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Smira1 Michael Smira George Cole PS 203 May 29, 2011 A Measure on Oregons Future: The passing of Judicial

Balance to Mandate Extremism The Formal Review of Measure 11 Background and Issue This analysis will focus solely on the proven impact M11 has had on Oregon in relation to criminal trends, Prison populations, budget allocations and ratio of people served. In 1994, Oregonians approved a tough-on-crime initiative known as Measure 11 (M11), which mandated minimum sentences for several serious and violent crimes ranging from 70 to 300 months for persons as young as 15 years old, with no previous offenses. Measure 57 (M57) required mandatory minimum sentences for property and drug crimes, and Measure 73 (M73) imposed more mandatory minimums for certain sexual crimes and drunk driving. Below are the authors of M11, who championed its cause, (Fora complete overview of M11 please refers to Appendix A).
Committee Members: Appointed by: Representative Kevin Mannix Robert J. Prinslow Lee Coleman Jim Francesconi Cory Streisinger Chief Petitioners Chief Petitioners Secretary of State Secretary of State Members of the Committee

Before M11 was approved by voters, prison sentences could be decided on a case-by-case basis at a judges discretion. However, M11 and other mandated sentencing made a cookie cutter approach to sentencing, says Patty Katz from Partnership for Safety and Justice (PSJ), whose mission is prison reform. It essentially eliminated the discretion we have entrusted to our elected and appointed judicial servants who know and understand criminal acts. Although crime has fallen in the past years since the passing of this measure, it is consistent with similar trends throughout the country, and it does come at a staggering cost. Our entire state government has been stripped to a skeleton operation as our budget has been depleted, causing

Smira2 the forced cuts to hundreds of programs as a direct result of a suffering economy and legal mandates. (Graph courtesy of the Criminal Justice Commission of the State of Oregon) Criminal Trends

Based on information obtained from Partnership for Safety and Justice, Oregon has increased its prison population by more than 41% since the passing of M11. Though, Oregon has enjoyed the steady decline of violent and property crimes in the last two decades, the decline in criminal activity cannot be hailed as solely being attributed to M11. According to FBI and Oregon statistical data, violent and property crime in Oregon has been decreasing since the late 1990s. In 2008, Oregon ranked 40th for violent crime and 23rd for property crime; the lowest state rankings for Oregon since 1960. National and statewide FBI UCR data is available going back to 1960. The graph below shows the national and Oregon violent crime rate from 1960 to 2008. Oregon follows a similar trend as the rest of the nation, and has historically had a lower violent crime rate than America as a whole. Craig Prins of the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) eluded that the long-term violent crime rate trend shows continuing increases through the 60s,70s, and 80s and decreases starting in the early to mid-90s and continuing through 2008. Violent crime in Oregon fell by 11 percent from 2007 to 2008 and by 14 percent from 2004 to 2008, says Prins, both the largest percentage drops of any state.

Incarceration Rates Since the implementation of mandates such as M11 the Oregon prison system has become bloated with long-term prisoners serving no less than what is prescribed by law to be 70 months and creating the need to increase the

Smira3 building program. The increases in the number of inmates due to M11 were not so much due to the growth in the number of offenders entering the system but to the length of time M11 offenders spend in prison. SB 1145 also affected the prison system by transferring the responsibility for those sentenced to 12 months or less to counties. This bill made a one-time reduction in the growth of the prison population after a short adjustment period when counties used the state prisons for incarceration until new jail capacity was completed. Other factors contributing to the prison population growth include changes by the 1999and laterLegislative sessions that increased the sentences for repeat property offenders. Finally, M57 passed in November 2008 changed the sentencing of certain property and drugrelated crimes. The Legislature altered the implementation dates for M57, but long-term it should have had a similar impact the way it was passed by the voters. It is estimated that approximately 600 inmates will be added to the prison population by July 2011 as a result of M57 growing to a total additional population of over 1,500 by 2015 (Transform). To the left is the most current conviction record of M11 by crime provided from Crime Victims United (CVU), a M11 advocacy group. The graph clearly demonstrates the relationship between prison overcrowding and the overall convictions associated with M11. With the mandate minimum sentence being 70 months, most of the people still remain incarcerated and can account for more than a third of the total prison population. Cost of Incarceration

Smira4 In the past few decades The Department of Corrections budget has ballooned from $377 million to $1.4 billion dollars. Additionally, the Department of Corrections absorbs over 55% of the public safety budget, leaving roughly $900 million left for all other safety needs. Our tax dollars would be better spent on education and social programs that work to better the antecedents to crime such as poverty and lack of education, rather than locking youths and adults away for 70 to 300 months. We must stop siphoning funds from public programs, like education, to support measure 11. This graph shows the estimated cost for M11 and the actual cost. Column 3 displays the cost for a single year and column 4 displays the bi-annual cost to house only property of the state prisoners in Oregon institutions. Currently there are approximately 6,959 offenders in DOC custody costing the public $103per day for each inmate, which amounts to an overall cost of $37,595. Today, there are over 14,400 persons in DOC custody, racking up a bi-annual bill well over a billion dollars.
Max Williams, the former Republican legislator now in charge of the Corrections Department, stated in an interview that, We are on an unsustainable trajectory,when asked about the future of the prison population. Although the DOCs budget is massive, it is still strapped for funding."I have very little flexibility financially." Williams further acknowledges that "Oregon's prison system does lean to one of the higher cost systems in the country, but most of that is driven by labor costs."

The National Institute of Corrections, part of the U.S. Justice Department, lists Oregon's annual cost per inmate in 2008 as $36,060, compared with the national average of $24,052. A corrections report by the Pew Center on the States, using 2007 data, showed Oregon consuming 10.9 percent of its general fund for corrections. Although the Pew report emphasizes that identical state-to-state comparisons are impossible because of multiple variables, it's still clear Oregon has one of the most expensive corrections systems based on the share of state money spent on its inmate population (Partnership). Such a cut the Department of Corrections proportional share of the $563 million across-the-board reduction ordered recently by Kulongoski simply cant be made, director Williams said. As much as Id like to say we can do it all, Im pretty convinced that we cant, he said. You really have to start closing institutions and releasing inmates and we really dont have the authority to do that. Those are decisions that policymakers in the Legislature have to make (Partnership).

Oregon cannot sustain the cost of housing drug addicts and criminals who would best be rehabilitated through programs and treatment to keep them from re-offending. This cost is a result of longer prison sentences and fewer people being released, as a direct result of minimum sentences. The Executive Director for Partnership for Safety and Justice, David Rogers stated in his article MONEY, PRISONS, AND POLITICS: AN OREGON BUDGET

Smira5 PRIMER,Rogers explains that due to the swelling in DOC population its budget is the siphon of Oregons public safety dollars. Their budget has exploded and expanded by 400% in the last fifteen years, from $377 million dollars to $1.4 billion dollars. He calls it dramatic growth and the fastest growing state agency budget. Today we spend more on incarceration than we do on education. A Measurable Service Ratio The DOC spends a billion dollars per biennium to house 14,400 inmates, which is $37,595 each. The Department of Education has 562,142 students in K-12 public schools (Education) and allocates $5,769 for each student. The graph to the left indicates the funding from Oregon in blue and Federal funding with Oregon funding in Red. Section 1 gives the amount of students, Section 2 is the amount for each student in K-12, Section 3 is the yearly cost for all students per year, and Section 4 is the bi-annual cost of just attendance. Oregon spends almost seven times the amount to incarcerate one person than to educate one person. Based on an interview with Jenni Deaton from the Oregon Department of Education (DOE) Superintendents Office, she states that for 2009-11, the state school fund amount is $5.76 billion and $500 million less than in 2008-09. For each student, the state school fund allocation is $5,769. The per-student number including local and federal funding is approximately $9,600. That is less than the year before. We have reduced our dropout rate in the last 19 years, but only by 1836 students. We have over 6,000 dropout students each year. According to the Oregon Department of Education, in the 1994-1995 school years there was a dropout rate of 7.4 percent or 11,152 students. This also happens to be the same year measure 11 was implemented. Some have said that Oregon has made a poisonous investment in the future of our state by taking public education dollars and redirecting them to the DOC. Oregon ranks 32 in the country on per student spending and number 1 for incarceration spending (PSJ). We have become a prison state (U.S.). Additionally, the Pew Charitable Trust report one in a 100: Behind bars in America 2008, states that we have 1% of America's entire population behind bars and nationally, educational spending has increased only 21% since 1987, when prison spending increased over 127% nationally. Our education system is only one of the many agencies that have been affected by the bloated corrections budget. The Department of Human Services, for example, has been cutting programs for years; they help the persons living with disabilities and persons suffering from the disease of addiction. These people represent roughly 85% of our prison population and absorb the largest amount of additional funds for the much-needed Alcohol and Drug Treatment, championed as being the reason that Oregon has such a low recidivism rate at 22.8% (PEW). Additionally, with M11 came a new alltime high cost of healthcare due in part to the shift in the incarceration age demographic. The state now must pay for any and all healthcare costs for all

Smira6 inmates which were the case for one person who has a quadruple bypass heart surgery at the expense of DOC (Partnership). When we look at the Department of Human Services who services on average of a million people each year and has an economic impact of $2.5 million per $1 million spent has seen its budget sliced and diced many times in the past decade (DHS). In recent bi-annual budget cycles the Department of Human services has seen its budget depleted by billions. Today, the federal government provides more than 60% of DHS funding as shown in the graph from DHS. Of the $13.53 billion in funding, more than $8 billion is dedicated to Medicaid, Foster Care and adoption assistance, Women with infants, Temporary assistance to needy families (TANF), and food stamps. These are programs that are solely funded by the Federal government and cannot be re-disbursed. That means the needed funding for Drug Treatment programs across the board are on the chopping block to close to $3.5 billion dollar shortfall for the 2011-2013 Bi-annual budget cycles. The once hailed and championed addictions treatment programs of which Oregon has served as a model for many states in the nation could be a thing of the past. We are turning into a strapped-for-cash, skeleton government, which would rather cut programs than advocate for prison reform because of re-election concerns. There is however one state agency has been sanctioned to delve into M11 and the almost poisonous effect it has had Oregon. The Criminal Justice Commission is that internal government agency. The Government Review of M11
The Criminal Justice Commission is a state run entity whose mission is: The Criminal Justice Commission's (CJC) purpose is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state and local criminal justice systems by providing a centralized and impartial forum for statewide policy development and planning. The commission is charged with

developing a long-range public safety plan for Oregon, which includes making recommendations on the capacity and use of state prisons and local jails, implementation of community corrections programs and methods to reduce future criminal conduct. In addition, the Commission has a role in funding and evaluating Oregon's drug courts. The commission also conducts research, develops impact estimates of crime-related legislation, acts as a statistical and data clearinghouse, administers Oregon's felony sentencing guidelines and provides staff to the advisory committees regarding asset forfeiture and racial profiling. Commission members are appointed to four-year terms by the governor and confirmed by the senate (Wasson). What led to the creation of the CJC has a bit of history. The CJC before its conception was known as the Criminal Justice Council, which was formed under House Bill 2093. They were charged with providing a permanent forum ...for communication, coordination and overall planning"(Wasson) with-in the corrections community and assisting in finding a solution of prison overcrowding. The Council would develop a punishment/risk management model that could be tested and validated in Oregon. The goal was to have a system that was capable of matching sanctions according to both the offense (punishment) and the offender (risk) (Wasson) .The councils relatively brief existence began in 1985 and ended in 1995. The 1995 legislative session allowed the Criminal Justice Council to sunset and created the Criminal Justice Commission. The earlier planning bodies had been composed of representatives from all elements of the criminal justice system, typically including law enforcement, local government, the judiciary, the Legislature, the Parole Board, the State Corrections Division/Department of Corrections, and prosecuting and defense attorneys. The new Commission was composed of but seven members, appointed with consideration to the different geographic regions of the state and with no more than four being from the same political party. Although the commission was limited in number, the chairman was given the authority to create additional committees (Wasson). Prison Overcrowding Capps v. Atiyeh: Oregons Prisons Unconstitutional. In 1980 the federal court ruled in Capps v. Atiyeh that the Oregon prisons presented unconstitutional conditions and ordered the state to reduce the institutional populations. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the order to the U.S. District Court. In December of 1982, the U.S. District court said that Oregons prisons did not violate Constitution standards, but were, nonetheless, so seriously overcrowded that future court intervention could be likely if remedial steps were not taken (Wasson). The Prison Overcrowding Project: Oregon was not alone in its prison overcrowding situation. The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and the National

Institute of Corrections funded a national Prison Overcrowding Project. The Project provided grants and technical assistance to four states: Colorado, Michigan, Oregon, and South Carolina in 1983. The Project sought to examine the factors contributing to prison overcrowding and develop strategies to control the size of prison populations (Wasson).The Oregon Prison Overcrowding Project collected offenderbased data on inmates, offenders released from jail, and probationers. The Oregon Project concluded that the Oregon correctional system was expertly managed, given the offenders sent to it. They also did an inventory of the sanctions (punishments) and services available at the local level on a county by county basis (Commission). Oregon had a Jail Overcrowding Project from 1984 through 1988 that was related to the Prison Overcrowding Project. Their final 1988 report noted that twenty-two of the thirty-two counties operating jails had been sued for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Jail population limits were either ordered (fourteen counties), or voluntarily set to avoid costly litigation. The Project made findings and recommendations to the 1987 legislature. The Sentencing Guidelines Proposal: Along with the Criminal Justice Council, established in 1985, the Jail Overcrowding Project recommended the Council develop sentencing guidelines. The guidelines were to be based on the severity of the offense and the seriousness of the offender s criminal history. The guidelines would synchronize the demand and supply of correctional resources, including jails. The proposal was to be presented to the 1989 legislature (Commission). The Jail Overcrowding Project also found that unnecessary delays were contributing to the overcrowding of jails. Time limits were adopted for: 1) offenders being detained in jails awaiting determination of whether they had violated conditions of their probation, 2) delays between conviction and sentencing, and 3) delays in the transmittal of the judgment orders to the sheriff for defendants in custody. The 1987 legislature also passed a law declaring it state policy that the state, not the counties, was responsible for the incarceration of sentenced felons (Commission). Mandates With the passage of M11, the commission was faced with the daunting task of the evaluation and impact of this measure. In March 2011 the CJC released its much anticipated review of M11 and its findings are as follows: The Promises of M11 All information used in the section is cited under Commission. The chief petitioner fleshed out his utilitarian argument for M11 in the 1994 voters pamphlet as follows: Requiring solid, minimum prison time for violent crimes will result in:

Incapacitation. The criminal cannot commit other crimes while in prison. This will reduce actual crime in society. Deterrence. Career criminals will learn that crime does not pay in Oregon. Some of them will leave, or change their ways. Predictability of Sentences. Right now, the range of sentences is so broad, and the reasons for increasing or reducing sentences so broad, that it is hard to predict what actual sentence will be imposed. With these mandatory minimums, everyone will know the exact minimum sentence which must be served for the crime. Comparable Sentences. All judges in Oregon, no matter how soft, must impose the minimum sentence for a violent crime when a jury has found the criminal guilty. Sentences can be higher if the circumstances call for it, but they cannot be lower. The Fulfillment of the M11 Promise All information used in the section is cited under Commission. Whether mandatory minimum sentences have provided the four outcomes promised by the chief petitioner will be considered in depth in this report. How it has fulfilled these promises is the bulk of this report, but can be summarized as follows: Incapacitation. Measure 11 did increase the use of incarceration to incapacitate offenders by requiring Oregon to grow its prison system to hold offenders for longer terms of prison. The increased need for prison beds was mitigated by the way the prosecution has applied the measure and mandatory minimum sentencing in general. Deterrence. The effectiveness of the measure as a crime deterrent is indeterminate, but it is clear that many of those indicted and convicted for these offenses were not career criminals in that they had little or no prior felony record. Predictability of Sentences. The measure did provide predictability for the minority of cases where the state sought a conviction for crimes that carried the sentence proscribed by the chief petitioner. It created this predictability by eliminating judicial discretion if the prosecution obtained a conviction for that crime. This report focuses on the application of mandatory sentencing in Oregon in thousands of cases over more than a decade, and makes clear the predictable sentence is only arrived at in the minority of cases where a prosecutor, not a judge, decided it was appropriate and necessary. This report delves into the factors that increase the likelihood a prosecutor will seek a conviction that calls for a mandatory minimum sentence and examines the broad disparity in sentences for the 70 percent of cases where the prosecutor uses the leverage of the mandatory sentence to obtain a plea bargain to a lesser charge.

Comparable Sentences. The chief petitioner focused on requiring soft judges to impose the minimum sentence if a jury found the offender guilty. This report shows that juries only hear about 15 percent of the cases involving mandatory minimum sentences, and in the other 85 percent of the cases there is broad disparity in the sentences arrived at by the plea negotiation process in Oregons 36 counties. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS Information Used by CJC All information used in the section is cited under Commission. The Oregon Judicial Information Network (OJIN) contains information on all charges in Oregon, the dispositions and sentences on those charges, as well as demographic information of offenders. Use of OJIN data allows analysts to identify the initial charges in the formal accusatory instrument, charges returned as indicted by the grand jury, how often individual offenders are convicted of those charges and the sentences imposed based on those convictions. For this analysis we rely on the language of ORS 132.390, concerning the grand jury, to provide the best information about what crime actually occurred and what the state would seek to prove at trial if an offender asserts the right to a jury trial. Our analysis then considered the movement from indictment to conviction as the point in the system where application of prosecutorial discretion impacts the actual sentence for the crime. Using this methodology, we were able to track changes in convictions before and after M11s passage. We also used well accepted statistical models to examine factors that influence if an offender is convicted of a M11 offense or if an offender is sentenced to prison. The Outcome of the M11 Review All information used in the section is cited under Commission. FINDINGS The typical M11 offender is white (74 percent), male (91 percent), and adult (89 percent) and has no adult felony convictions. Only 30 percent have been previously convicted of a felony, 15 percent have been convicted of a person felony and 15 percent have been previously incarcerated at an Oregon prison. In 2009, offenders who were charged by a grand jury with at least one M11 crime, and were convicted of that crime or a lesser felony made up 34 percent of prison intakes, and 64 percent of all prison months imposed. Statewide, 29 percent of offenders charged by a grand jury with committing at least one M11 offense were convicted of the most

serious crime in the grand jury indictment. Sixty-two percent of offenders indicted for at least one M11 crime were sentenced to prison. M11 is applied differently across counties. In the five most populous counties, Multnomah County convicts the lowest percentage of M11 indicted offenders for a M11 crime at 36 percent, while Marion County convicts 63 percent. Counties apply M11 differently, and those differences are statistically significant even after controlling for other factors such as age, gender, race, and criminal history. Offenders indicted for a M11 in one of the five most populous counties are 79 percent more likely to be convicted of a M11 and twice as likely to receive a prison sentence as offenders in the other 31 counties. (This is counter to the prevailing myth that officials in counties in Eastern Oregon, away from Oregons four largest cities, would be more likely to convict of the most serious offense carrying the longest sentence.) M11 is applied differently across demographics. Juveniles and females indicted for a M11 are both less likely to receive a M11 conviction. These differences are statistically significant with juveniles and females both being about 20 percent less likely to be convicted of a M11. M11 conviction rates also differ by ethnicity. Blacks who are indicted for a M11 are about 15 percent less likely to be sentenced to prison than whites, and Hispanics are about 40 percent more likely to be sentenced to prison than whites. M11 indicted offenders who go to trial are nearly four times more likely to be convicted of a M11. M11 indicted offenders who have a private attorney are about 25 percent less likely to be convicted of a M11. A M11 indicted offenders criminal history is important in determining whether they are convicted of a M11. A M11 indicted offender with three or more prior person felonies is nearly twice as likely to be convicted of a M11. Upon the passage of M11, fewer M11 indicted offenders were convicted of their most serious offense. During the 1990s, offenders who were subject to M11 were 34 percent less likely to be convicted of their most serious offense than those who committed crimes before the passage of M11. Upon the passage of M11, M11 indicted offenders were much more likely to go to prison and more likely to receive a longer prison sentence. Offenders who were subject to M11 were 36 percent more likely to go to prison and their median length of stay in prison was 81 percent longer. If Oregon voters had not passed M11, Oregon would require an estimated 2,900 fewer prison beds, about one third of the initial official estimate.

Senate Bill 1049 (1997), which allowed guidelines sentences for some M11 offenses, had little or no impact on the prison population. The prison months imposed for indicted offenders changed very little after passage of the law. Report Conclusion All information used in the section is cited under Commission. In conclusion, M11 did not eliminate the tough choices about what the appropriate sentence is in a specific case. It did change who makes that decision from the judge to the prosecutor. It did eliminate the structure the guidelines gave for guiding these tough decisions in cases involving a M11 charge. The result has been an increase in severity of sentence, and an increase in incarceration in Oregon, though not nearly as great an increase as there would have been if prosecutors had sought conviction for the charge carrying the mandatory minimum as they had before the measures passage. In the United States, the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches has developed into well-defined roles for each branch. In states and sentencing systems with sentencing guidelines, the legislature approves the sentencing laws; the executive branch prosecutes the laws and carries out the sentences imposed within its corrections system. The role of the judicial branch is to apply the law at the individual case level by evaluating the facts of the criminal case before it: the impact of the harm to the victim, the culpability of the offender, the public safety threat posed by the offender, and the societal impact of the crime. The judge then imposes a sentence that holds the offender accountable for his or her criminal action and promotes public safety. The judicial branch is usually seen as the neutral party in our adversarial criminal justice system that is best structurally situated to bring all the facts together, taking into account the most persuasive arguments of both adversarial sides, and to make an impartial informed decision. The prosecutors role in such a system is to bring the facts, from the States perspective, to bear in the case. The prosecutor, due to familiarity with the case, is best situated to understand and explain the case from the perspective of the victim and law enforcement. The defense can provide information about the defendant that would be unknown to law enforcement and seek to mitigate the punishment that may be thought to be necessary. Usually, the executive branch discretion is controlled by adherence to objective criteria that are the basis of discretion. The judicial branch is normally given broader discretion. M11 flipped this dynamic for sentencing on Oregons most serious offenses. M11 did not take away the difficult decisions, it simply moved the decision making power from the judge to the prosecutor.

These findings have sparked many discussions involving the complete reform of Oregons sentencing laws. Special hearings are taking place to figure out ways to trim the DOCs budget and all options are on the table.

Possible Solutions

A subcommittee of the Governor's Reset Cabinet recommended the state suspend fully imposing sentences required under Measure 57 for repeat property offenders. That alone could save $40 million the next two years. Kulongoski's advisers reached the same conclusion, dryly noting that prison costs are "too often ignored when sentencing policies are established." The advisers also recommended the state do what many others have done to rein in rocketing prison costs: shift more attention to less expensive ways of getting criminals to behave. The group suggested the state better treat the drug, alcohol and mental problems that afflict more than 70 percent of Oregons prisoners. They suggested more use of home detention and tighter community supervision, steps successful in other states (Justice). Governor Kitzhaber recognizes the need to reduce the DOC budget and increase funding for education, however since his solution for the DOC conglomerate is to cut all drug and alcohol treatments, parenting programs, and cognitive courses, this would also include the continued suspensionof Measure 57 and a newly suspended Measure 73 to bring down spending. Although the governor has brought up the idea of prison reform, that reform is only financial. Senator Chip Shields and his colleagues are advocates for prison reform and believe in the treatment programs that have proven to be successful. Shields, D-Portland, who has worked on public safety measures, has said, "The public safety system is out of balance. There's too much money going to prisons." A complete advocate for prison reform, Shields has further said in an interview that "Kevin Mannix never puts a price tag on any of his measures. He's OK with us taking money from K-12 to pay for them (Justice). In fact, Shields is a member of the Ways and Means committee reviewing the Public Safety budget which held public hearings to gain further insight as to what the public view is on prison funding. Many spoke including this author. I spoke to the panel about my experience in DOC and the treatment I received saying how grateful I am to have a new life, I get to be a part of my community and give back, I get to be a brother and a son today, and there were more stories of how treatment programs helped those incarcerated. I was touched that The Ways and Means subcommittee hung on my testimony, eager to hear more, which gave me hope for the future.For a complete copy of my testimony, refer to Appendix B. An option that has not been discussed is to temporarily suspend Measure 11 and all other mandatory minimum sentences laws, require all mandates to have funding in place, and give earned time for those who are currently incarcerated under Measure 11 crimes. Until the mid-80s the DOC was part of the Department of Human Services (DHS). Why not reverse that action and allow for DHS to absorb the DOC and take over the operations to reduce costs in medical and treatment services for those who suffer from illnesses and drug addiction? DHS already has the facilities to deal with most

of the services provided by DOC at a less expensive cost, thus saving Oregon time and money that could be better spent on education. Lastly, Oregon can keep M11 in the books, but modify the way it is implemented. Utilize M11 in cases of repeat offender cases that warrant a harsher touch on crime approach. Power Players The grid below demonstrates the amount each person or agency has to influence a change in M11 reform. Each is given a rating of 1-10, 10 being the most influence and 1 the least. Governor Kitzhaber: Has a high position of power and influence in the legislature. Also has Veto power. Senator Chip Shields: Has influence among his colleagues and constituents and chairs the most powerful financial committee in the legislature. Max Williams: As Director of DOC he has admitted that with the current structure of sentencing law the DOC cannot sustain the exponential growth any longer. Having this view puts him as an advocate with moderate influence among the legislature. His position gives him influence among legislators. Kevin Mannix: Since he is no longer in office, no longer has the financial backing from his supporters and is currently under investigation; his influence in low. He is also the Measures author and has no interest in changing the Measure for the good of Oregonians. Crime Victims United:A well-meaning group of tough-on-crime advocates that envelope all crimes as violent whether they be committed by non-violent offenders or not. Not a group interested in appealing Measure 11. Partnership for Safety and Justice: A smart on crime, pro-prison reform group who has many influential legislators as supporters of their causes. Though there are those cited that appear to have no or little influence, clearly if they pooled their political influence they could make some changes that Oregons public safety budget desperately needs. Political Players Governor Kitzhaber Senator Chip Shilds Max Williams Partnership for Safety and Justice Kevin Mannix Crime Victims United Community Leaders For/Agai nst 6 8 6 10 -10 -10 10 Salience or motivation 5 8 -5 10 -10 -10 10 Actual Power 10 5 6 2 3 3 2 Total Power 300 320 -180 200 -300 -300 200

Chart Number Definition High positive Medium Positive Low positive High - Medium Negative Low Negative 240 Column1 Will change Possible Change Could Change Will not Change Unlikely to Change

Based on my Political Power Chart I can predict that there is just simply not enough motivation and political will touch M11. The recognition for reform is apparent, however, to advocate for such a reform would most certainly be political Russian roulette. The public is too easily swayed by scare tactics and deceitful ads that a cry for change is nil. It will not be until utter catastrophe that my fellow Oregonians will rise to the occasion and demand our legislator to change our incarceration practices. My fear is that if that happens we will go for extreme changes rather than functional changes. We will have to wait and see. Summary: I have included these visuals and information about measures 11, 58, and 73 which gives a view of how Oregon is funding its schools, human services programs and prisons. The heartbreaking part is that too many voters with influence get their information from a 30-second soundbite and thus, hearing a poignant but brief victim of a violent crime victim story (not related to the intent of the measure), they base their votes on this information. Oregon has been a leader in offender rehabilitation, effectively reducing its recidivism rates. To cut these programs would do harm to society and go against the programs set forth in the 2004 legislative session. The potential impact these measures were unseen until recently, and the effect they have on other services like education funding, offender reform, and critical public services. These Oregonians would want to preserve to keep a healthy budget. Oregonians want healthy funding for education and treatments for offender rehabilitation instead of pouring money into a system that does no justice for those who can lead, want to lead, and are capable of leading a better and rebuilt life. Case in point, the DOC/M11 provides funding for 14,400 people, having a direct impact against those who serve millions. The siphoning of funds from much-needed programs to DOC has shown that Oregon is willing to invest more in incarceration than its general population. It has been proven that treating what brought individuals to crime, i.e. drug addiction, has reduced recidivism and allowed these people to become productive people in society. Hence the power structure I have included here: These are people with the influence to change this backwards practice and, thus far, we have seen no changes from any one of them. Until we as a community and an electorate hold these people and groups accountable, we cannot expect anything different. It is time for change and it is time for all of us to make and see that change happen. We have the power to do so. Im in.

Smira16 Conclusion: The math is wrong, bothersome, and the logic behind it is disturbing.It simply does not add up to have Oregons funds forits educational systemcome from our incarceration rate. Oregon has a high recidivism rate and we have created a revolving door in our criminal justice system, and it takes longer to cycle through. Handing out mandatory minimum sentences like measure 11 can makes our situation worse. It would be wiser to increase educational spending to promote an educated population, rather than a population of criminals, and prisons. With this reckless allocation of tax dollars could we be sealing our fate as a prison state? Can we stop the revolving door of incarceration? Will our government finally stop the temporary bandaging of our social issues and practice social and fiscal responsibility? Well, the answer lies with you. Writing a letter to your elected official or your District Attorneys office, or volunteering to help in some way, such as public testimony, can and will make an impact. Do your part and make Oregon a better place for the future.

Work Cited
Commission, Criminal Justice. "Longitudinal Study of the Application of Measure 11 and." Http://media.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest news/other/Measure

%2011%20Analysis%20030911.pdf. Oregon Live, 11 Mar. 2011. Web. 28 May 2011. Deaton, Jenni. Re: Oregon Department of Education: Budget numbers. Message to the author.9 Aug. 2010. E-mail. "Measure 11 Report Released | PSJ." PSJ | Partnership for Safety and Justice.Web. 30 May 2011. <http://www.safetyandjustice.org/news/2249>. "Oregon Violent Crime and Measure 11."Crime Victims United. Web. 07 May 2011. <http://www.crimevictimsunited.org/measure11/presentation/>. Partnership for Safety and Justice.Web. 9 Aug. 2010. Pew Charitable Trust. one in a 100: Behind bars in America 2008. 28 Feb. 2008. Web. 9 Aug. 2010. Prins, Craig. Crime in Oregon Report. Issue brief. Vol. June 2010.Salem, 2010. Print. Rogers, David. Money, Prisons, and Politics: An Oregon Budget Primer.20 June. 2009. Web. 9 Aug. 2010. State of Oregon Department of Corrections.Web. 9 Aug. 2010. "Transform Oregon's Budget: Department: Corrections, Dept of." Transform Oregon's Budget: Jive SBS: Transform Oregon's Budget. Web. 07 May 2011. <http://community.allenalley.com/community/budget1113/ps/dc>. US Census Bureau.Web. 9 Aug. 2010. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2010). Digest of Education Statistics, 2009 (NCES 2010-013)Table 180 and Chapter 2 .

Wasson, Billy F. "Criminal Justice Commission The Development of Oregon's." Oregon.gov Home Page.Web. 30 May 2011. <http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/overview.shtml>.