Social Capital and Village Governance: Experiences with Village Networks

A Discussion Paper

November 2005

Mr Arnaldo Pellini Dr David Ayres

For further information please contact us: Community Based Rural Development Project rdpadminpnh@online.com.kh CBRDP@online.com.kh (at MRD) Administrative Reform and Decentralisation Project lsothear@yahoo.com

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Content
Abbreviations and Acronyms iv Authors......................................................................................................................................v Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ vi Summary................................................................................................................................ vii Introduction Section 1 Decentralization, Civil Society, and Poverty Reduction 1 3

Decentralization and Civil Society ...................................................................................................3 Decentralization and Poverty Reduction ..........................................................................................4

Section 2 Social Capital Section 3 Social Capital: The Cambodian Context

6 9

Social Capital and Trust ...................................................................................................................7

Relational Social Capital at the Local Level ....................................................................................9 Institutional Social Capital at the Local Level ...............................................................................11 Social Capital: A Framework for Action........................................................................................11

Section 4 Civil Society: The Cambodian Context

13

Traditional Associations.................................................................................................................14 State Sponsored Groups: The Case of VDCs .................................................................................15 Externally Sponsored Groups.........................................................................................................18

Section 5 The Legal Framework

20

Spaces for Participation for Civil Society ......................................................................................20 Informal Structures at the Village Level ...................................................................................23 Redundant VDCs.......................................................................................................................23

Section 6 Principles for Village Governance

25

Identify Existing Groups and Actors..............................................................................................25 Establish Informal Networks..........................................................................................................25 Village Advisory Committee as Entry Point ..................................................................................25 Support Civil Society and Local Government Simultaneously......................................................26 Words are Important.......................................................................................................................26 Clear Definition of Roles and Responsibilities ..............................................................................26

Section 7 The Village Network Model

27

Conceptual Issues ...........................................................................................................................27

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The Village Network Model: An Outline.......................................................................................28 Kampong Thom and Kampot Experiences................................................................................30 Roles for the Village Networks ......................................................................................................31 Expanding Village Network Roles ............................................................................................32 Benefits of the Village Network Model .........................................................................................33 Enhanced Prospects for Sustainability ......................................................................................33 Capacity Building ......................................................................................................................35 Improved Awareness about Participation..................................................................................36 Facilitating Institutional Cooperation........................................................................................36

Section 8 Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................................................38

Recommendations for the National Level ......................................................................................38 Recommendations for the Provincial Level ...................................................................................39

References...............................................................................................................................42 Annex 1 Selected references on social capital and civil society in Cambodia........................46 Annex 2 Overlapping functions between VDC, Commune Council, PBC and Village Chief. ..................................................................................................................................................48 Annex 3 Comparison between the original VDC guidelines and the latest draft of VDC revision.....................................................................................................................................49 Annex 4 Checklists and results................................................................................................52 Annex 5 PRA tools..................................................................................................................55 Annex 6 List of interviews (alphabetical order)......................................................................57 Annex 7 Case Studies..............................................................................................................58

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CBO CDRI CEDAC CIDSE DED DOLA GTZ GTZ ARDP CBRDP LAMC LGSU LWF MOI MRD NCSC NGO OECD PADEK PBC PC PDRD PLAU RGC UNDP UNICEF VAC VDC VN WVI Community Based Organisations Cambodia Development Resource Institute Centre dEtude et de Dveloppement Agricole Cambodgien Coopration Internationale pour le Dveloppment et la Solidarit German Development Service Department of Local Administration Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit German Technical Cooperation Agency GTZ Administrative Reform and Decentralisation Project Community Based Rural Development Project Law on Administration and Management of Commune/Sangkat Local Governance Support Unit Lutheran World Federation Ministry of Interior Ministry of Rural Development National Committee to Support the Communes Non Governmental Organisation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Partnership for Development in Kampuchea Planning and Budgeting Committee Procurement Committee Provincial Department of Rural Development Provincial Local Administration Unit Royal Government of Cambodia United Nations Development Programme United Nations Children Fund Village Advisory Committee Village Development Committee Village Network World Vision International

Authors
Arnaldo Pellini has worked for the DED (German Development Service) as the advisor to the civil society/local governance component of the GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) Rural Development Project in Kampong Thom (Cambodia) since 2002. He has worked with traditional associations, community based groups and local NGOs, supporting their active participation in local governance processes. Arnaldo has gained experience on issues related to community development in Nepal, and worked as a trainer on project cycle management in Finland and Spain. He has an MPhil in economic development and is a PhD candidate at the University of Tampere, Finland. Contact: arnaldo.pellini@uta.fi. David Ayres has worked as a consultant on local governance and decentralization issues for GTZ,
PACT, VBNK, and AUSTCARE. He is presently the Chief Technical Advisor on decentralization for the GTZ Rural Development Program (Kampong Thom and Kampot) and Team Leader of the Decentralization Advisory Team for Pacts USAID-funded Local Administration and Reform Program. David was the founding project leader, in December 2000, of the Commune Council Support Project (CCSP). He is the author of a book and several academic articles about development issues in Cambodia. David has a PhD in education and development from the University of Sydney, and an MBA from the Australian Graduate School of Management. Contact: david@dayresconsulting.com.

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Acknowledgements
First of all we would like to thank the members of traditional associations, Village Networks, Commune Councils, government departments, local/international NGOs and agencies whom have accepted to meet us. Without them it would not have been possible to collect these experiences and learn about the factors that influence local governance and participation in the social and cultural context of Cambodia. In addition we would like to thank those who provided useful comments to the preliminary drafts of this paper, in particular: Dr. Angelika Fleddermann of GTZ CBRDP, and Ms. Shelley Flam and Mr. Luc De Meester of GTZ ARDP. In addition we would also like to remind the reader that the views and interpretations in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the position of GTZ.

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Summary

The official start of the decentralisation reform In Cambodia coincided with the Commune Council election held in February 2002. The main objectives of the reform are (NCSC, 2005): Promote democracy, good governance and quality of life Give ordinary people greater opportunities to determine their future Encourage greater and sustainable development, especially the delivery of basic services

While the stated objectives emphasise the importance of improved efficiency in the delivery of basic services, they also show that despite a long tradition of centralised government and the turmoil of the 1970-80s, there is in Cambodia today is a growing understanding that people must take a greater part in decision making processes and that government must be more sensitive and more responsive to its citizens. In this paper we have looked at the decentralisation policy of the Royal Government of Cambodia by focusing on the link between the Communes and the villages a link poorly articulated in the present legislation. We have tried to answer the question of how to strengthen the village Commune link? In doing so, we begin by addressing two issues. First, we consider issues of social capital in the Cambodian context, thinking about how social capital can be utilised to make the link between village and Commune stronger and more conducive to improved livelihood. Second, we consider the civil society actors that can better influence the process and help to achieve the development of a sustainable and democratic local governance environment. The paper argues that informal Village Networks (VN) can serve as a mechanism for the creation of a network of active individuals and groups at the village level which can link and cooperate with Commune Councils, particularly in respect of monthly Council meetings and the annual investment planning process. The idea underlying the VN is to capitalise on existing bonding social capital between members of community based groups and local leaders, strengthen social capital between groups and individual in the village, and use this social energy to create a lasting vertical link with Communes, thereby helping to strengthen institutional social capital and trust in the community and towards local government. The main experiences derived from the approach are the following: To increase the sustainability of the Networks, they should be formed by members of existing groups and actors at the village level; Tasks and function of the VN must be specific and clarified in a dialogue between the Network and the Commune Councils. This not only helps to avoid overlap of

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functions and activities with other community based organisations or civil society groups, but also helps to identify tasks where the Networks could assist the Commune at the village level and serve to establish mutual and clear expectations. Capacity building is provided by external facilitators such as local NGOs and Provincial Department of Rural Development staff and focuses on developing understanding about principles of local governance, participation and the decentralisation reform in Cambodia. Capacity building, whenever possible, should also serve as a mechanism for exchange, learning and trust building for civil society organisations, provincial authorities (in particular the Provincial Department of Rural Development and the Provincial Local Administration Unit), district authorities, and Commune Councils. Education materials for VN capacity building should focus on simple and direct messages and make use, for example, of posters that describe through images and limited text various aspects of the local governance process: elections, participation in meetings and planning exercises, monitoring of local development projects, and the equality of all citizens before the law.

The experiences that have been collected so far have helped to shape the VN mechanism and have been utilised to refine the VN approach to improve its sustainability after external support from donors and local NGOs is withdrawn. While this is not automatically secured, the Networks represent a starting point and a proposal for a village governance model that takes into consideration the opportunities provided by the decentralisation policy of the Royal Government of Cambodia and, at the same time, the traditional norms and values of Cambodian society.

Introduction

For more than a decade, the notion of increased participation of community members has been one of the arguments used to justify the introduction of decentralisation reforms in many developing countries. While the complexion of the reforms differ from one setting to the next, the basic assumption underlying them remains the same: bringing government closer to the people will lead to the establishment of more democratic institutions based on principles of good governance (Manor, 1999). One of the significant ironies associated with this idea is that while decentralisation purports to bring the government and government services closer to the people, there is no evidence to support the notion it has been adopted in response to grassroots or civil society pressure. In fact, decentralisation must be understood as a politically motivated initiative stemming from central government. Despite originating at the centre, many of the benefits of decentralisation are targeted at local communities. Litvack and Seddon (1999) argue, for example, that decentralisation can increase government officials sensitivity to local conditions and needs, ensure public services reach a larger share of the population, lead to more creative development programs, and provide a foundation for greater political representation and participation of minority ethnic and underprivileged groups. This paper is concerned with the spaces for peoples participation that are associated with decentralisation reforms. It refers to the experiences of the Community Based Rural Development Project (CBRPD) in Kampot and Kampong Thom, a project under the steering of the Ministry of Rural Development, with support from the German Government and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (see map). It also looks also at other initiatives implemented in Cambodia by local as well as international organisations that aim at strengthening Community Based Organisations and their cooperation and link with Commune Councils. The paper begins by exploring the notion of decentralisation and its implication for poverty reduction and participation. In the second and third parts, social capital is defined and analysed in the context of Cambodian traditional norms and values. In section four, attention shifts to an exploration of the meaning of civil society in the Cambodian context. Section five

analyses the opportunities for civil society participation and inclusion in local decision making processes provided by the Law on Administration and Management of Commune/Sangkat and various sub-decrees. Finally, the paper presents the principles that underlie the VN initiative and the lessons learned in the last three years. In the conclusion to the paper, we present our recommendations to strengthen and improve the approach at the provincial level and to include these experiences in the policy making debate at the national level. Finally, a limitation must be recognised: the experiences presented in this paper are limited to Kampong Thom and Kampot provinces and, though they may not be representatives for the whole of Cambodia, they refer to traditional norms and values that may be found elsewhere in Cambodia. For this reason they can provide useful information about what might work and what needs to be take into consideration to improve civil society participation in the local governance environment.

Section 1

Decentralization, Civil Society, and Poverty Reduction

Decentralization and Civil Society

1.1 There are many definitions and meanings surrounding the concept of decentralization. For the World Bank, James Manor developed a typology for decentralization which includes deconcentration, fiscal decentralization, and devolution, or democratic decentralization (Manor, 1999). The UNDP presents a more comprehensive typology of the different forms of decentralization. Its definition includes political decentralization, devolution, administrative decentralization, deconcentration, delegation, fiscal decentralization, and divestment, or market decentralization (UNDP, 2000). The definitions, as Anderson (2003) suggests, are largely mechanical. Despite this, the devolution referred to by Manor and the political decentralization referred to by the UNDP, are both associated with a range of positive values. Decentralization is touted as increasing everything from responsiveness to accountability. The IDEA handbook for democratic local governance argues, for example, that decentralization has the potential to increase the power of citizens, geographically diffuse economic activities, and increase the efficiency of government management of the economy (Sisk et. al., 2001). Decentralization fosters greater responsiveness of policy-makers to the will of citizens, may promote diversity in public policies, and may develop political leadership at the local level. An interesting discussion surrounds the relationship between decentralization and civil society. One element of this discussion concerns the tangible benefits that civil society may derive from decentralization. It is argued, for example, that decentralization may lead to greater government accountability to civil society and increased transparency, improved problem solving, opportunities for sharing technical and social expertise in policy-making, and greater influence over policy decisions (ibid.). The other element to the discussion relates to the importance of civil society to successful decentralization. Parker claims that an active civil society appears to assist significantly in implementing decentralisation (Parker, 1997, n.p.). Azfar et al (1999)

1.2

1.3

1.4

agree with this perspective, arguing that Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs), user associations and other civic groups may help to coordinate citizens actions and get their voice heard in the government. Further, they argue, that such groups may also act as checks on government actions and enforce leaders compliance with the wishes of citizens (ibid.: 19). Manor is not as enthusiastic, though he does argue that when a vibrant civil society is present, there is little doubt [it will] almost always tend to assist decentralised authorities to work well (Manor, 1997 n.p.).

Decentralization and Poverty Reduction

1.5 In theory, decentralisation should have a positive impact on poverty, as it is likely to make the voice of the poor better heard, improve their access to public services, and reduce their vulnerability. This theoretical perspective is fuelled by a belief that the perceived virtues of decentralization - including popular participation, responsiveness, and accountability will result in greater responsiveness to the needs of the poor. Since the poor are generally excluded from politics, and therefore have difficulty in accessing public goods and services, decentralization is seen as offering greater political participation to ordinary citizens whose voice is more likely to increase as the relevance and effectiveness of government policies and programmes increases (Crook & Sverrisson, 1999; Crook, 2003; Jtting et al., 2005). While, in theory, decentralisation can be a powerful tool to initiate improvements in instruments and policies for the poor, the reality appears less promising. An OECD Development Centre review of decentralization experiences in 19 countries found that decentralisation had actually lead to improvements in poverty reduction in only one third of the analysed cases (Jtting et al., 2005). In the majority of the countries, decentralisation had no impact at all. Even more worrying, in countries where the state lacked the capacity to fulfil its basic functions and in environments with high inequalities at the outset, there was a definite risk that decentralisation will increase poverty, rather than reduce it. While ambiguous, the evidence suggests that the link between decentralisation and poverty reduction is not straightforward and that the outcome is largely influenced by country specificities, as well as by the process design. An extension of the premise that successful decentralization requires an active civil society is the notion that successful decentralisation is therefore dependent on citizen participation, and that such participation often encompasses involvement with groups and associations. A fundamental problem, which may account for the failure of decentralization to improve poverty alluded to in the OECD study cited above, is that the poor are rarely active in voluntary associations and cooperatives (Cheema, 1983). Their lack of involvement may stem from any of a number of reasons: The organisations are often under the initiative of village elites, who have little contact with the poor; The leaders of local organisations rarely make any effort to recruit members from among the poor;

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1.7

1.8

The attitude of the government bureaucracy is in most cases paternalistic and rural poor are often only passive recipients of information and instruction; Most rural organisations have specific goals and attract only a particular segment of the rural communitythese segments rarely include the poor and/or landless; Many rural organisations do not reflect the priorities of the rural poor, whose needs might be different to those of the leadership of the organisations.

From the literature that examines how decentralisation has been made to work for the poor, there are two important implications. The first is the strong implication that central intervention is needed to ensure progressive or pro-poor outcomes in all but the most unusual circumstances (Cook and Sverrisson, 1999: 3). The second is that external actors (such as NGOs) are important to the decentralisation process in respect of its impact on the poor and disadvantaged. Cook and Sverrisson argue that pro-poor outcomes are more likely where there exist situations facilitating continued central intervention with external alliances that support the mobilisation of the disadvantaged (ibid. p. 6; see also Rusten and jendal, 2003). It seems quite clear that representative local government, and conducting regular elections, are not enough to transform the relationship between government and citizens, or to empower the poor. The introduction of elected local government has failed to encourage participation in systems where local government already has a very bad record or there is no tradition of or experience of electoral politics. In such cases, it has been the important role played by community and peoples organisations that have promoted more positive development outcomes for the poor.

1.9

Section 2

Social Capital

2.1

Central to the important role played by community and peoples organisations in promoting pro-poor development in a decentralized environment is the idea of social capital. From an economic perspective, sustainable development is often defined as a process where future generations receive the same or more capital per capita than the current generation has available (Serageldin, 1996). Traditionally, this has included a combination of natural capital, physical or produced capital, and human capital. At the village level in Cambodia, these forms of capital, which combine to determine village livelihood, include the following: Table 2.1: Forms of Capital in the Village Natural Capital Air quality, water (including quantity and quality), soil, biodiversity and landscape Cash in the village (money lender, private saving, savings groups, cash associations); Physical community infrastructure (bridges, culverts, wells, laterite roads, schools, health centres) Individual capacity, training, human health, values and leadership (includes non-formal skills associated with experience carrying out a particular task and indigenous knowledge about an area).

Physical or Produced Capital

Human Capital

2.2

Christiaan Grootaert (1998) argues that social capital is the missing link in terms of understanding how these forms of capital lead to economic growth. Social capital, he argues, is concerned with the way the economic actors interact and organise themselves to generate growth and development. The idea of social capital is a relatively new tool for economic analysis. In the political science, sociological and anthropological literature, where it has more established credentials, social capital is concerned with the connections among individuals (Putnam, 2000: 19). The World Bank defines it as the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a societys social interactions [it] is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society it

2.3

is the glue that holds them together (World Bank, 1999). This paper adopts the following working definition of social capital: The norms and networks that enable people to act collectively (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 226). 2.4 Within the boundaries of this definition, a number of approaches are associated with the idea of social capital. The most narrow of these is that associated with Putnam (1993), who is primarily concerned with the horizontal associations between people. These horizontal associations consist of social networks and associated norms that have an effect on community productivity and well-being. At this level, social capital facilitates coordination and cooperation (see Bebbington, 1997; Woolcock, 1998; Narayan, 1999; Krishna, 2000). A second approach to social capital is linked to the work of Coleman (1988), who broadens the concept to include vertical as well as horizontal associations between people. This view recognizes that horizontal ties are needed to give communities a sense of identity and common purpose, but also stresses that without "bridging" ties that transcend various social divides (e.g. religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status), horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow interests, and can actively preclude access to information and material resources that would otherwise be of great assistance to the community for example, access to credit (Krishna, 2000). The broadest and most encompassing approach to social capital includes the social and political environment that shapes social structure and enables norms to develop. This analysis extends the importance of social capital to the most formalized institutional relationships and structures, such as government, the political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties. This view not only accounts for the importance of forging ties within and across communities, but recognizes that the capacity of various social groups to act in their interest depends crucially on the support (or lack thereof) that they receive from the state as well as the private sector. Similarly, the state depends on social stability and widespread popular support. In short, economic and social development thrives when representatives of the state, the corporate sector, and civil society create forums in and through which they can identify and pursue common goals. This focus on institutions draws on North (1990) and Olsen (1982), who have argued that such institutions have an important effect on the rate and pattern of economic development.

2.5

2.6

Social Capital and Trust

2.7 It is important to note that the forms of social capital discussed above never exist in isolation, since societies always demonstrate a mix between them that is determined by the degree or orientation of a specific culture towards collective action. Krishna poignantly argues, therefore, that it is important to consider the specific cultural factors that shape and influence social capital formation (Krishna, 2000). Several analysts argue that trust is a critical element of all forms of social capital. Uphoff defines it as the essential glue for society (2000: 227). The basic argument

2.8

is that trust can grow and facilitate exchange and interaction between individuals, groups and institutions. It is linked to the availability of information as well as formal and informal norms and rules. We trust individuals and/or institutions because we know that in the past they have behaved correctly. We also trust them because we know that there are laws and a judicial system that regulate and punish wrong behaviours. There can also be strong informal norms and rules which, as in many parts of South East-Asia, reward trustworthy behavior by applying social sanctions such as shame to those who violate the norms (Pye, 1999). 2.9 This paper adopts a social capital model, which effectively synergises the three approaches outlined above by bringing together ideas of bonding, bridging and linking at the community level, and linking these to the notion of trust. The model builds on Uphoffs argument that relational social capital (bonding and bridging) predisposes individuals for collective action, while institutional social capital (linking) creates the condition and spaces that facilitate collective action (Uphoff, 2000), taking account of what Woolcock (1998) refers to as synergy, the states links to the community (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1

Section 3

Social Capital: The Cambodian Context

3.1

It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a full and comprehensive analysis of social capital and trust in Cambodian society. It is important, however, to define some of the critical elements of social capital in the Cambodian context in order to better understand the nature of civil society in Cambodia, and therefore the participation of civil society in local governance. Any analysis of social capital in Cambodia usually attempts to account for the impact of conflicts. Colletta and Cullen (2000) note, for example, that thirty years of warfare all but destroyed most forms of social capital in Cambodia (p. 9). They argue that traditional forms of social capital were severely eroded throughout the Lon Nol regime (1970-1975), were further transformed and depleted during the Khmer Rouge period 1975 - 1979, and gradually began to re-emerge during the Heng Samrin period (1979-1991) (p. 11). Interestingly, the authors argue: In terms of structural social capital and its composition, post-conflict forms do not differ greatly from those that existed before the wars (p. 11).

3.2

3.3

In supporting the argument, they note that informal networks continue to be organised by kinship, while a range of new networks are emerging that go beyond the circle of relatives. They also note that associations sponsored by the government, or initiated by village leaders and the pagoda show no visible changes from the pre-conflict period, as do local associational activities such as rice banks, funeral associations, and water-users groups (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 11).

Relational Social Capital at the Local Level

3.4 Extended family networks have been the main coping mechanism throughout Cambodias years of conflicts. This is reflected today in a strong collective feeling between members of the same family (bonding social capital), but at the same time has also resulted in weak linkages between different families and to a weak sense of community at the village level. Around this basic premise about the strength of family networks, other observations about so called relational social capital at the local level can be made:

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The bonding links between individuals exist at different levels of the social hierarchy. It is not uncommon, for example, for parents to come together in supporting the improvement of a school building, since such an endeavour is characterised by a shared objective and interest. It is important to stress, however, that while shared objectives and common interest serve to bring people together, they can also contribute to the exclusion of certain individuals from being part of a group. The poorest members of the community may, for example, feel excluded from a parents group dedicated to school improvement because of their inability to make any financial contribution to such a group, or because their own children are unable to attend school. Distance between rural areas and the administrative centre has created the conditions for development of indigenous coping systems that have often helped individuals during period of crisis. In this respect, distance between centre and the local level is enabling of collective action, as self help initiatives in rural areas have often been a necessity and have brought people together through the formation of ad hoc groups. Pagodas have represented an important point of reference for community action both before and after the Khmer Rouge period and can be considered as the centre of community life. In most instances, trust is particularly strong from villagers towards the pagoda leadership (either a monk or achar). A survey conducted by Centre for Advanced Studies in 2003 found that 84 percent of people in rural areas trust the pagoda as a public institution (CAS, 2003). Bridging social capital is weak in Cambodia. As noted above, families have often represented the safety nets to survive during periods of conflict. The mistrust generated by the Khmer Rouge regime in its attack on traditional institutions and values such as family, religion and association served to negatively affect the relationship between different families. The effects of this fracture of traditional institutions and values continue to be manifested today in the difficulties different groups and associations have at the local level in linking with each other. Prospects for the improvement of bridging between different groups at the local level appear quite strong as a result of the leadership structures of the different groups. Local leaders tend to occupy different posts of responsibility or represent different interests at the same time. The local achar may, for example, be in charge of the pagoda association and the cash association at the same time, and may also have been elected to the Village Development Committees (VDC). Presently, however, individuals rarely consider the overlapping an asset that could help to bridge differences between groups and also bring together resources.

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Institutional Social Capital at the Local Level

3.5 Any discussion of institutional social capital in the Cambodian context must take account of the dominance of a complex web of patron-client relations in determining interactions between people, and between groups of people. The patron-client system represents a form of social capital since it is based on the expectation there is a patron to whom one turns when help is required or a problem needs solving. The relationship carries with it mutual obligation, and so the client may be called upon to lend assistance to the patron at some point in the future. Certainly, the patron-client relations can work in negative ways too, such as the case with money borrowed through a money-lender which is then paid back with very high rates of interest. Other observations about institutional capital include: Cambodian society shows a marked preference for hierarchical relations within organisations. These relations are strictly defined and observed and lead to an unwillingness to take initiative without clear approval from above. This is manifested in a strong preference by people for clear guidelines about authority and responsibilities, and often leads to a myriad of different rules and regulations. It is also manifested in general reluctance by people to take part in and speak at public meetings. Peoples trust in government diminishes as distance increases. A survey by the Centre for Advanced Studies found different levels of trust by the people towards state and non-state institutions. Pagodas, as noted above, are the most trusted institution. Commune Councils are trusted more than provincial and national level of government, and more than Commune Clerks, who are employees of the Ministry of Interior. In terms of local government, while trust remains low, there are grounds for optimism. People regard the performance of Commune Council in the years 2002-2004 quite positively, and feel that Councils have improved their performance since the election in 2002 referring mainly to infrastructure development (Ninh and Henke, 2005).

Social Capital: A Framework for Action

3.6 Despite the damage to trust, family and religion caused by conflicts, these institutions and values have not been completely destroyed. De Monchys claim that trust is the missing element in Cambodian society is, we argue, not valid (UNICEF, 1996). Solidarity and trust have been damaged but, as shown by examples such as mutual savings groups (tongtin), self help initiatives and other associational activities, these elements are not missing. Many self-help and associational initiatives are linked to pagodas, demonstrating culturally appropriate forms of relational social capital based on bonding and, to a lesser extent, bridging relationships (Pellini, 2005). What remains weak; however, is institutional social capital, particularly in terms of links between local communities and the institutions of the state. At the lowest level, these are the links between villagers and Commune Councils.

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3.7

It is at this institutional or linking level where mistrust and distance are the strongest. It is argued here that institutional social capital can be strengthened by drawing on the existing forms of relational social capital and the enabling framework provided by decentralisation reforms in Cambodia. In order for this to happen, stronger relationships based on trust and cooperation must be established between villagers and local authorities, and between associations and groups and local authorities. In other words, the relationship between civil society and government should be strengthened.

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Section 4

Civil Society: The Cambodian Context

4.1

It is debatable whether the idea of civil society is new to Cambodia. If we accept Pyes notion that civil society comprises the diverse and autonomous interest groups that can exert pressure on the state and is therefore critical for the effective performance of democracy (1999: 764), then there appears little doubt it is a relatively new phenomena. NGOs and other civil groups emerged in Cambodia only following the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, which eventually led to the United Nations supervised elections in 1993. A critical element of the work of these groups has been community development projects and programs, which have often led to the establishment of formal and semi-formal village groups and community based organisations. If we adopt a broader definition of civil society, one which embraces institutions that are arguably not oriented towards exerting pressure on the state, then there is evidence of a nascent civil society which predates the social and political turmoils of the past three decades. Aschmoneit et al. (1998) noted, for example, that at the village level, there is evidence of collective action organised primarily around pagodas which dates back to the 1960s, and probably earlier. For the purposes of this paper, we have adopted Manors definition of civil society. He describes it as the: intermediate realm situated between state and households, populated by organized groups or associations which are separate from the state, enjoy some autonomy in relations with the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend their interests, values or identities (Manor et. al., 1999).

4.2

4.3

4.4

The definition embraces Whaites (2000) argument that civil society provides a realm in which society interacts constructively with the state to refine its actions and improve its efficiency. Key points to emerge from this definition include the following: Individuals are not considered civil society; they become civil society when they join a group that pursues with a certain organisation a certain objective; Households are the primary group in society, and it is in the space between households and the state that civil society in its multiple forms can be found;

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4.5

The private sector is not a part of civil society, though private sector initiatives (such as media ownership) can have a civil society component, especially when they deal with advocacy; Political parties are also excluded from civil society as their ultimate objective is to gain power and therefore control the state; Volunteerism, linked to collective action, characterises civil society, especially its beginning.

Turning to the Cambodian context, three main forms of civil society exist at the local level (that is the realm between local communities and local government). The characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of each of these forms are discussed below.

Traditional Associations
4.6 Pagodas in the rural areas of Cambodia represent the social, cultural, and religious centre of the community (Aschmoneit et al. 1995). It is around pagodas that the accumulation of social capital has often resulted in the creation of associations and committees involved in local development. These associations and committees are a traditional feature of community life throughout Cambodia and, though they suffered through the war and the political turmoil of the 1970s, they often re-emerged after peace retuned to the country. The pagoda association of Wat Botum (Rung Roueng commune, Stoung district, Kampong Thom province), for example, was set up by Venerable Theng Gna in 1952. While the association was outlawed during the Democratic Kampuchea period, Venerable Theng Gna re-activated it as soon as independent community based organisations were allowed, in the early 1990s at the end of the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia (Pellini, 2005). A pagoda is in fact normally linked to between six and eight villages and it is in the pagoda, and not in the individual villages, where most community meetings take place. The Pagoda Committee, a social and non-political administrative institution formed by elected or appointed achars (laymen) from the nearby villages is formed to see to the needs of the monks and novices, maintain the pagoda buildings, and organise ceremonies. Achars enjoy the trust of the community and have a leadership role (Aschmoneit et al. 1995). When the Pagoda Committee starts a specific community development activity, an ad hoc Pagoda Association is often created with an Association Committee elected to manage its activities. The initial financial capital of the associations is created through cash contributions during religious ceremonies. Subsequently, the payment of interests on loans to the associations often becomes the main source of income. Aschmoneit (1998) concludes that the associations, linking self-help activities to Buddhism, have been formed by villagers to respond to their pressing needs. In essence, they link material needs (rice, credit) to spiritual aspirations (karma), encapsulating the Buddhist teaching that people must save themselves, by their own effort. The strengths and weaknesses of the traditional associations are summarised in Table 4.1 below.

4.7

4.8

15

Table 4.1: Traditional Associations

Strengths Respect and trust for local leaders is linked to their leadership position and their activism in the community Volunteerism is motivated by the religious belief that by doing something good people will gain merits Represent continuity in Cambodian civic life Capacity to mobilize community for development activities Leaders tend to keep their position and responsibilities for a long time Elections of the associations committee members are held sporadically Limited access for women to position of responsibility Development activities are limited to the geographical area around the pagoda Strong bonding linkages among members Some bridging linkages between different associations Weak linkages with local authorities

Weaknesses

Elements of Social Capital

State Sponsored Groups: The Case of VDCs

4.9 Village Development Committees (VDCs) have been adopted as a rural development strategy in several countries. Their origin dates back to the early 1990s, when they were first promoted to improve local participation in decision making processes and greater involvement of villagers and beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of development projects. In Cambodia, VDCs have been officially adopted as a nation wide policy since 1999. The Circular of Guidance 02 for the establishment of the Provincial Rural Development Committee in 1999 defines VDCs as the foundation of the rural development structure and autonomous committee[s] that work to ensure coordination and communication between the village, civil society and government institutions (MRD, 1999: 4). The election of Commune Councils changed not only the local governance environment but also the rural development structure that was the foundation for VDCs. In this changed environment, the basic principle behind the creation of VDCs in Cambodia remains valid: the creation, through democratic elections, of an independent umbrella organisation working for the coordination, administration and management of village development activities. VDCs therefore represent spaces where bridging social capital between different groups and associations active at the village level can strengthen the local development process. Unfortunately, the VDC approach suffers from serious weaknesses, including geographic coverage and questions about sustainability. Only about 8,000 villages of the 13,694 in Cambodia have a VDC (Rusten et al. 2004). The reasons are quite

4.10

4.11

16

simple. The Ministry of Rural Development/Provincial Department of Rural Development (MRD/PDRD) lacks the financial resources to implement the approach and organise elections as well as the training of VDCs. As a result, VDCs are active only in provinces where external technical assistance has helped PDRD to organise them (including external and government resources channelled through SEILA), or where they have been set up by NGOs (e.g. Lutheran World Federation LWF, Partnership for Development in Kampuchea PADEK, CIDSE, World Vision International - WVI). 4.12 The result, as confirmed by a Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI) study, is that there are different types of VDCs: those created by the Seila program, those created by MRD with support from a donor, and those created by NGOs, which do not always reflect the original guidelines (Rusten et al. 2004). VDCs established by projects are generally those that achieve better results in terms of local development. They include groups that become active in key sectors for rural livelihood, including agriculture, livestock, health, savings and credit. These project-established VDCs generally receive significant long term inputs in term of capacity building. In the case of LWF, for example, one staff member stays at the village level to follow the development of the VDC over a period of several years, and a team at the district level provides technical training in relevant sectors. While there is evidence to indicate that such VDCs serve to improve livelihoods in the areas where they are established, even after the sponsoring organisation has left (see Cosar, 2005), questions must be raised about how such a labour and capital intensive development model can be replicated. An assessment conducted in Kampong Thom in 2004, where until 2002 VDCs had been supported by the CB-RDP, identified the following weaknesses with VDCs (Hor, 2004): 4.15 Most VDCs have been established and trained by PDRD staff, but no follow ups were conducted; VDCs do not take initiatives, relying on instruction from above; There is a general feeling among VDC members that they do not play an important role in the village; VDCs are active only when they receive external support; VDC members of VDCs are already involved in other community based organisations, which remain active; VDCs do not have a clear communication flow with the Commune Council; VDCs are not regarded as umbrella organisations in the village.

4.13

4.14

The assessment concluded by questioning the sustainability of VDCs, and poses the question of whether VDCs should be strengthened and re-established as new bodies for village development or if existing Community Based Organisations could take over this role and should be strengthened to conduct this task (Hor, 2004).

17

4.16

Further compounding the weaknesses with VDCs is the institutional confusion created by decentralization legislation and the election of Commune Councils. The primary legislation for commune governance, the Law on Administration and Management of Communes/Sangkat (LAMC), does not mention VDCs. Additionally, the development responsibilities related to assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring are clearly assigned by the LAMC to the Commune Councils, with assistance from the Village Chief (see Annex 2 for details of overlapping functions between VDCs, Commune Councils and the village chief). It is concluded here that VDCs have failed to occupy the strategic position between the state and the local community. This is due to two factors. First, VDCs have been perceived as government bodies that are external to the village and, as noted by Collins (1998), from what we know about the typical desire of civil society associations and actors to value their independence, one might guess that misunderstandings might arise between these SEILA designed VDCs and other civil action and public governance activities at the grassroots that aims to maintain a wary distance from the state (p. 13). Second, as intimated by Collins, the role of VDCs has been exclusively in the field of development, failing to address issues of public governance at the grassroots1. Aware of the limitations of the VDC approach, Ministry of Interior (MOI) and MRD established a working group comprised of the two ministries, the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), and a number of NGOs working with VDCs (PADEK, CIDSE, LWF, WVI). The working group, largely driven by MRD, has drafted new VDC guidelines. While the guidelines attempt to address the new decentralized environment, they have effectively only added a link to Commune Councils to the top of the existing guidelines, and fall significantly short of introducing real and positive change in terms of simpler village level governance structures (for analysis of the difference between the old and the new structures, see Annex 3). This paper proposes that the structure of an umbrella village institution should be simplified, and its mandate expanded (see Sections 6 and 7). It is argued that existing Community Based Organisations (CBOs) can play a role in local governance by representing specific interests of the village. These CBOs can be linked together in informal networks that not only strengthen the bonding and the bridging between groups, but also strengthen links with the Commune Councils. See Table 4.2 below for a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of VDCs:

4.17

4.18

4.19

Though Collins analysis refers to the piloting phase of the VDC, before the official guidelines N. 02 (MRD, 1999), his conclusions are also valid for the period following 1999.

18

Table 4.2: State sponsored groups: VDCs

Strengths Weaknesses Elements of Social Capital Umbrella organisation that coordinates development activities in the village VDC members have experience of community development With external support, VDCs conduct village based assessment, planning and monitoring At least 40% of the members must be women Represents state-centred bureaucratic approach with limited acceptance at the village level VDC often offered as package of different community based organisations. Ministry of Rural Development does not have the financial resources to develop the model VDC are operational only with funding and support from external agencies; Many tasks required from elected members who work as volunteers Elements of bonding and bridging linkages especially when external support implement capacity building and facilitation Limited linking social capital with local authorities

Externally Sponsored Groups

4.20 The third main form of civil society organisation that can be found at the local level is that associated with the self-help and community based groups and associations set up by projects implemented mainly by local and international NGOs. These groups focus mainly on livelihood improvement and community development. There is little doubt that in the majority of cases, these groups address important needs and problems in rural areas. The primary strengths of such groups are the fact their members have some degree of awareness of the needs of the villagers, and they are often successful in mobilising local human and financial resources for project implementation. The structure of such groups often relies on bonding social capital. This is the case, for example, with the Farmers Associations set up by the Centre dEtude et de Dveloppement Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC). These associations are typically formed by a management committee of 5-9 members and are involved in various activities, from marketing of agricultural produces of the members to support of vulnerable groups and small rural infrastructures construction. The Farmers Associations started in 1998 and are growing very rapidly in number,2 are active in a sector important for local communities, are informal, and allow for the transfer of knowledge between members. In addition, the growing number of associations has

Today there are 318 Farmers Association in 12 provinces. The target is to reach 5.000 by 2010. Source: personal interview October 2005.

19

given CEDAC the opportunity to cerate clusters of Farmers Association at Commune as well as District level. This networking has the potential to strengthen bonding and bridging social capital between Farmers Associations.3 4.21 While the bonding may be strong, it is reasonable to question the capacity and the willingness of these groups to bridge with each other or to link with other levels and institutions. Organisations which are project sponsored or implemented by external agencies often include in their activity schedules networking with similar groups in other villages of the target areas of their sponsoring agency. This is the case, for example, with the organisations established by LWF, and with the Farmers Associations of CEDAC, which are linked to promote the sharing of knowledge and experiences. The strengths and weaknesses of externally sponsored groups are summarised in Table 4.3. Table 4.3: Externally Sponsored Groups
Strengths Weaknesses Presence in the field and knowledge of local need and problems; Facilitations and training skills; Mobilisation of communities; Potential to link community based activities with Commune Council. Establishment of parallel structures with government; Mistrust towards local authorities; Dependence on NGO assistance; Potential to overlap with Commune Council activities. Elements of relational social capital within community based groups and between groups; Limited institutional social capital.

Elements of Social Capital

It is also worth mentioning that CEDAC has contributed to the establishment of a national federation of the Farmers Associations with the objective to influence policy making at the national level. Source: personal interview October 2005.

20

Section 5

The Legal Framework

5.1

The current institutional arrangements for local governance in Cambodia are the result of Commune Council elections held for the first time in February 2002. The elections followed the passage of two important pieces of legislation - the Law for the Election of Commune Councils (RGC, 2001a) and the Law on Administration and Management of Commune Councils (LAMC) (RGC, 2001b). It is important to note, as pointed out by Oberndorf (2004), that the constitutions does not recognise the village as a level of government and that therefore the village structures are merely an administrative arm of the commune (p. 29). With this in mind, this section seeks to determine the spaces for civil society participation included in the existing legal framework, and to provide suggestions for modification that account for the complexion of both social capital and civil society in the Cambodian context.

Spaces for Participation for Civil Society

5.2 The representative nature of the Commune Councils is clearly spelled in the LAMC: The Commune/Sangkat Council is a body representing the citizens in its commune/Sangkat and have the missions to serve the general interests of its commune/Sangkat (Chapter 2, article 9). 5.3 The LAMC provides no mention of the roles of communities and civil society in the management of local development, other than to suggest: A commune/Sangkat chief shall have the right to appoint various committees to provide advice and to assist affairs as it is necessary (Chapter 3, Article 27). 5.4 There is no further description of the mechanisms that could enable consultations and participation by villagers in local development and local governance. The mandatory selection of village chiefs by the Commune/Sangkat Councils (Chapter 3, Article 30), and a brief description of the duties of the village chief (Chapter 3, Article 31) are the only references in the LAMC to the village level. The Sub-decree N. 22 on The Decentralisation of Powers, Roles and Duties to Commune/Sangkat Councils (RGC, 2002a), provides more details about the spaces for citizens participation and linkages with local authorities. For example:

5.5

21

Commune/Sangkat Council shall select a village chief in each village (Chapter 2, article 22) and the village chief: Shall represent all residents of village and act as a main link between village and Commune/Sangkat Council (Chapter 2, article 23). 5.6 The following article describes the main tasks of the village chief as being: to promote consultation and cooperation between the village and the Commune/Sangkat Council; participate in meetings of various Commune committees to share view on matters relating to village advise Village Advisory Committee on needs and benefits of village advise Village Advisory Committee on how to develop and build capacity of village resources; advise the Planning and Budget Advisory Committee on the needs and priorities of the village for inclusion in the Commune/Sangkat development plan and budget and monitor the implementation of the plan, , and regularly consult with residents of his/her village; and seek out matter of common interest with adjoining villages (Chapter 2, article 24). 5.7 This is an important article, for it describes the need to establish two clear links: a horizontal bridge between village chief, villagers and the Village Advisory Committee on matters of village development, and a vertical link with the Commune Council, and the Planning and Budgeting Committee (PBC). The nature of this Committee is outlined in Inter-Ministerial Prakas No. 098 on Commune/Sangkat Development Planning (RGC, 2002b): the Commune/Sangkat chief shall establish its planning and budgeting committee. The committee shall be composed of: Commune/Sangkat chief, as its chairperson; three representatives elected from among the councillors and on the basis of their capacities, as members; two representatives of each village authority in the commune/Sangkat selected by the Commune/Sangkat Council, as members (Chapter 2, article 9). 5.8 The Prakas also describes the primary responsibility of the Planning and Budgeting Committee: The commune/Sangkat planning and budgeting committee shall be responsible for assisting the commune/Sangkat chief in the preparation of the commune/Sangkat development plan, investment program and annual budget (Chapter 2, article 9). 5.9 Civil society participation is also explicitly addressed in Prakas 098 (RGC, 2002b): Every civil society organization may participate in the preparation of the commune/Sangkat development plan and investment program, and shall be responsible for: representing the interests of local communities and specific stakeholders such as women, youth, the poor, minority, etc; and contributing knowledge and ideas to the preparation of commune/Sangkat development plan (Chapter2, article 8).

22

5.10

Article 21 subsequently mentions that participation of citizens should be supported by the Commune during the whole commune development project cycle: The commune/Sangkat council shall establish appropriate mechanisms to facilitate the participation of the direct beneficiaries in the detailed design and supervision of the implementation of all projects included in the commune/Sangkat development plan and investment program (Chapter 4, article 21).

5.11

The planning process should be started at the village level and lead through a series of eleven steps to the upward prioritisation and consolidation of these plans at Commune and District level. The PBC (and not the VDC) is responsible for the first three steps which are concerned with the village level: In the data and information analysis phase, the commune planning and budgeting committee shall execute the following steps: Step 1: assess the current level of development and access to basic services, to identify key issues for economic, social, institutional and environmental development in the entire commune/Sangkat; Step 2: verify and complete the above assessment, by reviewing each village of the commune/ Sangkat. List priorities of each village and identify how the village and civil society organizations use or may use their resources to address these needs; Step 3: select the priorities at the commune/Sangkat and village levels on which to focus the council's attention and efforts (Chapter 3, article 13).

5.12

The responsibilities of the PBC are described quite clearly. The emphasis put in the identification mechanisms for citizens participation and inclusion in the planning and prioritisation process provide room for the establishment of cooperative links in the planning exercises that take place annually. The same cannot be said for other opportunities for citizens to consult with the Commune Council. The Sub-decree N. 022 (RGC, 2002a) prescribes in general terms that: A Commune/Sangkat Council shall actively promote and facilitate the process of democracy in commune/Sangkat by developing mechanisms to consult with commune/Sangkat residents and community organisations (Chapter 1, Article 12) It fails, however, to explain how this should take place, or to specify further the role of the Village Advisory Committee. According to the LAMC, the main space for citizens participation, besides the annual commune investment planning process, is the monthly Commune Council meetings where: every commune/Sangkat resident can attend but cannot vote (Chapter 3, Article 30).

5.13

23

5.14

A number of critical themes emerge from the above analysis of the LAMC and subdecrees from the point of view of civil society participation in local governance and local development: Informal Structures at the Village Level

5.15

The general tone underpinning present legislative instruments which address spaces for participation for civil society organisations and citizens in the LAMC is one which avoids the establishment of formalised and rigid spaces for participation, and therefore successfully avoids any perception of an extension of the state into the realm of civil society. Given that bottom-up participation is relatively new in Cambodia, the spaces for participation presently outlined in the legislative instruments (specifically, the first three steps of the annual investment planning process and the right to participate at monthly Commune Council meetings) are a sufficient base for civil society groups (community based organisations and others) and citizens to have their voices heard. The Village Advisory Committee (VAC), which is poorly defined in the legislation, is obviously a suitable mechanism through which the Village chief can assist in linking the village with the Commune Council and its mandated sub-committees. It is recommended that legislative instruments provide a more detailed description of the roles and responsibilities of the VAC, including among its members representatives of community based organisations and associations. Links should also be established between the VAC and the PBC (for example, the two village representatives on the PBC could be nominated members of the VAC), and potential channels for direct communication between the VAC and the Commune Councils should be established. Redundant VDCs

5.16

5.17

VDCs are mentioned only once in the LAMC4. This is a clear message that MRDs assertion that VDCs are the foundation of the Rural Development Structure needs to be revised. As was discussed in Section 4 above, new draft guidelines for VDCs have been established, which were subsequently presented by MRD at a workshop in August 2005. The main differences between existing VDC guidelines and the new draft are that recognition of VDCs is given to Commune Councils instead of the Provincial Rural Development Committee, that responsibility for VDC capacity building is assigned to the Commune Council instead of PDRD staff, that VDCs shall report to the Commune Council, that VDCs shall participate in Commune Council meetings, and that the VDC mandate is reduced from 4 to 3 years. The changes are largely cosmetic, and do

5.18

4 In the Inter-ministerial Prakas 098: For any commune/Sangkat that has village development committee according to the development structure of the Royal Government, the composition of the planning and budgeting committee in terms of Article 9 of this Prakas shall include two more representatives - a male and a female from the village development committee (Chapter 6, article 29) (RGC 2002b).

24

nothing to address the fundamental problems relating to resources and sustainability which are critical to any proper consideration of VDC operations.

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Section 6

Principles for Village Governance

6.1

The previous sections of this paper have outlined and discussed selected concepts relating to social capital and civil society in Cambodia. Additionally, the paper has discussed the legal environment for local governance as it relates to spaces for citizen participation. In this section, attention turns to the principles underlying the local governance and local development model that is the core of the paper (discussed in Section 7). The principles are discussed below: Identify Existing Groups and Actors

6.2

In order to build a local governance and local development model that is culturally appropriate and therefore legitimate, the model should support existing social capital, strengthening relationships between groups and associations at the village level, and between these groups and the Commune. As such, it is important the model seeks to identify the groups and individuals who are already active and that enjoy the trust of the local population, assisting them to more active in Commune and village decision making processes. Establish Informal Networks

6.3

Existing groups and local leaders should be linked in informal networks that will serve to strengthen and consolidate bridging social capital advantage between active village groups. The informal networks can focus on concrete development and governance issues relevant to the various groups and /or individuals, improve the sharing of experiences, and retain the independence from government that has not been achieved through formal and institutionalised structures such as VDCs. Village Advisory Committee as Entry Point

6.4

The present LAMC provides for spaces for participation that can be considered as the entry point to further develop the vertical links between villages and the Commune Council. The Village Advisory Committee could serve as the informal body contemplated by the law, and could be further developed into a network of existing organisations and actors at the village level.

26

Support Civil Society and Local Government Simultaneously 6.5 A strong local governance environment will only result with both strong and accountable Commune Councils, and robust and demanding local associations and community based organisations. Capacity building to strengthen the link between Commune Councils and local communities should not focus only on the Commune Council side or the civil society side, but should focus on both sides, with both receiving the same key messages about participation and good governance. District and provincial authorities should not be excluded from these capacity building endeavours. Words are Important 6.6 It is important that key words are properly understood. Rusten at al (2004) note, for example, the word participation is often translated into Khmer as ka chol rourm, which can literally imply attendance to a meeting rather than direct, active participation. A more appropriate term for participation might be ka chol rourm do sakam (full participation) or synonyms as phiep chie dai ku (partnership), ket sahabratebateka (cooperation). Clear Definition of Roles and Responsibilities 6.7 A clear and concrete definition of the roles and responsibilities of all actors involved in the local governance and local development environment will help to clarify tasks, and will serve to facilitate an environment where those actors can concern themselves with concrete issues rather than concern themselves with who should be undertaking particular tasks.

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Section 7

The Village Network Model

7.1

The rationale behind Village Networks (VN) is to identify active individuals or groups at the village level, bringing them together in an informal group to link them with the Commune Council. Typically, in Cambodian villages, it is common to find a range of community groups, as described in sections 3 and 4, actively involved in small scale development, self-help initiatives, or project implementation. The VN approach seeks to identify and support active groups and improve their capacity to interact with the Commune Councils. At the same time, the approach seeks to identify ways for the Commune Councils to support the different groups. This key section of the paper presents a conceptual justification for the VN mechanism, before attention turns to the specifics of the model which has been implemented in Kampong Thom and Kampot provinces, and which this paper proposes is an appropriate institutional response to the issue of civil society participation in local governance and local development.

7.2

Conceptual Issues
7.3 In the social capital literature, institutional structures such as the VN are referred to as Second Order Organisations (OSGs5), as they unite a number of base groups at a supra-community level (Bebbington and Carroll, 2000). Such organisations, or federations of organisations, are considered important because of their: potential ability to transcend the limits of very localised forms of base organisation and foster more regional and strategic forms of collective economic, political and socio-cultural action (ibid.: 1) 7.4 The OSGs (VNs) constitute a social system with a capability to combine strong intragroup ties (bonding) with weak extra group networks (bridging and linking), thus generating a positive dynamic cycle (Woolcock, 1998). At times individuals such as teachers or nurses representing specific sectors are also part of the Networks. The key principle underlying the VNs is that such groups enable movement beyond narrow group interests (such as the interest of a rice bank only in issues of rice production and credit) and are able to nurture the identification of more broadly shared concerns, and
From the Spanish acronym, Organizaciones de Segundo Grado

28

then to act upon these (Bebbington and Carroll, 2000: 3). They are based on the idea that in order for these more broadly shared concerns and interests to be represented, and for patterns of local governance to be changed in any significant way, more inclusive and supra-community forms of collective action are necessary (Fox, 1996). 7.5 The potential effect of OSGs is demonstrated with reference to the example of federated organisations in Guamote, Ecuador. Bebbington and Carroll (2000) argue that the presence of the OSGs there has radically altered the political landscape and the nature of development (p. 15). It has meant that the municipal government has assumed a more active role in development projects in the canton, particularly in rural areas where previously the municipality had no real presence. External development actors increasingly engage with the municipality which simultaneously coordinates with the two federations. In time, and as long as the municipal government retains its rural community bias and political base, the federations may become the implementing arm of the municipal government, widening the reach of its programs (Bebbington and Carroll, 2000, p. 1). 7.6 A key lesson from the literature is that OSGs (VNs) add to the evidence that structural social capital can be induced and reinforced by purposeful intervention, and that trust, cooperation, shared identity and reciprocity can be enhanced through support (Bebbington and Carroll, 2000). The Ecuadorian, Bolivian and Peruvian cases examined by Bebbington and Carroll were often characterised by a relationship between the OSG and an external actor, generally an NGO.

The Village Network Model: An Outline

7.7 The VN mechanism, with a number of core features, is relatively simple: First, the Networks are formed through village level elections, with Commune Council members invited as election observers. The average size of Village Networks is 5 members. Female candidates are strongly supported, and in cases where a female candidate receives the same number of votes as a male candidate, the female candidate would assume membership of the Village Network. To be eligible for a Village Network member a candidate should: be literate, reside in the village, be familiar and active with community affairs, be willing to work as a volunteer, should ideally represent an existing village-level association, be respected and trusted, be more than 18 years old, and be able to participate in Commune Council meetings.6 Second, once elected, the Village Network members are provided training which familiarises them with the basic concept of decentralisation, the role and functions of the Commune Councils, participation in Commune meetings, the

This profile has been drafted at a joint Kampong Thom Kampot province workshop conducted in Siem Reap (August 2005) with PDRD staff from Kampot and Kampong Thom, GTZ Technical Advisors and Project Assistants, representatives of local NGOs and a Commune Council chief.

29

annual planning process, and conflict management. This training is conducted, over the course of one year, as a monthly workshop with members of different Village Networks that normally takes place in a pagoda. In order to focus on concrete issues, group discussion at the workshops centres on real examples of local development projects, conflicts and cooperation between the Commune Council and local communities. Third, reflection workshops are conducted every three months in the second year of operation of the networks, providing Village Network members with the opportunity to discuss their experiences in participating in Commune Council activities, the problems they have faced, and ideas for the future.

7.8

The VN acts as the link between the community and the Commune Council (including the sub-committees prescribed by the LAMC: Planning and Budgeting Committee and the Commune Procurement Committee) to provide public services that respond to community needs and demands. In practice, the community groups have the potential to channel community contributions to support the implementation of commune projects, provide regular reports about needs and problems at the village level, and also contribute to the yearly commune development planning process. As a next step, it is envisaged that the Commune Councils will provide funding to the networks to sustain community groups participation in local governance activities (Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1

30

Kampong Thom and Kampot Experiences 7.9 The first VNs were established by local NGOs in Kampong Thom province in 2003. Four local NGOs7 received funding and technical assistance from German Technical Assistance (GTZ) and German Development Service (DED) to implement activities to strengthen civil society participation in local governance in selected communes. These NGOs piloted Village Networks comprised of elected villagers, who generally represented existing and active interest groups or associations. The lessons learned in the pilot of the networks in Kampong Thom served to generate the VN approach subsequently adopted by the CBRDP in the two provinces. Responding to the different circumstances in Kampong Thom and Kampot provinces, two approaches have since been adopted to VN formation. In Kampong Thom, the Provincial Department of Rural Development (PDRD) now contracts local NGOs to facilitate formation of the networks, using IFAD funding to provide training in target villages. In Kampot province, where there are a limited number of local NGOs, formation of the networks and ongoing capacity building is directly provided by the community development staff of PDRD. As a result of its simplicity, it has been possible to rapidly expand the VN approach. In 2003, the NGOs in Kampong Thom worked in 53 villages and trained a total of 228 people. In 2004, the NGOs expanded their activities to 43 new villages and, while continuing follow-up reflection workshops with the initial 53 villages, they trained an additional 246 VN members. In 2005, the approach has been further expanded, with 92 new Village Networks in Kampong Thom and 159 in Kampot (Table 7.1)8. Women participation in the VNs is good but can still be improved. For example, in Kampong Thom in 2005 have been established 94 VNs. A total of 526 villagers have been elected, 179 (35%) of whom are women. The figure for the CB-RDP target districts in Kampong Thom for 2004 is slightly better: 33 VNs were established and 76 (46%) of the 165 members are women. Simplicity also positively impacts on the investments required to establish and maintain the networks. In 2003, the average cost per village of the Village Network in Kampong Thom was USD38 per month. This figure included the salary of one NGO staff member, materials for training and administration, and transports costs. In 2004, the average cost per village was USD30 per month, as the increased number of villages provided economies of scale.9

7.10

7.11

7.12

MODE: Minority Organisation for Development of Economy; CODEC: Cooperation for the Development of Cambodia; BFDK: Buddhism for Development Kampong Thom; COWS: Community Organisation for Women Support. 8 Of the 94 VN established in Kampong Thom in 2005, 32 VN in the CB-RDP target areas receive funding from IFAD, the remaining 62 are funded with a grant from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Finnish NGO Werde ry. 9 This average cost does not include the GTZ technical assistance although is important to note that this assistance has decreased compared to 2003 and is limited to monitoring of VN and follow up training for NGO staff.

31

Table 7.1 2003 Kampong Thom Villages VN Members 53 228 2004 Kampong Thom 43 246 2005 Kampong Thom 94 526 Kampot Total Kampong Thom 190 1000 Kampot

159 954

159 954

Roles for the Village Networks

7.13 A study conducted by PACT in Kampong Thom in 2005 to assess the participation of VN members in the annual Commune planning process found that there continues to be some confusion about the roles of the VN (Knight et al. 2005: 18), with several Commune Council members expressing a desire to have written Terms of Reference for the VN. The PACT study recommended a clear definition and dissemination of the roles and functions of the VN members vis--vis the Commune Councils. As a result, a workshop with participants from Kampot and Kampong Thom was conducted in August 2005, providing local NGOs staff, government officers and a Commune chief with the opportunity to discuss and agree on a list of tasks that they perceived as the most relevant for the VN. The discussions resulted in the following: 7.14 Actively take part in capacity building and dissemination activities on decentralization and local governance; Transfer information and knowledge to the villagers; Support villagers to understand the importance of the link between village and Commune for local development; Inform the Commune about activities, issues, problems at the community level and inform villagers about decisions taken at the Commune level; Participate in the monthly Commune meetings; Encourage villagers to participate in village and Commune development activities; Organise monthly meetings at village level to collect information and issues to be brought to the attention of the Commune Council; Participate in the annual Commune Investment Planning process.

While the list might serve as a guide for discussions between VNs and Commune Councils, ideally it should be adapted to local circumstances. After initial training is provided to the VN, a joint VN-Commune Council workshop facilitated by an external agency (local NGO or PDRD) could help to specify in detail how the VN will

32

carry out these tasks, the relationship with the village chief, and, if necessary, with what resources. Expanding Village Network Roles 7.15 It is also possible VN could also help to ease the work of the Commune Councils by being assigned some tasks that the laws presently prescribe for the Councils. In order to begin to examine this issue, a simple checklist survey was developed (Annex 4). The survey listed possible activities that could be assigned down to the village level, and ask respondents to specify whether a formal organisation, informal groups, local NGOs or the Village Chief should be responsible for these.10 A simplified checklist has been used to enquire about the same topic with VN members and Commune Councillors (see Annex 4). The survey confirms a perception that several tasks presently prescribed to the Commune Councils (by the LAMC) could be delegated to the village level (for detailed figures see Annex 4). These tasks include: 7.17 7.18 Conducting village livelihood assessments Identification and collection of local contributions for project implementation Identification of local human resource for project implementation Monitoring of local project implementation Maintenance of rural infrastructures Reconcile conflicts in the community Coordination of community activities in the village Guarantee equality between men and women Maintain the village notice board Promote security and public order Identification of local human resources for project implementation

7.16

The survey suggests that there are different opinions about the following tasks:

The survey also suggested that the following tasks should remain at the Commune level: Annual project planning Preparation of the annual investment budget

10

Two checklists have been used for the survey: one for international and national advisors (see Annex 4) where the respondents have been asked also to indicate which group[s] or individual[s] at the village level should assist in a specific task the Commune. The checklist did not include VN because they have been established only in Kampong Thom and Kampot. 38 respondents answered this first checklist. A simplified checklist limited to a yes and no answer for which task could be assigned to the village level has been completed by 28 Councillors and 109 VN members..

33

Contract with infrastructure/construction companies

Benefits of the Village Network Model

7.19 In Kampong Thom province, the VN mechanism to engagement between local government and local communities has had three years to evolve. In that time, two major evaluations of the approach have been undertaken (Ayres, 1993; Knight et al., 2005), and significant lessons have been learned about the advantages of the approach, and also about the challenges it has faced. While much more remains to be done and questions about continued future success remain unanswered, the emerging advantages of the approach are worthy of description and analysis. Enhanced Prospects for Sustainability 7.20 The prospects for the sustainability of the VNs are enhanced because the networks aim to build upon existing village level development institutions and figures of authority. The sustainability of traditional pagoda or village associations is beyond question. Traditional associations predate the turmoil of the 1970s, were outlawed during the Khmer Rouge years, and several reopened without external assistance during the years of the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989) and State of Cambodia (1989-1991). The sustainability of these institutions can be linked to two factors. First, the associations are an indigenous structure that reflects local norms and values, and are often formed without external assistance or support. A study conducted in Kampong Thom in 1999 poignantly noted that these associations are sustainable because they have their own purpose, management and funding base in the community, [and] their committees members work primarily for merit and not for profit (Sasse 1998: 104). A second factor which accounts for the sustainability of the associations is their close link to the local social and cultural environments. Association leaders are often recognised as leaders of their communities, while association statutes often support a link with spiritual development. Although they are a model introduced to the village from outside, the VNs build upon these existing sources of social capital. The networks bring together traditional as well as project based community groups, achars (laymen) and respected individuals. The heterogeneity of a composite survey of 43 networks (246 people in total) in Kampong Thom province in 2004 is confirmed in Figure 7.2 below.

7.21

34

Roles of Village Network members

11% 7%

1%

9% 14%

5%

32% 20%

Cash association Agriculture extension

Health group Village Chief

Rice association Farmer

VDC Teacher

Figure 7.2

7.22

It would be nave to make any predictions about the long-term future of the networks, which continue to receive modest external support and technical assistance. There are, however, some positive signs. Interviews conducted in October 2005 with the chiefs of seven Communes Councils where Village Networks were established in 2003 and 2004, indicate a commitment to the idea of the networks. Important results of the interviews included: In all seven Communes, VN members attend the monthly meetings and continue to work on a voluntary basis; All seven Communes Chiefs expressed the intention to provide support to the Networks in the future through allocating a share of their administrative budget; The possibility to include the villagers needs in the Commune development plans and the flow of information to villages about Council decisions were considered by the Chiefs to be the main benefits for VN of cooperation with the Councils. The attendance of villagers in monthly meetings and annual planning, the flow of information to villagers, and assisting to organise community contributions to Commune development activities were considered by the Chiefs to be the main benefits to the Councils of cooperation with VNs. In order to ease the work of the Commune, the Chiefs believed VN could be in charge of the dissemination of information to the village and the organisation of community contributions to local development projects.

35

Capacity Building 7.23 A second key benefit of the approach is the relative simplicity of building VN capacity (through either an NGO or other partner). Ongoing experience has demonstrated that three elements are necessary in order to ensure that the knowledge gained is put into practice through increased cooperation with Commune Councils. First, training content is linked to participation and the actual practice of local governance, rather than theories and definitions that underpin participation and practice. In this regard, training content based on group discussions of concrete case studies has proved to be most effective. Additionally, study visits within the province and to other provinces have provided VN members with the opportunity to observe and exchange experiences and ideas with colleagues involved in similar activities. Second, education materials focus on simple and direct messages. Initially, the local NGOs piloting the VN chose to use and distribute to VN members copies of the Law on Administration and Management of Commune Councils, and handouts prepared by the Ministry of Interior for Commune Councillor training. These materials proved too difficult for the participants to understand. In their place, what has worked particularly well are sets of posters developed by representatives of Commune Councils, Village Networks, local NGOs and associations that describe through images and limited text various aspects of the local governance process elections, participation in meetings and planning exercises, monitoring of local development projects, and the equality of all citizens before the law (Figure 7.3). Third, training curricula must include modules that address issues of advocacy, facilitation, and conflict moderation skills.

7.24

Two approaches are presently being adopted in terms of the provision of capacity building for VN members. The first involves local NGOs, who are contracted by PDRD in Kampong Thom, working with the VN. The second approach is adopted in Kampot, with PDRD staff building VN capacity. While there has not yet been any comparative assessment of the impact of the different capacity building approaches, what clearly emerges in both provinces is evidence of increased trust between local NGOs and provincial departments. The planning of training activities, discussion in reflection forums, and contracting by PDRD of local NGOs is serving to influence the attitudes of both sides in their perspectives on the benefit of greater participation by civil society in local governance.

36

Figure 7.3

Improved Awareness about Participation 7.25 A third benefit of the VN mechanism is that it leads to improved awareness about participation in local governance and local development. It is in this regard that the VN is different, for example, to Village Development Committees, which are focused exclusively on participation in development. The VN approach is not exclusively concerned with improving the participation of the local population in the local commune development planning process. Rather, it is concerned with improving local communities awareness about the range of commune council roles and functions, including those in improving public order and confront social issues such as domestic violence. Facilitating Institutional Cooperation 7.26 A final key benefit of the VN approach is that it seeks to link the institutions of civil society with those of the state by facilitating improved institutional cooperation, rather than through establishing new institutions. The VN mechanism adopts the idea that capacity building which focuses on civil society participation in the local governance environment should not take place in isolation from other capacity building initiatives focused on Commune Councils. Moreover, whenever possible, links should be established between civil society organisations, provincial government (in particular the PDRD and the Provincial Local Administration Unit), district authorities, and

37

Commune Councils. If we regard the local governance environment as a constellation comprised of provincial and district authorities, Commune Councils, and local communities, then it is clear that implementing the VN approach in concert with other actors provides an opportunity for exchange, learning and, importantly, a mechanism that works towards breaking the mistrust and separation between us and them that often results from the influence of party politics and the traditional hierarchical structure of the public sector in Cambodia.

38

Section 8

Conclusions and Recommendations

8.1

The nineteenth century philosopher and economist, John Stuart Mill, poignantly remarked that people can learn what democracy is, as a result of their active participation in political decision making processes at the local level (Pateman 1970). Rural areas in Cambodia have been traditionally far from the centre and, while independent collective action at the grassroots has taken place as demonstrated by the existence of traditional associations, what is new today is the institutional linkage between the villages and Communes. Political decision making processes in Cambodia have traditionally been determined by specific administrative and political conditions which favoured the interests of the ruling elite and have therefore overshadowed opportunities for active participation and democratic decision making processes (Engquist 2003). Nevertheless, there are also clear signs of long-standing social capital associated with traditional associations in rural areas. Village Networks are predicated on the goal of cooperation as a means to achieve participation. At the end of the third year of the project, there are signs that peoples awareness about the roles of Commune Councils has improved, and indications that Commune Councils feel the Village Networks support them in reaching out to communities. The key recommendations below include suggestions for the further development and strengthening of the Village Networks approach and, at the same time, suggestions for policy-makers seeking a model for village governance and peoples participation in local development.

8.2

8.3

Recommendations for the National Level

8.4 The drafting of Organic Laws, which will spell out the authority and relationships between different levels of administration, provides an opportunity to consider the issue of village level governance. It is recommended that the Village Advisory Committee, mentioned briefly in the present legal arrangements, be maintained and expanded. It is recommended the current structure (a Village Chief and two assistants11), which is still under discussion, be expanded so the committee represents

11

Personal interview, September 2005.

39

the variety of existing interest groups present at the village level. Village Networks could serve as a model for the Village Advisory Committee12. 8.5 It is recommended that a rigid institutionalization of the Networks should be avoided. While the principle of bringing together traditional groups and active community members will continue to underpin the approach, there is a need to avoid the idea of prescribing one rigid model of partnership between civil society and Commune Councils. The Village Networks should be considered in a broader sense as merely an option for promoting cooperation between Commune Councils and community members. Where villagers and councillors are satisfied with existing village structures, such as village development committee, or a traditional association, then these might be supported in terms of building a more effective link with the Councils. On the other hand, if the community perceives a need to informally elect groups of representatives to seek engagement and cooperation with Commune Councils, then support could be based on the Network model in Kampong Thom and Kampot. Any attempt to define roles and functions for VNs should avoid complexity and should keep in mind the volunteerism that underpins the approach. Any duplication of responsibilities between Commune and Networks should be avoided. This could be achieved by clearly assigning the responsibility for assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring of local development projects to the Communes (as is currently prescribed by the LAMC), giving the Networks space to assist in these processes, but leaving final responsibility with the democratically elected councils. Village Networks could meaningfully assist the Commune Councils in undertaking the following tasks: Participate in Commune monthly meeting and annual planning as villagers representative Bring issues problems, achievements to the Commune and disseminate decisions and result of discussion to the respective groups and associations Identification and of local contributions for project implementation Identification of local human resource for project implementation Monitoring of local project implementation Organise the maintenance of rural infrastructures (wells, roads, etc.)

8.6

Recommendations for the Provincial Level

8.7 Interviews conducted with local governance stakeholders in Kampong Thom have shown that Communes are willing to organise Village Networks but do not know how to train them. While learning by doing is an important element in the capacity

The role of the village chief can be debated. The workshop conducted in August 2005 with local NGOs and PDRD of Kampot and Kampong Thom concluded that neither Commune Councillors nor village chief shoudl be member of the VN. This would strengthen the independent position o the Networks. On the other hand, as we have seen in paragraph 7.14, Village Chiefs are elected in VN, thus contributing to strengthening bridging social capital. More research is needed on this specific point.

12

40

building of the Networks, specific training about the basic roles and functions of Commune Councils, and about the participation of civil society in local governance and local development is also essential. Such training could be provided under the supervision of PLAU by local NGOs and/or the Community Development unit of PDRD13. Local NGOs: The experience of Kampong Thom shows that if there is a sufficient number of local NGOs active in the province, it is possible, with external technical assistance, to develop the capacity of a core group of four-five local NGOs to build the capacity of Village Networks in the province. Local NGOs can then be contracted by a donor or a provincial department as facilitators to conduct initial training for the networks, and to conduct regular follow up for a fixed period of time. To improve the cooperation between local NGOs and authorities, and to clarify from the beginning the roles and tasks of the different actors in the process, a Memorandum of Understanding could be signed with PLAU and/or PDRD, as has been done by Concern Worldwide in Siem Reap province. Provincial Department of Rural Development: Since the PDRD has considerable experience in the concrete aspects of community development activities, it could play a role in the capacity building of the Village Networks. The PDRD could be utilised for VN capacity building in provinces where there is not a sufficient number of local NGOs, or where NGO capacity is particularly low. Provincial Local Administration Unit: As the VN is essentially concerned with relations between the Commune and the Village, PLAU should play a key coordinating role. This coordination role could include the promotion of cooperation with local NGOs, organising a mix of NGO and PDRD coverage of VNs across the province, and facilitating reflection and learning experiences for the different stakeholders involved in the process. 8.8 It is recommended that membership of the Networks is open to representatives of existing groups and individuals who have a formal or informal leadership function in the village. Commune councillors should not be members of the Network. It is also recommended that for the mandate of the VNs to be the same of the CCs. It is recommended that opportunities are provided for exchange of experience between Networks. Such exchanges can result in the expansion of community development activities, as well as the strengthening of linkages with the Commune. The experiences of the Farmers Associations of CEDAC show that the capacity building of village based groups could greatly benefit from exchange and reflection workshops between Networks and Commune Councils. Exchange and discussion between VN and Commune Councils should include simple self-assessment exercises that identify areas for improvement of cooperation. The experience of Lutheran World Federation in Cambodia shows that simple PRA tools

8.9

8.10

Other line agencies could provide specific trainings on request as showed by the Sethkoma programme of UNICEF.

13

41

could be useful to strengthen and assess the cooperation between Commune and Networks. For example: Social Network Mapping helps to describe existing relational social capital. The analysis could help to identify the active civil society groups that could be selected for the Networks (Annex 5). Web Maps help to describe and compare from one year to another, on the basis of selected indicators, the degree of satisfaction of the cooperation between Networks and Commune (Annex 5). 8.11 The VNs could also serve to test innovative methods for dissemination of information to the village level. Community radios have proven to be a popular and cost-effective tool in South Asia to support the dissemination of information and strengthen the role of civil society in local governance. They could be carefully tested in selected rural areas to assess whether they are suitable tool for the social and political environment of Cambodia. The experiences of the past three years with the VNs have shown that, despite a history characterised by top down decision making processes by all levels of government, participatory local governance can be developed in Cambodia. The VNs in Kampong Thom and Kampot represent a useful method to develop participatory local governance in rural areas, as they take account of values and norms associated with traditional forms of collective action. This not only helps promote the sustainability and ownership of the process, but also promotes a major change in local norms, making use of dialogue, open discussion, and reflection.

8.12

42

References

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Collins, W. (1998) Grassroots Civil Society in Cambodia: Final Report, Center for Advanced Study, Phnom Penh. Coleman, J. (1988) Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, American Journal of Sociology, No. 94 (supplement), pp. 95-120. Cosar, J. (2005) Planning for Increased Sustainability. Sustainability Evaluation, Lutheran World Federation, Phnom Penh. Crook, R.C. (2003) Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of LocalCentral Relations, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 23, 77-88. Crook, R. and Sverrisson, A. (1999) To What Extent can Decentralised Forms of Government Enhance the Development or Pro-Poor Policies and Improve Poverty Alleviation Outcomes, Unpublished Manuscript. Engquist, M. (2003) Strengthening the Peoples Voice: Decentralisation Reform in Cambodia. An Analysis of the New Form of Commune Governance, MA Thesis, Roskilde (Denmark) and Phnom Penh. Fox, J. (1996) How does Civil Society thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Mexico, World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 1089-1103. Grootaert, C. (1998). Social Capital: The Missing Link, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper 3, The World Bank, Washington D.C. Hor, C. (2004) Assessment of the Role and Status of VDC in Selected Villages in Kampong Thom Province, Unpublished Report, Ministry for Rural Development, Phnom Penh. Jtting, J., Corsi, E., Stockmayer, A. (2005) Decentralization and Poverty Reduction, OECD Development Centre Policy Insights, No. 5. www.oecd.org/dev/insights. Knight, K., Douk, N., Hing, S., Phay, S., and Benoy, A. (2005) Evaluation of the Participation of Village Network and Traditional Associations in the Commune Investment Planning Process in Kampong Thom, GTZ Rural Development Program Internal Paper 13, Phnom Penh. Krishna, A. (2000) Creating and Harnessing Social Capital, in P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin (eds), Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective, The World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 71-93. Litvack, J. and Seddon, J. (Eds.) (1999) Decentralization Briefing Notes, The World Bank Institute Briefing Papers, The World Bank, Washington. Manor, J. (1997) The Promises and Limitations of Decentralisation: Summary, FAO, Technical Consultation on Decentralisation, available at www.fao.org/sd/rodirect/ROfo0003.htm Manor J. (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

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Manor, J., Robinson, M., White, G. (1999) Civil Society and Governance: A Concept Paper, available at: www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/public.doc. MRD Ministry for Rural Development (1999) The Circular of Guidance 02 for the Establishment of the Provincial Rural Development Committee, Phnom Penh. Narayan, D. (1999) Social Capital and the State: Complementarity and Substitution, Policy Research Working Paper 2167, Poverty Division, Poverty Reduction and Management Network, Washington D.C. NCSC National Committee for Support to Communes/Sangkats (2005) Review of Decentralisation Reform in Cambodia: Policy and Practices, Phnom Penh Ninh, K. and Henke, R. (2005) Commune Councils in Cambodia: a National Survey of their Functions and Performance, with Special Focus on Conflict Resolution, The Asia Foundation, Phnom Penh. North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York. Oberndorf, R. B. (2004) Law Harmonisation in Relation to the Decentralisation process in Cambodia, Working Paper n. 31, Cambodian Development Resource Institute, Phnom Penh. Olsen, M. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidity, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. Ovensen, J. et al. (1996) When Every Household is an Island. Social Organisation and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia, Uppsala Research Report in Cultural Anthropology, 5, Uppsala University. Parker, A. N. (1997) Decentralisation: the Way Forward for Rural Development, Policy Research Working Paper N. 1475, The World Bank, Washington D.C. Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). Pellini, A. (2005) Traditional Forms of Social Capital in Cambodia and the Linkage with Local Development Processes, Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 8-11. Putnam, R. (1993) The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life, American Prospect, Vol. 13, pp. 35-42. Putnam, R. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon and Schuster, New York. Pye, L. (1999) Civility, Social Capital and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 762-782. RGC - Royal Government of Cambodia (2001a) The Law for the Election of Commune Councils, Phnom Penh.

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RGC - Royal Government of Cambodia (2001b) The Law on Administration and Management of Commune Councils, Phnom Penh. RGC - Royal Government of Cambodia (2002a) Sub-decree N. 22 on Decentralization of Powers, Roles and Duties to Commune/Sangkat Councils, Phnom Penh. RGC - Royal Government of Cambodia (2002b) Inter-Ministerial Prakas No. 098 on Commune/Sangkat Development Planning, Unofficial translation, Phnom Penh Rusten, C. and jendal, J. (2003) Poverty Reduction through Decentralisation? Lessons form elsewhere and Challenges for Cambodia, Cambodia Development Review, Vol.7, Issue 4, October-December. Rusten, C. Kim S., Eng, N. and Pak K. (2004) The Challenges of Decentralisation Design in Cambodia, Cambodian Development Resource Institute Working Paper, Phnom Penh. Sasse, R. (1998) GTZ/Provincial Development Program Kampong Thom, Self Help Component, Report of Internal Evaluation, GTZ Rural Development Programme, Kampong Thom. Serageldin, I. (1996) Sustainability as Opportunity and the Problem of Social Capital, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 187-203. Sisk, T., Ballington, J., Bollens, S., Chopra, P., Demichelis, J., Jurez, C., Loessner, A., Lund, M. (2001) Democracy At The Local Level, the International Idea Handbook On Participation, Representation, Conflict Management, And Governance. Idea, Stockholm. UNDP (2000) The Impact of Participation in Local Governance: A Synthesis of Nine Case Studies, Draft Report, Decentralized Governance Programme, 14 January 2000, pp. 5-7. UNICEF (1996) Towards a Better Future: An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Cambodia, Phnom Penh. Uphoff, N. (2000) Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation, in P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin (eds), Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective, The World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 215-252. Whaites, A. (2000) Lets Get Civil Society Straight: NGOs, the State, and Political Theory, in Jenny Pearce (ed.), Development, NGOs and Civil Society, Development in Practice Reader, Oxfam, Oxford, pp. 124 - 141. Woolcock, M. (1998) Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework, Theory and Society, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 151-208. Woolcock, M. and Narayan, D. (2000) Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 225249. World Bank, The (1999) What is Social Capital?, PovertyNet, available at www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm.

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Annex 1 Selected references on social capital and civil society in Cambodia

Aschmoneit, W. (1998). Traditional Self-Help Associations in Cambodia. How to Identify and Cooperate with Them. GTZ, Eschborn (Germany). Ayres, D. (2003). Assessment of the Role of Local NGOs in Local Governance in Kampong Thom Province, GTZ Rural Development Program, Kampong Thom (Cambodia) Ayres, D. (2004). NGOs, Partnership and Local Governance in Cambodia: a Discussion Paper, Working groups for Partnership and Decentralisation (WGPD), Phnom Penh. Ayres, D.; Pellini, A., and Perez-Leroux, A. (forthcoming). Promoting Participatory Local Governance through Village Networks in Kampong Thom and Kampot: a Case Study, in Sourcebook on Asian Civil Society Organisations Best Practices in Enhancing the Sustainability of Rural Poor Organizations, Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Development, Manila. Chim, C. et. al. (1998). Learning form Rural Development programmes in Cambodia, Working Paper N. 4, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Phnom Penh. Coletta, Nat J. and Cullen, Michelle L. (2000). Violent Conflicts and the Transformation of Social Capital. Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia, The World Bank, Washington D.C. Collins, W. (1998). Grassroots Civil Society in Cambodia, Forum Syd and Diakonia, Phnom Penh Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) (2004). Experiences of Commune Councils in Promoting Participatory Local Governance, Phnom Penh DANIDA (2005). Local Government, Civil Society and Local Accountability, NREM Programme Office, Phnom Penh. DANIDA (2005). Village Associations, Rural People Livelihood, Governance and NRM, NREM Programme Office, Phnom Penh. Local

Knight, K. et al. (2005). Evaluation of the Participation of Village Networks and Traditional Associations in the Commune Investment Planning Process in Kampong Thom, Community Based- Rural Development Project (CB-RDP), Kampong Thom.

47

Krishnamurthy, V. (1999). The Impact of Armed Conflict on Social Capital. A Study of Two Villages in Cambodia, Social Services of Cambodia (SSC), Phnom Penh. Kusakabe, K. (2002). Emergence and Development of Associations in Cambodia, JICA, Phnom Penh. Mansfield, C. and Mac Leod, K. (2004). Commune Council and Civil Society, PACT Cambodia, Phnom Penh Ninh, K. and Henke, R. (2005). Commune Councils in Cambodia: a National Survey of their Functions and Performance, with Special Focus on Conflict Resolution, The Asia Foundation, Phnom Penh. Pellini, A. (2004). Traditional Pagoda Associations and the Emergence of Civil Society in Cambodia, Cambodia Development Review, Volume 8, Issue 3, July-September 2004, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI). Pellini A. (2005). Traditional Forms of Social Capital in Cambodia and Their Linkage with Local Development Processes, Cambodia Development Review, Volume 9, Issue 3, July-September 2005. Rusten, C. et al. (2004). The Challenges of Decentralisation Design in Cambodia, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Phnom Penh. Sedara, K. and Sovatha, A. (2005). Decentralisation: Can Civil Society Enhance Local Governments Accountability in Cambodia?, Cambodia Development Review, Volume 9, Issue 3, July-September 2005. Warthon, D. (2003). Assessment and identification of the role and potential of the Pagoda Coordination Committee (Pacoco) on issues related to local governance and cooperation with Commune Councils: Summary of findings and recommendations, GTZ CB-RDP, Kampong Thom World Bank, The (2004). Cambodia at the Crossroads, Phnom Penh. jendal, J. (2003). Poverty Reduction through Decentralisation? Lessons form elsewhere and Challenges for Cambodia, Cambodia Development Review, Vol.7, Issue 4 October-December

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Annex 2 Overlapping functions between VDC, Commune Council, PBC and Village Chief.
Commune Council LMAC Village Chief LMAC

VDC 1999 Development activities assessment Development activities prioritization and planning Development activities budgeting Identification of local financial and human resources Identification of external financial resources Development activities implementation Development activities monitoring Identify ways to improve living standards Support discussion at village level (e.g. monthly meeting) Link with village chief Link between Commune Council and villagers Link with Village Advisory Committee Coordinate CBOs/NGOs activities in the village Represent villagers with local authorities Display information in notice board Line of authority MRD/PRDR Line of authority MoI/PLAU

PBC LMAC

49

Annex 3 Comparison between the original VDC guidelines VDC and the latest draft of VDC revision

same or similar task different task VDC 1999 VDC Aug. 2005

Principles Foundation of rural development Free and democratic elections Promote rural people self confidence Participation in decision making Autonomous committee Recognition by PRDC Recognition by CC 4 years term 3 years term Every organization must contact VDC before starting development activities CBOs are sub-committees of VDC PRDR has coordination or rural development activities Identification of capacity building needs by PDRD Capacity building of VDC by Commune Council Annual Commune Council budget divided per village/VDC External organization prepare prizes and compliment letter for best VDC VDC monitor annual budget and projects plan of CC Tasks Needs assessment Planning and design Implementation Monitoring and evaluation

50

Community development management

Structure 5-7 members (president, deputy, secretary, treasures, members) Internal selection of chief after election Select advisors to VDCs (achars, monks, elderly people, etc.) VC advisor if not elected in VDC

Duties and responsibilities Guidance from PRDC Guidance from Commune Council and PDRD Recognition from CC Discuss with community problems and priorities in annual village development plan Include village development plan in annual CIP help to solve problems within the community first Cooperate with PBC to strengthen village-commune development Mobilize village human and material resources Support villagers participation in development Identification of external financial resources Coordinate CBOs/NGOs activities in the village Dissemination of information on village based development activities Prepare reports on village based development activities to PRDC Prepare reports on village based development activities to CC Manage village development fund Manage funds of PBC/village based organizations for local development activities VDC members President Identify projects, implement , monitor Represent VDC with local authorities and external support agencies

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Participate/delegate participation in Commune Council meetings Lead monthly/quarterly VDC meeting Lead annual meeting for village development activities planning Ensure that local/external resources are well managed Report to Commune Council on every village development activity Deputy Secretary Treasurer Members Each member responsible for one sector of village development activities Each INGO, CNGO, UN, or CBO is included in a subcommittee VDC formation Under responsibility CD staff of PDRD CD staff prioritizes target villages in cooperation with Commune Council CD staff presents purpose of VDC in target villages to local stakeholders 40% of the places in VDCs for women

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Annex 4 Checklists and results

Question: which of the following tasks that are under the responsibility of the Commune Council do you think could be delegated to the village level in order to ease the workload of the Commune members? To which organization/s? Village level TO WHOM?
CNGO - Cambodian NGOs (CNGO) F - Formal Organization (for example Planning and Budgeting Committee, Village Development Committee) Yes=thick N =empty I - Informal Organizations (for example Pagoda Associations; SelfHelp Groups, Community Forestry Committee, etc.) VC - Village Chief

Q1 - Conduct village livelihood assessment Q2 - Local project assessment Q3 - Annual project planning Q4 - Preparation of annual investment budget Q5 - Identification and of local contributions for project implementation Q6 - Identification of local human resource for project implementation Q7 - Contract infrastructure/construction companies Q8 - Monitoring of local project implementation Q9 - Maintain rural infrastructures (wells, roads, etc.). Q10 - Promote security and public order Q11 - Reconcile conflict in the community Q12 - Organize monthly meetings to discuss local issues Q13 - Keep and update civil register Q14 - Coordinate community activities in the village Q15 - Maintain a notice board at village level to display information and decisions Q16 - Guarantee equality between men and women in decision-making and participation

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Checklist for international and national advisors

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% % 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Tasks Y N

N= 38

Checklist for Village Network and Commune Council members

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% % 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Tasks Y N

N= 137 (28 Commune Councillors and 109 Village Network members)

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The main difference between the survey for project staff and VN/CC members is that the later have not been asked to identify to which groups or individual at the village level (formal, informal, village chief or local NGO) the support tasks could be assigned. For this reason the tables and that identify groups/individuals at the village level refer only to the checklist for international and national advisors. If we consider all the positive answer it is then possible to analyse to which group at the village level could assist the Commune. A total of 839 answers have been given and the result is shown in the graph below:
40% 32% 30% 24%

20% 14%

0% Informal Local NGOs Formal Village Chief

N=839

It is also possible to divide the positive answers per each category. The result is presented in the Graph below
30

25

20 Informal 15 Local NGO Formal Village chief 10

0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16

N=839

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Annex 5 PRA tools

Social Networks Map

Prepared with Venerable Sech Cheng Hong, abbot of Don Lao Pagoda, Stoung district, Kampong Thom, October 2005.

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Self Assessment Map

CC-VN annual self assessment

Participation by Village Network in Commune meetings

10 8 6
Conflict management Participation by Village Network in CIP

4 2 0

Information of village needs to Commune

Organisation of communty contributions

Dissemination of information to villagers

2005 2006

Source: adapted from Luther World Federation Village Annual Self-Assessment

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Annex 6 List of interviews (alphabetical order)

Mr. Chan Bunthy Mr. Chan Taen Mr. Chhun Sophal Mr. Chhuon Vuthy Mr. Daniel Adler Mr. Ek Tinavuth Mr. Hen Puthy Mr. Huon Vannith Mr. Huor Kolvoan Mr. Huor Rotha Mr. Ismael Trasmonte Mr. Kae Gnel Mr. Khim Sophal Mr. Kim Pola H.E. Leng Vy Mr. Long Seng Horng Ms Lynn Losert Mr. Michel Le Pechoux Mr. Phour Mora Mr. Prak Samoeoun Mr. Roger Henke Mr. Ruud Corsel Mr. Son Siveth Mr. Tin Fesol Mr. Top That Ms Leni Dharmawan Ms Megume Endo Ms Mourk Youvealeak Ms Ruth Chinte Ms Shelley Flam Concern Worldwide - Siem Reap Neary Khmer - Siem Reap Partnership for Local Governance - Siem Reap Lutheran World Federation (LWF) The World Bank UNICEF Provincial Local Administration Unit (PLAU) - Siem Reap Provincial Local Administration Unit (PLAU) - Kampong Thom Ministry of Rural Development Ministry of Rural Development Commune Council Support Project (CCSP) World Vision International (WVI) - Kampong Thom Lutheran World Federation (LWF) Concern Worldwide - Siem Reap Ministry of Interior / Department of Local Administration Centre dEtude et de Dveloppement Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC) USAID UNICEF Partnership for the Development of Kampuchea (PADEK) Ministry of Interior / Department of Local Administration Phnom Penh Centre of Advanced Studies (CAS) OXFAM GB Lutheran World Federation (LWF) Ministry of Rural Development GTZ CB-RDP - Kampong Thom The Asia Foundation CARE Ministry of Interiors / Department of Local Administration Phnom Penh Lutheran World Federation (LWF) GTZ ARDP

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Annex 7 Case Studies

CASE 1 - Low Education and Poor, but Willing to Participate and Contribute Kalmek Village (Tbongkrapeu Commune - Kampong Thom) (Knight, 2005). Kalmek Village is located along the Steng Sen River in remote Tbongkrapeu Commune, Steng Sen District, Kampong Thom Province. Villagers commonly support themselves through the seasonal farming of paddy rice and fishing. Despite his poverty and lack of education, Mr. Lim Kheng has been encouraged through decentralization to involve in village planning meetings and actively to contribute to village development. Mr. Lim Kheng's family is supported by fishing and seasonal farming of paddy rice and with the assistance of the local NGO COWS has learned animal raising, farm crop improvement and compost making and lately the establishment of Village Network. Mr. Lim Kheng is also a member of a money savings group. When interviewed, Mr. Lim Kheng stated I do not understand about the meaning of decentralization because I cannot write and read. I have been a soldier for approximately 20 years, and my family living condition is poor among the poor in the village". However, he actively participates in all village meetings and knows that his contribution of 2000 Riel each year is an important contribution to such village development activities as canal and dam construction. He is proud that many villagers from good, medium and low income families attend the Kalmek village planning meeting and believes that their participation improves their efforts to help one another "to make survival and development." He notes that it has also been easy to collect contribution from villagers and that the receipt of an invoice an admiration certificate allows villagers to feel good about their participation in a village improvement project. Mr. Lim Kheng expressed pride in the growth of his knowledge and awareness and attributed some of his new strength to the awareness campaign and the facilitation role by COWS and his own involvement in Village and Commune Council meetings. Most recently, he was nominated by the Village Chief to become a group leader in the village.

CASE 2 - Commune Council (Tbong Krapeu Commune - Kampong Thom) (Knight, 2005) To encourage the participation of villagers, and on behalf of villagers, the Commune Chief of Tbong Krapeu Commune, Mr. Keang Seng Ky, works long hours. He and his wife, both educators, take very seriously their responsibility to the villages in the Commune and especially to the poor. Mr. Keang Seng Ky described the contribution that the three hectares of land belonging to the Commune Council makes in providing rice to the poorest families. Mr. Keang Seng Ky is strong in his appreciation of the work of Village Network members in helping him. He commented on their assistance in collecting information on the issues of villagers, raising issues to Commune Councillors, and bringing the poor into the Commune Council collaborative process. He even recognized the value of Village Network members in identifying and surfacing perceived errors of the Commune Council. In his opinion, work as a Village Network member has qualified some individuals to assume larger roles than they currently fill, including becoming a Commune Councillor in the future.

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Mr. Keang Seng Ky is most concerned about the sustainability of the Village Network structure and, consequently, his ability to perform his job. He is convinced that his work on behalf of villages will be compromised without the support and involvement of Village Network members. He worries that the ineffectiveness of some Village Networks and the lack of support for them by nongovernmental organizations will endanger Village Networks. He is attempting to identify financial resources that would allow him to place the Village Network as an administrative line item in the Commune Council budget.

CASE 3 - Participation in the Commune Council Monthly Meeting (Preh Damrey Commune - Kampong Thom). (Knight, 2005) Ms. Yut Nong, a 45 year old woman, is Deputy Chief of Pagoda Coordination Committee of Stung district and Village Chief of Lak Chea village (Kampong Thom). Ms. Yut Non was unaware she had the right to attend the Commune Council monthly meeting until she participated in a decentralization training provided by GTZ in 2002. She now reminds others that they also have the right to attend the monthly Commune Council meeting. She reported feeling shy at first when attending the meeting because she did not have an invitation. Now she reports her attendance as a habit something she does on the 23rd of each month. Ms. Yut Nong found her first "voice" in a Commune Council meeting when she raised her concern about a dam that had been destroyed by flood and rebuilt with funds from the World Food program, only to be destroyed again by villagers who had no water in the dry season because the dam had no water gate. Following her presentation she was invited by the Commune Council to make a proposal and, with technical support from GTZ, requested funding from the Japanese Embassy for a dam and water gate. A second request to the Commune Council for in-kind local contributions from people led to a request from the Commune Chief to the Village Chief to announce the need for contributed labour. Subsequently, villagers and monks worked together for 20 days to complete a dam which has provided water for rice production in all seasons for the past two years.

CASE 4 Laterite road in Sandan (Kampong Thom) (source local NGO CODEC) The Commune Council of Sandan, in Sandan district has approved the construction of a laterite road in Sandan village. The Commune hired a private contractor for the construction. The VN members supervised the project and construction and noticed that the constructor was not building the road according to the agreed terms and projects by putting garbage as foundation to the road and not gravel. The VN and Village Chief asked the informed the communes and asked to intervene to stop the construction of the road. Contractor and Commune then agreed to the proper construction standards and the road was completed accordingly.

CASE 5 Commune Forestry in Prasat Balang district (Kampong Thom) (source local NGO BFDK). The VNs of Tuol Kruel Commune in Prasat Balang district in cooperation with other villagers submitted a request to the Provincial Governor, Commune Council and district

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governor to obtain the right to establish a Community Forestry area . The proposal was accepted and now about 1.000 hectares of forest areas used by seven villages in Tuol Kruel Commune are managed as Community Forestry. This will help to increase the sustainable use of forestry resources in the area.

CASE 6 Interview with Commune chief in Stung Sen district (Kampong Thom) (source local NGO COWS). In the villages of Kal Mek and Chong Da in Stung Sen district was always difficult to collect local contributions to implement local development projects. Since the creation of the VN and the increased participation of villagers representatives in local development it is easier to organise these contributions. Mr. Keang Sengky, Commune Chief of Tboung Kropeu Commune, said that since the establishment of the VN it is easier for the CC to disseminate and receive information about decisions and needs of the villagers. He also mentioned that the Commune Councillors do not have enough time to visit all villages and extend the local governance process at the village level. The Commune chief would like to continue to support the VN after the NGOs will phase out its follow up.

CASE 7 Interview with Commune chief in Santuk district (Kampong Thom) (source local NGO CODEC). The Commune Chief of Kokoh, Santuk District says that the VN has helped to facilitate the work of the Commune by helping to organise citizens contributions for projects, participation in commune development planning, advocate on important issues such as gambling and domestic violence, and encourage citizens with the civil registration. The VNs have also helped to monitor projects in the Commune such as: rural road construction, school improvement, commune office construction. When the local NGO will stop the support to the VN, the Commune will try to support VN participation.

CASE 8 Experiences from the NGO HEKS in Kampot (source local PDRD Kampot). HEKS is a NGO that focus on poverty reduction through community development activities such as: rice bank, cow bank, and improved participation of civil society in local development. HEKS is started its activities in Chhouk District in 1997 and today has a target areas of 5 communes and 18 villages. The approach used by HEKS is to identify needs and priorities in the target area and decide the appropriate interventions to reduce poverty, like for example credits. In Kampot the facilitation of HEKS has also contributed to set up Village Networks formed by seven villagers to follow up and monitor the implementation of CBOs activities in the village and be the link with the Commune Council and other local authorities. Mr. Toul Yang, Commune Chief in Boeng Nymol Commune, said that the VN is very important in the village level because the members are from the village and work closely with the other villagers. They know what the problems in their village are and can give suggestions to improve the livelihood situation. The work of the Commune is with communities, there is therefore the need for the communities and their representatives to work closely with the Commune to address the real problems. VN members hey can also help

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the Commune to correct mistakes by mention this in the monthly meeting. He will try to support the VN to continue to cooperate with the Commune.