Cross-National Dimensions of Ethnocentrism Author(s): Roberta E.

Mapp Source: Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des tudes Africaines, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1972), pp. 73-96 Published by: Canadian Association of African Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/484153 . Accessed: 08/06/2011 17:58
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Canadian Journal of African Studies, VI, i (1972), 73-96 La Revue Canadienne des 1tudes Africaines

Cross-NationalDimensions of Ethnocentrism
E. ROBERTA MAPP*

The effects of ethnocentricattitudeshad plagued man's relations to his fellows long before Summergave an academicexplicationof the phenomenonin 1906.1 The apparentuniversality the attitudehas been confirmedby subsequentscholof ars 2 at the same time that the fluidity and relativityof perceptionof in-group In versusout-groupbecame increasingly apparent.3 the African context it is more but debate over the use usual to refer to "tribalism" given the often acrimonious of that term, this discussionwill use the more neutralword, ethnocentrism. use Its will serve to remindus that the same questionscan be asked of our own "particularisms"in Europe and North America. While there are many aspects of the general phenomenonof ethnocentrism that could be probed, the data availablehere permitsonly an examinationof the in patterns of ethnocentrism two African nations, some comparisonsof the two nationalpatternsand an investigationof some correlatesthat reflect differingsocialization experiences. The implicationsof differing intensities of affect-dislike betweenvariouscomponenttribalgroupsin the Ghanaianand Kenyanpopulations are of considerablesocial importance,even aside from the political uses to which they can be diverted.An integration problemper se is createdfor a nation if some
* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta. The data was collected in Ghana and Kenya in 1966 with the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Institute for International Studies and Overseas Administration of the University of Oregon. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the American Sociological Association, Denver, 1971. 1. W. G. SUMMER, Folkways (Boston, 1906).
and R. A. LEVINE, "Propositions About Ethnocentrism from Social 2. D. T. CAMPBELL

Science Theories" (Evanston, 1965, mimeo), tested the proposition of universality on 55 samples from the Human Relations Area File and found it confirmed (p. 15). 3. The best discussions and explanation of this relativity are those of P. H. GULLIVER, "Introduction", in P. H. Gulliver, ed. Tradition and Transition in East Africa (Berkeley, "On 1969) and Paul MERCIER, the Meaning of Tribalism in Black Africa", in Pierre L van den Berghe, ed., Africa, Social Problems of Change and Conflict (San Francisco, 1965), pp. 483-501.

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THE CANADIANJOURNALOF AFRICANSTUDIES

toward some (or possiblymany or all) of its ethnic groupsare highly ethnocentric or many of the other ethnic componentsof the nationalpolitical community.An obvious integration problemis present if one group seems to dislike al others or one particular if, alternatively, groupis dislikedby most other tribalgroups.These are are merely extremeson a possible continuum; the permutations limited only by the numberof definablegroups. The respondentswhose attitudesare reportedhere are the typical "captive audience"of socializationresearch- Secondary(IVth, Vth and VIth forms) and University students. There were nearly thirteen hundred in the sample from Ghanaiansecondaryschools (560), Kenya secondaryschools (376), and the University of Ghana (167) and Nairobi (188). The majorconsideration the sampledesign was to obtain a geographically in representative samplein both countries.The Ghanaianschools are from the Upper, Northern and Eastern Regions and from the Accra District. The Kenya schools are from the Coast, Eastern, Central, Nyanza and WesternProvinces and from the NairobiCentralDistrict.The Universityof Ghana samplewas on the basis of residence halls, CommonwealthHall (men) and Volta Hall (women). Research assistantswere used to administerthe interviewschedules to universitystudents in both Ghana and Kenya althoughthe latter sample was based on geographic the to distribution, schedulebeing administered studentsin their homes duringthe Christmasvacationperiod. Secondarystudentsfilled out the questionnaires duringor after regularclass hours in their classrooms,supervised the authoror, in some instances,by their by teachers. The Ghanaiansample was obtainedduringJune and July of 1966, the Kenya sampleduringOctober,Novemberand Decemberof 1966. The instrument used to measureethnocentrism the BogardusSocial Diswas tance Scale.4This is a method which allows the respondentto indicate at which of several possible "social distances"he would like to hold membersof another group, whetherethnic, national, racial or religious. Given the number of groups that it seemed desirableto include in the list, this was the only feasible measurement.5The five item scale used omits some of the standardalternatives which were becauseof the particular inappropriate samplebeing used (businessor professional as organizations fellow members,or movinginto the house next door did not seem to be meaningfulchoices in the context). The distanceswere, from least to most social distance: 1. I would willinglyacceptthem as marriage partnersfor membersof my family.
4. E. S. BoGARDus, "Measuring Social Distance", Journal of Applied Psychology, IX (1925), 299-308; Immigration and Race Attitudes (Boston, 1928). 5. More sophisticated measures, such as the California E Scale, were quite inappropriate for the sample. Nor did stereotyping seem the solution, since there were language problems involved.

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2. I would willinglyaccept them only so far as havingthem for friends,but not for marriage relatives. 3. I would willingly accept them only so far as to trade and do business with them, but not for friends. 4. I do not want to have anythingto do with them if I can help it. 5. I would keep them out of Ghana (Kenya)entirely,if I could.

Patternsof Intra-Nation Ethnocentrism:

The initial task is to discover the degree of social distance at which membersof each of the major ethnic groups would hold membersof other groups. This can be done rather simply by computingthe mean score given to each group on the list by, say, the Kikuyuor the Ashanti. For the Kenya sample, comparisonwith an earlieradultsampleis possible.In his 1961 opinionsurveyon tribalism, Gordon Wilson asked respondents state which other tribesworkedbest with their own.6 to They were allowedfirst,second and thirdchoicesbut we show only the firstchoices in Table 1.
TABLE 1

I.

TRIBAL PREFERENCES, FIRST CHOICES, 1961 1 Opinion From : Luhya Coast Embu Kamba Meru Kikuyu Taita Kalenjin 2 Masai Kisii Luo Somali First Choice Kalenjin/Masai Luhya & Coast/Taita Embu/Meru Kikuyu Kikuyu Embu/Meru Coast/Taita Kalenjin/Masai Kalenjin/Masai Luhya Luhya (Others/not stated/no other) % 46% 44 each 56 52 92 68 85 64 60 77 40 33 3

1. The sample consisted of one hundred members of each tribe giving an opinion, divided equally between rural and urban. The total N is therefore 1200. 2. Kalenjin is a term used to refer to a group of Nilo-Hamitic tribes, the major ones being the Kipsigis and the Nandi. They are resident in Western Kenya and are mainly differentiated from other NiloHamitic groups by the fact that they have taken up settled agriculture. The Taita are a Bantu group near student sample they are included with the Coastal Bantu respondents in the category the coast; in "other Bantu." the 3. Kikuyu were second choice with 22%. Source : Marco, Public Opinion Poll on Tribalism in Kenya (Nairobi: The Market Research Company of East Africa, 1961), p. 2 (Poll No. 8).

6. Marco Survey of Public Opinion, No. 8, "Attitudes on Tribalism in Kenya" (Nairobi, 1961), pp. 1-20.

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Probablythe most strikingthing about this preferencerating is the absence of the Luo; no other tribe rated them as first choice (or second or third, either). The Kambasharedthis dubious distinction,althoughthe Taita did rate them as a that the Luo and Kamba became the political second choice. It is not surprising of outcasts(or dissidents-in-company) the mid-sixtiesnor that the earlierpolitical combinationof Luo-Kikuyuin K.A.N.U. broke up. A brief descriptionof the the of background Kenya is necessaryto understand culturaldimenethnographic sions that emerge from the data. This discussionmust necessarilybe in terms of the ethnic and political situationprevailingin 1966, the time of the survey. Subin sequentevents such as the banningof KPU or the fall of the Busia government could not have affectedthe perceptionsof the respondents Ghana,while important, a few years earlier. The ethnicproblemis morecomplexin KenyathanGhanabecausethe African populationis divided into three major racial groups- Bantu, Nilotic, and NiloHamitic.7Cultural,linguisticand even physical differencesbetween these groups are more markedthan betweentribesin West Africa. Each racial groupis in turn composedof severaldistincttribes.8 The Kikuyuand the closely relatedEmbu-Meru-Kamba tribesformthe largest Bantu component.The Kikuyuprofitedmost from the transferof politicalpower from the British because of their numbersand fortuitouslocation near Nairobi. As the firsttribe to organizepolitically,they have kept their advantagedespitethe temporarysetbackof the Mau Mau emergency.The Kikuyuare the largest single tribe and with the Kamba,Embu and Meru accountfor about thirty-nineper cent of the total Africanpopulation(the politicalallianceis not always firm, however). Other importantBantu tribes are the Luhya (itself a loose term used to cover a considerable numberof small tribes)and Gusii near Lake Victoria and a congeries of small tribes along the coast sometimesreferredto as the Nyika. The Luhya and the Kambashow the most frequentsigns of discontentunder the mantle of Kikuyu leadership.The Kamba have always had a reputationfor to The Kambaprovided being ratherdifficultand unresponsive outsideinfluences.9 part of the voting strengthfor the new oppositionparty,the K.P.U., that appeared in 1966 underlargelyLuo leadership. The Bantu tribes have been the agriculturalists Kenya and benefitedmost of
7. This section is indebted to J. E. GOLDTHORPE, Outlines of East Africa Society (Kampala, 1958), pp. 20-30. A fourth group is often included, the Hamitic, but since this includes only the Somali and the Galla, both small tribes, we will follow Goldthorpe and include them with the related Nilo-Hamitic. The official census rather interestingly refers to "African and Somali Population." 8. Republic of Kenya, Kenya Population Census, 1962, Vol. III, African Population (Nairobi, 1966). 9. See, for example, the readable account of their resistence in R. A. OLIVER, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London, 1952), pp. 169-171.

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from the resettlementschemes that have apportionedformerEuropeanestates to African farmers.This, of course, furtheradds fuel to the charge that the Central the Bantu and particularly Kikuyuare gettingmore than their proper share. This chargeis neverdirectedagainstKenyattabut ratheragainstseveralKikuyucabinet is members.The retentionof Bruce McKenzieas Ministerof Agriculture undoubtin edly intendedto reducechargesof "tribalism" this very sensitivearea of allocation of benefits. The Nilotic groupin Kenyais represented the Luo - the rest of this racial by groupis to the east, in Uganda and up into the Sudan.They are the second largest tribe and, like the Bantu, are farmers.They are located in the densely populated Nyanzaprovinceon the easternshoresof Lake Victoriaand thus were not infringed upon by Europeansettlement.Even the most determinedsettlerwould have been hard put to discovervacant tribal land in this area. Tom Mboya, the extremelyable Ministerof Economic Planningand Develin opmentuntil his assassination 1969, was the Luo best known outside of Kenya. His death broughtinto the open the basic Kikuyu-Luo politicalrivalrydespite the fact thathis politicalpositionhad dependedon the tradeunionmovementin Nairobi and not upon a ruralfollowing.The speedydispatchof his assassin,a Kikuyu,did in little to calm the Luo and the instability NyanzaProvince(the Luo area)resulted in the jailing of Odinga, the radical leader of the K.P.U. and the leading Luo politician.He has only recentlybeen releasedundera generalpoliticalamnesty as Kenya moves towardthe potentialmajorpoliticalcrisis of choosing a successor for the aging Kenyatta. The third group, the Nilo-Hamitic,occupy by far the largest area of Kenya but are the least active politically.1'These are the nomadicpastoralists,of whom the Masai are the most romanticized (althoughthey are one of the smallertribes). The Kipsigis are the largest and most agricultural the various Nilo-Hamitic of groups. At the time of the survey, the larger of the two Hamitic tribes, the Somali, were in an invidiouspositionbecauseof the "shifta"problem.The officialgovernment positionwas that the guerrilla warfarewas conductedby infiltrators from the Somali Republicbut it shouldbe noted that the Kenya Somalishad boycottedthe 1963 Uhuruelection to registertheir protest at being includedin the new nation of Kenya. Whateverthe officialposition was, the Kenya Somaliswere widely held for by popularopinionto be responsible the disorders. The mean social distancescore given by each of the majortribalgroupsused
10. As the N's for each major tribal group in the sample will indicate, it was not possible to get many respondents from the Nilo-Hamitic groups, though they constitute a significant portion of the general population. Educational institutions simply have not penetrated the generally desolate areas of Kenya that they occupy.

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in the analysis,"for each of the Kenya tribesincludedin the social distancescale, is shown in Table 2. Severalpoints are immediatelyapparent.The first is that no one likes the Somalis; reintegrating this group into Kenya national life will be the difficultno matterhow satisfactory solutionwith the Somali Republicover the disputednorthernareas has been to Kenya.12 The mean score for the otherthreeNilo-Hamitictribes,the Kipsigis,Turkana and Masai, may or may not reflecta "spill-over" animositytowardthe Somalis. of The relativelyhigh scores for these three ethnic groups may as likely be due to the "culturaldistance"between them and the agriculturalist majority.This hypothesis would accountfor the lower mean scores of the Kipsigiswho have given up more of their pastoral ways and are more active participantsin Kenya political life than either the Masai or Turkana. The Luo are not popular, either. Only the small Nilo-Hamiticsample gave them a relativelylow mean score. This again could be a reflectionof "cultural distance" or it could be, and to a greaterextent probablyis, the result of Luo politicalactionsin the yearbeforethe survey,or both. In this case, as for the Somali, both factors push the mean social distance score in the same direction.This lack of popularity reciprocated the meanscoresgivenby the Luo sampleof students is in to other ethnic groups.Their mean score is the highest given by any groupto the Kikuyu,the Kamba,and the Turkana.The dubioushonor of being the most ethnocentric goes to the Kamba-Embu-Meru sample who gave the highest mean score to six of the ten Kenya ethnic groupsincludedin the Social Distance ratings: the Luhya,Gusii, Kipsigis,Luo, Masai and Somalis.We may concludethat the LuhyaMeru dislike is a mutualfeeling, as is the Luo-Kamba. This latterfact may explain the apparentfragility of the Luo-Kambapolitical coalition, the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.) of the mid-sixties.As soon as the government(dominatedby the K.A.N.U. Party) began applyingpressureto the opposition,the K.P.U. party fell apart rapidlyuntil only Odinga and a few die-hardLuo supportersremained,if we would judge by the re-crossings the floor. of The Luhyaoccupy a somewhatuniquepositionin this ethnocentric dimension of Kenya politics. The highest mean social distance given to them was by the Kamba-Embu-Meru groupingbut it is much lower than the highest mean score given to any other group, and, indeed, is very little higher than the lowest mean score given to the Kamba,the Meru or the Gusii and considerably lower than the lowest mean score given by any Kenyaethnic groupto the Nilotic or Nilo-Hamitic coalitionpartnersfor almostany ethnic groups.In short,they emergeas acceptable in Kenya. group
11. It was not possible to break down the sample in either country into smaller ethnic groups that would have been closer to the more extensive listing of groups in the social distance scale items. 12. R. THURSTON, "Detente in the Horn," Africa Report, 14 (February, 1969), 6-13.

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TABLE 2

MEAN SOCIAL DISTANCE SCORES *, BY TRIBE, KENYA

Rating from N Kikuyu Kamba Meru Mean social distance score for Luhya Gusii Luo

Kipsigis

Kikuyu Kamba-Embu. Meru Luhya Other Bantu Luo Nilo-Hamitic

186 106 113 46 74 16

2.8785 3.1504 2.9077 3.4459 2.2500

2.7581 (1.0467) 2.9823 3.0308 3.0676 2.4375

2.6828 (2.8505) 3.0885 2.9231 3.0405 2.8750

2.7043 2.7757 2.7692 2.1892 2.5000

3.0538 3.2617 2.7345 (2.6154) 3.0811 3.0000

3.2151 3.2897 3.0885 3.0308 3.1757 (3.1875)

3.0753 3.2523 3.0000 3.2154 2.4375

* Scores in parentheses include ratings from some members of the ethnic group being rated.

3 TABLE MEAN SOCIAL DISTANCE SCORES *, BY TRIBE, GHANA

Ratings from: N Fanti Mean social distance score for -MamAsante Nzima Brong

Akwapim

Akim

Gonja

Ga Fanti-Akim Other Akan Asante Ewe Northern Other No date on Tribe

187 84 108 93 85 97 50 23

2.5989 2.3690 (1.2685) 2.5484 2.4588 2.6186 2.6000 2.8696

2.8182 (2.0238) 2.6019 2.6129 2.6588 2.7216 2.8600 3.0870

2.4813 (1.2857) 2.6759 2.6774 2.4471 2.5258 2.6000 2.9565

2.8503 2.5357 2.2778 2.6000 2.5979 2.7000 2.6957

3.0214 2.9167 2.5833 2.9892 2.9059 2.9785 2.9600 3.0435

3.6043 3.4405 3.5463 3.7312 3.3294 3.0412 3.4800 4.2174

3.2299 3.2738 3.2315 3.3978 2.8588 2.5155 3.1000 3.7391

3. 3. 3. 3. 2.9 (1. 3. 3.

S* cores in parentheses include ratings from some members of the ethnic group being rated.

LA REVUE CANADIENNEDES IETUDES AFRICAINES

The ethnocentricattitudesof the Luhya themselvesare interesting. They are not over-fondof the Kikuyu and, in fact, dislike them more than the Luo. It is not, however, a significantdifference. The respondentsin the "other Bantu"categorywere rather a mixed lot CoastalBantu and Gusii from the West - and theirratingsof other ethnic groups versusthe otherracial may be taken as indicativeof the basic Bantu"in-groupness" political events. groups, perhaps somewhatinfluencedby contemporary While the Nilo-Hamitic student sample was really too small to draw any conclusionsfrom the social-distanceratingsthey gave other tribes, one fact does nexus. The low rating emerge that warrantscomment. This is the Kikuyu-Masai given the Kikuyuby the Nilo-Hamiticgroup, and the relativelylow Masai rating litby the Kikuyu,would be inexplicableif one had not read the anthropological Until relocatedby the colonial authoritiesto make room for European erature.13 settlement,the Masai had been neighborsof the Kikuyuand considerablecultural and personnel (women) exchange had taken place along with the less friendly and Each group, in cattle-raiding limited warfarethat dominatedthe relationship. fact, had built up a grudging respectfor the other that comes throughin the social distancescores. the To summarize Kenyaethnocentrism pattern,one couldpoint to the cultural isolation of the Nilo-Hamiticsand, to a lesser degree, the Nilotic Luo, from the Bantu plurality. It would also seem, given the similarpatterningof Marco's adult sample in 1961 (Table 1), that we have tapped an underlyingattitudinaldimensionthat is not merelyan artifactof the politicalevents of the moment.If so, this ethnocentric dimensionwill affect Kenya political and social life for some time, since this type of attitudeis not a lightly-heldone, changingwith the short run of events. We may now turn to a brief descriptionof the ethnic milieu of Ghana, then in examine the patternof ethnocentrism that nation. Despite a diversityof tribal and linguisticdivisions,Ghanaiansare considered belongto but one racialgroup, to the true Negro (as, in fact, do the Bantu),ratherthan the three or four of Kenya. Within this, the divisions are drawn in terms of language and culture, of which only a few majorethnic "families"need concernus here.14 The largestis the Akan, within which the Ashanti and the Fanti are the two more importanttribes. As is the case with many of the ethnic groups of Ghana, Kenya, and of Africa generally,the Akan are fairlyrecent arrivalsin their present location. The Fanti were the second of three waves of migrationfrom the north (the first, the Guan, do not figure large in either the past or present history of
13. Including, of course, Jomo KENYATTA,Facing Mount Kenya (London, 1953). 14. See B. GIL., et al., 1960 Population Census of Ghana, Special Report "E", Tribes in Ghana (Accra, 1964), for an excellent description of Ghanaian ethnic groups.

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Ghana). They settled along the coast and thus have had the longest contact with Europeaninfluences.The Fanti often attemptedto enlist the British during the nineteenthCenturyto aid them in their attemptto resist the militaryencursions of the Ashanti. The Ashanti (or Asante) were the third wave, occupyingroughlythe center of Ghana.Althoughthey provedthe most difficulttribeto come to termswith, the Ashanti have exerted a considerablefascinationfor Europeanadministrators and scholars.Their superiororganizational talents enabled them to defeat the British and/or their Fanti confederatesin a series of wars lasting about a century.They later provided the continuing nucleus of opposition to the C.P.P. (Convention People's Party), based not only on the fact that they were the largest tribe in the country but one of the most cohesive. The hold of tradition,exemplifiedby the Asanteheneat the apex of a complex hierarchyof sub and wing chiefs, is stronger than among the coastal tribes. Unlike the comparablelargest tribe in Kenya, the Kikuyu, the Ashanti did not providethe majorimpetusfor anti-colonial nationalism.Indeed, they were less than enthusiasticsupporters the idea of independenceand favored a loose fedof eration, with considerableautonomy for themselves,rather than the centralized state advocatedby Nkrumah'sC.P.P. The resultingcompromiselasted only until Nkrumahcould effectivelydismantleit.15They cannot be accused of having used a dominantposition in nationalpolitics to advance at the expense of other tribes althoughthe "returnto civilian rule" prime minister,Dr. Kofi Busia, is from the rulinghouse of Wenchi,one of the wing chiefdomsof Ashanti. The 1972 coup is too recent to hazardany firm interpretations was although"particularism" one of the charges broughtagainst Dr. Busia. If there is latent mistrustof the Ashanti, it is firmlybased on their political and militaryposition in the Gold Coast before the Britishencompassed themwithinthe Colonyin 1901. The eldersof neighboring tribes can rememberwhen the Ashanti threatenedmilitarilyor had to be bought off with annualtribute. Two smaller ethnic groups, the Ga-Adangbeand the Ewe, are immigrants from the East. They are located along the coast, the Ga being the principletribe in the Accra area16while the Ewe are settledin the Volta Region and are separated from the remainder the tribein Togo. The incorporation the BritishTogoland of of trustterritory into the Gold Coast in 1956 was precededby considerable opposition from some of the Ewe, particularly the southernpart,who would have preferred in to be reunitedwith the Ewe in French Togo. sentiment influenced Apparentlyboth latent anti-Ewe and anti-Nkrumahist
15. Dennis AusrTN, Politics in Ghana (London, 1964), pp. 370-380. 16. According to the 1960 census, 76.6 per cent of the Ga are classified as urban, Gin, et al., op. cit., pp. 80-82.

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the outcome of the 1969 election. The Busia-ledProgressParty had as its major N.A.L. (the NationalAllianceof Liberals),now part oppositionthe Gbedemah-led of the oppositioncoalition, the CongressParty). Gbedemahhad not, apparently, gone into exile quite soon enough, and his too-long associationwith the Nkrumah regimeplus his basic supportamong his own tribal group,the Ewe, resultedin a tribal vote in the return-to-civilian election.17 rule The N.A.L. won stronglyonly in the Volta Region (Ewe) and a few seats in the North while the Akan and most others voted stronglyfor Busia with some splinteringin the North and coastal regionsfor assortedindependent parties.18 The final major category is the Mole-Dagbaniof the Northern and Upper Regions whichconsistsof a numberof small tribes(a large groupbetweenAshanti and the Northern groups, the Gonja, are Guan). The largest are the Moshi, Dagomba and Mamprusi.Linguistic similaritiesprovide the strongest basis for classifyingthese people in a single group. The northerntribes are predominantly Muslim or Animist and also resistedthe first moves toward an independentGold Coast. Althoughthey are the secondlargesttribalgroup, after the Akan, they are Adult illiteracyis the rule, facilitiesof communication by far the least modernized. and transport sparce, and there is a generallydefensiveattitudetowardthe rest are of the country. The inter-tribal mean scoresfor Ghanaare presentedin Table 3. It seems that the Nzima (Nkrumah's tribe and an Akan group)occupy the bottom of the popuSomali in Kenya but in the same larity poll, not as unpopularas the comparable relativeposition.As in the case of the KenyaSomalis,this could be eitherphysical distance(the Nzima are residentin the extremeSouthwestcornerof Ghana) or a reaction to recent political events. It seems more likely to have been the latter, since the surveywas taken only a few monthsafter the 1966 coup d'etat and antiNkrumah sentimentwas high. There had been a general feeling that Nkrumah, for whateverreasons, had surrounded himself with membersof his own tribe to the detrimentof other ethnic groups. There was a largeenoughnumberof respondents who declined,for their own undisclosedreasons, to provide informationon ethnic group membership that we were able to include them as a separate"group"in this analysis. The category, "no data on tribe," is includedbecause of the generalbelief that detribalization, howeverit comes about, shouldreduce ethnic animosities.If studentswho refused informationon ethnic affiliationare indeed the "detribalized" the sample, then of the belief is clearly wrong, for the mean scores they have given others are all at
17. For the basis of anti-Ewe sentiment in the 1969 election, see Colin LEGUM, "Tribal Survival in the Modern African Political System," in Peter C. W. Gutkind, ed., The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa (Leiden, 1970), p. 109. 18. Emily CARDand B. CALLOWAY, "Ghanaian Politics: The Elections and After," Africa Report, 15 (March, 1970), 10-15.

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the high (or often highest)end of ratingsfor every group(six times out of eleven). It is more likely that these studentswere being recalcitrant not listingtheir tribes in on the questionnaireratherthan being representative the least traditionaleleof ments in the sample.On this dimension,they are clearlyamongthe least "modern" respondentsof the sample.Their number,however,is small and resultsshould be interpreted cautiously. If we ignore the erstwhile"detribalized" group,then it is the Asante who are most ethnocentric,providingthe highestmean score in seven of the eleven cases. (The other four instanceswere scatteredamongthe Ga, Fanti, Northernand other as Akan). This seems to be a clear case of ethnocentrism Summerdefinedit. The Ashanti,with their still strongtraditional chieftancysystemand memoriesof recent
military and political hegemony, "... look (s) with contempt on outsiders.""9

At the otherend of the continuum,it is the Ewe who seem least ethnocentric. They provided the lowest mean score in four cases - to the Fanti, Dagaba, Mamprusiand Ga. The Ewe are sometimescomparedto the Ibo of Nigeria: both as groups sharingsuch characteristics an over-crowdedhome area, an early and and mission education,a readinessto eager acceptanceof Christianity apparently and orientationthan many migratein searchof opportunity a strongernationalistic of the other ethnic groups of either country. Hence, they are both viewed with suspicion,as being eager to "take over"the countryfor their own advantage.Certainly, the 1969 election broughtout some latent anti-Ewesentimentin Ghana. The other groupswhose ratingsare given do not show the strong patterning of eitherthe Asante or Ewe. The other Akan category and Northerngroupswere the only other ones to give more than one "lowest"mean score. The position of the Gonja (the Guan representative) intermediate is between the other Akan group in the Northernpart of the country, the Brong, and the Muslin Northernethnic groups, the Dagaba and Mamprusi.The social distance means from the studentsample,in this case, seem to be an accuratereflectionof the culturaland geographicdistanceseparatingethnic groups. The clearestnaturalaffinitygroupingthat emergesfrom the Ghanaianmatrix is that of the Akan tribes. The Akwapim,Akim, Fanti, Asante and, to a lesser extent, the Brong and Gonja are all on the low end of the mean scores from the Akan tribes themselvesas well as from the non-Akan.The Northerntribes, separated not only from most other tribes by distance but by religion(Islam) as well, by this measureare also separatedby a considerablesocial distancefrom most of the southerntribalgroups.Their position is analogousto that of the Nilo-Hamitic tribes in Kenya, in many respects. The Ga and Ewe, although culturallydistinct from the Akan majority in
19. SUMNER,Op. cit., p. 13.

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Ghana, are not, judged by the mutual social distance ratings,viewed as particuby larly incompatable any of the Akan except the Asante. While the low ethnocentrismof the Ewe is not reciprocated, they are not held at the same distanceby other groups as are the Luo of Kenya. Although they are not technicallymembersof either nation, the alien commercial groups were includedin the list on each schedule, as well as the British, the formercolonialpower.The rumorsof anti-Asianfeelingwere pervasiveenough in 1966 that it seemedusefulto includethem,and the comparable groupsin Ghana. The mean social distancescores given to these groupsby the variousKenya ethnic groups may be comparedwith those in Table 2. We will also include Ghanaian scores for residentnon-Ghanaiangroups by way of contrast. The 1968 N.L.C. (the military-policeNational Liberation Council) decree placing restrictionson foreign traders,particularlythe Lebanese, Indians and some Nigerians,was the first indicationthat the officialGhanaianattitudetowardthese groupswas moving The closer to the officialand unofficialattitudein Kenya.20 second was the decision in late 1969 to enforce existinglaws governingthe large non-citizenpopulationof Ghana.Nearly a quarterof the populationwas affectedby the suddenrequirement to get residencepermitsor leave the country.Those affectedwere mainlyVoltaics, Nigerians, Togolese and other West Africans, since the members of the Asian tradingcommunities(Syrians,Lebaneseand Indians)were more likely to have the work or businesspermitsessentialfor the issuanceof a residencepermit.21 Nonethe regulationwas aimed at all alien groups even though the effect was theless, greateston other West Africannationals.The data in Table 4 indicatesthe general Kenyan dislike of Asians. The ratingby "otherBantu"is slightlylower than the rated so. others,but not appreciably The Goans fare ratherbetter than "Indians," about the same as the British. The fact that the Goans, as Catholic, are not as strangein their social and culturalways as the other Asians is usuallythe reason given in Kenya for the lower level of African antagonismtoward them. This is certainlysupportedby our data. The Ghanaiansare equallyconsistentin ratingtheir non-citizentradingcommunities,of which the Lebanese and Indians are the most visible. The Lebanese are generallyrated at greatersocial distancethan the Indians,with the position of the Nigerians quite similar to that of the Indians. As in the intra-nationethnic
"Taxis service operations small scale business... retail trade business with annual sale volume of less than 500,000 cedis, wholesale trade businesses.., and representation of overseas manufacturers, are to be reserved for Ghanaians from now on." "Restrictions on Foreign Traders," West Africa, No. 2667 (July 13, 1968), 819. 21. Cameron DUODU,"Ghana : The Exodus," Africa Report, 15 (January, 1970), 8; "Strangersin Trouble," West Africa, 2739 (November 29, 1969), 1429; "Alien Exodus Goes On," op. cit., No. 2741 (December 13, 1969), 1526; "Ghana's Other Africans," op. cit., 2742 (December 20, 1969), 1533-1534.

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CROSS-NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM

TABLE4

SOCIAL DISTANCE MEANS ON NONNATIONAL RESIDENT MINORITIES, KENYA AND GHANA

Mean social distance score for Indians Goans (Sikh)

Indians (Hindu)

British

Kenya tribes Kikuyu Kamba-Embu-Meru Luhya Other Bantu Luo Nilo-Hamitic

4.3441 4.2150 4.1239 3.8923 4.2703 4.0000

4.1613 4.2336 4.0531 3.9077 4.1892 4.0625

3.2527 3.3738 2.9381 3.1077 3.2027 3.5000

3.3333 3.4860 3.3540 3.1692 3.5270 3.1875

Mean social distance score for

SyriaLebanese Indians British Nigerians

Ghanaian tribes Ga Fanti-Akim Other Akan Asante Ewe Northern Other tribes No tribal designation

3.4332 3.6429 3.5370 3.7849 3.3882 3.1237 3.4400 3.3913

3.2888 3.3929 3.3241 3.6559 3.0118 3.0103 3.0800 3.3043

2.8396 3.0119 2.9259 2.9677 2.8588 2.9381 2.7400 3.0000

3.2674 3.2262 3.3241 3.4624 2.8588 2.5155 2.8800 3.2174

patterning,the Asante are the most ethnocentrictoward all non-nationalgroups and the Ewe and Nothern groups are again the least ethnocentric.It is noticable, comparingthese figureswith those of Table 3, that the Ghanaiansapply the same rating, more or less, to their noncitizenminoritiesas they do to the more geodistanttribesof Ghana. Whilethis is true of the way the Kenyansrate graphically the Britishor the Goans, it is definitelynot true of their ratingsof the two Asian subgroups.Only the Somaliswere held at greatersocial distance.The position of the Asian minoritiesin Kenya will be an uncomfortable one for some years yet, if the attitudesof this studentgroupreflectthose of the public at large. The events of 1968 indicated just how strong the animosity toward Asians was when the stepping-upof the Africanizationprogramresulted in most non-citizen traders havingtheirtradinglicensesrevoked.Refusedentry to the United Kingdomdespite their British passports, many of the noncitizenKenya Asians were literally left withno place to go. Theirplightreceivedinternational attention,but little remedy.22 There are two distinctconclusionsthat emerge from these patternsof ethnocentrism.The firstis that the absolutelevels are higherin Kenya, and the patterns
22. "News in Brief: Kenya," Africa Report, 14 (March-April, 1969), 28-29.

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THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

more distinct.That is, the separateculturalgroupingsemergemore clearly- the cohesion "out-group"position of the Nilo-Hamitic and Luo, the Central-Bantu and the generalBantu versuseverybodyelse sentiment.In the Ghanaiandata, the is generallevel of ethnocentrism distinctlylower and there are fewer clear patterns. The isolationof the Northernethnic groupsis clear, as is that of the Nzima. The basic cohesion of the Akan comes through,the isolationof the Ewe is less clear, but perceptible. The ethnocentricattitudesseem to reflect two things in each country: the culturalor social distancebetweengroupsand recentpoliticalhistory.Neither can be consideredin isolation,of course, since perceivedsocial distancewill influence one's choice of political partners and the experience with political allies and enemieswill in turn influenceethnocentricattitudes.Nonetheless,the influenceof ethnicityon contemporary politics seems obvious. II.

The Correlatesof Ethnocentrism :

All of the ethnic groupsin both countriesmaniestedethnocentricattitudestoward all other internaland externalgroupslisted on the social distancescale. While this is one way to answerthe question "who are the ethnocentric it does not take ?", us very far. Our abilityto point to the Asante or Kambaas the most ethnocentric groupin one or the othercountryis only a partialanswer.The firststep is to reduce the social distance scores to a smallernumberfor analysis. A correlationmatrixof the coefficientsof the eighteensocial distancescores had confirmedthe patternsdiscussed above.23The scores of related ethnic and categoricgroupscan be combinedon both intuitiveand statisticalgrounds,yielding a much smallernumberof scoresto work with. The combination groupsin each of score is as follows : 24 composite Kenya : All KenyaAfrican: Kamba,Turkana,Luo, Luhya, Kikuyu,Kipsigis,Somali, Gusii, Masai, Meru All Bantu, Kenya Africans: Kamba,Luhya, Kikuyu, Gusii, Meru All non-Bantu,Kenya Africans: Turkana,Luo, Kipsigis, Somali, Masai Kikuyu & CentralBantu: Kikuyu,Kamba, Meru
23. Not reproduced here. See R. E. KOPLIN, "Education and National Integration in Ghana and Kenya" (Eugene, 1968, unpublished doctoral dissertation), pp. 337-340. 24. Each score was computed by adding an individual's single scores for all the groups, dividing by the number of groups involved in the particular score. If one of the scores pertained to the individual's own tribe, the score was excluded and the divisor reduced by one. This was to prevent his probably highly favorable rating of his own tribe from diluting his score on "out-groups".

86

TABLE 5

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF COMPOSITE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCOR

All social distance All Ghanaian All Akan, All non-Akan, All NonGhanaian

scores

scores

Ghanaian

Ghanaian

scores

,)

Cd
0 o
i:
?.,

All social distance scores All Ghanaian Groups All Akan groups' Ghanaian All non-Akan Groups, Ghanaian All non-Ghanaiangroups All non-Ghanaian,African All non-Ghanaian, non-African Asian scores

.9325 .9586 .8561 .8801 .9195 .8424 .7505 .7683 .9030 .9075 .7819 .7523 .5845 .6267

.7770 .8614

.8327 .8650 .4903

.8553 .6256 .4535 .6257

.6407 .6590 .6458 .5400 .5171

TABLE 6

.7567 .7161 .5193 .6171

.8056 .8673 .8625

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF COMPOSITE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCO

All social distance scores All Kenya Africans All Bantu, Kenya All non Bantu Kenya Central Bantu Kenya NiloHamitic Kenya

A1 nonKenya

4~)

Cd

C O t4

t4

All social distance scores All Kenya African scores All Bantu, Kenya Africans All non-Bantu Kenya Africans All Kikuyu and Central Bantu Nilo-Hamitic, Kenya Africans All non-Kenyans All non-Kenyans, Africans All non-African Foreign Asians

.8993 .9132 .7091 .8180 .5241 .7461 .7439 .6605 .6023 .7032 .7745 .8911 .5995 .8423 .5214 .4962 .3346 .4513

.7210 .7796

.8273 .9126 .5001

.4559 .4833 .7648 .2482

.7919 .8705 .5981 .8786 .3433

.8502 .6362 .5045 .5637 .3370 .5595

.4473 .8541 .5244 .3390 .2670 .2056 .3129 .3389 .8759 .4389 .4976 .3094 .4321

.4103 .1764 .1444 .1123 .1649

.3619 .3821 .2132 .3516 .8035 .8933 .4812

LA REVUECANADIENNEDES

ITUDES

AFRICAINES

Nilo-Hamitic: Turkana,Kipsigis,Masai All Non-Kenyagroups: British, American,Zambia,Russia, Ghana Non-Kenya,African: Zambia,Ghana Non-AfricanForeign: British, American,Russia Asians : Goan, Indian (Sikh), Indian (Hindu) Ghana : All Ghanaian: Akwapim,Akim, Fanti, Asante, Ga-Adangbe,Brong, Gonja, Nzima, Dagaba, Mamprusi All Akan, Ghanaian: Akwapim,Akim, Fanti, Asante, Brong, Nzima, Gonja All non-Akan,Ghanaian: Dagaba, Mamprussi,Ewe, Ga-Adangbe All non-Ghanaian British,Nigerian,American,Syria-Lebanon, : India, Russian, Kenya African : Kenya, Nigeria Non-Ghanaian, Non-Africanforeign: British, American,Russian India Asian : Syria-Lebanon, The result was ten composite scores for Kenya studentsand eight for Ghanaian. We will use only three scoresfor each nationalsample: the all Ghanaian,all Akan and 'Asian' for Ghana and all Bantu, all non-Bantuand all Kikuyu and Central Bantu for Kenya.25Before discussing the relationshipsbetween the background to variablesand the scores,it is important examinethe possibletheoreticalgrounds for predictingthat patternswill emerge. An analysisof the impact of educationon ethnic groups per se in the two countrieshas revealedrelationships betweenethnic groups and such things as elite The occupations, socio-economicstatus, past and present levels of education.26 vast literatureon socializationalone would suggest that ethnocentrism would, in some way, be related to age, sex, parental income, education or occupation,to name only the most obvious background variablesisolated in other studies as imcorrelatesof attitudes.The literatureon African ethnocentrism rather is portant but we way summarize findingsthat are relevanthere. more sparce the The generalizations fromresearchon prejudiceare not very sanguine.Allport's careful surveyof the availableresearchdoes not leave the impressionthat education, or any of the other integrativetactics, will prove particularlysuccessful in Of diminishingethnocentrism. the ten conditionsthat he found to be conducive
25. Regression analysis of the five excluded composite Ghanaian scores are available upon request from the author, as well as the seven excluded Kenya regressions. The results were statistically more unsatisfactory than those reported here, which are unsatisfactory enough. 26. See R. E. MAPP, "The Impact of Education on Ethnic Diversity in Ghana and Kenya," in Wendell Bell and W. Freeman, eds., Ethnicity and Nation-Building: National and International Perspectives (Beverly Hills, 1972) and David ABERNETHY, Political The Dilemma of Popular Education (Palo Alto, 1969); pp. 253-277.

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CROSS-NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM

to higher levels of prejudice,almost half are present in both Ghana and Kenya. These are: (1) rapid social change, (2) the possibility of vertical mobility, (3) ignoranceand barriersto communication,and (4) the availabilityof traditional justifications ethnocentrism.27 for The Koff and von der Muhil study of East African socializationfound a lower level of trusttowardmembersof differentgroupsamongsecondremarkably studentsthan amongprimaryschool students,28 that more education ary suggesting was not having the expected national integrationeffect. A study of programmed in political educationfor nation-building Uganda concludedthat whateversuccess the schools had in socializingstudentsinto a nationalcommunitywas in spite of the program,not because of it.29 A survey of adult attitudestoward "Europeans" the Gold Coast before in independencefound an unexpecteduniformityof stereotypesand preferences,reA gardless of educationalor social backgrounds.30 similar lack of patterningis students; Barkanfound a remarkable of possible among similarity attitudesamong three Africanuniversitystudentsamples.3' Given the dual conditionsof "tribalism" and rapid social change, the transis ferabilityof hypothesesrelatingthe influenceof educationon ethnocentrism at best uncertain.32 the one hand, it seems to be clear that educationwill increase On the awareness the politicalsystembut does not necessarily of determine affective the content of this perception.33 There is the additionalprobabilitythat the basic political communityorientations may be establishedvery early in life and are resiliant to subsequentchange.34There is no doubt that African families socialize their children.The problemis that "parentssocialize their childrenfor participation in
27. Gordon ALLPORT, Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 221. The 28. David KOFF and G. von der MUHLL,"Political Socialization in East Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, V (May, 1967), 40-41; see, also, K. PREWrrr,ed., Education and Political Values (Nairobi, 1971), for a collection of articles dealing with the problem in East Africa. 29. Kenneth PREWITT, with J. OKELLO-OCULI, "Political Socialization and Political Education in the New Nations," in Roberta S. Sigel, ed., Learning About Politics, (New York, 1970), pp. 607-621. 30. Gustav JAHODA, "National Preferences and National Stereotypes in Ghana Before Independence,"Journal of Social Psychology, 50 (1959), 166. 31. Joel BARKAN, '"The Political Socialization of University Students in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda," (New York: American Political Science Association, 1969). 32. S. M. LIPSET, "Research Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Mobility and Development," International Social Science Journal, XVI (1964), 35-48. 33. G. A. ALMOND and S. VERBA, The Civic Culture (Boston, 1953), pp. 315-324. 34. D. EASTON and R. D. HEss, "Youth and the Political System," in S. M. Lipset and L. Lowenthal, eds., Culture and Social Character (New York, 1961). pp. 240-241; R. D. HESS, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority: Some CrossNational Comparisons," International Social Science Journal, XV (1963), 542-559. But, see BA~RAN, cit., for the opposite view. op.

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THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

the local authoritysystemsof the rural areas ratherthan for roles in the national to citizenry." More educationhas been found to increaseethnocentrism, diminish 35 or to have an effect that varies with the level of parentaleducation.36 it, There is nonethelessreason to expect that level of education and type of educationalinstitutionmight have an effect on ethnocentrism. One factor is the enhanced role of education in socializationin African countries because of the absenceor weaknessof other institutions such as voluntaryassociationsor the At mass media - comparedto more maturepolities.37 least one study of a West African student population found evidence that a heterogeneousstudent body diminishedethnocentricattitudes.38 There is other evidencefor the primacyof the influenceof the school in competitionwith dissimilaror conflictingsocialization from other sources.39 Some of this effect may be due to the instrumental value of educationin the attainmentof generalizedstudent goals of high-income,high-statusemployment aftergraduation.40There is some researchsupportfor this possibility.Summarizing the findingson social change, Berelson and Steinerconcludedthat: Social changes,howeverlarge, that are desiredby the people involvedcan be assimilatedwith little social disruption.Changes that are not desired, even social and personal quite small ones, can be put into effectonly at considerable cost.41 The re-orientation politicalloyaltyfromthe ethnic or tribalgroupto the national of and a diminution ethnocentric of a level, attitudes,ordinarily majorchangeby any be accomplished with relativeease in the context of the educational standards, may experience.One would hesitate to suggest that this would be true for the general populationof these countries,althoughBerelsonand Steinerseem to be proposing as much :
35. Robert LE VINE, "Political Socialization and Culture Change," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States (New York, 1963), p. 282.
36. ALLPORT,op. cit., p. 432.

37. James S. COLEMAN, "Introduction,"in J. S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton, 1965), p. 22. 38. Dwaine MARVICK, "African University Students: A Presumptive Elite," in J. S. Coleman, ed., op. cit., pp. 463-497.
39. G. ALMONDand S. VERBA, op. cit., pp. 305-306.

40. R. E. KoPLN, "A Model of Student Politicization in the Developing Nations," Comparative Political Studies I (1968), 373-390; David J. FINLAY, et al., "University and Polity," in D. J. Emmerson, ed., Students and Politics in Developing Countries (New York, 1968), pp. 64-102.
41. B. BERELSON and G. A. STEINER, Human Behaviour:

New Lives for Old (Caldwell, Findings (New York, 1964), pp. 613-614. They cite M. MEAD, New Jersey, 1956), and M. NASH, "Applied and Action Anthropology in the Understanding of Man," Anthropological Quarterly, XXXII (1959), 67-81 in support of this proposition.

An Inventory of Scientific

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CROSS-NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM

social ties makes people particularly An abruptshift from traditional susceptible to new identifications, opinions,practices,institutions,politicalpractices, in countriesof the Middle ways of life ; as, for example,currently the emerging East, SoutheastAsia, and Africa.42 On the other hand, sharp changes in socio-economicstatus (i.e., radical mobility either upwardor downward)were found to tend to produceethnic prejudicein the United States.43This would accord with Allport's conclusions concerningrapid social change and mobility. A test of these diverse hypothesesmay be made, for the African context, in the process of determiningthe correlatesof ethnocentrism. The following indevariableswere used in the regressionanalysis(the directionof coding is pendent indicated). 1) Age: 2) Father'seducation: coded from low to high 3) Father'sIncome: 4) Sex: Male, Female 5) Father'soccupation: from lowest status (unemployedor unskilledlabor) to highest(professional,civil service) rural to predomi6) Residentialexperienceof respondent: from predominantly urban natly 7) Level of education: from IVth form to universitygraduatestudent. 8) School: educationalinstitutionattendedfrom most rural and parochialsecondary as low to most cosmopolitansecondary,with universityat the high end. 9) Religion: from most liberal, "open"to most conservative,"closed"religious affiliation.44 be 10) Tribe most urbanizedto least 11) Region variableswith the comThe simplecorrelations each of the eleven independent of on scores '(whichran from low to high ethnocentrism) "All Akan" or "All posite

42. Ibid., p. 615. They do not, however, cite any research evidence. 43. B. BETTLEHEIM and M. J?ANowrrz, Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans (New York, 1950), pp. 60-61. 44. The author freely admits that the coding of both School and Religion, but particularly the 'latter, reflects her own prejudices and impressions. To prevent a reopening of the Thirty Years War, and to avoid insulting any graduates of the sampled schools who may chance to read this, the location of specific religions and schools in the low to high coding will not be revealed in public or in private. The (probably biased) coding decisions were arrived at before the data was analyzed, whatever correlations may emerge did so honestly.

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Bantu" are shown in Table 7.45 Since the N's for both countriesare quite large, the level of significance includedin parentheses is followingthe specificcorrelation Basedon earlierdiscussionof the literature, directionof the predicted the figure. ,the is indicated.Unstarredvariablesare those which should have had a relationship positive correlation,asteriskedvariablesshould have had a negative correlation, and those indentified a questionmarkhad conflictingpredictionsas to the direcby tion of correlation. The three variablesrelatingto family status were given a question mark because of the equallystronglogicalpossibilities, that (1) the radicalmobilityimplied by a studentbeing at this level of education,if he came from a poor family, could mean that he was open to new ideas and experiences,hence would be less ethno-

TABLE 7

ETHNOCENTRISM AND BACKGROUND VARIABLES, SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 1

GHANA (All Akan Scores) significance r level KENYA (All Bantu Scores) significance r level

* Age
Sex

-.0227
- .0066

(.271)
(.430)

-.1198
- .0458

(.002)
(.139)

? Father's Education ? Father's Occupation ? Father's Income

* Residential

.0052 - .0841 .0237 - .0079

--.1304 -.1347

(.445) (.012) (.261) (.416)

(.001) (.001)

.0871 .0662 .0245 .0413

-.1526 -.1600

(.019) (.058) (.281) (.164)

(.001) (.001)

Experience
* Level of Education * School

Religion Tribe Region

.0305 -.1037 -.0002

(.206) (.003) (.497)

- .0486 .4114 .1668

(.125) (.001) (.001)

1. Underlined significance levels were those where the predicted direction of correlation was significant.

45. Simple correlations and multipleregressions using a quartile scoring (which put as close to 25 per cent of each sampleas possibleinto low, medium-low, and medium-high high categories)resultedin better statisticalresults for the Ghanaiansample by "forcing" into respondents a "high" to positionthat was relativebut not really comparable the amount of ethnocentrism expressedby the Kenya students. An absolute comparisonseemed the more honestsolution.

92

CROSS-NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM

becauserapidmobilityis psychologically centric, or (2) more ethnocentric painful and the individualmay take refuge in prejudice.The results do not lend much with higher positiverelationship supportto either thesis. There is a non-significant levels of paternaleducationand income in both sampleswhile higher status occupations have a weak negativecorrelationin Ghana and a weaker positive one in None of these simple correlationsare strong enough Kenya with ethnocentrism. to permitus to say that one or the other hypothesiswas pointed toward. The absence of strong cross-national patternsmay be inferredfrom the observationthat only six of the eleven variablepairs agree as to the directionof the relationship.Of the eight variableswith a predicteddirectionof correlation,only ten of the possible sixteen correctdirectionsobtainedand only seven were significant. It is clear, however,that lower levels of educationand more parochialschools are associatedin both countries with higher ethnocentrism.In Kenya there are also strong correlationswith age (negative), tribe and region. The latter two are both positive, i.e., the least urbanizedare most ethnocentric.The Ghanaiancorrelationwith tribe is significant in the oppositedirection.Thus, we have some but
8 TABLE
CORRELATES OF ETHNOCENTRISM: KENYA Multiple r Kikuyu and Central Bantu Tribe Father's Education * Level of Education
* Sex

r2 .36929 .37986 .38607

.39038

.60769 .61633 .62135

.62481

* Father's Income (with all variables in)

.62691 .63123 .41144 .43444 .44587 .45334

.45648

.39302 .39845 .16928 .18874 .19880 .20551

.20838

All Bantu Scores Tribe * Level of Education Father's Education * Religion

* Sex

(with all variables in) All non-Bantu scores * School * Tribe Sex * Religion * Father's Income (with all variables in)
* Indicates simple correlationwas negative

.46412 .20424 .25524 .28435 .29274 .30350 .32248

.21541 .04171 .06515 .08086 .08570 .09211 .10400

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THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES

supportfor the conventionalsocial science wisdom, but scarcely a passing score. The qualityo the school and level of educationare far more important than those variablesrelatingto familial socializationexperiences.These, however, are simple correlationsand multipleregressionanalysisis essentialto determinewhich variables are most important,which others merely reinforcing.Since the results of the Kenya analysis are statisticallythe more satisfying,they are reportedfirst. One of the Kenya composite scores yielded appreciablybetter results than of the others. This is the score on Kikuyu and other CentralBantu groups. any variablewas tribe, the positive simpler being largelydue to The best independent at Kikuyuand Kamba-Embu-Meru the low value positions,Luo and Nilo-Hamitic effect of this variableis also apparentin the positive at the high. The predominate correlation with the "All Bantu"and negativecorrelation with the "All non-Bantu" scores. The profileof studentwith high ethnocentrism towardboth "All Bantu" ,the and "Kikuyuand CentralBantu"is thus a respondentwho is non-Bantu,male, at a lower level of educationwith the important footnotethat higherlevels of paternal educationwere relatedto higherlevels of ethnocentrism towardKikuyuand related groups.
TABLE 9

CORRELATES OF ETHNOCENTRISM: GHANA Multiple r All Ghanaian Groups * School * Level of Education Age * Residential Experience Sex (with all variables in) All Akan Scores * School * Level of Education * Age * Residential Experience * Father's Occupation (with all variables in) Ghana : Asian Scores Age Residential Experience Region * Father's Education Level of education (with all variables in)
* Indicates simple correlationwas negative

r2 .01637 .02317 .02776 .02959 .03098 .03156 .01816 .02771 .03030 .03322 .03424 .03537 .02346 .02564 .02826 .02926 .02971 .03143

.12795 .15221 .16660 .17201 .17602 .17764 .13474 .16645 .17406 .18228 .18505 .18807 .15316 .16014 .16810 .17106 .17237 .17730

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CROSS-NATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM

Ethnocentricattitudestowardthe non-Bantu(Luo and Nilo-Hamitic)are, as might be expected, related to being Bantu in a lower status school. It is only on this last score that quality of the educationalinstitutionbecomes the first variable enteredinto the regression. In the case of these three scores it should be noted that, at best, we have explainedonly forty percentof the variationin the Kikuyuand other CentralBantu score, slightly over twenty percent of the all Bantu and only ten percent of the non-Bantu. The Ghanaianregressionanalysisis even more unproductive. The composite scoreswith the highestr2are reportedin Table 9 and the best is only three and one half percent. None of the variableshave sufficientexplanatorypower to justify extendeddiscussion. Ill.

: Conclusions
What, then, may we conclude about the probableeffect of differingsocialization ? experiences and ethnocentrism In Ghana, almost nothing. Although there are of ethnic group affect-disaffect, unrelatedto specific patterns they are remarkably of familycharacteristics paternalincome,occupationor educationand only weakly related to the educationalexperiencesitself. We would concur with Jahoda that ethnocentricattitudes are held irrespectiveof educationalor social backgrounds in Ghana as in the pre-independence Gold Coast. In Kenya the situationis somewhatclearer in that tribal affiliationemerges as the single most importantcorrelateof ethnocentricattitudes. We might have inferredthis from the much strongerpatternsof ethnic groupingsin Table 2 and from a knowledgeof recentpoliticalevents in that country.Nonetheless,we would hesitateto predictethnocentrism towardany but the Kikuyuand the Kamba-EmbuMeru group, and even that predictionwould have to be hedged. If we must point to a singlefactor explaining in ethnocentrism these countries, it would be Allport's "availability traditional of The justifications".46 data do not offer supportof the thesis that radical social mobilityleads to either increasedor decreased ethnocentrism,and rapid social change is not isolable with the data. Certainlywe may assumethat socialchangeis takingplace and that all respondents were to some extent affectedby it. The fact that there was frequentlya correlation with quality of school - the most parochialschools and higherscores - cannot be taken as evidencein eitherdirectionfor the impactof social change.The socioeconomic cross section at each of the samplededucationalinstitutionswas quite broad and so we cannot say that studentsat the less prestigeousones were from
46. ALLPORT,op. cit., p. 221.

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hence had experiencedgreatermobility the poorest socio-economicbackgrounds, at nor and thus were moreethnocentric that they were frustrated not havinggained schools and saw their personal mobilityas thwarted.47 admissionto high-prestige Increasedlevels of education do seem to have some effect in diminishing ethnocentrismbut not as much as political and educationalleaders may have findingthat distrust anticipated.We could not re-testthe Koff and von der Muh11 of other groupsincreasedfrom primaryto secondaryschool, but it shouldbe kept in mind by the reader.It is quite probablethat educationcannot be as effective in promotingnational integration(by diminishingethnocentrism)as one would in wish as long as it exists in a social and politicalenvironment which ethnicityis value for generalsocietal ecohighly salient. There is doubtlesssome "threshold" nomic and social integrationthat must be reached before there is reinforcement of any positiveeducationalimpact.The evidencefrom NorthernIreland,Belgium, Quebec or East Pakistansuggeststhat this thresholdlevel is very high indeed. In the meantime,we cannotpoint to specificfactorsreflectiveof differingsocialization experiencesas being the "sources"of these ethnocentricattitudes.They derive from the social and historicalmilieu of the relevant ethnic groups - from the politicalculture- and will change as rapidlyor slowly as it does.

47. Secondary students are quite accurate in their perception of the relative prestige of various schools in Ghana, at least, in terms of academic quality and public prestige. See Philip FOSTER, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago, 1965), pp. 220-223.

96