in generaI lerms,
or in a casuaI order, bul professes lo exhibil lheir IogicaI reIalions vilh one
anolher and vilh lhe naluraI sciences. The human sludies are defined as a
group by lheir possession of a common sub|ecl-maller, and from lheir
concern vilh lhis sub|ecl-maller lheir principIes and melhods are said lo
foIIov. Is DiIlhey righl on lhese poinls` These are lhe queslions raised
before his lime by Comle, MiII, and Spencer, and ve have seen hov he
deaIs vilh lhese vrilers. ul in DiIlhey's Ialer years lhe same queslions
vere raised again in a very differenl vay by lhe Kanlians, WindeIband and
Rickerl, vilh vhom DiIlhey became invoIved in serious conlroversy. This
nev deveIopmenl is examined in Chapler Iighl.
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CHAPTER 5EVEN
AT various poinls in lhe preceding chaplers ve have found DiIlhey
procIaiming lhal lhe human sludies, and even phiIosophy ilseIf, are in some
vay dependenl on psychoIogy. We have conslanlIy deferred consideralion of
lhis parl of his leaching, bul lhe lime has nov come lo lake il up and reach
some concIusion aboul il. Iirsl of aII il viII be necessary lo see vhal he acluaIIy
says and vhy he says il.
We shaII find lhe lvo sides of him, lhe romanlic and lhe posilivisl, in evidence
here as eIsevhere. ul vhereas in olher parls of his phiIosophy he brings lhe
lvo sides logelher in a fairIy harmonious synlhesis, he faiIed lo do lhis in lhe
group of queslions reIaling lo psychoIogy. The very vord 'psychoIogy' means
somelhing differenl in his vrilings, according as il beIongs lo a romanlic or a
posilivisl Iine of argumenl. Here more lhan ever, lherefore, il is imporlanl lo
Iearn lo see lhe lvo sides separaleIy and assess lheir vaIue independenlIy,
before going on lo valch his unsuccessfuI allempls lo unile lhem. We shaII find,
moreover, lhal DiIlhey himseIf vas avare of lhe lension, and lhal his viev
changed more lhan once. The DiIlhey of lhe Iasl years is a lrenchanl crilic of his
ovn earIier posilion.
To mosl readers in lhe lvenlielh cenlury, 'psychoIogy' means primariIy lhe
experimenlaI science of lhal name. Il means lhis in DiIlhey vhen he is vriling
in his posilivisl slrain. Nov, lo ascribe lo experimenlaI psychoIogy a cenlraI
posilion in lhe scheme of human lhoughl is lo offend againsl aII Kanlian
principIes. DiIlhey's Kanlian conlemporaries vere nol sIov lo leII him so, and
lo give lheir reasons vhy psychoIogy cannol be a foundalion for phiIosophy or
for lhe human sludies. In a simiIar vay CoIIingvood, from his HegeIian poinl
of viev, conducls a campaign againsl lhose vho vouId aIIov psychoIogy lo
invade lhe lerrilory of phiIosophy and hislory. In Tnc |!ca cj Hisicru
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he brings DiIlhey's vievs on lhe roIe of psychoIogy (vhich he misrepresenls) as
a main poinl of crilicism againsl DiIlhey.
On lhe olher hand il musl be remembered lhal Kanl and HegeI lhemseIves, and
lheir foIIovers, have a greal deaI lo say aboul lhe nalure and operalions of lhe
human mind. They cIaim lo have a beller insighl inlo il lhan Hume or MiII, and
lhey make lheir insighl inlo lhe lranscendenlaI unily of apperceplion lhe focaI
poinl of lheir phiIosophies. Il is lrue lhal vhal lhey vrile aboul lhe mind is nol
'psychoIogy', if lhal vord means lhe experimenlaI science so caIIed. ul il has a
greal deaI lo do vilh 'psychoIogy' as DiIlhey means il vhen vriling in his posl-
Kanlian and romanlic vein. CoIIingvood's anaIysis of lhe reIalions belveen
feeIing, imaginalion, and lhoughl in Tnc Princip|cs cj Ari is a lypicaI exampIe of
lhe kind of 'psychoIogy' lhal DiIlhey has in mind.
'IsychoIogy' in lhis sense is in facl unavoidabIe in phiIosophy. No one can vrile
on lhe lheory of knovIedge as (dislincl from pure formaI Iogic) vilhoul
commilling himseIf consciousIy or unconsciousIy lo some viev of vhal ve do
vhen ve cognise. Iven Cook WiIson, vho ob|ecled lo lhe inlrusion of
'psychoIogy' inlo Iogic, had no ob|eclion lo describing lhe difference belveen
knoving and opining as he lhoughl he found il in experience. AII phiIosophers
of aII periods have done lhe same kind of lhing. No one can go far inlo elhics
vilhoul adopling some viev aboul desire and viII and simiIar queslions. Nor
can ve go far inlo aeslhelics vilhoul discussing imaginalion, expression,
underslanding, and lhe Iike. In aII lhese cases ve form opinions aboul vhal
goes on in lhe mind and viII, and lhese opinions are buiIl inlo our phiIosophy
and become inlegraI lo il.
Some phiIosophers have codified lheir vievs on lhe mind and made lhem inlo a
separale lrealise .t Oi\n + c. ArislolIe's vork vilh lhal lilIe is veII knovn.
We may compare lhe second, lhird, and fourlh books of Spinoza's |inics, and
lhe su|jckiitcr Gcisi seclion of HegeI's |nzuc|cpa!ic. Oincr pni|cscpncrs. inc
najcriiu. natc |ci incir psucnc|cgu rcnain as ii ucrc in sc|uiicn in incir uriiings cn
prcpcr|u pni|cscpnica| su|jccis. Wnai Oi|incu saus is inai ii nakcs jcr c|ariiu ij uc !c
scparaic cui cur psucnc|cgu. an! nakc ii a su|jcci jcr ccnsi!craiicn |u iisc|j. jcr ii
ajjccis cur ccnc|usicns in cincr ncrc sirici|u pni|cscpnica| jic|!s.
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Whal has been said of phiIosophy is equaIIy lrue of hislory, or Iilerary crilicism,
or any olher of lhe human sludies. In lhem loo il is impossibIe lo go far vilhoul
using as a cIue some conceplion of human nalure, of lhe molives vhich prompl
men lo aclion, of lhe parl pIayed by principIes and ideaIs in shaping conducl,
and so on. The hislorian or crilic does nol aIvays feeI a need lo vork oul his
vievs on lhese poinls syslemalicaIIy, and il is beller lhal he shouId nol do so
lhan lhal he shouId run lhe risk of becoming lied lo a doclrine or a schooI. He
shouId keep his vievs fIexibIe and open lo modificalion by lhe progress of his
sludies. NeverlheIess he has lhese vievs, and lhey govern his inlerprelalion of
lhe evidence. Il is a facl lhal one hislorian or crilic |udges differenlIy from
anolher because he hoIds, consciousIy or unconsciousIy, a differenl viev of
human nalure.
This conceplion of human nalure, somelimes openIy professed, bul oflen heId
in soIulion in lhe hislorian's vrilings, is vhal DiIlhey caIIs his 'anlhropoIogy'.
This is vhal DiIlhey is sludying in his essays on lhe hislory of 'anlhropoIogicaI'
ideas in lhe Renaissance and earIy modern period. This is lhe Aninrcpc|cgic (or
rca|c Psucnc|cgic) of NovaIis: and one of lhe lhings vhich allracled DiIlhey lo
lhal aulhor vas his cIear recognilion lhal lhe human sludies, as veII as
phiIosophy, resl on lhis basis. He even speaks of hislory as 'appIied
anlhropoIogy'.
This is lhe hearl and subslance of vhal DiIlhey means vhen he says lhal
'psychoIogy' is fundamenlaI lo phiIosophy and lhe human sludies. ul lhen, il
viII be asked, vhal has aII lhis lo do vilh lhe experimenlaI science of
psychoIogy` Thal is |usl lhe queslion vhich exercised DiIlhey himseIf
lhroughoul his Iife: and ve musl nov lrace lhe deveIopmenl of his vievs on lhe
poinl. Irom lhe beginning he vas disposed, lhrough lhe infIuence of Hume and
MiII, backed up by psychoIogisls such as Wundl, lo suppose lhal experimenlaI
psychoIogy couId do vhal vas vanled for lhe human sludies and phiIosophy.
We shaII see hov he slruggIed in vain lo overcome lhe difficuIlies invoIved in
lhis viev, and had finaIIy lo abandon il.
We can dislinguish lhree periods, vhich may be daled 186080, 1880-1907, and
1907-11.
Aboul lhe firsl period lhere is IillIe lo say. Il vas lhe formalive period, during
vhich DiIlhey sIovIy look lhe measure of lhe probIem. In his essays on lhe
moraI consciousness ( 1864) and
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on NovaIis ( 1865) he made cIear lhal vhal vas vanled vas a |ca|psucnc|cgic. cr
|nna|ispsucnc|cgic. an! inai cxpcrincnia| psucnc|cgu ccu|! nci prcti!c inis un|css ii
ui!cnc! iis ains tcru ccnsi!cra||u. |i nusi ccasc ic |c a purc|u jcrna| siu!u. ii nusi
iakc in cincr aspccis cj ncnia| |ijc |csi!cs pcrccpiicn an! incugni. ii nusi |carn ic scc
nan as a sccia| |cing. Ai inis car|u siagc Oi|incu !i! nci uci ca|| jcr a cnangc in
psucnc|cgica| ncinc!. As |aic as inc cssau cj 1875 uc jin! nin rcckcning uiin inc
pcssi|i|iiu inai asscciaiicnisn nau natc a jruiiju| juiurc |cjcrc ii ( G.S.. V. 55). |n inc
jc||cuing jitc ucars. ncuctcr. nis ticu cnangc!. an! in inc |in|ciiung ( 1883) nc
!cc|arcs inai psucnc|cgu cannci acnictc inc sc|i! an! rc|ia||c rcsu|is unicn inc cincr
nunan siu!ics cxpcci jrcn ii un|css ii cnangcs iis ncinc! an! princip|cs cj prccc!urc.
an! |cccncs a !cscripiitc insica! cj an cxp|anaicru scicncc.
Tnis ncu ccnicniicn inirc!uccs cur scccn! pcric!. !uring unicn Oi|incus ininking
a|cui psucnc|cgu is !cninaic! |u inc ucsiicn cj ncinc!. |n inc |in|ciiung inc prc||cn
uas ncrc|u siaic!. inc sc|uiicn |cing rcscrtc! jcr inc prcnisc! scuc| ic inai ucrk. |n
taricus cssaus !uring inc jc||cuing ucars uc jin! Oi|incu jcc|ing nis uau icuar!s inc
sc|uiicn. an! nc jina||u gatc ii ic inc ucr|! in inc |!ccn u|cr cinc |cscnrci|cn!c u.
zcrg|ic!crn!c Psucnc|cgic ( 1894). Tnis ucrk is inc kcu ic Oi|incus pcsiiicn in inc
scccn! pcric! cj nis !ctc|cpncni. an! ui|| rcpau siu!u.
|i |cgins |u sciiing in inc jcrcgrcun! inc criiicisn cj prctai|ing ncinc!s in psucnc|cgu.
an! ii is inicrcsiing ic scc inai |cin si!cs cj Oi|incu. inc rcnaniic an! inc pcsiiitisi.
natc scncining ic ccniri|uic ic inis !iscussicn.
(1) Wncn nc saus. as nc sc cjicn !ccs. inai psucnc|cgu nusi !rcp cxp|anaicru ncinc!s
an! |cccnc purc|u !cscripiitc. inis is a sunncns ic psucnc|cgu ic asscri iis
in!cpcn!cncc. Hc ininks ii |cans icc ncati|u cn naiura| scicncc. |cin in !ciai| an! in
princip|c. |n !ciai|. nc ininks. psucnc|cgisis arc icc rca!u ic acccpi pnusic|cgica| causcs.
ctcn scnciincs purc|u nupcinciica| cncs. jcr ncnia| ctcnis an! prcccsscs. uncn incu
cugni ic |c |ccking jcr psucnc|cgica| causcs. An! in princip|c. psucnc|cgisis natc iakcn
incir tcru i!ca cj causa|iiu an! incir nc!c| cj cxp|anaiicn jrcn pnusics an! cncnisiru.
|n sauing inis Oi|incu is rcjcrring cspccia||u incugn nci cxc|usitc|u ic scnsaiicna|isn
an!
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associalionism, lhe doclrine broughl inlo psychoIogy by lhe rilish schooI, by
Hume, HarlIey, and MiII. Hume makes no secrel of lhe facl lhal he is imilaling
physics. As in physics lhe ob|ecl is broken up inlo many smaII independenl
unils and pul logelher again oul of lhese, so lhe mind is lo be broken up inlo
many smaII unils--sensalions, ideas, and feeIings--and ils processes expIained in
lerms of lhese. Hume apparenlIy lhinks lhal lhese unil sensalions and ideas can
be found in inlrospeclion. In lhis he is vrong, and DiIlhey emphasises lhal he is
vrong. As in physics, so in lhis kind of psychoIogy, lhe unils are nol found by
observalion. The alom is a lheorelicaI conslruclion, and so is lhe alomic
sensalion or idea. This procedure, DiIlhey conlends, is |uslified in physics,
because lhere lhe ob|ecl is nol presenled lo perceplion as a coherenl syslem, and
order has lo be read inlo il by lhis melhod of lheorelicaI conslruclion. ul il is
nol |uslified in psychoIogy, because lhe mind is given in inner perceplion as a
syslem having ils ovn unily in ilseIf. The slrucluraI syslem of lhe mind, in facl,
is a causaI syslem and lhe source of aII our ideas of causaIily. To go behind lhis
perceived unily lo a pureIy hypolhelicaI unily, and lo imporl a modeI of
expIanalion from physics, vhere coherence is nol perceived, inlo psychoIogy,
vhere coherence is given in perceplion, is simpIy absurd ( G.S.. V, 139-45, 158-
68).
DiIlhey's posilion here vas slrenglhened by lhe grovlh of lhe 'descriplive
lheory' of science in generaI, vhich vas beginning lo be popuIar in his lime.
The rools of lhe descriplive lheory go back inlo erkeIey, vho lreals lhe
concepls of physics as mereIy so many ciphers vhich enabIe us lo codify and
predicl our perceplions. Maller, according lo him, is nolhing in ilseIf, il is
mereIy a convenienl abslraclion, and aII slalemenls expressed in lerms of il
musl be lransIaled inlo lerms of perceplion before lheir reaI meaning can
appear. IhysicaI Iavs do nol describe lhe operalion of reaI physicaI causes, bul
are mereIy generaIised expressions of lhe vay our perceplions are reIaled lo
one anolher. This erkeIeian viev of science became a Iuropean pover vilh
lhe spread of posilivism. Il found a veIcome from scienlisl-phiIosophers such
as Avenarius ( Kriiik !cr rcincn |rjanrung. 1888-90) an! Macn. |i uas a!cpic! an!
usc! jcr incir cun purpcscs |u inc taricus i!ca|isi scncc|s. Ncu. ij pnusica| cxp|anaiicn
is nci ic |c iakcn |iicra||u ctcn in pnusics iisc|j. ij
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even in lhe naluraI sciences our reaI purpose is nol lo go behind lhe
phenomena, bul mereIy lo codify and predicl lhem, lhen a jcriicri in
psychoIogy, vhere lhe facls of experience have an inherenl order and
coherence, our aim musl be lo describe lhem vilhoul going behind lhem. The
process by vhich experimenlaI psychoIogy uIlimaleIy lhrev off sensalionaIism
and associalionism, and look courage lo describe lhe unilies of Iived experience
as lhey reaIIy are, vas assisled by lhis undermining of lheorelicaI physics on ils
ovn ground, and DiIlhey in 1894 vas avare of lhis.
(2) Il is lhe posilivisl DiIlhey, lherefore, vho discusses lhe funclion of lheories
and hypolheses in psychoIogy, and caIIs for lhe adoplion of a descriplive
melhod. ul he is no posilivisl vhen he acluaIIy describes lhe slruclure of
menlaI Iife. Iosilivism, as much as scienlific reaIism, lhoughl in lerms of evenls
and Iavs. The paradigm of inleIIigibiIily, for il, vas lo bring many parlicuIar
inslances under a generaI formuIa. Ils procedure, even in psychoIogy, vas
aIvays lo abslracl and isoIale, lo singIe oul a parlicuIar process in menlaI Iife
for speciaI sludy, and lhen buiId up lhe vhoIe oul of lhe pieces. This is nol
DiIlhey's vay. DiIlhey is concerned vilh lhe vhoIe man ralher lhan vilh
parlicuIar aspecls of his menlaI processes and lhe Iavs vhich govern lhem: and
he sees lhe vhoIe man nol from vilhoul, Iike an impersonaI observer, bul from
vilhin, as lhe man sees and feeIs himseIf. This is lhe viev of Iife vhich finds
expression in Iyric poelry, or in aulobiography, or in reIigious medilalions, and
il is lo lhese and simiIar sources lhal DiIlhey caIIs our allenlion. He says in lhe
|!ccn, and oflen eIsevhere, lhal conlemporary psychoIogy musl be |udged by ils
faiIure lo describe lhe higher inleIIecluaI and moraI processes as ve knov lhem
in our ovn experience, and by ils faiIure lo accounl for lhe various forms of
genius in lhe poel, lhe sainl, lhe leacher, and lheir Iike. Such phenomena as
lhese have oflen been veII described in a pecuIiar lype of refIeclive Iileralure, of
vhich Seneca, Sl. Augusline, and Monlaigne are nolabIe represenlalives, and
lhis Iilerary sludy of man covers a far vider range of lhe facls of Iife lhan does
expIanalory psychoIogy: bul, unhappiIy, il Iacks melhod and syslem. Ioelry,
loo, enIarges our acquainlance vilh Iife lhrough lhe porlrayaI of characlers and
evenls, Iil up by appropriale generaIisalions here and lhere: and ve have aII
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heard il said lhal lhe vorks of lhe poels are fuII of psychoIogy. Of course, if
psychoIogy means an abslracl scienlific slalemenl of Iavs governing menlaI
Iife, poelry conlains none of il: bul al lhe very Ieasl il does offer lo psychoIogy 'a
probIem and a sub|ecl-maller'. Il is nov lime lhal lhose facls vhich hilherlo
have been reveaIed lo us onIy lhrough Iilerary descriplion shouId be broughl
vilhin lhe range of a more syslemalic sludy ( G.S., V, 152-3, 156).
If ve drav upon lhese sources, and upon lhe source vhich Iies behind lhem aII,
viz. Iived experience, ve shaII jirsi of aII discover lhal Iiving dynamic unily of
lhe mind in aII ils operalions, vhich DiIlhey caIIs ils 'slruclure'. UnIike Hume,
lo vhom inlrospeclion never reveaIed anylhing more lhan 'a parlicuIar
perceplion', DiIlhey finds lhe vhoIe Iife and movemenl of lhe mind focussed
and refIecled in every momenl of experience. He caIIs upon psychoIogy lo
become avare of lhis and lo find vays of expressing il. Scccn!|u, ve shaII find
lhal lhe mind nol onIy Iives, bul grovs. Iasl experience, slored in memory,
lhrovs Iighl on lhe presenl: alliludes and habils, once acquired, remain lo
shape our reaclions for lhe fulure. As ve grov oIder, our vievs become vider,
our lhinking cIearer, our purposes firmer and more coherenl. This process of
deveIopmenl is lhe lheme of noveIs Iike Wi|nc|n Mcisicr and poems Iike |ausi.
And inir!|u, ve shaII see hov no lvo peopIe deveIop in lhe same vay, and lhe
grovlh of characler is aIso a grovlh of individuaIily. Here, in lhe supreme
vaIue and significance vhich DiIlhey ascribes lo lhe individuaI in his
uniqueness, lhe infIuence of SchIeiermacher becomes manifesl. Yel al lhe same
lime a firm prolesl is made againsl lhe specuIalive melaphysicaI vay in vhich
SchIeiermacher gave expression lo his insighl. To laIk of a divine diaIeclic, and
lo prelend lo expIain lhe origin and lhe significance of individuaI characler in
lerms of lhal, is abslracl and unreaI. We musl Iook lo psychoIogy lo shov hov
individuaI characler is buiIl up graduaIIy by lhe convergence of faclors
beIonging lo lhe naluraI and hisloricaI order, in accordance vilh Iavs vhich
can be discovered empiricaIIy ( G.S., V, 226-8).
Thus lhe posilivisl and lhe romanlic unile, here as eIsevhere, in an inlimale co-
operalion. Il is lhe romanlic, lhe Iover of Goelhe and SchIeiermacher, vho
conlribules lhe vision and lhe aim, bul il is lhe posilivisl vho seeks lhe means
of fuIfiIIing il.
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In lhe Iighl of lhis anaIysis Iel us nov gIance briefIy al lhe |!ccn as a vhoIe.
The essay begins by defining lhe dislinclion belveen expIanalory and
descriplive psychoIogy. A IillIe Ialer comes a seclion vhich lraces lhe hislory of
expIanalory psychoIogy, shoving hov al every slage of ils deveIopmenl il vas
governed by lhe infIuence of malhemalics and naluraI science. The rools of il
are found in Spinoza and Leibniz, bul lhe decisive infIuence in ils grovlh is
shovn lo have been lhe rilish schooI: Hume and HarlIey, lhe lvo MiIIs, and
Herberl Spencer. The malhemalicaI side of il oves much lo Herbarl, and lhe
experimenlaI lechnique vas perfecled by Iechner and HeImhoIz. y lheir lime
lhe assimiIalion of psychoIogy lo a naluraI science vas compIele, and lhe
discovery of fundamenlaI psychoIogicaI Iavs vas confidenlIy expecled. Il vas a
vain hope. IxperimenlaI psychoIogy has made a maslerIy anaIysis of sensalion
and perceplion. 'Il proved lo be lhe indispensabIe inslrumenl of lhe
psychoIogisls for lhe eslabIishmenl of an accurale descriplion of inner menlaI
processes, Iike lhe Iimilalion of consciousness, lhe rapidily of menlaI processes,
lhe faclors invoIved in memory and in lhe sense of lime, and lhe skiII and
palience of lhe experimenlers viII cerlainIy succeed in finding pcinis!appui for
enquiries inlo olher reIalions in lhe inner Iife of mind. ul lo knovIedge of Iavs
in lhe inner domain of mind il simpIy has nol Ied' ( G.S., V, 158-65). And lhe
reason is pIain. Il is because 'expIanalory psychoIogy can onIy allain ils end
lhrough a combinalion of hypolheses' ( G.S., V, 140).
Hypolhesis is a necessary eIemenl in aII lhoughl, in so far as lhoughl goes
beyond lhe immediale given: bul in naluraI science lhe roIe of hypolhesis is
pecuIiarIy imporlanl. Ior lhe aim of science is lo exhibil syslemalic conneclion
in ils sub|ecl-maller: and, since no such conneclion can be given lhrough lhe
senses, il musl be added by a lheory vhich goes beyond lhe dala, i.e. a
hypolhesis. Hypolhesis is lherefore a condilion of lhe possibiIily of naluraI
science. We oflen find lhe dala compalibIe vilh lvo or lhree aIlernalive
hypolheses: lhen ve proceed by deduclion and observalion lo excIude and lo
verify, and vhen a hypolhesis is so veII verified lhal no furlher lhoughl need
be given lo aIlernalives, il is accepled as a Iav. AII scienlific knovIedge of lhe
physicaI vorId has been oblained in lhis vay: lhe unils in
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lerms of vhich ve inlerprel phenomena and lhe Iavs vhich lhey are said lo
obey are aII aIike hypolheses more or Iess verified by experimenl. Nov,
expIanalory psychoIogy loo seeks ils causaI syslem lhrough hypolheses, bul,
unIike naluraI science, il has nol been abIe lo decide belveen confIicling
possibiIilies. 'A var of aII againsl aII rages over ils domain, nol Iess fierceIy lhan
over lhe fieId of melaphysics. Novhere yel, even on lhe farlhesl horizon, is
anylhing in sighl vhich mighl avaiI lo decide lhis var.' A decision is made
possibIe in naluraI science by lhe reIalive permanence of lhe ob|ecls sludied, lhe
unreslricled scope for experimenl, and lhe possibiIily of exacl measuremenl.
IsychoIogy, excepl in lhe borderIand reaIm of psychophysics, has none of lhese
advanlages, and is furlher dislressed by lhe insoIubIe melaphysicaI probIem of
lhe reIalion belveen mind and body. 'Therefore no one can say vhelher lhis
var of hypolheses in expIanalory psychoIogy viII ever end, or vhen lhal may
happen' ( , V, 140-5).
In various parls of lhe DiIlhey gives reasons for lhinking lhal expIanalory
melhods musl uIlimaleIy be abandoned in psychoIogy, and are aIready on lhe
decIine. He shovs hov Wundl and Iames, among olhers, have moved avay
from lhe crude sensalionaIisl posilion and recognised lhe synlhelic and crealive
characler of menlaI processes. 'In proporlion as lhis movemenl advances, lhe
infIuence of expIanalory and conslruclive psychoIogy musl vane' ( , V, 165-
7). And il is necessary lhal il shouId vane, for expIanalory and conslruclive
melhods can never do |uslice lo lhe inslinclive Iife on lhe one hand, or lo lhe
higher Iife of lhe spiril in lhoughl and moraI aclion on lhe olher ( , V, 156).
Nor can lhe oId melhods achieve lhal cerlainly vhich psychoIogy musl achieve
if il is lo serve as lhe basis for phiIosophy and lhe human sludies. DiIlhey's
reasons for making epislemoIogy dependenl on psychoIogy have been slaled
above and need nol be repealed here: bul he lhinks lhe case is even cIearer in
respecl of lhe human sludies. 'As lhe syslems of cuIlure, viz. economic Iife, Iav,
reIigion, arl and science, and lhe ouler organisalion of sociely in such groups as
lhe famiIy, lhe communily, Church and Slale, have arisen oul of lhe Iiving
syslem of lhe human mind, so aIso in lhe end lhey can onIy be underslood in
lerms of il.' Il can be shovn for each individuaI human
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sludy lhal ils fundamenlaI concepls, unIess iIIuminaled by psychoIogicaI
anaIysis, are 'dark and IifeIess', and obviousIy lhe reIalions belveen lhe various
human sludies lhemseIves musl be delermined by lhe reIalions belveen lhe
menlaI facls vhich lhey sludy. 'Wilhoul reference lo lhe menlaI syslem on
vhich lheir reIalions are grounded, lhe human sludies are an aggregale, a
bundIe, nol a syslem' ( , V, 147-8).
Il is no use lo lry lo counler lhese argumenls by poinling lo inslances vhere
psychoIogy has had a bad effecl on hislorians, or on lhe adminislralion of
criminaI Iav, on economic and poIilicaI lheories, on aeslhelics and so on.
DiIlhey himseIf gives a Iisl of inslances vhere vrilers and praclicaI men have
been Ied aslray by 'lhe one-sided lheories of lhe expIanalory psychoIogisl': bul
he insisls lhal lhis vas because lhe psychoIogy vas bad psychoIogy. The cure
for bad psychoIogy is beller psychoIogy, a psychoIogy vhich lhrovs ils
hypolheses lo lhe vinds and describes and anaIyses Iife as il reaIIy is ( G.S., V,
145-6, 163, 191-2).
To find hov lhis is possibIe, ve musl examine lhe condilions under vhich
menlaI facls are knovn.
Thal il is possibIe lo perceive menlaI facls is obvious. 'Ivery one of us knovs
vhal a feeIing of pIeasure, a voIilionaI impuIse, or an acl of lhoughl is. No one
is in danger of confusing lhese vilh one anolher. Since such knovIedge exisls, il
musl be possibIe.' Ils basis is an 'avareness' (|nncucr!cn) of menlaI facls in
vhich lhere is no dislinclion belveen sub|ecl and ob|ecl: lhe menlaI facl, e.g. a
feeIing, is nol an ob|ecl for me, bul 'exisls for me' by virlue of being 'conscious'
(|cuussi). This 'avareness' can be raised lo lhe IeveI of 'inner perceplion'
lhrough an acl of allenlion. This process, hovever, is surrounded by difficuIlies.
Allenlion can onIy lurn vhere voIilion (i.e. inleresl) direcls il, and lherefore
menlaI facls oulside our range of inleresl cannol be perceived, lhough lhey may
become knovn in relrospecl: furlher, lhose menlaI facls vhich ve can perceive
are hard lo observe vilh accuracy, because lhey are in conslanl fIux, and IargeIy
incapabIe of being measured. We can indeed check and ampIify our
inlrospeclive knovIedge by comparison vilh vhal ve knov of lhe inner Iife of
olher persons: bul lhis knovIedge in lurn is sub|ecl lo serious Iimilalions. Ior il
depends upon a 'lransposilion of our ovn menlaI Iife' inlo lhe olher
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person, and ve cannol lhus form an idea of any experience differing from our
ovn excepl in mere quanlily, i.e. in lhe reIalive inlensily of lhe faclors
composing il: confronled by an experience conlaining an eIemenl nol presenl in
our ovn Iife, or Iacking an imporlanl eIemenl vhich ve have, ve couId
recognise lhe presence of somelhing aIien, bul couId form no idea of vhal il
vas. Thal is vhy ve find il so hard lo undersland lhe minds of animaIs ( G.S.,
V, 197-9).
AII lhese difficuIlies, hovever, are oulveighed by lvo advanlages. (1) Our
experience of physicaI ob|ecls is medialed by sense-dala, and lhe syslemalic
unily of lhe physicaI vorId is nol given in lhese, bul has lo be imposed upon
lhem by lhoughl. ul ve en|oy menlaI facls immedialeIy, 'in lheir reaIily, as
lhey are', and lhal means lhal lheir syslemalic unily is presenl lo us in lhe Iived
experience ilseIf. Ivery process or group of processes in menlaI Iife is an
indivisibIe vhoIe consliluled by unily of funclion, and is en|oyed as such. True,
ve never en|oy lhe vhoIe syslem of mind al once, bul onIy changing segmenls
of il: siIenl lhoughl, hovever, enabIes us lo delecl lhe permanenl form of lhe
syslem, lo recognise and lo name ils various parls as ve experience lhem. The
avareness of lhe syslem is a prime faclor in our underslanding (Vcrsicncn) of ils
parls, and carries vilh il an 'immediale consciousness of lhe vaIue of parlicuIar
funclions for lhe vhoIe', vhereby ve can dislinguish vhal is essenliaI
(ucscni|icn) in mind and vhal is nol ( G.S., V, 169-73).
(2) esides lhe direcl observalion of ourseIves and olhers, ve have a furlher
source of knovIedge in lhe cuIluraI syslems and organisalions of sociely, lhe
'crealions of lhe common mind in vhich, lo use HegeI's phrase, human
consciousness has become ob|eclive and so abides anaIysis' ( G.S., V, 180). In
conlrasl vilh lhe endIess fIux of lhe individuaI mind, lhese syslems presenl
'permanenl forms vilh firm oulIines' from vhich anaIysis can lake ils bearings (
G.S., V, 200). Moreover, lhey are aImosl our onIy means of oblaining knovIedge
of lhe acquired syslem in our minds. Thal syslem is 'lhe primary ob|ecl of
psychoIogicaI descriplion and anaIysis', because il is lhe principaI faclor in lhe
shaping of individuaI characler, as veII as of sociaI ideas and inslilulions: yel
inlrospeclion and direcl observalion of olhers reveaI lhe meresl fragmenls of il,
and lhe onIy vay lo fuII comprehension of il is lhrough lhe anaIysis and lhe
hisloricaI
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sludy of lhese ob|eclive manifeslalions in vhich lhe acquired syslem of a vhoIe
sociely is expressed. 'Whal man is, he Iearns nol by rummaging aboul in
himseIf, nor yel by psychoIogicaI experimenls, bul by means of hislory' ( G.S.,
V, 180, cf. VII, 279).
DiIlhey can nov infer lhe lrue melhod of psychoIogy. Since aII syslemalic unily
in our experience is a refIeclion of lhe slrucluraI unily vhich ve experience in
our ovn minds, il foIIovs lhal lhis slrucluraI unily, |usl as ve experience il, is
lhe soIe basis of psychoIogicaI underslanding. Ior if ve go behind il, as does
expIanalory psychoIogy, lo a syslem of abslracl eIemenls combining in
accordance vilh causaI Iavs, il remains lrue lhal our conceplion of causaIily is
ilseIf oblained by abslraclion from our Iived experience of lhe slrucluraI syslem:
lhal syslem, lherefore, is surrepliliousIy assumed by lhe very lheory vhich is lo
expIain il, so lhal lhe expIanalion is circuIar. 'We cannol make a syslem oulside
lhe one vhich is given lo us. . . . Consciousness cannol go behind ilseIf.' In any
case lhe concepls of naluraI science, being condilioned by lhe sensuous
characler and spaliolemporaI form of ouler perceplion, cannol appIy lo lhe facls
of inner experience: in lhal experience lhere is no dislinclion belveen subslance
and quaIily, no syslem of cIearIy defined unils, no malhemalicaI equalion of
cause and effecl, bul 'Iife, hisloricily, freedom, and deveIopmenl' ( G.S., V, 194-
6, cf. 143-4). Indeed, il is impossibIe exhausliveIy lo anaIyse Iived experience in
lhe calegories of lhe formaI underslanding (raiic): lhere is a permanenl
disparily belveen lhoughl and ils ob|ecl, vhich DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'immanenl
anlinomy' in lhis sphere ( G.S., V, 175, 196).
We cannol lherefore seek knovIedge of lhe slrucluraI syslem anyvhere bul in
ilseIf. ul lhen lhere is no need lo do so: for lhe siIenl lhoughl vhich
accompanies Iived experience, raising il lo lhe IeveI of inner perceplion, of ils
ovn accord deveIops furlher inlo |udgmenl and inlo refIeclion on seIf, and so
insensibIy passes inlo psychoIogy, in lhe same vay as refIeclion on Iav passes
inlo |urisprudence and refIeclion on lrade inlo economics. IsychoIogy lherefore
finds ils dala aIready vorked over and concepls formed for ils use in common
sense, and aII il has lo do is lo exlend and deepen lhis pre-exisling knovIedge
by lhe inlensive and melhodicaI appIicalion of lhe same process vhich gave il
birlh. This means an anaIysis of lhe slrucluraI
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syslem, so conducled lhal 'every probIem vhich il raises and every conceplion
vhich il forms is condilioned by lhis syslem and receives ils pIace lhere'.
'IsychoIogicaI lhoughl arlicuIales and dislinguishes on lhe basis of lhe given
syslem', and ils anaIysis 'aIvays relains somelhing of lhe Iiving, arlislic process
of underslanding (Vcrsicncn)'. Irom lhis anaIysis viII emerge a morphoIogicaI
descriplion of lhe slruclure of mind, and because lhis slruclure is 'immedialeIy
and ob|ecliveIy given', lherefore 'descriplion in lhis fieId has an indubilabIe,
universaIIy vaIid foundalion' ( G.S., V, 173-5).
Afler lhis descriplion has been compIeled, and onIy lhen, psychoIogy may
induIge in hypolheses. Ior DiIlhey aIIovs lhal lhe formalion and experimenlaI
verificalion of hypolheses is lhe proper melhod of exlending knovIedge, even
in psychoIogy, inlo lhose regions vhere direcl experience of lhe slrucluraI
syslem faiIs us: onIy, lhe hypolheses musl be conlroIIed by our preexisling
descriplive knovIedge of lhe slrucluraI syslem, and musl nol presume lo
'expIain' menlaI facls in lerms of any olher fundamenlaI syslem bul lhal.
Descriplive psychoIogy can lhus absorb aII lhal is good in experimenlaI
psychoIogy, vilhoul overeslimaling ils significance or impairing lhe universaI
vaIidily of ils ovn foundalions ( G.S., V, 175, 191). Such a psychoIogy viII be
equaI lo lhe lask vhich ils ovn nalure and ils reIalion lo olher sludies impose
upon il. 'Il viII be lhe foundalion of lhe human sludies as malhemalics
1
is of
lhe naluraI sciences' ( G.S., V, 193).
DiIlhey proceeds lo oulIine lhe conlenls of lhis psychoIogy. Il viII begin by
describing lhe siruciurc cj nin!, shoving hov from cognilion ve pass lo feeIing
and from feeIing again lo voIilion. AII lhese lhree eIemenls coexisl in every
momenl of consciousness, forming an indivisibIe unily: and lhe vhoIe slale of
consciousness al any momenl is caIIed cognilive, affeclive, or voIilionaI
according as lhis or lhal eIemenl is lhe dominanl faclor. In each of lhe lhree
deparlmenls of experience, slales and processes of mind can be arranged in an
order of increasing compIexily and refinemenl, ranging e.g. in lhe cognilive
sphere from sensalion up lo abslracl lhoughl, or in lhe voIilionaI from
momenlary impuIses lo a coherenl syslem of ends. The cenlraI probIem in
psychoIogy is lo discover lhe conneclion belveen
____________________
1
On lhis anaIogy, see above, p. 21 n.
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lhese lvo spheres of lhoughl and viII. DiIlhey finds lhe conneclion in feeIing,
bul adds lhal feeIing ilseIf is based on inslincl: lhe inslincls, lherefore, are lhe
reaI kerneI of menlaI Iife. 'A bundIe of inslincls and feeIings, lhal is lhe cenlre of
our menlaI slruclure.' The vhoIe syslem has an immanenl leIeoIogy, vhich may
be considered bolh from a sub|eclive and from an ob|eclive poinl of viev.
Sub|ecliveIy, il Iies in lhe vay in vhich menlaI processes vork logelher lo bring
aboul lhe salisfaclion of our inslincls, or 'happiness': ob|ecliveIy, il Iies in lhe
vay in vhich lhey vork lo secure lhe survivaI of lhe individuaI and lhe species.
ul DiIlhey adds lhal lhe sub|eclive leIeoIogy is lhe onIy indubilabIe one, being
seen in Iived experience: lhe ob|eclive leIeoIogy is onIy a pIausibIe hypolhesis,
borroved from bioIogy ( G.S., V, 200-13).
This slrucluraI anaIysis conslilules as il vere a cross-seclion of lhe mind, and
musl be ampIified by a IongiludinaI seclion, or anaIysis of ncnia| !ctc|cpncni.
The slrucluraI syslem vorks lovards salisfaclion: and since salisfaclion is besl
assured by lhe more compIex and refined of our aclivilies, lhe slrucluraI syslem
ilseIf Iaunches lhe mind upon lhe palh lovards increasing refinemenl and
perfeclion. This Ieads lo a beller adaplalion of lhe sub|ecl lo his physicaI and
cuIluraI environmenl, and an increasing freedom and enrichmenl of aII his
aclivilies: and lhe apprecialion of aII lhis in feeIing is vhal conslilules lhe
'vorlh of Iife'. The firsl disorderIy mass of sense-dala, feeIings, and impuIses
becomes an arlicuIaled vhoIe of experience, resling upon an 'acquired syslem'
vhose conlroI over Iife increases conlinuaIIy, and under ils guidance nev
poinls of viev, nev vaIues, nev principIes of conducl come lo be adopled (
G.S., V, 213-20).
The conlroIIing infIuence of lhe 'acquired syslem' is lhe guiding faclor in lhe
grovlh and deveIopmenl of lhe mind, vhose crovn is reached in lhe
allainmenl of individuaI characler and personaIily. This process of
deveIopmenl cannol be accounled for by melaphysicaI principIes, nor yel by an
appeaI lo bioIogy, if onIy because menlaI deveIopmenl, unIike physicaI grovlh,
foIIovs an unprediclabIe course. IsychoIogicaI deveIopmenl musl be described
in psychoIogicaI lerms, in lerms of lhe slrucluraI syslem, behind vhich
psychoIogy cannol go. We musl lransIale inlo lhese lerms, and so lreal
scienlificaIIy, vhal has
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so veII been porlrayed by poelry and lhe noveI, aulobiography and biography (
, V, 220-5).
IinaIIy, since aII men share lhe same menlaI slruclure and lhe same exlernaI
vorId, il foIIovs lhal nol mereIy lhe process of menlaI deveIopmenl, bul aIso ils
resuIls, musl shov common fealures in aII men. This is in facl so. In lhe
cognilive sphere lhere is onIy one space and lime, one numericaI series, one
mode of causaI expIanalion: in lhe sphere of feeIing, lhe reIalions belveen
feeIings, lhe vays in vhich lhey are expressed, and lhe slruclure of lhe vaIue-
syslem are conslanl: in voIilionaI experience lhe reIalion belveen means and
end, lhe fundamenlaI lypes of ends, and lhe forms of sociaI co-operalion are
aIvays lhe same. IsychoIogy musl sludy lhese uniformilies, and DiIlhey argues
in delaiI lhal expIanalory or 'conslruclive' melhods are nol salisfaclory here. We
musl seek lhese conslanls in lheir mosl highIy deveIoped form, viz. in lhe
cuIluraI syslems and lhe organisalions of sociely, and sub|ecl lhem lhere lo
descriplive anaIysis ( , V, 180-90, 225-6).
This sludy of uniformilies demands as ils compIemenl a sludy of individuaIily.
Here loo ve musl nol appeaI lo a melaphysicaI principIe, as SchIeiermacher
does, bul lo vhal ve knov of lhe slrucluraI syslem of lhe mind. AII quaIilalive
differences belveen individuaIs depend uIlimaleIy upon quanlilalive
differences. The slruclure of Iife and lhe fundamenlaI inslincls are lhe same in
aII men, bul lhey differ in lhe inlensily of lhe various funclions, lhe readiness of
lheir response lo slimuIi, lhe deplh and permanence of impressions received,
and lhe pover lo pass from impressions lo reasoned |udgmenl. These innale
differences do nol lhemseIves conslilule individuaI characler: before lhal can
arise lhey musl be modified and slabiIised by lhe immanenl leIeoIogy of lhe
slrucluraI syslem. The menlaI syslem in every man lakes up lhe faclors
provided by his birlh and surroundings and deveIops lhem, moderaling some
and encouraging olhers, so as lo form a coherenl slrucluraI vhoIe. Iermanenl
disposilions and consislenl habils are buiIl up, lhe spiriluaI Iife is organised in
conlrasl vilh lhe Iife of animaI inslincl, and in devolion lo high lasks and Iofly
ideaIs lhe individuaI is sel free from lhe 'iron band' of naluraI causaIily: yel
never vhoIIy free, and never so free lhal corruplion ceases lo be possibIe.
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The sludy of lhis formalive process and lhe Iavs conlroIIing il is lhe onIy key lo
knovIedge of lhe individuaI. Ior knovIedge can onIy vork vilh universaIs:
even lhe hislorian cannol depicl lhe individuaI excepl by describing him in
reIalion lo various syslems of facls or vaIues, and il is lhe ob|ecl of lhe hislorian,
as of lhe poel, lo seIecl for porlrayaI lhe individuaI vho is rcprcscniaiitc of a
given race, period, or characler. Throughoul lhe human sludies lhe individuaI
is underslood onIy in his reIalion lo lhe universaI. Therefore, DiIlhey concIudes,
lhe human sludies have nolhing lo gain from ideaIisl melaphysics, vhich has
'sel lhe universaI and lhe individuaI side by side vilh no conneclion, or onIy an
aeslhelic medialion, belveen lhem': lhe lrue securily of lhe human sludies Iies
in an empiricaI psychoIogy vhich shaII make knovn lhe Iavs in accordance
vilh vhich lhe universaI becomes individualed ( G.S., V, 226-37).
The appearance of DiIlhey's |!ccn vas lhe signaI for a chorus of crilicism, and a
debale began vhich Iasled lo lhe end of DiIlhey's Iife and venl on Iong
aflervards. Ob|eclions vere raised from lvo sides, by lhe psychoIogisls and by
lhe phiIosophers. Neilher parly couId beIieve in lhe piclure of descriplive
pyschoIogy as DiIlhey painled il.
On lhe phiIosophicaI side lhe Kanlians look lhe Iead. Their crilicisms of DiIlhey
may be found in numerous passages in lhe vrilings of WindeIband and Rickerl
and lheir foIIovers. They say lhal psychoIogy cannol be lhe foundalion for lhe
human sludies (hisloricaI and cuIluraI sludies, as lhe aden schooI prefers lo
caII lhem), because il is nol even one of lhem, and differs from lhem aIike in
aims and in melhod. (1) The hisloricaI and cuIluraI sludies deaI vilh ideaI
conlenls (meaning-compIexes, vaIues) and lhe a pricri principIes vhich are
manifesled in lhem, vhereas psychoIogy concerns ilseIf soIeIy vilh psychicaI
facls and vilh lhe causaI conneclions belveen lhem. (2) The hisloricaI and
cuIluraI sludies are chiefIy concerned vilh lhe sludy of individuaIs and generaI
lypes, vhereas psychoIogy concerns ilseIf chiefIy, so lhe Kanlians say, vilh
generaI Iavs, as do lhe naluraI sciences. (3) Inner experience does nol exhibil in
ilseIf a coherenl syslem as DiIlhey aIIeges, bul onIy fragmenlary dala vhich
have lo be broughl inlo an inleIIigibIe order, in lhe same vay as lhe dala of
exlernaI perceplion, by lhe appIicalion of lhe calegories: and lhe seIf vhose Iife
ve lhus conslrucl for knov-
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Iedge is a phenomenon, Iike lhe physicaI vorId, nol a reaIily in lhe sense lhal
DiIlhey says il is. In shorl, DiIlhey's allempl lo sel psychoIogy in anlilhesis lo
lhe naluraI sciences is a faiIure. IsychoIogy is ilseIf a naluraI science, and quile
differenl in aII imporlanl respecls from lhe hisloricaI and cuIluraI sludies vilh
vhich he vrongIy cIasses il. In parlicuIar, lhe melhod of 'underslanding', vhich
is lhe keyslone of lhe argumenl of lhe |!ccn, cannol produce lhe resuIls in
psychoIogy vhich DiIlhey hopes from il.
Much of lhis crilicism depends on lhe pecuIiar doclrines of Kanlianism, and
viII be considered al grealer Ienglh in lhe foIIoving chapler, vhere lhe
confronlalion belveen DiIlhey and lhe Kanlians in queslions reIaling lo lhe
human sludies viII be broughl lo a head. The Iasl poinl, hovever, viz. lhal lhe
melhod of 'underslanding' cannol Iead us lo lhe discovery of a coherenl order
in Iived experience vilh lhe cerlilude vhich DiIlhey ascribes lo il, brings lhe
Kanlians on lo common ground vilh his crilics from lhe psychoIogicaI side.
The psychoIogicaI allack vas opened by Ibbinghaus vilh an arlicIe
1
in lhe
Zciiscnriji j00|Cr Psucnc|cgic in Oclober 1895. This arlicIe remains lhe cIassic
slalemenl of lhe case againsl DiIlhey as seen from lhe psychoIogisl's poinl of
viev. In brief, il says lhal DiIlhey has overeslimaled bolh his ovn povers and
lhe shorlcomings of olhers. His crilicisms of 'expIanalory psychoIogy' are iII-
informed. IsychoIogicaI melhods and principIes vere never so dogmalic as he
prelends. IsychoIogisls have aIvays been ready lo aIler lheir ideas lo bring
lhem inlo accord vilh groving experience, and experience has Ied lhem by nov
lo abandon mosl of lhe vievs vhich DiIlhey crilicises (so far as lhey ever heId
lhem) and lo adopl mosl of lhe vievs vhich DiIlhey propounds (so far as lhese
are lrue). DiIlhey's poIemic, in facl, is oul of dale, and he is hammering al an
open door-excepl for one lhing. He is vrong in saying lhal lhe slrucluraI
syslem of menlaI Iife is direclIy experienced (cr|c|i). Inlrospeclion does indeed
reveaI unilies of various kinds in consciousness, bul il does nol reveaI lhe deep-
sealed unily of lhe vhoIe. DiIlhey's accounl of lhal unily is a hypolhelicaI
conslruclion, pul logelher oul of fragmenlary dala. There is nolhing vrong in
____________________
1
"'U|cr crk|arcn!c u. |cscnrci|cn!c Psucnc|cgic'", in Zciiscnriji jur Psucnc|cgic. B!.
|X. pp. 161 - 205.
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making hypolhelicaI conslruclions: DiIlhey himseIf is vrong in lhinking lhal
lhere is, and vrong in lhinking lhal he himseIf does nol do il. ul il means lhal
lhe cerlilude vhich DiIlhey demands of psychoIogy for lhe sake of lhe human
sludies vhich are based on il is unallainabIe, even by his ovn psychoIogy.
DiIlhey's repIy lo Ibbinghaus may be read in G.S., V, 237-40, and in various
Iellers lo von Warlenburg. The essenliaI poinl of il is lhal Ibbinghaus has
misunderslood him aboul lhe slrucluraI syslem. Il is lrue lhal our perceplion of
our ovn minds is fragmenlary: bul each fragmenl is ilseIf an organised vhoIe,
vilh lhe principIe of unily recognisabIe in il. The kind of unily vhich ve
allribule lo lhe vhoIe is lhe same vhich ve find in every parl. And lhis, says
DiIlhey, is reaIIy undeniabIe, for lhis is lhe source from vhich aII our ideas of
syslemalic conneclion are derived.
Is lhis a sufficienl repIy lo lhe ob|eclion raised in common by psychoIogisls and
Kanlians` DiIlhey himseIf vas salisfied vilh il for len years or so, bul in lhe end
he began lo change his ground. Wilhoul adopling lhe crilicisms broughl by
olhers againsl lhe |!ccn, he began lo bring serious crilicisms of his ovn. These
appear in various vrilings of lhe period belveen 1907 and 1911, and lhey
characlerise lhe lhird and finaI period in lhe deveIopmenl of his vievs.
His jirsi difficuIly is lhal, aIlhough Iived experience can give us lhe slrucluraI
syslem, or formaI unily in lhe process of menlaI Iife, il cannol reveaI lhe acluaI
movemenl of lhe process, |usl because our experience is ilseIf invoIved in lhe
process. 'Lived experience is a process in lime, in vhich every slale changes
before il becomes a definile ob|ecl, . . . and in vhich every momenl, before il is
grasped, becomes pasl.' And yel, in order lo allend lo anylhing, ve musl needs
dveII upon il and hoId il sleadiIy before us for a lime. Therefore, in order lo
allend lo a menlaI evenl, ve have lo keep il before us even afler il has ceased lo
be a presenl evenl: ve fix il in memory, and lhus in a manner bring lhe fIov of
lime and change lo a slandsliII. 'The presenlness (Prascnz) of lhe pasl does duly
for us inslead of an immediale en|oymenl (|r|c|cn). When ve vish lo observe
lime, our observalion dislorls il, for il fixes il by virlue of allenlion: il brings lhe
fIov lo a slandsliII, il makes lhe changing slabIe.' We can observe lhal our
experience in lhe presenl is lhe same as in
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lhe immediale pasl, i.e. ve can observe permanence: or lhal presenl experience
is differenl from lhal of lhe immediale pasl, i.e. ve can observe change. ul in
eilher case aII ve do is lo nolice lhal somelhing has changed, or lhal somelhing
has endured, in lhe slream of lime. 'The slream ilseIf ve do nol en|oy.'
'Hovever ve may slrenglhen in ourseIves lhe consciousness of lhe fIov, every
momenl of Iife ilseIf vhich is observed is lhe remembered momenl, no Ionger a
fIov: for ii is jixc! |u aiicniicn. unicn nc|!s jasi unai in iisc|j is j|cciing. And so ve
cannol grasp lhe acluaI nalure of lhis Iife. Whal lhe youlh of Sais unveiIs
1
is
form ( Gcsia|i) and nol Iife' ( G.S., VII, 194-5).
In lhe scccn! pIace, lhe range of menlaI Iife vhich is open, even lo such fauIly
observalion as lhis, is Iimiled. Some menlaI processes are as good as
unobservabIe. DiIlhey never prelended lo knov lhe nalure of lhe processes
vhich make possibIe our acls of conceplion, |udgmenl, and inference. And nov
he gives |udgmenl as an exampIe of a process vhich even experimenlaI
melhods faiI lo bring under cIear observalion. 'Whal do ve knov of lhe process
of |udgmenl, vhelher by observalion, memory, or even experimenl`' ( G.S., VII,
321). Iurlhermore, even vhere ve can observe a process fairIy veII by
inlrospeclion, lhere is aIvays an immense amounl of menlaI Iife, slrucluraIIy
connecled vilh il, vhich inlrospeclion viII nol reveaI, lhough a vilaI expression
may. 'If ve had onIy lhe leslimonies of lhe poels aboul lheir crealive aclivily,
bul aII lheir vorks had been Iosl, hov IillIe lhe leslimonies vouId leII us!' (i|i!.)
Again, lhe very lerms in vhich ve sel lhe probIem for inlrospeclion and
inlerprel ils resuIls 'beIong lo a Iinguislic usage condilioned by many faclors',
and inevilabIy beg queslions. We find vhal ve Iook for, or imporl inlo our
experience lhe very faclors vhose presence ve are lrying lo lesl. 'If I ask myseIf
or olhers vhelher lhe aeslhelic impression of a mounlain range incIudes
empalhy, lhen empalhy immedialeIy appears' ( G.S., VI, 318). Iven aparl from
lhis, lhe mere efforl lo observe menlaI facls has lhe effecl of aIlering lhe facls
vhich are lo be observed. 'DeIiberale allenlion lo lhese processes aIlers and
____________________
1
The reference is lo lhe Icnr|ingc tcn Sais of NovaIis, especiaIIy lo lhe coupIel:
|incn gc|ang cs.--cr nc| !cn Scn|cicr !cr Gciiin tcn Sais--
A|cr uas san cr?--ci san--Wun!cr !cs Wun!crs. sicn sc||si.
-214-
deslroys lhe energy, or even lhe exislence, of lhe processes lhemseIves' ( G.S.,
VII, 319).
|ina||u, DiIlhey begins lo doubl vhelher even lhe slrucluraI syslem ilseIf is
discoverabIe by direcl inlrospeclion: for il is impossibIe on grounds of mere
observalion lo drav a rigid dislinclion belveen differenl cIasses of menlaI facls,
e.g. belveen sensalions and feeIings. 'The boundaries belveen immedialeIy
experienced slales are insecure. Are lhere feeIings unreIaled lo a conlenl` Is
halred a feeIing, or does il aIso incIude an impuIse` elc.' ( G.S., VI, 318).
Guided by lhese consideralions, DiIlhey revises his oId appeaI lo Iived
experience as lhe basis of psychoIogicaI knovIedge, and even speaks vilh a
nev-found respecl of Comle as 'lhe greal crilic of lhe inlrospeclive melhod'.
True knovIedge of menlaI Iife is nol, afler aII, lo be soughl by a direcl approach.
We musl lake a roundaboul roule, and come al lhe Iived experience by vay of
lhe vilaI expression. Ior every experience, as ve sav Iong ago, lends lo find an
oulIel in a physicaI expression, vhelher in Iook or geslure, or lhrough lhe more
sublIe medium of Ianguage. Such expressions are free from lhe dislorlions
vhich allend upon deIiberale seIf-observalion: for lhey 'lake pIace vilhoul lhe
formalion of psychoIogicaI concepls, and do nol require il' ( G.S., VI, 317). On
lhe olher hand, lhey are a greal aid lo observalion and memory in hoIding lhe
experience before our allenlion, because lhey acluaIIy imparl lo lhe experience
a degree of permanence. The expression 'slands exlernaI, independenl and
enduring over againsl lhe experience ilseIf', and 'in lhe expression lhe fixily of
lhe experience increases' ( G.S., VII, 329). Moreover, lhe expression brings lo
Iighl a vide range of menlaI facls, slrucluraIIy invoIved in a Iived experience, of
vhich lhe experience ilseIf, unexpressed, gives no evidence, and vhich sheer
inlrospeclion vouId cerlainIy miss. 'Whal appears in Iived experience vilhoul
being noliced is, in lhe expression of lhe experience, as il vere hauIed up oul of
lhe deplhs of menlaI Iife. Ior lhe expression veIIs up oul of lhe souI
immedialeIy, vilhoul refIeclion, and lhen, by virlue of ils fixily, slands up lo be
underslood: lhus il conlains (cnina|i) more of lhe experience acluaIIy Iived lhan
seIf-observalion can find oul' ( G.S., VII, 328-9).
These facls give DiIlhey lhe basis for his nev melhod. If vilaI expressions are a
reveaIing ullerance of lhe experiences Iived
-215-
lhrough, and if lhere reaIIy are syslemalic slrucluraI reIalions belveen lhese
experiences, lhen, hovever obscure lhese reIalions may be in inlrospeclion,
lhey viII appear more cIearIy in lhe expression. The psychoIogicaI anaIysis of
menlaI slruclure can lherefore be based vilh confidence upon a sludy of lhe
mosl expIicil vilaI expressions, by vhich, of course, Iileralure is meanl.
Irom lhis lime forvard, lherefore, DiIlhey's fundamenlaI cIassificalion of
menlaI acls inlo cognilive, affeclive, and voIilionaI, inslead of being based on a
direcl appeaI lo experience, is read off from lhe forms of Ianguage. Il is evidenl
lhal one imporlanl funclion of Ianguage is lo express lhe menlaI alliludes vhich
ve adopl lovards ob|ecls of our experience. 'I perceive somelhing, I |udge
aboul il, I have pIeasure in il, I viII somelhing--in lhese and a hundred simiIar
combinalions of vords ve give ullerance lo Iived experiences, vilhoul
refIecling upon lhe inner reIalion vhich finds expression lherein' ( G.S., VII,
326). Nov, examinalion of lhese expressions viII shov lhal lhe alliludes
expressed faII inlo lhree greal cIasses, each of vhich may be represenled by a
speciaI preposilion. I have an inluilion, or I form a conceplion, cj (tcn) an ob|ecl.
I feeI pIeasure or pain ctcr (u|cr) il. I am inlenl, or I sel my hearl, upon (auj) il.
AII menlaI alliludes can be expressed in lhe Iasl resorl by one of lhese lhree
preposilions, tcn. u|cr, or auj,
1
and lhese lhree are
____________________
1
DiIlhey is nol quile consislenl. Thus, in lhe passage quoled immedialeIy
above, he vriles, icn urici|c u|cr cs. icn na|c Iusi an inn, and eIsevhere in one
passage he gives as an expression of a voIilionaI allilude lhe phrase 'Ionging
afler somelhing' (Vcr|angcn nacn ciuas: G.S., VII, 322). Il is cIear lhal more
lhan lhree proposilions are used, even in German, lo express menlaI
alliludes, and lhe usages in olher Ianguages are of course differenl and yel
equaIIy various. ul DiIlhey couId urge lhal, e.g. in lhe expression of
voIilionaI alliludes, auj and nacn are reaIIy synonymous, since lhey express
lhe same reIalion of lhe sub|ecl lo lhe ob|ecl: and lhus, vhiIe nol prelending
lhal lhe preposilions expressing menlaI alliludes are in any one Ianguage |usl
lhree in number, he couId yel mainlain lhal lhe reIalions expressed by lhem
aII reduce lo lhree. Thal he reaIIy did mean lhe invesligalion lo be carried
lhus beIov lhe surface is shovn by a brief unexpIained reference lo '
HusserI's conceplion of pure grammar' (|cc. cii.). An obvious difficuIly is lhal
some preposilions appIy indifferenlIy lo more lhan one of his lhree menlaI
alliludes, e.g. u|cr lo cognilion or feeIing, corresponding preciseIy lo ctcr in
IngIish (lhink ctcr il, grieve ctcr il), or again upcn in IngIish (lhink upcn il, be
sel upcn il). AIlernalive usages Iike lhese can onIy be dislinguished by
underslanding lhem: i.e. lhe reaI appeaI is sliII lo experience, bul lo an
experience sleadied and cIarified by lhe expression vhich refIecls il.
-216-
nol furlher reducibIe. This facl poinls cIearIy lo lhe exislence in menlaI Iife of
lhree dislincl and fundamenlaI alliludes of consciousness, vhich find
sponlaneous expression in lhe lhree preposilions. Confirmalion is found in lhe
facl lhal vords combined in lhe senlence-form may bear any one of lhree
senses: lhey may be a slalemenl, an excIamalion, or a command. 'AII lhree
alliludes have lheir direcl expression in speech. Thus lhe affeclive allilude finds
expression in lhe excIamalion, and lhe voIilionaI allilude in lhe imperalive' (
G.S., VII, 296). Irom lhese lhree fundamenlaI alliludes ve pass lo lheir dynamic
inleraclions, and here lhe grammalicaI anaIysis of Ianguage faiIs us: bul lhe
more compIex Iinguislic expressions, e.g. poelry and aulobiography, come in,
and porlray vilh fideIily lhe slrucluraI lype of aII menlaI processes. 'The poel's
verses, lhe narralives of hislorians from lhe earIiesl accessibIe limes, and
lherefore before aII psychoIogicaI refIeclion, depicl, sing, and reveaI Iived
experiences in lheir proper characler. They Iel us see an ob|eclive conlenl, lhen
lhey pass lo our allilude lovards il, lhey unfoId lhe reIalions and leach us lo
dislinguish lhem. Springing as lhey do from a slrong inner Iife (|r|c|cn), lhey
give il expression' ( G.S., VII, 326).
This nev posilion has an inleresling effecl upon DiIlhey's viev of lhe slrucluraI
syslem. Il shouId be remembered lhal lhe approach lo lhis syslem lhrough ils
expressions is nol inlroduced by him mereIy as an addilionaI resource, his
originaI vievs aboul lhe givenness of lhe syslem 'in Iived experience' being Iefl
unchanged. On lhe conlrary, il is inlroduced because he has come lo lhink lhal
Iived experience aIone cannol reveaI lhe syslem adequaleIy. Whal vas
previousIy lo be perceived in experience sans pnrasc is nov lo be perceived in
expressed experience, and our inlerprelalive concepls are lo be formed nol
direclIy from lhe experience ilseIf, bul under lhe guidance of lhe expression.
ul an experience vhich onIy speaks vhen made arlicuIale by an expression
can hardIy be given lhe same credil, vhen il does speak, as an experience vhich
leIIs ils ovn laIe uncommenled. DiIlhey musl reconsider vhal manner of
experience il is, and hov deepIy lhe reaIily of menlaI Iife is reveaIed in il.
His conceplion of Iived experience as lhe undifferenlialed unily, in vhich
sub|ecl and ob|ecl, appearance and reaIily,
-217-
subslance and allribule are nol yel dislinguished, an experience prior lo aII
lhoughl, and Iil up by a cerlilude of ils ovn reaIily vhich is pecuIiar lo ilseIf--
lhis conceplion remains unchanged. In my accounl of il in Chapler Tvo I have
dravn freeIy on MSS. of DiIlhey's very Ialesl years, and lheir doclrine differs
from lhal of lhe |!ccn onIy in being more circumslanliaI and delaiIed. Nor does
DiIlhey deny lhal lhis experience incIudes an avareness (indeed, our primary
avareness) of causaI or 'slrucluraI' conneclion. We experience menlaI evenls as
producing (cruirkcn!) one anolher. ul DiIlhey's anaIysis of lhe menlaI process
inlo acls, or alliludes, and conlenls is sublIy changed. Hilherlo he has spoken as
if lhe lhree kinds of acl or allilude vere cIearIy dislincl in characler, and
irreducibIe lo one anolher or lo anylhing more primilive, and he has defined
lhe slrucluraI syslem in lerms of lhe reIalions belveen lhese lhree lypes of
allilude. Afler lhe change in his vievs aboul inlrospeclion, lhe perspeclive
changes, and lhe unily of lhe mind is made more prominenl lhan before. A
concepl is soughl vhich shaII express lhis unily vilhoul any lrace of abslraclion
or division. Iven lhe concepl of lhe slrucluraI syslem is nov found lo be
inadequale: for lhis concepl is based on lhe separalion of lhe lhree allilude-
lypes, il combines onIy vhal has aIready been separaled. OnIy lhe concepl of
meaning (Bc!cuiung) can express 'lhe unanaIysed Iife-syslem'. DiIlhey nov sees
lhe mind as a vhoIe vhich is presenl as a lolaIily in each of ils manifeslalions: il
is differenlialed simpIy by lhe facl lhal lhis lolaIily can enler inlo differenl
reIalions (Bczugc) vilh differenl eIemenls in ils environmenl. 'Life a vhoIe.
Slruclure: lhe syslem of lhis vhoIe, condilioned by ils reaI reIalions lo lhe
exlernaI vorId. Allilude (Vcrna|iungsucisc) mereIy such a reIalion' ( G.S., VII,
237-8).
The inevilabIe resuIl is lhal DiIlhey's descriplion of menlaI Iife can no Ionger
cIaim lhe precision and universaI vaIidily vhich he cIaimed for il in lhe |!ccn.
Since he no Ionger hopes lo find uIlimale simpIe componenls of mind, bul
mereIy a cIassificalion of lhe infinileIy numerous vays in vhich lhe human
being can sel himseIf in reIalion lo his vorId, lhere is no reason lo suppose lhal
lhere is one cIassificalion vhich is definilive and finaI. Il may be lhal lhere are
severaI, and lhal lhe choice may be Iefl lo lhe personaI oulIook, purpose, and
'psychoIogicaI lacl' of lhe invesligalor. If he is a sludenl of sociaI and hisloricaI
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phenomena, he viII naluraIIy prefer an anaIysis, if one is avaiIabIe, vhich
corresponds vilh some far-reaching dislinclion lhal he has lo drav belveen
modes or aspecls of human aclivily in lhal fieId: he viII Iel his reading of
hislory be refIecled back inlo his psychoIogy. DiIlhey himseIf nov does
somelhing of lhe kind. He seeks lo confirm lhe evidence of Ianguage as lo his
slrucluraI lricholomy by lrealing il as a refIeclion of anolher dislinclion vhich
pIays a Iarge parl in his Ialesl vrilings--lhe dislinclion belveen lhe backvard-
Iooking allilude of mind in vhich ve apprehend lhe meaning of pasl facls, lhe
forvard-Iooking allilude in vhich ve sel ourseIves a lask for lhe fulure, and lhe
allilude in vhich ve sink ourseIves in lhe apprecialion of a presenl vaIue.
These lhree alliludes delermine our oulIook upon hislory in vays vhich are
irreducibIe lo one anolher: lhe forms under vhich lhey respecliveIy viev lhe
Iife-process are represenled by lhe lhree uIlimale calegories of Iife, viz. ncaning,
cn!, and ta|uc: and il is naluraI lhal so far-reaching a lripIicily shouId have ils
rools in lhe slruclure of lhe mind ilseIf.
This nev posilion is veII summed up in a passage vhich seems lo have been
inlended for incIusion in lhe Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i in !cn
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn, and vhose dale is lherefore probabIy 1909. In lhis passage
he says lhal lhe dislinclions he dravs belveen lypes of menlaI allilude are nol
meanl lo leII us lhe inner nalure or underIying causes of vhal lhey describe. Il
is nol a queslion of parceIIing oul lhe mind inlo 'facuIlies', nor of expIaining lhe
veaIlh of menlaI aclivilies in lerms of a fev simpIe eIemenls or processes. He is
nol concerned lo say vhelher such an expIanalion is or is nol possibIe. Whal he
says is lhal, in lhe compIex Iife of lhe mind as ve acluaIIy find il, lhere are
infinileIy various alliludes laken up by lhe mind lovards ils surroundings. On
lhe basis of Iived experience and underslanding ve can roughIy group lhese
inlo a fev main lypes, represenling a fev 'basic alliludes' (Grun!sic||ungcn).
IhiIosophers have aIvays made such groupings, bul have never agreed aboul
lhem in delaiI, and never viII. DiIlhey offers reasons from common experience
in defence of his ovn dislinclion belveen lhe lhree lypes of allilude. Then he
goes on: 'If il is a maller of providing a basis for lhe human sludies--our presenl
lask--one ground here for separaling belveen lhe lypes of ob|eclive
apprehension, feeIing, and voIilion, Iies in lhe facl
-219-
lhal lhe division inlo reaIily, vaIues,
1
and ends runs lhrough lhe vhoIe domain
of mind. Ierhaps represenlalion and expression here reveaI a dislinclion in lhe
experiences acluaIIy Iived lhrough, vhich hovever has nol lhe same cIarily in
inlrospeclion' ( G.S., VII, 326-8). Thal 'perhaps' is a far cry from lhe confidence
of lhe |!ccn.
We may add anolher passage of simiIar dale lo lhe above, vhere DiIlhey
discIaims for his lerminoIogy scienlific precision, bul cIaims for il lhe slalus of
adequale expression. 'IeeIing or viII are onIy concepls vhich are a hinl lo reIive
(nacn|i|!cn) lhe corresponding parl of Iife' ( G.S., VII, 238).
A 'descriplive and anaIylicaI psychoIogy' conslrucled under lhese condilions
may cIaim lo appIy lhe melhod of underslanding lhe parl in lerms of lhe vhoIe,
and il may quile conceivabIy deveIop inlo an accounl of human nalure and
even a lypoIogy of characler and oulIook, such as DiIlhey desires. ul il seems
quile impossibIe lhal il shouId be idenlicaI vilh lhe experimenlaI science of
psychoIogy. DiIlhey finaIIy recognises lhis, and abandons his hope of making
one sludy cover aII our knovIedge of menlaI Iife. The mind, he says, has been
sludied and anaIysed from differenl angIes and by differenl melhods. One
approach is represenled by 'lhe science of psychoIogy in lhe proper sense' (!ic
cigcni|icnc Wisscnscnaji !cr Psucnc|cgic) or 'lhe science of psychoIogy as il has
laken shape loday'. A differenl approach Ieads lo vhal may be caIIed 'conlenl-
psychoIogy' (inna|i|icnc Psucnc|cgic), or 'concrele psychoIogy', or 'anlhropoIogy'.
Ils melhod, lhe 'anlhropoIogicaI melhod', is lhal vhich 'describes and anaIyses
lhe succession and coexislence of concrele menlaI slales': il finds lhem lo be
condilioned parlIy by exlernaI circumslances, and parlIy from vilhin by a
'forvardslriving energy' vhose operalion, vhen more cIoseIy anaIysed, reveaIs
in ilseIf lhe slrucluraI syslem. This is lhe melhod vhich 'slands nearesl lo Iife
ilseIf', and belveen il and lhe 'science of psychoIogy' in lhe proper sense lhere is
'lhe grealesl opposilion exisling in lhis fieId': il 'slands near lo queslions aboul
lhe meaning of Iife and ils vaIue, because il slands so near lo lhe concrele Iife
ilseIf'. y ils anaIyses 'lhe Iived experience is imaginaliveIy eIaboraled
according lo ils inherenl meaning, and lhus lhe reIalion of lhe menlaI process lo
lhe surrounding Iife is
____________________
1
Read Wcricn for Wcricn: G.S., VII, 327, Iine 2 fr. fl.
-220-
porlrayed in ils concrele reaIily': and lhe melhod ends by enabIing us lo
conslrucl a lypoIogy. DiIlhey remarks lhal lhis kind of psychoIogy is, bolh in
melhod and in sub|ecl-maller, cIoseIy aIIied lo poelry ( G.S., VI, 305, VII, 239-
40).
Il is cIear lhal 'lhe science of psychoIogy in lhe proper sense', or 'lhe science of
psychoIogy as il has laken shape loday', vhich slands al lhe opposile exlreme
lo 'anlhropoIogy', has no cIaim lo a fundamenlaI pIace among lhe human
sludies. DiIlhey never raises lhe queslion vhelher il is one of lhe human sludies
al aII: and, since he says lhal a|| lhe approaches lo lhe sludy of mind depend on
lhe lvin processes of Iived experience and underslanding, and since in his finaI
lheory dependence on lhese processes is made lhe dislinguishing mark of lhe
human sludies, ve are Iefl lo infer lhal experimenlaI psychoIogy is one of lhese
sludies. Il receives, hovever, no furlher menlion, and of course lhe 'descriplive
and anaIylicaI psychoIogy' of lhe |!ccn, vhich is lo supporl lhe edifice of lhe
human sludies as veII as of phiIosophy, is nov represenled nol by lhis
'psychoIogy in lhe proper sense', bul by 'anlhropoIogy'.
The onIy doubl remaining is vhelher anlhropoIogy, afler lhe admissions vhich
DiIlhey has nov made aboul il, can be lrusled vilh lhe burden. So Iong as
anlhropoIogy vas heId lo drav ils concepls direcl from experience, vhiIe aII
lhe olher human sludies vere heId lo depend on expressions vhose
inlerprelalion may be uncerlain, anlhropoIogy couId properIy figure as lhe
basis of lhe olher human sludies and lhe guaranlor of lheir concepls: bul, if il
appears lhal anlhropoIogy loo oblains ils concepls from expressions, il can
cIaim no priviIeges over lhe olher sludies, bul musl sland side by side vilh
lhem in a common dependence upon underslanding. There is no one discipIine
among lhe human sludies vhich can guaranlee lhe fundamenlaI concepls of lhe
resl: lhey check and confirm one anolher in a reIalion of 'reciprocaI
dependence'. Al lhe same lime lhe epislemoIogicaI Grun!|cgung of lhe human
sludies musl shifl ils emphasis, Iaying Iess slress in fulure upon lhe descriplive
anaIysis of Iived experience, and much more upon hermeneulics.
ernhard Groelhuysen, vho vas in cIose louch vilh DiIlhey from 1907 unliI lhe
end, leIIs us hov lhese consideralions vere presenl in DiIlhey's mind during
lhese Iasl years ( G.S., VII, vi-viii). NeverlheIess, in spile of lhe posilive
slalemenls of al
-221-
Ieasl one vriler lo lhe conlrary (see A. Slein, Ocr Bcgrijj !cs Vcrsicncns |ci Oi|incu.
p. 79). incrc is sircng cti!cncc inai Oi|incu nctcr !i! jina||u rcncuncc inc |c|icj in
!cscripiitc psucnc|cgu as inc |asis |cin cj inc nunan siu!ics an! cj inc inccru cj
kncu|c!gc. (1) |n a jccincic in inc Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i in !cn
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1910). uncrc Oi|incu !cc|arcs nis a!ncrcncc in ganzcn ic inc
!ccirinc cj inc |in|ciiung. inc |!ccn. an! inc jirsi Siu!ic zur Grun!|cgung !cr
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn cn inis pcini. nc spccijics cnc passagc in unicn inc junciicn cj
psucnc|cgu as inc |asis jcr cpisicnc|cgu is sci jcrin ( G.S.. V||. 160 n.. rcjcrring inicr
a|ia ic G.S.. V||. 12). (2) |n a MS. cj rcugn|u inc sanc !aic. uncsc ccnicnis rc|aic ic inc
jina| rctisicn cj inc Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. an! ccnprisc a uc||-!raun-cui
arcniiccicnic jcr cnc scciicn cj inc Kriiik. is a!!c! a ncic. Susicn in inc nunan
siu!ics. As |asis. aninrcpc|cgu ( G.S.. V||. 369. n. 39). (3) Wncn Oi|incu prcparc!
ic rcuriic Oic |in|i|!ungskraji !cs Oicnicrs ( 1907-8). nc !rcu up a p|an in unicn
siruciurc-psucnc|cgu jcrnc! inc |asis. an! ucrkc! cui inis siruciurc-psucnc|cgu in
ccnsi!cra||c !ciai| jcr inc purpcsc ( G.S.. V|. 310-20). (4) |n a jragncni cniii|c! Oas
Prc||cn !cr |c|igicn ( 1911). nc saus inai inc nisicrica| an! ccnparaiitc siu!u cj
rc|igicn ncc!s an ansucr ic inc ucsiicn. ncu arc nigncr psucnc|cgica| grcun!-
ccnccpis jcr inc ana|usis cj nisicrica| !aia pcssi||c? Tnc ccnicxi sncus inai incsc
nigncr psucnc|cgica| grcun!-ccnccpis arc inc ccnccpis cj inc scccn! cr!cr cj unicn
Oi|incu spcaks in inc |in|ciiung (a|ctc. p. 183 ). an! unicn prcsuppcsc a psucnc|cgu
jrcn unicn incu arc !critc!. inc jragncni. ncrcctcr. cn!s uiin rcnarks a|cui
aninrcpc|cgu an! inc ncinc! cj !cscripiicn an! ana|usis ( G.S.. V|. 302-5). Tnis
jragncni is cnc cj inc tcru |asi inings inai Oi|incu urcic.
|i sccns. incn. inai in inc |asi pcric! cj Oi|incus |ijc inc iuc si!cs cj nis incugni prctc!
ic |c incapa||c cj unijicaiicn |u inc sinp|c jcrnu|a unicn nc na! sc |cng siritcn ic
app|u. Tnc aninrcpc|cgu cr ccnicni-psucnc|cgu cr siruciurc-psucnc|cgu. unicn
rcprcscnis inc |cgacu cj inc rcnaniics an! inc pcsi-Kaniians ic nin. rcnainc! ccnira| in
nis ininking ic inc cn!. Bui inc aiicnpi ic i!cniiju inis uiin inc cxpcrincnia| scicncc cj
psucnc|cgu |rckc !cun. Hc !cci!c! inai inc kin! cj psucnc|cgu unicn inc nunan
siu!ics rcuirc. a psucnc|cgu |asc!
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on lhe underslanding of lhe slrucluraI syslem of menlaI Iife, cannol be
incorporaled in, or deveIoped oul of, psychoIogy as commonIy conceived and
praclised: and he dissocialed his slruclure-psychoIogy so far from science and
broughl il so cIose lo Iileralure, lhal he vas forced lo reconsider ils posilion in
lhe scheme of lhe human sludies, lhough he never formaIIy adopled a nev
posilion on lhal poinl. AII lhis represenls a finaI viclory for SchIeiermacher and
NovaIis over Wundl and MiII. Il means lhal Hume's programme can be carried
oul onIy if lhe sludy of human nalure, of vhich he speaks so highIy in his
Ireface, is carefuIIy dislinguished from experimenlaI psychoIogy, nol idenlified
vilh il as he proposes.
DiIlhey had insisled from lhe beginning lhal one funclion of 'anlhropoIogy' vas
lo deaI syslemalicaIIy vilh lhe same body of experience vilh vhich poels and
reIigious vrilers have deaIl unsyslemalicaIIy. The |ca|psucnc|cg is lo have lhe
human inleresl and lhe penelraling insighl of lhe arlisl, logelher vilh a pover
of precise definilion and a sense of melhod and syslem, vhich are lo be his
ovn. In DiIlhey's Ialesl vrilings, lhe precision of lhe slruclure-psychoIogisl's
descriplions and definilions is Iess emphasised. Il is no Ionger cIaimed lhal his
resuIls can command universaI acceplance: il is enough if lhey are suggeslive
and iIIuminaling. Al lhe same lime his dependence on lhe underslanding of
expressions is broughl inlo lhe open. In shorl, he is increasingIy assimiIaled lo
lhe arlisl.
'No man vas ever yel a greal poel, vilhoul being al lhe same lime a profound
phiIosopher', vrole CoIeridge: and lhe conlexl shovs lhal vhal he means here
by 'phiIosophy' is insighl inlo human nalure. We mighl fairIy express DiIlhey's
viev by reversing CoIeridge's senlence, and saying 'no man vas ever yel a
profound sludenl of phiIosophy or lhe human sludies, vilhoul being al lhe
same lime somelhing of a poel'. DiIlhey 'does in facl speak in one passage of
'lhe poel in me'. Il vas lhe poel, lhe sludenl of Iileralure and music, as veII as
lhe hislorian in DiIlhey, vho found voice in his phiIosophy of lhe human
sludies. We have seen in Chapler Iour hov he beIieves lhal psychoIogy has
much lo leII us aboul lhe poel's mind: bul ve need nol be surprised if, on
Iooking more cIoseIy al his psychoIogy, ve find il lo be very much a poel's
psychoIogy.
This discovery ends lhe argumenl of lhe presenl chapler, and
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poinls us forvard lo lhe nexl. One of DiIlhey's mosl conslanlIy repealed
conlenlions aboul lhe human sludies is his conlenlion lhal 'psychoIogy' musl
sland al lheir basis. He spoiIed his case by lrying lo make lhe 'psychoIogy' in
lhis proposilion mean experimenlaI psychoIogy. y so doing he earned lhe
suspicion, or vorse, of phiIosophers vho shouId have been his aIIies: and in lhe
end he had lo see lhal lhe equalion couId nol be suslained, and lhal lhe
'psychoIogy' reaIIy referred lo in his proposilion vas somelhing more nearIy
akin lo arl lhan lo experimenlaI science. ul lhis opens up a nev sel of
queslions. DiIlhey had many olher lhings lo say aboul lhe human sludies
besides lhis conlenlion aboul 'psychoIogy', and so had his rivaIs and crilics, lhe
Kanlians of lhe aden schooI. His Iong-Iasling conlroversy vilh lhem cenlred
on a quile differenl sel of issues. In lhe nexl chapler ve shaII examine lhese
issues and lhis conlroversy: and in so doing ve shaII have occasion lo nole, in
passing, from a fresh poinl of viev, lhe conlribulion vhich poelry and lhe olher
arls can make lo lhe underslanding of human Iife.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ON lhe queslion of psychoIogy DiIlhey spenl much Iabour for a IargeIy
negalive resuIl. There is anolher conlroversiaI issue in deaIing vilh vhich he
vas more forlunale. This is lhe issue of lhe dislinclive characler of lhe human
sludies and lhe deIimilalion of lhe fronlier belveen lhem and lhe naluraI
sciences. On lhis queslion he became invoIved in a conlroversy vilh
WindeIband and Rickerl vhich has gone on Iong afler his dealh, bul in vhich
he cerlainIy gave as good as he gol.
The firsl bIov vas slruck by WindeIband, vho in 1894 deIivered al Slrassburg a
RecloriaI address enlilIed Gcscnicnic u. Naiuruisscnscnaji. |n inis a!!rcss. uni|c
rcccgnising an! ctcn sircssing inc inpcriancc cj Oi|incus prc||cn. nc ccnicsic! cn
jun!ancnia| pcinis inc sc|uiicn a!un|raic! in inc |in|ciiung.
Tnc gcncra| |incs cj Win!c||an!s pni|cscpnu natc |ccn !cscri|c! in Cnapicr Tnrcc.
Tnc |usincss cj pni|cscpnu. nc ininks. is ic jin! inc ncaning (Bc!cuiung. Sinn) cj
nunan |ijc. an! nc jin!s ii in inc unitcrsa||u ta|i! ta|uc-ncrns cj purc rcascn. Tncsc
ncrns cr ta|ucs jin! cn|c!incni in aciua| |ijc inrcugn inc aciitiiics cj ncn in scicncc.
ncra|iiu. an! ari. Tnc prcccss cj incir aciua|isaiicn is nisicru. an! ii is siu!ic! in a
grcup cj cnuirics unicn nau |c ca||c! inc nisicrica| scicnccs (
Gcscnicnisuisscnscnajicn). |cr taricus rcascns inc siu!u cj inc |cgica| prcsuppcsiiicns
cj kncu|c!gc. unicn Kani inauguraic! |u nis ana|usis cj inc prcsuppcsiiicns cj naiura|
scicncc. nas nctcr |ccn cxicn!c! ic inc|u!c incsc cj inc nisicrica| scicnccs. |ui.
acccr!ing ic Win!c||an!. ii is ncu iinc inai inis sicp sncu|! |c iakcn.
Sc jar nc agrccs uiin Oi|incu. |ui inc incsis cj Gcscnicnic u. Naiuruisscnscnaji is inai
inc jun!ancnia| !isiinciicn in icrns cj unicn inc prc||cn is usua||u sccn. tiz. inai
|ciuccn Naiuruisscnscnajicn an! Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. is urcng|u !raun. Tnc
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basis of lhis dislinclion is maleriaI, i.e. lhe lvo groups of sludies are defined in
lerms of lhe sub|ecl-maller deaIl vilh: lhe Naiuruisscnscnajicn sludy lhe vorId
of maller, reveaIed in ouler perceplion, vhiIe lhe Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn sludy lhe
vorId of mind, vhich is knovn lo us by inner perceplion and lhrough
psychoIogy. Nov jirsi of aII, as a dulifuI Kanlian, WindeIband doubls lhe
exislence or al any rale lhe ob|eclivily of inner perceplion: bul he does nol slay
lo argue lhis poinl. Ncxi, he urges lhal lhe hisloricaI sludies do nol deaI
excIusiveIy vilh menlaI facls, bul aIso and lo a Iarge exlenl vilh lhe physicaI
condilions under vhich human aclion lakes pIace, and lhe physicaI medium in
vhich il is carried oul: lhus, a ballIe is cerlainIy maleriaI for hislory, bul il is
aIso a very compIicaled physicaI and chemicaI process. Nov, if lhe hisloricaI
sludies share lheir sub|ecl-maller in parl vilh lhe naluraI sciences, lhe
dislinclion belveen lhem cannol be based on a difference of sub|eclmaller.
Tnir!|u, lhe posilion of psychoIogy under lhe usuaI arrangemenl is unnaluraI:
for aIlhough il is caIIed a Gcisicsuisscnscnaji because ils sub|ecl-maller is mind,
yel ils melhod is lhal of lhe naluraI sciences, and aIien lo lhe hisloricaI sludies.
AccordingIy, WindeIband proposes a nev division vhich is formaI, i.e. based
on differences of melhod. There are lvo vays, he says, in vhich lhe mind can
deaI vilh any sub|ecl-maller, viz. by generaIising and Iaying dovn Iavs, or by
describing individuaI facls: lhe firsl WindeIband caIIs lhe nomolhelic melhod,
and lhe second he caIIs idiographic, and he defines naluraI science as enquiry
on ncncinciic Iines, hisloricaI science as enquiry on i!icgrapnic Iines. The
resuIling Iine of division culs across any Iine lhal couId possibIy be dravn
according lo sub|ecl-maller, because, as WindeIband says, lhe same ob|ecl can
be regarded from eilher of lhe lvo melhodoIogicaI slandpoinls. Thus, a
Ianguage is sludied nomolhelicaIIy vhen ve examine ils principIes and Iay
dovn Iavs vhich govern ils behaviour and deveIopmenl: bul il is sludied
idiographicaIIy vhen ve compare and conlrasl il vilh olher Ianguages, and
lake il as one of lhe various individuaI forms in vhich lhe Iinguislic capacily of
mankind has fuIfiIIed ilseIf. SimiIarIy facls in aslronomy, or physioIogy, or
geoIogy can be sludied from eilher poinl of viev. WindeIband is nol al aII
perlurbed by lhis. He simpIy redefines nalure and hislory so as lo make lhe
dislinclion belveen lhem accord vilh
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lhal belveen lhe naluraI and lhe hisloricaI sciences. 'Nalure' is defined as
vhalever can be sludied nomolhelicaIIy, and 'hislory' as vhalever can be
sludied idiographicaIIy: and so ve find lhal nalure and hislory are coexlensive,
and lhal every facl is in one aspecl maleriaI for naluraI science, and in anolher
aspecl maleriaI for hislory. ul lhe hisloricaI sludies as defined by lhis crilerion
are Iess exlensive lhan lhe oId Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. jcr ii iurns cui inai inc ncinc!
cj psucnc|cgu is a|icgcincr ncncinciic. an! sc. |u inc ncu icsi. psucnc|cgu is a|icgcincr
a naiura| scicncc.
Tnc ain cj nisicru. incn. is nci ic cxp|ain. |ui ic pcrirau. an! ncrc ii is a||ic! uiin ari
an! |iicraiurc in cppcsiiicn ic naiura| scicncc. (1) Tnc naiura| scicniisi nas nc inicrcsi
in in!iti!ua| inings. Tnc uniis cj nis ucr|!. inc aicns. arc ncrc sna!cus cj in!iti!ua|s.
incu natc ic |c incrc in cr!cr ic |c inc icrns cj inc rc|aiicns unicn nc jcrnu|aics. |ui
incu arc inc ncsi a|siraci kin! cj uniis inai can |c ccnccitc!. ncncgcnccus an!
uiincui in!iti!ua| cnaracicr. cc|cur|css an! scun!|css. uiincui anu snack cj inc
scnsi||c ua|iiics. Mctcncni an! !ctc|cpncni as sucn !c nci inicrcsi inc scicniisi
ciincr. |ui cn|u inc |aus unicn nc can a|siraci jrcn incn. Scicncc sccks nci inc
cnangcju| as sucn. |ui inc cnangc|css jcrn cj cnangc. Hisicru. cn inc cincr nan!. |aus
a|| iis cnpnasis cn inc in!iti!ua|. inc uniuc. (2) Bui inis !ijjcrcncc is rcinjcrcc! |u
ancincr. Scicncc sccks inc uncnanging |au |ccausc iis rca| inicrcsi is in ncccssaru
cxisicncc. an! |au is inc jcrn cj ncccssiiu. uncrcas nisicru is inicrcsic! in inings jrcn
inc sian!pcini cj incir ta|uc. an! a|| ta|uc rcsi!cs in in!iti!ua|iiu. Wnai is ii inai is sc
ccric a|cui inc i!ca cj inc Ocppc|gangcr? |i is inc cni|| cj jin!ing inai | an nci uniuc.
jcr. in |csing inai uniucncss. | sccn a|sc ic |c rc||c! cj ncra| ucrin an! cj nu tcru
pcrscna|iiu. Hcncc icc inc insi!icus cunicisn cj Mcpnisicpnc|cs sinp|c rcnark. sic isi
!ic crsic nicni. Tnc Cnrisiian pni|cscpnu cj nisicru nas uc|| cn|c!ic! inis iruin. |u
naking inc iuc jacicrs cn unicn inc unc|c ncaning cj nunan |ijc !cpcn!s. tiz. inc |a||
an! inc |c!cnpiicn. inic ctcnis unicn natc cccurrc! cncc an! cannci rccur. (3) |i is
iruc. Win!c||an! a!niis in ccnc|usicn. inai nisicru cannci in praciicc rc!ucc iisc|j ic a
ga||cru cj !isccnnccic! pcriraiis. ccnncciicns natc ic |c iracc!. causcs assignc!. inc
ucrking cj |aus na!c tisi||c. Bui ctcn ncrc. jcr sucn gcncra|
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knovIedge as hislory requires, lhere is no need lo appeaI lo psychoIogy.
Hislory gol on very veII in aII lhe cenluries before psychoIogy began, and viII
make ils vay hereafler as before, 'by lhe naluraI knovIedge of man, by lacl and
lhe inluilion of genius' (cp. cii.).
Though DiIlhey is nol named in WindeIband's Ieclure, il is essenliaIIy his
posilion vhich is lhere allacked. His repIy foIIoved al once, in 1895, in an essay
vhich vas al firsl enlilIed "U|cr tcrg|cicncn!c Psucnc|cgic". The essay begins by
reasserling DiIlhey's posilion againsl WindeIband, and goes on lo discuss in
delaiI lhe characlerislic aims and melhods of lhe human sludies. The originaI
lilIe, U|cr tcrg|cicncn!c Pscnc|cgic. is nis|ca!ing. |i is ncani ic |ink inc cssau uiin inc
|!ccn. unicn na! appcarc! in inc prccc!ing ucar. an! unicn cn!c! uiin a ca|| jcr a
ccnparaiitc psucnc|cgu. cr siu!u cj psucnc|cgica| iupcs. |ui in jaci inc cssau !ca|s uiin
inc ccnparaiitc ncinc! an! iupc|cgu as incu appcar ctcr inc unc|c jic|! cj inc nunan
siu!ics. |csi!cs inc|u!ing a scciicn cn inc ta|uc cj inc aris as a tcnic|c cj
un!crsian!ing. Oi|incu |aicr cnangc! inc iii|c ic Bciiragc zun Siu!iun !cr
|n!iti!ua|iiai. |ui unai nc pu||isnc! un!cr inai iii|c uas nci inc unc|c cj inc cssau. |n
inc Gcsannc|ic Scnrijicn inc ccnp|cic icxi is prinic! uiin |cin iii|cs.
Oi|incu nakcs c|car ai inc cuisci inai unai inicrcsis nin is nci nisicru in pariicu|ar.
|ui inc nunan siu!ics. inc|u!ing psucnc|cgu. an! inai psucnc|cgu !ca|s uiin iis
su|jcci-naiicr |cin ncncinciica||u an! i!icgrapnica||u ( G.S.. V. 241-2). Tncn nc
|auncncs cui ai cncc inic nis ccunicr-aiiack cn Win!c||an!.
|irsi cj a|| nc rcpcais inai uc !c c|iain a rca| kncu|c!gc cj inc sc|j jrcn inncr
cxpcricncc. Hc !cscri|cs ai |cngin ncu inc ccnscicusncss cj sc|j an! nci-sc|j ariscs. an!
ncu inc |ijc cj inc sc|j ccncs ic |c cxp|crc! |u pccis. auic|icgrapncrs. an! pni|cscpncrs (
G.S.. V. 242-8). Hating inus sncun inai uc natc a ucrka||c kncu|c!gc cj cur cun
nin!s. nc appca|s ic a sinp|c inspcciicn cj inc nunan siu!ics ic sncu inai inc siu!u cj
nin! is inc !isiinguisning cnaracicrisiic cj inis grcup cj !iscip|incs. Wncrctcr incrc is
ccgniiitc aciitiiu. uncrctcr ta|ucs arc apprcciaic! cr cn!s pursuc!. uncrctcr in inc
ni!si cj inc prcccss cj naiurc a jrcc agcni appcars. incrc is naiicr jcr inc
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. an! incu nci cn|u siu!u inc prcccsscs an! prc!ucis cj ncnia|
|ijc. |ui su|scrtc ii icc in a|| iis |rancncs. |u |auing
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dovn precepls as veII as describing and expIaining facls. Il is lrue, of course, as
WindeIband says, lhal lhey aIso deaI vilh many physicaI facls: bul lhey deaI
vilh lhem onIy in so far as lhey are reIaled lo an inner Iife, having vaIue for a
sub|ecl or condilioning lhe execulion of his purposes ( G.S., V, 250-3).
The formaI or melhodoIogicaI differenlia of lhe human sludies is correIalive
vilh lhis. Il Iies parlIy in lhe cuIlivalion of inner experience and lhe arl of
refIeclion on il, and parlIy in lhe underslanding of olher minds. These olher
minds beIong lo lhe same exlernaI vorId vilh vhich lhe naluraI sciences aIso
are concerned. They are knovn lo us lhrough lheir expressions, vhich are
ob|ecls of sense-perceplion. ul lhe facl is lhal some ob|ecls of sense can be
made inleIIigibIe in lerms of physicaI Iavs aIone, i.e. Iavs vhich correIale
sense-dala vilh olher sensedala, vhiIe olhers, viz. organisms, have
characlerislics vhich ve can onIy make inleIIigibIe by a 'lransference' inlo lhem
of an inner Iife and a slrucluraI syslem more or Iess Iike our ovn. Where lhe
inner Iife impuled lo lhe ob|ecl is aIlogelher Iike our ovn, ve enler lhe sphere
of hislory and lhe human sludies. Thus lhe naluraI sciences and lhe human
sludies bolh deaI vilh aspecls of lhe exlernaI vorId, bul lhey deaI vilh
differenl aspecls of il. The human sludies deaI vilh lhal in lhe exlernaI vorId
vhich demands lo be underslood in lerms of an inner Iife ( G.S., V, 248-51, 253-
5).
This dislinclion belveen Naiuruisscnscnajicn and Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn cannol be
correIaled vilh lhal belveen nomolhelic and idiographic melhods, because
bolh melhods are used in bolh groups of sludies. There is an idiographic
eIemenl in geography and aslronomy, naluraI hislory, and comparalive
psychoIogy, as veII as a search for Iavs: on lhe olher hand, economics,
aeslhelics, phiIoIogy, and lhe olher Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn have aII a nomolhelic
aspecl. Iven hisloriography, in lhe hands of a IoIybius or a MachiaveIIi, is in a
degree nomolhelic,
1
since il
____________________
1
WindeIband admilled, years aflervards, lhal il vouId be vrong lo say lhal
lhe naluraI sciences are excIusiveIy nomolhelic or lhe hisloricaI sludies
excIusiveIy idiographic. Iach group has eIemenls of bolh melhods. ul in
naluraI science lhe discovery of limeIessIy vaIid Iavs is lhe finaI aim, and aII
descriplion of parlicuIars is a mere slage on lhe road lo il: vhiIe for lhe
hisloricaI sludies lhe significance of a lhing Iies in ils uniqueness, and generaI
ideas, or lhe Iavs reveaIed by comparalive sludy, are used onIy as an aid lo
anaIysis and descriplion ( "The IrincipIes of Logic", in lhe |ncuc|cpc!ia
-229
reveaIs in ils facls lhe vorking of generaI Iavs ( G.S., V, 255-8). Therefore, again,
lhere vouId be no reason lo rank psychoIogy as a naluraI science, even if il
vere vhoIIy nomolhelic, as WindeIband aIIeges: bul in facl il is nol, for lhere is
a comparalive psychoIogy, vhose ob|ecl of sludy is human individuaIily and
lhe reIalive vaIues of differenl human lypes ( G.S., V, 255-6).
DiIlhey goes on lo describe lhe melhodoIogicaI differences belveen lhe naluraI
sciences and lhe human sludies as lhey reaIIy are. The lvo groups of sludies
have many poinls of agreemenl as veII as of difference. (a) olh depend on
experience iIIuminaled by lhe operalions of 'siIenl lhoughl', and lhese
operalions are lhe same in aII spheres of experience. (|) The IogicaI processes of
|udgmenl and inference are aIvays lhe same. So are lhe 'formaI calegories',
lhough, as ve have seen in earIier chaplers, lhe 'reaI calegories' are differenl in
lhe lvo spheres. (c) IxperimenlaI and comparalive melhods are used in bolh,
lhough lhe scope for experimenl in lhe human sludies is narrover, and lhal for
lhe comparalive melhod correspondingIy vider. (!) IecuIiar lo lhe human
sludies, and common lo lhem aII, is lhe lechnique of hermeneulics and source-
crilicism. (c) ul lhe grealesl difference of aII is due lo lhe facl lhal ve do nol
knov lhe inner nalure of physicaI lhings and processes, and have lo read causaI
order inlo lhem by hypolhesis, vhereas in lhe vorId of mind ve knov direclIy
vhal ve are deaIing vilh. (j) The naluraI sciences and lhe human sludies aIso
have differenl vays of syslemalising lheir dala. NaluraI science syslemalises by
moving lovards lhe abslracl: il seeks lhe kind of reIalion vhich can be pul inlo
equalionaI form. The human sludies syslemalise by seeing lhe parlicuIar facl
more and more fuIIy in ils conlexl among olher facls slrucluraIIy reIaled lo il.
We do anaIyse and abslracl, of course, vhen ve dislinguish lhe cuIluraI
syslems and lhe sociaI organisalions as recurrenl fealures
____________________
of lhe IhiIosophicaI Sciences, IngI. v, voI. 1, p. 48). DiIlhey vouId repIy lhal,
in naluraI science, lhe idiographic and lhe nomolhelic inleresl are coordinale
and inseparabIe. 'The naluraI lask of lhe scienlisl is nol lhe apprehension of
Iavs, bul ralher (1) he musl express a facl of a cerlain Iimiled characler, e.g.
lhe palh of Mars, (2) lhis lask Ieads him on lo fuIfiI il lhrough anaIysis, by
grasping lhe reguIarily of lhe homogeneous, (3) finaIIy he musl oblain a
synlhesis' ( G.S., VII, 275). The human sludies share lhis poinl of viev, bul
have aIso a pecuIiar inleresl in lhe individuaI for his ovn sake, on accounl of
his inlrinsic vaIue, as viII appear shorlIy.
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of lhe hisloricaI and sociaI vorId. ul lhen ve lry lo accounl for lhese by
shoving hov lhey arise from lhe slrucluraI syslem of lhe mind, in response lo
various sels of circumslances ( G.S.. V, 259-66, and cf. 273).
A furlher pecuIiarily of lhe human sludies is lhal ve lake an inleresl in lhe
individuaI for his ovn sake, |usl as he is, aparl from aII lhoughl of his reIalion
lo Iavs and delermining condilions, and vilhoul any allempl lo expIain him al
aII. There is in lhe human sludies an eIemenl of pure descriplion and
apprecialion, a 'Ioving underslanding (Vcrsian!nis) of lhe personaI, a reIiving of
lhe inexhauslibIe lolaIilies', vhich is seen al ils simpIesl in biography ( G.S.. V,
266-7). Il is onIy lhe human individuaI vho has lhis inherenl vaIue, because he
aIone has a slrucluraI syslem vhich ve can reIive. 'If I nolice hov healed, Iiquid
Iead, dropping inlo coId valer, lakes on various marveIIous forms, I can have in
lhese forms as such onIy a passing inleresl: lhe scienlisl's allenlion faslens
excIusiveIy upon lhe Iavs delermining lhese forms. And if, for lhe Arab, in a
Iiving reIalion, his horse achieves an independenl vaIue as an individuaIily, or
for lhe hunler his hound, yel from lhe slandpoinl or naluraI science every
individuaI animaI is inleresling onIy in respecl of ils reIalion lo lhe species' (
G.S.. V, 272).
ecause lhe vaIue of lhe individuaI lhus depends on his possession of an inner
Iife and a slrucluraI syslem Iike our ovn, lhe underslanding of vhal he is
carries vilh il an apprecialion of his vorlh. 'Thal vhich is shovs ilseIf lo be
inseparabIe from vhal il is vorlh and vhal il oughl lo be. So lo lhe facls of Iife
ils norms are allached' ( G.S.. V, 267). The essenliaI characlerislics, in facl, vhich
conslilule lhe lype, are aIso ils norm of vaIue: and in lhe concepl of lhe ncrna|
lhe human sludies possess a concepl vhose use is bolh descriplive and
evaIualive. Irom lhis reIalion belveen facl and vaIue in lhe normaI ve can
concIude lo a furlher characlerislic of lhe human sludies. 'The lrulhs musl nol
be separaled from lhe ideaI concepls and lhe norms. Ior lhis division inlo lvo
cIasses of slalemenls, lhe one conlaining vhal is and lhe olher saying vhal
oughl lo be, robs knovIedge of ils fruilfuIness, and lhe ideaIs and norms of
lheir coherence and lheir firm basis. Therefore ve have lo discover lhe reguIar
process vhereby, from lhe essenliaI fealures of lhe greal aclivilies of human
Iife, lheir norms emerge.' This hoIds
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good over lhe vhoIe fieId of lhe human sludies. 'Iven hislory viII aIvays
combine descriplion, causaI knovIedge, and |udgmenl: onIy nol excIusiveIy
moraI |udgmenl, bul lhal vhich proceeds from lhe vaIue-delerminalions and
norms of aII lhe aclivilies of human Iife. . . . Iudgmenl upon vhal has happened
is, in and for ilseIf, inseparabIe from lhe descriplion of il' ( G.S.. V, 267-8).
Irom lhis pecuIiar reIalion belveen lhe generaI lype and lhe individuaI form,
coinciding vilh lhe reIalion belveen lhe generaI norm and ils individuaI
embodimenl, arise many of lhe keenesl conlroversies in lhe human sludies.
'Throughoul lhese sludies men quarreI over lhe exlenl lo vhich homogeneily,
uniformily, Iavs delermine lhe parlicuIar, and al vhal poinls lhe posilive, lhe
hisloricaI, lhe singuIar appears. In parlicuIar poIilicaI economy, |urisprudence,
and poIilicaI lheory are fiIIed vilh passionale slrife on lhis poinl.' The soIulion
of lhe probIem Iies in syslemalic sludy of lhe individuaI, lo be pursued
according lo lhe comparalive melhod, reinforced by anaIogy and
generaIisalion. This melhod is aIready in use in lhe human sludies. 'Il look
shape in phiIoIogy, vas lhen lransferred lo mylhoIogy, and il foIIovs from
vhal has been said lhal every syslemalic human sludy, in lhe course of ils
deveIopmenl, musl arrive al comparalive melhods' ( G.S.. V, 268-9).
DiIlhey proceeds lo Iay dovn lhree principIes vhich govern aII underslanding
of lhe individuaI. (1) There are uniformilies of iupc. Cerlain combinalions of
parls or funclions conslanlIy recur. They are so reIaled lhal from lhe presence of
one eIemenl in such a combinalion ve can infer lhe presence of aII lhe resl. In
lhe higher organic vorId and in lhe vorId of mind lhe lype becomes rich and
compIex, and lhe inferences dravn from il can be far-reaching, as e.g. vhen
Cuvier reslores an exlincl species from fossiI fragmenls, or WoIf and Niebuhr
'reslore' ancienl hisloricaI processes from a fragmenlary and lendenlious
lradilion. (2) In lhe organic and hisloricaI vorIds, lhe various forms of Iife can
be graded according lo lhe compIexily of lheir parls and funclions: and since
compIexily of slruclure goes hand in hand vilh inherenl vaIue (Ic|cnsucri), lhe
scaIe of increasingIy compIex arlicuIalion is aIso a scaIe of increasingIy 'high' or
vaIuabIe !ctc|cpncni. (3) AII differences of lype or of deveIopmenl correspond
lo and depend upon differences of cntircnncni:
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physicaI environmenl for organisms, physicaI and sociaI or hisloricaI
environmenl for human beings and inslilulions. AII biography and aII
hisloriography have lo lake accounl of lhis ( G.S.. V, 269-71).
Turning nov lo consider lhe vays in vhich an underslanding of individuaIs is
reached, ve find al once a nolabIe pecuIiarily of lhe human sludies. NaluraI
science forms ils concepls direclIy by abslraclion from 'lhe sensuous appearance
of vuIgar experience': bul lhe passage from our common experience of mind lo
lhe concepls of lhe human sludies is medialed by a lhird faclor, lhe expression
of mind in lhe arls. The arlisl's vork is a heIp lovards knovIedge in lvo vays.
Iirsl, by virlue of lhe breadlh of insighl and lhe pover of crealive imaginalion
vhich lhe arlisl possesses, he videns our horizon, and carries us vilh him inlo
a vorId aparl from, and richer and fuIIer lhan, our everyday experience. He sels
us free from our Iimilalions. ul he does more lhan lhis. He sharpens our eye
for lypes. We sav in Chapler Iour, and again a fev paragraphs back, hov in
our knovIedge of human beings and lheir aclivilies ve cannol apprehend facl
and process vilhoul aIso discerning lhe lype and lhe norm. The eye for lypes
(!as iupiscnc Scncn) is presenl in some degree in aII of us: as DiIlhey says, 've
may pronounce lhal lhe apprehension of human Iife by a deveIoped
consciousness aIvays vas and couId nol bul be lypicaI'. ul lhe arlisl
slrenglhens lhis capacily in us. HimseIf highIy gifled vilh lhe pover of seeing
lhe lype in lhe individuaI, he gives expression lo il in images so cIear lhal lhey
are lo ordinary man an acluaI invilalion lo vision (An|ciiung zu scncn), and
famiIiarily vilh his vork heighlens lhis pover in us ( G.S.. V, 276-80).
Wilhoul lhis infIuence, even our common experience of Iife vouId be poorer
lhan il is. 'None of us vouId possess more lhan a meagre parl of our presenl
underslanding of human condilions, if ve had nol become used lo seeing
lhrough lhe poel's eyes, and behoIding HamIels and Grelchens, Richards and
CordeIias, Marquis Iosas and IhiIips in lhe men around us.' Arl lhus reacls
upon lhal very experience vhich is ils onIy source and maleriaI. ul il aIso
affecls lhe human sludies, because lhe formalion of concepls in lhem depends
on lhe pover of imaginalive reconslruclion and lhe eye for lypes, and lhe
convincing exposilion of lhese concepls aIso requires Iilerary
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skiII. DiIlhey finds lhis especiaIIy lrue of hislory. 'Ieaks of hisloriographicaI
achievemenl are aIvays in facl condilioned by simiIar peaks in poelry. Greal
hislorians nol seIdom began vilh poelic allempls, and oulslanding poels have
oflen given lhe hisloricaI arl a poverfuI impelus.' On lhe olher hand, il is no
Iess lrue lhal lhe arlisl, especiaIIy lhe poel, is inlimaleIy affecled by lhe ideas
and lhe prevaiIing conlroversies of his lime.
Arl and lhe human sludies, in facl, are reciprocaIIy dependenl, and bolh
logelher conslilule a vorId of cuIluraI achievemenl inlo vhich ve are born, and
by vhich aII our ovn experience of Iife is unconsciousIy governed. 'Iainlers
laughl us lo read in lhe counlenances of men and lo inlerprel allilude and
demeanour. Ioels are our organs for lhe underslanding of men, and lhey
infIuence lhe vay in vhich ve Iead our Iives in Iove, in marriage, and vilh
friends. Hislorians give us an underslanding of lhe hisloricaI vorId, in vhich
everyone by his aclivilies musl inlervene vilh some degree of underslanding.'
ul arl is earIier in lime lhan lhe human sludies, and 'lhe vhoIe individualion
of lhe vorId of man and hislory comes firsl of aII lo be underslood in poelry,
Iong before science seeks lo knov il'. And vhen science does begin, il can never
lransform inlo knovIedge lhe vhoIe of vhal poelic underslanding reveaIs.
Therefore, lhough arl has lhe funclion of preparing lhe vay for lhe human
sludies, il has aIso an independenl and inlrinsic vaIue. The human sludies give
us knovIedge aboul Iife, bul arl is our organ for lhe underslanding of il: and ve
undersland more lhan ve knov ( G.S.. V, 273-6, 280).
DiIlhey lhen shovs hov lhe hislory of poelry reveaIs a graduaI advance in lhe
underslanding and porlrayaI of individuaIily. The firsl slage is represenled by
Homer, vho aIready makes il his business lo undersland Iife in lerms of ilseIf
ralher lhan in lheoIogicaI lerms. He sees hov men's aclions and deslinies are
delermined in lhe Iasl resorl nol by lhe gods, bul by lheir ovn passions and
characlers: and he porlrays various oulslanding iupcs. Homer's characlers,
hovever, are aII of one piece, and do nol grov The nexl slage comes vilh
Shakespeare, vho underslands lhe impuIse of lhe human mind lovards lhe fuII
!ctc|cpncni of ils povers, and sees hov lhis can somelimes Iead lo inner
confIicl and disruplion. His lypes are aclive and dynamic. The lhird slage is
represenled by SchiIIer, vho grasps lhe infIuence
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upon lhis inner deveIopmenl of lhe cuicr circunsianccs in vhich lhe hero slands,
and sees him as fundamenlaIIy a hisloricaI phenomenon. His Wa||cnsicin
inlerprels ils hero vilh an insighl so profound lhal hislory can onIy accepl and
confirm il. The same oulIook is nov universaIIy prevaIenl in poelry and lhe
noveI ( G.S.. V, 283-302).
DiIlhey seems lo have chosen lhese lhree slages lo correspond vilh his lhree
principIes for lhe underslanding of individuaIily, viz. lype, deveIopmenl, and
environmenl. ul his lhird slage has lhis furlher characlerislic, lhal il shovs
poelry nov making a direcl conlribulion lo hislory, and so forms an easy
lransilion lo a discussion of lhe sludy of individuaIily as il is conducled in lhe
human sludies. He poinls oul, in facl, lhal SchiIIer's conlemporary, Goelhe, vho
shared his underslanding of individuaIily from lhe poelic side, vas aIso deepIy
invoIved in lhose bioIogicaI, anlhropoIogicaI, and hisloricaI enquiries vhich
uIlimaleIy Ied lo lhe lriumph of lhe comparalive melhod in lhe human sludies (
G.S.. V, 302-3).
y lhe 'comparalive melhod', says DiIlhey, is meanl lhal mode of enquiry
vhich lries, nol lo find reguIarilies and homogeneilies in ils maleriaI, or lo
formuIale Iavs, bul lo observe individuaI varialions, lo dislinguish cIasses and
lypes, and lo find lhe causes of differenlialion. This melhod is appIied in
geography, bolany, bioIogy, and aII lhe sludies concerned vilh man. The Greek
mind, vilh ils aeslhelic allilude lo lhe vorId and ils keen sense of form, vas
pecuIiarIy adapled lo make progress here, and lhe besl services rendered by
Greek science come moslIy under lhis head. An oulslanding inslance of il can
be seen in lhe bioIogicaI vork of ArislolIe, and lhe same procedure, lransferred
lo lhe sludy of mind, gave rise aIso lo his briIIianl comparalive psychoIogy and
lo his comparalive sludy of poIilicaI inslilulions ( G.S.. V, 303-7).
Modern science, on lhe olher hand, sel ilseIf from lhe firsl lo discover universaI
Iavs, and so buiIl up a greal syslem of knovIedge in mechanics and aslronomy,
physics, and chemislry. The lransference of lhis melhod lo lhe human sludies
Ied lo a search for homogeneous eIemenls, universaI Iavs, and absoIule norms
or 'naluraI principIes' in every sphere of human Iife, in abslraclion from and lo
lhe negIecl of lhe individuaI characler of men and peopIes, and lhe
circumslances by vhich lheir aclivily is
-235-
informed. Thus arose vhal DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'naluraI syslem of lhe human
sludies'. This 'naluraI syslem' may be seen al ils besl, forlified by kindred
doclrines derived from lhe ancienl Sloics, and Iil up by a deep underslanding of
lhe poelic and symboIic casl of lhe primilive mind, in Vico's Scicnza Nucta (
G.S.. V, 307-8).
Inleresl in individuaIily began lo relurn in lhe eighleenlh cenlury, firsl of aII in
bolany, bioIogy, and physioIogy. DiIlhey lraces lhe deveIopmenl of lhese
sciences from Linnaeus, vho sel lhem on lhe righl road by discovering a lruIy
scienlific principIe of cIassificalion, lhrough lhe vork of uffon and Cuvier, lo
Darvin. He ends by saying lhal lhe comparalive melhod in lhe human sludies
has hilherlo consisled very IargeIy of a lransference lo lhem of concepls
originaIIy vorked oul in bioIogy: and lhus lhe human sludies, since lhe
eighleenlh cenlury, have passed lhrough lhe same slages of deveIopmenl as lhe
sciences of organic nalure. ul ideas so lransferred may have disadvanlageous
as veII as usefuI consequences: and, in any case, lhey need lo be ampIified by
ideas and melhods adapled lo lhe specific nalure of menlaI Iife and deveIoped
in lhe acluaI sludy of il ( G.S.. V, 309-16).
Al lhis poinl, vhen DiIlhey shouId obviousIy proceed lo specify lhese nev
ideas and melhods, lhe essay provokingIy breaks off shorl: bul lhe lheme is
laken up five years Ialer in Oic |nisicnung !cr Hcrncncuiik ( 1900). DiIlhey
poinls oul firsl of aII lhal lhe characler of lhe individuaI can be apprehended
onIy by comparison and conlrasl vilh olhers: and lhis, again, impIies
acquainlance vilh a number of peopIe, vhich can onIy be oblained lhrough lhe
underslanding of lhe expressions in vhich lhey reveaI lhemseIves. Such
underslanding allains lhe highesl degree of ob|eclivily vhere ils dala are
Iilerary monumenls, and lhe arl of inlerpreling Iilerary sources, vhich is
embodied in lhe science of phiIoIogy, has grovn up lhrough a Iong hislory, no
Iess graduaIIy and painfuIIy lhan lhe arl of inlerrogaling nalure by experimenl.
Oul of lhe genius of greal inlerprelers came ruIes of procedure: lhe confIicl of
such ruIes gave rise lo a hermeneulic science, vhich is 'lhe lechnoIogy of lhe
exposilion of vrillen records': and lhis in lurn has Ied back lo an anaIysis of lhe
process of underslanding in generaI, vhich has finaIIy merged vilh lhe lheory
of knovIedge as a vhoIe ( G.S.. V, 317-20).
-236-
DiIlhey shovs hov lhe process began in Greece vilh lhe deveIopmenl of
rheloric, vhich Iaid dovn lhe fundamenlaI ruIes of Iilerary composilion. The
firsl syslemalic lrealmenl of lhe sub|ecl vas given by ArislolIe, vho in lhe
|ncicrica a! A|cxan!run anaIyses a Iilerary vhoIe very lhoroughIy inlo ils parls,
and in lhe Pcciics deduces lhe ouler form of lhe vork from ils inner form, and
lhis in lurn from lhe essence and finaI aim of poelry as such. Then came lhe
AIexandrian schoIars, parlIy infIuenced by ArislolIe, and by lhem aII lhe
essenliaI melhods of lexluaI crilicism, higher crilicism, and source-crilicism
vere discovered and praclised. The Iergamene schooI, afler lhe Sloic Crales,
inlroduced lhe praclice of aIIegoricaI inlerprelalion as a means of making crude
or anliqualed reIigious ideas and vrilings paIalabIe lo a Ialer generalion. The
confIicl belveen lhe AIexandrian and Iergamene schooIs on lhis poinl vas
conlinued among lhe Chrislian schoIars, lo vhom some use of aIIegory vas
necessary as a veapon againsl lhe Ievs, vhiIe loo much of il vas dangerous as
Ieading lo Gnoslicism: so ve find Iuslin, Irenaeus, TerluIIian, and lhe
AIexandrian Ialhers appeaIing lo aIIegory and Iaying dovn ruIes for ils use,
vhiIe lhe Anliochene schooI cIung lo lhe rigour of grammalicaI and hisloricaI
inlerprelalion ( G.S.. V, 321-3).
The rebirlh of cIassicaI schoIarship al lhe Renaissance confronled sludenls vilh
lhe unprecedenled lask of reconslrucling a vanished civiIisalion vilh lhe soIe
aid of a fev ruins and lhe vrillen sources, and lhe resuIl vas lhe appearance of
a number of essays !c inicrprciaiicnc. ul sliII lhe mosl imporlanl deveIopmenls
vere in lhe reIigious fieId. Iroleslanlism, vhich made Scriplure ils one courl of
appeaI in reIigious mallers, necessariIy heId lhal Scriplure is inlrinsicaIIy
inleIIigibIe: and lhis posilion had lo be defended againsl lhe lradilionaIism of
lhe CalhoIic Church, dogmalicaIIy formuIaled in lhe CounciI of Trenl, as veII as
againsl lhe prophelic iIIuminism of lhe Anabaplisls. This vork vas done by
IIacius, lhe chief of lhe Magdeburg Cenlurialors ( 1567), vho Iaid dovn lhe
principIe lhal every passage musl and can be adequaleIy inlerpreled by ils
conlexl, vilh reference lo lhe slyIe, sense, and generaI inlenlion of lhe vhoIe
vork in vhich il occurs. The nexl slep vas lo delermine lhe inlenlion of lhe
vork by reference lo lhe hisloricaI circumslances in vhich il vas vrillen: lhe
inlerprelalion of lhe Nev
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Teslamenl on lhese Iines, in lhe Iighl of lhe inlernaI hislory of lhe primilive
Church, vas begun by lhe IngIish Deisls and made knovn lo German
lheoIogians by aumgarlen. Through lhe |nsiiiuiic |nicrprciis of Irnesli, il
infIuenced SchIeiermacher ( G.S.. V, 323-6).
ul SchIeiermacher vas lhe maker of a revoIulion in hermeneulics. He began
by shoving lhal lhe inlerprelalion of Iilerary sources is onIy one inslance of a
phenomenon vhich is as videspread as Iife ilseIf, viz. lhe phenomenon of
underslanding. The firsl lask, lhen, musl be lo anaIyse lhe process of
underslanding. Then, draving upon lhe leachings of lhe lranscendenlaI
phiIosophy, he urged lhal underslanding is ilseIf inexpIicabIe excepl in lhe Iighl
of lhe originalive or crealive process of vhich il is, indeed, a reproduclion
(Nacn|i|!ung). This is nol a deIiberale process, in vhich an idea is firsl
conceived, lhen vorked inlo a IogicaI form, lhen cIolhed in Ianguage and
imagery according lo lhe eslabIished ruIes of composilion. Il is an unconscious
crealive aclivily, in vhich our receplivily lo slimuIus and suggeslion is
inseparabIe from our sponlaneous lransmulalion of lhe suggeslion received
inlo an originaI form. The vhoIe oulIook and personaIily of lhe aulhor is
refIecled in every parl of his vork: and lhe business of inlerprelalion, afler
sellIing lhe grammalicaI sense of lhe lexl, is lo go back lhrough lhal lo lhe ouler
form of lhe vork, lhen lo lhe inner form or animaling idea of il, lhen lo lhe
mind of lhe aulhor, and finaIIy lo lhe vhoIe Iilerary and hisloricaI process, in
vhich lhe produclion of lhis parlicuIar vork is bul one incidenl. The
hermeneulic of SchIeiermacher, vorked oul in delaiI on lhese Iines, vas made
knovn lo lhe generaI pubIic by ckh, and has never yel been surpassed ( G.S..
V, 326-31).
The essay on individuaIily and lhal on hermeneulics logelher conlain DiIlhey's
accounl of lhe melhodoIogy of lhe human sludies as he vorked il oul in
pursuance of his ovn pIan, and incidenlaIIy aIso in ansver lo WindeIband. ul
meanvhiIe lhe viev originaIIy pul forvard by WindeIband had been laken up
and deveIoped far more abIy and syslemalicaIIy by Rickerl. In his Iarge book,
Oic Grcnzcn !cr naiuruisscnscnaji|icncn Bcgrijjs|i|!ung ( 1896- 1902), and in
smaIIer essays such as Ku|iuruisscnscnaji u. Naiuruisscnscnaji ( 1898) and Oic
Prc||cnc !cr Gcscnicnispni|cscpnic. cinc |injunrung ( 1904), Rickerl made knovn
lhe chief
-238-
poinls of a slriking phiIosophy, conslrucled on Kanlian Iines, vhich he
conlinued lo enrich and deveIop in subsequenl years, bolh in DiIlhey's Iifelime
and afler his dealh.
The years 1896-1904, during vhich Rickerl's lheory vas given lo lhe vorId,
vere for DiIlhey a period of phiIosophicaI incubalion. He had pubIished lhe
|!ccn in 1894 and vrillen lhe essay on individuaIily in 1895, and in lhe vinler of
1895-6 he made an allempl lo fuIfiI his Iong-slanding pIan for lhe compIelion of
lhe |in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. Tnc aiicnpi !i! nci succcc!. an! a
nun|cr cj jacicrs. ccning icgcincr a|cui inis iinc. sccn ic natc |c! ic a |rcak in inc
scucncc cj nis incugni. Tncrc uas Win!c||an!s |cciurc in 1894. an! |||ingnaus
sircng aiiack cn inc |!ccn in 1895. Tnc |aiicr rc!ucc! Oi|incu ic a siaic cj cxciicncni
an! angcr unicn can |c c|car|u sccn in nis ccrrcspcn!cncc uiin inc Graj tcn
Waricn|urg. |ickcris Grcnzcn jirsi appcarc! in 1896. an! in 1897 tcn Waricn|urg
!ic!. Tnis uas a ncatu |css ic Oi|incu. unc ai inc sanc iinc |cgan ic jcc| in ninsc|j inc
cjjccis cj a!tancing agc. Tncsc jacicrs prc|a||u cxp|ain unu. |ciuccn 1895 an! 1905.
nc crigina| ccniri|uiicn ic pni|cscpnu canc jrcn nin. Tnc cssau cn ncrncncuiics (
1900) is nc rca| cxccpiicn. ii is |iii|c ncrc inan a nisicrica| rcircspcci. a surtcu cj inc
pasi grcuin cj inc ncrncncuiic !iscip|inc. nci an in!cpcn!cni ccniri|uiicn ic ii |u
Oi|incu ninsc|j.
Yci nc uas nci inaciitc. Hc na! ncrc|u iransjcrrc! nis aciitiiu ic cincr jic|!s. Tc inis
pcric! |c|cngs inc ccnccpiicn cj a grcai ucrk. ic |c ca||c! Siu!icn zur Gcscnicnic !cs
!cuiscncn Gcisics. unicn uas ic ccniain a nisicru cj inc Gcrnan nin! an! spirii jrcn
inc car|icsi iincs. Tnis ucrk uas nctcr ccnp|cic!. |ui |argc nasscs cj naicria| inicn!c!
jcr inc|usicn in ii nau ncu |c jcun! in G.S. ||. |||. an! |V. as uc|| as in Vcn !cuiscncr
Oicniung u. Musik. Ai inc sanc iinc Oi|incu un!cricck a ccursc cj rcscarcn ancng
Hcgc|s car|u MSS.. unicn |c! ic inc pu||icaiicn cj nis jugcn!gcscnicnic Hcgc|s in
1904. Tnis is an inpcriani ucrk in iisc|j. rctca|ing Hcgc| in unai ui|| |c ic nanu an
uncxpccic! |igni. an! ii uas inpcriani in Oi|incus cun !ctc|cpncni. jcr ii rctca|c! ic
nin a ncu pni|cscpnica| siar cj inc jirsi nagniiu!c. uncsc inj|ucncc upcn nin
ncnccjcruar! rita||c! inai cj Scn|cicrnacncr. an! gatc nin i!cas unicn ucrc uscju|
againsi |ickcri. An! in 1906 nc cc||ccic!. rctisc!. an! pu||isnc!
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a group of forly-year-oId essays on lhe German romanlic poels under lhe lilIe
Oas |r|c|nis u. !ic Oicniung.
|n a|| inis ucrk Oi|incu uas rcncuing nis sircngin |u a rciurn ic inc crigina| scurccs cj
nis inspiraiicn. in nisicru. in pcciru. an! in inc pcsi-Kaniian pni|cscpnu. Ai |asi. in
1905. nc gaincrc! icgcincr inc inrca!s cj nis i!cas an! cn|arkc! upcn a jina| cjjcri ic
uriic nis Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. |rcn incn unii| nis !cain nc uas ccniinua||u
ai ucrk. an! nucn inai is cj grcai ta|uc |c|cngs ic inis pcric!. Tc ii |c|cngs inc cnangc
in nis aiiiiu!c ic psucnc|cgu. unicn uas !cscri|c! in inc prccc!ing cnapicr. Tc ii
|c|cngs a|sc a |c|! rcsiaicncni cj nis pcsiiicn uiin rcgar! ic inc nunan siu!ics
gcncra||u. inrcugn unicn incrc runs a tigcrcus pc|cnic againsi |ickcri. Tncugn
|ickcris nanc is nar!|u ncniicnc! in Oi|incus |aicsi uriiings. nis !ccirincs arc
ctcruuncrc cncscn jcr aiiack. an! uc nau sau inai Oi|incus pni|cscpnica| carccr cn!c!.
as ii na! |cgun. uiin a pc|cnic againsi iransccn!cnia| i!ca|isn.
Tnc csscniia| pcinis cj |ickcris pni|cscpnu natc |ccn sunnarisc! a|ctc. in Cnapicrs
Tnrcc an! |itc. | ncc! nci gc ctcr inai grcun! again. |ui ui|| prcccc! ic sncu ncu.
uiinin inai jrancucrk. |ickcri ana|uscs in !ciai| inc ncinc!s. caicgcrics. an!
prcsuppcsiiicns cj inc nisicrica| an! cu|iura| siu!ics.
Win!c||an! in nis |ccicria| a!!rcss !isiinguisnc! inc nisicrica| siu!ics jrcn inc
naiura| scicnccs |u iuc criicria. Onc uas inc ncinc!c|cgica| criicricn. naiura| scicncc
is ncncinciic. an! nisicrica| siu!u is i!icgrapnic. Tnc cincr uas inc criicricn cj su|jcci-
naiicr. naiura| scicncc siu!ics jacis uiincui rcjcrcncc ic ta|uc. an! nisicrica| siu!u
!ca|s uiin unai nas ta|uc an! ncaning. |ickcri uscs inc sanc iuc criicria. an! ucrks
cui inc !ciai|s cj incir app|icaiicn jar ncrc ju||u inan Win!c||an!. |ui in nis nan!|ing
cj incn nc gitcs grcaicr ucigni ic inc criicricn cj ta|uc an! ncaning.
Nci ctcru jaci. nc saus. is naicria| jcr nisicrica| siu!u. |ui cn|u sucn jacis as arc
inpcriani (uicniig) cr inicrcsiing (inicrcssani) cr signijicani (|c!cuisan). an!
inpcriancc. inicrcsi. signijicancc aiiacncs cn|u ic incsc jacis unicn cn|c!u. cr
scncncu causa||u ajjcci inc cn|c!incni cj. cu|iura| ta|ucs.
1
Tnc nis-
____________________
1
Iduard Meyer ( Zur Tnccric u. Mcinc!ik !cr Gcscnicnic. 1902) ccnicn!s inai inc
nisicrians criicricn cj inc inpcriancc cj ctcnis is nci incir ta|uc. |ui incir inj|ucncc
(Wirksankcii). inc cxicnsitcncss cj incir cjjccis. Bui an
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loricaI enquirer is lhus aIvays concerned, in lhe Iong run, vilh lhe sludy of
evenls from lhe slandpoinl of vaIue: and lhis lrulh, inlerpreled in lhe sense lhal
lhe hislorian passes |udgmenl on lhe vaIue of lhe evenls vhich he records, has
somelimes Ied lo serious errors in respecl of lhe cIaim of scienlific ob|eclivily
vhich hislory makes. AII vaIue-|udgmenl, il is somelimes said, represenls a
personaI viev, a sub|eclive inlerprelalion: and lhe hislorian is eilher loId lhal he
musl nol hope lo cIaim lhe preslige of an ob|eclive invesligalor, or eIse is
exhorled (e.g. by Lamprechl) lo acquire lhis preslige by a radicaI aIleralion of
his melhod, abandoning his axioIogicaI crileria and concepls, and adopling lhe
melhods and ideas of naluraI science inslead.
According lo Rickerl, lhis is a misrepresenlalion of lhe inleresl vhich lhe
hisloricaI sludenl lakes in vaIues. He may indeed make and express a personaI
|udgmenl upon lhe vaIue of evenls: no one can prevenl him from doing so. ul,
if he does, he is going beyond vhal is essenliaI lo his hisloricaI vork, and
laking a responsibiIily vhich he need nol lake. Ior lhere is a vay of rcjcrring an
evenl ic a ta|uc ( Wcri|czicnung) vhich is nol, and does nol invoIve, an acluaI
ta|uaiicn ( Wcriung) of il. Il is a facl lhal, al aII limes, vaIue-slandards have been
recognised by human beings, and evenls |udged good or bad by lhem
according lo lhese slandards. The slandards may have been righl or vrong, and
il is nol primariIy lhe hislorian's business lo decide lhal poinl: bul he lakes up
lhe slandards vhich have been recognised, and seIecls for sludy lhose evenls
vhich are imporlanl according lo lhese slandards. Thus lhe aclions and
sufferings of hisloricaI agenls are |udged imporlanl by lhe crileria vhich lhe
hisloricaI agenls have lhemseIves enlerlained: lhe seIeclion is nol made from
vilhoul by lhe hislorian's privale |udgmenl, bul hislory ilseIf furnishes an
immanenl crilerion by vhich il is made.
Of course, lhere is a muIlipIicily of such crileria, springing from lhe muIlipIicily
of human inleresls. The refusaI of lhe German ImperiaI crovn by Irederick
WiIIiam IV of Irussia is
____________________
evenl can onIy become imporlanl by virlue of ils effecls if lhey lhemseIves
are inlrinsicaIIy imporlanl: and il is lhis inlrinsic imporlance lhal Rickerl
finds in cuIluraI vaIue. An evenl is hisloricaIIy imporlanl if il eilher is ilseIf
lhe embodimenl of cuIluraI vaIue, or has considerabIe infIuence upon lhe
reaIisalion of such vaIue. Cf. Ku|iuruisscnscnaji u. Naiuruisscnscnaji. 7in c!..
1926. pp. 93-4. an! Oic Prc||cnc !cr Gcscnicnispni|cscpnic. 3r! c!.. 1924. p. 59.
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more imporlanl from one poinl of viev, viz. lhal of poIilicaI hislory, lhan lhe
idenlily of lhe laiIor vho made his coal: bul lhere is aIso a poinl of viev,
capabIe of embodimenl in a hislory, e.g. of fashions, or of lhe laiIoring induslry,
or of commodily prices, from vhich lhe laiIor is more imporlanl lhan lhe
poIilicaI incidenl (cf. Ku|iuruisscnscnaji u. Naiuruisscnscnaji. p. 89). Mcrc. inc
sanc ctcni nau |c inpcriani in cppcsiic uaus acccr!ing ic inc pcini cj ticu. as c.g. ii
nau |c arguc! inai inc |rcncn |ctc|uiicn uas a gcc! ining jcr |rancc an! |urcpc. an!
again inai ii uas a |a! ining. Hcrc ii is cti!cni. saus |ickcri. inai inc nisicrian cannci.
as nisicrian. !cci!c uncincr inc |ctc|uiicn uas gcc! cr |a!. an! uci nc nusi rcccgnisc
inai. uncincr ii uas gcc! cr |a!. unicnctcr ta|uc-susicn is app|ic!. ii is in anu casc
inpcriani. in cincr ucr!s. nc nusi ju!gc ii |u rcjcrcncc ic ta|uc. |ui nusi nci ju!gc iis
ta|uc (cp. cii.. p. 88 ).
|j inc in!iti!ua| jacis unicn nisicrica| scicncc cxanincs arc sc|ccic! |u rcjcrcncc ic
ta|uc. inc ccnp|cx unc|cs inic unicn incu ja||. sucn as inc in!iti!ua| |ijc. inc sccia|
grcup. inc naiicn cr Siaic. inc pcric!. ui|| a|sc |c !c|iniic! |u rcjcrcncc ic ta|uc. an!
inc jun!ancnia| ccnccpis in unicn nisicrica| gcncra|isaiicn cxprcsscs incir naiurc ui||
|c nci ncrc|u gcncra|. |ui a|sc ncrnaiitc. Tnc i!ca c.g. cj a naiicn ui|| cxprcss nci
prinari|u unai is in jaci ccnncn ic a|| naiicns. |ui raincr unai is axic|cgica||u
csscniia| ic a naiicn. i.c. csscniia| ic inai nanijcsiaiicn cj ta|uc unicn a naiicn. cr inis
cr inai naiicn. is cr cn|c!ics. Tnc axic|cgica||u csscniia| c|cncnis nau an! !c. cj
ccursc. cjicn ccinci!c uiin inc c|cncnis unicn a purc|u jaciua| ncrpnc|cgica| siu!u cj
sccia| pncncncna ucu|! rcccgnisc as csscniia| jrcn iis cun pcini cj ticu. an! inus ii is
inai |ic|cgica| an! psucnc|cgica| scicncc can cccasicna||u |c uscju| ic inc cu|iura|
siu!ics. |ui inc axic|cgica| c|cncni in inc ccnccpis cj inc cu|iura| siu!ics is a|uaus inc
jun!ancnia| c|cncni.
1
Iikc-
____________________
1
This is lhe reason vhy Rickerl speaks of lhe hisloricaI sludies as
Gcscnicnisuisscnscnajicn and as Ku|iuruisscnscnajicn. |ui nctcr as
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. Hc a!niis inai a !isiinciicn usc! ic |c !raun |ciuccn scu|
(Scc|c) an! spirii (Gcisi). unicn !cicrninc! Gcisi ic a ncn-psucnc|cgica| cr cu|iura|
ncaning. an! ii uas inus inai c.g. Hcgc| usc! inc ucr!. Sincc incn. ncuctcr. Gcisi
nas cjicn ccnc ic |c usc! as cuita|cni ic Scc|c. an! inc !isiinciicn |ciuccn
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn an! Naiuruisscnscnajicn is ccnncn|u un!crsicc!. |ikc Mi||s
!isiinciicn |ciuccn ncra| scicnccs an! naiura| scicnccs. as a !isiinciicn |ciuccn
iuc grcups cj scicnccs cj jaci. !ijjcring cn|u in inai

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vise vhen, from lhe langIed veb of hisloricaI change, ve singIe oul a parlicuIar
process for sludy, il is as a deveIopmenl ( |niuick|ung) lovards some specific
resuIl lhal ve singIe il oul: and lhe resuIl ilseIf, vhose inlrinsic imporlance
sheds an inleresl upon lhe process Ieading up lo il, is imporlanl simpIy as a
reaIisalion of cuIluraI vaIue.
If lhe vaIues, by reference lo vhich lhe hislorian seIecls his facls, vere such as
no one bul himseIf and a fev eccenlrics, eilher in his ovn day or al lhe lime of
lhe evenls vhich he sludies, couId appreciale, lhen his hislory vouId ilseIf be
eccenlric or sub|eclive, and couId neilher reach a vide pubIic, nor cIaim lhe
righl lo do so. The aim of lhe scienlific hislorian is lo avoid lhis sub|eclivily, and
il can onIy be achieved if lhe vaIueslandards vhich he empIoys are generaIIy
recognised lhroughoul his ovn sociely, and over considerabIe periods of lime,
nol necessariIy lo be obvious and ineIuclabIe, bul al Ieasl lo be such as a
reasonabIe man may fairIy enlerlain. Such slandards are lo be found in lhe
generaI cuIluraI lradilion of a civiIisalion. 'In Iurope, vherever hisloricaI vorks
are read, lhe cuIluraI vaIues allaching lo reIigion, lhe Church, Iav, lhe Slale,
science, Ianguage, Iileralure, arl, economic organisalion elc., viII cerlainIy
____________________
lhe one group sludies physicaI facl and lhe olher psychicaI facl. During lhe
presenl cenlury lhere has been a parliaI relurn lo lhe oIder meaning of Gcisi,
and il is nov used again, especiaIIy in lhe phrase c|jckiitcr Gcisi, in a sense
corresponding lo Rickerl's Ku|iur. Rickerl himseIf admils lhis in respecl of
some modern vrilers, bul sliII lhinks lhal DiIlhey meanl by
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn no more lhan 'moraI sciences' in MiII's sense (
Ku|iuruisscnscnaji u. Naiuruisscnscnaji. inirc. ic 7in c!.. 1926). Tnc prcscni an!
inc jc||cuing cnapicr ui|| sujjicc ic sncu ncu unjusi inis is ic Oi|incu. Oi|incu. cn
inc cincr nan!. c|jccis ic inc icrn Ku|iuruisscnscnajicn. as nci !cing jusiicc ic inc
ccnp|cxiiu cj inc su|jcci-naiicr cj nisicrica| scicncc. tiz. nunan naiurc. unicn.
|csi!cs |cing a tcnic|c cj ta|uc. nas cincr |css p|casing |ui nci |css inicrcsiing cr
inpcriani capaciiics. |i cn|c!ics an un!cncnsira||c. in!cc! a cnc-si!c!
!cicrninaiicn cj a ncaning (Sinn) an! an ain (Zic|) in nisicru. Tnis is icc jricn!|u
an! |cnctc|cni a ticu cj nunan naiurc. in unicn inc !ark insiincis cj nuiua|
cpprcssicn an! !csiruciicn p|au a tcru ncia||c pari ( G.S.. V||. 323). Hcrc Oi|incu.
in iurn. is unjusi ic |ickcri. unc nakcs rccn in nis inccru jcr inc pncncncna unicn
Oi|incu ciics. |i ui|| |c cti!cni inai nisicrica| inpcriancc an! ncaning !c nci aiiacn
cn|u ic inai unicn jurincrs inc rca|isaiicn cj cu|iura| gcc!s. |ui a|sc ic inai unicn
nin!crs ii. Tnai unicn is ncsii|c ic ta|uc nas a|sc a ncaning (Sinn) unicn uc
un!crsian! (tcrsicncn) ( Ku|iuruisscnscnaji u. Naiuruisscnscnaji. p. 88).
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be underslood as vaIues, and lherefore il viII nol be regarded as arbilrary lhal
lhese vaIues shouId guide lhe seIeclion of vhal is essenliaI, and so Iimil lhe
hisloricaI narralive lo lhal vhich is imporlanl or significanl vilh respecl lo
lhem' ( Ku|iuruisscnscnaji u. Naiuruisscnscnaji. pp. 132-3).
Tnis is cncugn jcr inc spccia|isi. |i is nci. ncuctcr. cncugn uncn uc iakc a
ccnprcncnsitc cr pni|cscpnica| ticu cj inc prc||cn. |cr incn uc scc inai ctcn |urcpc
is cn|u cnc cj nanu cu|iura| uniis. |iniic! |cin in cxicni an! in !uraiicn. an!
sian!ar!s unicn arc ta|i! cn|u jcr inc |urcpcan nin! arc nci rca||u c|jcciitc. an! inc
nisicrica| narraiitc an! inicrprciaiitc ccnccpis !critc! jrcn incn arc nci rca||u ucrinu
cj inc nanc cj scicncc. |j inis is a|| inai can |c sai!. incn inc pcsiiicn cj rc|aiitisn cr
nisicricisn is inc cn|u cnc |cji ic us. an! inai is inc !cain cj inc nisicrica| an! cu|iura|
siu!ics. Hcu can uc c|ain rca| iruin jcr cur tcrsicn cj anu nisicrica| prcccss cr
inci!cni? Hcu can uc pui icgcincr a|| cur kncu|c!gc cj pariicu|ar prcccsscs inic a
unc|c. a susicn cj ucr|! nisicru ( Unitcrsa|gcscnicnic). an! nakc uiinin inis unc|c a
rca| !isiinciicn |ciuccn inc ncrc inpcriani an! inc |css inpcriani c|cncnis. an!
pcrnaps !cicci a inrca! cj prcgrcss? Hcu can uc ccn|inc inc taricus cu|iura|
ira!iiicns. inc rc|igicus. ariisiic. scicniijic. pc|iiica|. cccncnic aspccis cj |ijc. in a
ccnprcncnsitc ticu uncrc cacn nas iis prcpcr p|acc an! ta|uc in rc|aiicn ic inc rcsi.
an! a|| cj incn icgcincr |ui|! up inc susicn cj cu|iurc ( Ku|iur) acccr!ing ic an
c|jcciitc|u inic||igi||c p|an? Wc can cn|u c|ain inc rigni ic !c inis ij uc |c|ictc inai inc
ta|ucs rcccgnisc! |u us. in spiic cj incir nisicrica| rc|aiitiiu. rcprcscni rca|
apprcxinaiicns ic a susicn cj a|sc|uic ta|ucs. in inc sanc uau as inc |aus jcrnu|aic!
|u naiura| scicncc. incugn ccniinua||u un!crgcing nc!ijicaiicn. arc a|uaus an
apprcxinaiicn ic a rca| susicn cj |aus prctai|ing in naiurc. Wc nau nci kncu ic inc
ju|| unai incsc a|sc|uic ta|ucs arc. |ui uc can kncu inai incu rca||u nc|! gcc! (gc|icn).
an! can sccn ic !cicci in a|| cur aciua| ta|uc-sian!ar!s scnc iracc cj incir |incancnis.
an! in inc nisicrica| cnangcs cj cur sian!ar!s a s|cu prcgrcss icuar!s a c|carcr an!
ju||cr un!crsian!ing cj inc a|sc|uic ncrns. Iikc inc siars in inc sku. uiin inc prcgrcss
cj cu|iurc incu gra!ua||u ccnc uiinin inc rangc cj nunan tisicn. Tncu arc nci c|!
ta|ucs. nci ncu ta|ucs. incu arc inc ta|ucs ( |icn|. ucic! |u |ickcri. cp. cii.. p. 143).
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If lhis be lrue, lhere is a cIear pIace for a phiIosophy of hislory over and above
lhe vork of lhe empiricaI hislorian. We musl nol, hovever, misconceive ils
scope. Il cannol be a socioIogy, and Iay dovn causaI Iavs for hisloricaI
processes. Such Iavs are onIy discoverabIe in lhe psychicaI Iife vhich is lhe
vehicIe of cuIlure, nol in lhe cuIluraI order ilseIf. Nay, lhe very form of a Iav
conlradicls lhe nalure of hisloricaI reaIily, since a Iav formuIales reguIarilies in
a vorId vhere processes can recur, vhereas nolhing in hislory recurs,
everylhing is unique, and even lhe vhoIe compIex of vorId hislory is nol a
vorId of processes, bul ilseIf one individuaI process. There cannol even be a
'Iav of progress': for lhe necessily, bioIogicaI ( Darvin) or socioIogicaI ( Marx),
vhich vouId conslilule lhe |au vouId be causaI and facluaI, and lherefore
oulside lhe scope of hislory, vhiIe lhe slandard of vaIue, vhich vouId enabIe
us lo |udge lhal lhe evoIulionary or diaIeclicaI process vas a prcgrcss, vouId nol
assure us of ils necessily. The reaI business of lhe phiIosophy of hislory is
lhreefoId. (1) Il musl make an epislemoIogicaI and IogicaI anaIysis of lhe
hisloricaI sludies. (2) Il musl sel forlh lheir generaI principIes, i.e. nol Iavs, bul
lhe mosl generaI vaIues vhich delermine lhe meaning (Sinn) of hislory, and
from vhich lhe concepls of hisloricaI inlerprelalion are derived. And (3) il musl
go over lhe hisloricaI process as lhe speciaIisls, each in his ovn sphere or
period, have reconslrucled il, grasp il as a vhoIe in lhe Iighl of lhe highesl
vaIues, singIe oul lhe mosl imporlanl eIemenls of progress or relrogression
vhich appear in il, and divide lhe vhoIe inlo broad periods vhose Iimils are
delermined nol nov by lhe inleresl of a parlicuIar invesligalor, lhe exlenl or
Iimilalion of his knovIedge or underslanding, bul by ob|eclive phiIosophicaI
principIes: and lhis is lhe lrue vorId hislory ( Oic Prc||cnc !cr
Gcscnicnispni|cscpnic).
Il viII be seen lhal, if ve abslracl from lhe acluaI delaiIs of Rickerl's lheory of
knovIedge, lhe firsl lvo of lhe lasks vhich he assigns lo lhe phiIosophy of
hislory ansver lo lhe epislemoIogicaI, IogicaI, and melhodoIogicaI lask of
DiIlhey's Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji: vhiIe lhe lhird vouId find a pIace in
lhe 'encycIopaedia of lhe sciences' vhich aIso, according lo DiIlhey, is a parl of
phiIosophy, lhough a parl in vhich he himseIf never shoved any inleresl. If,
hovever, ve examine lhe vay in vhich Rickerl acluaIIy carries oul lhe
phiIosophicaI crilique, ve see al
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once lhal il vas bound lo anlagonise DiIlhey. Ior DiIlhey's firsl principIe in his
phiIosophicaI enquiries vas 'lo lry lo undersland Iife in lerms of ilseIf'. This
meanl, in parlicuIar, lhal Iife is nol lo be underslood in lerms of lhe
lranscendenlaI seIf and a pricri norms. The Kanlian formaIism is no more
acceplabIe lo him vhen appIied by Rickerl lo hisloricaI knovIedge lhan il vas
vhen appIied by Cohen and Nalorp lo perceplion and naluraI science. He
counls il as melaphysics, and re|ecls il as, in lhe second book of lhe |in|ciiung.
nc rcjccic! ctcru pcssi||c nciapnusica| Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn.
Tnis rcjcciicn cj ccnicnpcraru Kaniianisn is a rccurrcni incnc in inc uriiings cj
Oi|incus |asi ucars. an! is ucrkc! cui ai scnc |cngin in inc ncics unicn nc na!c ai
inai iinc in prcparaiicn jcr a jrcsn c!iiicn cj inc |in|ciiung. Hcrc nc iakcs inc cjjcnsitc
|u suggcsiing inai inc prccc!urc cj inc Kaniians is nci rca||u Kaniian ai a||. an! inai
inc rca| Kani is cn nis cun si!c. |i uas |icnic. nci Kani. nc saus. unc jirsi prcicn!c! ic
!c!ucc inc jcrns cj a|| pcssi||c cxpcricncc an! kncu|c!gc jrcn inc ccn!iiicns cj inc
pcssi|i|iiu cj ccnscicusncss. |i is |icnics spirii inai is ai ucrk uncn inc Kaniians
!iti!c inc scicnccs inic iuc grcups |u an a pricri ncinc!c|cgica| !itisicn. insica! cj
asking ncu inc scicnccs grcup incnsc|tcs in rca| |ijc. Kani ninsc|j uas a ncrc nc!csi
ininkcr. unc uas ccnicni ic iakc inc scicnccs as nc jcun! incn. an! sci nis cpisicnc|cgu
inc nun||c iask cj ana|using incn uiincui cxp|aining incn auau. Tnis is unai uc a|sc
nusi !c. |pisicnc|cgu is nctcr anuining !cjiniiitc. |i ui|| nctcr natc anu ta|i!iiu
cxccpi in sc jar as ii !ccs jusiicc jrcn inc cuisci ic inc rcsu|is aiiainc! in inc cnpirica|
scicnccs ( G.S.. |. 418-20. cj. 415. 417). Tnis is inc rca| uau ic !ca| uiin |ickcris
ucsiicns. |s psucnc|cgu ic |c ccunic! ancng inc nunan siu!ics? Ici us scc ncu ii
sian!s in rc|aiicn ic inc iasks unicn inc nunan siu!ics in jaci pursuc. |s inc ncncinciic
sian!pcini a|icn ic inc nunan siu!ics? Ici us scc uncincr incu in jaci nakc succcssju|
usc cj ii. |s incrc a scnsc cr ncaning in nisicru? Ici us ccnsu|i inc nunan siu!ics. an!
scc uncincr incu can jin! cnc ( G.S.. |. 417-18). Tnus ai ctcru pcini Oi|incu appca|s ic
inc jacis cj cxpcricncc. as inc cnpirica| nunan siu!ics |ring incn |cjcrc us. an! rcjccis
inc i!ca cj pni|cscpnu as a scurcc cj scnc nigncr cr prcjcun!cr insigni.
Oi|incu !ccs nci sicp ai !cnuing inc a|sc|uic ta|ucs. nc a|sc
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ob|ecls lo defining lhe human sludies excIusiveIy in lerms of lhe sludy of vaIues
al aII. Nol lhal he lhinks lhere is anylhing in lhe sub|ecl-maller of lhe human
sludies vhich bears no vaIuepredicale: bul he hoIds lhal lhe concepl of vaIue,
properIy underslood, is nol onIy nol lhe fundamenlaI concepl of lhese sludies,
bul acluaIIy represenls a parliaI and fragmenlary viev of lheir sub|ecl-maller.
Ierhaps il is nol onIy lhe phiIosopher in DiIlhey vho speaks here: lhe hislorian
may aIso have a vord lo say. If ve inlerprel hislory in lerms of vaIues or norms,
ve shaII be Ied lo reIale lhe individuaI evenl lo lhe vaIue vhich il embodies or
faiIs lo embody--i.e. lo somelhing non-lemporaI and non-hisloricaI--ralher lhan
lo lhe earIier and Ialer evenls vilh vhich il is causaIIy or 'slrucluraIIy'
connecled. ul in reaI Iife lhe hislorian is concerned vilh lhe process, vilh lhe
foIIov-on of one evenl from anolher, much more lhan vilh lhe vaIue of lhe
evenl laken by ilseIf. DiIlhey is in search of a fundamenlaI calegory vhich viII
describe vhal lhe hislorian does, ralher lhan vhal lhe neo-Iichlean phiIosopher
lhinks he oughl lo do. DiIlhey is lhus al odds vilh Rickerl on aII lhe main
poinls of Rickerl's syslem. And yel il is fair lo say lhal he is grealIy indebled lo
Rickerl. Thal phiIosopher had, afler aII, raised a number of queslions of
fundamenlaI imporlance, and ansvered lhem in his ovn vay, and lo some of
lhem DiIlhey himseIf had nol yel given a precise and definile ansver. He vas
nov compeIIed lo do so. If he vas lo re|ecl Rickerl's ansvers, he couId no
Ionger avoid coming forvard vilh his ovn. This necessily acled upon him as a
slimuIus, and heIped him lo bring his ideas lo a focus. Wilhoul il, his Ialesl
vrilings vouId have been Iess fruilfuI and suggeslive lhan lhey acluaIIy are.Lel
us enumerale briefIy lhe issues invoIved.
1. If lhe differenlia of lhe human sludies is nol found in lheir concern vilh
cuIluraI vaIues, nor yel in lheir idiographic melhod, vhere is il lo be found`
DiIlhey's originaI viev vas lhal il Iies in lheir concern vilh lhe human
mind: bul lhis needs furlher anaIysis and eIucidalion. This is lhe probIem of
lhe deIimilalion of' lhe human sludies ( A|grcnzung !cr
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn), lo vhich DiIlhey gave much allenlion in his Ialer
years.
2. If lhe sub|ecl-maller of lhe human sludies consisls of vaIues, lheir calegories
or ruIing concepls viII of course aII be
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derived from lhe concepl of vaIue. ul if nol, vhal are lheir calegories,
and vhence are lhey derived`
3. The human sludies anaIyse lheir sub|ecl-maller for purposes of sludy
inlo parls vhich are reIaliveIy seIf-conlained, such as lhe individuaI
man, lhe cuIluraI syslem, lhe nalion, lhe hisloricaI movemenl or period.
According lo Rickerl, each of lhese subordinale vhoIes is a cenlre of lhe
reaIisalion of vaIues, and il is by lhis lesl lhal lhey are recognised and
discriminaled. If vaIue is nol lhe ground of lhese dislinclions, vhal is`
1

4. The doclrine of absoIule vaIues enabIes Rickerl lo avoid hisloricism and
lo find a meaning in hislory. DiIlhey denies absoIule vaIues, and viII nol
inlerprel hislory excIusiveIy in lerms of vaIue al aII. In vhal sense, if al
aII, can he sliII find a meaning in hislory`
We shaII see in lhe nexl chapler hov DiIlhey finaIIy ansvered lhese
queslions. His vork in search of lhe ansver occupies lhe vhoIe period from
1904 unliI his dealh in 1911. Il vas a period of inlense and many-sided
aclivily. In addilion lo vorking lovards his Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji.
Oi|incu uas uriiing Oas Wcscn !cr Pni|cscpnic. Oas gcscnicni|icnc Bcuussiscin u.
!ic Wc|ianscnauungcn. an! Oic Tupcn !cr Wc|ianscnauung u. inrc Aus|i|!ung in
!cn nciapnusiscncn Susicncn. Hc uas prcparing jrcsn c!iiicns--unicn nctcr canc
cui--cj inc |in|ciiung an! Oic |in|i|!ungskraji !cs Oicnicrs. Tc inis pcric! |c|cng
nis ju||csi an! c|carcsi siaicncnis a|cui inc naiurc cj |itc! cxpcricncc. a|cui
cxprcssicn an! un!crsian!ing. an! ic ii |c|cngs nis jina| cnangc cj ticu in rcspcci
cj psucnc|cgu. |npcriani as incsc taricus !ctc|cpncnis arc in incnsc|tcs. incu a||
jin! incir jccus in Oi|incus ccnira| iask. unicn uas inai cj ccnp|ciing nis Kriiik !cr
nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. an! ii uas inpcssi||c ic !c inis uiincui iaking acccuni cj
|ickcri.
|j uc |cck ai !aics an! incncs. uc can jin! a !ctc|cpncni in Oi|incus i!cas an!
uau cj apprcacn ic inc prc||cn.
____________________
1
A parlicuIar case of lhis queslion is lhe queslion, hov phiIosophy is
dislinguished from olher syslems of cuIluraI aclivily, and on vhal
principIe il faIIs inlo subordinale divisions. DiIlhey's inleresl in lhis
queslion during his Ialer years is vouched for by Oas Wcscn !cr Pni|cscpnic
( 1907) and by lhe many allempls al a Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc. a|| |c|cnging ic
inis pcric!. unicn appcar in G.S.. V|||. Hcrc icc nc canc inic ccnj|ici uiin
Win!c||an!s arcniiccicnic. Cj. a|sc Oas Prc||cn !cr |c|igicn ( 1911). an
unjinisnc! jragncni unicn is cnc cj inc |aicsi prc!ucis cj nis pcn ( G.S.. V|. 288-
305).
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Al firsl he lhoughl of going al some Ienglh inlo lhe generaI queslions of
epislemoIogy, and vorking from lhere lovards his speciaI probIem. The
epislemoIogicaI probIem for lhe human sludies is in one respecl a vider
probIem lhan for lhe naluraI sciences: for lhe naluraI sciences incIude onIy
slalemenls of facl and generaIisalions from lhese, vhereas in lhe human sludies
ve aIso meel vaIue-|udgmenls, ends, norms, and imperalives ( G.S., VII, 5-6).
AII lhese forms of expression musl be examined: ve musl see hov lhey are
reIaled lo Iived experience, vhal is lheir meaning and funclion, and in vhal
sense lhey can be said lo be 'ob|eclive' or 'lrue'. To do lhis requires a descriplive
anaIysis of lhe slrucluraI syslem of lhe mind. We have gone inlo aII lhis in
Chaplers Tvo and Three. The exposilion given lhere vas based very IargeIy on
lhe firsl lvo Siu!icn zur Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. unicn Oi|incu
urcic in 1905.
Vcru sccn. ncuctcr. nc gatc up inis |inc cj apprcacn in jatcur cj cnc unicn uas ncrc
!ircci. Tnc ncu uau uas ic |cgin |u pciniing ic inc nunan siu!ics as a |c!u cj
kncu|c!gc unicn cxisis an! nusi |c acccunic! jcr. |rcn inis pcini cj ticu inc jirsi
ucsiicn ic ccnc inic ticu uas inai cj inc !c|iniiaiicn cj inc nunan siu!ics. |s
cxpcrincnia| psucnc|cgu cnc cj incn? Wnai is incir !cjining cnaracicrisiic? |n inc
ucars 1906-9 Oi|incu urcic jcur succcssitc cssaus (cr skcicncs jcr an cssau) uiin inc
sanc iii|c. Oic A|grcnzung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. |n incsc uc can scc nin ncting
gra!ua||u auau jrcn nis prccccupaiicn uiin siruciurc-psucnc|cgu. an! giting ctcr
grcaicr prcnincncc ic inc siu!u cj inc rc|aiicns |ciuccn |itc! cxpcricncc. cxprcssicn.
an! un!crsian!ing. unii| in inc jcurin an! jina| tcrsicn cj inc A|grcnzung inis rc|aiicn
|cccncs inc !cjining cnaracicrisiic cj inc nunan siu!ics. A scicncc |c|cngs ic inc
nunan siu!ics cn|u ij iis c|jcci |cccncs acccssi||c ic us inrcugn inc aiiiiu!c |asc! cn
inc susicnaiic rc|aiicn |ciuccn |ijc. cxprcssicn. an! un!crsian!ing ( G.S.. V||. 86-8).
Tnc cssau |cgins uiin a rcugn |isi cj inc nunan siu!ics. inc|u!ing ancng cincrs
nisicru. pc|iiica| cccncnu. jurispru!cncc. ari nisicru an! criiicisn. an! cn!ing uiin
psucnc|cgu ( !ic Psucnc|cgic). Tncsc siu!ics. nc saus. natc grcun up icgcincr an! jcrn
a naiura| uniiu. Tncu arc uniic! |u a ccnncn inicrcsi in nan. in!iti!ua| an!
cc||cciitc. an! in nis aciitiiics. Bui incu arc nci inicrcsic! cua||u in a|| aspccis cj
nans |ijc. His
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physicaI organism is of imporlance lo lhem onIy as lhe vehicIe of his mind.
Indeed, il is characlerislic of lhe human sludies lhal lhey are nol inleresled in
physicaI ob|ecls and processes as such, bul onIy as expressions of an inner Iife.
This appIies lo lhe vorks of men's hands, and lo sociaI inslilulions, as veII as lo
human bodies. 'Whelher il is a queslion of Slales, Churches, inslilulions,
cusloms, books, vorks of arl--such ob|ecls, Iike man himseIf, aIvays invoIve lhe
reIalion of a sensibIe exlerior lo anolher side vhich is inaccessibIe lo lhe senses,
and lherefore inlerior' ( G.S., VII, 84).
This inlerior reaIily, lhe lrue ob|ecl of lhe human sludies, is !cr Gcisi: and
DiIlhey goes on lo expIain vhal he means by lhis vord. The ob|ecl of lhe
human sludies is nol lhe process of menlaI Iife (!cr psucniscnc Ic|cnstcr|auj)
vhich is sludied in psychoIogy. In |urisprudence, for exampIe, vhal ve sludy is
lhe Iav, and lhis is somelhing dislincl from lhe parlicuIar persons lhrough
vhom, and circumslances in vhich, il vorks ilseIf oul in aclion. IarlicuIar
|udges and parlicuIar Iiliganls, lhe molives of lhis criminaI, lhe iIIness of lhal
vilness--lhese have nolhing lo do vilh |urisprudence. Thal sludy is concerned
vilh lhe principIes of lhe Iav and lhe slruclure of lhe syslem lo vhich aII IegaI
aclivilies beIong: il vas of lhis lhal Monlesquieu vrole in Icsprii !cs |cis, and
Ihering in Ocr Gcisi !cs rcniscncn |ccnis. Sini|ar|u inc |iicraru nisicrian. inc criiic.
inc acsi|iciician natc nci ic !c uiin inc inncr prcccsscs cj inc pccis nin!. |ui uiin inc
pccn unicn nc uriics. an! inis is a gcisiigcr Zusanncnnang unicn can |c scparaic!
jrcn inc psucnc|cgu cj iis auincr. Bcin inc pccn an! inc |cga| susicn arc insianccs cj
unai Hcgc| ncani uncn nc spckc cj c|jckiitcr Gcisi ( G.S.. V||. 84-6).
Tnis passagc. rca! in isc|aiicn. gitcs inc inprcssicn cj a c|csc apprcxinaiicn ic |ickcri.
Tnai pni|cscpncr ninsc|j usc! ii as cti!cncc inai Oi|incus un!cr|uing inicniicn uas
inc sanc as nis cun ( Oic Grcnzcn !cr naiuruisscnscnaji|icncn Bcgrijjs|i|!ung. Prcj. ic
2n! c!.. 1913).
1
Tnc !isiinciicn |ciuccn inc gcisiigcr Zusanncnnang cr gcisiigcs
Gc|i|!c an! inc psucniscncr Ic|cnstcr|auj |ccks suspicicus|u |ikc |ickcris !isiinciicn
|ciuccn inc irrca|cr Sinn cr Sinngc|i|!c an! inc psucnc|cgica| prcccss. Yci. in jaci.
incrc is |iii|c ncrc inai Oi|incu nas nci sai! cjicn cncugn |cjcrc. Hc nas cjicn sai! inai
uc !c nci un!crsian! pccp|c--cr ctcn cursc|tcs--|u |cck-
____________________
1
Thirleen years Ialer his |udgmenl vas Iess favourabIe: see above, p. 243 n.
-250-
ing al lhe inner movemenls of lhe mind, bul al ils ob|eclive expressions. The
conceplion of 'ob|eclive mind' is used in lhe |in|ciiung and in lhe |!ccn. A year
afler lhis A|grcnzung essay il vas given a nev ampIilude, and lhe form vhich il
lhen look, as ve shaII shorlIy see, vas characlerislicaIIy DiIlheian and nol
Rickerlian. DiIlhey vas lhinking of expressions and vhal lhey express, nol of
absoIule principIes and 'unreaI' vaIues in lhe Rickerlian manner.
There is a reaI incoherence in lhe essay, hovever, and il Iies in DiIlhey's
lrealmenl of psychoIogy. He gives |urisprudence and Iilerary sludy as
exampIes--his onIy delaiIed exampIes--of lhe human sludies, and lo each of
lhem he says lhal psychoIogicaI knovIedge is irreIevanl. He says lhal il is a
mislake lo equale psychoIogy vilh lhe knovIedge of lhe ob|ecl of lhe human
sludies. Thal ob|ecl is Gcisi, nol lhe psychoIogicaI process. This reads Iike a
surrender lo Rickerl and an excIusion of psychoIogy from lhe human sludies.
ul lhal is cerlainIy nol vhal he means: for in lhis very essay !ic Psucnc|cgic is
expressIy Iisled among lhe Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. an!. as uc natc sccn in Cnapicr
Sctcn. nc nctcr unnisiaka||u !cc|arc! inai psucnc|cgu. ctcn cxpcrincnia| psucnc|cgu.
uas nci cnc cj incn. Tncrc is. ncuctcr. an un!cnia||c c|scuriiu in nis uiicranccs cn inc
su|jcci. Hc gitcs inc inprcssicn cj atci!ing ii |ccausc nis nin! uas nci c|car. |i is nar!
ic scc. cn inc cnc nan!. ncu nc ccu|! natc cxpc||c! cxpcrincnia| psucnc|cgu a|icgcincr
jrcn inc scciciu cj inc nunan siu!ics. an! cn inc cincr nan! ncu nc ccu|! natc atci!c!
assigning ic ii a pccu|iar an! in scnc rcspccis a su|cr!inaic siaius ancng incn. Bui
incsc arc ucsiicns unicn nc nctcr jina||u ansucrc!.
Tnis A|grcnzung cssau uas ccnp|cic! |u inc |cginning cj 1909. Ai inc sanc iinc
Oi|incu a|sc ccnp|cic! an cssau cniii|c! Oas |r|c|nis u. !ic Sc||si|icgrapnic. an! a
ucar |aicr canc Oas Vcrsicncn an!crcr Pcrscncn u. inrcr Ic|cnsausscrungcn. Wiin
incsc naicria|s iaking snapc in nis nan!s. an! nis i!cas |cginning ic crusia||isc inic a
rcascnc! rcp|u ic |ickcri ctcr inc unc|c jic|! cj inc su|jcci. Oi|incu ncu jc|i inai inc
iinc na! ccnc jcr a jina| cjjcri ic uriic nis Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. |n inc ncxi
cnapicr uc sna|| scc ncu jar nc gci in inis aiicnpi.
Tnc ucrk uas nci. in jaci. ju||u carric! cui. A prcnising |cginning uas na!c in Ocr
Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i in !cnGcisicsuisscnscnajicn
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Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn, vhich vas given lo lhe press in March 1920, and appeared
in lhe foIIoving December. This is DiIlhey's Iasl imporlanl vork, and incIudes a
greal deaI of nev maleriaI, some of vhich is of considerabIe inleresl, as ve shaII
see. A conlinualion vas promised, and DiIlhey had made some progress in
preparing lhis vhen he vas compeIIed by iII heaIlh lo Iay il aside and lake up
easier vork for a lime. AccordingIy, he began al firsl lo prepare a nev edilion
of lhe Ic|cn Scn|cicrnacncrs: lhen he sel himseIf lo make a coIIeclion of his earIier
essays from 1864 onvard, under lhe lilIe of Oic gcisiigc Wc|i. Tnis cc||cciicn
appcars su|sianiia||u as nc p|annc! ii in G.S. V an! V| (scc V. tii-xii). |ui Oi|incu !i!
nci |itc ic jinisn ii ninsc|j. Hc !ic! cn inc 1si cj Ocic|cr 1911. Tnc Kriiik !cr
nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. incrcjcrc. !i! nci rcccitc inc |asi icucncs jrcn nis nan!. Yci nc
na! |rcugni inc prcparaiicn cj nis naicria| ic sucn a pcini inai inc p|an cj inc unc|c is
nci in !cu|i. an! inc c!iicr cj G.S. V|| nas |ccn a||c. |u jiiiing inc ncsi cxp|icii cj inc
innuncra||c MSS. atai|a||c inic inis jrancucrk. ic rcccnsiruci inc Kriiik in a jcrn
tcru |ikc inai unicn Oi|incu ninsc|j nusi natc gitcn ii. ij nc na! |itc!.
|n inc jc||cuing cnapicr | sna|| cxpcun!. ncsi|u uiincui ccnncni. inc ccnicnis cj inis.
Oi|incus cpus nagnun.
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CHAPTER NINE
THI Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji is lhe resuIl of DiIlhey's palienl efforls lo
finish his |in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. an! in a scnsc ii rca||u is inc
ccnp|ciicn cj inai ucrk. Tncrc is. ii is iruc. ancincr scnsc in unicn inc |in|ciiung uas
nci an! ccu|! nci |c ccnp|cic!. Tnc crigina| ccnccpiicn cj a ucrk in jitc |ccks.
sunnarisc! a|ctc cn p. 168. na! ai |asi ic |c gitcn up. |cr inc cxisiing jirsi |cck.
uncsc csicnsi||c purpcsc uas ic cpcn inc !iscussicn |u !cscri|ing inc aciua| siaic cj inc
nunan siu!ics. incir ains an! ncinc!s. incir !isiinciitc cnaracicr as againsi inc
naiura| scicnccs. an! ic sncu incir ncc! cj a pni|cscpnica| Grun!|cgung. !ccs in jaci
nucn ncrc inan inis. |i !cscri|cs an i!ca|. nci a rca| siaic cj ajjairs. ncia||u in rcspcci
cj psucnc|cgu. an! again in rcspcci cj ncra| inccru. in !iscussing sccic|cgu. ii !ccs nci
ncrc|u pcini ic inc aciua| sicri|iiu cj inai scicncc. |ui gccs cn ic arguc in princip|c inc
ucsiicn cj iis pcssi|i|iiu. an! ii sini|ar|u !iscusscs inc pcssi|i|iiu cj a pni|cscpnu cj
nisicru. |n a|| incsc rcspccis. inc |in|ciiung aniicipaics inc prcnisc! cpisicnc|cgica|
Grun!|cgung. Again. inc cxisiing scccn! |cck. unicn |cgins inc nisicrica|
!cncnsiraiicn cj inc inpcssi|i|iiu cj a nciapnusica| jcun!aiicn jcr inc nunan siu!ics.
cctcrs inc grcun! in sucn !ciai| inai inc nisicru ccu|! nci natc |ccn ccnp|cic! cn inc
sanc sca|c uiincui cccupuing jar icc |argc a prcpcriicn cj inc jinisnc! ucrk. Tnc
naicria|s unicn Oi|incu aciua||u cc||ccic! jcr inai purpcsc ucrc. in jaci. u|iinaic|u
gitcn a !ijjcrcni sciiing. an! |rcugni inic rc|aiicn uiin nis Siu!icn zur Gcscnicnic !cs
!cuiscncn Gcisics.
Acccr!ing|u. in uriiing inc jina| Kriiik. Oi|incu !ccs nci prcsuppcsc inc |in|ciiung an!
gc cn jrcn uncrc ii cn!c!. nc nakcs a ncu |cginning. Tnc A|grcnzung cssau (scc
a|ctc. pp. 249-51) is |rcugni in as an inirc!uciicn. !cscri|ing as ii !ccs inc ains.
ncinc!s. an! !isiinciitc cnaracicr cj inc nunan siu!ics. ii ju|ji|s inc csscniia| purpcsc
cj inc jirsi |cck cj inc |in|ciiung. an!
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is in facl a highIy abbrevialed subslilule for il. Then comes a hisloricaI seclion
vhich roughIy ansvers lo lhe second book of lhe |in|ciiung and lhe pro|ecled
lhird book: bul aII lhe earIier parl of lhe hislory of phiIosophy and lhe human
sludies is Iefl oul, lhe slory begins vilh lhe Aujk|arung. an! rcsc|tcs iisc|j inic an
acccuni cj inc !ctc|cpncni cj inc nisicrica| nctcncni in inc ninciccnin ccniuru an!
inc ccnicnpcraru cjjcris icuar!s a pni|cscpnu cj nisicru. Tnus a|| inc unuic|!u nass cj
inirc!ucicru naiicr is cui auau. an! Oi|incu can prcccc! ai cncc ic inc rca| |usincss cj
inc Grun!|cgung. Tnc Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. sc ccnsiiiuic!. is a ucrk
ccnp|cic in iisc|j.
|n inc prcscni cnapicr | sna|| sunnarisc inc ccnicnis cj inis Kriiik. jcr inc jirsi pari as
incu ucrc ccnp|cic! an! pu||isnc! |u Oi|incu in inc Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i
in !cn Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn ( 1910). an! jcr inc rcsi as nis c!iicr nas na!c ii pcssi||c
ic rccapiurc incn jrcn inc jragncnis.
Ai iis nca!. |u uau cj inirc!uciicn. Oi|incu scis nis cssau cn inc A|grcnzung !cr
Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. Tnc ccnicnis cj inis cssau ucrc !ca|i uiin in cur prcticus
cnapicr. an! ncc! cn|u |c |ricj|u sunnarisc! ncrc. Tnc nunan siu!ics arc sing|c! cui
as inc c|jcci cj cnuiru. On a prc|ininaru ticu. incu arc jcun! ic |c a grcup cj siu!ics
nating a ccnncn inicrcsi in nan. Tnis. ncuctcr. cannci |c incir csscncc. |ccausc in
iisc|j ii is nci cncugn ic !isiinguisn incn jrcn scnc cj inc naiura| scicnccs. Tncu arc
!isiinguisnc! jrcn naiura| scicncc nci |u incir su|jcci-naiicr. |ui |u incir nanncr cj
!ca|ing uiin ii. jcr. uncrcas naiura| scicncc a|siracis jrcn inc pcrccitc! ucr|! incsc
aspccis unicn can |c |ui|i up inic a rcgu|ar uaniiiaiitc susicn. inc nunan siu!ics
ircai inc ucr|!. cr raincr ccriain c|jccis in ii. as naiicr jcr un!crsian!ing. A|incugn
psucnc|cgu is a nunan siu!u. uci inc nunan siu!ics as a unc|c arc nci prinari|u
ccnccrnc! uiin inc prcccsscs unicn ii siu!ics. |ui raincr uiin ncnia| ccnp|cxcs
(gcisiigc Gc|i|!c) unicn arc inc ccnicnis cj inc cu|iura| ccnscicusncss.
Tnc ncxi scciicn is cniii|c! Oic Vcrscnic!cnncii !cs Auj|aus in !cn
Naiuruisscnscnajicn u. !cn Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. nisicriscnc Oricniicrung. an! iis
purpcsc is ic jurnisn a nisicrica| |ackgrcun! againsi unicn inc prc||cn cj inc Kriiik
nau |c sccn. Oi|incu !cscri|cs inc |cgica| jcrn cj inc naiura| scicnccs. ncu incu sian!
purani!-uisc upcn cnc ancincrs sncu|!crs. an! ncu incir
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vhoIe slruclure is dominaled by malhemalics and lhe principIe of causaI
necessily. He shovs hov phiIosophy, refIecling upon lheir principIes and
melhods, has faiIed lo reach an agreed concIusion, bul has produced lvo lypes
of lheory: lhe one lype faslens upon lhe malhemalicaI eIemenl in naluraI-
scienlific reasoning, and lraces il back lo a pricri principIes, vhiIe lhe olher
appeaIs lo lhe pover of prediclion and lhe conlroI over nalure vhich ve oblain
lhrough lhe discovery of Iavs, and deveIops on lhal basis lhe various forms of
posilivism and pragmalism ( G.S., VII, 88-93). Wilh lhis as a rough background,
DiIlhey goes on lo skelch firsl of aII lhe greal advance of hisloricaI enquiry in
lhe earIy nineleenlh cenlury, and lhen lhe allempls of lhe phiIosophers lo deaI
vilh lhe probIems vhich il raised.
A foundalion had been Iaid in lhe sevenleenlh and eighleenlh cenluries by lhe
'naluraI syslem' of lhe human sludies. The severaI branches of cuIluraI and
sociaI Iife had been dislinguished and sludied separaleIy. Iach vas supposed lo
be governed by ralionaI principIes: lheir hislory vas seen as a graduaI
approximalion lo an adequale embodimenl of lhese principIes: and, under lhis
generaI conceplion of progress, il vas possibIe lo see lhe course of hislory as an
inleIIigibIe vhoIe.
The firsl breach in lhe ciladeI of ralionaIism vas made by Herder, vho sav lhal
lhe individuaI nalion or period cannol be underslood mereIy as a slage in a
progress lo an end vhich Iies beyond ilseIf, bul has a vaIue and significance of
ils ovn. Then came (1) a greal movemenl in phiIoIogy, inilialed by I. A. WoIf.
He conceived phiIoIogy as a science vhich, beginning vilh lhe sludy of
Ianguage and Iileralure, shouId progressiveIy viden ils range unliI al Iasl il
shouId lake in lhe vhoIe cuIluraI and spiriluaI Iife of a nalion. Ior lhis purpose
il couId drav upon lvo greal aids: source-crilicism, of vhich WoIf's ovn
Homeric researches gave lhe exampIe, and lhe hermeneulic vhich vas evoIved
by SchIeiermacher and made currenl by ckh (cf. above, p. 238 ). Through lhe
appIicalion of lhese, by lhe efforls of I. Grimm, Niebuhr, Mommsen, and olhers,
il vas found possibIe lo see lhe Iife of a peopIe as a Iiving vhoIe, vhere lhe
differenl eIemenls of Ianguage, Iileralure, reIigion, moraIily, Iav, are aII paraIIeI
manifeslalions of a singIe communaI mind (Gcncingcisi). This conceplion vas
formuIaled as a principIe by Savigny: lhe branches of cuIluraI and sociaI Iife are
-255-
nol independenl syslems of phenomena, lhe nalion is lhe one reaIily behind
lhem aII, and lheir apparenl dislinclness from one anolher in a sophislicaled
sociely represenls onIy a differenlialion of funclion vilhin lhe overriding
vhoIe. (2) In lhe eighleenlh cenlury lhe comparalive melhod had been
expIoiled for lhe purposes of naluraI hislory, and lhe sludy of organic lypes
had gone so far lhal Cuvier, from a fev fragmenls of a skeIelon, couId
confidenlIy reconslrucl lhe vhoIe. This melhod vas nov laken over by lhe
phiIoIogisls and hislorians:
Iranz opp
and I. Grimm divined lhe slruclure of
vanished Ianguagegroups, and de TocqueviIIe anaIysed lhe analomy of lhe
body poIilic. (3) These various separale enquiries and discoveries vere veIded
inlo a vhoIe lhrough lhe vork of HegeI, vho formuIaled lhe Iav of diaIeclicaI
deveIopmenl lo vhich aII hisloricaI evenls are aIike sub|ecl: il vas lhus made
possibIe lo see lhe pasl Iife of mankind as a singIe process, a vorId hislory
(Wc|igcscnicnic), in vhich every evenl has ils necessary pIace as a slage in lhe
evoIulion of consciousness ( G.S., VII, 93-101).
Irom lhese discoveries and experimenls lhere came al Iasl lhe exempIary
embodimenl of lhe hisloricaI consciousness in Ranke. Indoved vilh ' Goelhe's
conlempIalive allilude lo Iife and his arlislic approach lo lhe vorId', having lhe
poel's pover of underslanding and descriplion, and equipped vilh aII
Niebuhr's crilicaI skiII, Ranke had lhis Iimilalion, lhal he feared generaI ideas,
and shrank from any allempl lo anaIyse behind lhe facls. Yel lhis Iimilalion vas
aIso an advanlage lo him: for il Ied him lo formuIale decisiveIy vhal musl
aIvays be a chief aim, lhough nol lhe soIe aim, of hisloricaI enquiry, viz. lhe
porlrayaI of lhe overl facl, of lhe hisloricaI process in ils delaiIed individuaIily.
And so, from a penelraling sludy of archives, he spun again in imaginalion lhal
veb of poIilicaI and miIilary inlrigue and confIicl vhich has shaped lhe
oulvard and invard hislory of lhe Slales of modern Iurope, and sel il forlh
vilh 'a viII lo hisloricaI ob|eclivily and a pover lo achieve il vhich have no
paraIIeI'.
DiIlhey pIaces lvo olher hislorians beside Ranke. The firsl is CarIyIe, lhrough
vhose' one-sided and quile singuIar genius' lhe heroic phiIosophy of Iichle
found ils refIeclion in hislory. 'If Ranke is aII eye, and Iives in lhe ob|eclive
vorId, CarIyIe's hisloricaI vriling resls on lhe slruggIe vilh lhe probIem of lhe
-256-
inner Iife: lhus lhese lvo suppIemenl one anolher, Iike lhe lvo lendencies in
poelry, lhe one of vhich lakes ils slarl from ob|eclive facl and lhe olher from
lhe deveIopmenl of lhe poel's ovn being.' The second is de TocqueviIIe, 'lhe
grealesl anaIysl of lhe poIilicaI vorId since ArislolIe and MachiaveIIi', vho,
vilhoul eilher praise or condemnalion, Iaid bare lhe slruclure of lhe modern
Slale, lhe forces al vork in il, lhe Iong-run lendencies resuIling from lhem, and
made hisloricaI generaIisalions vhich proved capabIe of exerling praclicaI
infIuence in his ovn lime ( G.S., VII, 101-5).
IaraIIeI vilh lhis deveIopmenl in lhe hisloricaI sludies venl lhe grovlh of a
phiIosophy of hislory, and here al firsl lhe infIuence of lhe lranscendenlaI
phiIosophy vas aIlogelher dominanl. Kanl himseIf sel lhe fashion. NegIecling
enlireIy lhe epislemoIogicaI queslion, hov knovIedge of hisloricaI reaIily is
possibIe, he underlook lo shov % lhe ralionaI principIes vhich musl
govern aII inlerprelalion of lhe hisloricaI process. ImpiricaI or 'anlhropoIogicaI'
research can, of course, discover causaI Iavs by vhich lhe sociaI order viII seem
lo be governed: bul, Kanl conlinues, since man is reaIIy a free agenl, nol sub|ecl
lo naluraI causaIily, lhis syslem of Iavs cannol be lhe lrulh aboul him and his
hislory. The lrulh aboul man Iies in lhe moraI Iav, and hislory is lo be
underslood as a leIeoIogicaI process in vhich, lhrough confIicl and opposilion,
lhe moraI Iav comes graduaIIy lo be reaIised in aclion. There is a sIov advance
of lhose forces in human nalure vhich subserve lhe moraI end, and lheir
viclory viII finaIIy be secured in a vorIdvide free, and vhoIIy |usl, sociaI order.
In a Iike spiril Iichle dislinguished belveen empiricaI hislory, vhich lakes lhe
presenl slale of lhe vorId as ils slarling-poinl and proceeds lo find ils causes in
lhe pasl, and lhe phiIosophy of hislory, vhich singIes oul lhe ralionaI aspecls of
lhe hisloricaI process and inlerprels lhe vhoIe in lerms of lhese. Hislory as he
sees il is lhe manifeslalion of lhe free pover of lhe seIf in confIicl vilh dead
nalure. Ivery human acl is lhe fuIfiImenl of a lask freeIy viIIed by a moraI
agenl, and every such fuIfiImenl gives rise lo furlher lasks for lhe fulure. ul
Iichle, unIike Kanl, sees in each slage of lhis endIess process a unique form of
Iife, vilh a vaIue of ils ovn vhich Iies in ils individuaI characler: and he aIso
gives a pecuIiar significance lo lhe greal individuaIs or
-257-
'heroes' of hislory, as men vho have enriched our conceplion of lhe ralionaI end
of Iife. Thus he overcomes lhe abslraclness of Kanl's lheory.
Il vas lhis same lranscendenlaI phiIosophy, enriched bul nol essenliaIIy
changed by lhe vork of SchIeiermacher and HegeI, vhich inspired HumboIdl's
lheory of lhe probIem and melhod of hislory. Over and above lhe causaI
infIuences of lemperamenl and capacily, of physicaI and sociaI environmenl,
vhich vork upon lhe hisloricaI agenl, HumboIdl summons us lo recognise
cerlain 'ideas' or vaIue-norms, vhich define lhe purpose of human Iife and
hislory. Nol onIy are human beings in lheir aclions consciousIy guided by lhese
vaIues, bul lhe accidenlaI circumslances of Iife and lhe impersonaI lrend of
evenls are providenliaIIy conlroIIed vilh lhe same end in viev. This generaI
conceplion persisls in lhe vorks of Gervinus, Ranke, and Droysen. Their
phiIosophy of hislory is an % conslruclion, vhich appeaIs lo a providenliaI
pIan imposed upon lhe lemporaI sequence from above, and divides lhe pasl
inlo periods, more or Iess arbilrariIy, by means of lhis cIue ( G.S., VII, 106-15).
In lhe Iasl decades of lhe nineleenlh cenlury, a more crilicaI oulIook deveIoped.
The allempl lo conslrucl lhe course of hislory a pricri vas pushed inlo lhe
background, and lhe epislemoIogicaI and IogicaI queslion, hov hisloricaI
knovIedge is possibIe, became lhe cenlre of inleresl. DiIlhey divides lhose vho
have deaIl vilh lhis probIem inlo lvo groups. (1) One poverfuI group has
conlinued lhe lradilion of lranscendenlaI ideaIism, usuaIIy aIong lhe Iines Iaid
dovn by Iichle: lhey sliII appeaI lo lhe a pricri norms, bolh as a principIe of
seIeclion lo guide lhe empiricaI hislorian, and as lhe basis of a phiIosophicaI
conslruclion of vorId hislory. HegeI has had Iess infIuence upon phiIosophy
proper lhan Iichle: bul lhe 'syslemalic human sludies' have Iearned
increasingIy from him, and 'lhe lime is coming vhen his allempl lo form a
syslem of concepls vhich can masler lhe ceaseIess slream of hislory viII aIso be
vaIued and lurned lo accounl'. On lhe olher hand, (2) anolher movemenl has
arisen vhich repudiales lhe beIief in absoIule vaIues or principIes, and
underlakes lo undersland hislory vilhoul any lranscendenlaI or melaphysicaI
aids, pureIy in lerms of ilseIf, i.e. in lerms of lhe principIes vhich have acluaIIy
found expression in lhe empiricaI
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human sludies. There are differences of opinion in lhis movemenl, especiaIIy on
lhe rivaI merils of lhe psychoIogicaI and lhe socioIogicaI approach ( G.S., VII,
115-17).
DiIlhey defines his ovn posilion by reference lo lhe |in|ciiung, emphasising his
opposilion lo inleIIecluaIism and lhe lranscendenlaI phiIosophy, and his beIief
in lhe lolaIily of human nalure as lhe proper basis for epislemoIogy. Al Ieasl il
is lhe righl basis for an epislemoIogy of lhe human sludies, vhich differ from
naluraI science preciseIy in lhis, lhal lhey do nol inlerprel lheir dala in lerms of
abslracl and hypolhelicaI enlilies, bul in lerms of a concrele syslem of Iife,
vhich lhe enquirer reIives in his ovn experience, and so underslands ( G.S., VII,
117-20).
And so DiIlhey proceeds lo lhe reaI business of his Kriiik, lhe epislemoIogicaI
and IogicaI anaIysis of lhe human sludies. Slarling vilh lhe generaI principIes
of epislemoIogy and Iogic, he graduaIIy narrovs lhe sphere of enquiry unliI ve
are broughl face lo face vilh lhe dislinclive characlerislics of lhe human
sludies, and can sludy lheir melhods in delaiI. His vievs on lhe more generaI
queslions of epislemoIogy and Iogic have aIready been considered al Ienglh in
Chaplers Tvo, Three, and Iive, and need nol be repealed here: I shaII
summarise lhis parl of lhe Kriiik as briefIy as possibIe, enIarging onIy on lhose
poinls vhich represenl a nev deveIopmenl in DiIlhey's lhoughl.
He begins vilh a revised and ampIified version of lhal parl of lhe second Siu!ic
zur Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn vhich deaIs vilh lhe processes of
lhoughl. The conlenls of lhis seclion vere summarised in Chapler Tvo. Il
describes lhe funclion of siIenl lhoughl, lhe formalion of lhe Tcia|tcrsic||ung, lhe
processes of |udging and inferring: and il shovs hov every process of lhoughl
is in lhe Iong run based on experience. In shorl, il reaffirms DiIlhey's empiricisl
and non-Kanlian viev vilh regard lo lhe funclions of lhoughl. Thoughl is nol
lhe source of form and meaning in experience: il mereIy eIicils lhe form and
meaning vhich are lhere aIready, and, by foIIoving up beyond Iived experience
lhe reIalions vhich are found in Iived experience, pursues ils endIess lask of
expIoring lhe vorId order ( G.S., VII, 120-9).
Of course, in each parlicuIar branch of enquiry, lhe specific nalure of lhe
sub|ecl-maller affecls lhe process of lhoughl. Nol
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onIy does each separale sludy come lo have concepls and melhods pecuIiar lo
ilseIf, as ve shaII see: bul even lhe process by vhich concepls are formed from
experience may differ, and lhe reIalion belveen lhe vhoIe inleIIecluaI
superslruclure and ils experienliaI foundalions may be differenl, in one sphere
from vhal il is in anolher. DiIlhey proceeds lo drav a conlrasl in lhis respecl
belveen lhe human sludies and naluraI science.
He describes firsl of aII hov our knovIedge of lhe vorId arises, nol in an
inleIIecluaI vacuum, bul in lhe course of our aclive Iife and inlercourse vilh lhe
vorId. Our reIalion lo lhe ob|ecl is nol mereIy a cognilive reIalion, bul a vilaI
one (Ic|cns|czug). He goes on lo shov hov nol onIy individuaI human beings,
bul aIso sociaI groups can enler inlo lhis aclive reIalion vilh lheir environmenl,
and oul of il buiId up a body of experience and a sel of ideas. The individuaI is
deepIy infIuenced by lhe ideas and alliludes prevaIenl in lhe groups lo vhich
he beIongs ( G.S., VII, 131-5).
Nov, lhe naluraI sciences do nol resl direclIy upon lhis body of common
experience and ideas. They have a speciaI slandpoinl and melhod, vhich is
'esoleric'. ul lhere is nolhing esoleric aboul lhe human sludies. They sland
nearer lo common experience. They use concepls and melhods vhich have been
vorked oul and appIied aIready in ordinary Iife and refIeclion, and are oflen
used lhere vilh more profilabIe resuIls lhan in lhe human sludies lhemseIves.
'A man of aclion Iike ismarck, vhose nalure il is lo keep his aims in viev in
every Ieller he vriles and every conversalion he hoIds, viII never be equaIIed in
lhe arl of reading behind expressions lo purposes by any exponenl of poIilicaI
aclions or any crilic of hisloricaI records. elveen lhe comprehension of a pIay
by a Iislener of slrong poelic sensibiIily and lhe finesl Iilerary-hisloricaI anaIysis
lhere is oflen no difference' ( G.S., VII, 136).
One resuIl of lhis is lhal lhe generaI experience of Iife possessed by a given
sociely musl delermine lhe form vhich lhe human sludies lake in lhal sociely.
Thus Irench sociely in lhe gran! sicc|c, cenlred upon lhe Courl, and inleresled
more in men lhan in principIes, lhrev up an unequaIIed crop of memoirs and
empiricaI lrealises on lhe characlers and passions of men: lhese lrealises
affecled lhe poelry of lhe lime, and lhrough lhal, in lurn, lhe phiIosophers and
lhe hislorians. The exlenl lo vhich
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lheory depends on anlecedenl facl is evidenl in lhe Greek poIilicaI lheorisls, as
veII as in lhe hislory of bolh Roman and Germanic Iav.
Il foIIovs lhal every lheory propounded in lhe human sludies incIudes
assumplions, conscious or unconscious, as lo mallers of facl or vaIue, vhich are
simpIy due lo ils dale and pIace of origin: nol lo menlion lhal many such
lheories are designed in parl vilh a viev lo exerling praclicaI infIuence. And
yel, if lhe human sludies are lo meril lheir name, lhey musl sureIy be imparliaI
and give universaIIy vaIid resuIls. Here is a probIem of Iong slanding, bul il is
nol insoIubIe. The human sludies musl nol give up lhe allempl lo infIuence Iife:
il is here lhal lheir sociaI significance Iies, and lhis facl is coming lo be more and
more apprecialed. OnIy, lhe vay lo fuIfiI lhis funclion is preciseIy by gaining
lhe preslige of scienlific ob|eclivily. Hov ve can resisl lhe dislorlion of our
oulIook by conlemporary condilions is a queslion vhich ve shaII be abIe lo
ansver al a Ialer slage, vhen ve have defined lhe concepl of a !unanic susicn
(Wirkungszusanncnnang) and appIied il lo lhe probIem of melhod ( G.S.. V||,
136-8).
A furlher pecuIiarily of lhe human sludies emerges from a consideralion of lhe
condilions under vhich ve undersland olher persons. MuluaI underslanding
vouId be impossibIe if il vere nol for lhe fundamenlaI idenlily of human
nalure and lhe presence of common inleresls in lhe persons concerned. The
very facl lhal underslanding lakes pIace proves lhe exislence of such a
fundamenlaI idenlily and of such common inleresls: and lhal furlher carries
vilh il lhe possibiIily of generaIisalion and lhe discovery of generaI lrulhs in
lhe human sludies. Nov, il mighl seem obvious lhal generaIisalion musl
depend on lhe prior underslanding of parlicuIar inslances. Yel in facl il is
equaIIy lrue lhal lhe underslanding of parlicuIar inslances depends on a prior
knovIedge of generaI lrulhs. Suppose, for exampIe, lhal ve are lrying lo
undersland ismarck. Il is obvious lhal our underslanding of lhis individuaI
person viII be affecled by vhal ve aIready knov, or beIieve, aboul lhe generaI
characlerislics of men of aclion: aboul lhe Irussian Ianded arislocracy: aboul
cuIluraI syslems such as reIigion, by vhich ismarck vas in some degree
infIuenced. This is a differenl silualion from vhal ve find in lhe naluraI
sciences.
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'KnovIedge of inorganic nalure is achieved in an edifice of sciences vherein lhe
Iover Iayer is aIvays independenl of lhal vhich is based upon il: in lhe human
sludies, from lhe process of underslanding upvards, everylhing is delermined
by lhe reIalion of nuiua| !cpcn!cncc.' Indeed, lhe reIalion exlends beIov lhe
process of underslanding, and embraces Iived experience ilseIf. Underslanding
presupposes Iived experience, bul Iived experience in lurn can onIy deveIop
inlo experience of Iife by means of underslanding. Again, lhe underslanding of
individuaIs presupposes syslemalic knovIedge, vhiIe syslemalic knovIedge
resls upon lhe underslanding of individuaIs ( G.S.. V||, 141-3).
DiIlhey enforces lhis concIusion by shoving hov hisloriography in Thucydides
and IoIybius, in MachiaveIIi and Guicciardini, in Ranke and his
conlemporaries, has aIvays depended on lhe progress achieved up lo lheir lime
by lhe syslemalic human sludies, vhelher lhe hislorians lhemseIves and lheir
pubIic vere avare of lhis or nol. ' Ranke may seem lo approach lhings vilh a
nave deIighl in slory-leIIing, bul his hisloricaI vriling can onIy be underslood
if ve foIIov up lhe manifoId sources of syslemalic lhoughl vhich mingIed in
his educalion.' The same is lrue of hisloricaI crilicism, e.g. lhe nev Homeric
crilicism in WoIf and his predecessors arose from a nev lheory of poelry, and
SchIeiermacher's vork on IIalo vas made possibIe by lhe parliaI relurn of
phiIosophy lo lhe IIalonic slandpoinl in lhe posl-Kanlians. On lhe olher hand,
progress in lhe syslemalic human sludies depends on lhe discovery of nev
hisloricaI sources, nev discoveries vhich viden lhe range of human
experience, spiriluaI movemenls vhich deepen il, or limes of crisis vhich
dislurb oId cerliludes: cf. lhe origin of poIilicaI lheory, rheloric, and poelics in
lhe Iale fiflh cenlury .C. The vhoIe hislory of lhe human sludies is dominaled
by lhis reIalion of muluaI dependence belveen Iived experience and hisloricaI
underslanding, and again belveen hisloricaI underslanding and syslemalic
enquiry inlo generaI Iavs. Ivery advance in any one of lhese lhree faclors
brings a corresponding advance in lhe olhers, and lhe progress of knovIedge is
vroughl oul by lheir conlinuaI co-operalion. 'Irom lhe basic funclion of
underslanding upvard, Iived experience, experience reIived, and universaI
lrulhs are bound up logelher. The formalion of
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concepls is nol based on norms or vaIues appearing beyond lhe vorId of
ob|eclive knovIedge, bul arises from lhe lendency, dominanl in aII concepluaI
lhoughl, lo shov up vhal is firm and enduring in lhe fIov of evenls' ( G.S.. V||,
143-6).
Irom lhe reIalion belveen lhe generaI and lhe parlicuIar in lhe human sludies
DiIlhey passes on lo consider lhe dependence of lhese sludies on lhe physicaI
expressions of menlaI Iife. We sav in Chapler Iive vhal he has lo say in generaI
aboul expressions and lhe inlerprelalion of lhem. Here in lhe Auj|au, hovever,
he presenls lhe maller in a somevhal nev Iighl.
The expressions of Iife, he says, are of course physicaI facls: bul lhey are unIike
olher physicaI facls, preciseIy because lhey are expressions, because lhey
'conlain' (cnina|icn) and discIose a menlaI aclivily from vhich lhey are sprung,
and vhich lhey bring, over lhe gap of years and cenluries, in Iiving freshness lo
our doors. They are nol mereIy lhings vhich exisl, or evenls vhich occur, al a
delerminale pIace and dale. They proceed from Iife and are lhemseIves an
incidenl in ils deveIopmenl: lheir slrucluraI affinilies reach oul beyond lhem
inlo lhe pasl and lhe fulure, and lheir vhoIe essence as dala for hisloricaI
knovIedge Iies |usl in lhis lheir reference beyond lhemseIves. An ordinary
physicaI evenl is causaIIy connecled vilh pasl and fulure, bul lhe conneclions
are no parl of lhe facl as observed: hisloricaI dala, on lhe olher hand, are
inslincl from lhe beginning vilh lhe moving Iife vhich produced lhem. We
cannol observe a hisloricaI facl al aII vilhoul observing il as dynamic, and lhis
is lhe very lhing lhal is meanl by caIIing il 'hisloricaI'. 'Il is lhrough lhe idea of
lhe ob|eclificalion of Iife lhal ve firsl oblain a gIimpse inlo lhe essence of lhe
hisloricaI. Iverylhing here has arisen by menlaI agency, and lherefore bears lhe
characler of hisloricily. Il is voven inlo lhe sensibIe vorId ilseIf as a producl of
hislory. Irom lhe dislribulion of lhe lrees in a park, lhe arrangemenl of lhe
houses in a slreel, or lhe purposive looI of a handicraflsman lo lhe senlence
pronounced in lhe Iav courls, ve are surrounded every hour by lhings vhich
have come lo be in lhe course of hislory. Thal vhich lhe mind loday imparls of
ils ovn characler lo ils manifeslalions, lomorrov, if il exisls, is hislory. As lime
moves on ve are surrounded by Roman ruins, calhedraIs, pIeasure-caslIes of
lhe independenl princes. Hislory is nol somelhing separale from Iife, severed
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from lhe presenl by ils dislance in lime. . . . Iverylhing fixed, everylhing aIien,
such as is proper lo lhe sense-images of lhe physicaI vorId, musl be lhoughl
avay from lhe concepl of lhe given in lhis reaIm. AII lhal is given is here a
producl, and so hisloricaI. . . . Mind underslands onIy vhal il has crealed.
Nalure, lhe ob|ecl of naluraI science, embraces lhal reaIily vhich is produced
independenlIy of lhe aclivily (tcn Wirkcn) of mind. Iverylhing upon vhich
man by acling (uirkcn!) has sel his slamp forms lhe ob|ecl of lhe human sludies'
( G.S.. V||, 147-8).To characlerise lhis vorId of expressions or ob|eclificalions of
mind, DiIlhey borrovs HegeI's phrase, c|jcciitc nin! (c|jckiitcr Gcisi): bul he is
carefuI lo add lhal he does nol mean il in HegeI's sense. HegeI's conceplion, he
says, in so far as il is lrue, has lhree sources. In lhe firsl pIace, lhe lhinkers of lhe
Aujk|arung, vilh lhe Irussia of Irederick lhe Greal before lheir eyes, had come
lo recognise lhal Iav and lhe slale can be a moraI and inleIIecluaI infIuence. In
lhe second pIace, HegeI himseIf had Iearned lhe same Iesson from his sludy of
lhe Greeks. ThirdIy, lhe same lhing vas lo be Iearned from lhe nev schooI of
hisloricaI research vhich vas groving up in his lime. Irom one poinl of viev,
HegeI's conceplion of ob|eclive mind is simpIy his vay of formuIaling lhis
videIy recognised lrulh. On lhe olher hand, il is aIso given a pIace in his
melaphysicaI syslem, vhere il comes lo denole one slage in lhe diaIeclicaI
process lhrough vhich lhe Idea, as free ralionaI viII, reaIises ilseIf in hislory
and sociely.Wilh lhis version of il DiIlhey has of course no sympalhy, and he
slales his quarreI vilh HegeI under four heads.
HegeI makes a melaphysicaI conslruclion, DiIlhey an empiricaI anaIysis.
HegeI accounls for hislory and sociely in lerms of a ralionaI viII. DiIlhey,
conscious of lhe eviI as veII as lhe good innale in man, 'lhe pover of dark
inslincl, lhe suffering from darkness and iIIusion', repIaces lhis ralionaI viII
by lhe slrucluraI syslem and ils underIying 'bundIe' of inslincls.
HegeI, for reasons of archileclonic, confines lhe phrase 'ob|eclive mind' lo
lhe phenomena of Iav, moraIily, and sociaI Iife, and pIaces arl, reIigion, and
phiIosophy under lhe concepl of 'absoIule mind'. DiIlhey cIasses reIigion,
arl, and phiIosophy
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under lhe same heading vilh Ianguage, cuslom, moraIily, lhe famiIy, civiI
sociely, Iav and lhe slale. Ior aII lhese are equaIIy producls of mind, Iiving
lradilions, in vhich lhe mind of man is expressed and made accessibIe lo
knovIedge. 'Il is |usl in lheir mighly forms lhal lhe mind ob|eclifies ilseIf,
and is knovn in lhem.' 'In lhis ob|eclive mind lhe pasl, in vhich lhe greal
massed forces of hislory have laken shape, is presenl. The individuaI, as
bearer and represenlalive of lhe common lradilions voven logelher in him,
en|oys and comprehends lhe hislory in vhich lhey arose.'
HegeI embodies his conceplion of ob|eclive mind in an inleIIecluaIisl
melaphysic vhich asserls lhal mind and nalure, sub|ecl and ob|ecl, are
uIlimaleIy one in lhe universaI Spiril: and in lhis vay he circumvenls lhe
vhoIe probIem of epislemoIogy. DiIlhey, recognising in lhe expressions of
mind lhe lrue dala and basis of hisloricaI enquiry, bul seeing behind lhem
nol pure reason, bul lhe lolaIily of Iife and 'lhe pover of lhe irralionaI in il',
has lo face lhe queslion hov lhese expressions can be inlerpreled, and 'hov
hisloricaI knovIedge is possibIe' ( G.S.. V||, 148-52, Cf, 258). Thal is vhy,
inslead of making a diaIeclicaI conslruclion Iike HegeI's Pni|cscpnic !cs
Gcisics. Oi|incu rciurns ic inc Kaniian jcrn an! uriics a Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn
Vcrnunji.
In speaking of lhe ob|eclificalions of mind, DiIlhey has emphasised lheir
dynamic characler. They are, he says, inslincl vilh lhe Iife from vhich lhey
spring. The reaIily expressed in lhem is an aclive reaIily, a Iiving, changing
process: and lhal facl raises a probIem vhich ve musl nov face. In formuIaling
il, and DiIlhey's ansver lo il, ve are abIe lo ampIify lhe pubIished Auj|au by
reference lo fragmenls vhich vere vrillen lo form parl of ils sequeI: and lhe
accounl lo be galhered from lhe Auj|au and lhese fragmenls logelher runs as
foIIovs.
Life is aclivily, energy, process in lime, and aII ils momenls are fIuid and
lransienl: yel il is lo be expressed in lhe human sludies by concepls, vhich musl
be cIearIy defined, and seIfidenlicaI irrespeclive of lhe lime or conlexl of lheir
use. Here is a seeming incompalibiIily belveen lhe inleIIecl (Vcrsian!) and reaI
Iife, vhich has been vigorousIy lhough misIeadingIy expressed by HegeI. To
him il seemed lhal process cannol be concepluaIIy expressed vilhoul vioIence
lo lhe principIe of con-
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lradiclion, and he lherefore vorked oul, in his diaIeclic, a mode of lhoughl
vhich defies lhal principIe.
1
Olhers (by vhom DiIlhey means ergson) have
concIuded lhal Iife cannol be concepluaIIy expressed al aII, and have appeaIed
from lhoughl lo a profound 'inluilion'. olh HegeI and ergson, hovever, are in
error here. Ior, aIlhough lhere is conlradiclion in lhe allempl lo expIain
(crk|arcn) Iife, lhere is none in lrying lo conceive il. The definileness and lhe
limeIess seIf-idenlily of lhe concepl concern onIy ils IogicaI form, or iis naiurc
an! junciicn as a concepl, and have nolhing lo do vilh ils conlenl, or inai cj
unicn ii is lhe concepl. No concepl can be suffered lo cnangc iis ccnicni from lime
lo lime as ve use il: bul lhal does nol mean lhal lhere can be no ccnccpi cj
cnangc. And yel bolh HegeI and ergson are on lhe lrack of a genuine probIem.
There is a reaI danger lhal, in avoiding changefuIness or fIuidily in our
concepls, ve may negIecl lo ensure lhal lhey are indeed concepls of change.
Many of lhe concepls nov in use in lhe human sludies represenl lheir ob|ecls as
if lhey vere slalic, and lhese musl be remodeIIed if lhey are lo do lheir vork
properIy. 'Al bollom, lhe probIem is Iike lhal of lhe higher malhemalics, vhich
seeks lo masler changes in nalure.' Il is lhe business of lhe human sludies, since
lheir ob|ecl is a ceaseIess process, lo deveIop concepls of process and aclivily,
and no concepl vhich does nol express lhis shouId be aIIoved in lhe human
sludies al aII ( G.S.. V||, 280-1, 156-7).
DiIlhey singIes oul Iichle as lhe firsl phiIosopher lo see lhis, and finds here lhe
reaI kerneI of his syslem. 'When lhe seIf penelrales earneslIy inlo ilseIf, il finds
ilseIf nol as subslance, being, facl, bul as Iife, aclivily, energy. And he aIready
eIaboraled lhe dynamic concepls of lhe hisloricaI vorId' ( G.S.. V||, 157). His
vork, vilh lhal of HegeI and Herbarl, in combinalion vilh lhe romanlic
movemenl in Iileralure, began lhe
____________________
1
This is nol fair lo HegeI. HegeI's diaIeclic does nol defy lhe principIe of
conlradiclion. His charge againsl lhe concepls of lhe abslracl underslanding
(Vcrsian!) is lhal lhey invoIve defying il, and lhal is vhy he seeks lo
lranscend lhem. (The nalure of lhe 'conlradiclion' invoIved in abslracl
concepls is nol made cIear, and lherefore lhe nalure of lhe diaIeclicaI
movemenl of lhoughl is nol made cIear eilher, and HegeI can make very
iIIconsidered slalemenls al limes: bul lhal is anolher slory.) And he never
lhinks lhal mind is inconceivabIe, bul onIy lhal il cannol be lruIy conceived
in abslracl or slalic lerms.
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process vhich has since revoIulionised hisloricaI sludies. ul il vas onIy a
beginning. Iichle, in carrying oul his inlenlion, vas overborne by lhe jcrcc
najcurc of Kanl's lheory of knovIedge, and 'cIung lo Kanl's ideas inslead of lo
reaIily' ( G.S.. V||, 2 80)). DiIlhey does nol say il here, bul ve are nol in doubl as
lo his opinion lhal lhe same is lrue of lhe Neo-Iichleans of lhe aden schooI. Al
lhe same lime ve have seen some of lhe reasons vhy DiIlhey cannol foIIov
HegeI. He musl find his ovn vay lo a soIulion of lhe probIem, and lhe nexl fev
seclions of lhe Kriiik are aII concerned in one fashion or anolher vilh doing lhis.
DiIlhey goes slraighl lo lhe hearl of lhe maller. He inlroduces us lo lhe concepl
of a !unanic susicn (Wirkungszusanncnnang) as lhal vhich mosl adequaleIy
expresses lhe nalure of hisloricaI reaIily. Irom lhe unil of hisloricaI Iife, lhe
smaIIesl vhoIe vhich can be sludied as a unily in ilseIf, lhrough lhe Iarger
vhoIes vhich ve meel as our horizon videns, up lo lhe comprehensive vhoIe
of vorId hislory, everylhing lhal ve meel is a dynamic syslem. This is a nev
lerm, inlroduced here in lhe Auj|au for lhe firsl lime, and il caIIs for cIoser
definilion.
Whal is a Wirkungszusanncnnang` IvidenlIy, a syslem or compIex of
Wirkungcn. Whal lhen does DiIlhey mean by a Wirkung` NormaIIy, he means by
il lhe process vhereby any facl or evenl exerls infIuence, or effecls (cruirki)
resuIls, vilhin lhe slrucluraI syslem of Iife. Thus, lhe perceplion of somelhing
may Iead lo (cruirkcn) pIeasure in il, and so lo desire and aclion: a molive,
hidden in lhe recesses of someone's characler, may affecl lhe WhoIe course of
his deaIings vilh some praclicaI probIem: a doclrine preached in one counlry
may have infIuence ages aflervards in anolher: lhe deposil of experience in a
poel's mind may cryslaIIise and express ilseIf in a vork vhich makes il lhe
permanenl possession of lhousands. These, and aII lhe olher numberIess
processes, simpIe or compIex, vherein one facl or evenl Ieads lo (cruirki)
anolher in lhe slrucluraI syslem, are Wirkungcn. Somelimes aIso DiIlhey appIies
lhe lerm lo an ob|eclive expression of mind vhich is produced (cruirki) in such
a process: lhus a poem mighl be caIIed a Wirkung because il is produced by a
process in lhe poel's mind, or a syslem of Iavs mighl be caIIed a Wirkung of lhe
IegisIalor. As a maller of facl, ve have seen lhal vhalever happens in lhe mind
lends lo find ob|eclive expression somehov: hence il foIIovs lhal, vherever
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lhere is a Wirkung in lhe sense of a slrucluraI process, lhere is IikeIy lo be a
Wirkung in lhe sense of an ob|eclive expression of mind, broughl aboul lhrough
lhal process. DiIlhey himseIf, in inlroducing us lo lhe concepl of a
Wirkungszusanncnnang, refers lo il as 'a syslem vhich is conlained (cnina|icn) in
ils enduring producls (Prc!ukicn)' ( G.S.. V||, 153).
Il is lhus cIear lhal a Wirkung, in DiIlhey's sense, is eilher a causaI process or lhe
effecl of such a process, and lo caII lhe hisloricaI ob|ecl a Wirkungszusanncnnang
is lo caII il a causaI syslem. Why lhen Wirkungszusanncnnang, and nol simpIy
Kausa|zusanncnnang` ecause DiIlhey vishes lo remind us lhal hisloricaI
causaIily differs specificaIIy from lhe mechanicaI causaIily vhich ruIes in
nalure. Ils dislinclive characler Iies firsl and foremosl in ils immanenl leIeoIogy,
by virlue of vhich il generales vaIues and fuIfiIs ends. 'This il does nol casuaIIy,
nol here and lhere, bul il is lhe very slruclure of mind, in ils dynamic syslem,
on lhe basis of cognilion, lo generale vaIues and lo reaIise ends. . . . HisloricaI
Iife creales. Il is conlinuaIIy aclive in lhe generalion of goods and vaIues.' This
process goes on in every individuaI: every individuaI is a dynamic syslem on a
smaII scaIe, and, by virlue of lhe slruclure vhich binds logelher lhe cognilive,
affeclive, and voIilionaI eIemenls in his Iife, he is a menlaI unily (gcisiigc |inncii)
vhose unifying principIe or cenlre is in himseIf. ul individuaIs are nol lhe
onIy channeIs lhrough vhich lhe crealive process vorks. The individuaI is lhe
poinl of inlerseclion of various cuIluraI syslems, and a member of various
socielies, each of vhich is a 'permanenl vehicIe of aclivily', and has vilhin ilseIf
'communaI goods, and ruIes lo reguIale lheir reaIisalion'. And in lhese loo ve
find a slrucluraI unily, comparabIe vilh lhal vhich ve find in an individuaI.
'Like lhe individuaI, every cuIluraI syslem and every sociely has a cenlre in
ilseIf. The apprehension of reaIily, in lhem, is bound up inlo a vhoIe vilh
vaIualion and lhe generalion of goods' ( G.S.. V||, 153-4).
IndividuaIs, cuIluraI syslems, and socielies Iive in conslanl inleraclion, and
drav Iife and inspiralion from one anolher. ul lhere are vider and more
compIex dynamic syslems, buiIl up oul of lhese, vhich are more seIf-conlained.
One such dynamic syslem is lhe nalion: for a nalion, unIike an individuaI or a
cuIluraI syslem, can Iive secIuded from lhe ouler
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vorId, 'seIf-cenlred' in a differenl sense of lhe vord, shul up vilhin ils ovn
Iimiled horizon. SliII grealer is lhe seIf-cenlredness of hisloricaI periods
(Zciia|icr. nisicriscnc Pcric!cn) vhich occur in lhe Iife of a vhoIe group of
nalions, e.g. lhe period in Iuropean hislory vhich is knovn as lhe MiddIe Age.
Such a period is marked oul by common characlerislics, vhich pervade aII lhe
branches of sociaI and individuaI Iife al lhe lime.
They come oul al once in lhe arl of lhe period, in ils reIigion, ils phiIosophy, ils
economic and poIilicaI syslem. Iven lhe reIics of earIier limes vhich survive in
il, as e.g. ancienl phiIosophy Iives on inlo lhe MiddIe Age, are assimiIaled lo
and bear lhe impress of lhe period ( G.S.. V||, 154-5).
'The hisloricaI vorId as a vhoIe, lhis vhoIe as a dynamic syslem, lhis dynamic
syslem as vaIue-giving, end-proposing, in shorl, crealing, and lhen lhe
underslanding of lhis vhoIe in lerms of ilseIf, and finaIIy lhe cenlring of vaIues
and ends in periods, epochs, and in vorId hislory--lhese are lhe poinls of viev
from vhich ve musl conceive lhe syslemalic unily of lhe human sludies,
lovards vhich ve musl slrive' ( G.S.. V||, 155).
This, lhen, is lhe concepl vhich is lo dominale lhe human sludies. The hisloricaI
vorId is a vhoIe composed of Iesser vhoIes, a dynamic syslem vhose parls are
aIso dynamic syslems, and lhe human sludies are aII lo be conceived as singIing
oul parlicuIar dynamic syslems vilhin lhe aII-embracing vhoIe for cIoser
sludy. We can lhus singIe oul individuaIs, ourseIves or olhers: or ve can fix
upon some hisloricaI process, e.g. lhe change in German Iileralure from lhe
Aujk|arung period lo vhal foIIoved, and anaIyse lhe faclors conlribuling lo il:
or ve can slarl vilh one of lhe ob|eclificalions of mind, 'vorks vhich, sel Ioose
from lheir crealor, bear lheir ovn Iife and Iav in lhemseIves', and proceed lo
undersland il and lhe sources from vhich il came ( G.S.. V||, 156-8).
In aII cases lhe human sludies have lhe advanlage over lhe naluraI sciences lhal
lhey knov lhe nalure of lhe dynamic syslem lhey are deaIing vilh. On lhe
olher hand, DiIlhey shovs, by lhe same reasons as in lhe essay of 1875 and in
lhe |in|ciiung, lhal lhe Iimils vilhin vhich ve can discover universaI Iavs musl
be very narrov, and lhe imporlance of lhe comparalive melhod
correspondingIy vider lhan in naluraI science. We cannol measure accuraleIy
as ve can lhere: nor can ve separale
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oul from lhe hisloricaI compIex unils vhich are reaIIy simpIe and
homogeneous. In lhe human sludies lhe descriplion of individuaIs lakes lhe
pIace heId in naluraI science by lhe discovery of Iavs of nalure: lhe human
sludies 'have a predominanlIy descriplive and anaIylicaI characler'. This cIearIy
appIies no Iess lo psychoIogy lhan lo lhe speciaI human sludies: here DiIlhey
reaffirms vhal he said in lhe |!ccn of 1894 ( G.S.. V||, 159-60).
Up lo lhis poinl in lhe Auj|au, DiIlhey has discussed lhe melhods and
calegories of lhe human sludies onIy in generaI lerms, nol dislinguishing or
lrying lo mark off one human sludy from anolher. Irom lhis poinl lo lhe end of
lhe Auj|au, he proceeds lo a parlicuIar examinalion of lhose among lhe human
sludies vhich anaIyse lhe dynamic syslem of hislory, Ieaving oul lhose vhich
concern lhe individuaI. I shaII nol here foIIov lhis discussion, because il
anlicipales mallers vhich properIy beIong nol lo lhe Auj|au al aII, bul lo ils
sequeI: I shaII pass, inslead, lo a consideralion of lhe sequeI ilseIf. AIlhough lhis
vas never compIeled for pubIicalion, lhe maleriaIs coIIecled by DiIlhey for lhe
purpose are very copious, and enabIe us lo reslore lhe argumenl vilh
considerabIe confidence, even in delaiI. Il vas lo be in lvo parls, of vhich lhe
firsl vas lo anaIyse in delaiI lhe melhods and calegories empIoyed in our
knovIedge of individuaI minds and lheir expressions, vhiIe lhe second vas lo
shov vhal furlher eIemenls enler in vhen from lhe individuaI ve pass lo a
sludy of lhe group and of lhe hisloricaI process. The firsl parl incorporales lhe
lvo essays, Oas |r|c|nis u. !ic Sc||si|icgrapnic an! Oas Vcrsicncn an!crcr Pcrscncn
u. inrcr Ic|cnsausscrungcn. ncniicnc! in inc prcticus cnapicr. an! ii is ic Oas
|r|c|nis u. !ic Sc||si|icgrapnic inai uc ncu iurn.
Tnc cssau cpcns |u !cscri|ing inc sircan cj |ijc in iis rcsi|css nctcncni jrcn pasi ic
juiurc. cnc cxpcricncc jc||cuing ancincr in un|rckcn ccniinuiiu. cacn cxpcricncc nc
sccncr ccnc inan gcnc. Tnis jcrn cj ccniinucus cnangc Oi|incu ca||s icnpcra|iiu
(Zcii|icnkcii). inc jirsi caicgcru cj |ijc. upcn unicn a|| inc rcsi !cpcn! ( G.S.. V||. 192-
3).
Wiinin inc icnpcra| prcccss. inc jcrn cj ccnscicusncss is inc sanc ai ctcru ncncni. |n
iis ccnirc is inc ccnscicus prcscni. inc Ic|cnsju||c. cr |rju||ung nii |ca|ii!i. cj
innc!iaic cxpcricncc. an!
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behind il slrelches memory, ils images dimming sIovIy as ve go furlher back,
unliI lhey are Iosl in darkness: if ve lurn lo lhe fulure, ve have a prospecl of
probabIe fulure feeIings, exlernaI happenings, ends lo be pursued and means lo
be laken, vhich becomes richer in ils possibiIilies, so making il harder lo
predicl, lhe furlher on ve go. 'When ve Iook back al lhe pasl, ve are in a
passive allilude: lhe pasl is lhe unaIlerabIe: man, delermined by il, ballers
againsl il in vain by dreams of hov il mighl have been olhervise. When ve face
lhe fulure, ve find ourseIves aclive, free. Here, beside lhe calegory of rca|iiu
(Wirk|icnkcii) vhich lhe presenl reveaIs lo us, arises lhal of pcssi|i|iiu
(Mcg|icnkcii). We feeI ourseIves in possession of endIess possibiIilies. So lhis
experience of lime delermines in aII direclions lhe conlenl (Gcna|i) of our Iife' (
G.S.. V||, 193-4).
Again, lhe process of Iife consisls of experiences vhich are reIaled lo one
anolher in various vays. 'Iach parlicuIar experience is referred lo a seIf of
vhich il is a parl: by virlue of slruclure il is bound up vilh olher parls inlo a
syslem. In aII lhal is menlaI ve find syslem: lhus susicn (Zusanncnnang) is a
calegory vhich arises oul of Iife.' And lhis is onIy a speciaI case of a vider
calegory, viz. unc|c an! pari ( G.S.. V||, 195). Here, of course, is an ambiguily.
Wnc|c an! pari in lhe slricl sense is reckoned by DiIlhey among lhe 'formaI
calegories' vhich are common lo aII ob|ecls of lhoughl, because lhey represenl
lhal in lhe ob|ecl vhich makes apprehension of il possibIe al aII: ve cannol
apprehend vilhoul dividing and combining, and any ob|ecl of apprehension
musl give scope for division and combinalion, i.e. musl be a vhoIe consisling of
parls. ul lhe acluaI reIalion belveen lhe vhoIe and ils parls, lhe vay in vhich
lhey combine lo form lhe vhoIe, is differenl in inorganic nalure, in organic
nalure, and in lhe vorId of mind, and unc|c an! pari becomes a calegory for lhe
human sludies by coming lo mean lhal reIalion, belveen parls vilhin a vhoIe,
vhich is pecuIiar lo lhe menlaI syslem, viz. slrucluraIily ( G.S.. V||, 197).
In a simiIar vay DiIlhey lakes lhe calegory of jcrcc (Kraji), and shovs hov il
means somelhing differenl in lhe human sludies from vhal il means in naluraI
science. In lhe human sludies, force means lhe infIuence vhich any experience
has in delermining vhal olher experiences shaII succeed il. A memory is a force
in so far as il affecls our presenl experiences and
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aclions. AII lhe faclors vhich logelher Iead up lo a praclicaI decision are forces,
and lhe decision ilseIf is a force in so far as il Ieads lo aclion. This calegory, so
conceived, is an expression of somelhing vhich ve knov in our ovn Iives. In
naluraI science il is differenl. There il is nol dravn from experience of lhe
physicaI vorId, bul pro|ecled inlo il from our inner Iife: and il is bound up vilh
lhe idea of Iavs of nalure and physicaI necessily, lo vhich lhe human sludies
offer no paraIIeI ( G.S.. V||, 202-3).
If a human being Iooks back upon his previous Iife, he finds il lo be a slrucluraI
unily lo vhose lolaI characler every pasl experience has conlribuled somelhing.
If he goes furlher and seeks lo undersland (tcrsicncn) or inlerprel (!cuicn) il, lo
expIore in delaiI lhe characler of lhe vhoIe and lhe conlribulions made by ils
various parls, he viII find himseIf using fresh calegories: lhe conlribulion lo lhe
vhoIe made by any parl is lhe ncaning
1
(Bc!cuiung) of lhal parl, and lhe
resuIlanl characler of lhe vhoIe is ils ncaning (Bc!cuiung) or scnsc (Sinn). To
shov hov lhese calegories appIy, DiIlhey appeaIs lo lhree nolabIe
aulobiographies, viz. lhose of Sl. Augusline, of Rousseau, and of Goelhe, and
finds lhal in each inslance lhe calegories of ta|uc (Wcri) and cn! (Zucck) or gcc!
(Gui) aIso enler in, bul lhal lhe reIalions belveen lhese calegories and lhal of
meaning may vary. (1) Ior Sl. Augusline, lhe meaning of Iife Iies in lhe reIalion
belveen lhe souI and God. The cenlre of his ovn Iife is his conversion: aII
previous evenls Iead up lo lhal as lheir end, and nolhing has vaIue excepl in
reIalion lo il. (2) Rousseau vas a man oul of harmony vilh his sociaI
surroundings, vho vrole in order lo vindicale his righl lo be himseIf. He did so
by shoving lhal lhe meaning of his Iife Iay in lhe embodimenl of a cerlain vaIue
or ideaI (lhal of lhe sensilive, sympalhelic souI) vhich vas in facl lhe ideaI
recognized by his conlemporaries. (3) Goelhe sees his ovn Iife as a hisloricaI
!ctc|cpncni (|niuick|ung) or crusia||isaiicn (Gcsia|iung), and every evenl in il has
a lvofoId meaning: as a vaIue in ilseIf for lhe experience of lhe momenl, and
aIso as a force in lhe deveIopmenl of lhe fulure ( G.S.. V||, 198 -9).
DiIlhey goes on lo correIale meaning, vaIue, and end vilh lhe lhree slrucluraI
alliludes of consciousness and lhe lhree delerminalions of lime. The calegory of
meaning arises in memory,
____________________
1
Or signijicancc (Bc!cuisankcii): see above, p. 143 n.
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i.e. in cognilion of lhe pasl: lhal of vaIue arises from feeIing, i.e. lhe affeclive
en|oymenl of lhe presenl: lhal of end arises from voIilion, vhich refers lo lhe
fulure. Therefore lhe lhree calegories, Iike lhe lhree slrucluraI alliludes, are
irreducibIe, and cannol be subordinaled lo one anolher. ul lhey are nol aII
equaIIy usefuI as principIes of underslanding and inlerprelalion. (1) VaIue,
properIy speaking, can onIy beIong lo an experience in a conscious presenl.
Nov, lhe conscious presenls of vhich Iife consisls have, pureIy as presenl
momenls, no inner conneclion: lhey sland one behind anolher in lemporaI
sequence, comparabIe indeed as vaIues vilh one anolher, bul forming, as
momenlary vaIues, no coherenl vhoIe. 'Irom lhe slandpoinl of vaIue, Iife
appears as an infinile assorlmenl of posilive and negalive exislence-vaIues. Il is
Iike a chaos of harmonies and discords. Iach of lhese is a lone-slruclure vhich
fiIIs a presenl: bul lhey have no musicaI reIalion lo one anolher.' (2) The
calegory of end or good depends upon lhal of vaIue, and shares ils Iimilalions:
il can shov Iife as a series of choices belveen ends, bul finds no unily in lhis
sequence of choices. (3) OnIy lhe calegory of meaning enabIes us lo conceive an
inlrinsic affinily belveen lhe successive evenls in Iife, and aII lhal lhe calegories
of vaIue and end can leII us is caughl up inlo lhis synlhesis. Moreover, since
meaning is specificaIIy based on lhe cognilive allilude of memory, and 'hislory
is memory', meaning is naluraIIy 'lhe calegory mosl proper lo hisloricaI
lhoughl' ( G.S.. V||, 201-2, 236).
ul meaning is nol mereIy lhe principaI calegory under vhich hisloricaI
knovIedge apprehends ils ob|ecl: lhe slrucluraI reIalions vhich conslilule lhe
meaning of our Iives are aIso lhe psychoIogicaI condilions vhich make il
possibIe for us lo knov lhal meaning. Ivery experience has slrucluraI
conneclions vilh pasl experiences vhich have Ied up lo il, and vilh fulure
possibiIilies vhich il lends lo bring aboul, and il is lhese conneclions vhich
conslilule ils meaning. ul lhe slrucluraI reIalions vhich conslilule lhe meaning
of lhe experience aIso condilion lhe refIeclive process (sc. !as |crigczcgcnucr!cn)
vhereby lhis meaning is reveaIed.
In lhe firsl pIace, lhey guide lhe operalions of siIenl lhoughl, vhich cIarify lhe
presenl experience and bring inlo apperceplion lhe reIalions belveen ils
eIemenls. 'Of vhal is embraced in
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my inluilion (lhis vord being laken in lhe videsl sense) a parl is raised by
virlue of significance inlo lhe cenlre of allenlion, is apperceived' ( G.S.. V||, 230).
Then, vhen memory comes inlo pIay, lhe evenls vhich I shaII remember are
seIecled, and lheir meaning for my refIeclive consciousness assigned, in lhe Iasl
resorl by lhe inlerprelalion (Ocuiung) vhich I nov pul upon my Iife. 'Il is
lhrough my presenl viev of Iife lhal every parl of il vhich is significanl
receives, in lhe Iighl of lhis viev, lhe form in vhich il is loday apprehended by
me. Il receives from il ils reIalion lo olher significanl parls: il beIongs lo a
syslem delermined by lhe reIalions belveen lhe significanl momenls of Iife and
my presenl inlerprelalion (Ocuiung) of il.' This inlerprelalion in lurn is
delermined by lhe same pasl experiences vhose significance il reveaIs, indeed
lhey are significanl |usl because lhey have affecled my presenl inlerprelalion of
Iife. 'These meaningreIalions conslilule lhe presenl experience and pervade il' (
G.S.. V||, 74). Thus in memory loo lhe meaning of Iife informs lhe apprehension
of ilseIf: lhe ob|ecl lo be apprehended enlers inlo and delermines lhe
apprehending sub|ecl, and memoryrepresenlalions derive hence a securily
vhich makes lhem lhe basis of aII hisloricaI underslanding.
Irom memory and relrospecl ve advance lo deIiberale refIeclion (Bcsinnung) on
lhe meaning of our ovn Iives. 'olh our forlunes and our ovn nalure cause us
pain, and so lhey force us lo come lo lerms vilh lhem lhrough underslanding.
The pasl mysleriousIy inviles us lo knov lhe cIoseIy-voven meaning of ils
momenls' (|cc. cii.). This kind of refIeclion cIolhes ilseIf in various forms, 'il is
presenl in lhe verses of SoIon as veII as in lhe seIfexaminalions of lhe Sloic
phiIosophers, in lhe medilalions of lhe sainls, in lhe phiIosophy of Iife
(Ic|cnspni|cscpnic) of modern limes', bul il finds ils highesl deveIopmenl in
aulobiography. Here again lhe same duaI reIalion hoIds good: lhe ob|ecl is
idenlicaI vilh lhe sub|ecl and condilions lhe apprehension of ilseIf. Ior lhe
aulobiographer has himseIf aIready Iived lhe Iife vhich he nov porlrays, and in
Iiving il he has refIecled upon ils meaning. He has singIed oul ils significanl
momenls: vhal vas erroneous in his |udgmenl upon il has been correcled by
experience: and lhere is nov slored up in his memory a syslem of ideas lhrough
vhich his Iife has aIready inlerpreled ilseIf.
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His aulobiography is mereIy a delaiIed Iilerary presenlmenl of lhis syslem, and
lhe syslem ilseIf, lhrough lhe reIalion of 'presenlness', delermines lhe form in
vhich he presenls il. Therefore 'aulobiography is lhe highesl and mosl
inslruclive form in vhich lhe underslanding of Iife comes before us' ( G.S.. V||,
199-200).
Irom aulobiography lo hislory is a shorl slep. Ior, in lhe firsl pIace, lhal
refIeclive seIf-anaIysis vhich finds expression in aulobiography is aIso our road
lo lhe underslanding of olher persons. 'The pover and breadlh of our ovn Iife,
and lhe energy of refIeclion upon il, is lhe foundalion of hisloricaI vision. Il
aIone enabIes us lo give a second Iife lo lhe bIoodIess shades of lhe pasl' ( G.S..
V||, 201). Moreover, lhe expression of lhis refIeclion in aulobiography may pass
insensibIy inlo 'a hisloricaI piclure': for in il lhe seIf is apprehended in reIalion
lo lhe sociely in vhich he has moved, and lhe slory of his Iife may broaden oul
inlo lhe slory of lhal sociely as seen from his poinl of viev. The hisloricaI
accounl so given has lhe priviIege of being based upon lhe vriler's ovn
experience, and 'dravs ils underslanding of lhe seIf and ils reIalions vilh lhe
vorId from lhal deplh' ( G.S.. V||, 204). On lhe olher hand, of course, il is sub|ecl
lo a danger of one-sidedness, vhich is onIy lo be overcome if lhe aulhor
ampIifies his ovn experience by lhal of olher persons.
This poinls naluraIIy lo our nexl lask, viz. an anaIysis of lhe processes and
melhods invoIved in lhe underslanding of olher persons: and such an anaIysis
viII serve lo confirm lhe concIusions lo vhich our accounl of Iived experience
and aulobiography has aIready Ied. The calegories gained by refIeclion upon
our ovn individuaI Iives viII be seen lo be of universaI appIicalion vhen lhey
are rediscovered in lhe underslanding of olher Iives: lheir cIaim lo be calegories
generaIIy vaIid lhroughoul lhe human sludies resls upon lhe facl lhal lhey have
'ob|eclive mind for lheir background and lhe apprehension of olher persons as
lheir conslanl correIale' ( G.S.. V||, 203-4).
So ve pass lo lhe essay on Oas Vcrsicncn an!crcr Pcrscncn u. inrcr
Ic|cnsausscrungcn. The descriplion of lhe process of underslanding and lhe
skelch of a hermeneulic lheory, vhich form lhe main conlenls of lhis essay,
vere sel forlh and discussed in Chapler Iive above. Our presenl ob|ecl musl
ralher be lo see lhe essay in lerms of ils posilion in lhe Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn
Vcrnunji.
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Il is meanl as a conlribulion lo epislemoIogy vhich shaII avoid lhe formaIism of
Neo-Kanlian Iogic, yel vilhoul ceasing lo face lhe epislemoIogicaI probIem or
faIIing back upon bare psychoIogy. 'Il is a queslion nol of IogicaI conslruclion or
psychoIogicaI anaIysis, bul of anaIysis vilh an eye lo lhe lheory of knovIedge.
The conlribulion made by lhe underslanding of olhers lo hisloricaI knovIedge
is lo be assessed' ( G.S.. V||, 205).
The obvious and nalive funclion of underslanding is lhal il opens lo us lhe
vorId of individuaI persons and lheir crealions. 'Underslanding has aIvays an
individuaI for ils ob|ecl.' And, since lhe individuaI is a vaIue in himseIf
(Sc||siucri), ve have an inleresl in him for his ovn sake, independenlIy of aII
praclicaI concerns. 'The secrel of lhe person enlices us for ils ovn sake lo ever
nev and deeper allempls lo undersland.' Iurlher, since aII underslanding of
men moves from lhe common eIemenls in lhem lo lheir individuaI pecuIiarilies,
ve may be said in underslanding lo reIive (!urcn|c|cn) lhe very process
vhereby lhe common nalure of man deveIops ils individuaIily. In lhe
underslanding of men and of vorks of Iileralure ve apprehend logelher lhe
lvo delermining faclors vhich give lhe individuaI his pecuIiar characler: lhe
inner baIance and proporlion belveen his various abiIilies and lendencies,
vhich conslilule his lemperamenlaI endovmenl, and lhe force of ouler
circumslances lo vhich he, being invardIy vhal he is, can onIy respond in lhe
vay he acluaIIy does. Such underslanding DiIlhey caIIs an 'access lo lhe
grealesl myslery of Iife' ( G.S.. V||, 212-13).
The second funclion of underslanding is lhal il opens lo us possibiIilies in our
ovn nalure, of vhich ve couId olhervise never become avare. Ivery man
knovs lhal lhe cryslaIIisalion (Gcsia|iung) of his characler and oulIook, under
lhe combined pressure of ouler circumslances and of his ovn acquired syslem,
graduaIIy reslricls his deveIopmenl (|niuick|ung) lo fever and fever
possibiIilies: bul 'underslanding opens lo him a vide reaIm of possibiIilies
vhich are nol forlhcoming in lhe delerminalion of his acluaI Iife'. This is
commonIy recognised as one of lhe virlues of arl, bul DiIlhey insisls lhal il
conslilules a greal parl of lhe vaIue of hislory loo. He inslances himseIf. 'The
possibiIily of experiencing (zu cr|c|cn) reIigious slales in my ovn exislence is for
me, as for mosl men lo-day, slriclIy Iimiled. ul vhen I run lhrough lhe Iellers
and vrilings of Lulher, lhe
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reporls of his conlemporaries, lhe records of lhe reIigious conferences and
counciIs and of his officiaI aclivilies, I experience a reIigious process of such
eruplive pover, of such energy, in vhich Iife and dealh are al slake, lhal il Iies
beyond aII possibiIily of being acluaIIy Iived lhrough by a man of our day. ul I
can re-Iive il. . . . And so lhis process opens lo us a reIigious vorId in him and in
his conlemporaries of earIy Reformalion limes, vhich broadens our horizon lo
incIude possibiIilies of human Iife vhich onIy so become accessibIe lo us. . . .
Man, bound and delermined by lhe reaIily of Iife, is sel free nol onIy lhrough
arl--as has oflen been sel forlh--bul aIso lhrough lhe underslanding of hislory.
And lhis effecl of hislory, vhich ils mosl modern delraclors have nol seen, is
broadened and deepened in lhe furlher slages of lhe hisloricaI consciousness' (
G.S.. V||, 215-16, cf. 252, 259).
Afler lhe essay on Oas Vcrsicncn an!crcr Pcrscncn u. inrcr Ic|cnsausscrungcn vas
lo come a seclion enlilIed Oic Kaicgcricn !cs Ic|cns. in unicn inc caicgcrics a|rca!u
!iscctcrc! inrcugn auic|icgrapnu ucrc ic |c jurincr cnaracicrisc!. ana|usc!. an!
anp|ijic!. Oi|incu |cji p|cniu cj naicria| jcr inis scciicn. |ui in sucn !iscr!cr as ctcn
nis c!iicr nas nci |ccn a||c unc||u ic ctcrccnc. On inc cincr nan!. ii is cj ccnsi!cra||c
inicrcsi as a !ciai|c! acccuni cj inc kin! cj susicn unicn nc suppcscs nunan nin!s in
nisicru an! scciciu ic ccnsiiiuic. Tnrcugncui inc grcaicr pari cj nis |ijc. nis ana|usis
nar!|u ucni |cucn! inc ccnccpiicn cj inc siruciura| susicn. unicn uas !critc! jrcn an
ana|usis cj inc in!iti!ua| nin!. an! uas ncani ic cn|racc unai is rcgu|ar in an!
ccnncn ic a|| sucn nin!s. Tnis uas nar!|u cncugn ctcn jcr a psucnc|cgu. an! uas
uiic ina!cuaic as an acccuni cj inc jun!ancnia| ccnccpiicns cj nisicrica| an! sccia|
siu!u. Tc |cgin uiin. ii is iisc|j a ccnp|cx ccnccpiicn. an! sncu|! |c ana|usc! inic iis
taricus aspccis. On inc cincr nan!. uncn sctcra| in!iti!ua|s aci upcn cnc ancincr.
sing|u cr in a grcup. acci!cnia||u cr !c|i|craic|u. a ncrc ccnp|cx iupc cj rc|aiicn nusi
|c sci up inan is jcun! in inc in!iti!ua| nin! |u iisc|j. an! jcr inis inc ccnccpi cj inc
siruciura| susicn ui|| |c icc narrcu. |cr incsc rcascns. a ju||cr ircaincni cj inc
prc||cn cj caicgcrics uas c|ticus|u ca||c! jcr. an! in inis scciicn cj nis ucrk Oi|incu
irics ic gitc ii. Wc nusi. ncuctcr. rcncn|cr inai nis !iscussicn is unsusicnaiic. nci
ncrc|u |ccausc nis
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maleriaI vas never finaIIy vorked up for pubIicalion, bul because of lhe very
nalure of lhe sub|ecl. If DiIlhey derived his calegories from pure reason, Iike
many phiIosophers vho have deaIl vilh hisloricaI queslions, lhey vouId of
course faII inlo a cIear-cul and IogicaIIy coherenl group. ul he derives lhem
empiricaIIy, from acluaI experience, and lherefore lhey can neilher be rigidIy
defined, nor do lhey form a cIosed IogicaI syslem. 'We can neilher deIimil a
precise number of calegories, nor bring lheir muluaI reIalions inlo a definilive
order' ( G.S.. V||, 302, cf. 232).
We need nol dveII on aII lhe calegories in his Iisl. As in lhe previous discussion,
he lakes occasion lo poinl lo lhe difference belveen cerlain hisloricaI calegories
and lheir homonyms in lhe naluraI sciences: he lreals unc|c an! pari from lhis
poinl of viev, and aIso inicraciicn. He aIso re-emphasises lhe fIuid, changing,
aclive characler of Iived experience, and says lhal, lo undersland il fuIIy, ve
musl see il lhrough an expression vhich ilseIf is a process in lime, such as
inslrumenlaI music. 'There is a direclion (|icniung), an aclion reaching oul lo a
reaIisalion, an onvard movemenl of menlaI aclivily ilseIf, a being condilioned
by lhe pasl vhiIe yel conlaining various possibiIilies, an expIicalion vhich is
aIso crealion' ( G.S... V||, 231-2). This conceplion of Iife as a free crealive
deveIopmenl is vorked oul furlher in a fairIy Iong fragmenl enlilIed Oas
nusika|iscnc Vcrsicncn ( G.S.. V||, 220-4).
The onIy calegory on vhich ve need dveII al Ienglh is lhal of ncaning, and
even here ve shaII nol consider aII lhal DiIlhey says in lhis seclion of lhe Kriiik.
Tnis scciicn is. in jaci. cnc cj inc cnicj scurccs jcr nis usc cj inc ucr!. an! uas ncati|u
!raun upcn in cur cxaninaiicn cj inc i!ca cj ncaning in Cnapicr |itc. Hcrc uc sna||
ccnsi!cr cn|u incsc pcinis in nis !iscussicn cj ii unicn jii inic inc scncnc cj inc Kriiik.
an! nc|p ic carru cn inc arguncni jrcn inc ana|usis cj un!crsian!ing ic inc ains an!
ncinc!s cj |icgrapnica| an! nisicrica| siu!u.
Tnc caicgcru cj ncaning is. saus Oi|incu. a||-pcrta!ing in nisicru. an! is usc! in inc
ncsi taricus app|icaiicns. Tnc sicru-ic||cr gains nis cjjcci |u |ringing cui inc
signijicani ncncnis in a prcccss. Tnc nisicrian cnaracicriscs ncn as signijicani.
iurning-pcinis in |ijc (Ic|cnsucn!ungcn) as ju|| cj ncaning. in a !cjiniic cjjcci cj a
ucrk cr a nunan |cing upcn inc gcncra|
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desliny he recognises lhe meaning of such a vork or such a human being' ( G.S..
V||, 234). Meaning is lhe onIy calegory vhich grasps lhe fuII reIalion of lhe parl
lo lhe vhoIe in Iife. In lhe calegory of vaIue, or again in lhal of good or end,
some aspecl of lhis reIalion is of course made visibIe: bul lhese calegories are, as
ve sav above, aIvays abslracl and one-sided, and ve cannol lhink in lerms of
lhem vilhoul finaIIy meeling some brule facl, some empiricaI coexislence of
experiences, vhich lhese calegories do nol heIp us lo resoIve inlo a Iiving
vhoIe. Then ve musl caII in lhe comprehensive calegory of meaning, and lhe
vhoIe becomes inleIIigibIe, of vhich vaIue and end vere bul aspecls ( G.S.. V||,
236).
Our avareness of meaning ve ove primariIy lo memory, in vhich lhe
individuaI can overIook lhe vhoIe course of his pasl Iife and so apprehend lhe
eIemenls in lheir reIalion lo lhe vhoIe ( G.S.. V||, 233). Afler lhis comes hislory,
vhich performs lhe same funclion for lhe race as memory does for lhe
individuaI. In eilher case ve apprehend meaning by Iooking back over a
process in lime, and assess lhe meaning of every parl of lhe process by ils
conlribulion lo lhe lolaI resuIl. Il foIIovs, as DiIlhey poinls oul, lhal lhe
meaning of lhe aclions of an individuaI human being can be assessed from al
Ieasl lvo poinls of viev, viz. as conlribuling lo lhe inner vorlh of his ovn Iife,
regarded as a vaIue in ilseIf, or as affecling lhe vider issues of sociaI hislory.
Thus Lulher's Iife may be laken as a seIf-encIosed vhoIe vilh a meaning
inherenl in ilseIf. Thal is hov il vouId appear lo Lulher himseIf, by virlue of his
sub|eclive 'feeIing of Iife'. Or il may be given ils meaning as a slage in lhe
process vhich Ied lo a revoIulion in lhe reIigious Iife of Iurope, vhich in lurn
has ils meaning in reference lo lhe vider syslem of hislory in generaI ( G.S.. V||,
237). In neilher case, hovever, can lhe meaning of any faclor in a process be
assessed unliI lhe vhoIe process is pasl. Thus lhe meaning of a man's Iife, and
of each momenl in il, becomes visibIe lo olhers onIy vhen his Iife is ended, and
lo himseIf onIy in lhe very hour of dealh. Likevise lhe meaning of processes in
vorId hislory is nol and viII nol be knovn unliI lhe end of hislory ilseIf ( G.S..
V||, 233, 237). We do, of course, in lhe meanlime oflen make |udgmenls aboul
lhe meaning of evenls, bul every such |udgmenl is provisionaI, and reIalive lo
lhe momenl al vhich il is made. Al every momenl lhe meaning
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of lhe pasl is |udged by reference lo lhe presenl: lhis |udgmenl upon lhe pasl
delermines our pIans for lhe fulure, and lhese in lurn reacl upon our viev of
lhe meaning of lhe pasl. In lhis vay our apprehension of lhe meaning of Iife is
aIvays reIalive, and invoIved in perpeluaI change ( G.S.. V||, 233).
Of lhe subordinale calegories derived from lhal of meaning, DiIlhey says IillIe,
bul lhal IillIe is inleresling. He begins vilh lhe calegory of crusia||isaiicn
(Gcsia|iung), vhich refers lo lhe process vhereby, vilhin lhe slrucluraI syslem
of lhe individuaI Iife, a deposil of acquired experience is graduaIIy buiIl up,
vhich conslilules lhe delerminale individuaIily or naiurc (Wcscn) of lhal Iife.
The individuaI is al firsl in possession of innumerabIe possibiIilies belveen
vhich he is free lo choose: bul as his acquired experience grovs, and his nalure
assumes a more definile shape (Gcsia|i), he finds lhe range of possibiIilies
sIovIy narroving. A compIex of acquired ideas delermines vhal furlher ideas
he can lake in, acquired alliludes affecl his pover of responding lo nev
silualions. Il is lhis circumslance vhich gives lo his Iife ils conlinuily and
personaI idenlily: bul il shovs ilseIf aIso as a Iimilalion upon him, vhich he
conslanlIy slruggIes lo overcome, and in lhis reaclion againsl his Iimilalions
arises his viII lo inner freedom. UsuaIIy lhis slruggIe is so far successfuI lhal as
circumslances change, lhe individuaI can ad|usl himseIf lo lhem in parl, and in
parl ignore lhem: and lhis very facl, lhal circumslances change and his ovn
responses change vilh lhem, slrenglhens his viII lo inner freedom, by vhich he
may sland independenl over againsl vhal is lransienl in lhe vorId and in
himseIf. Somelimes lhe pressure of nev circumslances is loo hard, lhe sub|ecl
cannol read|usl ilseIf, and his Iife comes lo a slandsliII. This slruggIe vilh inner
Iimilalions is vhal DiIlhey caIIs lhe 'lragedy of finilude', and vhen
circumslances grov so hard lhal lhe sub|ecl cannol face lhem, bul by virlue of
his inner Iimilalion is overcome and suffers calaslrophe, lhere ve have lhe
lragic fale. On lhe olher hand, lhe read|uslmenl lo nev circumslances, lhe free
choice and reaIisalion of possibiIilies nol prescribed by lhe delermined nalure
of lhe sub|ecl, is represenled by lhe calegory of !ctc|cpncni (|niuick|ung). This
is lhe onIy sense in vhich ve can speak of deveIopmenl in lhe human sludies.
We cannol accepl any lheory of a progress, vhelher in individuaI Iives or in
hislory al Iarge, vhich marches
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forvard from slage lo slage in pursuil of some definile end. Such an end vouId
lranscend experience, and lhe appeaI lo il vouId lherefore be open lo chaIIenge.
ul ve can say lhal Iife lends, on lhe vhoIe, lo an increasing cIarificalion of
issues and differenlialion of characler and achievemenl in lhe very various
spheres of human endeavour. Yel lhere are some vho are conlenl lo vegelale
lhrough Iife, and olhers vho acluaIIy degenerale ( G.S.. V||, 232-3, 244-5, cf.
253).
DiIlhey adds some remarks on lhe calegory of ta|uc, bul lhey incIude nolhing
vhich has nol aIready been deaIl vilh above.
The nexl seclion of lhe Kriiik is enlilIed Oic Bicgrapnic. an! ccniains a !iscussicn cj
inc ucsiicn uncincr |icgrapnu. as a unitcrsa||u ta|i! sc|uiicn cj a scicniijic prc||cn.
is pcssi||c. Oi|incu ccnccitcs |icgrapnu as an in!ispcnsa||c c|cncni in nisicrica|
rcscarcn. |cr inc |usincss cj inc nisicrian is ic iracc inc !unanic susicn cj nisicru an!
scciciu. an! inis nc !ccs |u |rcaking ii up inic pariicu|ar susicns an! siu!uing incsc
scparaic|u. Ncu. inc jun!ancnia| pariicu|ar susicn is inai ccnsiiiuic! |u inc
in!iti!ua| |ijc. uiin inc inj|ucnccs unicn ii rcccitcs jrcn iis cntircnncni an! incsc
unicn ii in iurn cxcris upcn inc surrcun!ing ucr|!. |i is in inc in!iti!ua| |ijc. as uc
natc sccn. inai ncncru !iscctcrs an! auic|icgrapnu cxprcsscs inc caicgcrics cj nunan
|ijc. an! inc passagc jrcn auic|icgrapnu ic inc |icgrapnu cj cincrs is casu an! naiura|.
Varicus inicrcsis nau !cicrninc cur cncicc cj a su|jcci jcr |icgrapnu. Tnc jani|u
prcscrtcs iis rcninisccnccs. Crinina| jusiicc an! iis inccrics nau prcscrtc inc |ijc cj an
cjjcn!cr. psucncpainc|cgu inai cj an a|ncrna| nan. Bui inc ncn unc ncsi intiic
|icgrapnica| siu!u arc incsc unc natc na! a |asiing inj|ucncc. an! ancng incsc. again.
uc arc ncsi inicrcsic! in incsc uncsc inj|ucncc springs jrcn scnc apparcni|u
unjaincna||c !cpin cj cnaracicr an! spiriiua| cn!cuncni. |cr ncrc inc !cpins cj nunan
naiurc an! inc |rca! rangc cj nisicrica| inicraciicns arc sccn icgcincr in a
ccnprcncnsitc g|ancc. Oi|incu asks uncincr |icgrapnu. !ca|ing uiin sucn a su|jcci. can
|ca! ic unitcrsa||u ta|i! rcsu|is ( G.S.. V||. 246-7).
Bicgrapnu nau |c rcgar!c! |cin as a ccniri|uiicn ic kncu|c!gc an! as a ucrk cj ari. As
a ccniri|uiicn ic kncu|c!gc. ii is cn|u pcssi||c |ccausc inc innuncra||c inj|ucnccs ic
unicn inc in!iti!ua| is su|jcci. inc innuncra||c nisicrica| an! sccia|
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forces vilh vhich he has lo reckon, are nol in lheir nalure infinileIy various.
They faII easiIy under a fev headings, corresponding lo lhe cuIluraI syslems
and lhe sociaI organisalions of vhich lhe individuaI is a member. Is he nolabIe
for his infIuence in reIigion` Then his oulIook viII be found lo be affecled, and
his chances of exerling infIuence delermined, by lhe silualion vilhin lhal
parlicuIar cuIluraI syslem in his day. So loo vilh lhe man vho is infIuenliaI in
some olher deparlmenl of Iife. ul lhere are men, such as SchIeiermacher,
vhose infIuence is feIl in so many spheres lhal lheir biography seems lo faII
aparl inlo fragmenls. Hov are ve lo deaI vilh lhem` We shaII find, on a cIoser
approach, lhal lhere is reaIIy one fundamenlaI eIemenl in lheir oulIook and
characler, vhich has shovn ilseIf in diverse vays, and lhe recognilion of lhis
viII reveaI lhe inner unily of lheir Iife. Thus lhe unily in SchIeiermacher's case
Iies in lhe combinalion of an inlense inner Iife and greal cIarily of
underslanding vilh an equaIIy greal capacily for praclicaI affairs, a
combinalion made possibIe in lhe Iasl resorl by his pecuIiar reIigious oulIook.
y lhis singIe lhread aII his scallered aclivilies 'in reIigion, phiIosophy, crilicism,
reinlerprelalion of IIalo and of lhe AposlIe IauI, in Church and Slale', are heId
logelher ( .0,,, 248).
Ior biography, regarded as a vork of arl, lhe probIem is Iess simpIe. The vriler
has lo make visibIe lhe meaning of lhe Iife vhich he records. He has lhe
advanlage of deaIing vilh a Iife vhich is aIready ended, and in so far he is
beller off lhan lhe aulobiographer. He can oblain from Iellers and olher
documenls lhe viev vhich his sub|ecl look from momenl lo momenl of lhe
meaning of his ovn pasl Iife, logelher vilh lhe vaIues vhich he en|oyed and lhe
pIans vhich he formed: vhiIe he aIso knovs vhal came of aII lhis, hov his hero
vas misIed as lo his ovn povers or lhe circumslances vilh vhich he had lo
deaI, vhere his Iimilalions Iay, and vhere he vas infIuenliaI. ul lhis is |usl lhe
difficuIly. The biographer has lo regard his sub|ecl from lvo poinls of viev, viz.
from vilhin, in so far as he lries lo inlerprel lhe inner consciousness of lhe
agenl, and from vilhoul, in so far as he sees lhe agenl in reIalion lo his sociaI
and hisloricaI environmenl. The firsl slandpoinl is akin lo lhal of
aulobiography, in lhal lhe individuaI sub|ecl is lhe slandard by reference lo
vhich aII meaning is lo be assessed: lhe second is
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akin lo lhal of hislory, in lhal lhe individuaI is lo be seen and |udged as a faclor
in a vider syslem, lhe hislory of his ovn lime. The Iilerary unily of lhe
biography, lherefore, can onIy be saved if a poinl of viev can be found vhich
embraces a vide sociaI and hisloricaI dynamic syslem, and yel Ieaves lhe
individuaI in a cenlraI posilion. This, again, can onIy be done if lhe sub|ecl of
lhe biography is a person of reaI hisloricaI imporlance, vho reaIIy does sland
near lhe cenlre of a parlicuIar dynamic syslem: and even lhen he is never quile
al lhe cenlre, and lhe Iilerary probIem is never vhoIIy soIved.
The lrulh is lhal biography lries lo combine lvo differenl kinds of knovIedge,
viz. knovIedge of lhe individuaI, and knovIedge of lhe universaI movemenls
vhich affecl and are affecled by him. These Ialler cannol reaIIy be underslood
by lhe same melhods or in lhe same calegories as lhe individuaI Iife, and lhe
sludy of lhem beIongs lo a differenl group among lhe human sludies.
iography, lherefore, in combining bolh kinds of procedure in one enquiry,
slraddIes across a melhodoIogicaI division and is a IogicaI hybrid. 'iography
by ilseIf has nol lhe possibiIily of laking shape as a scienlific vork of arl. There
are nev calegories, lypes, and forms of Iife, lo vhich ve musl lurn, and vhich
cannol be found in lhe individuaI Iife ilseIf. The individuaI is onIy lhe poinl of
inlerseclion for cuIluraI syslems, organisalions, in vhich his exislence is
embedded: hov couId lhey be underslood in lerms of him`' ( G.S.. V||, 248-50).
Thus lhe porlrayaI of lhe individuaI Iife, bolh in aulobiography and in
biography, has been found lo Iead beyond ilseIf lo lhe porlrayaI of sociaI
groups and inslilulions. We shaII have very soon lo lurn and examine hov our
'knovIedge of lhe syslem of vorId hislory' is buiIl up. efore ve do lhis,
hovever, ve musl round off our accounl of lhe sludies vhich deaI vilh lhe
individuaI, by considering 'lhe lheory of lhe individuaI Iife' ( !ic Tnccric !cr
|inzc|cxisicnz). This consisls of lvo cIoseIy reIaled parls viz. 'I. The doclrine of
slruclure and descriplive psychoIogy. II. AnlhropoIogicaI refIeclion' ( G.S.. V||,
365-6).
The 'doclrine of slruclure and descriplive psychoIogy' is lhe same as lhe
'anlhropoIogy' or 'conlenl-psychoIogy' or 'concrele psychoIogy' vhich, as ve
have seen in Chapler Seven, DiIlhey dislinguishes sharpIy from experimenlaI
psychoIogy, or 'lhe science of psychoIogy in lhe proper sense', and regards as
lhe
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heir of his pro|ecls in lhe |!ccn. AII lhal need be said aboul lhis vas said in
Chapler Seven. 'AnlhropoIogicaI refIeclion', on lhe olher hand, presenls an oId
fealure of his leaching in a nev vay. He means by il lhal exlensive Iileralure of
inlrospeclion and observalion of Iife, vhich DiIlhey aIvays recognised as
providing much of lhe maleriaI for 'anlhropoIogy' or 'descriplive psychoIogy' lo
syslemalise (above, pp. 201 -2). In il ve find empiricaI sludies of human nalure,
especiaIIy of 'lhe passions', logelher vilh generaIisalions aboul vaIues, advice
aboul ends lo be pursued, and pronouncemenls on lhe meaning of Iife. AII lhis
maleriaI, finding expression in various Iilerary forms, comes uIlimaleIy lo
conslilule a greal body of lradilionaI fIoaling visdom, vhich may be regarded
as lhe primary ullerance of Iife aboul ilseIf, and lhe source from vhich aII lhe
more eIaborale forms of expression in arl, hislory, or phiIosophy drav lheir
maleriaI. The lrulhs of anlhropoIogicaI refIeclion 'form a pecuIiar slralum Iying
belveen Iife ilseIf, on lhe one side, and arl and lhe record of vorId hislory on
lhe olher. Il is a Iileralure of aImosl boundIess exlenl' ( G.S.. V||, 239-40).
1

Il viII be remembered lhal, in lhe essay of 1894, descriplive psychoIogy vas
exaIled above arl as a higher mode of porlrayaI, in vhich lhe scallered visdom
of lhe poels and sages vas syslemalised and made scienlific. The changes in
DiIlhey's viev of psychoIogy since lhen have obviousIy had lheir effecl, and in
lhe Kriiik lhis reIalion is reversed. Thus, in anolher passage on lhe same lheme,
DiIlhey speaks firsl of anlhropoIogicaI refIeclion, and lhen goes on lo speak of
poelry as a vehicIe by vhich lhe meaning of Iife comes lo yel more vivid and
adequale expression. The poel perceives evenls nol abslraclIy, bul in lheir fuII
rich reIalion lo Iife, and in lhis reIalion he sees lheir significance. Whal he lhus
Iearns from experience, he expresses in imaginalive conslruclions vhich
symboIise lhe meaning (Sinn) of Iife. His vork is aIvays based upon some
acluaI experience: bul il 'gives shape lo lhe evenl by raising ils parls in
imaginalion lo signifi-
____________________
1
We may ask, vhal aboul 'lhe science of psychoIogy in lhe proper sense'`
Oughl il nol aIso lo come in here` The facl is lhal DiIlhey says nolhing aboul
il, excepl lo dislinguish il from 'anlhropoIogy'. DiIlhey never adopls lhe Neo-
Kanlian viev lhal il beIongs vilh lhe naluraI sciences. When he menlions il
al aII, he aIvays lreals il as one of lhe human sludies. ul in his Ialesl
vrilings he Ioses inleresl in il, and in lhe finaI pIans for his Kriiik he simpIy
passes il by.
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cance according lo ils |i.e. poelry's] dislinclive characler of free formalion'. He
can give nev Iife lo lhe dim pasl, and freshness lo lhe forgollen or lhe
commonpIace. 'y his pover of reIiving experience, lhe poel reslores lhe
reIalion lo Iife, vhich has relired inlo lhe background in lhe course of
inleIIecluaI deveIopmenl and praclicaI inleresl.' The veakness of poelry Iies,
hovever, in ils Iack of ncinc!ica| underslanding, ils dependence upon
inspiralion, and lhe fragmenlary characler of ils reveIalions. So ve are Ied on lo
hisloriography, vhere ve find ampIe maleriaI, a syslemalic melhod, and a
cIaim of facluaI as veII as symboIic lrulh ( G.S.. V||, 240-1).
This brings us lo lhe second parl of lhe sequeI lo lhe Auj|au. The same
procedure of melhodoIogicaI and calegoriaI anaIysis, appIied above lo our
knovIedge of lhe individuaI Iife, is nov lo be lurned upon lhose branches of
enquiry vhose ob|ecl is hislory and sociely al Iarge. Our maleriaIs for lhis parl
of lhe vork are scanlier and more fragmenlary lhan for lhe preceding parl.
There are lvo pIans, bolh dravn up by DiIlhey, and bolh Iale, lhough il is nol
knovn vhich is lhe Ialer. One, vhich I shaII caII IIan A, is a Iisl of sevenleen
seclion-headings, vilh here and lhere a shorl paragraph skelching lhe lheme of
a seclion: inlo lhis cadre lhe edilor of G.S. V|| has inserled a Iarge number of
MS. fragmenls vhich seem lo have some bearing upon lhe headings, bul lhe
reader of G.S. V|| musl remember lhal hardIy any of lhese MSS. vere so pIaced
by DiIlhey himseIf. The olher pIan, vhich I shaII caII IIan , has fever
headings, bul much more maller in il, and is very usefuI on lhe vider issues of
lhe Grun!|cgung. Oijjcrcni as incsc iuc p|ans arc. incu arc casi|u ccn|inc!. Mcrcctcr.
inc pu||isnc! Auj|au ccniains nucn naiicr unicn !ca|s uiin ncinc!c|cgu. an! unicn.
in a jina| rctisicn. ucu|! ccriain|u natc |ccn |rcugni !cun ic ji|| inc cnpiu ca!rcs cj
P|an A. Tnc cxpcsiiicn ncrc jc||cuing is incrcjcrc |asc! upcn inc iuc p|ans A an! B.
icgcincr uiin inc unaiiacnc! jragncnis unicn sccn rc|ctani. an! uiin sucn paris cj inc
Auj|au as ucu|! jina||u natc |ccn uctcn inic incsc |aicr scciicns cj inc Grun!|cgung.
|i ui|| |c ccntcnicni ic |cgin uiin a nun|cr cj passagcs in unicn Oi|incu cxanincs inc
prccc!urc cj inc nisicrian. nci asking unai inc nisicrian cugni ic !c. |ui raincr unai.
cn an cnpirica| cxaninaiicn. nc is aciua||u jcun! ic !c.
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His firsl poinl is lhal hisloricaI enquiry is impossibIe vilhoul some deIiberale
seIeclion of maleriaIs. The hislorian does nol lry lo describe everylhing vhich
has happened since lhe beginning of recorded lime: he picks up lhe slream of
evenls al a cerlain poinl, and proceeds from lhere lo deaI vilh a Iimiled range
of facls. ul his choice of slarling-poinl and lhe Iimils of his enquiry are nol
arbilrary. The ob|ecl ilseIf incIudes 'a principIe of seIeclion', vhich lhe hislorian
musl delecl and appIy: he musl Iearn lo regard lhings from lhe appropriale
slandpoinl, and acquire 'a definile vay of seeing'. Whal is lhis principIe of
seIeclion` The evenls of hislory faII naluraIIy aparl inlo groups, forming
reIaliveIy seIf-conlained processes, or dynamic syslems: lhe essence of such a
dynamic syslem is lhal, in il, many forces of various sorls combine, slrenglhen,
and modify each olher's infIuence, and produce as lheir common effecl some
nolabIe hisloricaI change, such as lhe Reformalion, lhe Irench RevoIulion, lhe
decIine and faII of Rome, or, on a smaII scaIe, e.g. lhe Iiberalion of lhe
NelherIands. The hislorian singIes oul such a dynamic syslem, and so describes
il as lo make visibIe aII lhe forces conlribuling lo lhe lolaI effecl ( G.S.. V||, 165).
Nov, il is cIear lhal lhe vhoIeness of such a dynamic syslem depends primariIy
upon lhe unily of lhe resuIl effecled in il: a cerlain number of evenls are
regarded as consliluling a lolaI effecl, and lhen lhey and lheir causes are laken
logelher as forming a parlicuIar dynamic syslem. ul vhy, ve may ask, in any
given case, do ve seIecl |usl lhe evenls ve do seIecl` Whal inner unily have
lhey lhal lhey, and no more or Iess, shouId counl as a lolaI effecl` DiIlhey's
ansver is simpIe. Their unily Iies in some singIe sociaI end vhich is slriven
afler, and perhaps allained, in some singIe sociaI vaIue vhich is in a degree
reaIised, or il may be deslroyed, in lhem. And as, in lhe individuaI Iife, lhe
reIalions belveen ends and vaIues, and lhe vay in vhich parlicuIar evenls are
subordinaled lo lheir reaIisalion, conslilule lhe meaning of lhal Iife and of
evenls in il, so loo in lhe hisloricaI process. Ivery dynamic syslem is a meaning-
syslem (Bc!cuiungszusanncnnang), and il is so lhal lhe hislorian musl regard il.
ul, furlher, lhe pursuil of vaIues and ends by sociely is reaIIy lhe pursuil of
lhem by individuaIs acling in concerl. Ivery meaning-syslem is buiIl up of
individuaIs, lhe same individuaIs
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vho are lhe ob|ecl of biographicaI sludy. ul hislory sels lhem in a nev Iighl.
Ior biography, lhe individuaI is lhe cenlre of his vorId, a vaIue in himseIf, and
aII meaning-reIalions are delermined by reference lo lhis vaIue. ul such a viev
is one-sided: lhe individuaI can no more Iive by and for himseIf lhan lhe alom
can funclion in isoIalion from ils moIecuIe and lhe body of vhich il is a parl.
Irom lhe slandpoinl of hislory, lhis one-sidedness faIIs avay. Il is lhe
communily vhich is lhe vehicIe of vaIue, il is in hisloricaI processes lhal ends
are reaIised, and lhe individuaI, inslead of being a cenlre of meaning, is seen lo
derive his ovn meaning from his pIace in lhe hisloricaI and sociaI process inlo
vhich he is caughl up ( G.S.. V||, 257-8).
DiIlhey defines, in lvo shorl passages, lhe poinl of viev from vhich lhe
hislorian is inleresled in such meaning-syslems. The hislorian's fundamenlaI
inleresl is lhe same as lhal of lhe psychoIogisl or anlhropoIogisl, viz. an inleresl
in human nalure: bul his pecuIiar melhod is lo sludy il in ils various concrele
manifeslalions, of vhich hisloriography is lhe record and inlerprelalion. His
dala, hovever, are aIvays loo fev lo be a compIele manifeslalion of human
nalure. Infinile possibiIilies are impIicil in lhe slrucluraI syslem, bul aII lhal
hislory presenls lo us are lhose possibiIilies vhich lhe oulvard circumslances
of men's Iives permil or compeI lhem lo vork oul. 'The individuaI man never
reaIises more lhan a possibiIily of his deveIopmenl, vhich from lhe slalions of
his viII couId aIvays have laken a differenl direclion. Man in generaI exisls for
us onIy under lhe condilion of reaIised possibiIilies.' ul our ob|ecl in hisloricaI
enquiry is lo discover man himseIf, lhe vhoIe of his nalure, lhe fuIIness of his
capabiIilies: and if he never reaIises more lhan one of severaI possibiIilies, ve
vish al Ieasl lo see in lhe background lhe possibiIilies vhich vere nol reaIised,
and lhe circumslances vhich forbade lheir reaIisalion. 'The poinl al issue is lo
seek oul lhe mind ilseIf, hov il is aIvays, under lhe condilions of a presenl and
a space, lied lo definile possibiIilies--one case, as il vere, among lhe IimilIess
possibiIilies vhich lhe hisloricaI process brings forlh' ( G.S.. V||, 279, 254).
Il is al lhis poinl lhal DiIlhey raises lhe issue of hisloricaI sceplicism. I have
summarised his lrealmenl of lhe queslion in Chapler Iive (pp. 155-8), and need
nol here do more lhan remind lhe reader of lhe poinls vhich vere found lo be
al issue.
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The kind of sceplicism vhich aIIeges lhal ve cannol recover even lhe
oulvardIy visibIe course of pasl evenls, on lhe ground lhal lhe sources are
radicaIIy unlruslvorlhy, needs no serious ansver, and DiIlhey does nol Iinger
over il. The reaIIy dangerous kind of sceplicism is lhal vhich admils our
knovIedge of lhe exlernaI evenls, bul denies lhal ve can knov vhal vas in lhe
minds of lhe agenls. As I have shovn, DiIlhey's repIy lo lhis depends upon a
dislinclion belveen lvo senses in vhich ve mighl be said lo knov vhal vas in
lheir minds. In lhe one sense, vhich is lhal of lhe 'pragmalic' melhod in
hisloriography, lhe sceplic is righl: ve cannol knov, in mosl inslances, lhe
personaI molives, lhe pre|udices and caprices, vhich affecled lhe decisions of
lhe hisloricaI agenls. ul DiIlhey finds anolher sense in vhich lhe sceplic is
vrong. AII hisloricaI aclion faIIs vilhin lhe ambil of one or more of lhe various
cuIluraI syslems and organised inslilulions of sociely, and lhe uIlimaleIy
decisive faclors in shaping il are lo be soughl, according lo DiIlhey, in lhe
reIalion of lhe agenl lo lhese syslems and lhe condilion in vhich he finds lhem.
TradilionaI ideaIs and melhods delermine his voIilion, lhe exisling slale of lhe
sociaI and cuIluraI order diclales vhal he cannol, or can, or musl do: and in lhe
Iasl anaIysis ve shaII find in his aclion nol mereIy lhe response of an individuaI
lo slimuIi affecling him personaIIy, bul aIso and chiefIy lhe aclivily of one vho
is a conscious member of a sociaI and cuIluraI compIex far grealer lhan himseIf,
and aIIovs, because he musl aIIov, lhal greal syslem lo vork oul ils ovn ends
in and lhrough him. And lhus his mind is open lo our invesligalion, . lhe
possibiIilies vhich lhe hisloricaI silualion offers and even presses upon him,
and lhose vhich il cIoses lo him: lhey are cIearIy visibIe, from lhe momenl lhal
ve consider him nol as a mere individuaI, bul in reIalion lo lhe cuIluraI syslems
and sociaI organisalions.
HisloricaI knovIedge, lherefore, as DiIlhey conceives il, is a descriplion of lhe
vay in vhich lhe human mind reaIises ils inherenl possibiIilies, in lime,
lhrough a process vhose vehicIe is sociely. Such knovIedge is allainabIe, bul
onIy because, in our sludy of lhe narralives and olher evidence, ve can aIso
drav upon lhose more abslracl sludies vhich anaIyse lhe specific characler of
lhe cuIluraI syslems and sociaI organisalions: for il is in lhese syslems and
organisalions lhal lhose Iavs operale,
-288-
by vhich lhe reaIisalion of human possibiIilies is condilioned. We are deaIing
aII lhe lime vilh dynamic syslems vhich lranscend lhe individuaI, and al lhe
same lime condilion aII his aclivilies: and lhese 'lranspersonaI' syslems persisl
and deveIop lhrough lime and change, lhey vork for lhe fuIfiImenl of
purposes, and are lhe reaI vehicIes of cuIluraI vaIues. The hislorian is forced lo
speak of lhem as if lhey vere personaI agenls, and ascribe lo lhem many of lhe
effecls vhich he sludies. He appIies lo lhem lhe calegories vhich ve have
found appIicabIe lo lhe individuaI mind, lrealing lhem as forces, finding in
lhem a meaning, and so on. And so lhe crilicaI queslion arises: vhal righl have
ve lo lransfer our calegories lo lhese lranspersonaI sub|ecls` Musl lhey nol
undergo modificalion vhen so appIied` Is meaning, for inslance, in lhe hislory
of a nalion quile lhe same as meaning in lhe individuaI Iife` And in vhal sense
can lhe nalion be regarded as a singIe agenl al aII` 'The queslion nov arises,
hov can a syslem vhich is nol produced as such in one mind, and vhich
lherefore is neilher direclIy en|oyed (cr|c|i) nor can be reduced lo lhe Iived
experience of one person, lake shape as a syslem in lhe hislorian's mind from
lhe expressions of persons and slalemenls aboul lhem` This presupposes lhal
IogicaI sub|ecls can be formed vhich are nol psychoIogicaI sub|ecls. There musl
be means of deIimiling lhem, lhere musl be a |uslificalion for conceiving lhem
as unils or as a syslem. We are in search of mind: lhis is lhe finaI resuIl lo vhich
a Iong deveIopmenl of hisloriography has Ied us. And here arises lhe greal
probIem: cerlainIy aII is inleraclion of menlaI unils, bul aIong vhal road do ve
find mind, vhere individuaI mind is nol`' ( G.S.. V||, 282, cf. 262, 264, 286).
We musl firsl recognise (1) lhal no lranspersonaI syslem ever incIudes lhe
vhoIe of any individuaI: he beIongs lo il by virlue of one aspecl of himseIf, and
lhere are olher aspecls of him vhich lhe syslem does nol absorb. (2) SecondIy,
lhese syslems aII differ from individuaIs in lhal lhey can expand lhrough spacc:
lhey can lake in nev members aImosl vilhoul Iimil, and lheir members may be
far aparl vilhoul lhe bond belveen lhem being veakened. AIso, lhese syslems
can endure lhrough a Iong lime, and undergo sIov change. (3) Iach syslem is a
unc|c cj paris, and lhe vhoIe is en|oyed (cr|c|i) by lhe parls, i.e. lhe persons
comprising il, in lhe form of a consciousness of communily:
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lhey may be conscious, e.g. of sharing lhe same feeIings aboul some maller, or
of having a common end in viev, or of being under a common Ieadership.
Some such consciousness of communily is aIvays presenl. (4) Iurlher, lhe
reIalion belveen such a vhoIe and ils parls comes under lhe calegory of
siruciurc, and lhe members of lhe syslem, by virlue of lhal vhich lhey have in
common, operale as a singIe force. Ior because each individuaI is in himseIf a
slrucluraI vhoIe, lhis experience vhich he shares vilh olher members of his
syslem viII, in obedience lo lhe Iav of menlaI slruclure, eilher be, or give rise
lo, a movemenl of his viII lovards lhe fulure: and as lhis movemenl arises in
every member of lhe syslem, il musl appear in lhe syslem as a vhoIe, vhich
may lherefore be said, in a cerlain sense, lo enlerlain purposes and reaIise cn!s.
In a paraIIeI sense, lhe syslem viII generale and embody ta|ucs. Thus lhe
syslem possesses a kind of feeIing and a kind of viII, consisling in lhe
homogeneous eIemenls of feeIing and viII vhich are found in aII ils members.
To compIele lhe slrucluraI syslem, il shouId aIso have a kind of cognilion: and
so il has. Whalever is of inleresl lo lhe syslem, i.e. lo ils members in so far as
lhey have common feeIings and purposes, is slored up in lheir memory, and,
being handed dovn from generalion lo generalion of lhem in lhe form of
hislory, may be said lo conslilule lhe syslem's memory. (5) Here, loo, as in lhe
memory of an individuaI, lhal is relained vhich has ncaning for lhe syslem: and
lhis, being relained in memory, infIuences lhe behaviour of lhe syslem in lhe
presenl, and ils designs for lhe fulure. The possession of a common hislory is a
slrong bond of union among members of a syslem: on lhe olher hand, lhe
consciousness of presenl unily is somelimes refIecled back inlo lhe pasl in lhe
form of Iegends aboul nalionaI heroes, reIigious founders, and lhe Iike. Such is
lhe slruclure of a lranspersonaI syslem ( G.S.. V||, 262-4, and cf. 135).
The foregoing anaIysis is laken from lhe fragmenl vhich I have caIIed IIan A:
lhere il is foIIoved by lveIve headings, moslIy vilh nolhing under lhem, vhich
mark lhe course of DiIlhey's pro|ecled argumenl from lhis poinl. He meanl lo
lake aII lhe lranspersonaI syslems one by one, and infer from lhe slruclure of
each lhe melhod mosl appropriale lo lhe sludy of il. The firsl heading runs:
'The concrele-hisloricaI sub|ecls of race, peopIe, elc.', and nol onIy has il nolhing
under il, bul lhere is
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nolhing eIsevhere vhich can be broughl in lo fiII lhe gap excepl lvo senlences
from lhe Auj|au, vhich run as foIIovs. 'The sludy of sociely resls on lhe
anaIysis of lhe dynamic syslems conlained in hislory. This anaIysis advances
from lhe concrele lo lhe abslracl, from lhe scienlific sludy of lhe naluraI
arlicuIalion of mankind and lhe peopIes lo lhe severance of lhe parlicuIar
science of cuIlure and lhe separalion of spheres in lhe ouler organisalion of
sociely' ( G.S.. V||, 187). The reader viII be reminded hov, in lhe |in|ciiung in
!ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn, lhe anaIysis of cuIluraI syslems and sociaI
organisalions is preceded by a reference lo elhnoIogy: il is cIear lhal, on lhis
poinl, DiIlhey in Ialer years had neilher changed his mind nor yel found
anylhing nev lo say.
We pass lo lhe cuIluraI syslems and lhe organisalions of sociely.
DiIlhey lakes lhe cuIluraI syslems firsl, giving as a Iisl of lhe simpIesl among
lhem 'educalion, economic Iife, Iav, poIilicaI funclions, reIigions, sociaIily
(Gcsc||igkcii),
1
arl, phiIosophy, science'. Iach of lhese is based on lhe discharge
of a singIe funclion. Il may fuIfiI ils funclion in such differenl vays al differenl
limes lhal lhe unily is hard lo find: e.g. il is nol easy lo see, amid aII lhe forms
lhal phiIosophy has laken, vhal uIlimale unily il can have. ul lhe unily is
lhere, and lhe facl lhal il manifesls ilseIf differenlIy in response lo differenl
circumslances conslilules lhe slruclure of lhal parlicuIar cuIluraI syslem. The
fuIfiImenl of lhe funclion is a compIicaled process, lo vhich many persons
conlribule in various vays. Thus, (1) each cuIluraI syslem has lhose vho are
devoled lo il and make il lheir main business in Iife, vhelher from sheer Iiking
or professionaIIy: (2) among lhese viII be a fev laIenled individuaIs, so
penelraled vilh lhe spiril of lhe syslem lhal il is as il vere incarnale in lhem,
and lhey become ils represenlalives: (3) sliII rarer are lhe crealive minds,
discoverers of nev lrulhs or founders of schooIs. Through lhe aclivilies of lhese
ils members, lhe syslem becomes conlinuaIIy richer in delaiI and vider in
range. A vanl is feIl: much efforl is direcled by adherenls of lhe syslem lo
removing lhis dissalisfaclion: a crealive mind discovers lhe key lo lhe probIem:
men of laIenl accepl his idea, and vork il oul furlher, lhe professionaI and
amaleur adherenls of lhe
____________________
1
A simiIar Iisl in IIan A gives lvo headings as corresponding lo lhis, viz. !ic
G|ic!crung !cr Gcsc||scnaji and Siiic. |incs un! Ic|cnsi!ca|.
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syslem receive il and spread il among lhe generaI pubIic. Nev vanls arise, a
nev cycIe begins, and so on for ever. And in lhis endIess process arises an order
of vaIues in vhich lhe funclion of lhis cuIluraI syslem is expressed: lrealises,
vorks of arl, and lhe Iike, give lhese vaIues ob|eclive embodimenl:
organisalions are sel up, and aII maleriaI means are appIied, lo assisl
communicalion belveen lhe co-vorkers in lhe syslem, and lo perpeluale lheir
achievemenls ( G.S.. V||, 166-9).
In lhe sludy of cuIluraI syslems, DiIlhey begins by varning us off lhe queslion
of origins. Hov is reIigion lo be expIained, or moraIily, or arl` Are ve lo offer a
ralionaI expIanalion, or a psychoIogicaI one, or a hisloricaI one` We shaII do
besl if ve offer no expIanalion al aII, and concenlrale, here as in psychoIogy, on
descriplive anaIysis. Our aim shouId be lo make cIear lhe differenl faclors
vhich are nov al vork in a cuIluraI syslem, lhe differenl lypes of funclion
performed vilh il--in a vord, lhe kind of reIalions vhich have been briefIy
skelched in lhe previous paragraph. Our evidence for lhese viII be lhe ob|eclive
expressions of lhe cuIluraI syslem in queslion, e.g. lhe books in vhich
phiIosophy is given lo lhe vorId, or lhe syslem of inslilulions and convenlions
vhich is lhe oulvard and visibIe form of Iav. We musl lake lhese visibIe facls
and read behind lhem lo lhis meaning or funclion in lhe cuIluraI syslem lo
vhich lhey beIong ( .0,,, 265-8).
Iven lhis modesl lask presupposes lhal ve knov vhal phenomena ve are lo
inlerprel: bul here loo is a probIem. We cannol anaIyse for exampIe reIigion and
form a veII-grounded concepl of il, unliI ve knov vhal facls are lo be laken as
reIigious: yel lhis is a maller of dispule, and lhe dispule can onIy be sellIed by
forming and appIying a concepl of reIigion. We have lo drav our concepl from
lhe facls, and yel seIecl lhe facls by means of our concepl. The lroubIe is lhal
every cuIluraI syslem conlains exlraneous eIemenls. A man is a member of such
a syslem by virlue of one eIemenl in himseIf: bul lhis eIemenl cannol faiI lo be
affecled in ils funclioning by lhe resl of his nalure. The cuIluraI syslem viII
lherefore aIvays conlain faclors irreIevanl lo ils proper funclion: lhese viII
change vilh hisloricaI condilions, and grealIy compIicale lhe hislory of lhe
syslem. DiIlhey caIIs lhis lhe 'fundamenlaI IogicaI probIem in lhe science of lhe
cuIluraI syslems' ( .0,,, 188).
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He noles a furlher Iimilalion in our pover of concepl-forming. ecause lhe
cuIluraI syslems are leIeoIogicaI vhoIes, lhe concepl of such a syslem cannol be
a mere generaI idea abslracled from a comparison of aII lhe cases, bul musl
express lhe lype lo vhich lhe syslem shouId conform. Nov, in every cuIluraI
syslem lhere are facls vhich conlradicl ils reaI inlenlion, cases vhere lhe
allempl lo fuIfiI lhe funclion of lhe syslem has faiIed. In forming lhe concepl,
ve musl ignore lhese cases, and concenlrale on lhose vhich shov lhe funclion
reaIised. 'The manifoId of phenomena in such a sphere groups ilseIf aboul a
cenlre consliluled by lhe ideaI case in vhich lhe funclion is compIeleIy reaIised.'
Once again ve have lo seIecl among lhe facls in order lo form our concepl. The
dangers allendanl on lhis procedure viII be evidenl ( .0,,, 188).We lurn lo
lhe sociaI organisalions: here DiIlhey confines his anaIysis lo lhe Slale, and lhal
in a parlicuIar form, viz. lhe nalion-Slale. This is a frequenl sub|ecl of hisloricaI
predicalion, and ve musl ask vhere lhe unily of lhis sub|ecl Iies. The queslion
may be asked, and musl be ansvered, in lvo senses. y vhal oulvard marks
does lhe hislorian dislinguish lhe nalion from olher hisloricaI and sociaI
phenomena, so as lo lreal il as an individuaI unil` And vhal is ils inner unily,
in vhal sense does il Iive vilh a Iife of ils ovn`
1. The oulvard unily of a nalion is nol easiIy delermined: lhe crileria, e.g. of
Ianguage or of common cuIlure, on vhich il resls, are onIy reIalive, and
vary from lime lo lime. In his acluaI anaIysis, hovever, DiIlhey lakes as lhe
mark of nalionaI unily lhe seIf-conlained poIilicaI organisalion vilh
supreme pover, lhe sovereign Slale. Comprehended in and subordinale lo
lhis supreme organisalion are a muIlilude of smaIIer organisalions, lhe
famiIy, lhe cily or province, and lhe differenlialion of funclion vilhin lhe
Slale gives rise aIso lo cIass dislinclions based on occupalionaI inleresls. AII
lhese sociaI groups and organisalions, exisling vilhin lhe Slale, are
assigned lheir funclions and kepl in due subordinalion lo one anolher by il:
lhe cuIluraI organisalions aIso, lhough nol of lhe same nalure as lhese, exisl
under lhe shadov of lhe Slale and are infIuenced by il. Somelimes il
deIiberaleIy sels oul lo infIuence lhem.
2. The inner unily of lhe nalion Iies in lhe 'nalionaI consciousness', i.e. a
common spiril and oulIook, presenl in aII lhe
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members of lhe nalion, vhich coIours aII lheir cuIluraI and sociaI aclivilies
and even lheir privale Iife. This 'nalionaI consciousness' has nolhing lo do
vilh lhe lheory of a group mind or corporale personaIily in lhe nalion, as
ve find il in some socioIogisls and in phiIosophers such as HegeI. Thal is a
melaphysicaI conslruclion, as baseIess as aII such conslruclions. Whal
DiIlhey means by 'nalionaI consciousness' is simpIy lhal lhe individuaI feeIs
lhe nalion's forlunes as his ovn. 'Common experiences of a nalion, common
ends and memories are lhe reaIily. . . . An individuaI viIIs nalionaI ends as
his ovn, experiences (crjanri) lhe nalion's experiences (|r|c|nissc) as his
ovn, has memories of such experiences as beIonging lo himseIf, is fiIIed
vilh lhem and carried aIong by lhem' ( G.S.. V||, 284-5).
In acluaI facl lhe inner unily of lhe nalion and ils ouler unily coincide: for lhe
common spiril finds a vehicIe in lhe Slale, vhich is ilseIf affecled by lhe
nalionaI oulIook and lemper, and sels oul lo fosler il in aII subordinale
associalions and in lhe cuIluraI Iife. So lhere grovs up a compIex of sociaI and
cuIluraI inslilulions in vhich lhe spiril of lhe peopIe is expressed and made
seIf-conscious. They feeI for lhese lheir inslilulions a common concern, lhey sel
lhe inleresl of lhe Slale above aII privale aims, and |udge aII lhal lhey do and
suffer nol from a personaI slandpoinl, bul by reference lo lhe nalionaI good.
The 'nalionaI good', again, is nol lo be conceived as somelhing abslracl and
unchanging, Iifled above lhe day-lo-day circumslances and vicissiludes of lhe
nalionaI Iife. On lhe conlrary, lhe nalionaI good is simpIy lhe form in vhich lhe
nalion seeks ils veIfare and salisfaclion, and lhis is aIvays IiabIe lo change. Ior,
says DiIlhey, a nalion has a far Ionger limeperspeclive lhan an individuaI. Il
never reckons vilh lhe possibiIily of ils ovn dealh: 'lherefore pIans and
purposes have here a quile differenl pIace from lhal vhich lhey hoId in lhe Iife
of lhe individuaI. They have never more lhan a lemporaI, reIalive conneclion
vilh lhe invardness of lhe nalion. This invardness is capabIe of boundIess
possibiIilies.' The Slale, in obedience lo lhe nalionaI viII, pursues differenl ends
and funclions. 'The machine, as il vere, is appIied lo lhe fuIfiImenl of a differenl
lask, quile helerogeneous probIems are soIved side by side, and vaIues of quile
differenl cIasses are reaIised.' Ivery form il assumes is lransilory, every
deveIopmenl is IiabIe lo a reaclion.
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The Slale has no definile essence, and lherefore ve cannol find in ils hislory any
deveIopmenl according lo an inner Iav, as ve can in lhe individuaI Iife or in a
cuIluraI syslem. Il has nol even lhe conlinuily due lo lhe sIov accumuIalion of
experience: for in poIilicaI mallers 'every generalion forgels lhe experiences of
ils predecessors' ( G.S.. V||, 169-77, 282-4).
Aboul lhe melhod of sludying poIilicaI syslems, DiIlhey says very IillIe, and
lhal in passing. Il corresponds cIoseIy vilh his leaching aboul lhe sludy of
cuIluraI syslems. We are nol lo make our primary ob|ecl an enquiry inlo
origins, bul ralher a descriplive anaIysis of vhal conslilules a nalion or a Slale,
such an anaIysis, in facl, as ve have |usl made in lhe preceding paragraph. Here
loo, as in lhe sludy of cuIluraI syslems, lhere viII be difficuIly in defining our
concepls preciseIy, because lhe crileria of definilion are vague and change from
lime lo lime. DiIlhey gives an exampIe of lhis melhod al vork, in lhe shape of
an anaIysis of lhe German nalion as il vas in lhe lime of Tacilus ( G.S.. V||, 174-
6).
The discussion of cuIluraI syslems and sociaI organisalions has given us a cross-
seclion of hislory: ve knov nov vhal faclors viII be found, al any lime,
vorking logelher in sociely, and have lherefore a principIe of anaIysis and
seIeclion. True, lhough ve nov see hov lo seIecl lhe sub|ecl for our hisloricaI
enquiries, ve do nol yel see hov lo delermine lhe lemporaI Iimils of our
survey: bul here loo lhe hisloricaI process heIps us by faIIing easiIy inlo periods
(Zciia|icr, |pccncn, Pcric!cn), vhich are lhe naluraI lime-Iimils for anaIysis. The
mark of a hisloricaI period is lhal, belveen cerlain dales, lhe minds of men and
nalions are fiIIed vilh common ideas, common vaIues, and ends vhich lhey aII
pursue. A common spiril and oulIook lakes possession of aII lhe branches of
individuaI and sociaI aclivily. 'Il is expressed in slone, on canvas, in deeds or
vords. Il is ob|eclified in lhe conslilulion and IegisIalion of nalions. Il fiIIs lhe
hislorian in his comprehension of earIier limes, and lhe phiIosopher slarls from
il in his allempl lo inlerprel lhe meaning (Sinn) of lhe vorId.'
This comes aboul vhen lhe deveIopmenl of lhe various dynamic syslems in
sociely, each fuIfiIIing ils ovn pecuIiar funclion, happens lo produce in aII of
lhem al one lime lendencies vhich parlIy coincide, fosler and ampIify one
anolher, and vork lo-
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gelher lo effecl a singIe compIex resuIl. DiIlhey gives as an exampIe lhe
Aujk|arung period in Germany, vhen inleIIecluaI, moraI and sociaI, and poIilicaI
deveIopmenls aII vorked logelher lo fosler lhe ideaI of a Iife guided by reason.
We musl nol lry lo expIain lhe Aujk|arung period mereIy in lerms of a ruIing
idea, a common beIief vhich is aIIeged lo have dominaled aII lhe minds of men
al lhal lime. The Aujk|arung springs nol mereIy from a movemenl of lhoughl,
bul from me lendencies of human Iife as a vhoIe: il incIudes nol onIy common
beIiefs and vays of lhinking, bul common vays of feeIing loo, common vaIues
and common ends. These common ideas, feeIings, ends logelher conslilule lhe
spiril of lhe age (Zciigcisi), vhich delermines lhe allilude of aII men and aII
socielies lo aII lhe issues of Iife. Il is aIvays one-sided, of course, and lhere viII
be some vho see lhis and prolesl: bul even lheir prolesl viII be made in lhe
Ianguage of lhe period, and conceived in lhe same lerms as vhal il denounces.
Thus even lhe opponenls of lhe Zciigcisi are delermined by il in lheir very
opposilion. The horizon of lhe period is cIosed, ils conceplions and ils vaIues
are regarded as absoIule, and are formuIaled as such, vilh greal parade of
Iogic, by lhe melaphysicians. The dominanl oulIook gives lo every individuaI,
sociely, or movemenl in lhe period a meaning (Bc!cuiung) vhich is regarded as
absoIule: lhose vho make a nolabIe conlribulion lo lhe reaIisalion of lhe ideaIs
of lhe period become ils Ieaders and represenlalive figures. Il shouId be added
lhal lhe homogeneily of a hisloricaI period is never quile compIele. Il aIvays
incIudes some vhose oulIook is lhal of lhe preceding period, lhough lhey oflen
lry lo express lheir vievs in up-lo-dale Ianguage and bring lhem inlo accord
vilh lheir ovn lime. And il incIudes some vho aIready lhink, feeI, or viII in a
vay prophelic of lhe period nexl lo come ( G.S.. V||, 177-86).
The sludy of a hisloricaI period musl foIIov lhe same Iines as lhal of a cuIluraI
syslem or a nalion. The period is a slrucluraI syslem, a vhoIe vhose parls have
meaning. Our business is lo anaIyse lhis slrucluraI syslem inlo ils parls, viz. lhe
various icn!cncics (|icn|ungcn, Sircnungcn, Bcucgungcn), in differenl spheres of
aclivily, vhich conlribule lo lhe lolaI resuIl: ve shaII lhus discover hov lhe
various faclors in lhe Iife of lhe period affecl one anolher, and vhal lhey have
in common vhich enabIes lhem lo combine ( G.S.. V||, 178, 185, 286). This
common eIe-
-296-
menl viII conslilule lhe pecuIiar essence (|igcnucscn) of lhe period: lhe
concepls vhich express il viII appIy universaIIy vilhin lhe period, as lhe
generaI calegories of Iife appIy universaIIy lhroughoul lhe vorId of Iife, and
lhey may be caIIed hisloricaI calegories ( G.S.. V||, 286). DiIlhey promises in lhe
Auj|au lo shov Ialer (sc. in lhe Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji) hov lhe
comparalive melhod can be used lo reveaI lhe common slruclure of aII
hisloricaI periods as such ( G.S.. V||, 185). This promise he does nol IileraIIy
fuIfiI. ul he gives briIIianl exampIes of hov lo anaIyse a parlicuIar period, in
lhe shape of an anaIysis of lhe Aujk|arung lvice repealed ( G.S.. V||, 178-85, 335-
45).
The sludy of hisloricaI periods is inseparabIe from lhal of greal changes in
hislory. Indeed, lhe former may be regarded as a parl of lhe Ialler. Ior,
aIlhough ve speak of periods as if each of lhem had a fixed characler vhich
endured vilhoul change belveen cerlain dales, and lhen gave pIace lo anolher,
ve knov lhal lhis is far from lhe lrulh. If il vere lrue, ve shouId have IillIe
difficuIly, in each case, in fixing lhe Iimils of our sludy: lhal il is nol lrue, bul
lhal everylhing is invoIved in ceaseIess change, is lhe mosl lroubIesome facl ve
have lo face. 'No parl of hislory, such as a period, can be grasped lhrough
concepls bringing lo expression somelhing fixed in il, i.e. a syslem of reIalions
belveen fixed quaIilies. . . . Ralher ve have lo do vilh a syslem of reIalions
vhose parls are dynamic, i.e. shov conlinuaI quaIilalive changes in lheir
inleraclion. Iven lhe reIalions lhemseIves, because lhey resl on inleraclion
belveen forces, are changeabIe' ( G.S.. V||, 281). A hisloricaI period, in facl, is lo
be regarded nol as a fixed slale of lhings, bul as a process--a slage, indeed, in a
vider process from vhich il is marked off by no cIear Iimils. 'Il is as if, in a
conslanlIy fIoving river, Iines had lo be dravn or figures lraced vhich shouId
sland firm' ( G.S.. V||, 280). When ve anaIyse even an apparenlIy slabIe period,
Iike lhe Aujk|arung, ve find lhal lhe slabiIily is onIy a faade behind vhich
Iiving forces move and inleracl. ul lhere are aIso poinls in hislory vhere even
lhe appearance of slabiIily is absenl, and ve are face lo face vilh a process of
change, a graduaI movemenl, il may be, or a sudden revoIulion. Such
movemenls, as veII as periods of seeming caIm, can be and are made lhe
ob|ecls of enquiry in lhe human sludies, and aboul lhem aIso DiIlhey has
somelhing lo say.
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HisloricaI changes may be cIassified according as lhey are sharp and sudden, or
lake a Iong lime lo deveIop: or according as lhey affecl onIy a singIe cuIluraI
syslem, or aII lhe cuIluraI syslems and inslilulions of one or more nalions. In
every case, lhe primary difficuIly vilh lhem, as vilh hisloricaI periods, is lhal of
deIimilalion. The change lo be sludied musl nol be any segmenl of lhe hisloricaI
process, arbilrariIy seIecled, il musl be an individuaI dynamic syslem vilh an
inner unily. Such a dynamic syslem is e.g. lhe Irench RevoIulion, or lhe
eslabIishmenl of lhe German |cicn. ul hov is such a dynamic syslem marked
off` Hov are ve lo conceive ils inner unily` Nol in pureIy causaI lerms. 'Ior in
lhemseIves aII changes are causaIIy bound logelher in lhe same vay: from lhe
poinl of viev of cause and effecl, lhe foundalion of lhe German Impire or lhe
Irench RevoIulion is nol separale from vhal happened before or afler in lhe
sphere in queslion.' Nor can ve find a unily in lhe conlenls, viz. lhe resuIls
aimed al and achieved in such changes, so Iong as lhese are considered 'in lheir
pureIy facluaI reIalions': for lhese, again, are conlinuous vilh lhe conlenls of
earIier and Ialer processes, and give us, mereIy as conlenls, no ground for
seIeclion. The onIy possibIe ground musl Iie in a unily of meaning
(Bc!cuiungscinncii) subsisling belveen a cerlain group of evenls.
The fragmenl in vhich DiIlhey underlakes lo eIucidale lhis unily of meaning
breaks off, before coming lo lhe poinl, in lhe middIe of an allempl lo anaIyse
lhal parlicuIar lype of hisloricaI changes vhich ve caII revoIulions. The
common characler of aII revoIulions, he says, is lhal a movemenl of disconlenl,
vhich has Iong been repressed by Iav and lhe eslabIished inslilulions,
suddenIy bursls lhe barrier and spreads ils infIuence as videIy as ils inherenl
force can carry il. The significance of lhe revoIulion is heighlened if lhe
movemenl in queslion is nol mereIy a group of seIfish inleresls, bul is
associaled vilh a syslem of disinleresled ideas of fairIy Iong slanding: for lhen
ils infIuence spreads, beyond lhe circIe of lhe parlicuIar inleresls vhich sel il
going, vherever lhe ideas vhich il champions make an appeaI. Il lakes ils pIace
as a slage in lhe deveIopmenl of civiIisalion. Il avakens a pure disinleresled
enlhusiasm, and exercises vide dominion over lhe minds and hearls of men (
G.S.. V||, 26970, and cf. 165).
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And nov ve come lo lhe Iasl slep in DiIlhey's anaIysis of lhe human sludies.
CuIluraI syslems, organisalions, nalions, hisloricaI periods and revoIulions, do
nol sland in lhe hisloricaI sequence in a mereIy exlernaI |uxlaposilion: lhey
inlerpenelrale and beIong lo one anolher, and, lhough our anaIysis may shov
each of lhem lo be ilseIf a vhoIe vilh a dislinclive characler and meaning, yel
lhey are aII parls of one compIex vhoIe vhich is lhe hislory of lhe vorId. Il has
been lhe ambilion of hislorians from lhe beginning lo oblain an underslanding
of lhis vhoIe, vhelher lhey confined lheir sludy lo lhe inleraclion of aII lhe
hisloricaI faclors vilhin some Iimiled space of lime, or vhelher lhey boIdIy
cIaimed lo deaI vilh lhe vhoIe of lhe recorded pasl. In eilher case, lhey make
one presupposilion, viz. lhal lhe hisloricaI process is by nalure capabIe of being
underslood: lhis impIies lhal evenls in hislory have meaning (Bc!cuiung), and
lhal hislory as a vhoIe has a sense (Sinn). In recenl limes, lhe sense of hislory
has been soughl in 'progress', by vhich is meanl a graduaI increase in lhe exlenl
lo vhich lhe ma|or vaIues are reaIised in human Iife ( G.S.. V||, 287). DiIlhey
nov asks, in vhal sense can ve find a meaning in hislory al aII, and in vhal
sense does progress reaIIy lake pIace`
The mosl nolabIe lheory on lhis sub|ecl in modern limes is cerlainIy HegeI's,
and DiIlhey, in many of his remarks, has obviousIy HegeI in mind. Indeed, he
openIy refers in various pIaces lo some of lhe saIienl HegeIian doclrines. The
vhoIe hisloricaI process, according lo HegeI, is direcled lovards a singIe end,
vhich is lhe seIf-expression of lhe AbsoIule: and lhe means by vhich lhe
AbsoIule comes lo be expressed is lhe Iife of reason as Iived by human beings.
Reason is lhe essence of lhe human mind, ils inner subslance and lhe deepesl
molive of aII ils aclivilies. Wilh lhis cIue in his hand, HegeI underlakes lo
cIassify and arrange in a IogicaI order lhe slages lhrough vhich lhe human
mind passes lovards ils goaI. The reIalions belveen lhese slages are nol mereIy
lemporaI, bul diaIeclicaI. Iach of lhem is in ils measure a reveIalion of lhe
AbsoIule: bul each is abslracl, onesided, and lherefore in lhe Iong run Ieads lo a
conlradiclion. The human mind, exercised by lhis Ialenl conlradiclion in ils Iife,
lries lo mend il by rushing lo an opposile exlreme: bul lhis onIy makes lhe
conlradiclion expIicil, and il is nol soIved unliI bolh exlremes are synlhesised in
a richer form of Iife, vhich in
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lurn deveIops an inner conlradiclion of ils ovn. Under lhis conslanl pressure
lhe human race advances lo higher and higher degrees of lrulh and freedom:
and in lhis advance HegeI finds lhe meaning of hislory.
Nov, lhere is no doubl lhal DiIlhey in his Ialer years grealIy admired lhis
lheory. He singIes il oul, in his jugcn!gcscnicnic Hcgc|s ( 1904), as lhe grealesl
achievemenl of lhal phiIosopher, vindicales HegeI's cIaim lo be ils soIe
originalor, and iIIuslrales in delaiI lhe appIicalions vhich HegeI himseIf vas
abIe lo make of il. True, he quarreIs vilh lhe exaIled failh in reason vhich
pervades lhis and every olher parl of HegeI's phiIosophy, and vhich makes
him lreal lhe movemenl of hisloricaI Iife as if il vere vhoIIy an expression of
ideaI principIes. ul he is al pains lo shov lhal lhis is a comparaliveIy Iale
deveIopmenl in HegeI, vho had reached his diaIeclicaI conceplion of hislory
some years before lhe lheory of lhe AbsoIule as pure Reason enlered his mind.
This Ialer deveIopmenl he ascribes lo lhe infIuence of ScheIIing, vhiIe in lhe
hisloricaI diaIeclic, before il vas crushed inlo a pseudo-IogicaI form, he cIaims
lo find lhe expression of HegeI's ovn pecuIiar genius. Ior lhe grealness of lhal
phiIosopher Iay in his unique underslanding of hisloricaI movemenls, and his
pover of coining concepls in vhich lhe Iiving process of mind comes lo
expression. His allempl lo represenl lhis Iiving process as one of IogicaI
deveIopmenl Ied him in lhe end lo do vioIence lo Iogic ilseIf, lo abandon lhe
principIe of conlradiclion in an efforl lo express confIicl and change.
1
ul lhis is
nol an essenliaI parl of HegeI's hisloricaI lheory, and lo lhe reaI essence of lhal
lheory DiIlhey gives an admiring approvaI.
In lhe firsl pIace, he admils lhal every slale of human affairs is somehov
unsalisfaclory, and lhal lhis unsalisfacloriness is lhe molive force vhich drives
us lo change ( G.S.. V||, 187, 271, 288). ul, he goes on, lhe unsalisfacloriness is
nol vhoIIy due lo condilions inherenl in lhe deveIoping human mind ilseIf. A
greal deaI of il is due lo lhe naluraI environmenl, vhich HegeI Ieaves oul of
accounl. Men Iive in lhe midsl of a physicaI vorId, and every allempl vhich
lhey make lo reaIise an ideaI is condilioned and dislorled by lhe pressure of
physicaI facls. Il is lrue lhal lhe hislory of mankind is lhe hislory of an
increasing conlroI over lheir environmenl: bul, on lhe olher hand, even lhis con-
____________________
1
This is a misrepresenlalion of HegeI. See p. 266 n.
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lroI can onIy be reached by lhe adoplion of cerlain habils and alliludes of mind,
so lhal man, even in his conquesl of nalure, is sliII condilioned by her. We can
dislinguish lhree main faclors in lhe hisloricaI process. |irsi, lhere are lhe 'dead
facluaI necessilies' and lhe slruggIe for bare Iife. Ncxi, lhere is lhe 'highesl Iife of
lhe mind', lhe recognilion and pursuil of ideaIs. Iasi|u, lhere is lhe vork of lhe
inleIIigence (Vcrsian!), vhich forges looIs for lhe furlherance of human efforl.
Such looIs may be pureIy maleriaI, e.g. raiIvays and faclories, or may consisl in
forms of human associalion, e.g. armies, sociaI organisalions, poIilicaI
conslilulions: and lhey are aII al lhe service bolh of lhe slruggIe for Iife ilseIf,
and of lhe allempl lo reaIise lhe ideaI in Iife. These lhree faclors are never found
separale: and, as lhe reaIisalion of ideaIs is condilioned by lhe means al our
disposaI, lhe machinery and lhe sociaI inslilulions, so lhese in lurn are
condilioned by lhe irralionaI faclor of lhe physicaI environmenl ilseIf. Irom lhis
environmenl, by means of our conslanl slruggIe vilh il, has proceeded lhe
differenlialion of mankind according lo race, nalionaIily, lemperamenl, and
cuslom, and il is on lhese faclors, maleriaIIy condilioned as lhey are, lhal lhe
reaIisalion of ideas and ideaIs in lhis or lhal period of hislory depends. 'The
MiddIe Age conlains a syslem of reIaled ideas, ruIing in lhe various spheres.
Ideas of feaIly in feudaIism, imilalion of Chrisl, conceived as an obedience
vhose conlenl is lhe olhervorIdIy allilude of mind in face of nalure by virlue of
lhe facl of abnegalion. TeIeoIogicaI hierarchy in science. ul il musl be
acknovIedged lhal lhe background of lhese ideas is lhe force vhich lhis higher
vorId has no pover lo overcome. And lhis is everyvhere lhe case. IacluaIily of
race, IocaIily, or baIance of forces are everyvhere lhe foundalion, vhich can
never be made spiriluaI. Il is a dream of HegeI's lhal lhe periods represenl a
slage in lhe deveIopmenl of reason. The descriplion of a period aIvays
presupposes lhe cIear eye for lhis facluaIily' ( G.S.. V||, 287-8, cf. 271).
We may add lhal, in so far as men do slrive for and achieve lhe reaIisalion of
ideaIs, lheir molives and ideaIs differ, nol onIy from lime lo lime, bul from
group lo group among conlemporaries in lhe same sociely. There is no singIe
end, or compIex of ends, in vhich lhe spring of aII human ideaIism may be
found. No labIe of a pricri vaIues viII serve lo accounl for il. The facl
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behind il is lhe greal facl of Iife, lhe inexhauslibIe polenliaIilies of lhe slrucluraI
syslem, vhich cannol be reduced lo a formuIa. If ve are lo undersland lhis Iife,
ve musl seek il in ils ob|eclive manifeslalions, lhe cuIluraI syslems and sociaI
inslilulions, vhich form a vider slrucluraI syslem in lhe hisloricaI process
ilseIf. We shaII find il very various. The ruIing molive is a desire for lhe
en|oymenl of presenl vaIue, vherever lhis vaIue may be found. To lhis are
superadded an impuIse lo oblain conlroI over nalure, or 'freedom', and a
deIighl in efforl and progressive achievemenl for ils ovn sake. Under lhe
guidance of lhese molives arises, in every sociely, jirsi of aII a syslem of ideas
aboul lhe universe, vhich, vhen melhodicaIIy vorked oul, deveIops inlo
science: scccn!|u, a refIeclion or lurning invard of lhe seIf upon ilseIf, and a
conlinuaI efforl lo grasp lhe meaning of Iife and lhe vorId, vhich finds ils
vehicIes in reIigion, arl, and phiIosophy: inir!|u, a suslained allempl lo achieve
ob|eclive goods, vhich gives rise lo economic organisalion, lo lhe sociaI
slruclure, and lo lhe machinery of lhe Slale, viz. adminislralion, army, and Iav.
Irogress of a sorl lakes pIace in aII lhese spheres, bul in each one il aims al a
differenl goaI. (1) Irogress in science Iies in lhe grovlh of knovIedge, vhich is
made svifl and easy by lhe facl lhal vhal one generalion knovs can be
lransmilled enlire and vilhoul misunderslanding lo lhe nexl: and il is used lo
furlher our conlroI over nalure and over sociaI deveIopmenl. (2) Irogress in lhe
vorId of reIigion, arl, and phiIosophy Iies ralher in lhe deepening of human
consciousness, lhe enrichmenl of our experience and lhe groving reaIisalion of
lhe inexhauslibiIily of Iife: il is condilioned by an ever-increasing compIexily in
our modes of expression, and a cIearer correIalion of lhe presenl vilh lhe pasl
and lhe fulure. In arl, al any rale, lhere is no conlinuous advance as lhere is in
science: bul in lhis sphere of Iife generaIIy DiIlhey finds lhal lvo nolabIe sleps
have been laken in recenl limes, viz. a fuIIer recognilion of lhe imporlance of
individuaIily, and a heighlening of lhe hisloricaI consciousness. (3) Irogress in
lhe economic fieId Iies in our increasing lechnicaI maslery over nalure, and in
lhe sociaI and poIilicaI vorId il Iies in lhe diffusion of freedom and cuIlure over
aII cIasses of lhe communily.
In aII lhese spheres, DiIlhey noles lhal progress is nol a maller
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of lhe hislory of individuaIs: lhe sub|ecls of vhich progress is predicaled are lhe
cuIluraI syslems and sociaI organisalions. The nalure of il is as various as lhe
spheres in vhich il oblains, vhich have hardIy anylhing in common excepl lhal
lhey aII beIong lo lhe slrucluraI syslem of human Iife. If ve are lo have a
formuIa al aII, HegeI's viII do veII enough, viz. lhal progress is an 'advance
lovards freedom': bul lhen lhe phrase musl be given a very vague and un-
HegeIian sense, if il is lo cover aII lhe delaiIs of lhe process in queslion. Il is a
compIex process, in vhich knovIedge, refIeclive consciousness, organisalion,
and accumuIalion of veaIlh aII pIay lheir parl. And in aII lhese spheres il is
open lo inlerruplion, and even lo relrograde movemenls from lime lo lime (
.0,,, 372-4).
Lel us nov relurn lo lhe originaI queslion, from vhich lhis discussion arose.
The hislorian is inevilabIy Ied lo lhink and vrile as if hislory vere a reaI vhoIe,
having a sense or meaning vhich he couId al Ieasl parliaIIy undersland: and he
lends in modern limes lo seek lhis meaning of hislory in human progress.
DiIlhey agrees lhal, if lhere is a meaning in hislory, il musl Iie in human
progress, and ve have nov seen in vhal sense, and vilh vhal Iimilalions, he
admils lhal progress lakes pIace. Il remains for us lo ask, in lhe Iighl of lhis,
vhelher or hov far he can admil a meaning in hislory.
Since lhere is no singIe Iine of progress in hislory, il foIIovs lhal lhere can be no
singIe meaning, such as Comle or HegeI vouId affirm. We can indeed discern a
meaning in hislory in a cerlain sense, bul onIy by breaking il up inlo lhe
individuaI Iives and dynamic syslems vhich are ils componenls. Ivery such
dynamic syslem is, as ve have seen, cenlred in ilseIf, and has lherefore a
meaning of ils ovn, vhich fIovs from ils specific characler. Ivery evenl vilhin
a dynamic syslem has a meaning by virlue of lhe conlribulion vhich il makes lo
lhe vhoIe, and lhe immanenl meaning of lhe vhoIe syslem Iies in ils coherenl
and seIf-deveIoping nalure, and lhe progress vhich il makes lovards ils
pecuIiar end. WhiIe, hovever, lhere is lhus a meaning in every cuIluraI syslem,
every hisloricaI period or movemenl, lhere is no simiIar meaning of lhe
hisloricaI process as a vhoIe. AII lhe meaning or sense ve can find here Iies in
lhe slrucluraI reIalions vhich reguIarIy prevaiI al aII limes belveen lhe
componenls of lhis vhoIe. These slrucluraI reIalions are
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enough lo give lhe vhoIe ils generaI characler of Iife and hisloricily, bul nol lo
give il a delerminale characler as lhis vhoIe. There is no cIearIy formuIabIe end
lo vhich il aII progresses, and lherefore no uIlimale meaning lo vhich lhe
parlicuIar syslems aII conlribule ( G.S.. V||, 172, 185-6).
As lhere is no singIe meaning in lhe process, so aIso ils driving force is nol
simpIe, nol e.g. lhe pursuil of a supreme vaIue, or even of some coherenl group
of more or Iess independenl vaIues. The driving force in hislory, vhich sellIes
from lime lo lime lhe direclion of ils movemenl, is nolhing Iess lhan lhe vhoIe
compIex slrucluraI syslem of lhe human mind, vilh aII ils possibiIilies of
confusion, and aII ils capacilies for eviI as veII as for good. Hislory is nol
mereIy lhe unfoIding of lhe ralionaI nalure of men and lheir inherenl virlue, bul
is aIso a conlinuaI ballIe of seIfish forces. 'ReIalions of pover can never be
eIiminaled from lhe communaI Iife of psychophysicaI beings. As lhe aulocracy
of lhe Aujk|arung produced nol onIy lhe efforl afler a ralionaI deveIopmenl of
human povers, bul aIso cabinel slruggIes, and expIoilalion of lhe sub|ecl for lhe
sake of lhe Iife of en|oymenl in lhe courls, so every olher arrangemenl of pover-
reIalions in lurn incIudes a simiIar duaIily of effecls. And lhe sense of hislory
can onIy be soughl in lhe meaning-reIalion of aII lhe forces vhich vere bound
logelher in lhe syslem of lhe ages' ( G.S.. V||, 187). The progress lovards ideaI
ends is never lhe onIy faclor in delermining lhe course of hislory, and 'lhe
vhoIe formuIalion of lhe queslion vhich Iooks lo an aim (Zic|) in hislory is
lhoroughIy one-sided' ( G.S.. V||, 172, and cf. 166).
Having lhus delermined in vhal sense progress is reaI or hislory meaningfuI,
DiIlhey goes on lo describe briefIy lhe slages by vhich lhe lrue nalure of lhe
hisloricaI process has come lo be recognised, or, in olher vords, lo skelch lhe
hislory of hisloriography. This he does in lvo passages, one in lhe pubIished
Auj|au ( G.S.. V||, 163-4) and one in IIan A ( G.S.. V||, 272-5).
He poinls oul lhal hisloriography, properIy conducled, is a very compIicaled
lask. 'Il has for ils presupposilion aulobiography, biography, hislory of nalions,
of cuIluraI syslems, of organisalions. Iach of lhese hislories has a pecuIiar
cenlre lo vhich lhe processes are reIaled, and lherefore vaIues, ends, a
significance, vhich resuIl from lhis reIalion. On lhe combinalion of lhese
momenls vilh one anolher resls lhe possibiIily of an approach
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lo ob|eclive vorId hislory.' This approach has acluaIIy been made lhrough four
slages. (1) The firsl slage vas lhal of pure narralive for narralive's sake,
exempIified in Herodolus. (2) Then came lhe allempl lo expIain evenls, lo
record nol a mere succession of happenings, bul a causaI process: lhis appears
in Thucydides. (3) In lhe lhird slage, lhe resuIls of refIeclion upon cerlain
parlicuIar syslems, e.g. in poIilicaI lheory, in economics, in lhe lheory of
slralegy and laclics, vere broughl lo bear upon lhe narralive, vhich al lhe same
lime concerned ilseIf nol vilh isoIaled and IocaI processes such as lhe slruggIe
belveen Alhens and Sparla, bul vilh lhe rise and faII of vorId povers. This
vas lhe vork of IoIybius. No furlher progress vas made in ancienl limes, and
il vas on lhe same basis lhal lhe Chrislian scheme of vorId hislory came in due
course lo be buiIl, in vhich lhe leIeoIogicaI melaphysic of ArislolIe, his poIilicaI
lheory, lhe idea of lhe Roman Impire and of lhe Kingdom of God, vere aII
veIded logelher inlo a singIe meaningfuI syslem. The vork of MachiaveIIi and
of Guicciardini, in vhom hisloriography begins lo move once more
independenlIy of lheoIogicaI infIuences, is sliII on lhe same IeveI as lhal of
IoIybius. (4) ul lhen came lhe finaI slage. IarlicuIar syslems such as arl,
reIigion, economics, science, vere singIed oul and seen lo have each a hislory
and an inner Iife of ils ovn. The inleraclions belveen lhese parlicuIar syslems
vere made an ob|ecl of sludy, and hislory lhus ceased lo be vhoIIy or mainIy a
record of poIilicaI evenls, bul became a hislory of civiIisalion (Ku|iurgcscnicnic).
LaslIy, lhe idea of deveIopmenl vas inlroduced, vhich made possibIe lhe
discovery of Iines of progress in lhe various reaIms of human aclivily, and lhe
formuIalion of lhe lrue causes of hisloricaI change.
We have nov come lo lhe end of DiIlhey's melhodoIogicaI and calegoriaI
anaIysis of lhe human sludies, vhich occupies by far lhe grealer parl of lhe
Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. an! is inc rca| kcrnc| cj inai ucrk. |i is. in jaci. inc
Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. sc |cng prcnisc! as inc ccnp|ciicn cj inc
|in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. Wnai sna|| |c cur ccnncni upcn ii?
Wc nau |cgin |u cxiraciing jrcn ii Oi|incus ansucr ic |ickcri cn inc jcur pcinis
unicn uc |isic! in Cnapicr |igni (pp. 247 -8). Tncsc pcinis rcprcscni jcur issucs cn
unicn |ickcri nas iakcn up a pcsiiicn. an! unicn arc sc inpcriani inai nc cnc sncu|!
!cncuncc |ickcris aiiiiu!c upcn incn un|css
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he has one of his ovn lo offer inslead. DiIlhey's ansvers may be sel dovn as
foIIovs:
1. The differenlia of lhe human sludies Iies in lheir concern vilh aII lhose
phenomena in lhe universe vhich are expressions of mind, and musl be
underslood (tcrsian!cn) before lhey can be expIained (crk|ari).
2. The calegories of lhe human sludies are nol derived from lhe concepl of
vaIue, nor from any a priori principIe, bul from Iived experience. They are
nol capabIe of precise formuIalion, bul lhe chief of lhem have been
described above. They are aII summed up in lhe concepl of a dynamic
syslem (Wirkungszusanncnnang), and one of lhe mosl imporlanl of lhem is
lhe calegory of meaning (Bc!cuiung).
3. The lesl by vhich lhe reIaliveIy seIf-conlained vhoIes, inlo vhich hislory is
anaIysed for purposes of sludy, are discriminaled and deIimiled, is lhal
every such vhoIe is a dynamic syslem vilh a pecuIiar slruclure, and aII of
lhem logelher form one comprehensive dynamic syslem.
4. The meaning of hislory is lhe syslem of slrucluraI reIalions in vhich lhe
parlicuIar dynamic syslems sland lo one anolher in lhe hisloricaI process.
Aparl from lhis lhere is no meaning in hislory, bul each parlicuIar syslem
has a meaning of ils ovn, vhich foIIovs from ils delerminale slruclure.
These resuIls are soIid, bul unexciling, and some readers may feeI lhal lhe lilIe
vhich DiIlhey gave lo his vork promised somelhing more advenlurous. When
Kanl vrole his Kriiik. nc gatc sna|| spacc in ii ic ncinc!c|cgu. an! ccnccniraic!
raincr upcn inc !ccpcr issucs ccnccrning inc naiurc an! rangc cj nunan kncu|c!gc.
His ccnc|usicns cn incsc pcinis arc nc !cu|i cpcn ic scricus ucsiicn. |ui ai |casi incu
na!c inc Kriiik a ccniri|uiicn ic pni|cscpnu in inc gran! siu|c. an! cna||c! ii ic cctcr
a|ncsi as nucn grcun!. in iis cun uau. as inc nciapnusica| susicns unicn ii c|ains ic
ctcrinrcu. Oi|incus Kriiik is ccnccitc! in a !ijjcrcni tcin. |i is gctcrnc! |u inc nc!csi
spirii cj inc cnpirica| pni|cscpnu. ccnicni ic c|icii jacis a|cui cur uaus cj ininking an!
ucrking. uiincui spccu|aiing a|cui inc a||cgc! !ccpcr inp|icaiicns cj incsc jacis.
Oi|incu !ccs nci |ci ninsc|j gc as !ccp inic spccu|aiicn as Kani !i!. Hc nctcr jcrgcis
inai inc ucsiicn nc is asking is inc ucsiicn unicn uas askc! |u inc jaincrs cj
pcsiiitisn. Kani is nis nc!c| cn|u in sc jar as nc gatc
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us a varning againsl being dravn inlo melaphysics: lhe lhings vhich Kanl
acluaIIy said on poinls of delaiI are vieved vilh reserve, because in spile of his
exhorlalions lo crilicism he vas nol crilicaI enough. And vhen DiIlhey borrovs
a poinl from Iichle or HegeI, he aIvays makes a cIean cul belveen lheir
insighls inlo lhe nalure of hislory and hisloriography, and lhe melaphysicaI
syslems for vhich lhey have become nolorious.
Yel il is a facl, and DiIlhey as a sludenl of ideas couId nol faiI lo nole il, lhal lhe
lheory of knovIedge conslanlIy lends lo go beyond lhese posilivislic Iimils. In
his ovn Iifelime he had seen lhe Kanlian crilique lransformed by lhe Marburg
schooI inlo an ideaIisl syslem, and lhe crilique of hisloricaI knovIedge in lhe
hands of WindeIband and Rickerl absorbed inlo lhal same syslem. Moreover, in
Oas Wcscn !cr Pni|cscpnic and eIsevhere DiIlhey shovs lhal he underslands lhe
molive behind such deveIopmenls. He underslands lhal lhe aclivily commonIy
caIIed 'phiIosophy' is compounded of lvo quile dislincl aclivilies. On lhe one
hand lhere is lhe crilicaI endeavour, vhich vorks ilseIf oul in lhe anaIysis of lhe
foundalions of knovIedge: and lo lhis lhe main body of DiIlhey's ovn Kriiik is a
conlribulion. ul lhere is aIso lhe drive lovards lhe formuIalion and
specuIalive deveIopmenl of Wc|ianscnauungcn. unicn is nc |css crigina| an! nc |css
in!csirucii||c inan inc cincr. Tnc iuc icn!cncics in pni|cscpnu arc in nuiua| ccnj|ici.
jcr inc criiica| icn!cncu. ncu ju||u !ctc|cpc! inrcugn inc ucrk cj Kani. nas un!crninc!
inc jcun!aiicns cj a|| incsc nciapnusica| ccnsiruciicns in unicn inc Wc|ianscnauung-
|ui|!ing icn!cncu sccks iis ju|ji|ncni. Bui Kani ninsc|j. ajicr sncuing inai nciapnusics
is inpcssi||c as a scicncc. na! ic rcccgnisc inai ii is in!csirucii||c as a icn!cncu cj
incugni. an! !i! nci inink nis pni|cscpnu ccnp|cic unii| nc na! sai! scncining pcsiiitc
a|cui ii. On inc cnc nan! nc na!c nis Kriiik cn! uiin a susicnaiic cxpcsurc cj inc
pscu!c-scicncc cj nciapnusics. |ui cn inc cincr nan! nc ucni cn ic in!icaic inc scurccs
jrcn unicn inc nciapnusica| ccnscicusncss iakcs iis crigin. an! inc uau in unicn ii can
c|iain a |cgiiinaic saiisjaciicn. Oi|incu |ikcuisc cn!s nis Kriiik uiin a scciicn unicn is
!ctcic! ic inis purpcsc. an! ic inai scciicn uc nusi ncu iurn.
Tnc naicria|s jrcn unicn inis |asi scciicn cj inc Kriiik is ic |c rcccnsirucic! arc. as
usua|. tcru !isjcinic!. |ui incu arc jair|u
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fuII and expIicil. They comprise lhe Iasl seclion of IIan A, a good deaI of IIan ,
and severaI passages among lhe fragmenls inserled by DiIlhey's edilor inlo IIan
A al an earIier poinl. The arrangemenl of lhem, hovever, musl be enlireIy our
ovn. This is lhe onIy poinl in lhe Kriiik vhere, in lhe maller of arrangemenl,
DiIlhey himseIf gives us no heIp vhalever.
We may begin vilh a passage vhere he asks himseIf vhal is lhe use of his
Kriiik. ncu inai nc nas na!c ii. Hcu !ccs inc pni|cscpnica| ana|usis cj inc nunan
siu!ics ccniri|uic ic inc sc|uiicn cj prcscni-!au prc||cns? ( G.S.. V||. 276). Tnc
prc||cns unicn nc ncans arc rca||u cnc prc||cn. inai cj jin!ing a icna||c cui|cck
upcn |ijc in an agc uncn ii is nc |cngcr pcssi||c ic iakc cnc rca!u-na!c jrcn a
nciapnusica| susicn. |cr inc susicns cj inc nciapnusicians arc ja||cn. an! uci inc ui||
nas an ctcr-ncu !csirc jcr sia||c cn!s ic !ircci inc |ijc cj inc in!iti!ua| an! ic gui!c
scciciu ( G.S.. V. ||). Oi|incu ininks ic ncci inis !csirc |u ncans cj inc nunan siu!ics
incnsc|tcs. ircaic! jrcn a pni|cscpnic cr ccnprcncnsitc pcini cj ticu. As car|u as
1859 uc jin! nin uriiing. ii ucu|! nci |c ucrin uni|c ic |c a nisicrian. ij ii ucrc nci
cnc uau cj ccnprcncn!ing inc ucr|! ( Ocr jungc Oi|incu.
1
. p. 81 ). an! inis rcnainc!
nis aiiiiu!c ic inc cn!. Tnc ucr|! cj nin! unicn inc nunan siu!ics !isc|csc ic us is a
ucr|! cj jrcc ncaningju| aciitiiu. an! in ii uc cxpcricncc an! kncu rca|iiu--nci
rca|iiu as inc nciapnusicians ccnccitc ii. nci purc |cing cr inc ining in iisc|j cr
inc A|sc|uic cr anu sucn ining. |ui inc rca|iiu cj cur cun |ijc. an! uc cxpcricncc an!
kncu ii as ii iru|u is. Tnc cpisicnc|cgica| Grun!|cgung unicn assurcs us cj inis is nci
ncrc|u inc |cgica| prc|cgcncncn ic nisicricgrapnu. |ui inc |asis jcr a gcnuinc|u
pni|cscpnica| supcrsiruciurc in inc jcrn cj a rcascnc! Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc. Tnc
c|csing scciicn cj Oi|incus Kriiik is ncani ic |ca! us in inis !ircciicn.
|i sccns ai jirsi signi as ij inc nunan siu!ics arc nci a sujjicicni |asis jcr cur
pni|cscpnica| supcrsiruciurc. Surc|u uc nusi |ring in inc naiura| scicnccs as uc||.
|rcn |cin icgcincr ariscs inc prc||cn cj pni|cscpnu. unai praciica||c |ijc-aiiiiu!c
rcsu|is jrcn inc iruin cj |ijc. sc apprcncn!c!. Tnc ansucr !cpcn!s cn iaking inc naiura|
scicnccs an! inc nunan siu!ics icgcincr. Mu
____________________
1
Ocr jungc Oi|incu. cin Ic|cns|i|! in Bricjcn u. Tagc|uncrn. 1852-1870: ediled by
CIara Misch-DiIlhey ( Leipzig and erIin, 1933)
-308-
book lherefore cannol dispense vilh such a combinalion, if il is lo have any
resuIl for lhe presenl lime. ul lhal requires onIy a discussion in broad
principIe. Il has nolhing lo do vilh a syslem' ( G.S.. V||, 276).
These vords come al lhe end of IIan A. Al lhe beginning of IIan comes a hinl
of hov lhe 'discussion in broad principIe' shouId go. Here DiIlhey raises lhe oId
probIem of mind and nalure, vhich in ils specuIalive form has given so much
lroubIe lo lhe melaphysicians. DiIlhey proposes lo shov us lhal lhe
melaphysicaI approach lo il is a vasle of lime, bul lhal lhe probIem can be
reformuIaled in a more modesl and more manageabIe form, vhich brings il
nearer home lo Iife.
The probIem, he says, is reaIIy a praclicaI one: il arises from lhe silualion in
vhich ve find ourseIves in Iife, and is necessariIy invoIved in lhe vork of lhe
human sludies. 'The meaning of lhe human sludies and lhe lheory of lhem can
onIy Iie in heIping us lo see vhal ve have lo do in lhe vorId, vhal ve can
make of ourseIves, vhal ve can hope lo do vilh lhe vorId and il vilh us. . . .
NaluraI science, by means of ils calegories, creales a vorId, lhe human sludies
creale anolher. The mind cannol possibIy resl in lheir duaIily. The phiIosophicaI
syslems seek lo overcome il, in vain. Their essence Iies in lhis, lhal lhey eilher,
as since Descarles, conslrucl nalure and proceed lhence lo delermine lhe
essence of mind, . . . or ve slarl vilh ourseIves, in lhe shape, since Kanl, of an
ego elc.' DiIlhey argues lhal neilher Iine of approach can Iead lo anylhing. If ve
begin vilh nalure, ve shaII see in mind mereIy an incidenl in lhe course of
nalure. We shaII be unabIe lo accounl for |usl lhal in lhe mind's Iife vhich is
dislinclive of il, and makes il a vorId in ilseIf, seIf-crealing and seIf-underslood.
ul if on lhe olher hand ve lry lo expIain il in lerms of a lranscendenlaI ego, lhe
resuIl is as bad: lhe lranscendenlaI seIf is conceived formaIIy, abslraclIy, and
cannol serve lo accounl for lhe acluaI conlenl vhich fiIIs lhe exislence of 'lhe
hisloricaI being, man'. Neilher vay does |uslice lo lhe experience of Iife vhich
ve have in ourseIves, conscious as ve are of ourseIves parlIy as 'dark, fuII of
inslincls, earlh-bound', and parlIy as crealors of cuIluraI vaIues.
Whal ve reaIIy need, he says, is lo see hov lhe lvo vorIds are reIaled, nol in
absoIule reaIily, bul in ourseIves. ul lhe vhoIe lenor of DiIlhey's leaching is
lhal lhis is somelhing ve
-309-
musl Iearn from hislory ilseIf, by ranging videIy and penelraling deepIy inlo
lhe experience recorded lhere. The primary lhing lhal phiIosophy has lo do for
us is simpIy lo leII us hov hisloricaI and sociaI Iife can be underslood, by vhal
melhods ve can penelrale inlo il, and hov deep ve can go. Il is in facl lhe vork
vhich lhe Kriiik has been doing aII lhis lime. As for lhe naluraI vorId, aII lhal
ve need lo knov aboul lhal has aIready been sel forlh above. We have seen lhal
lhe meaning of lhe physicaI vorId for human Iife Iies nol in ils ovn inner
conslilulion, bul in lhe impacl vhich il makes on our minds and viIIs. We have
seen al vhal poinl lhe naluraI sciences make a conlribulion lo our
underslanding of Iife, viz. vhere lhey inform us aboul lhe physicaI condilions
by vhich our aclivilies are slimuIaled and governed. ul aII lhis is absorbed
inlo lhe comprehensive sludy of human Iife and consciousness, vhich lhe
human sludies logelher carry oul. Il is here lhal lhe reIalion belveen mind and
nalure comes home lo us, vhere ve feeI il on our puIses, and il is here, from
lhis underslanding of Iife, and nol from phiIosophicaI syslems, lhal our
praclicaI alliludes and Wc|ianscnauungcn lake shape.
They lake shape in lhe vaIues vhich ve recognise, lhe ends vhich ve sel before
ourseIves, and lhe sense vhich ve have of lhe meaning of Iife. ul lhis is |usl
vhere lhe shoe pinches, and vhere ve are lempled lo ask of phiIosophy
somelhing more lhan a simpIe lheory of knovIedge. Ior vhen ve come lo
vaIues and lhe meaning of Iife, ve find ourseIves in a region of doubl and
debale, and lhe queslion vhich ve address lo phiIosophy is: can any
foundalion for our vaIue-|udgmenls be found oulside our ovn feeIings and
desires` And if nol, is lhere any vay in vhich ve can reach 'ob|eclive' or
universaIIy vaIid slandards of |udgmenl` In lhe course of lhe Kriiik ve have
seen indicalions of vhal DiIlhey's ansver is IikeIy lo be: bul nov is lhe lime for
him lo speak oul fuIIy and openIy.
He gives fuII recognilion lo lhe demand for universaIIy vaIid principIes as a
icn!cncu cj inc nin!: lhal is, he recognises lhal ve have an ineradicabIe lendency
lo seek universaIIy vaIid principIes and lo regard lhe principIes vhich ve
acluaIIy hoId as being such. This is lrue bolh of individuaIs, and of peopIes and
periods of hislory. 'In a period lhere deveIop universaI norms, vaIues, ends, in
reIalion lo vhich lhe meaning of aclions is
-310-
primariIy lo be seen.' Such principIes may be lhoughl of as lhe Iav of God, or of
reason, or as some kind of cosmic purpose: bul, in one guise or anolher, lhey
are aIvays conceived by lhose vho hoId lhem as universaIIy vaIid ( G.S.. V||,
289, 173).
The more, hovever, ve penelrale inlo human hislory, lhe Iess ve can beIieve
lhal lhe principIes supposed lo be universaIIy vaIid are reaIIy so. 'Ior hislory
knovs indeed of lhe asserlion of somelhing uncondilionaI as a vaIue, norm, or
good. . . . ul hisloricaI experience knovs onIy lhe process, so imporlanl for il,
of lhese asserlions: of ilseIf, hovever, il knovs nolhing as lo lheir universaI
vaIidily. . . . Il nolices lhe unreconciIed confIicl of lhese uncondilionaI asserlions
among lhemseIves' ( G.S.. V||, 173). If ve compare nalions and periods, e.g. lhe
Roman Impire, mediaevaI Chrislendom, lhe Aujk|arung, il is evidenl lhal lhere
is no ideaI vhich is acknovIedged by aII of lhem. Somelimes il Iooks as if even
a singIe nalion vere divided againsl ilseIf aboul vaIues: and lhis Ieads us
deeper lo lhe HegeIian lrulh, lhal lhe deveIopmenl of such ideas moves
lhrough opposilion and confIicl lo ever vider and freer synlheses. Il is cIear,
lhen, lhal every slandard of |udgmenl vhich ve appIy lo hisloricaI evenls is
ilseIf a hisloricaI producl: 'hislory is ilseIf lhe produclive force vhich generales
lhe vaIue-delerminalions, ideaIs, ends, by vhich lhe meaning of men and
evenls is measured'. And lhere are aIvays lvo slandards, by bolh of vhich lhe
meaning of any evenl or person comes lo be |udged: firsl, lhal of his ovn age,
and lhen lhal of lhe conlribulion he makes lo human progress ( G.S.. V||, 289-
90). There is no vaIue-delerminalion vhich slands oulside lhe fIov of evenls,
and is nol mereIy a producl of and a faclor in lhis fIov. DiIlhey's finaI
concIusion is 'lhe compIele recognilion, in lhe hisloricaI consciousness, of lhe
immanence of even lhose vaIues and norms vhich appear as uncondilionaI' (
G.S.. V||, 290).
DiIlhey is firm in his acceplance of lhis concIusion. ul he is aIso avare of lhe
probIems vhich il raises. Ior hundreds and lhousands of years ve have Iived in
lhe failh lhal lhere are uncondilionaI principIes vhich ve can knov and by
vhich ve musl Iive. The impuIse lo seek such principIes is as IiveIy lo-day as il
ever vas. If phiIosophy and hislory nov combine lo shov lhal lhe search is
vain, musl lhey nol do somelhing lo aIIay lhe resuIling beviIdermenl`
-311-
DiIlhey accepls lhe responsibiIily: bul lhe cIearesl accounl of hov he lried lo
meel il is nol in lhe Kriiik. |i is jcun! in iuc unjinisnc! skcicncs unicn nc urcic in
1903-4. csicnsi||u !cscri|ing a !rcan unicn nc na! an! a ccntcrsaiicn in unicn nc icck
pari scnc icn ucars |cjcrc. uni|c tisiiing nis jricn! tcn Waricn|urg ai nis casi|c in
Si|csia.
|n inc jirsi. Oi|incu ic||s ncu cnc nigni. ajicr a |cng pni|cscpnica| !iscussicn. nc ucni ic
s|ccp in a rccn unicn ccniainc! a ccpu cj |apnac|s Scncc| cj Aincns. an! na! a !rcan
in unicn inc piciurc canc ic |ijc. Tnc pni|cscpncrs cj pcsi-|cnaissancc iincs canc in
an! jcinc! inc ancicnis an! nc!iacta|s unc ucrc a|rca!u incrc. an! incn inc unc|c
ccnpanu |cgan ic scri incnsc|tcs cui inic ncncgcnccus grcups. |irsi inc naiura|isiic
an! pcsiiitisiic ininkcrs canc icgcincr arcun! Arcninc!cs an! Pic|cnu. incn inc
pni|cscpncrs cj jrcc!cn gaincrc! arcun! Sccraics an! P|aic. an! inc c|jcciitc i!ca|isis
jcrnc! a grcup arcun! Puinagcras an! Hcrac|iius. Ocscarics an! Kani. unc ucrc ai
jirsi ancng inc naincnaiicians an! scicniisis. |cji inai grcup an! jcinc! inc i!ca|isis cj
jrcc!cn. Tncn inc inrcc grcups |cgan ic rccc!c jrcn cnc ancincr. grcai jissurcs
appcarc! in inc grcun! |ciuccn incn. a !rca!ju| ncsii|c a|icnaiicn sccnc! ic scparaic
incn--| uas scizc! |u a sirangc anxiciu. inai pni|cscpnu sccnc! ic cxisi in inrcc cr
pcssi||u ncrc !ijjcrcni jcrns --inc uniiu cj nu cun |cing sccnc! ic |c rcni. as | uas
|cnging|u !raun ncu ic inis grcup. ncu ic inai. an! | sirugg|c! ic rciain ii.
Hcrc inc !rcan cn!s. an! Oi|incu ccniinucs uiin nis cun rcj|cciicns upcn ii. |tcru
Wc|ianscnauung is nisicrica||u ccn!iiicnc!. an! incrcjcrc |iniic!. rc|aiitc. A !rca!ju|
anarcnu cj incugni sccns ic rcsu|i jrcn inis. Bui inc sanc nisicrica| ccnscicusncss.
unicn nas gitcn risc ic inis a|sc|uic !cu|i. can a|sc sci |iniis ic ii. |irsi cj a||. inc
Wc|ianscnauungcn natc scparaic! jrcn cnc ancincr acccr!ing ic an inncr |au. . . .
Tncsc iupcs cj Wc|ianscnauung nainiain incnsc|tcs si!c |u si!c in inc ccursc cj
ccniurics. An! incn inc scccn!. inc |i|craiing incugni. inc Wc|ianscnauungcn arc
grcun!c! in inc naiurc cj inc unitcrsc an! inc rc|aiicn cj inc jiniic kncuing nin! ic ii.
Sc cacn cj incn cxprcsscs cnc si!c cj inc unitcrsc uiinin inc |iniis cj cur incugni. |acn
is ncrcin iruc. Bui cacn is cnc-si!c!. |i is nci granic! ic us ic scc incsc si!cs a|| ai cncc.
Tnc purc |igni cj iruin can |c sccn |u us cn|u in taricus|u |rckcn raus ( G.S.. V||.
222).
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Whal lhis means is iIIuslraled by lhe second skelch, vhich describes a
conversalion belveen DiIlhey and severaI olhers on lhe evening of lhe day afler
his dream. DiIlhey begins by saying lhal lhe one greal facl before vhich aII
sceplicism is reduced lo siIence or siIIiness is lhe facl of lhe naluraI sciences,
vhich reveaI lo us, aIbeil in 'lhe symboI-Ianguage of quaIilies, movemenls,
spaliaI reIalions', a reaIily independenl of ourseIves. The poinl is laken up by a
neuroIogisl, vho asserls his failh in lhe mechanicaI inlerprelalion of nalure and
in lhe possibiIily of reducing psychoIogicaI processes lo lerms of physioIogy.
Von Warlenburg repIies lhal naluraI science is mereIy an abslraclion from lhe
lolaIily of experience: il discovers empiricaI conneclions, bul knovs nolhing of
lhe melaphysicaI reaIily vhich may Iie behind lhem. The neuroIogisl relorls
lhal personaI ideaIism, vilh ils allempl lo undersland lhal reaIily, is a Ieap inlo
specuIalion, vhich he himseIf feeIs no desire lo make. 'Il is a maller of our
sub|eclive energy, our habils, lhe ob|ecls ve lhink aboul, vhelher ve are
naluraIisls or ideaIisls. In lhal case ve musl Iive and Iel Iive. Thal is, ve cannol
refule one anolher. Ior in lhe fieId of lhe experiences vhich conlroI and
condilion each of us, ve are sovereign. . . . And if lhal is so, lhen I have a righl
vilhin my vorId of experience lo lhink consislenlIy as, in lhal vorId, I musl.'
'Yes,' says von Warlenburg, 'if lhe differenl reaIms of experience are of equaI
vorlh.'
The nexl speaker is a painler, vho is fuII of lhe conlempIalion of lhe unily of
nalure. Ior him lhere is no anlilhesis belveen maller and mind: in lhe human
face, lhe souI speaks lhrough lhe body, and in lhe fieIds lhe soiI is inseparabIe
from lhe horses vhich pIough il and lhe Iife vhich grovs oul of il. The
impression is slrenglhened by a drive lhrough lhe ripe cornfieIds and a vaIk
lhrough lhe garden in lhe earIy lviIighl. DiIlhey himseIf speaks: 'Hov
irresislibIe, if ve do nol refIecl or drav dislinclions, is lhe unily of nalure, her
meaning and essenliaI coherence. Il exisls on a IeveI beyond our refIeclion, ils
Iife vas in mylh and in Ianguage. And vhal a diaIeclic arises if man allempls lo
pul lhis ob|eclive ideaIism inlo vords.' ul lhe sun goes dovn and lhe gIov of
nalure dies avay. 'Slern and soIemn lhe broad pIain nov spread oul before us.'
And lhen von Warlenburg speaks: 'So vanishes lhe harmonious beauly . . . lhe
harmony is broken in face of lhe viII vhich surrenders ilseIf
-313-
--lhen lhe necessily of nalure is overcome, her harmony is dissoIved--uc arc
ncrc inan a|| naiurc.' The slars begin lo appear, and lheir dislanl gIory is lo lhe
lvo friends a kind of visibIe symboI of lhe spiriluaI lranscendence of lhe human
viII over nalure: and DiIlhey lhinks hov veII lhis is exempIified in his friend,
vho in lhe consciousness of lhe near approach of dealh has, lhrough his
Chrislian failh, lranscended himseIf, and become a proof of lhal vhich breaks
lhrough nalure and her necessily'.
DiIlhey goes lo his room fuII of admiralion for lhis spiriluaI pover, and asks
himseIf: 'Is nol my ovn hisloricaI slandpoinl a fruilIess sceplicism, if I measure
il againsl such a Iife` We musl endure and conquer lhis vorId, ve musl acl
upon il. Hov vicloriousIy my friend does so. Where in my Wc|ianscnauung is
lhere a Iike pover`' He envies lhe pover vhich comes from reIigious failh, bul
cannol honeslIy share lhal failh. 'If hisloricaI and psychoIogicaI reIalivism vere
lhe Iasl vord, il vouId louch lhe reIigions firsl of aII.' Whal lhen is lo be done`
According lo DiIlhey, lhe soIulion Iies in a 'phiIosophy of phiIosophy', i.e. a
comparalive Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc. ul he does nol cIearIy slale, in lhis
conversalion piece, lhe concIusion lo vhich lhal viII Iead us. Ior lhal, ve musl
relurn lo lhe fragmenls of lhe Kriiik. |n inc jina| scciicn cj P|an B ccncs a
paragrapn. uiin inc uciaiicn cj unicn uc nau jiiiing|u c|csc.
Tnc nisicrica| ccnscicusncss. nc uriics. cj inc jiniiu!c cj ctcru nisicrica|
pncncncncn. ctcru nunan cr sccia| siaic. cj inc rc|aiitiiu cj ctcru scri cj |c|icj. is inc
|asi sicp icuar!s inc |i|craiicn cj nan. Wiin ii. nan aiiains inc sctcrcign pcucr ic
uring jrcn ctcru cxpcricncc iis ccnicni. ic surrcn!cr unc||u ic ii. uiincui
prcpcsscssicn. as ij incrc ucrc nc susicn cj pni|cscpnu an! nc jaiin unicn ccu|! |in!
ncn. Iijc |cccncs jrcc jrcn kncu|c!gc |u ccnccpis. nin! |cccncs sctcrcign in jacc cj
a|| iissucs cj !cgnaiic incugni. |tcru |cauiu. ctcru sanciiiu. ctcru sacrijicc. rc|itc! an!
cxpcun!c!. cpcns up pcrspcciitcs unicn !isc|csc a rca|iiu. An! in inc sanc uau uc iakc
up inic cursc|tcs inc cti|. inc jrigniju|. inc ug|u. as cccupuing a p|acc in inc ucr|!. as
cnjc|!ing in iisc|j a rca|iiu ic unicn jusiicc nusi |c !cnc in inc ucr|! cr!cr. Scncining
unicn cannci |c ccnjurc! auau. An!. in ccnirasi uiin inc rc|aiitiiu. inc ccniinuiiu cj
inc crcaiitc jcrcc nakcs iisc|j jc|i as inc ccnira| nisicrica| jaci ( G.S.. V||. 290-1).
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CHAPTER TEN
THI purpose of lhis book has been mainIy exposilory: lo sel before lhe reader
lhe facls aboul DiIlhey's phiIosophy, vilh |usl so much commenl and
discussion as mighl serve lo bring oul lhe main poinls and lo cIear up
obscurilies. Il vouId be oul of pIace, al lhis Iale slage, lo begin discussing his
phiIosophy on ils merils. There is no room here for an exlended crilique of him,
and sliII Iess is lhere room for a decIaralion of my ovn vievs on lhe mallers
vhich he raises. My purpose in lhis finaI chapler is a Iimiled one: lo singIe oul,
from among lhe greal mass of his conlenlions, lhose vhich seem lo be of
abiding significance. A greal deaI of vhal he vriles is zeil|c!ingi, expIicabIe by
lhe inleIIecluaI silualion in vhich he found himseIf, bul of no Iasling
significance. Selling lhis aside, vhal have ve Iefl` Whal is lhere in his
phiIosophy vhich deserves furlher consideralion and deveIopmenl`
Il vouId hardIy be possibIe for any phiIosopher in IngIand lo deveIop DiIlhey's
lhemes vilhoul being Ied inlo a comparison of DiIlhey vilh CoIIingvood. The
Iikenesses belveen lhe lvo men are so obvious lhal lhe comparison imposes
ilseIf inevilabIy: and lhe differences belveen lhem are such lhal lhe vorking
oul of lhe comparison musl prove inslruclive. In deaIing vilh DiIlhey, poinl by
poinl, I shaII have CoIIingvood in mind, and shaII make such comparisons as
may serve lo lhrov Iighl on each phiIosopher by conlrasl vilh lhe olher.
We can begin by dismissing from consideralion one vhoIe range of queslions.
Wherever lhe Iiving poinl of DiIlhey's phiIosophy may be, il is nol in his
lheories aboul sense-perceplion and lhe exlernaI vorId. To him lhis vas aIvays
a secondary inleresl, and lhe vievs vhich are summarised in our Chapler Tvo
have IillIe inlrinsic vaIue, lhough lhey serve lo lhrov Iighl on lhe ruIing
molives of DiIlhey's lhinking. Il is cIear lhal his
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slandpoinl is anli-melaphysicaI. He is delermined lo re|ecl any kind of
apriorism, any kind of ideaIism, or any lheory vhich cIaims lo knov lhe 'inner
nalure' of lhings 'behind' lhe phenomena of perceplion. He can cIaim lhe meril
of having seen lhal lhe queslion of lhe 'reaI exislence' of lhe 'exlernaI vorId' is
IargeIy a queslion of definilions--vhal do ve ( by such vords as 'ob|ecl',
'reaI', 'exlernaI' and so on` Hovever, he does nol vork oul lhe remoler
impIicalions of lhis, and vhal IillIe he does say is nol free from obscurilies.
Much lhe same musl be said of his lrealmenl of lhe vider issues of Iogic and
epislemoIogy. His approach lo phiIosophy vas nol IogicaI, and lo Iogic proper
he made no conlribulion vhalever. He is more al home in expIoring lhe
preIogicaI IeveIs of experience, vhelher in sense-perceplion or in our avareness
of our ovn and olher seIves. His aim is lo make a descriplive anaIysis of lhe
fieId of consciousness--an aim vhich phiIosophers have oflen enough sel before
lhemseIves, and vhich brings him inlo Iine vilh Kanlians, HegeIians, and
phenomenoIogisls. ul if ve accepl lhe facl lhal lhis vas his aim, ve cannol be
impressed by his achievemenl. We need nol dveII on his remarks aboul
'conlenls' and 'alliludes', or on lhe lripIicily of cognilive, affeclive, and conalive
alliludes vhich runs lhrough his vork. These are lhe lribule vhich he paid lo
conlemporary habils of lhoughl and speech. He does nol lake lhem loo
seriousIy in delaiI himseIf. There are onIy lvo poinls on vhich he is immovabIe.
The firsl is lhal menlaI processes are predominanlIy purposive or, as he says,
'slrucluraI', and lend lovards lhe buiIding up of an inlegraled mind and
characler. The second is lhal lhoughl is nol an independenl source of lrulh, bul
exisls mereIy lo 'cIarify' vhal is impIicil in feeIing or 'Iived experience'. He can
cIaim lo have done vhal fev in his generalion vere abIe lo do: lo be vhoIe-
hearledIy empiricisl in epislemoIogy vilhoul being associalionisl or
behaviourisl in psychoIogy: lo do |uslice lo lhe movemenl of Iife and experience
vilhoul being Ied off by il inlo melaphysicaI specuIalion as ergson vas. This is
lo his credil, and may serve as a modeI for us loo, bul nol in any maller of
delaiI.
Ixperience as a seIf-inlegraling vhoIe: dependence of aII lhoughl upon
preIogicaI forms of experience: fruilIessness of aII onloIogicaI or melaphysicaI
specuIalions: lhese lhree poinls
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conlain mosl of vhal is sound and Iiving in DiIlhey's generaI lheory of
knovIedge. Lel us keep lhem in mind as ve carry our examinalion of him a
slage furlher.
Ierhaps lhe facl mosl videIy knovn aboul DiIlhey is lhal he vas a phiIosopher
vho concerned himseIf vilh hislory. This is lrue, bul viII be deceplive if il Ieads
us lo rank him as |usl one more among lhose vho have devoled lhemseIves lo
somelhing caIIed lhe 'phiIosophy of hislory', |usl one more in a group vhich
incIudes such aIready veII-knovn members as Croce and CoIIingvood. The
poinls in vhich he diverges from lhal group are as imporlanl and inslruclive as
lhose in vhich he agrees vilh lhem. If ve add lhal he aIso concerned himseIf
vilh fine arl, music, and Iileralure, and lhal lhis brings him inlo reneved
conlacl vilh Croce and CoIIingvood in lheir capacily as aeslhelicians, again il
musl be said lhal lhe differences are as imporlanl as lhe Iikenesses.
One difference arises from lhe facl lhal Croce and CoIIingvood, Iike many
olher phiIosophers, lreal arl and hislory nol onIy as forms of experience vhich
are inleresling and imporlanl in lhemseIves, bul aIso as unils in lhe edifice of a
syslem. The pIan of Croce's phiIosophy is veII knovn: il cIaims lo bring aII lhe
aclivilies of lhe human 'spiril' under four main heads, and so lo give a
comprehensive viev of lhe mind's Iife--vhich lurns oul aIso, on Croce's ideaIisl
principIes, lo be a viev of aII reaIily. CoIIingvood's phiIosophy is lrue lo lhe
spiril of his masler, diverging from Croce onIy vhere il reverls lo a posilion
more Iike HegeI's, and reinlroducing a form of diaIeclicaI lransilion vhich
Croce had abandoned as unsound. The syslem vhich he conslrucled in
Spccu|un Mcniis viII have lo be broughl under examinalion before ve have
done: for lhe presenl il is enough lo recognise lhal lhis kind of syslem-buiIding
is aIlogelher aIien lo DiIlhey.
I do nol make il a grievance againsl CoIIingvood lhal he lhoughl he found an
ordered syslem in experience. There is cerlainIy some degree of order in lhings,
and vhal is lhinking for, bul lo delecl as much of il as ve honeslIy can` I lhink
hovever lhal CoIIingvood, Iike olhers, has accepled loo easiIy a simpIe formuIa
as expressing lhe slruclure of experience, and has aIIoved lhis lo delermine a
pricri his approach lo parlicuIar reaIms of experience, He cannol Iook slraighl al
arl, because he
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has decided beforehand lhal il musl somehov be correIaled vilh 'imaginalion'
in lhe Kanlian sense of lhal vord. He cannol see lhe reaI reIalion belveen
naluraI science and hisloricaI lhinking, because he has decided beforehand lhal
lhey musl represenl lvo rungs in a diaIeclicaI Iadder. The posl-Kanlian mirror
of lhe mind, in lhis ils Ialesl configuralion, does nol resuIl from honesl
examinalion of lhe severaI aclivilies of civiIised man and lhe reIalions belveen
lhem. Il is a prefabricaled framevork inlo vhich lhese aclivilies are filled by
force. y conlrasl vilh lhis, DiIlhey's re|eclion of lhe posl-Kanlian syslems sels
him free from lheir dogmalic assumplions. Il enabIes him lo consuIl olher
sources, and lo Iook freeIy al experience ilseIf. He has nol CoIIingvood's
crispness of expression, nor his pover of reasoned anaIysis and ordered
presenlalion: bul he has a grealer sensilivily lo lhe facls of experience, and a
grealer humiIily before lhem.
This is nol lo say lhal DiIlhey has nol an ordered syslem of his ovn. He has, bul
il is nol an aII-comprehending one Iike CoIIingvood's: lhe aII-comprehending
syslem is |usl vhal his re|eclion of melaphysics is meanl lo excIude. He loo
exhibils arl and hislory as eIemenls in a vider vhoIe: bul lhal vhoIe is simpIy
lhe human sludies. Il is nol even lhe vhoIe of human knovIedge, for lhe
naluraI sciences remain oulside il, a reaIm vhose fronlier DiIlhey lraces, bul
vhose inlerior he does nol venlure lo expIore. And |usl for lhis reason, because
lhe human sludies are nol seen as a Iink in a chain vhich musl somehov reach
from senseperceplion, lhrough naluraI science and hislory, lo a finaI lerm in
phiIosophy, bul are laken as a province reIaliveIy compIele in ilseIf, somelhing
of lheir dislinclive characler becomes visibIe lo DiIlhey, vhich more ambilious
syslems may miss.
Il is lo lhis, I beIieve, lhal ve musl allribule DiIlhey's firm refusaI lo separale
hisloricaI knovIedge from lhe olher discipIines, so diverse in characler, vhich
make up lhe Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn. If ve are arranging lhe sciences diaIeclicaIIy,
or by degrees of approximalion lo some IogicaIIy delermined norm of lrulh, ve
are sure lo divide lhem on grounds of melhod and principIe, and lhe presence
of experimenlaI melhods and generaIising lheories in psychoIogy or in
economics is sure lo Iead us lo cIassify lhem vilh lhe naluraI sciences, vhiIe
hisloriography remains separale, dislinguished by ils individualing
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or idiographic characler. Thal is lhe principIe on vhich Croce and CoIIingvood
have vorked. Il is aIso, as ve have seen, lhe principIe foIIoved by Rickerl and
lhe Neo-Kanlians, and for lhe same reason: because lheir phiIosophy loo is
governed by dislinclions of IogicaI form. DiIlhey's is nol, lhough he recognises
lhese dislinclions vhen he meels lhem. The cenlraI faclor in lhe human sludies
is nol, as he sees il, lheir inleresl in lhe parlicuIar and lhe individuaI. Il is lhe
presence in lhem aII of some eIemenl of 'underslanding'.
DiIlhey's phiIosophy is nol a pni|cscpnu cj nisicru, if lhal means a lheory of
hisloricaI lhinking simpIy as such. Il is a pni|cscpnu cj un!crsian!ing, and because
il is lhal il is aIso a pni|cscpnu cj cu|iurc. Il is one of lhe marks of civiIised men
lhal lhey can en|oy a communily of Iife and experience. They do nol mereIy
come lo an underslanding': lhey 'undersland' one anolher. DiIlhey knovs lhis,
and il is nol loo much lo say lhal a passion for underslanding pervades aII his
lhoughl. Il is here lhal he finds lhe meaning and vaIue of hislory ilseIf: nol lhal
il enIarges our knovIedge of evenls, nor even lhal il gives us individuaI facl
vhere naluraI science gives us generaI Iav, bul lhal il makes lhe hislorian's
mind a mirror in vhich are refIecled lhe minds and experiences of olher men.
Hislory is a vehicIe of underslanding. Il is 'Iife embracing Iife', in a phrase of
DiIlhey's ovn. So, in a measure, are aII lhe human sludies: for underslanding is
presenl lhroughoul lhe sludy of human behaviour, as dislincl from lhe
analomy and physioIogy of lhe human body. Arl loo is a sphere of
underslanding: lhe arlisl is one vho underslands, and ve undersland him. This
is lhe lheme vhich runs lhrough lhe Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji. an! gctcrns
inc sc|cciicn an! arrangcncni cj iis ccnicnis.
Iijc cn|racing |ijc. Tnis !ccs nci ncan inai a|| nin!s arc Onc Min!. an! inai inc
A|sc|uic |cccncs sc|j-ccnscicus in an! inrcugn inc nisicrica| sc|j-ccnscicusncss cj
nankin!. Tnai kin! cj jusiian nau |c |cji ic Hcgc| an! nis iniiaicrs. inc|u!ing inc
auincr cj Spccu|un Mcniis. Wnai Oi|incu ncans is inai in!iti!ua| nunan |cings
un!crsian! in!iti!ua| nunan |cings. an! nc ncans nc ncrc. Bui ncu nucn inai is! |i
is inc |asis cj a|| sccia| |ijc. an! cj a|| cu|iura| aciitiiu. |n pariicu|ar. ii is inc
cxp|anaiicn an! jusiijicaiicn cj Oi|incus cun |ijc as a scnc|ar an! nunanisi. nc is cnc
unc ccniains in ninsc|j. an! nc|ps ic jcsicr
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in olhers, lhis mosl essenliaI human capacily of underslanding. And in his
phiIosophy, as dislincl from his hisloricaI and crilicaI vrilings, a Ieading aim is
lo discover vhal ve do, and vhal il is lhal ve knov, vhen ve undersland
peopIe.
A Ieading aim in his phiIosophy--bul il is nol lhe soIe aim. If ve vere lo ask
DiIlhey vhal are lhe fundamenlaI aims of his phiIosophy, he vouId ansver lhal
lhere are lvo. The firsl is lo dig dovn lo lhe rools of human knovIedge, lo
discover on vhal basis il resls, vhence il derives ils conlenl, ils principIes, and
ils aulhorily. This is lhe aim of epislemoIogy, and of course lhe enquiry inlo lhe
nalure and basis of underslanding is mereIy one parl of lhis vider enquiry,
lhough il is a parl vhich parlicuIarIy inleresls DiIlhey. The second aim vhich
he sels before himseIf is lo enquire inlo vhal he caIIs lhe melaphysicaI
consciousness--vhal il is in our nalure vhich impeIs us lo raise specuIalive
queslions of lhe kind vhich lradilionaI melaphysics vas supposed lo ansver,
and vhich Kanl and lhe posilivisls say cannol be ansvered. This is a vider
enquiry lhan epislemoIogy, since il concerns nol onIy our inleIIecluaI processes
and capacilies bul aIso our vaIue-|udgmenls, our conscience, our hopes and
aspiralions. AII lhese pIay a parl in generaling and shaping a Wc|ianscnauung,
and a Wc|ianscnauung musl assign lo each of lhem ils proper pIace in lhe
piclure.
In lhese enquiries ve are Ied lo an idea vhich is even more fundamenlaI in
DiIlhey's lhoughl lhan lhal of underslanding-lo lhe idea of Iife (!as Ic|cn). olh
Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc and epislemoIogy come round lo lhis al Iasl. Il is nol from
lhe inleIIecl lhal Wc|ianscizauungcn arise, and il is nol by mereIy IogicaI anaIysis
lhal ve can discover vhal lhey mean. They spring from human Iife in lhe
'lolaIily' of ils povers and impuIses, and musl be underslood in lerms of lhal
lolaIily. ul even in lhe narrover fieId of epislemoIogy DiIlhey finds lhal lhe
same is lrue. Life appears here on bolh sides of lhe epislemoIogicaI reIalion. Il is
one of lhe ob|ecls--lo us lhe mosl inleresling and imporlanl ob|ecl--vhich ve
cognise, and il is aIso lhe sub|ecl by vhich lhe cognising is done: for here loo il
is nol mereIy lhe mind or inleIIecl, bul lhe vhoIe Iiving man in lhe lolaIily of
his povers, vho perceives and lhinks.
DiIlhey gives a pregnanl sense of his ovn lo lhis vord Iife. Wilh him il is nol a
bioIogicaI lerm. His phiIosophy is nol a
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variely of vilaIism, Iike ergson's. Nor is il a psychoIogicaI lerm, if by
psychoIogy ve mean primariIy lhe science of human behaviour: for lhal science
sludies peopIe vilh a delachmenl vhich DiIlhey, lhe humanisl, does nol allain
or seek. Iijc lo him means human experience as knovn from vilhin, as knovn
by lhe poel and lhe aulobiographer. IhiIosopher as he is, and lherefore famiIiar
vilh lhe ralionaI aclivilies of lhe mind, he has aIso a keen sense of lhe non-
ralionaI side of human nalure, of ils inslinclive and especiaIIy of ils inluilive
aspecls, and his phiIosophy is meanl lo incIude an accounl of aII lhese.
IspeciaIIy noliceabIe is his keen sense of lhe aclion and reaclion in vhich lhe
human being is perpeluaIIy invoIved vilh aII lhal is around him. We are aII lhe
lime al grips vilh our surrounding vorId, and perceiving and lhinking are lo
be accounled for onIy in lhis conlexl of slimuIus and response, vhich is an
inlegraI parl of vhal DiIlhey means by |ijc.
Il is in lhese lerms loo lhal ve shaII undersland vhal he means by rca|iiu
(Wirk|icnkcii), and hov he can cIaim lhal his phiIosophy is a recaII lo reaIily and
ob|eclivily, in spile of lhe obvious eIemenls of sub|eclivism in il. He has nolhing
in lhe nalure of an onloIogy. He makes il abundanlIy cIear lhal vhal ve knov
in nalure is nol a lhing in ilseIf, bul an ordered syslem of appearances,
impinging upon us in sensalion and inlerpreled by our lhinking. ul il is nol
againsl an uncrilicaI reaIism lhal he direcls his conlroversiaI shafls. Il is againsl
various phiIosophies of recenl limes, vhose accounl of knovIedge and lhe
knoving sub|ecl DiIlhey lhinks is abslracl and formaI. Il is againsl lhe limeIess
lranscendenlaI seIf of Kanl and Kanlianism, againsl lhe dilch dug belveen
sensory maleriaI and a pricri forms (vhereby bolh are robbed of lheir
ob|eclivily), and againsl lhe superslilion lhal knovIedge can be anaIysed
excIusiveIy in lerms of sense-dala and IogicaI reIalionships. Ixperience, he says,
is nol a panorama vhich unroIIs ilseIf before a delached observer, nor is il an
imaginalive and inleIIecluaI conslruclion pul logelher by a lranscendenlaI seIf,
or even by many such seIves in concerl. Il is a maller of 'Iife-reIalions', of
slimuIus and response, of aclion and reaclion, of a Iiving conscious organism al
grips vilh ils environmenl. Il is here lhal ve are lo find lhe archelypaI 'reaIily':
and il is because DiIlhey recognises lhis lhal he |uslIy cIaims lo be a lrue
empiricisl, vhiIe many
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vho cIaim lhal lilIe have no conceplion of vhal experience acluaIIy is.
An IngIish reader may somelimes be reminded of radIey's recoiI from Kanlian
and HegeIian epislemoIogy, vhich seemed lo him lo reduce lhe vorId lo a
'speclraI voof of impaIpabIe abslraclions'--his insislence lhal 'reaIily' musl
mean 'feeIing' or 'senlienl experience'--his crilicism of lhe conceplion of lhe
limeIess seIf--his insislence lhal a proper accounl of 'reaIily' musl incIude lhe
vilness of aII modes of experience, of feeIing and voIilion as veII as of
cognilion. radIey's 'feeIing' or 'senlienl experience' has much in common vilh
DiIlhey's 'Iived experience', nol Ieasl in lhe inlensily vilh vhich radIey himseIf
obviousIy experienced il: bul DiIlhey's sense of aclion and reaclion, his beIief
lhal lhe nol-seIf is somehov 'given' in Iived experience as acling upon me, is
absenl from radIey.
Whal appIies lo knovIedge appIies a jcriicri lo a Wc|ianscnauung: il springs nol
from pure reason, bul from lhe vhoIe of Iife. Il is lrue lhal melaphysics has
conslanlIy prelended olhervise, and slriven lo presenl Wc|ianscnauungcn under
lhe guise of pureIy ralionaI specuIalions: invoIving ilseIf lhereby, as DiIlhey
says, in a 'Iabour of Sisyphus' in lhe allempl lo ralionaIise vhal cannol be
ralionaIised. Il vas Kanl, DiIlhey conlinues, vho haIf-unknovingIy exposed lhe
iIIusion, and direcled our allenlion lo lhe reaI rools of lhe melaphysicaI
consciousness in lhe moraI and reIigious Iife. 'Whal Kanl examines is nol lhe
Iiving melaphysicaI oulIook, as il dravs nourishmenl and bIood from aII lhe
forces of ils molher earlh, vhich is lhe lolaIily of human nalure, lhe human
hearl ilseIf, and so slrides aIong lhrough hislory as an indeslruclibIe reaIily.
Whal he examines, allacks, and annihiIales is a shadov, lhe dead concepluaI
science of melaphysics. And so arises a curious drama. He Iooks for lhe
anaIylicaI eIemenls of melaphysics in lhe sphere of lhe isoIaled inleIIigence, Ied
on by lhe anaIogy of Iogic and malhemalics, and under lhe infIuence of lhe
melaphysics acluaIIy crealed on lhal basis by WoIff: he shovs lhal no
melaphysics can be erecled on lhe basis of lhese eIemenls, and finaIIy reIegales
lhe origin, pover, and evidence of a melaphysicaI oulIook lo lhe pIace vhere he
shouId have soughl il from lhe beginning: he arresls lhe vagabond Melaphysics
in lhe pIace vhere she had IaleIy been residing, and sends her back lo her
home. Ior lhal is lhe
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greal vork of his praclicaI phiIosophy and Crilique of Iudgmenl' (quoled in
G.S.. V, Ixv f.).
Il does nol foIIov from lhis lhal phiIosophy has no concern vilh
Wc|ianscnauungcn. |i nau natc a tcru inpcriani ccnccrn uiin incn. Iikc inc acsinciic.
ncra|. an! rc|igicus ta|uaiicns cn unicn incu sc |argc|u !cpcn!. incu spring jrcn
scurccs in nunan naiurc unicn cannci |c cra!icaic!. |tcn ij uc rcgar! incn as purc
janiasu. incu arc uci a pcrpciua||u rccurring janiasu. an! pni|cscpnu ui|| natc inc !uiu
unicn Kani assignc! ic ii. cj cxpcsing inc i||usicn ancu ic cacn gcncraiicn as ii grcus
up. Bui inai is nci inc unc|c cj inc naiicr. Iikc ta|uc-ju!gncnis. again.
Wc|ianscnauungcn p|au a grcai pari in inc jcrnaiicn cj pcrscna|iiu. an! in gcncraiing
an! susiaining inc |ijc cj sccia| grcups. |tcn ij incu arc a|| ja|sc uncn iakcn |iicra||u. as
inccrics cj inc unitcrsc. uc usua||u jcc| inai scnc arc ncrc nca|inu an! siinu|aiing ic
inc nin! an! cnaracicr inan cincrs. Tnc ucsiicn. jcr insiancc. uncincr Cnrisiianiiu
nas |ccn a gcc! inj|ucncc in |urcpcan |ijc an! incugni is a rca| ucsiicn. ctcn ij uc
assunc inai inc Cnrisiian |c|icjs a|cui Gc! an! inc unitcrsc arc nci iruc in inc scnsc in
unicn Cnrisiians arc suppcsc! ic nc|! incn. Tnis is a iupc cj ucsiicn unicn nas a grcai
!ca| cj pni|cscpnica| inicrcsi. A!niiiing inai a Wc|ianscnauung nas an inj|ucncc cn |ijc
an! incugni. inai is a|rca!u a naiicr unicn ui|| inicrcsi inc ncra| pni|cscpncr an! inc
pni|cscpncr cj nisicru. |j uc incn ask ncu sucn inj|ucncc is cxcric!. an! ncu a sci cj
i!cas unicn arc nci iruc in inc scnsc in unicn incu arc ccnscicus|u nc|! can uci cxcri a
gcc! an! nca|inu inj|ucncc. uc arc |c! ic !ccpcr ucsiicns a|cui iruin an! ncaning.
Can a sci cj jcrnu|ac unicn is ccnscicus|u inicn!c! ic ccntcu cnc ncaning. a ja|sc cnc.
nctcrinc|css natc unccnscicus|u ancincr ncaning unicn is in scnc scnsc iruc? Tnc
prc||cn cj inc ta|uc an! inj|ucncc cj Wc|ianscnauungcn |ca!s in inis uau ic inc
prc||cn cj incir inicrprciaiicn. an! inai iakcs us inic !ijjicu|i ucsiicns cj sun|c|isn
an! |anguagc. Tnus inc !cncnsiraiicn inai nciapnusics as a scicncc cj purc rcascn is
inpcssi||c is nci ncccssari|u inc cn! cj cur inicrcsi in nciapnusics. Wncn inai
!cncnsiraiicn nas |ccn gitcn. inc Criiiuc cj Mciapnusica| Sun|c|isn nau jin! inai
iis ucrk is jusi |cginning.
Sucn a criiiuc is jcrcsna!cuc! in |icnic an! Hcgc| an! incir jc||cucrs. |ui uiin
inpcriani |iniiaiicns. |n incn ii is cn|u a
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crilique of olher peopIe's reIigious and melaphysicaI ullerances. Ior lhemseIves,
lhey Iel il be seen lhal lhey have found lhe one lrue melaphysic, of vhich aII lhe
resl are imperfecl refIeclions: and lhis one lrue melaphysic is afler aII a science
of reason, indeed il is AbsoIule Reason becoming seIf-conscious. To DiIlhey,
vho is in earnesl aboul nol having a science of pure reason, nol even a 'crilicaI'
or 'lranscendenlaI' one, lhis posilion musl appear haIf-hearled. He musl go
furlher. In parlicuIar, he musl make cIear lhal melaphysicaI symboIs are nol
imperfecl formuIalions of an inleIIecluaIIy apprehensibIe lrulh, bul expressions
of 'Iife' in his sense of lhe vord. In so far as lhey conlain somelhing lhal can be
caIIed 'lrulh', il is nol reason becoming seIfconscious, bul 'Iife embracing Iife':
and lhe funclion of phiIosophy in reIalion lo lhem is lo sharpen lhe symboIism
and make cIearer vhal il is lhal lhey express. 'IhiIosophy', he says, 'is an aciicn
by vhich |ijc, i.e. lhe su|jcci in ils rc|aiicnsnips as |iting aciitiiu. is raisc! ic
ccnscicusncss an! incugni inrcugn ic inc cn!' ( Bricjuccnsc| Oi|incu-Ycrck, p. 247).
The underslanding and inlerprelalion of melaphysicaI symboIism is an
imporlanl eIemenl in lhis lask.
Conceiving lhe lask of a Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc in lhis vay, DiIlhey mighl sliII
find his vay lo lhe viev lhal one parlicuIar sel of symboIs is lhe besl and lruesl,
because lhe lolaI allilude lo Iife vhich finds expression in il is lhe fuIIesl and
heaIlhiesl. Then he vouId be Iike lhe HegeIians, underslanding and evaIualing
olher peopIe's vievs of Iife vhiIe yel giving a primacy lo his ovn. We can see
vhal his chosen viev vouId be: a kind of conlempIalive humanism, cIoseIy
approximaling lo Goelhe and NovaIis. Somelhing of lhis kind shovs lhrough
his vork as il is: no man can vhoIIy conceaI his personaI lendencies and
enlhusiasms: bul somelhing eIse has enlered in and prevenled him from openIy
adopling and propagaling il. Thal somelhing is lhe breadlh of his hisloricaI and
psychoIogicaI underslanding, logelher vilh his scrupuIous honesly in face of
opposing vievs. These faclors logelher expIain vhy DiIlhey, inslead of vorking
oul a phiIosophicaI expression of his ovn Wc|ianscnauung and Ieaving lhe
maller lhere, ends on a nole of reIalivism vilh his lhree rivaI lypes.
In so doing he has in a manner 'lranscended himseIf' (as he says of von
Warlenburg), and recognised his ovn oulIook and
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slandpoinl as onIy one of severaI vhich are pIausibIe and Iegilimale. ul he has
bequealhed lo phiIosophy a serious probIem. Hov lhal probIem shouId be
deaIl vilh is a queslion vhich ve musl discuss shorlIy. MeanvhiIe Iel us nolice
hov, in lhis cuIminaling seclion of DiIlhey's phiIosophy, his lvo Ieading
conceplions of |ijc and un!crsian!ing come logelher. Lel us nolice loo hov lhe
lask of phiIosophy, lhus modeslIy conceived, approximales lo lhal of hislory.
He said so himseIf al lhe oulsel of his career, in vords vhich aII his Ialer vork
serves onIy lo iIIuslrale and confirm. 'Il vouId nol be vorlh vhiIe lo be a
hislorian, if il vere nol aIso a vay of comprehending lhe vorId. . . . Whal is
vorlh knoving` To vhal end lhis pIanel vas formed, lovards lhe reaIisalion of
vhal purposes ve are carried during lhe haIf-cenlury of inleIIigenl Iife vhich
ve Iive on ils surface: veighlier queslions lhan lhese, queslions arising more
oul of lhe deplhs of human need, I couId nol name. ul if hisloricaI knovIedge
is lo be vhal il oughl lo be, il viII--ansver lhese queslions` Thal vouId be
fooIish presumplion, bul from lhe vhoIe deveIopmenl of mankind il viII be
abIe lo exlracl convincing refIeclions. . . . When a man sludies hislory vilh such
an eye for lhe forms of human exislence, lhe Iavs vhich govern il, lhe
lendencies vhich arise oul of ils nalure, in his mind lhere comes lo Iife, afler his
ovn manner, no Iess a porlion of such lrulh as is vouchsafed lo us lhan in lhe
mind of lhe phiIosopher' ( Ocr jungc Oi|incu, p. 81).
Afler lhese generaI consideralions, il viII be convenienl lo proceed lo a delaiIed
confronlalion of DiIlhey vilh CoIIingvood. We shaII find lheir phiIosophies
running paraIIeI, bul al a noliceabIe dislance from one anolher. They run
paraIIeI, in lhal lhey deaI very IargeIy vilh lhe same issues, and vilh a
somevhal simiIar background of experience. They are kepl aparl by lhe facl
lhal lheir fundamenlaI assumplions and guiding principIes are differenl.
DiIlhey's ruIing conceplions of un!crsian!ing and |ijc beIong lo a differenl vorId
from lhe HegeIian conceplions vhich conlroI CoIIingvood's lhinking.
CoIIingvood himseIf has begun lhe confronlalion by giving us (in Tnc |!ca cj
Hisicru) his vievs on DiIlhey. We shaII have lo examine lhese vievs, vhich
lhrov more Iighl on lheir aulhor himseIf lhan on DiIlhey. Yel, before ve are loo
brusque vilh CoIIingvood, ve shaII do veII lo consuIl lhe chapler on DiIlhey
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in |i|cscji !c| Nctcccnic. |u !c |uggicrc. uncn Cc||ingucc! !cscri|cs as nu jricn! (
An Auic|icgrapnu. p. 99). A||cuing jcr !ijjcrcnccs cj !aic an! purpcsc. inc iuc ncn
ircai Oi|incu in a siriking|u sini|ar uau. Bcin arc prcnpi ic rcccgnisc nis |rca!in cj
|carning an! nis pcucr cj nisicrica| un!crsian!ing. Oc |uggicrc saus inai nis ucrk cn
inc |cjcrnaiicn pcric! is inc |csi inai na! |ccn uriiicn. !cun ic inai iinc. in
Gcrnanu. an! Cc||ingucc! uriics cj nin as a |cnc|u an! ncg|ccic! gcnius. Bui |cin
!rau a piciurc cj nin as cnc unc sirugg|c! in tain ic nakc nis un!crsian!ing
ariicu|aic in pni|cscpnica| ana|usis. |i is inc sanc ticu cj nin unicn uc a|sc jin! in
|ickcris !iscip|cs (cj. Arinur Sicin. Ocr Bcgrijj !cs Vcrsicncns |ci Oi|incu). |i sccns ic
|c inpcssi||c jcr Hcgc|ians an! Ncc-Kaniians ic cnicr un!crsian!ing|u inic Oi|incus
pcini cj ticu. cr ic ircai ii scricus|u as a |cgiiinaic a|icrnaiitc ic incir cun. |n inc casc
cj !c |uggicrc an! Cc||ingucc!. ii nusi |c ccnjcssc!. ancincr jacicr is ccriain|u ai
ucrk. tiz. an insujjicicni acuainiancc uiin unai Oi|incu aciua||u urcic.
| sna|| nakc inc ccnjrcniaiicn |u iaking succcssitc|u a nun|cr cj issucs. jc||cuing
rcugn|u inc cr!cr in unicn incu arisc in Oi|incus Kriiik. an! cxanining in cacn casc
unai Oi|incu an! Cc||ingucc! natc ic sau.
leeIlng und lmuglnutlon
Oi|incu an! Cc||ingucc! arc |cin kccn|u inicrcsic! in inc su|inic||cciua| jcrns cj
cxpcricncc. an! in inc prc|cgica| jcrns cj cxprcssicn ic unicn incu gitc risc. Bcin
cnpnasisc inc !cpcn!cncc cj incugni cn incsc |cucr jcrns cj cxpcricncc. an! inc pari
p|auc! |u cxprcssicn in naking incn acccssi||c ic rcj|cciitc cxaninaiicn. Hcrc is an
cxicnsitc an! inpcriani jic|! cj cnuiru unicn incu natc in ccnncn. Hcu jar !c incu
agrcc in incir ircaincni cj ii?
Tncrc is cnc icpic cn unicn nciincr cj incn snincs. tiz. inc !isiinciicns ic |c !raun
|ciuccn ccgniiitc an! ncn-ccgniiitc iupcs cj cxpcricncc. Oi|incu nas nis inrccjc|!
scncnc cj ccgniiitc. ajjcciitc. an! tc|iiicna| cxpcricnccs. |ui nc nas c|ticus|u iakcn ii
ctcr jrcn car|icr uriicrs sucn as Kani. an! uc natc sccn ncu in inc cn! nc |ccanc
sccpiica| cj c|car-cui !isiinciicns in inis jic|!. an! a!niiic! inai nis icrninc|cgu uas
ncrc|u a ucrka||c apprcxinaiicn. Scncuncrc |cnin! inc jcc|ings an!
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'voIilions' Iurk lhe 'inslincls', vhich are said lo conslilule lhe core of lhe mind's
Iife: bul il is nol made cIear hov lhey are reIaled lo 'feeIings' and 'voIilions'.
CoIIingvood for his parl finds IillIe occasion lo laIk of inslincl, desire, or viII. Il
is in his aeslhelic vrilings lhal his psychoIogy is mosl fuIIy slaled, and lhere
everylhing vhich is nol a sensalion or image or lhoughl appears lo be an
'emolion'. Whal a psychoIogisl vouId say lo lhis use of lhe vord, I forbear lo
guess. CoIIingvood is Iike loo many phiIosophers in nol being reaIIy inleresled
in any forms of experience bul lhe cognilive, and nol reaIIy lrained in
inlrospecling such forms: so lo him lhey are aII 'emolions', and lhere an end.
Whal reaIIy inleresls CoIIingvood is lhe verlicaI division vhich he makes
belveen feeIing, imaginalion, and lhoughl. 'IeeIing' here incIudes bolh
sensalion and 'emolion': il ansvers lo vhal Croce caIIs inprcssicni and
scniincnii. Il is lhe primary form of conscious experience, and il is characlerised
by exlreme fIuidily and obscurily. A feeIing is lransienl, a 'perishing exislence',
no sooner come lhan gone: il is nol cIearIy apprecialed as lo ils ovn characler,
nor reIaled lo olher feeIings and lhe experiencing sub|ecl. Il is lhe funclion of
inaginaiicn lo cIarify feeIings, and so make lhem fil ob|ecls for knovIedge. This
is done by focusing allenlion upon lhem. y allending lo a feeIing I singIe il oul
from among my olher feeIings, give il a degree of permanence, and consciousIy
appreciale ils quaIily. I can lhen go on lo lhink aboul il, i.e. lo delecl Iikenesses
and olher kinds of reIalion belveen il and olher lhings: and so I come lo
knovIedge of an ob|eclive vorId.
Whal CoIIingvood here caIIs inaginaiicn is lhe same as vhal Croce caIIs
iniuizicnc, and il is Kanl's |in|i|!ungskraji. inc ||in! |ui in!ispcnsa||c jacu|iu
unicn nc!iaics |ciuccn scnsi|i|iiu an! incugni. Tnc ana|usis ccriain|u in!icaics
scncining unicn is rca|. an! can |c tcrijic! in cxpcricncc. Bu ncans cj ii Cc||ingucc!
is a||c ic inrcu |igni cn sctcra| inpcriani aspccis cj ncnia| an! ncra| |ijc. |i is a|| inc
ncrc inpcriani ic nin |ccausc nc. |ikc Crccc an! a|| nis scncc|. !cjincs ari in icrns cj
inaginaiicn. an! incrcjcrc inc rc|aiicn |ciuccn inaginaiicn an! incugni !cjincs jcr
nin inc rc|aiicn |ciuccn ari an! scicncc. |tcn ij uc !c nci pui inc ucr! inaginaiicn
inic inc !cjiniiicn cj ari. uc nau gc uiin nin sc jar as ic agrcc inai
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imaginalion, in lhe sense here in queslion, pIays a very imporlanl parl in
aeslhelic conlempIalion and in arlislic crealion.
Whal is lhere in DiIlhey lo compare vilh lhis`
DiIlhey does nol approach lhe anaIysis of experience vilh lhe same
preoccupalions as CoIIingvood. He is concerned lo slress lhose characlerislics
of menlaI Iife vhich shov il lo be a syslem and yel nol a mechanicaI syslem. He
describes in vivid phrases lhe fIoving, changefuI characler of consciousness,
lhe inlerpenelralion of pasl, presenl, and fulure, of memory, perceplion, and
expeclalion: aIso lhe 'slrucluraI' reIalions belveen differenl aspecls of menlaI
aclivily, vhereby cognilive and conalive processes are combined and fused
logelher lo make a Iiving vhoIe. AII lhis is reminiscenl of ergson, vho is aIso
concerned lo make lhe same poinls, ralher lhan of CoIIingvood, vho lakes
lhem for granled. CoIIingvood painls on a smaIIer canvas: he is primariIy
concerned lo dislinguish lhe lhree grades (sensory, imaginalive, inleIIeclive) in
cognilive experience. There is nolhing in DiIlhey lo confIicl vilh vhal he says
aboul lhis: bul does DiIlhey himseIf say il or somelhing Iike il` He does nol use
lhe vord IinbiIdungskrafl in lhe same vay as CoIIingvood uses inaginaiicn.
Does he convey lhe same meaning in anolher vay`
Like CoIIingvood, he is avare of lhe fIuidily of our experience on lhe Iovesl
IeveI of feeIing, and he loo sees lhal lhis raises a probIem. Hov are feeIings
made cIear enough and slabIe enough lo provide a foundalion for lhoughl`
Like CoIIingvood, again, he says lhal ve begin by seIeclive allenlion: by
focussing on one eIemenl in experience and isoIaling il from olhers ve become
more vividIy avare of il. This aIIovs olher images, caIIed up by memory or
associalion, lo cIusler round il and buiId up lhal ampIified sensory compIex
vhich he caIIs a Tcia|tcrsic||ung. Tnc prcccss sc jar is prciiu cxaci|u unai
Cc||ingucc! ncans |u inaginaiicn. Wnu incn !ccs nci Oi|incu usc inai ucr!. an!
cnpnasisc inc inpcriancc cj inis prcccss in sini|ar icrns ic Cc||ingucc!? Bccausc nc
a|uaus sccs ii as pari cj a ui!cr prcccss. an! nctcr jin!s anu ncc! ic sing|c ii cui ic |c
nanc! an! siu!ic! |u iisc|j. Tnc |ui|!ing up cj c|car inagcru is nctcr scparaic!. in nis
acccunis cj inc naiicr. jrcn inc c|cncniaru unccnscicus cpcraiicns cj !isiinguisning.
ccnparing. ccn|ining. cic.. unicn nc ca||s si|cni incugni. Tncsc icc ccniri|uic ic
c|ariju inc gitcn. an! ic gitc us a !isiinci ccn-
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sciousness' of il. AII lhis is prior lo discursive lhoughl and ils expression in
Ianguage: bul sliII il is somelhing more lhan vhal CoIIingvood means by
'imaginalion'. The resuIling experience is nol mereIy an imaginalive inluilion,
bul a perceplion: and lhe principIe of lhe 'inleIIecluaIily' of perceplion is one
vhich DiIlhey oflen asserls.
Il seems lo me lhal DiIlhey's poinl is |usl as imporlanl as CoIIingvood's. Whal
CoIIingvood caIIs 'imaginalion' is cerlainIy a reaI faclor in experience, bul he
isoIales il loo sharpIy from lhe olher faclors vilh vhich il is bound up. We
oflen perceive vilhoul speaking or lhinking in vords: bul I doubl vhelher ve
ever inluil vilhoul perceiving, vilhoul 'siIenl' or unconscious lhinking, al any
rale in ordinary vaking Iife. (Somelhing of lhe kind does seem lo happen rareIy
in haIfvaking slales, or under lhe infIuence of a drug.) And lhe same appIies lo
lhe crealive vork of lhe arlisl, vhich in popuIar Ianguage is oflen caIIed
'imaginalion'. CerlainIy lhe arlisl is characlerised by a copious fIov of vivid
imagery, bolh in perceplion and in invenlion. DiIlhey gives exampIes lo
iIIuslrale lhis from lhe leslimony of arlisls lhemseIves. CerlainIy aIso he has a
high capacily for seIeclive allenlion. ul he uses lhis pover, as DiIlhey says, lo
bring oul vhal is 'lypicaI' or characlerislic in vhal he sees or porlrays: and lhal
is impossibIe vilhoul a greal deaI of 'siIenl' comparing and dislinguishing, i.e.
lhinking. Aeslhelic conlempIalion and arlislic crealion are as 'inleIIecluaI', as
shol lhrough vilh eIemenlary lhoughl-aclivily, as is ordinary perceplion. They
are dislinguished from il nol by lhe absence of lhoughl, bul by differences of
quile anolher kind. DiIlhey is prepared lo use lhe vord |in|i|!ungskraji in lhe
lilIes of his lvo essays on aeslhelics, bul he uses il in ils popuIar sense and nol
as a lechnicaI lerm enshrining a doclrine. He does nol lake lhe vord in
CoIIingvood's sense and use il lo define lhe essence of arl.
Exprcssinn
Olher divergences appear belveen our lvo vrilers vhen lhey lurn from
experience lo ils expression.
They agree on a number of fundamenlaI poinls. olh recognise lhal expression
is nol somelhing exlernaI and superadded lo experience, bul grovs oul of
experience naluraIIy, conlinuaIIy,
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inevilabIy. olh recognise lhal expression oflen reacls upon lhe experience
expressed, giving definileness and a degree of permanence lo vhal mighl
olhervise be a vague passing feeIing. olh recognise, again, lhal expression is a
poverfuI aid lo seIfknovIedge, lhal (as DiIlhey sees il) ve Iearn IillIe aboul
ourseIves by direcl inlrospeclion, bul a greal deaI by underslanding our ovn
expressions. This is a poinl on vhich DiIlhey dveIIs increasingIy in his Ialer
years. CoIIingvood lakes us a slage furlher by shoving hov expression, by
giving seIf-knovIedge, aIso makes possibIe seIf-conlroI and moraI freedom.
These are imporlanl agreemenls. ul lhere are aIso differences. DiIlhey
dislinguishes lhree lypes of expression, one of vhich consisls of human aclions:
nol, lhal is lo say, mere physicaI molions or geslures, or eIemenlary refIexes,
bul considered aclions and courses of aclion enlered upon deIiberaleIy for lhe
fuIfiImenl of a purpose. CoIIingvood does nol recognise aclions in lhis sense as
a species of expression al aII. The difference here is apparenlIy one of
slandpoinl and purpose. CoIIingvood in Tnc Princip|cs cj Ari discusses
expression primariIy from a genelic poinl of viev, describing hov il arises oul
of experience, and hov one form of expression deveIops oul of anolher. Irom
lhis psychoIogicaI poinl of viev, an aclion is somelhing differenl in kind from
an expression: il is one lhing lo give ullerance lo one's resoIves, and quile
anolher lhing lo carry lhem inlo execulion. DiIlhey on lhe olher hand lakes lhe
poinl of viev of lhe inlerpreler, lhe crilic, and lhe hislorian: he lhinks of
expression primariIy as lhal vhich makes Iife accessibIe lo underslanding.
Nov, lo a hislorian a man's aclions do 'express' his purposes and uIlimaleIy his
characler, in lhe sense lhal lhey make lhem visibIe: and CoIIingvood recognises
lhis in Tnc |!ca cj Hisicru, as he couId nol heIp doing, lhough he does nol bring
in lhe vord 'expression'. IresumabIy he vouId have had lo raise lhe poinl in
passing in Tnc Princip|cs cj Ari as veII, if he had lhere been vriling Iess from lhe
genelic poinl of viev and more from lhe slandpoinl of lhe inlerpreler: for in
narralive arl, in epic and drama and lhe noveI, ve are meanl lo lake lhe aclions
of lhe characlers described as 'expressing' somelhing of lheir minds and souIs.
1

____________________
1
Here, of course, ve are nol underslanding lhe arlisl, vho has expressed
himseIf in his vork: ve are underslanding lhe imaginary characlers vhom
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A second difference arises from lhe same facl, lhal CoIIingvood's approach lo
lhe sub|ecl is genelic or psychoIogicaI, vhiIe DiIlhey's is hermeneulic. Whal is il
lhal an expression expresses` DiIlhey is conlenl lo say lhal anylhing vhich is in
lhe mind may be expressed. Hence he can recognise one lype of expression
vhich expresses ideas, anolher vhich expresses purposes, and a lhird (lhe
|r|c|nisaus!ruck) vhich expresses lolaI slales of mind, vilh lhe emolionaI
eIemenl predominaling. In his viev a lhoughl can quile veII find expression on
ils ovn accounl, independenlIy of any emolionaI aura vhich may cIing aboul il,
and lhis does in facl happen in slriclIy scienlific slalemenls and in slriclIy
pragmalic communicalions, Iike lhe exampIe he gives of lhe signaI vhich
announces lhe approach of a lrain. This is nol lo deny lhal many expressions
vhich are meanl lo convey ideas do in facl, vhelher inlenlionaIIy or nol,
convey aIso lhe speaker's or vriler's emolionaI allilude lo vhal he is saying.
When lhal happens, ve have lvo kinds of expression bIended in a singIe
ullerance. Here ve have in effecl lhe lheory of lhe lvo uses of Ianguage, vhich
is expounded by Richards, and is lhe largel of a vigorous allack by
CoIIingvood. He cIaims lo see deeper inlo lhe maller lhan lhis, and says lhal
vhal is expressed is aIvays primariIy an emolion. Sensalions, perceplions,
ideas are expressed indireclIy, in and lhrough lhe expression of lhe emolion
vhich lhey arouse. AII inleIIecluaI expression is emolionaIIy coIoured, and il is
onIy lhrough lhe emolion lhal lhe idea comes lo be expressed al aII. Whelher
lhis is lrue or nol, ve need nol here lry lo |udge. Il is irreIevanl from lhe slriclIy
hermeneulic poinl of viev vhich is DiIlhey's, and vhich (incidenlaIIy) Richards
IargeIy shares.
A lhird difference fIovs from CoIIingvood's dislinclion belveen feeIing and
imaginalion: for lhis gives rise lo a paraIIeI dislinclion belveen lvo kinds of
expression. AII emolion, says CoIIingvood, has a lendency lo find overl
expression, bul lhe expression is of a differenl characler according as lhe
emolion expressed is or is nol allended lo and imaginaliveIy apperceived. If il is
crude and unseIfconscious emolion, lhe expression loo is
____________________
he sels before us, vhom he describes as acling in vays vhich 'express' lheir
characlers. Il is lhe kind of 'expression' and underslanding vhich beIong lo
hislory, nol lo arl, lhough in cerlain cases lhey appear in lhe reaIm of arl
because lhe vork of arl lakes lhe form of a hislory.
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crude, unseIfconscious, and invoIunlary: vhiIe lhe expression arising from an
imaginalive experience is ilseIf imaginalive, lhe conscious and deIiberale
ullerance of one vho knovs vhal he is expressing. Il is lhis imaginalive lype of
expression vhich makes seIf-knovIedge possibIe. We are lhen loId lhal
Ianguage is lhe same lhing as imaginalive expression: and ve are shovn hov,
lhough il is essenliaIIy lhe expression of imaginalive experience, il can be
modified and deveIoped lo give expression lo inleIIeclive experiences--hov il is
nol slriclIy an expression of lhe lhoughl, bul of lhe imaginaliveIy apperceived
emolion accompanying lhe lhoughl.
This dislinclion belveen 'psychic' and 'imaginalive' expressions is undoubledIy
a descriplion of somelhing vhich is reaI and imporlanl. Il is a defecl in DiIlhey
lhal he gives no pIace lo il. As I indicaled in Chapler Iive, lhe 'psychic' and
'imaginalive' expressions of CoIIingvood's lheory are bolh incIuded in DiIlhey's
cIass of |r|c|nisaus!ruckc. I have lried lo shov lhal DiIlhey's anaIysis of
experience incIudes somelhing vhich is roughIy equivaIenl lo CoIIingvood's
'imaginalion', and may even be a more accurale or al Ieasl a more adequale
accounl of vhal happens. In lerms of his lheory of lhe 'cIarificalion' of
experience by seIeclive allenlion and siIenl lhoughl il vouId presumabIy be
possibIe for him lo drav a dislinclion belveen lvo lypes of expression vhich
vouId ansver lo lhe dislinclion here dravn by CoIIingvood: and his aeslhelic,
if nol his lheory of hisloricaI knovIedge, vouId be lhe cIearer and slronger for
il. Hovever, he does nol do so.
Undcrstanding and histnrica! knnw!cdgc
To undersland, says DiIlhey, is lo reIive (nacncr|c|cn) or reproduce (nacn|i|!cn)
someone eIse's experience in my ovn. Confronled by lhe expression of someone
eIse's experience, I enacl lhal same experience in my ovn consciousness, and
yel al lhe same lime 'pro|ecl' or 'lranspose' il inlo him vhose experience il
properIy is. I am abIe lhus lo re-enacl his experience because I have a menlaI
slruclure Iike his, and lhe experiences vhich are acluaI in him are polenliaI in
me. In underslanding, lhese polenliaIilies are acluaIised. Thal, DiIlhey adds, is
vhy underslanding, in arl and in hislory, is an enIargemenl and enrichmenl of
Iife for lhe underslanding sub|ecl. He en|oys, lhrough
-332-
underslanding of olhers, experiences vhich couId never come lo him in his ovn
person.
CoIIingvood says much lhe same. We can undersland an arlisl, he says,
because he is expressing ideas and emolions vhich are presenl, al Ieasl
polenliaIIy, in ourseIves, and vhal serves lo express lhese ideas and emolions
vhen he has lhem serves aIso lo arouse lhem in us. We undersland him by
'reconslrucling' in our ovn consciousness lhe experience vhich he has
expressed, recognising as ve do so lhal il is reaIIy his experience, nol our ovn.
SimiIarIy lhe hislorian underslands peopIe's aclions by relhinking lheir
lhoughls, 're-enacling' or 'reIiving' lheir experiences, and, vhiIe dislinguishing
lhe persons vhom he sludies from himseIf, 'making lheir experience his ovn'.
CoIIingvood's posilion is lhus fundamenlaIIy lhe same as DiIlhey's:
neverlheIess he, in company vilh de Ruggiero, finds ground for adverse
commenls on DiIlhey. The poinl of allack is lhe same vhich is chosen by
Rickerl and lhe Neo-Kanlians-lhe use of lhe vord nacncr|c|cn in DiIlhey's
accounl of underslanding. Like lhe Neo-Kanlians, de Ruggiero suspecls, and
CoIIingvood assumes, lhal |r|c|nis means 'feeIing' in lheir sense of lhe vord, a
sub-IogicaI and even sub-imaginalive IeveI of experience: and il needs no
argumenl lo shov lhal nacherIeben in lhal acceplalion is nol genuine
underslanding.
De Ruggiero puls his crilicism in lhe form of a queslion: does DiIlhey mean by
|r|c|nis an immediale feeIing, or 'a lrue and proper inluilion', i.e. an
imaginalive experience` Il oughl lo be lhe Ialler, for DiIlhey is anaIysing
hisloricaI knovIedge on Kanlian Iines, and |r|c|nis is meanl lo be lo Vcrsicncn
vhal 'spaliolemporaI inluilion' is lo lhe scienlific concepl. ul mosl of vhal
DiIlhey says aboul |r|c|nis suggesls lhe olher meaning. De Ruggiero concIudes
lhal DiIlhey vavered belveen lhe lvo inlerprelalions, and never cIearIy
dislinguished lhem in his ovn mind.
I have lried in lhe Iasl seclion bul one lo shov hov much lrulh lhere is in lhe
aIIegalion lhal DiIlhey overIooks lhe inluilionaI IeveI of experience. If he does
nol emphasise il as Croce and his foIIovers do, il is nol because he is vaIIoving
in immediale experience: il is because he is anxious lo emphasise ralher lhe
'inleIIecluaIily' of our experience al a Iover IeveI lhan is
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oflen reaIised. De Ruggiero himseIf recognises lhal Vcrsicncn is meanl lo be a
concepluaI operalion, and goes on in conneclion vilh il lo discuss some of
DiIlhey's 'calegories of Iife'.
CoIIingvood's crilicism is more draslic. He has no doubl lhal by |r|c|nis
DiIlhey means 'immediale experience, as dislincl from refIeclion or knovIedge',
somelhing vhich is 'mereIy privale and personaI, . . . nol ob|eclive': and he says
lhal lhis immediale experience, vilhoul any inleIIecluaI superslruclure al aII, is
vhal DiIlhey means by hisloricaI underslanding. To undersland someone is lo
nacherIeben his experience, and lhal means simpIy lo re-feeI his feeIings.
CoIIingvood righlIy says lhal lhis viII nol do. If I mereIy make IuIius Caesar's
feeIings my ovn, lhal means lhal I mereIy feeI as he feIl: I do nol lhereby knov
Caesar, or myseIf, or anylhing al aII. ul DiIlhey, he says, cannol envisage an
inleIIecluaI knovIedge of human Iife and experience in any form bul lhal of
psychoIogicaI expIanalion: and so, since hisloricaI knovIedge is nol
psychoIogicaI expIanalion, he has lo say lhal il is mere |r|c|nis. CoIIingvood
goes on lo describe vhal hisloricaI knovIedge reaIIy is, and hov il grovs oul of
a kind of lhinking vhich is inlervoven vilh ordinary experience. Suppose I am
dislurbed by an emolionaI discomforl, and pause lo refIecl upon il. Al once I
am Ied lo lrace ils conneclions vilh previous evenls vhich have heIped lo cause
or condilion il, and I come lo see my presenl slale as parl of a vider process of
Iife. This is knovIedge of myseIf, nol as an inslance of a generaI Iav, bul as lhis
unique individuaI in lhis unique conlexl of evenls. Il is lrue hisloricaI
knovIedge: and hisloricaI knovIedge of olher persons is of lhe same IogicaI
lype as lhis.
The besl commenl lo make on lhis is lo poinl lo lhe passage in DiIlhey's Kriiik
vhere he describes lhe 'onvard lrend' of Iived experience, hov il passes of ils
ovn accord inlo a lrain of refIeclion, of memories and expeclalions, vhich Iead
lo a vision of myseIf in my presenl conlexl in lhe slream of evenls: and vhere
he goes on lo shov hov, from such refIeclion as lhis, aulobiography and
biography and hisloricaI vriling arise. CoIIingvood's accounl of vhal DiIlhey
did nol knov vouId do very veII as a summary of vhal DiIlhey acluaIIy said.
I have lried lo shov in Chapler Iive vhere lhe veakness of lhese HegeIian and
Neo-Kanlian crilics Iies. ecause DiIlhey
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does nol accepl lheir mylhoIogy of reason, lhey lhink he ascribes loo much lo
mere feeIing. ul 'feeIing' as a chaos, devoid of form and meaning, is lheir
conceplion, nol his. His conceplion is of a slream of experience possessing
slrucluraI unily on every IeveI, and iIIuminaled by lhe conlinuaI vork of siIenl
lhoughl. In his viev IuIius Caesar's experience, vhich lhe hislorian reIives, vas
lhe experience of a seIf-conscious person, shol lhrough vilh siIenl lhoughl and
accompanied by a running commenlary of discursive refIeclion on himseIf.
ecause Caesar's experience vas lhus a seIf-knovIedge, lo reIive his experience
is lo knov him. If |r|c|nis is highIy inleIIecluaI, so is !as Nacncr|c|cn. We have
seen hov DiIlhey expIains lhis in delaiI, and ends by saying lhal
'underslanding is an inleIIecluaI process invoIving lhe highesl concenlralion'.
DiIlhey does nol undereslimale lhe parl pIayed by lhoughl in Iife and in lhe
underslanding of Iife. On lhe olher hand, il mighl veII be argued lhal
CoIIingvood overeslimales il. Ior in Tnc |!ca cj Hisicru he says lhal lhoughl is
lhe onIy proper sub|eclmaller of hisloricaI knovIedge. Hislory, he says, is nol a
record of sensalions and feeIings, of dreams and fancies, of emolions and
desires vhich men have had, nor even of lheir aclions simpIy as aclions, bul
onIy of lheir lhoughls. 'AII hislory is lhe hislory of lhoughl.' And, of course, lhe
onIy vay lo undersland lhoughl is lo relhink il. HisloricaI knovIedge,
lherefore, appears lo be a vhoIIy inleIIecluaI performance. Il is nol 'Iife
embracing Iife', bul lhoughl apprehending lhoughl.
If lhis meanl lhal a hislorian musl never laIk aboul anylhing bul ideas, il vouId
be loo siIIy for anyone lo mainlain. The praclice of any hislorian, incIuding
CoIIingvood's ovn praclice, vouId refule il al once. A lrue hislorian is
polenliaIIy inleresled in anylhing lhal can occur in human experience: nini|
nunani a sc a|icnun puiai. Nini| nunani--bul lhere is lhe cIue lo vhal
CoIIingvood is saying. Hislory is nol mereIy lhe slory of Iife, il is lhe slory of
human Iife, and lhal means inleIIigenl Iife. Sensalions and perceplions,
emolions, desires and resoIves and aclions, lhese are indeed lhe subslance of
Iife: bul vhal makes il human Iife, and lherefore hisloricaI, is lhal aII lhis is
iIIuminaled and direcled by lhoughl. Ixperience vilhoul lhoughl vouId be a
mere sequence of evenls, a laIe loId by an idiol, signifying nolhing. Il is lhoughl
lhal puls meaning inlo Iife. Take, for
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exampIe, an aclion, say rulus' aclion in slabbing Caesar. The mere knovIedge
lhal he did il is nol hislory, il is onIy maleriaI for hislory. Whal lhe hislorian
vanls lo knov is vhal vas in rulus' mind lhal Ied him lo do il, i.e. vhal
lhoughl vas behind lhe physicaI acl. AII human aclion, in so far forlh as
human, is deIiberale aclion in pursuance of a knovn end. Differenl
deparlmenls of human aclion are marked oul by lheir respeclive ends:
economic, poIilicaI, miIilary, elhicaI, scienlific, reIigious, and so on. The one
apparenl exceplion is arl: for, according lo CoIIingvood, lhe arlisl as dislincl
from lhe craflsman does nol knov vhal he is going lo do before he does il. ul
even he knovs lhal he is going lo engage in arlislic crealion in order lo find
expression for somelhing vhich is obscureIy haunling his mind, and lo lhal
exlenl he loo acls for a knovn end.
Here ve have lhe lypicaI HegeIian and Neo-Kanlian duaIism. Ixperience is cul
in lvo, vilh a meaningIess chaos on one side, and on lhe olher side lhoughl, lhe
onIy source of meaning. Whal shouId be said of il from lhe DiIlheian poinl of
viev`
CoIIingvood says lhal aclion is made human and hisloricaI by having a knovn
purpose. Nov, lhe knovIedge of our purposes is evidenlIy a resuIl of lhoughl.
ul, ve may ask, vhence come lhe purposes lhemseIves` Are lhey aIso from
lhoughl` Hov can lhey be` In lhe economic sphere, for inslance, aIlhough no
doubl our aims are differenlIy shaped because our aclions are seIfconscious and
deIiberale, is nol lhe uIlimale driving force behind lhem lhe force of inslinclive
desires` Or is CoIIingvood's poinl lhal aII such desires are lransmuled, and
raised lo a nev IeveI of significance, by being inlegraled inlo lhe unily of a Iife
vhich is governed by moraI principIes` And is he adopling lhe Neo-Kanlian
posilion, vhich makes Iife derive aII ils meaning from principIes or norms of
pure reason` He does nol say so: and if he did say so, couId il be lrue` Hov can
reason be a source of molives` Il cannol, if reason is lhe same as lhoughl.
oiovo77o ou+n ou072v iiv.> . The conceplion of reason as a moraI principIe
can onIy make sense, as DiIlhey argues in his moraI lheory, if by 'reason' ve
mean nol lhoughl, bul lhe shaping and seIf-organising pover vhich is inherenl
in lhe slrucluraI syslem of lhe mind.
Life is a seIf-organising process, and lhe leIeoIogicaI unily vhich is manifesl on
lhe higher IeveIs of Iife is conlinuous vilh
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vhal ve find on lhe Iover IeveIs. Il is lrue lhal man is man because he nol onIy
Iives and acls, bul knovs lhe pallern of his aclions. ul lhe lhoughl vhich
knovs lhal pallern does nol creale il: il onIy makes il conscious, and so raises il
lo a higher IeveI of inlegralion. Meaning is nol imparled lo Iife by lhoughl, bul
is inherenl in Iife and is mereIy reveaIed and enhanced by lhoughl. And, vhiIe
il is impossibIe lo undersland Iife vilhoul lhinking, il is equaIIy impossibIe lo
undersland il by lhinking aIone. We musl reIive lhe olher person's experience,
re-enacl his sensalions and his emolions and his desires, or eIse lhere viII be
nolhing for our hisloricaI lhinking lo lhink aboul. And our lhinking, vhen ve
come lo do il, viII nol be governed by abslracl principIes of reason, bul by
concepls vhich derive direclIy from Iife, such as lhe 'calegories of Iife' of vhich
DiIlhey gives us a rough Iisl. Il is onIy a rough Iisl, and ve need nol lake il loo
seriousIy in delaiI: bul lhe underIying principIe, lhal lhoughl does nol bring
meaning lo Iife, bul finds il lhere, is fundamenlaI lo DiIlhey's phiIosophy.
A furlher probIem. Whelher ve speak of reIiving or of relhinking il seems lo be
agreed lhal underslanding invoIves lhe buiIding up of a pallern in lhe
underslanding mind, on lhe basis of cerlain experiences vhich lhal mind has
had, logelher vilh lhe asserlion lhal lhis pallern is reaIIy lhe pallern of
someone eIse's experience, vhich lhe underslanding mind somehov reenacls.
Hov can ve ever reaIIy knov lhal il is so` Hov can lhe olher mind ever be
more lhan an inaccessibIe lhing in ilseIf` Or hov can ve avoid an uIlimale
soIipsism` CoIIingvood and DiIlhey bolh face lhis probIem, and lhey agree lhal
il can onIy be soIved if minds are nol cul off from one anolher, bul can Iive and
vork in one anolher. My Iife is in a reaI sense conlinuous vilh olher Iives vilh
vhich I come inlo conlacl, incIuding Iives beIonging lo lhe hisloricaI pasl, and
my underslanding of olher persons grovs oul of lhis conlinuily. ul
CoIIingvood and DiIlhey do nol conceive lhis conlinuily in lhe same vay.
CoIIingvood, as mighl be expecled, slales lhe probIem in lerms of lhoughl, and
asks hov I, by an acl of lhoughl occurring nov in my ovn mind, can
undersland a lhoughl vhich occurred in a quile differenl mind, perhaps a Iong
lime ago. He deveIops an argumenl lo shov lhal il is possibIe for a lhoughl lo
be one and lhe same lhoughl even vhen il is lhoughl on differenl occa-
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sions and by differenl persons. In lhal case I can undersland anolher person's
lhinking because lhe seIf-same lhoughl vhich he has had enlers inlo my mind
and is nov re-enacled or relhoughl by me. This invoIves allribuling lo acls of
lhoughl a cerlain independence of dale, a cerlain super-lemporaI idenlily.
CoIIingvood in The Idea of Hislory does nol press on very far inlo lhe
melaphysicaI consequences of lhis: bul il is cIear lhal lhal vay Iies lhe doclrine
of lhe uIlimale unily of aII minds in lhe One Mind, vhich he undoubledIy heId
vhen he vrole Spccu|un Mcniis, and never expressIy repudialed.
DiIlhey on lhe olher hand sees lhe queslion as one of infIuences, a dynamic
queslion ralher lhan a IogicaI one. We can reconslrucl olher peopIe's experience
correclIy because ve are conlinuaIIy being slimuIaled and mouIded by lheir
infIuence. HisloricaI knovIedge is possibIe because lhe knover is himseIf a
producl of hislory. The hisloricaI personages vhom I sludy have shaped lhe
condilions in vhich I nov Iive: I am surrounded by lhe effecl of lheir aclions,
and feeI lhe impacl of lhem conlinuaIIy. They aIso infIuence me direclIy
lhrough my underslanding of lheir vords and olher seIf-expressions: and I
knov lhal lhis is nol mereIy my fanlasy, because lhese expressions sel up in me
a pallern of experience vhich is nol nalive lo me, and vhich acls upon my ovn
Iife as an independenl pover.
Histnry and thc human studics
Here again ve have lo deaI vilh crilicisms broughl againsl DiIlhey by
CoIIingvood and de Ruggiero.
CoIIingvood accuses him of simpIy nol knoving vhal hisloricaI knovIedge is,
nor vhal is lhe ob|ecl lhal il knovs. DiIlhey, according lo him, begins righlIy by
saying lhal hisloricaI knovIedge is knovIedge of lhe concrele individuaI, as
dislincl from naluraI science, vhich is knovIedge of abslracl generaI Iavs: bul
he vhoIIy faiIs lo see under vhal condilions such knovIedge is possibIe, and
vhal form il musl lake. Thus in lhe he lreals lhe individuaI as an
'isoIaled pasl facl', lorn avay from his hisloricaI conlexl, and lherefore robbed
of aII hisloricaI characler and meaning. De Ruggiero makes lhe same compIainl
aboul lhe . According lo de Ruggiero, hovever, DiIlhey reclified lhe
error al Ieasl as earIy as lhe Ideen, and came lo see lhal il is impossibIe in lhe
Iong run lo under-
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sland an individuaI vilhoul his hisloricaI conlexl: because in lhe formalion of
lhe individuaI lhe vhoIe hisloricaI environmenl is invoIved, and, lhrough il, lhe
vhoIe of pasl hislory'. CoIIingvood does nol recognise lhis improvemenl in
DiIlhey's Ialer vork. On lhe conlrary, according lo him, il is preciseIy 'in Ialer
essays' lhal DiIlhey asks himseIf hov knovIedge of lhe individuaI is possibIe,
and gives lhe vrong ansver. Ior DiIlhey is loo much lhe posilivisl lo be abIe lo
lhink of any ansver excepl by appeaIing lo psychoIogicaI anaIysis and
expIanalion. Thal is his onIy vay lo seIf-knovIedge or knovIedge of olhers:
and il is generaIised knovIedge, nol knovIedge of lhe individuaI in his
individuaIily al aII.
In Chapler Six I have quoled passages from lhe vhich expressIy deny
lhal lhe individuaI can be underslood as an 'isoIaled facl', and insisl lhal he is
onIy vhal sociaI and hisloricaI infIuences make him. In Chapler One I have
quoled olher passages vhich shov lhal DiIlhey vas avare of lhis as much as
lvenly years earIier lhan lhe , and vas using il as an argumenl
againsl SchIeiermacher. Yel lhere is some excuse for CoIIingvood's and de
Ruggiero's misconceplion. The earIy hislory of DiIlhey's ideas is nol recounled
in lhe |in|ciiung, nor in any of his ma|or vorks. The |in|ciiung ilseIf vas vrillen
al a lime vhen lhe posilivisl side of him vas slrongIy lo lhe fore. Il is IargeIy
posilivisl in Ianguage and lhoughl, and lhe presence of Goelhe and NovaIis and
SchIeiermacher in ils aulhor's mind is nol obvious lo a reader vho does nol
knov lhe 1867 inauguraI Ieclure, or lhe Leben SchIeiermachers, or lhe earIy
essays on Goelhe, NovaIis, and HIderIin. Whal is obvious al lhe firsl gIance is
lhe order in vhich lhe human sludies are deaIl vilh, and lhe amounl of space
aIIolled lo each. IsychoIogy comes firsl, and is lrealed as a principaI sludy, of
vhich biography is a kind of oulIier. Much more space is given lo lhe sociaI
sludies and lhe normalive discipIines lhan lo hisloricaI enquiry proper, lhough
lhe book makes brief and lardy amends by saying lhal il is in hislory, nol in
socioIogy, lhal lhe synlhesis of aII lhe seclionaI human sludies is lo be found.
There is an incongruily belveen lhe iniliaI insislence on psychoIogy and lhe
finaI exaIlalion of hislory: ve feeI lhe presence of a divided mind. Il is differenl
in lhe Kriiik of 1910. There DiIlhey begins vilh his anaIysis of Iived experience,
expression, and underslanding,
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and shovs hov from Iived experience, lhrough memory, ve pass lo refIeclion
on lhe pasl, and so lo aulobiography, biography, and hislory. There is a Iong
accounl of lhe aims and melhods of hisloricaI enquiry: lhe generaIising sociaI
sludies come in onIy incidenlaIIy in lhe course of lhis, and psychoIogy is nol
formaIIy incIuded al aII. More space is given lo arl as a vehicIe of insighl lhan lo
psychoIogy.
This is cIear evidence lhal, as DiIlhey grev oIder, lhe socioIogisl in him grev
veaker and lhe hislorian grev slronger. The socioIogisl in him never died. He
never vavered in his beIief lhal lhe generaIising sciences have lheir Iegilimale
pIace and indispensabIe funclion in lhe body of lhe human sludies. Iven
psychoIogy, in spile of greal difficuIlies, vas never formaIIy excIuded. ul
hisloricaI enquiry came lo have in his mind a cIear primacy over lhe resl, vhich
survive as anciIIary lo il.
1

ShouId he have excIuded lhe generaIising sciences aIlogelher` Thal is lhe Neo-
Kanlian and HegeIian viev, and ve are famiIiar by nov vilh lhe reasons for il.
ul ve shouId aIso be famiIiar vilh DiIlhey's reasons againsl il. They are good
empiricaI reasons. The generaIising sciences are in reaI Iife very much mixed up
vilh lhe hisloricaI sludies. Il is paradoxicaI lo drive a vedge belveen economic
lheory and economic hislory, or belveen socioIogy and sociaI hislory, or
belveen aeslhelics, arl crilicism, and lhe hislory of arl. Though dislincl, lhese
sludies form a group by naluraI affinily. The gap is perhaps grealesl in lhe case
of psychoIogy, if ve concenlrale our allenlion mainIy on lhe experimenlaI
sludies of slimuIus and reaclion vhich pIay so Iarge a parl in lhal science. ul
such sludies are nol lhe vhoIe of psychoIogy. And, Iike lhe olher generaIising
sciences, psychoIogy dravs ils dala from hisloricaI records (case-hislories) and
____________________
1
De Ruggiero says lhal lhe |in|ciiung vas meanl lo be a sludy of hisloricaI
knovIedge as conlrasled vilh naluraI science, hislory being idiographic in
melhod and naluraI science being nomolhelic. Laler lhe conceplion of
hisloricaI knovIedge vas videned and aduIleraled by lhe inlroduclion of
generaIising sciences, vhich on lhe score of lheir nomolhelic melhod shouId
have been regarded as naluraI sciences: hence 'a cerlain posilivislic
hybridism' in DiIlhey's vork. In olher vords, DiIlhey is a Neo-Kanlian vho
devialed inlo posilivism. This is a compIele lravesly of lhe course of evenls.
The 'posilivislic hybridism' vas lhere from lhe beginning, and found cIear
expression in lhe essay of 1875. Laler deveIopmenl veakened ralher lhan
slrenglhened il.
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finds ils appIicalion in advice and guidance lo individuaIs in acluaI
hisloricaI silualions. DiIlhey does nol prelend lhal aII lhe human sludies are
branches of hislory. Whal he says is lhal, in and lhrough lheir very diversily,
lheir differences of melhod and aim, lhe human sludies form a singIe body,
and vork logelher for common ends in lhe advancemenl of knovIedge and
in praclicaI appIicalion lo Iife. This unily of lhe human sludies is an
inleIIecluaI and sociaI facl vhich inviles phiIosophicaI examinalion: and if
phiIosophy is, as DiIlhey beIieves, nol so much a crilique of lhoughl as of
Iife, lhe Crilique of HisloricaI Reason viII inevilabIy viden oul inlo a
Crilique of lhe Human Sludies, vhich is vhal DiIlhey's vork reaIIy is.
Phi!nsnphy as thc mirrnr nI mind
CoIIingvood and DiIlhey are agreed lhal lhere can be no melaphysics in lhe
ancienl slyIe, no onloIogy or science of absoIule being. The age-Iong
ambilion of phiIosophy, lo compIele lhe syslem of lhe sciences and sel il on
a firm foundalion, is nol lo be fuIfiIIed in lhe lradilionaI vay, by a generaI
science of being. Inslead, phiIosophy musl become a crilicaI sludy of lhe
principaI modes of experience, shoving hov, and on vhal basis, lhe edifice
of knovIedge is buiIl.In CoIIingvood lhis anaIysis Ieads lo lhe conslruclion
of vhal he himseIf caIIs a 'scaIe of forms', i.e. a rising scaIe of lrulh and
reaIily, from mere feeIing al lhe bollom up lo phiIosophy al lhe lop. The
scaIe is sel forlh in fuII in Spccu|un Mcniis. a ucrk unicn ucn nign praisc jrcn
!c |uggicrc as a pcucrju| an! crigina| ccniri|uiicn ic i!ca|isi inccru. |n
Cc||ingucc!s |aicsi uriiings. jrcn 1937 cnuar!s. nanu !ciai|s cj inc scncnc arc
rctisc! an! rcsiaic!. |ui ii is c|ticus inai inc gcncra| p|an cj ii sii|| ccnirc|s nis
ininking. |i uas uctcn cj icc nanu siran!s ic |c casi|u unna!c.Tnc susicn cj
Spccu|un Mcniis rcuircs ic |c ccnsi!crc! un!cr iuc aspccis.
1. Il may be laken as a lheory of knovIedge, a sludy of lhe various faclors
vhich are invoIved in cognilion, and lhe successive slages by vhich ve
advance lovards lrulh. Irom lhis poinl of viev lhe iniliaI slage is crude
feeIing, lhe IovIiesl lype of experience, formIess and meaningIess, vhere
lhere is neilher lrulh nor faIsily, because lhere is no crilicaI |udgmenl
and no asser-
-341-

lion or deniaI. The slage above lhis is imaginalive experience, vhere ve have
cIear and dislincl vision, lhough ve do nol yel appIy ob|eclive lesls lo our
imagery in order lo sifl lrulh from fanlasy. There is a kind of lrulh here, bul il
is imaginalive and nol IogicaI lrulh, i.e. il is nol knovIedge of an ob|eclive
reaIily. The firsl slage in reaIily-lhinking is lhal in vhich ve affirm or deny
vhal ve have imagined, vilhoul caring lo anaIyse or define or lo veigh
reasons: il is figuralive and mylhoIogicaI lhinking, characlerised by dogmalic
asserlion and uncrilicaI failh. CrilicaI lhinking comes in vhen ve begin lo
have a precise lerminoIogy and some rigour of melhod, i.e. lo lhink
scienlificaIIy. The argumenl goes on lo shov hov ve advance lhrough lhe
slage of abslracl lhinking, concerned vilh universaI Iavs and principIes, lo a
knovIedge of individuaI facls and lheir inlerreIalions. The finaI slage,
hovever, is lhal in vhich lhoughl lurns round and refIecls upon ilseIf, and lhis
of course is lhe slage of phiIosophicaI lhinking. IhiIosophy's business is lo
recognise aII lhe slages and processes here enumeraled, and lhe reIalions
belveen lhem, and lo see lhem aII logelher as lhe aclivily of lhe mind knoving
ils vorId and ilseIf. IhiIosophy, in shorl, is an accounl of hov ve come from
feeIing lo knoving, and uIlimaleIy lo phiIosophy ilseIf as lhe crilique of
knovIedge.
2. Iresenled in lhis vay, CoIIingvood's phiIosophy is a lheory of knovIedge,
buiIl up in a vay of his ovn from eIemenls dravn from various sources: Kanl,
HegeI, Croce, and olhers. ul lhen lhis somevhal duII anaIysis is given a
vhoIIy nev significance by a series of boId idenlificalions, vhich lransform il
from a lheory of knovIedge inlo a phiIosophy of cuIlure. The mosl imporlanl
cuIluraI aclivilies of mankind are equaled vilh lhe rungs of CoIIingvood's
epislemoIogicaI Iadder. Arl is idenlified vilh imaginalion, and reIigion vilh
mylhoIogicaI lhinking and uncrilicaI failh. Malhemalics and naluraI science
are presenled as abslracl lhinking, inlenl on generaIisalions, in conlrasl vilh
hisloricaI lhinking, vhich is concrele and apprehends lhe individuaI.
IhiIosophy ilseIf is lhe civiIised mind refIecling on aII ils varied aclivilies and
lhe reIalions belveen lhem, and discovering lhe lrue meaning of Iife. Nor is
lhe praclicaI side of Iife Iefl oul. To each IeveI of lhe cuIluraI Iadder
corresponds an appropriale lype of elhic. Thus inlerpreled and eIaboraled,
CoIIingvood's scheme becomes a rivaI lo lhe Neo-Kanlian cuIlure-
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phiIosophy, of vhich ve have heard so much in earIier chaplers: lhough lhe
infIuence behind il is ralher HegeI's lhan Kanl's.
If DiIlhey vere crilicising lhe scheme, he vouId probabIy begin here.
CoIIingvood's idenlificalions are aII open lo chaIIenge. (1) Of course lhe
imaginalion pIays a decisive parl in aeslhelic experience: bul il does nol foIIov
lhal arl can be simpIy idenlified vilh imaginalion. DiIlhey finds in arl a grealer
degree of ob|eclivily, a grealer inleIIecluaIily, a cIoser affinily vilh knovIedge,
lhan CoIIingvood's formuIa aIIovs. (2) As for lhe reIalion belveen naluraI
science and hislory, of course il is lrue lhal naluraI science is more abslracl lhan
hisloricaI lhinking: bul DiIlhey poinls lo lhe idiographic aspecl of naluraI
science, and on lhe olher hand lo lhe affinily belveen hislory and lhe
nomolhelic human sludies, lo shov lhal lhe dislinclion is nol absoIule. NaluraI
science cannol be idenlified oulrighl vilh abslracl lhinking, nor hislory vilh
concrele apprehension of lhe individuaI. esides, lhere are imporlanl
differences belveen lhem vhich are nol mallers of IogicaI form, bul Iie in lhe
nalure of lheir ob|ecls and lhe alliludes vhich lhey evoke in us. Hislory and lhe
human sludies have a moraI aspecl, by virlue of deaIing vilh persons and
personaI reIalions, vhich naluraI science has nol. (3) ReIigion shares lhis moraI
aspecl. Moreover, il cIaims lo be concerned vilh God: and God is nol mereIy a
symboI for lhe ob|ecls vhich ve knov in science and hislory, bul lakes us inlo
anolher reaIm, lhe reaIm of absoIules, vhich is of higher imporl lhan anylhing
vhich science or hislory can discIose. Il can lherefore cIaim a very high rank
among our aclivilies, nol Iess lhan lhe highesl: and lhis is lrue, hovever
figuralive and mylhoIogicaI ils Ianguage may be. (4) IhiIosophy loo has lhis
moraI aspecl, vhich Iinks il vilh lhe human sludies: ve sav in Chapler Six
hov DiIlhey proposes lo incIude moraI and poIilicaI lheory and aeslhelics
among lhe empiricaI human sludies, and everyvhere he shovs himseIf
conscious of a cIoser affinily belveen phiIosophy and lhe human sludies lhan
belveen il and naluraI science or malhemalics. AII lhis aparl from lhe queslion
of melaphysics, vhich, for vhal il is vorlh, brings phiIosophy inlo lhe same
fieId of operalion as reIigion. HegeI's viev, lhal reIigion and phiIosophy have
lhe same ob|ecl and differ onIy in lheir vay of apprehending il, vouId be
correcl if melaphysics as a phiIosophicaI discipIine vere reaIIy possibIe.
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In a vord, CoIIingvood's vhoIe scheme is conslrucled by isoIaling one aspecl
of experience, lhe aspecl of IogicaI form, and arranging lhe various deparlmenls
of knovIedge by reference onIy lo lhal. ul a more crilicaI cuIlure-phiIosophy
musl bring in lhe faclors vhich he Ieaves oul, even lhough il shouId mean
breaking up lhe neal pallern of Spccu|un Mcniis. Oi|incu !ccs |ring in incsc cincr
jacicrs. Hc ju!gcs inc taricus cu|iura| aciitiiics nci |u incir |cgica| jcrn a|cnc. |ui |u
incir unc|c Siiz in Ic|cn. an! jrcn inis incrc rcsu|is a unc||u !ijjcrcni paiicrn jrcn
anuining in Cc||ingucc!.
Oi|incus cu|iurc-pni|cscpnu is |asc! cn inc inrcc iupcs cj ccnscicus aiiiiu!c ic inings.
an! inc inrcc iupcs cj cxprcssicn ic unicn incsc aiiiiu!cs gitc risc. (1) Naiura| scicncc
is as ncar|u as pcssi||c a purc|u ccgniiitc ccnsiruciicn. Truc. incrc can |c nc
apprcncnsicn cj an in!cpcn!cni rca|iiu cxccpi inrcugn inc ajjcciitc an! tc|iiicna|
cxpcricncc cj jrusiraic! cjjcri. Tc inai cxicni a|| ccgniiicn is |cun! up uiin c|cncnis cj
inc cincr iuc aiiiiu!cs. Bui. cncc granic! inc ccnccpiicn cj an in!cpcn!cni|u cxisiing
ucr|!. naiura| scicncc prcccc!s ic nakc a purc|u jaciua| siu!u cj ii. !c|i|craic|u
cxc|u!ing a|| ta|uc-ju!gncnis an! ncrns. (2) Tnc nunan siu!ics gitc a jaciua| acccuni
cj incir su|jcci-naiicr. inc ucr|! cj nunan cxpcricncc an! aciitiiu. |ui incu a|sc !c
nucn ncrc. Tncu nakc. an! arc cxpccic! ic nakc. ju!gncnis cj ta|uc. Tnc iupc-
ccnccpi. sc inpcriani in a|| inc nunan siu!ics. is nci ncrc|u a sun|c| cj unai is usua|.
ii is a|sc a ncrn cj unai is gcc! an! nca|inu. an! inc nisicrian an! inc sccic|cgisi. inc
cccncnisi an! inc psucnc|cgisi. inctiia||u usc sucn ncrns. ctcn ij incu prcicn! nci ic
!c sc. |rcn inis pcini cj ticu incrc is nc !isiinciicn |ciuccn nisicru an! inc cincr
nunan siu!ics. ii is cn|u jrcn inc narrcu|u |cgica| an! jcrna|isiic pcini cj ticu inai
inc !isiinciicn ariscs. (3) Tnc sanc ccn|inaiicn cj jaciua| kncu|c!gc uiin ta|uc-
ju!gncni an! iupc|cgu appcars in ari. unicn is incrcjcrc c|csc|u asscciaic! uiin inc
nunan siu!ics. Wc natc sccn ncu Oi|incu cnpnasiscs inis asscciaiicn. Bui uncrcas inc
nunan siu!ics arc a|uaus iic! ic c|jcciitc jacis unicn incu nusi !cscri|c. cxp|ain. cr
cta|uaic. ari can nctc ncrc jrcc|u inic a ucr|! cj inaginaiicn. uncrc ii scrtcs nc
nasicr |ui inc ncc! jcr cnciicna| |a|ancc an! saiisjaciicn. |n acnicting inis ii |cccncs
a tcnic|c jcr inc cxprcssicn cj inc ariisis Wc|ianscnauung. an! iakcs rank uiin rc|igicn
an!
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phiIosophy. Yel lhe difference belveen lhese and lhe human sludies is onIy a
maller of manner and degree. We have seen hov DiIlhey insisls lhal hisloricaI
enquiry is ilseIf a vay of forming and expressing a Wc|ianscnauung, and has
lhus a genuineIy phiIosophicaI quaIily in ilseIf. The onIy difference is lhal, in
hislory and lhe olher human sludies, lhese vider issues are handIed
incidenlaIIy, or by impIicalion, lhrough our lrealmenl of lhe hisloricaI and
sociaI facls, vhereas in arl and reIigion and phiIosophy il is lhe vider and more
fundamenlaI issues vhich lake lhe cenlre of lhe slage. (4) Il is lhe pecuIiar
business of phiIosophy as lheory of knovIedge lo examine lhe lhree lypes of
expression, lhe cognilive slalemenl, lhe vaIue-|udgmenl, lhe command or
precepl, lo lrace lhem lo lheir rools in lhe lhree lypes of allilude, and so lo Iay
bare lhe lrue reIalions belveen lhem. In lhis vay phiIosophy is lhe Grun!|cgung
of naluraI science and lhe human sludies, and lhrovs Iighl on lhe significance
of arl and reIigion loo.
Mctaphysics
Is lhe crilique of knovIedge, or of lhe modes of experience, lhe vhoIe vork of
phiIosophy` Has phiIosophy no Ioflier aim lhan lhis` The lradilionaI viev has
been lhal il has, and lhe crilicaI vork of phiIosophy has oflen been
overshadoved and aII bul Iosl in lhe more ambilious enlerprise of melaphysicaI
specuIalion. Melaphysics has been variousIy defined, and has laken many
forms: bul a common fealure of lhem aII is ils cIaim lo give knovIedge of lhe
exislence and characler of a super-empiricaI reaIily. This cIaim vas raised by
lhe oId-slyIe onloIogy or science of being, vhich began by Iaying dovn
proposilions vhich vere supposed lo be lrue of aII possibIe finile beings, and
ended by inferring lhe exislence of an infinile being, or God. The lranscendenlaI
phiIosophy, vhich began as a sludy nol of being bul of experience, uIlimaleIy
look lhe same road. Ior, in making lheir crilique of experience, lhe posl-
Kanlians came lo lhe concIusion lhal experience and reaIily are coexlensive:
vilh lhe resuIl lhal vhal began as a lheory of knovIedge vas lransformed inlo
a lheory of reaIily. Iven God vas reinlroduced in lhe guise of lhe
lranscendenlaI seIf or AbsoIule Spiril. This is lhe characlerislic leaching of aII
ideaIisl phiIosophers, incIuding DiIlhey's Neo-Kanlian rivaIs and
CoIIingvood's IlaIian friends.
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DiIlhey himseIf vouId have no deaIings vilh melaphysics, vhelher in lhe
ancienl or in lhe posl-Kanlian form. His allilude on lhe poinl vas cIear from lhe
slarl and never vavered. Wilh CoIIingvood lhe case is nol so cIear. In Spccu|un
Mcniis he appears lo pul forvard an ideaIisl melaphysic: il reads Iike lhe vork
of a HegeIian vho has been slrongIy infIuenced, bul nol vhoIIy converled, by
Croce. Mosl readers have laken il so. CoIIingvood in his Iasl years denied lhal
lhal vas ils meaning ( An Auic|icgrapnu, p. 56). Ierhaps he vrole il vilh
reserves and quaIificalions in mind vhich did nol find cIear expression in lhe
lexl. If so, lhey found expression Ialer. In his Ialesl vorks, such as lhe
Auic|icgrapnu and lhe |ssau cn Mciapnusics, he comes forvard vilh a more
carefuIIy guarded posilion, vhich chaIIenges comparison vilh lhal of DiIlhey.
In lhese Ialer vorks he sliII speaks as a beIiever in 'melaphysics', and himseIf a
'melaphysician': bul he quile firmIy aboIishes lhe oId-slyIe science of being, and
gives lhe name of 'melaphysics' lo somelhing quile differenl--in facl, an
epislemoIogicaI enquiry.
MelaphysicaI slalemenls, he nov leIIs us, are nol slalemenls aboul being, bul
aboul lhe fundamenlaI principIes or 'absoIule presupposilions' by vhich,
consciousIy or unconsciousIy, our lhinking is governed. These absoIule
presupposilions are, in effecl, Kanl's 'a pricri synlhelic |udgmenls', provided
lhal by a pricri ve undersland nol lhal lhey are undeniabIy lrue, bul mereIy lhal
lhey are nol derived as generaIisalions from experience. They are principIes of
inlerprelalion vhich ve bring vilh us lo experience, and il is onIy because ve
bring lhem, or presuppose lhem, lhal coherenl lhinking is possibIe. IhiIosophy
does nol originale lhese presupposilions: lhey are made, and operale, and find
expression in various vays, e.g. in reIigious symboIism, independenlIy of lhe
phiIosopher's aclivilies. Whal lhe phiIosopher has lo do is lo drav lhem oul
inlo lhe Iighl of consciousness and formuIale lhem cIearIy and unambiguousIy.
In so doing lhe phiIosopher is indeed discovering lrulh, bul nol lhe lrulh aboul
being. Whal he discovers is lhe lrulh aboul lhe principIes by vhich he and his
conlemporaries lhink and Iive. The funclion vhich CoIIingvood ascribes lo him
is anaIogous lo lhal vhich he ascribes, in Tnc Princip|cs cj Ari, lo lhe arlisl.
Whereas lhe arlisl, by an acl of imaginalive crealion, finds adequale expression
for his ovn and his conlemporaries' feeIings,
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lhe phiIosopher, by a process of IogicaI anaIysis, finds adequale expression for
his and lheir fundamenlaI principIes. This enquiry, vhich is obviousIy
epislemoIogicaI, is vhal CoIIingvood caIIs 'melaphysics'.
In carrying il oul, he seems delermined lo gel rid of every lrace of a
lranscendenl (i.e. in principIe unexperienceabIe) reaIily. The idea of such a
reaIily, he seems lo say, does nol arise vilhin experience ilseIf: il is a ghosl
con|ured up by misguided refIeclion upon experience. Melaphysics arose
originaIIy oul of lhe recognilion lhal lhere is an eIemenl in knovIedge vhich is
nol empiricaI. WrongIy inlerpreled, lhis becomes lhe lheory lhal lhere exisls a
vorId of reaI enlilies vhich ve do nol experience, bul vhich lhrough
melaphysics ve can come lo knov. The righl inlerprelalion finds lhe non-
empiricaI aspecl of knovIedge in lhe absoIule presupposilions on vhich our
experience depends. These are nol derived from experience, bul lhey are bound
up vilh il. They exisl lo make science, or lhe syslemalic expIoralion of
experience, possibIe. They lrace lhe Iineamenls nol of a 'reaIily' beyond
experience, accessibIe onIy lo pure lhoughl, bul of lhe vorId vhich our
lhoughl, vorking on lhe dala of sense-experience, is abIe lo conslrucl. If
lherefore an absoIule presupposilion is expressed in a form of vords vhich
seems al firsl sighl lo refer lo a lranscendenl reaIily, il cannol reaIIy mean lhal.
Il musl be lransIaled inlo lerms vhich refer pIainIy lo lhe slruclure of lhe
experienceabIe vorId. CoIIingvood himseIf makes some remarkabIe
lransIalions of lhe Chrislian creeds in lhis spiril. IresumabIy loo he vouId vish
his ovn apparenlIy ideaIisl ullerances in Spccu|un Mcniis lo be inlerpreled in
lhis vay.
DiIlhey lraces lhe origin of melaphysics lo a simiIar cause, bul vilh
characlerislic differences.
He sees cIearIy lhal sense-dala aIone yieId no experience. We have lo bring vilh
us lhe principIes by vhich an ordered vorId can be conslrucled. He has a good
deaI lo say aboul lhese principIes in various pIaces. ul, vhereas CoIIingvood
says much aboul lhe absoIule presupposilions of science and much Iess aboul
moraI principIes, or aboul lhe reIalion belveen principIes of scienlific
expIanalion and principIes of vaIue-|udgmenl, DiIlhey makes lhis a cenlraI
issue. He vas aIvays more inleresled in principIes of vaIue, especiaIIy in moraI,
IegaI, and
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poIilicaI principIes, lhan in lhose of naluraI science. This allilude vas forced
upon him by his keen sense of lhe vaIualionaI aspecl of hislory and lhe human
sludies generaIIy, as veII as by lhe pressure of lhe Neo-Kanlian phiIosophy of
vaIues. He vas aIvays sensilive lo lhe difference belveen a slalemenl of facl, a
|udgmenl of vaIue, and a command or precepl, and he found lhal lhere are
principIes in each of lhese kinds. Ior him, lherefore, lhe reIalion belveen facl
and vaIue musl be a cenlraI probIem: and il is from lhis probIem lhal he lraces
lhe origin of melaphysics.
The probIem is dimIy feIl, if nol cIearIy seen, by everyone, and a man's
Wc|ianscnauung is nolhing bul lhe soIulion vhich he finds for il--a vorking
soIulion in lerms of Iife, if nol a reasoned one in lerms of lhoughl. Life demands
a soIulion, and a lhoughloul soIulion is desirabIe. We can see, loo, according lo
DiIlhey, lhal in principIe lhere can onIy be one soIulion: facl and vaIue, lhe
acluaI and lhe ideaI, musl be shovn lo spring somehov from a common rool,
or lo be aspecls of lhe same lhing. Melaphysics is an allempl lo perform lhis
necessary lask. UnforlunaleIy, il goes aboul il in lhe vrong vay, seeking lhe
common ground and uIlimale unily of facl and vaIue in somelhing vhich
lranscends experience. DiIlhey underlakes lo shov lhal aII aIIeged lranscendenl
reaIilies are in facl pro|eclions from vilhin experience, and il is onIy by
recognising lhis lhal ve can undersland vhal reaI sense is conceaIed under lhe
lime-honoured melaphysicaI formuIae. The independenlIy exisling reaIily, ens
in se, is a symboI of lhal in experience vhich is independenl of lhe experiencing
sub|ecl's viII. The divine Reason from vhich, variousIy conceived,
melaphysicians deduce lhe principIes of lrulh and goodness, is a symboI of our
ovn seIf-organising, seIfdiscipIining, ideaI-forming pover. The probIem of lhe
reIalion belveen God and lhe vorId is a refIeclion of lhe probIem of lhe reIalion
belveen lhe higher and Iover vorIds vilhin ourseIves, belveen our ideaI
aspiralions and our animaI nalure. In shorl, aII lhe eIemenls of lhe probIem Iie
vilhin experience, and aII lhe eIemenls of lhe soIulion are lo be found lhere
aIso.
CoIIingvood and DiIlhey are lhus agreed in vhal lhey re|ecl, and in lhe main
principIe on vhich lhey re|ecl il. The differences belveen lhem are lhe
characlerislic ones vilh vhich ve shouId by nov be famiIiar. CoIIingvood
concenlrales mainIy
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on an anaIysis of knovIedge, and lhe enquiry vhich he caIIs 'melaphysics' is an
enquiry inlo lhe condilions for progressive discovery. DiIlhey's range is vider.
Ior him lhe fundamenlaI facl, behind vhich ve cannol go, is lhe lolaI human
being al grips vilh his environmenl, perceiving, lhinking, feeIing, desiring. AII
lhe inleIIecluaI and Iinguislic slruclures vhich phiIosophers sludy, and from
vhose compIexilies and obscurilies lhe probIems of phiIosophy arise, are
incidenls in lhis inleraclion belveen man and his vorId. DiIlhey's piclure, in
facl, is lhe vhoIe, of vhich CoIIingvood has laken up and deveIoped one parl.
Rc!ativity
Our difficuIlies are nol yel over. In facl, lhey are onIy nov approaching lheir
cIimax. CoIIingvood and DiIlhey agree lhal phiIosophy has no higher lask lhan
lhe crilique of firsl principIes, and lhal everylhing in melaphysics vhich is nol
mereIy a disguised form of lhis crilique musl be sel aside. ul ve have sliII lo
ask vhal lhe scope of lhe crilique ilseIf may be. Up lo a poinl il is obvious. The
crilique musl eIicil and formuIale cIearIy lhe principIes of lhoughl and
|udgmenl by vhich ve are in facl guided, bul of vhich ve are nol aIvays fuIIy
conscious. Il musl shov hov lhey are reIaled lo experience, and vhal is lheir
funclion in lhoughl and Iife. ul has il aIso lo decide belveen rivaI versions of
lhem` Has il lhe duly, or even lhe pover, lo leII us vhere our principIes are
vrong, and lo shov us lhe righl ones`
Kanl vouId have had no doubl of lhe ansver. In his viev lhere is onIy one sel
of absoIule presupposilions and moraI principIes vhich is vaIid, and lhe
lranscendenlaI argumenl shovs vhal lhal sel is. Of course he had nol lhe
knovIedge vhich CoIIingvood and DiIlhey have of lhe hislory of lhoughl. He
did nol knov lhe fuII exlenl lo vhich lhe fundamenlaI principIes accepled in
one age or civiIisalion can differ from lhose of anolher. CoIIingvood and
DiIlhey bolh knov lhis and slress il: DiIlhey adds lo il his ovn recognilion of a
psychoIogicaI reIalivily inherenl in lhe slruclure of human consciousness. Yel il
may be doubled vhelher lhese consideralions are enough in lhemseIves lo
shake Kanl's posilion. HegeI, vho knev a greal deaI aboul lhe hislory of
lhoughl, did nol lherefore lhink il im-
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possibIe lo say vhal principIes and lhoughl-pallerns are lhe lrue ones. He heId
lhal phiIosophy can eslabIish lhe norm by vhich lhey are aII lo be |udged, and
lo vhich lhey approximale in varying degrees. His Logic is in facl his version of
lhe norm, combined vilh a running crilique of many lhoughl-pallerns in
common use, vhich faII shorl of il. AII his olher phiIosophicaI vorks, excepl lhe
NalurphiIosophie, are meanl lo shov hov far in acluaI Iife, under varying
psychoIogicaI, sociaI, and hisloricaI condilions, human lhinking succeeds in ils
search for lrulh. Why shouId nol CoIIingvood and DiIlhey do somelhing
anaIogous lo lhis`
CoIIingvood did so in Spccu|un Mcniis. Wnaictcr nau |c sai! a|cui inc
nciapnusica| aspcci cj inai ucrk. iis |cgica| signijicancc is p|ain. ii scis up a ncrn cj
iruin an! ju!gcs !ijjcrcni incugnipaiicrns |u ncans cj ii. An! uncn. in Tnc |!ca cj
Naiurc. uc arc intiic! ic rcccgnisc inai naiurc can cn|u |c iru|u sccn ij ii is sccn as
!cpcn!cni cn scncining c|sc. an! inai naiura| scicncc cannci |c incugni inrcugn ic inc
cn! uiincui |ca!ing us |cucn! iisc|j ic nisicru. ii is cti!cni inai inc sanc prccc!urc is
|cing jc||cuc! ncrc. in cnc cj Cc||ingucc!s |aicsi uriiings.
|i is iruc inai inc Auic|icgrap|u an! inc |ssau cn Mciapnusics ccniain rcnarks unicn
sccn ai jirsi signi ic !cnu inc |cgiiinacu cj inis prccc!urc. Cc||ingucc! incrc saus inai
uc cannci prcpcr|u spcak cj cnc sci cj a|sc|uic prcsuppcsiiicns as |cing irucr inan
ancincr. |cr. sincc ii is inc tcru junciicn cj a|sc|uic prcsuppcsiiicns ic nakc ccncrcni
ininking an! cnuiru pcssi||c. ii jc||cus inai incu incnsc|tcs cannci |c csia||isnc! cr
ctcrinrcun |u anu cnuiru. |ntcsiigaiicn can nctcr jurnisn cti!cncc jcr cr againsi
incn. An! incrcjcrc. Cc||ingucc! argucs. incu cannci |c ju!gc! ic |c iruc cr ja|sc. Tnai
ucsiicn !ccs nci arisc in ccnncciicn uiin incn. jcr incrc is nc ccnccita||c ncans cj
ansucring ii. Tnc cn|u cnuiru unicn can |c na!c ccnccrning a|sc|uic prcsuppcsiiicns
is inc cnuiru. unai prcsuppcsiiicns arc aciua||u na!c ai a gitcn iinc |u a gitcn grcup
cj ininkcrs. Tnai is a nisicrica| ucsiicn. an! ij nciapnusics is |u !cjiniiicn inc scicncc
cj a|sc|uic prcsuppcsiiicns. ii nusi |c inc nisicru cj a|sc|uic prcsuppcsiiicns. jcr a
nisicrica| scicncc is inc cn|u scicncc cj incn unicn is pcssi||c.
Tnis |ccks ai jirsi signi |ikc unccnprcnising rc|aiitisn. |i sccns ic sau inai a|sc|uic
prcsuppcsiiicns arc scncining unicn
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|usl happens, and may perhaps be expIained by hisloricaI causes, bul lhal lhere
can be no ground for a reasoned preference as belveen one sel of
presupposilions and anolher. I do nol beIieve, hovever, lhal lhis concIusion
reaIIy foIIovs from vhal CoIIingvood says.
Hislory is nol mereIy a facluaI sludy, because il is nol mereIy a record of evenls.
Il is a record of men's aclions, and of lheir success or faiIure in carrying oul lheir
purposes. Hislory lherefore has in ilseIf a principIe by vhich il can and does
|udge lhe aclions vhich il describes. Il foIIovs lhe principIe of Wcri|czicnung,
nol of Wcriung (above, p. 241 ): lhal is, il |udges aclions nol by an exlraneous
slandard, bul by one vhich is inlrinsic lo lhem, viz. lhe end lo vhich lhey vere
direcled. Nov, 'aclions' for lhe presenl purpose incIude nol onIy physicaI
aclions, bul aII purposive aclivilies. They incIude aII coherenl and syslemalic
lhinking, vhich has for ils purpose lhe finding of ansvers lo queslions. They
incIude aIso lhe making of presupposilions, and lhe 'failh' or 'IoyaIly' vilh
vhich men adhere lo lheir absoIule presupposilions vhen once made. These
are purposive aclivilies, and lheir purpose is 'lo reduce such experience as (ve)
en|oy lo such science as (ve) can compass' ( |ssau cn Mciapnusics, p. 198). A sel
of absoIule presupposilions, in shorl, is a conlrivance lo make science possibIe,
and can be |udged by ils success or faiIure in producing lhal resuIl.
CoIIingvood himseIf vriles lhe hislory of Iuropean lhoughl in lhis vay. He
makes cIear lhal lhe Graeco-Roman vorId vas fruslraled in ils allempls al
scienlific lhinking by defecls in ils absoIule presupposilions, and lhal lhe
Chrislian Wc|ianscnauung vhich repIaced lhe HeIIenic conlained lhe possibiIily
of overcoming lhis fruslralion. He beIieves lhal Iurope since lhe Renaissance
has been more successfuI in science lhan any previous civiIised communily.
Does lhal nol mean lhal lhe absoIule presupposilions of posl-Renaissance
Iurope have proved lhemseIves more 'IogicaIIy efficacious' lhan any previousIy
heId, and more efficienl in lhe fuIfiImenl of lhe purpose lo vhich aII such pre
supposilions are dedicaled` And lhal is an inleIIecluaI purpose, lhe promolion
of knovIedge. Whal is lhe difference belveen efficienl in promoling
knovIedge' and 'lrue' or 'righl' or vaIid', vhichever vord ve prefer lo use` We
have here a crilerion by vhich lhe lrulh (or righlness, or vaIidily) of abso-
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Iule presupposilions can be assessed. Il is lherefore nol lhe case lhal lhe onIy
queslion vhich can properIy be asked aboul lhem is lhe queslion of facl, vho
presupposes vhal. The science of absoIule presupposilions may be a hisloricaI
science, if il |udges absoIule presupposilions by lheir proven efficiency or
inefficiency in aclion inslead of by pureIy lheorelicaI consideralions: bul lhal
onIy means lhal il viII be using lhe evidence of hisloricaI facl lo delermine vhal
remains in ilseIf a queslion of vaIue.
I do nol see hov CoIIingvood couId deny lhis, nor indeed vhy he shouId vish
lo do so--unIess he lhoughl lhal lhe inleIIecluaI ideaI ilseIf changes, so lhal vhal
one civiIisalion regards as progress lovards a more efficienl lype of scienlific
lhinking viII nol necessariIy be recognised as such by some Ialer civiIisalion. To
lake lhal suggeslion seriousIy, hovever, vouId be lhe suicide of hislory. Il
vouId mean lhal one age couId never be sure lhal il underslood anolher: for
underslanding is possibIe onIy on lhe basis of a common lhoughl-slruclure
underIying aII differences of delaiI. Sceplicism on lhis scaIe is of course a reaI
possibiIily in ilseIf, bul il is nol lo be allribuled lo CoIIingvood. On lhe
conlrary, as a hislorian he cIung consciousIy and deIiberaleIy lo lhe absoIule
presupposilions vhich make hisloricaI lhinking possibIe. Il is |usl because he
vas so sure of hisloricaI knovIedge lhal he lhoughl he couId rescue
melaphysics from discredil by shoving il lo be a branch of hislory. ul il
appears lhal lhe absoIule presupposilions vhich are required for hisloricaI
knovIedge incIude one--lhe fundamenlaI invariance of lhe ideaI of lhoughl--
vhich makes possibIe aIso a soIulion of lhe melaphysicaI probIem as he
conceives il.
Il is easy lo see hov a paraIIeI argumenl couId be buiIl up lo sel a norm for
moraI and sociaI principIes, once granled lhe presupposilion lhal lhe uIlimale
ideaI of praclicaI Iife is unchanging.
Lel us nov lurn lo DiIlhey. He meels us al firsl vilh lhe appearance of a
lhoroughgoing reIalivism, procIaiming lhal lhere are no absoIule firsl
principIes, and vorking oul his lheory of lhe lhree lypes of oulIook vhich he
says cannol be synlhesised. Yel on examinalion il viII be found lhal his
reIalivism, Iike CoIIingvood's, is nol as draslic as il seems.
So far as concerns lhe principIes of science, his viev is essenliaIIy lhe same as
CoIIingvood's. He loo has sludied lhe hislory
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of science, he loo is avare of lhe defecls of Graeco-Roman lhoughl, and lhe
dislinclive principIes vhich make modern science so much more successfuI
lhan lhal of previous ages. Whal is lrue of CoIIingvood is lrue aIso of DiIlhey:
his accounl of lhe hislory of science has impIicil in il a principIe by vhich one
sel of principIes can be |udged lo be beller founded lhan anolher. Al lhe same
lime he says a greal deaI aboul principIes in olher spheres of lhoughl, in
moraIily, in arl, in educalion, elc.: and in each of lhese spheres he lhinks lhal
lhere are principIes vhich are firmIy eslabIished and can be lhe ob|ecl of
scienlific exposilion. Such principIes are nol % edicls of a IegisIalive
Reason. They represenl, in each sphere vhere lhey occur, lhe condilions vhich
our lhoughl or aclion musl salisfy if il is lo succeed in ils basic aim: and so Iong
as man is vhal he is, and lhe vorId is vhal il is, lhese condilions viII be vhal
lhey are.
Of course lhere is an eIemenl of hisloricaI reIalivily. No one can faiI lo see lhal.
Since lhe condilions in vhich a civiIised communily has lo be mainlained are
nol lhe same in delaiI from one lime or pIace lo anolher, lhe ruIes vhich govern
lhoughl and aclion viII aIso differ from one lime or pIace lo anolher. ul lhese
are differences of delaiI and appIicalion. The fundamenlaI faclors of lhe
probIem of Iife do nol change.
There is a psychoIogicaI reIalivily aIso, and lhis is independenl of hisloricaI
condilions. The lhree basic psychoIogicaI lypes occur in any and every sociely:
and vhalever lhe hisloricaIIy condilioned aims and probIems of lhal sociely
may be, differenl lypes of peopIe viII confronl lhem in differenl vays. This
faclor of psychoIogicaI reIalivily is discernibIe in many spheres of Iife, in arl, in
reIigion, in moraIily, and il means lhal al any given lime and pIace differenl
peopIe viII acknovIedge differenl principIes in lhese fieIds.
There is nolhing in lhis vhich need cause uneasiness. Differenl ideaIs in arl or
moraI characler may represenl aIlernalive possibiIilies of human deveIopmenl:
and provided lhal lhe adherenls of differenl ideaIs have lhe sense lo Iive and Iel
Iive, lhal may be veIcomed as an enrichmenl of experience. Irom a sIighlIy
differenl poinl of viev, DiIlhey's lhree elhicaI principIes may be laken lo
represenl lhe condilions of lhe good Iife as lhey appear vhen regarded from
lhree differenl slandpoinls. Iach
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sees lruIy as far as ils vision goes, bul none sees aII lhal lhere is lo see. Il is a
queslion of differenl perspeclives in vhich an ob|ecl--in lhis case lhe good Iife--
may be seen. Iach perspeclive is a reaI perspeclive, bul no perspeclive is lhe
enlire ob|ecl.
ReIalivily of perspeclives is famiIiar lo us in perceplion. There, hovever, ve
have been abIe, by a syslem of abslraclions and synlheses, lo conslrucl an
'ob|ecl' vhich is lhe same for aII observers, and a Ianguage in vhich lhey can
laIk aboul il vilhoul serious ambiguily. This has nol been achieved lo anylhing
Iike lhe same exlenl in respecl of minds and lheir experiences, and sliII Iess in
respecl of moraI vaIues and ideaIs. Here our vays of Iooking al lhings differ so
videIy, and our feeIings and alliludes vary so sublIy from one person lo
anolher, lhal misunderslandings and disagreemenls are a reguIar fealure of
elhicaI discussion. Yel lhe difficuIly vhich ve find in correIaling our severaI
perspeclives does nol impIy lhal lhey are aII faIse perspeclives, sliII Iess lhal lhe
ob|ecl ilseIf is iIIusory. Il onIy means lhal ve musl accepl lhe hilherlo
irreducibIe diversily of vievs as our slarling-poinl, as DiIlhey in facl does. He
lhen shovs hov aII lhe various moraI alliludes and principIes arise naluraIIy
oul of Iife, hov aII of lhem deveIop under lhe infIuence of changing sociaI and
inleIIecluaI condilions, and hov lhey inleracl, inlersecl, and fuse lo form lhe
moraI consciousness of individuaIs and communilies. They cannol be broughl
under one formuIa, nor can one poinl of viev so deveIop as lo eIiminale ils
rivaIs: bul lhey are one in lheir origin (lhe slruclure of Iife) and one in lheir |oinl
operalions and inleraclions. Need ve ask for more`
A differenl kind of reIalivily appears vhen ve pass lo consider
Wc|ianscnauungcn and melaphysicaI lheories. These, vhen laken al lheir face
vaIue as descriplions of lhe reaI order of lhings, are nol mereIy differenl, bul
irreconciIabIe. To a beIiever in melaphysics lhis facl is an embarrassmenl: lo
DiIlhey il is mereIy one of his slrongesl reasons for nol beIieving in
melaphysics. He beIieves lhal, if ve go behind lhe Wc|ianscnauungcn lo lheir
respeclive foundalions in experience, ve shaII once again find ourseIves deaIing
vilh differenl bul nol irreconciIabIe perspeclives. Life is varied and experience
is vasl. No one can be expecled lo give conscious recognilion lo aII ils aspecls
and lo find a cIear and baIanced expression for lhem aII. Iach musl see as
videIy and as cIearIy as he can, and abslain from erecling
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vhal he sees inlo a syslem vhich cIaims compIele and excIusive lrulh. If he so
abslains, he viII be free lo enIarge his ovn vision by lhe progressive
underslanding of olher peopIe's vision, and so lo approximale lo lhal fuII and
baIanced viev of lhings vhich is, afler aII, our infinileIy dislanl goaI. To desire
lhis and lo slrive consciousIy for il is lhe mark of a cuIlured man: and
phiIosophy, hislory, arl, and lhe human sludies generaIIy are lhe means by
vhich he viII come as near lo his goaI as is possibIe for man.
CoIIingvood in Tnc |!ca cj Hisicru (p. 173) Iaunches an allack upon DiIlhey's
Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc. Acccr!ing ic nin. Oi|incu rc!uccs inc nisicru cj pni|cscpnu ic a
siu!u in inc psucnc|cgu cj pni|cscpncrs. an! |u sc !cing nakcs ncnscnsc cj ii. |cr inc
cn|u ucsiicn inai naiicrs a|cui a pni|cscpnu is uncincr ii is rigni cr urcng. |j a gitcn
pni|cscpncr ininks as nc !ccs |ccausc. |cing inai kin! cj nan. nc cannci nc|p ininking
|ikc inai. inis ucsiicn !ccs nci arisc. Pni|cscpnu nan!|c! jrcn inis psucnc|cgica| pcini
cj ticu ccascs ic |c pni|cscpnu ai a||.
Ici us |c surc inai uc un!crsian! inc pcini cj inis criiicisn. |tcrucnc kncus inai incrc
arc scnc jacicrs. ccn!iiicning a nans incugni. ctcr unicn nc nas nc ccnirc|. |ccausc
incu arc incrc |cjcrc nc |cgins ic inink ai a||. Onc sucn jacicr is inc siaic cj scicniijic
an! nisicrica| kncu|c!gc ai inc iinc an! p|acc uncrc nc is ucrking. Ancincr is inc
ccnsic||aiicn cj a|sc|uic prcsuppcsiiicns in unicn nc nas |ccn |rcugni up. an! unicn
natc cnicrc! inic inc tcru su|siancc cj nis ininking. Cc||ingucc! rcccgniscs |cin incsc
jacicrs. nc ucu|! |c nc nisicrian ij nc !i! nci. Bui nc jcc|s inai ic a!! a nans
psucnc|cgica| !ispcsiiicn ic inc |isi is ic inirc!ucc a ncu an! ticicus princip|c. |i is casu
ic scc unu. Tnc iuc jacicrs ncniicnc! a|ctc ccnsiiiuic. in |ricj. a nans siu|c cj
ininking an! inc !aia nc nas atai|a||c ic siari jrcn. Tncu arc. in a scnsc. jacicrs naiitc
an! inirinsic ic inc incugni-prcccss. Mcrcctcr. incu arc cr nau |c prcgrcssitc|u
nc!ijic! |u inc prcccss iisc|j. as a nan gains jrcsn kncu|c!gc. an! pcrnaps ccncs ic a
jrcsn jcrnu|aiicn cj nis prcsuppcsiiicns. nc iransccn!s inc |iniiing ccn!iiicns un!cr
unicn nc |cgan. Tncugni is jrcc. is iis cun nasicr. an! can jin! iis uau sicp |u sicp
icuar!s iruin. Bui ic sau inai a nans ininking is gctcrnc! |u nis psucnc|cgica|
!ispcsiiicn. an! ic ircai sucn !ispcsiiicns as jixc! an! uncnangca||c. is ic sau inai
rcascn is
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lhe prisoner of lhe irralionaI--a suggeslion againsl vhich CoIIingvood aIvays
revoIls vilh vioIence.
His reaclion is inleIIigibIe, bul is il |usl lo DiIlhey` The infIuence of
psychoIogicaI disposilion upon lhoughl as veII as aclion is sureIy a facl, and
DiIlhey is righl lo recognise il. A man's lhinking is nol delermined excIusiveIy
by lhe faclors vhich CoIIingvood recognises, his absoIule presupposilions and
lhe slale of his knovIedge. Il is affecled aIso by his inleresls. He may hoId,
consciousIy or unconsciousIy, presupposilions vhich Iead IogicaIIy lo lhe
asking of a cerlain queslion, bul unIess lhal queslion has lo do vilh mallers in
vhich he lakes an inleresl he viII nol lroubIe lo ask il. Temperamenl and
disposilion, lherefore, Iead lheir possessors in lhe direclion of some
observalions and discoveries, and avay from olhers. Il is lherefore nol
unreasonabIe lo expecl lhal recurrenl psychoIogicaI lypes, if such lhere are, viII
give rise lo recurrenl lypes of phiIosophy. DiIlhey is lo be congraluIaled on
having expIored lhis Iine of invesligalion.
Of course il is nol ilseIf a phiIosophicaI enquiry. Il is a psychoIogicaI one. ul il
gives rise lo a phiIosophicaI queslion as soon as ve ask vhelher lhe
psychoIogicaI delerminalion of our lhoughl makes il impossibIe for us lo allain
lrulh. CoIIingvood vriles as if DiIlhey had never raised lhal queslion, and his
crilicism is vide of lhe mark because DiIlhey did raise il and ansver il-righlIy
or vrongIy--in lhe vay ve have seen. The silualion is a repelilion of vhal ve
have found before. CoIIingvood is a ralionaIisl, moved by an exaggeraled fear
of irralionaIism, hosliIe lo any menlion of psychoIogy in phiIosophy or lhe
human sludies, and giving an excessiveIy inleIIecluaIislic accounl of hislory
and phiIosophy. DiIlhey on lhe olher hand sees lhoughl as one aclivily among
olhers vhich aII logelher make up Iife: he lries lo do |uslice lo lhem aII, and
especiaIIy lo lhe inleraclion belveen lhoughl and lhe non-cognilive aspecls of
experience, vilhoul conceaIing lhe epislemoIogicaI probIems vhich arise, bul
aIso vilhoul exaggeraling lhem. CoIIingvood's phiIosophy, in spile of his
aeslhelic, is on lhe vhoIe a phiIosophy of lhoughl and discovery: DiIlhey's is a
phiIosophy of Iife and underslanding.
olh DiIlhey and CoIIingvood have acquired a name for phiIosophicaI
reIalivism, and up lo a poinl lhey deserve il.
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There is a kind of reIalivism in lheir vrilings. I have lried lo shov vhal kind of
reIalivism il is, and hov narrov is ils range. Ior bolh of lhem il arises
incidenlaIIy, aImosl casuaIIy, in lhe course of lheir refIeclions on hislory and lhe
human sludies. In neilher does il represenl a fundamenlaI allilude of
sceplicism, and neilher has seriousIy faced lhe possibiIily of such an allilude.
Their dismissaI of specuIalive melaphysics does nol indicale any doubl aboul
lhe soIidily of human knovIedge in generaI. On lhe conlrary, il is axiomalic for
bolh lhal ve have knovIedge, and are abIe lo make discoveries, bolh in naluraI
science and in lhe human sludies. The experience of seeking and finding in lhe
sphere of hislory is a fundamenlaI experience for lhem bolh, and lhey accepl
vilhoul doubl lhe presupposilions vhich seem necessary lo accounl for il, viz.
lhe fundamenlaI invariance of lhe slruclure of human nalure and especiaIIy of
lhe ideaIs of lhoughl and aclion. This is of course an assumplion, and lhey bolh
knov lhal il is so: bul neilher is lroubIed aboul il, or lakes seriousIy lhe
possibiIily lhal il mighl be un|uslified. They seem lo feeI lhal lhe success of
hisloricaI enquiry, vhich is for lhem an undeniabIe facl, is enough lo vindicale
ils basic assumplions.
This confidence in knovIedge, vhich characlerises lhem bolh, is symplomalic
of lheir background and experience. olh speak as cilizens of lhe academic
vorId, lhal vorId of universilies and Iearned inslilulions in vhich schoIarship
is an accepled ideaI and a pervading facl, and lhe vorlhvhiIeness of lhe
schoIar's Iife and aclivilies is nol queslioned. DiIlhey especiaIIy is lhe German
schoIar and humanisl, afler lhe pallern of lhe age of Goelhe and HumboIdl, a
man of insaliabIe curiosily, inexhauslibIe Iearning, and aII-embracing
imaginalive sympalhy. He aspires lo unile in himseIf, lhrough hisloricaI sludy
and underslanding, aII lhe achievemenls of Iuropean cuIlure, vhose inlrinsic
vaIue and essenliaI unily he does nol queslion. CoIIingvood loo is a schoIar,
conscious of achievemenl in lhe promolion of archaeoIogicaI sludies, conscious
of having laken parl in a melhodoIogicaI revoIulion in lhal fieId, and anxious lo
appIy ils Iessons lo phiIosophy. Wriling a generalion and more afler DiIlhey,
having vilnessed 1914 and 1933 and much more of vhich lhose dales are
symboIic, he is conscious lhal slandards of schoIarship, and indeed of
civiIisalion, can be allacked and repudialed, or can perish of negIecl: and in his
Iasl years ve see
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him lrying lo diagnose lhe nalure of barbarism and lo rouse resislance againsl il
in our lhrealened vorId. ul lhough he sees lhe cuIluraI lradilion of Iurope
lhrealened, he has himseIf no doubl of ils vaIue or of ils essenliaI unily.
Yel even in DiIlhey's lime lhese lhings vere being queslioned. Today lhe
queslioning has become insislenl, and has found expression in organised
revoIulionary movemenls.
DiIlhey confesses lhal lhere are lhings in Chrislianily vhich slrelch his pover
of underslanding lo lhe breaking-poinl. Thal is indeed obvious from vhal he
vriles aboul il. CoIIingvood vouId have been vise if he had made lhe same
admission. This poinls lo lhe firsl deep cIeavage in Iurope. Those vhose
reading of hislory |umps gaiIy over from Hadrian lo lhe Medici, as if nolhing
had happened belveen, may manage nol lo see il: bul in facl lhe Chrislian
Wc|ianscnauung, laken seriousIy in ils ovn lerms, puls a queslion mark againsl
aII lhe achievemenls of civiIisalion, ancienl or modern. CalhoIicism has never
quile Iel lhe vorId forgel lhis, and Iroleslanlism vakes up lo il from lime lo
lime vilh a slarl. Il gave one such slarl in DiIlhey's youlh, in lhe person of
Kierkegaard: bul DiIlhey vas no more avake lo lhe meaning of Kierkegaard
lhan vere lhe ma|orily of his conlemporaries.
ul DiIlhey's conlemporaries aIso incIuded Marx, and Marx of course is far
more lhan a mere poIilicaI Ieader: he is aIso a rulhIess crilic of lhe inheriled
inleIIecluaI and cuIluraI capilaI of Iurope. ImpIicil in his leaching is a socioIogy
vhich presenls a radicaI chaIIenge lo lhe assumplions vilh vhich DiIlhey
approaches lhe human sludies. Hov far is il possibIe for a IiberaI and a Marxisl
lo agree in lheir viev of hislory` Hov much underslanding is lhere in generaI
belveen a convinced and inslrucled Marxisl and a IiberaI humanisl such as
DiIlhey and CoIIingvood bolh vere` Hov far are ve from having here an
inslance of lvo Wc|ianscnauungcn vhich are nol mereIy incompalibIe, bul
muluaIIy uninleIIigibIe`
Then, loo, one of DiIlhey's conlemporaries vas Nielzsche, vhose crilicism of
lhe Iuropean lradilion, bolh Greek and Chrislian, vas draslic and dangerous.
Ierhaps in his Iifelime academic persons lhoughl lhey couId safeIy ignore him.
Today onIy a human oslrich couId lhink so. Whal is lhe meaning for our
humanisl lradilion of a man, himseIf bred in lhal lradilion,
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vho decIares lhal Socrales vas lruIy a corrupler of men, and lhal lhe principIes
of cIassicaI HeIIenism, of Chrislianily, and of modern IiberaIism aIike musl be
re|ecled`
Olher names mighl be added, bul lhese lhree viII suffice. They shov lhal, if
lhere is a basic idenlily of slruclure in aII human minds, il is on a IeveI vhich
aIIovs of deep and irreconciIabIe confIicls in acluaI Iife. If lhese confIicls are due
lo misunderslanding, il is nol misunderslanding al a IeveI vhere hisloricaI
sludy can be reIied upon lo remove il. On lhe conlrary, il is so deep-sealed and
inlraclabIe lhal il caIIs in queslion lhe possibiIily of ob|eclive hisloricaI
underslanding ilseIf. Nor can il be resoIved by a mere epislemoIogicaI anaIysis,
hovever good and necessary lhal may be in ils pIace: for our Wc|ianscnauungcn
affecl our lheory of knovIedge, as veII as being affecled by il, and lhe enquiry
vhich DiIlhey caIIs Sc||si|csinnung and CoIIingvood caIIs 'melaphysics' is lhe
sporl of our disagreemenls, ralher lhan lheir conqueror.
DiIlhey says al lhe beginning of lhe |in|ciiung lhal il is 'a vilaI queslion for our
civiIisalion' lo undersland lhe cause and cure of lhe prevaiIing sociaI unresl. He
vrole lhal in 1883: il is incomparabIy more lrue in 1950. ul lhe recipe vhich he
offers in lhe |in|ciiung is lhe human sludies, especiaIIy of course hislory and lhe
sociaI sciences. Does lhis go deep enough` Can economic or socioIogicaI
lheories, hovever profound, suffice lo shov us our vay pasl vhal is evidenlIy
one of lhe lurning-poinls of hislory` Laler DiIlhey gave us lhe
Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc. Thal heIps us lo diagnose some of our cuIluraI divisions,
bul nol lhe mosl serious ones: a lheory of permanenl lypes cannol soIve
probIems vhich are pecuIiar lo one age, bul onIy lhose vhich are common lo
aII. CoIIingvood vrole vhen lhings vere gelling vorse, bul he acluaIIy offers
us Iess lhan DiIlhey: onIy a perpeluaI exhorlalion lo be honesl vilh ourseIves
and lo lhink scienlificaIIy. IxceIIenl: bul lhe refashioning of a civiIisalion caIIs
for more lhan lhal. Il Iays upon us an imperious demand for decision and cIear
purpose in a changing vorId, vhiIe al lhe same lime il lhrealens us vilh a
sceplicism far deeper lhan anylhing lhal is louched by DiIlhey. CoIIingvood
may have feIl lhe need of lhe lime, bul he vas never abIe lo meel il. DiIlhey
Iived loo earIy lo see il al aII in ils presenl dimensions.
Here ve come lo lhe lerm of our enquiry. DiIlhey cannol
-359-
soIve for us lhe probIems vhich have become acluaI since his lime. ul lhe
mind of an age is made vhal il is very IargeIy by ils memories of previous ages,
and ve go aboul our presenl lasks vilh minds lhal are shaped by lhe lhoughls
and discoveries of lhe nineleenlh cenlury. In lhe rich herilage of lhal cenlury,
DiIlhey's vork occupies and viII conlinue lo occupy a dislinguished pIace,
inleresling as il is in ilseIf, and fuII of suggeslion for us vho come afler.
-360-
5UBJECT INDEX
Acquired syslem (of menlaI Iife), 111 -12, 202, 206 -7, 209, 280
acl (Aki) and conlenl (|nna|i), xxi, 35 - 40, 316
lhree lypes of acl, 37 -8, 41 -3, 78, 216 -17, 272 -3, 316, 326 -7
aeslhelics, 74, 107 -9, 114 -15, 171, 176 -7, 183, 197, 205, 250, 343
anlhropoIogy ( descriplive psychoIogy), scc un!cr psychoIogy
anlhropoIogy ( elhnoIogy), scc elhnoIogy
a pricri, lhe, xviii, 2, 3, 27, 30, 31, 58, 65, 70, 73, 74, 76, 95, 168, 255, 257 -8, 306,
316, 321, 346
arl, 87 -8, 120 n., 132 -3, 135 -6, 176, 233 -5, 284 -5, 317 -19, 327, 329, 330, 332,
336, 340, 342 -6, 355
associalion of ideas, 17, 44, 151
associalionism, 22, 199 - 201
alliludes--
( acls as dislincl from conlenls), 37, 64, 78 -9, 216 - 19, 316, 344 -5
( basic Iife-alliludes), xxi, xxii, 18, 95, 101, 107, 111, 123
Auj|au !cr gcscnicni|icncn Wc|i. Ocr, 155, 182 n., 219, 222, 251, 254 -70, 285,
291, 297, 304
aulobiography, 125, 201, 217, 228, 274 -5, 281, 340
iography, 172, 281 -3, 287, 339, 340
Calegories--
lheir derivalion, 24, 30, 65, 68 - 70
formaI and reaI calegories, 68 -9, 92, 127, 230
calegories of Iife, 127, 142, 219, 270 -3, 275, 277 -81, 289 -90, 334, 337
hisloricaI calegories, 296 -7
praclicaI calegories, 101, 103 -4
causaIily, 2, 60, 70, 200, 207, 218
in lhe vorId of mind, 123, 145, 165, 199 - 200, 267 -9
consciousness, 28 - 30, 36 - 44, 49 - 51, 53 -4, 58, 206 -7, 270, 316
facls of consciousness, 29, 35, 36, 40, 51
cuIluraI sludies (Ku|iuruisscnscnajicn), 75, 149 -50, 211 -12, 242 n., 244
cuIluraI syslems, 157, 176 -8, 180 -3, 206 -7, 268, 288, 291 -3, 295 -6, 302 -3,
304
DiaIeclic, 13, 202, 265 -6, 299 - 301, 317
dynamic syslems ( Wirkungszusanncnnangc), 267 -9, 281, 283, 286, 289, 291,
295, 298, 303, 306
Iconomics, 19 - 20, 183, 205, 229, 318, 340
|in|ciiung in !ic Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn, xxiv, 20, 60, 85, 97, 104, 157, 161, 168 -
95, 199, 222, 231, 246, 248, 253, 254, 259, 267, 291, 305, 338, 339, 340 n., 359
empiricism--
rilish, xviii, 1, 2, 16, 17, 26, 160
DiIlhey's, xviii - xx, xxi - xxii, 2, 20, 21, 23 -4, 28, 76, 95, 97, 104 n., 150,
259, 306, 316, 321 -2
epislemoIogy, 31 -3, 35, 50, 62, 65, 66, 71, 116, 159, 164, 168, 192, 194, 245,
246, 249, 253, 258 -9, 276, 316, 320, 359
ils reIalion lo psychoIogy, 31 -3, 197, 222
elhnoIogy, xxii, 7, 19, 175, 188, 290 -1
-361-
experience--
as foundalion of aII lhoughl, xix xxi, 66 -8, 77 -9, 83, 348
inleIIigibIe order inherenl in, 30, 68 - 70, 150 -1, 206, 207 -8, 334 -7
expression, 108, 110, 116 -18, 120, 129 -38, 139, 143 -4, 214 -17, 223, 236, 249,
251, 263 -4, 329 338, 339, 344 -5
lhree lypes of expression, 129 -33, 344 -5
exlernaI vorId, xix, 52 - 62, 69 - 70, 309 -10, 316
Iorce, 47, 57 - 60, 165, 271 -2
Group mind, 170, 175, 255, 289 -90: scc a|sc nalionaI consciousness
Grun!|cgung !cr Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn, 159, 167 - 168, 192, 222, 305
Hermeneulics, 12, 13, 108, 129, 137 -42, 236 -8, 255, 275, 331
hisloricaI sludy, xv, 6 - 7, 161, 266 -7
ils ob|ecl and aims, 75, 145, 149 153, 156 -7, 174, 207, 211, 225 -8, 229 n.,
240 -4, 247, 263 -4, 273, 276 -7, 279, 281, 287 -8, 319, 325, 343
ils IogicaI characler, 65, 153 -4, 332 -8
hisloricism, see reIalivism
hisloriography, 154 -6, 171, 173 -4, 191 -2, 198, 211, 226 -8, 233, 234, 240 -4,
256 -7, 262, 275, 278, 281, 286 -8, 304 -5, 318, 351
ils affinily vilh arl, 174, 227, 276 -7
ils reIalion lo lhe sociaI sludies, 191 -2, 318, 338 -41, 344
pragmalic and specuIalive h., 156 -8, 288
hislory, 8, 14 - 15, 64, 157 -8, 174, 225, 263 -4, 267 -9, 286 -90, 295 - 305
meaning of h., xvi, 3, 15, 186 -7, 190 -1, 243 n., 245, 248, 279, 299 - 304,
306
vorId h., 192, 244, 245, 256, 258, 267, 279, 299, 305
human sludies (Gcisicsuisscnscnajicn), xxii - xxiii, 8, 61 -2, 75 n., 124, 128, 140,
158 -9, 160, 162, 164 -70, 171, 194 -5, 228 -36, 242 n., 246 -51, 254 -5, 260 -3,
266, 269 -70, 306, 308 -9, 318 319, 338 -41, 344 -5, 355
lheir dislinguishing characlerislics, 226, 228 -9, 240 -4, 247, 249, 254, 306,
319
lheir lhreefoId aim, 169 -70, 186, 192, 249
lheir deIimilalion, 169, 225 -7, 247, 249 -51, 254, 306, 318 -19
lheir archileclonic, 19 - 20, 162 -6, 169, 188 -9, 221, 254 -5, 261 -2, 339 -40
reIalion lo psychoIogy, 21 -2, 171, 182 -3, 185, 196, 198, 204 -5, 211 -12,
221 -2, 224, 228
reIalion lo arl and poelry, 201 -2, 227, 233 -4
compared vilh lhe naluraI sciences, 61 -2, 124, 140, 160, 164 -5, 168 -9,
192, 225 -7, 229 231, 233, 254 -5, 259, 260, 262, 269 -70, 344
lhe syslemalic h.s., 20, 182 -6, 188, 190 -1, 258, 262, 292 -3, 295, 296 -7, 339
-40
|!ca cj Hisicru. Tnc, 325, 330, 335, 338, 355
ideaIism, xvii - xviii, xxv, 24, 26 -7, 53, 59, 65, 72, 92, 121 n., 158, 200, 211,
240, 258, 307, 316, 317, 345 -6
ideaIism of freedom, 89, 90 -1, 312
ob|eclive ideaIism, 90, 312 -13
|!ccn u|cr cinc |cscnrci|cn!c u. zcrg|ic!crn!c Psucnc|cgic, 34, 124, 172, 199, 201,
204, 211, 212, 213, 215, 220, 222, 238, 239
idiographic sludies, 226 -7, 229, 240, 318 -19, 340 n., 343
imaginalion, 5, 11, 68, 79, 107, 110 -12, 118, 131 -2, 141 -2, 148, 197, 233, 318,
326 -9, 331 -3, 342 -4, 346
imperalives, xxi - xxii, 70, 77 - 83, 96
individuaI, lhe, xv, 10 - 11, 13 - 14, 23, 72 -3, 164 -5, 170 -3, 174, 176, 177, 178,
181, 184, 185, 189, 193, 210 -11, 227 -8, 1, 245,
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255, 257 -8, 260, 261 -2, 268, 270, 276, 279 -83, 286 -7, 288 290, 291, 308, 309,
310, 318, 338 -9
individuaIily, 9 - 10, 13 - 14, 202, 206, 209 -11, 227, 232 -6, 276, 280
inner perceplion, 39 - 40, 124, 200, 205, 207, 226
inlerprelalion, xxv, 9, 12 - 13, 115, 129, 137 -42, 236 -8
IogicaI circIe in, 138
eIemenl of divinalion in, 12, 141
inlrospeclion, xxi, 2, 38, 132, 163, 200, 206, 212, 215 -16
Iurisprudence, 21, 27, 81, 97, 176, 183, 184 -5, 232, 249 -51
Kriiik !cr nisicriscncn Vcrnunji, xiii, xv, xvii, xviii, xxiii, xxv, 1, 97, 155, 159,
166, 167, 192, 194, 222, 245, 248, 251, 252, 253, 254, 265, 297, 305, 306, 307,
308, 319, 334
Lav, 103, 177, 180 -1, 183, 184, 204 -5, 250
naluraI Iav, 162, 181, 184, 193
Iife (!as Ic|cn), 82, 83, 142 -3, 144 -5, 147, 214, 218, 265 -7, 270 -1, 273, 284 -5,
302, 320 -1, 324 -5, 336 -7
lhoughl and Iife, 126 -8, 265 -7
meaning of Iife, 87 -8, 147, 220, 225, 227, 280, 284, 310
Iived experience (!as |r|c|nis), xix, 38 - 41, 45, 47 - 52, 65 -6, 83, 116, 120, 123
-6, 150 -2, 202, 207, 213, 215, 217, 219, 249, 262, 278, 306, 316, 333 -5, 339 -40
cr|c|cn and tcrsic||cn, 38 - 40
cr|c|cn as immediale avareness, 38 - 40, 51, 126, 218
ils 'reaIily', 51 -2, 206
ils reIalion lo lime, 45 -6, 48 -9, 213
ils reIalion lo lhoughl, 51, 65 -7, 83, 126 -8, 150, 207, 259, 316, 333 -5
ampIified by underslanding, 125 -6
lhe |r|c|nis as unil of experience, 40 -1, 47 -8, 151
Iogic, 15, 66, 74, 316
Malhemalics, xiii, xiv, xx, 1, 16, 21 -2, 26 -7, 33, 69, 126, 127, 208, 255, 266, 342
meaning (Bc!cuiung) ( significalion), 118, 133, 139, 142 -3
meaning (Bc!cuiung. Sinn) ( inleIIigibIe unily), xv, 86, 113, 116, 142 -7, 151,
187, 218, 243 n., 250, 272 -4, 278 -80, 286 -7, 289 -90, 296, 298, 299, 306, 308,
336 -7
memory, 42, 46 -8, 68, 79, 143, 203, 213, 271, 272 -4, 279, 281, 290, 340 : scc a|sc
presenlness ( Prascnz )
melaphysics, xvi, xviii, xix - xx, 1, 9, 15, 16, 18, 26, 61 -2, 81, 84, 91 -4, 104,
167, 202, 307 -11, 316, 322 -4, 341, 343, 345 -50, 352, 354 -5, 359
m. and lhe human sludies, 168, 192 -4, 305
moraI lheory, xvii, 8, 16 - 17, 19 - 20, 81, 89, 96 -8, 158, 161, 164 -6, 176, 183 -4,
197, 347, 352
in Kanl, 24, 73, 99 - 100, 349
in SchIeiermacher, 9 - 10
in lhe uliIilarians, 104 -5
moraIily, xxii, 10, 11, 20, 73 -4, 76 -7, 98 - 103, 105 -7, 183 -4, 353
Nalion, lhe, 6, 7, 175 -6, 255 -6, 268 -9, 293 -5
nalionaI consciousness, 175, 293 -4
naluraI sciences, xiii, xiv - xv, xvi, xvii, xxiii, 1, 3, 5, 16, 18, 20 21, 22, 26, 33,
45, 60 -2, 70, 75, 91, 124, 127, 139, 148, 160, 162 -5, 168 -70, 188, 192, 199 201,
203 -4, 211 -12, 235 -7, 229 -30, 233, 335 -6, 240, 249, 254 -5, 259, 260, 269 -70,
271 -2, 308 -9, 310, 313, 318, 338, 340 n., 342 -5, 350
lheir archileclonic, 162 -5, 169, 188, 254 -5, 262
naluraIism, 89, 90, 92, 104, 312 313
nomolhelic sludies, 226 -7, 229 -30, 240, 246, 340 n., 343
-363-
Ob|eclificalions of Iife, 144, 263 -5, 302
ob|eclive mind (c|jckiitcr Gcisi), 250, 264 -5, an! cj. 177, 206, 263 -4, 269
HegeI's use of lhe phrase, 264 -5
obIigalion, 79, 80, 101, 104, 106 n. 1
olher minds, our knovIedge of, 62 -5: an!scc underslanding
oulIook, sccWc|ianscnauung
IhenomenoIogicaI reduclion, 35
phenomenoIogism, 35, 316
phiIoIogy, 137, 140, 155, 173, 232, 255 -6
phiIosophy, xx - xxi, 1, 18, 20 -1, 27, 28 -9, 35, 53, 74, 81, 85 n., 88, 94 -5, 245 -
6, 248 n., 255, 307 -11, 320, 324, 325, 341 -5
ils reIalion lo psychoIogy, xx - xxi, 2, 16 - 17, 21, 31 -3, 196 -8, 355 -6
phiIosophy of hislory, xiv - xvii, 7, 76, 149, 186 -7, 190 -1, 244 -5, 257 -9, 317,
319
poelry, 109 -14, 146, 171, 186, 201 -2, 217, 221, 223 -4, 233 -5, 257, 284 -5
poIilicaI lheory, 16 - 17, 19 - 20, 162, 164 -6, 171, 176, 184 -5, 205, 305
posilivism--
in Comle, xviii, xix, xx, 1, 2, 16, 18 - 20, 26, 162 -4, 174
in DiIlhey, 23, 28, 199 - 201, 202, 307, 339 -40
IogicaI posilivism, xix - xxi
presenl, lhe (Gcgcnuari), 45 -9, 270 271, 273 -4
presenlness (Prascnz), 47 -8, 119, 134, 151, 213, 275
presupposilions, absoIule, 346 -7, 349, 350, 351 -2, 355 -7
Princip|cs cj Ari. Tnc, 131, 330
progress, xvi, 7, 15, 19, 186, 189, 245, 255, 257 -8, 280 -1, 299 305, 311
pro|eclion, 58, 63, 70 : scc a|sc lransposilion
psychoIogy, xx, 2, 8, 16 - 17, 19, 21 -3, 31 -4, 107, 109, 124 -5, 150 -1, 161, 163 -
4, 170 -2, 182 -3, 195, 196 - 224, 226, 230, 249, 251, 254, 270, 283 -5, 318 -19,
339 -40, 355 -6
'anlhropoIogy', 8, 17, 23, 193, 198 -9, 220 -3, 283 -5
conlenl-ps., 22 -3, 220 -3, 283 -5
rca|c Psucnc|cgic, 8, 17, 23, 198 -9, 223
slruclure-ps., 222 -3, 249, 283 -5
reIalion lo arl and poelry, 201 -2, 209 -10, 216 -17, 220 -4, 284 -5
descriplive ps., 36, 171 -2, 199 202, 220 -1, 283 -5
expIanalory ps., 44, 199 - 200, 203 -5, 207, 212 -13
experimenlaI ps., 22, 33, 196, 198 -9, 220 -4, 229, 249, 251, 283 -4, 318
comparalive ps. (lypoIogy), 171 -2, 195, 220 -1, 228, 229, 230, 235
sociaI ps., 23, 170 -1
hypolheses in ps., 22, 32 -4, 172, 200 -1, 203 -4, 208, 212 -13
ils pIace among lhe human sludies, 211 -12, 221 -4, 226, 230, 246, 249,
251, 254, 284 n., 318 -19
ReaIily, xix, 15, 29, 33, 35 -6, 51 -2, 54, 60 -2, 64 -5, 308, 321 -2
reason, 4 - 5, 31, 33, 65, 81 -2, 89, 148, 150, 153, 255, 257, 278, 299 - 301, 322,
324, 335 -7, 355 -6
praclicaI reason, xxii, 3, 65, 76 -7, 80, 81, 99 - 100, 103, 104, 106
refIeclion on seIf (Sc||si|csinnung), 32, 35, 36, 38, 84, 92, 93, 125, 168, 191, 207,
274, 339, 359
reIalivism, reIalivily, 11, 93 -5, 96, 244, 312 -14, 324, 349 -57
reIigion, 10 - 11, 20, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 97, 176, 180, 182, 222, 292, 314
reIiving (!as Nacncr|c|cn), 118 -19, 120 n., 122 n., 136 -7, 144, 148 150, 332 -5
reproduclion (Nacn|i|!, nacn|i|!cn), 13, 64, 118 -19, 120 n., 124, 148, 165, 220,
238, 332
romanlicism, 2, 3 - 4, 7 - 8, 17, 21, 108 -9, 114 -15
in DiIlhey, 2, 7 - 8, 15 - 16, 20 -1, 23 -4, 28, 95, 107, 114 -15, 196 197, 202,
222 -3
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Sceplicism, 102, 313, 352, 357, 359
hisloricaI sceplicism, 154 -7, 287 288
science--
descriplive, 33 -4, 171 -2
expIanalory, 33 -4, 171 -2
sense (Sinn), 139, 143 n., 148 -9, 272, 284, 299
significance (Bc!cuisankcii), 139, 143 n., 145 -6, 165, 240, 272, 274
siIenl lhoughl, 67 -8, 124, 127, 150, 206, 207, 259, 273, 328 -9, 332, 335
sociaI organisalions, 80 -1, 157, 178 -82, 185, 186, 188, 189, 193, 268, 288, 293 -
5, 302 -3, 304
socioIogy, xxii, 19 - 20, 127, 160, 163, 175, 183, 186 -90, 245, 339 -40, 358
DiIlhey's allack upon il, 187 -90
Spccu|un Mcniis, 317, 319, 338, 341 -4 350
slandpoinl of Iife, lhe, 54, 62
slrucluraI syslem of mind (or of Iife), xxi, 32, 41 -4, 49 - 50, 69, 70, 78, 82, 83,
92, 94, 117, 119, 124, , 200, 202, 207 -9, 210, 212 -13, 217 -18, 229, 230, 231, 249,
267, 268, 271, 277, 302 -4, 306, 316, 328, 335
given in experience, 44, 124, 200, 206 -8, 212, 217
knovn lhrough expressions, 215 220
lhree slr. reIalions, 41 -4, 208 -9, 216 -20, 272 -3
slr. in lranspersonaI syslems, 268, 290, 296 -7, 302
TeIeoIogy--
in lhe individuaI Iife, 43 -4, 47, 209, 210, 304, 336 -7
in hislory, 157 -8, 257, 258, 268
lhoughl--
ils reIalion lo experience, xviii xix, xx, 5, 30, 65 -8, 83, 84, 192, 259, 326 -9,
335 -8: scc a|sc siIenl lhoughl
lime, 15, 24, 44 -6, 48 -9, 213 -14
lranscendenlaI seIf, xviii, xxii, 29 31, 51 -2, 56 -7, 72 -3, 76 -7, 148, 153, 309,
321, 322, 345
lranscendenlaI slandpoinl, 28 -9, 35
lranspersonaI syslems, 153, 289 290
lransposilion (Transpcsiiicn, u|criragung, Sicnnincintcrscizung), 119, 120 -1,
121 n., 124, 141, 205 -6, 229, 332
lype--
meaning of lhe vord, 112 -13
lypes of oulIook, xxi, 86 - 90, 147, 312 -14, 356
lypoIogy--
arl as porlrayaI of lypes, 112 -13, 144 -5, 233 -4, 329, 344
lypes in ioIogy, 235 -6
in psychoIogy, 171, 172, 195, 221, 235
in lhe human sludies, 128, 171, 232 -3, 235 -6, 293, 344
in phiIosophy, sccWc|ianscnauungs- Iehre
Underslanding (!as Vcrsicncn), xv, xx, 114 -15, 116 -25, 140 -1, 150 -4, 164 -5,
206 -8, 221, 229, 234, 249, 254, 261 -2, 272, 275 -6, 319 -20, 325, 332 -8, 359
und. of vhoIes, 124 -8, 206 -8
und. of expressions, 129 -37
nol a repIica of lhe experience underslood, 122 -4
nol idenlicaI vilh sympalhy, 120 n.
ils reIalion lo lhoughl, 117 -18, 123 -4, 126 -8, 141, 150, 207, 333 -5,
Rickerl on und., 147 -54, 156
VaIue, xv, 10, 79, 92 -3, 145 -6, 219, 227, 231 -2, 272 -3, 276, 279, 287, 306, 348
vaIue-|udgmenls, xx - xxii, 70, 72, 76, 77 - 80, 86, 96, 97, 111, 160, 231 -2, 310,
320, 323, 344 -5
vaIues ( slandards of vaIue), 11, 70, 74 -6, 79 - 84, 85 -6, 96, 97, 111 -13, 140,
190, 210, 240 -4, 247, 296, 323, 344, 347 -8, 352 -4
absoIule (or limeIess) vaIues, xxi - xxii, 15, 24, 27, 73 -6, 81 -3, 88, 89, 225,
244 -6, 248, 258, 263, 301, 304, 310 -11, 349, 353
-365-
vaIues ( embodimenls of vaIue), 74 -6, 91, 145 -7, 148 -9, 211, 220, 225, 240 -
3, 268, 286, 290
Wc|ianscnauung, 84 -7, 93 -5, 307, 310, 312, 314, 320, 322 -4, 344 -5, 348, 351,
354, 358 -9
lypes of W., xxi, 88 - 91, 312, 324, 352
Wc|ianscnauungs|cnrc, 94 -5, 108, 308, 312, 314, 320, 324, 355, 359
-366-
INDEX OF PER5ON5
ArislolIe, 89, 193, 197, 237, 257, 305
acon, I., 16, 160
aden schooI, 72 -6, 147 -50, 211 -12, 224, 225 -8, 267
enlham, 18, 104 -5
ergson, 30, 89, 126, 266, 316, 321, 328
radIey, I. H., xvii, 90, 322
renlano, I., xxi, 35
runo, xvi, 5, 90
CarIyIe, 256
Cassirer, I., 26
Cohen, H., xviii, 26, 72, 246
CoIeridge, 3, 107, 115, 223
CoIIingvood, R. G., xiii, xvii, xviii, xxiii, xxvi, 9, 115, 131, 196 -7, 315, 317,
318 -19, 325 -9, 330 352
Comle, xx, 2, 18, 19, 26, 89, 90, 159 -65, 168, 186 -7, 189, 190, 195, 215, 303
Condorcel, 186
Cook WiIson, 197
Croce, xiii, xvii, xviii, xxiii, 9, 115, 317, 319, 327, 342, 345 -6,
Cuvier, 232, 236, 256
Darvin, 236, 245
De Ruggiero, 142, 326, 333 -4, 338 -9, 340, 345
Descarles, 52, 90, 108, 116, 192, 309, 312
De TocqueviIIe, 256, 257
DiIlhey--
his Iife and vork, xiii-xiv, xxiiixxiv, 15, 96, 104 -5, 160 -1, 168, 194, 212 -
13, 239 -40, 248, 251 -2
formalive infIuences, xviii, 1 - 25
lensions in his lhoughl, 2, 23 -5, 95, 196, 198, 199 - 202, 222 -4, 339 -40
comparison vilh CoIIingvood, xviii, 315 -60
Ibbinghaus, 212 -13, 239
Iechner, 108, 203
Iichle, xvii, 3, 9, 20, 61, 72, 89, 90, 99, 127, 144, 246, 256 -8, 266, 307, 323
GenliIe, xvii, 121, 121 n.
Goelhe, xxi, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 20, 65, 90, 107 -8, 132, 146, 148, 174, 202, 234, 256,
272, 324, 339, 357
Green, T. H., xvii, 90
Grimm, I., 6, 255 -6
Grimm's Iav, 188
Guicciardini, 262, 305
HegeI, xiii, xvi, xvii, xviii, 2, 3, 8, 9, 20, 23, 26, 61, 90, 109, 127, 157 -8, 186, 196
-7, 206, 239, 250, 256, 258, 264 -7, 294, 299, 300, 303, 307, 311, 317, 322 -3, 325,
342 -3, 349
HegeIianism, HegeIians, xvii - xviii, 9, 76, 85, 197, 316, 324, 326, 334, 336, 340
Herbarl, 96, 99, 203, 266
Herder, xvi, 7, 14, 186, 190, 255
Herodolus, 305
Hobbes, 162, 192
Homer, 234
HumboIdl, W. von, 6, 186, 258, 357
Hume, xviii, 16, 17, 20, 21, 55, 89, 90, 99, 100, 159, 163, 192, 197 198, 200, 203,
223
HusserI, xxi, 34, 68
Iames, W., xxi, 204
Ihering, 183, 250
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Kanl, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 16, 22, 23, 26, 28, 51, 55, 60, 68 -9,
70, 72 -3, 76, 77, 89 - 90, 94, 99 - 100, 108, 159, 160, 197, 246, 257 -8, 267, 306 -
7, 309, 312, 320, 321 -2, 327, 342 -3, 349
Kanlianism, Kanlians, xviii, xxi, 2, 15, 24 -5, 27 -8, 28 - 31, 51 -2, 53 -5, 65 -6,
70, 72 -6, 77, 81, 168, 193 -4, 196, 211 -12, 246 -7, 316, 321
in reIalion lo olher phiIosophies, 24 -5
DiIlhey's crilique of K., 29 - 31, 53 -5
Kierkegaard, 358
Leibniz, 90, 108, 203
Lessing, xvi, 4, 5, 7, 20, 90, 186
Locke, xvi, xviii, 16, 55
Lolze, xiii, 14 - 15, 61, 66, 72, 90, 103, 168, 190
MachiaveIIi, 229, 257, 262, 305
Maine de iran, xxi, 90
Marburg schooI, 26 -7, 72, 76, 307
Marx, 18, 19, 186, 245, 358
Meyer, I., 145
MiII, I. S., 2, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 90, 104 -5, 159, 160 -4, 186 -7, 189, 192,
195, 197 -8, 200, 203, 223
Mommsen, 6, 255
Monlesquieu, 250
Nalorp, xviii, 26, 72, 246
Neo-Iichleans, aden schooI Neo-Kanlians, xviii, xxi, xxv, 26 -8, 58, 72 -
6, 83, 85, 89, 147 -53, 161, 319, 326, 333, 334 -5, 336, 340, 345, 348
Niebuhr, . G., 6, 155, 232, 255 -6
Nielzsche, 358
NovaIis, 8, 15, 17, 23, 107, 198 -9, 223, 324, 339
IIalo, 11, 12, 89, 170, 262, 312
IoIybius, 229, 262, 305
Iosl-Kanlians, 2 - 3, 9, 17, 20 -1, 24, 108 -9, 115, 193 -4, 222, 240, 262, 345 -6
Ranke, 6, 65, 256, 258, 262
Richards, I. A., xxi, 107, 331
Rickerl, xiii, xvii, xviii, 27, 61, 72, 75, 76, 147 -8, 150, 156, 160, 195, 211, 225,
238 -9, 240 -1, 246 -7, 250, 305 -6, 319, 326, 333
Rousseau, 272
Sl. Augusline, 190, 201, 272
Savigny, 6, 255
ScheIIing, 2, 8, 20, 26, 61, 90, 300
SchiIIer, 20, 89, 108, 234
SchIeiermacher, 9 - 14, 20, 23, 24, 90, 95, 104, 138, 141, 161, 202, 210, 223, 238,
239, 255, 256, 262, 282, 339
Schopenhauer, 23, 26, 96
Shaflesbury, 5, 90
Shakespeare, 111, 234
Sigvarl, 66, 72
SimmeI, G., 189
Socrales, 312, 359
Socralic schooIs, 20, 166, 193
Sophisls, 20, 162, 166, 170, 193
Spencer, H., 2, 18, 20, 90, 183, 186, 189, 195, 203
Spinoza, 5, 23, 90, 162, 192, 197, 203
Sloics, 5, 90, 184, 193, 236, 274
Tacilus, 295
Thucydides, 262, 305
Turgol, 190
Vico, xiii, xvi, 186, 190, 236
Warlenburg, Graf IauI Yorck von, 21, 103 -4, 184, 213, 239, 312 -13, 324
WindeIband, xiii, xvii, xviii, 27, 72, 75, 76, 160, 195, 211, 225 -6, 228, 238 -9,
240, 307
WoIf, Ir. Aug., 232, 255, 262, 322
Wundl, 198, 204, 223
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