Harakat al-Muqawama alIslamiyya

Reconciling Ideology and Pragmatics in the Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement

Nathaniel Whittemore

*Please note that, in the interest of space, in-text references refer to informational sources by the number listed with the particular article in the bibliography.

Introduction It was a hot, listless day in 1989 in the neighborhood of Bayt Sahur, part of the occupied Palestinian territories. Dust hung in the air as hundreds of angry feet stamped frustration into a palpable storm on the narrow street. From the windows above, gawky onlookers cheered and screamed as the children, teenagers and younger, hurled stones at the small group of Israeli soldiers caught in the melee. Some yelled for blood; some crowed for death; all raged with the inescapability of their furious violent intoxication. Within one shabby apartment, a middle-aged woman wrested herself away from her Pyrrhic glee long enough to wonder aloud, Am I losing my humanity?1 Such were the conditions of the Palestinian territories during the first intifada, which began in December of 1987. Life was a blur of occupation, fear, struggle, economic hardship, God, forgotten promises, forsaken dreams, and a constant battle to avoid succumbing to hopelessness. It was into this world that Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Resistance Movement, was born. The movement began as a militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas relationship with its parent would allow it to access an entire network of social, organizational, and financial resources that it would otherwise have been without. Although the Brotherhood operated on a Palestinian and international plane, Hamas came about specifically in response to the crisis of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas was a departure from other organizations in that it cultivated the depravity of the population for political and social mobilization. It portrayed solutions in the terms of a militant religious ideology. In this way, it was a reaction not only to Israeli presence, but to the failure of impotent secular Palestinian leadership. Caught between dogmatic ideology and political reality, Hamas is a movement fraught with paradox. How can it contend that secular nationalism is entirely ineffectual yet at the same time insist that it is not trying to drive a wedge in the Palestinian national leadership? How can base itself on disparaging compromise in principle and an association of surrendering any part of Palestine with heresy, yet at the same time, maneuver politically for
1

Finkelstein, Article 17

the good of the people? Most fundamentally, how is it that a movement that views itself as violently militant and religiously fundamentalist can function as an unflinching national and moral defender, yet at the same time react and adapt to new social circumstances? Within the intifada participants, there existed a multitude of mindsets connected by a common thread of desperation and the intolerable motionlessness that two decades of occupation had left them with. Hamas appealed both to this frustration and moreover, to a shared Islamic heritage, which had until then remained relatively untapped as a source of social mobilization. In these appeals, Hamas outwardly posited itself as the religious, unflinching, and proactive alternative to the secular, complacent, and reactive monolith of extant leadership. On an important operational level, however, the Movement attempted to distance itself from potential sources of blame and to leave its rhetorical options open that it might adapt to the changing circumstances of adherents. On some levels then, Hamas functioned as a populist movement in the disguise of a novel religiously militant ideology. It did indeed appeal to peoples hopeless side, but in so doing, tied itself to the fluid emotional condition of the occupied Palestinians. The early history of Hamas was thus a balancing act between rigid ideology and prosaic practice that would hopefully allow it to become both a credible alternative to secular Palestinian leadership and effective leader of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation. Extant literary and media sources have tended to dismiss Hamas as a hopelessly radical and interminably violent obstacle to peace. Rather than looking at the way in which the organization has functioned, the journalistic corpus has taken Hamas at face value, only mentioning it in the context of yet another suicide bombing or as a diversion to be somehow handled by whoever the new Palestinian Prime Minister may be. The American public has been conditioned after Pavlov to associate Hamas with Islam and Islam with extremist violence. Indeed, until a few years ago, my mind made the same instant associations that the broad majority of news-hungry Fox viewers experience now. Little if any consideration, however, is given to why Hamas exists. Little if any attention is paid to the historical underpinnings of the organization and what it is that has allowed it to remain an influential actor in

the Middle-Eastern crisis. By attributing the terrorism of Hamas to an incomprehensible psychological division between us and them, we free ourselves from examining our assumptions and settle comfortably into a meaningless pseudo-intellectual diatribe about the nature of good and evil. I contend that Hamas is not as rigid or monolithic as mainstream American media perceives it be or as it unyieldingly religious as it would purport to be. Hamas is not mired in functional fixedness, but rather has walked a precarious tightrope in maintaining a position of supposedly unyielding religiosity and violent militancy while also strategically adapting to fluid social dynamics. In The Palestinian Hamas, Mishal and Sela argue that the intricacies of Hamass policy[have] enabled the movement to maneuver within the prose of political reality while never ceasing to recite the poetry of ideology. This paper will examine that argument in the context of the movements August 1988 Charter, which I contend writes this duality into the very constitution of the organization itself. I endeavor to analyze the way in which the document framed an unflinching militant religiosity in the context of the occupied Palestinians, while at the same time, allowed the group the maneuverability to adapt to the changing nature, emotional underpinnings, and fluid power dynamics of the first intifada. The Charter is amazing in its ability to conceal its own balance behind apparent radicalism and its populist appeal behind ostensible religious principle. The fundamental strength of the document is its transformation of extant nationalist sentiment and radicalized discontent into a fundamentalist ideology that appealed to latent religiosity and frustration at the ineffectuality of any then-proposed or implemented solutions. What is most remarkable is that it did this while also filling the document with ideological release valves by which the Movement could change direction or refocus opprobrium as circumstances dictated. While this paper will focus on these peculiarities of the Charter itself, it will also look at the organizational basis and historical impetus that made them necessary. Materials The majority of my sources were articles from scholarly journals published during the first intifada. In an attempt to understand how people

were interpreting Hamas as they were introduced to it, as well as to separate the collective stereotype of the Islamic Resistence Movement from its actually early functional organization, I tried to find sources from the late 1980s and early 1990s. A number of articles come from the Middle East Report, and many are from the Journal of Palestine Studies. The articles range from the strictly factual, such as the U.S. Deparment of States Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1989, to interviews with Hamas leaders and spokespeople, to vivid personal accounts of time spent in the occupied territories, such as Norman Finkelsteins moving article about his stay in Bayt Sahur. For overall guidance, I employed The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, a book published in 2000. A few other books with topics ranging from social movement theory to the nature of Muslim Rebellion were recruited to help augment my understanding of Hamas as a social phenomenon. For a complete list of materials, please see the end of this paper. Analysis Precursor to a Movement: The Organizational Foundation of Hamas Even from its earliest moments, the social positioning of Hamas had been imbued with the politics of caution. The Charter of Harakat alMuqawama al-Islamiyya was published in August 1988, a full eight months after the intifada had exploded in the occupied territories. The first leaflets released to the public under the organizations banner had been disseminated in January of that year, and the earliest fliers retroactively identified with Hamas were released on December 18, 1987. 2 The Muslim Brotherhood, out of which the Islamic Resistance Movement had formed, was cautious to test public perception of the more radical group before acknowledging its own role in formation. The creation of the movement was a response to the Palestinian uprising and more specifically, the demand of younger Brotherhood members that the organization become involved in the immediate politics of liberation. 3 During the 1970s and 80s, the Brotherhood had maintained a comfortable distance from political or physical confrontation of the Israeli occupation. Its
2 3

Article 2 Article 2

espoused ideology suggested that a re-education and re-Islamicization of society were necessary precursors of any attempt to build a truly Islamic state. This is not to suggest that the Brotherhood was inactive in the social framework of occupied Palestinian society. Indeed, the charismatic new leadership of this era centralized the religious and civic activities of the Brotherhood and was vital in creating social bases of support and potential sites of mobilization that would later be employed by Hamas. Interestingly, it was the relative political laxity of the Brotherhood during the twenty-years following the Six Days war that created both the necessity of a new organization to serve as the MBs radical face and the organizational resources which would allow that organization to function within the chaotic power dynamics of the intifada. On December 8, 1987, one day after the start of the Uprising, Brotherhood leaders met in Gaza to discuss possible courses of action. It was at this meeting that Shaykh Ahmad Yassin suggested the creation of an ostensibly distinct but affiliated organization to carry out the radical functioning of the Brotherhood.
Yassin and his close associated had to find a way to join the intifada without compromising the future of the movement they had built up.4

The organization would have to be its own entity because on an important directional level, it would represent a paradigm shift in the active principles of the Brotherhood. Due to its absence from anti-occupation activities and history of conflict with nationalist forces, Taraki suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood had to adopt a new name upon entering the political sphere.5 The fiery passion with which young members demanded Brotherhood involvement in the uprising suggested that the changing circumstances of Israeli occupation necessitated that, at least initially, action take precedence over education and the delayed reward of a truly Islamic society. The Islamic Resistance Movement had its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood formed by Hasan al-Banna in the late 1920s. During the 1930s, Palestinian branches of the Young Muslim Mens Association (Jamiyyat al4 5

Ibid Article 1

shubban al-muslimin) coalesced under the leadership of Shaykh Izz al-Din alQassam, a figure who would provide later revolutionary inspiration for Hamas. In 1945, the first branch of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was opened in Jerusalem.6 Its functioning during the next twenty-two years was largely calibrated to the particular attitudes of Egypt and Jordan 7. As the Egyptian government began to institute Nasserist Pan-Arab secular nationalism, the religiously pious organization was forced underground. It was in this climate and largely under the onus of a young Ahmad Yassin that the institutional framework for Hamas was laid. Under the auspices of the newly formed al-Mujamma al-Islami (Islamic Center), the 1970s and 80s were spent cultivating the personal, organizational, and financial resources necessary for a movement seeking to reassert the moral framework of society. Despite this, Abu-Amr suggests that a certain tension arose within the movement that wouldnt be resolved on any tangible level until the creation of Hamas. He writes:
[Following 1967]: The Brotherhood continued to concentrate mainly on the upbringing of an Islamic generation but [its] emphasis on the Islamic restructuring of society and religious education seemed to have little relevance for a population that was seeking liberation from foreign occupation.

The Islamic Center was formed as a voluntary association by Shaykh Yassin in 1973 to coordinate the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and Palestine at large. Yassin had learned from his experience in Egypt that a focus on dawa or education would ensure that ruling bodies would give the young movement its space.8 The organization channeled the financial resources of the Muslim Brotherhood at home and abroad towards a number of projects including the creation of nursery schools, social and sports clubs, libraries, and Islamic exhibitions.9 The Islamic Center was initially made up of seven committees ranging from preaching and guidance to charity to health. Perhaps most importantly, it was crucial in directing the zakat tax to the destitute, building new mosques, and cultivating Islamist sentiment in the universities.

6 7

The Palestinian Hamas, 16 The controllers of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively 8 The Palestinian Hamas, 19 9 Article 2

The

dilapidated

socio-economic

and

physical

conditions of

the

occupied territories, including Gaza Refugee Camps that had the highest population densities on Earth, along with the latent religiosity of the Palestinians10 created an opening for religiously oriented social activism. The activities of the Islamic center revolved around the mosque and in so doing, created an appealing amalgam of religion, education, civic duty, and social relief. The ostensibly religious and social orientation of the organization also ensured that Israeli forces would allow it to operate with at least tacit consent. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a nascent ideological shift beginning within the occupied populations. The failure of the secular Palestinian leadership to salve the situation within the territories, combined with the vital social function of the Islamic Center and the revolutionary religious example of Iran sparked a persistent if subtle refocus on Islam as a source of remedy. In light of this, the Mujamma increased its attempts to gain a foothold in voluntary and public institutions. 11 The Islamic Center was able to gain control of a large percentage of the Strip mosques, which were still funded from outside the organization itself. Similarly, it encouraged supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood to join professional associations and unions. The Islamic University had been founded in Gaza in 1978, and although initially bankrolled by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, by 1983 Islamic movement members comprised a majority of the board of trustees. In the same year, an Islamic bloc of students backed by the Mujamma won 51% of the votes in student elections. By 1986 that number had risen to 61%. It was this cultivation of resources that would be vital for the mobility of Hamas during the course of the intifada.12 During the 1980s, the actions of the Israeli military served to the link religious mobilization and nationalism.13 In the aftermath of the attack at the al-Aqsa mosque in April 1982, the soldiers violence against worshipers shocked the Palestinian and foreign public and created a scenario in which nationalist protest merged with religious outrage. At the same time,
10 11

According to Article 9, 95% of the 633,000 Gaza Refugees were practicing Muslims. The Palestinian Hamas, 22 12 The Palestinian Hamas, 23 13 Article 9

economic crisis such as sinking oil prices and Israeli control over the free Palestinian markets dramatically increased the depravity both in Gaza and on the West Bank. By 1987, the intifada seemed to be a tinderbox just waiting for a spark. As late as December 6, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres had suggested leaving the Gaza Strip. The next day, all hell broke loose. Reconciling Prose and Poetry: the Charter of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya In the climate of the first nine months of uprising, the efficacy of the ostensibly radical new organization was put to the test. In August 1988, the group released its Charter, expounding its redefined militant ideology and delineating its own function as well as the responsibility of all Palestinians in raising the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.14 These ideas aside, the most important function of the document was to resolve the operational paradox between rigid Islamic principles that decried compromise and the adaptive necessity inspired by fluid political realities. By allowing the flowing grandeur of revolutionary religious principle to rhetorically subsume the safety valves and apparent inconsistencies, the organization allowed itself important functional maneuverability while preserving the consistency and unyielding force of its message. Cultivating Mass Appeal: Religious Co-option of Populist and Nationalist Sentiment It is undeniable that the 1988 charter it is, both in language and content, religious in its appeal to action. Yet, within this religiosity, there are a number of intricacies by which the religion of Hamas appropriates the popular sentiments that had previously been used to galvanize the Palestinian population. Milton-Edwards goes so far as to suggest that the activities remain essentially the same; [it is] the justification for the action [that] changes.15 In the course of its thirty-six articles, the Charter creates individual religious duty out of common oppression and links Islam inextricably to both means and ends of Palestinian struggle.

14 15

Article 7 Article 3

10

The Charter begins with three quotes that within them allude to the multiple sentiment of the Movement. Quoting from the Quran sets the religious tone of the document, but in the particular selection also suggests a latent Islamic nationalism: bismallah al-rahman al-rahim: Ye are the best nation that hath been raised up unto mankind: ye command that which is just, and ye forbid that which is unjust, and ye believe in Allah. 16 The quote, while literally referring to all Arab Muslims, takes slightly new properties in the context of Hamas directed appeal to the occupied populations. Such a powerful statement ostensibly from the mouth of God could not help but engender a sort of national pride which would serve to bind the Palestinian readers together in both a national and religious struggle. Just as it binds together, however, Hamas suggests that the responsibility of struggle falls not only on the community but upon each individual member as well. Indeed, the Islamic world is burning, therefore it is obligatory on everyone to put a little of it out so he can extinguish what he is able to do without waiting for anyone else. So begins the theme of necessary personal commitment that is extended later in the document. In addition to broadening the movement to include everyone, this particular quote speaks to the urgency of Hamas inception. In quoting the Shaykh Amjad al-Zahawee, the organization suggested the immediacy, necessity, and primacy of its own mission. Additionally, the first page of the Charter quotes Hasan al-Banna and suggests that the only possible solution to the establishment of Israel must come from Islam. This is the first example of the documents attempt to frame militant religion as the solution which national secularism has been unable to propose. This theme is extended in Hamas interpretation and appropriation of the principle of jihad. Later the Charter says: There is no solution to the Palestine question other than sacred struggle. The connection to religion placed the daily personal struggle requested of Palestinians in the context of something already near and dear to them. Perhaps even more importantly, the connection to religion was the way in which Hamas presented itself as an alternative. On some levels, this has been the main strength of the organization. The Charter suggests that
16

Article 7

11

Hamas perceived itself as new and novel: Nothing of the sort is found in any other system. Indeed, from within its position of oppose it was able to avoid primacy in action, and as such, culpability. By maintaining loyal opposition to entrenched Palestinian leadership and outright defiance of Israeli rule, it has served as the other to which disenchanted and desperate Palestinians could turn. In appealing to Islam, the founders of Hamas were targeting the disparity and frustration of Palestinians. In some ways, this appeal was an ideological gamble in which Hamas committed itself to steadfastness of principle. If the movement sought to cultivate support among those disenchanted with the ineffectuality of extant leadership, it had to position itself as somehow opposite to that leadership. Thus, in presenting itself as an alternative to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a secular body steeped in the political reality of compromise, Hamas needed to maintain a position of uncompromising religiosity. Article One of the Charter thus delineated the Islamic Resistance Movement as derivative of and committed to Islam. Similarly, Article Two suggests that both Hamas and its parent the Muslim Brotherhood were characterized by the understanding that Islam relates to the totality of human life: views and beliefs, politics and economics, education and society, jurisdiction and law, exhortation and teaching, communication and art, the seen and the unseen.17 It was the active history of the movements predecessors that allowed the organization to make this claim, and the shifting attitudes of the 1970s and 1980s that made it resonate with potential adherents. During the pre-intifada period, the Muslim Brotherhood had capitalized on rising Palestinian frustration to position religion as a new alternative to secularism. It demanded a return to personal piety that would in the long run restructure Palestine into a truly Islamic society. While it did not eclipse extant Nationalist leadership bodies, it did have an important advantage in spheres of mobilization. Because the Brotherhood operated as a religious voluntary organization through the Mujamma, Israeli gave its tacit consent to the construction of new mosques, and in so doing, unwittingly facilitated the

17

Article 7

12

creation of new centers for organization that would later be capitalized for radical aims.18 1979 saw the revolutionary rise of the Ayatollah Khomeni in Iran. This proved to some Palestinians the political efficacy of religious organization. During the 1980s, Islamists increasingly rallied support in a variety of social venues. While not entirely successful in municipal professional association elections, Islamist factions were often able to score a significant percentage of votes and force opposition groups, such as the secular PLO and Communist parties to join forces to survive. In the universities, Islamists were profoundly successful. Throughout the 1980s there were clashes between religious and secular nationalist factions, but by December 1987, the pro-Brotherhood bloc at the Islamic university was able to capture fully 75% of votes towards the womens student council and 60% towards the mens. If Islam was to provide the Movements ideological foundation, it was the job of the Charters authors to frame that religion not only as fundamentally capable of serving the purpose of liberation, but also to present it as something deeply embedded in the population yet at the same time socially dormant. The trick of the Charter would be to show people that the failure of those nationalist and populist principles to which extant leadership appealed was not in the principles themselves. Rather, the document suggested that the fault had come in failing to understand those principles in the context of Islam, which was, according to Hamas, the central indivisibility and in turn, cardinal source of strength of the occupied population. In this way, Hamas could ensure that its interpretation of religion would be cast in a new light and not tossed onto the increasingly large pile of failed Palestinian ideologies. During the 1980s, there had been a growing sense of the totality of consequence of the occupation. Continually worsening economic conditions and undifferentiating Israeli abuses chipped away at any sort of intraPalestinian class conflict and gave the struggle a nationally-based populist tone. In 1995, spokesman Mahmud Zahhar said that the building up of man is the goal, because man, armed with his convictions, is the essential
18

The Palestinian Hamas suggests that in the decades prior to the 1987, the number of mosques doubled from 77 to 150.

13

element. Hamas extended this populism by connecting all Palestinians under the banner of Islam. From its opening stanzas, the Charter makes an appeal not to any subgroup but to all Muslims living under the yoke of Israeli oppression. Article Four extends its invitation to participate to all Muslims who desireto join its ranksAllah will reward them.19 It is clear that the document takes great pains to relate the populism to religion; the totality of participation is meant for all committed Muslims. Interestingly, it finds ways to reconcile broad appeal with the social roles imposed by fundamentalist Islamic interpretation. Acknowledging that women would have a key function in any popular uprising, Hamas espoused the importance of Muslim women in the struggle, while at the same time suggesting specific functions which maintain at least theoretical religious consistency. In what seems outwardly like a radical suggestion, Article 12 claims that, as confronting the enemy is an individual obligation, the woman is allowed to fight the enemy [even] without her husbands permission. Similarly affecting is Article 17, which contends that the Muslim woman has a no lesser role than that of the Muslim man in the war of Liberation.20 The document quickly shifts on a rhetorical level, however, and reclaims gender from Western modernity by applying a traditionalist understanding of proper social roles in delineating the ways in which the Muslim woman is to have this importance. She is the manufacturer of men and has the incredible duty of educating the younger generations. Throughout the Charter, there is a sometimes explicit and often implicit recognition that any struggle is destined to be long and not possibly won in one generation. Consequently, the movements founders spend significant time explaining the need for education of younger Muslim. The theme of education or tarbiya21 represented the long term ambitions of Shaykh Yassin and his Muslim Brotherhood companions who had spent the past twenty years emphasizing the need for a re-Islamicization of society as the precursor to a truly Islamic state. It was for this reason that they had
19 20

Article 7 Ibid 21 Article 3

14

devoted so many resources, financial and otherwise, to maintaining Islamic nursery schools and kindergartens and to providing scholarship money for future movement leaders who wished to study in foreign Arab states. Thus, while to our sensitive eyes, relegating women to the field of child rearing and education seems less than inspirational, it was indeed, a terrific and important duty. Taraki suggests that this ideology, combined with its implementation by a number of charismatic female leaders within the organization, ensured the it was particularly successful in bringing a significant number of young refugee camp and urban women out of their homes and into the mosque and other groupings.22 Hamas thus maintained the consistency of fundamentalist religion while framing the movement in extended populist terms that included women. As the founders of Hamas could have hardly failed to realize, the populist appeal and specific nature of the 1987 intifada was the result of a decade in which occupation had forced depravity on all classes. The uprising was not the first instance of Palestinian rebellion, but it was different in that it was a collective reaction comprised not simply of the destitute Gaza Refugees or Professional Middle classes. Indeed, Hamas mission in its Charter and informational dissemination was not to diminish depravity as the spark of insurgence, but rather to encode that seemingly social issue with poignant underlying religious significance. The two decades of Israeli occupation following the 1967 war had, by the late 1980s, created significant structural changes in the class constituency of the occupied population. During the 1970s, the Palestinian elite had lost much of its economic clout in the territories. An increasing proportion of the population worked within Israeli proper, and additionally, citrus output declined, diminishing an already weakened financial presence.23 Tamari writes that Israeli subordination of the West Bank and Gazan economies to its needs in the last two decades undermined local elites and brought about major dislocations in the regional distinctiveness of local communities. In addition, Israeli resettlement efforts of the 1970s had blended Gaza refugees and indigenous populations in a way that had not
22 23

Article 1 Article 9

15

happened before, setting up a scenario in which mutual oppression could coagulate into mutual reaction.24 Tamari contents that while this didnt entirely eliminate Palestinian social hierarchies25, it did have the unintended consequence of creating a homogenized social base to which the intifada leadership could appeal. The years leading to the 1987 insurrection had seen various uprisings about specific issues. In 1981, urban professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and dentists engineered a strike to protest new taxes levied against them.26 While merchants supported them, the effort did not have the broad appeal of tax refusals during the intifada. In the spring of 1982, Muslim students gathered to demonstrate after a Jewish extremist attacked worshippers at the al-Aqsa mosque. In response, the Israeli army beat and attacked protestors, going so far as to fire into a mosque where prayer was taking place, killing one young child and wounding many others. Discontent seethed from all strata of Palestinian society at the abuses.27 A pattern of military response to discontent and seemingly endless taxes finally created the inescapability of Palestinian solidarity in common struggle.
Palestinians were deeply entangled in the tentacles of Israeli economic and personal control over their lives. Prior to the intifada, the struggle by Palestinians was not against their political leaders or against a social caste, but against a collective subordination to Israeli rule. Israeli military presence and administrative dominance stimulated a collective Palestinian response of steadfastness or sumud, the communal struggle to stay on the land and maintain Palestinian social, economic and educational institutions. The intifada was unlike its predecessor [the uprising of 1936-1939] in that is became a participatory undertaking for most segments of Palestinian society.28

The Charter of Hamas is rife with appeal to this collective discontent. Article Ten commits the organization to providing a support for the deprived and a defense for all the oppressed.29 In Article Twenty-One, it binds the responsibility of Hamas to the people to the responsibility of the people to each other. In a declaration that could have come straight from a populist handbook, Hamas posits that the people are part of the movement and for
24 25

Ibid The hierarchies remained visible in the coordination and leadership of rebellion groups during the intifada. 26 Article 9 27 Ibid 28 Article 14 29 Article 7

16

the movemet; its power is [the movement members power; and its future is their future.30 Importantly, the document also links a response to poverty to the totality of the effort; social solidarity means giving aid to the needy, both material or moral, and helping take certain actions.31 Throughout the Charter, it ties common oppression to common responsibility, arguing (as it does in Article Twenty) that just as the offense of the enemy has targeted all men, women, and children, so must all men, women, and children take part in the battle for liberation. The Charter also contains important allusions to the nationalism of the Palestinians. Since Nasserist Egypt, there had been a large number of adherents to secular nationalist politics which separated religion from the functioning of the state. Indeed, this was precisely the lack of Islamic Spirit [that had] brought about distorted judgment and absurd comprehension that Hamas sought to remedy. Capitalizing on the apparent ineffectuality of the Palestinian Leadership Organization to affect real political and social improvement, the Charter attempted to appropriate nationalist principles under the banner of religion. Article Six declares in no uncertain terms that the Islamic Resistance Movement is a unique Palestinian movement that strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, but it is Article Twelve which most clearly appropriates the principle of nationalism for Hamas interpretation of Islam. The Article declares nationalism to be part and parcel of Hamas religious creed. Indeed, nothing is loftier or deeper than confronting [the enemy] when he sets foot on the land of the Muslims.32 Moreover, the Article not only co-opts the principle, but extends it and imbues it with a religious meaning much beyond what was being suggested to Palestinians by the extant leadership.
Whereas other nationalisms consist of material, human or territorial considerations, the Islamic Resistance Movements nationalism carries all of that plus all the more important divine factors, providing it with spirit and life, since it is connected with the origin of the spirit and lifegiver, raising in the sky of the homeland the divine banner to connect earth to heaven with a strong bond. 33
30 31

Ibid Ibid 32 Article 7 33 Ibid

17

Hamas thus argued that it was not the nationalism itself which had gone awry, but rather that in implementing it without connecting it to Allah, the PLO had allowed it to loose spirit and life. It was for this reason that nationalism had failed. As Milton-Edwards observed: In essence, the organization [appeared] to be striving to straddle (both intellectually and ideologically) nationalist and Islamic approaches to the nature of the Palestinian uprising.34 It is important to acknowledge Hamas reliance on the idea of homeland, in the above statement. Throughout the Charter, the Movement ties its religious nationalism to the idea of land itself and the according significance of monuments within the rightful Palestinian borders. Taraki suggests that this is a fundamental difference from which flows one of the most basic and important tenets of Hamas dogma.
35

Article Eleven delineates Palestine as an Islamic waqf or sacred endowment. This means that it perceives the land to be promised to all Muslims from the day of its conquering until the day of judgment. In this assessment it creates an act of heresy from any compromise which would in any way parcel that land. It is not right to give up it or any part of it. Framing its argument in the language of the Quran and even alluding to the sin of associationism, the Charter writes:
Neither a king nor a presidentnot any organization or all of them have such authority, because the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [endowed] to all Muslim generations until the day of resurrection. [So] who has the legitimate right to represent all Islamic generations until the day of resurrection?36

This unyielding position, perhaps more than any other delineated in the Charter, has caused controversy for opponents of the organization. How could the organization function, they have asked, with no room for compromise. Indeed, it is this section which has been the most troublesome for the main Palestinian leadership bodies which have attempted to use compromise as a negotiating tool for improvement of social conditions. In a similar religious reassertion, the Charter reemphasizes the significance of certain sites contained within the contested territories.
34 35

Article 3 Article 1 36 Article 7

18

Principally, it connects the struggle for liberation to the holy importance of Jerusalem and specifically, the Haram al-Sharif from which Muhammed began his ascention to Heaven in the Night Journey. Article 14 extends the significance of the Palestinian conflict to all Muslims by reminding that the mosque is the third holiest site in Islam. Article Twelve not only reclaims nationalism in the name of Islam, it assumes the responsibility of introducing the single most important religious concept of the Islamic Resistance Movement, the sacred struggle of jihad.
Nothing is loftier or deeperthan waging a holy war (jihad) against the enemy. This becomes the individual responsibility of every Muslim man and woman.37

In their appeal to this principle, Hamas tied the depravity, frustration, and borderline hopelessness of the Palestinian rebels to tangible religious action and a new suggestion of real solution to the problem. For the organization, it represented a paradigm shift from the tarbiya (education) and dawa employed by Shaykh Yassins Mujamma.38It was a strategy borne of example, and was vital in taking religion out of the realm of theory and rhetoric and placing it squarely into the physical world. The significance of visible participation and movement cannot be overestimated. Taraki suggested in early 1989 that Hamas had up until that point struggled to gain support for the simple reason that it hadnt acted enough to build credentials.39 Four years later, however, Abu-Amr suggested that it had been precisely this action, more even than any purported principle, that had facilitated Hamas political and social ascendancy40. Hamas suggested use of violence as a political tactic had its direct predecessor in the militant Islamic Jihad organization. Young militants such as Imad al-Saftawi rejected not only the leadership of the PLO, but also decried what they saw as inaction on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood. New violent revolutionary counter-occupation tactics were to become their mantra. The Islamic Jihad announced its arrival onto the political scene in October 1986, when a number of paramilitary youths associated with the group threw

37 38

Ibid Article 3 39 Article 1 40 Article 2

19

grenades into a crowd of Israeli soldiers assembled for a ceremony at the Western Wall.41 The idea of revolutionary violence and jihad was not a new to the 1980s, however. In 1965, Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb published his seminal Milestones. In the book, Qutb suggests that not only is jihad acceptable, it is a fundamental responsibility of Muslims. He says that jahili (ignorant) societies seek to put obstructions in [Islams] path. This leaves no option for Islam but to fight.42 Indeed, Hamas viewed itself as the most recent link in the chain of Jihad in confrontation with the Zionist invasion.43 In the view of the movements framers, this chain extended back much farther than Qutb. They viewed themselves as inheritors of the heritage of Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam who led the Haifa branch of the Young Muslim Mens Association and dedicated that group to assinating Jewish and British officials in the name of jihad.44 The success of the 1979 Iranian revolution renewed the plausibility of violent tactics for social upheaval.45 In the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood started to shift towards more militant tactics in order to avoid loosing youthful recruits to the more militant Islamic Jihad. 1984 saw the arrest of Shaykh Yassin and a number of conspirators when an illegal arms cache was uncovered.46 Israeli soon began putting restrictions on the suddenly more questionable religious organization, but by 1987, the philosophy of jihad was well-placed to take primacy as modus operandi for the new Palestinian Hamas. Article Fifteen begins once the enemies usurp some of the Muslim lands, Jihad becomes an individual obligation for every Muslim. In the confrontation with the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we must raise the banner of Jihad.
47

The statement shows the dual conceptual nature of

Hamas jihad. It was a responsibility extended to all Muslims, yet somehow distinctly Palestinian. This article (as well as the Nineteenth) extends the
41 42

Article 9 Milestones, 62 43 Charter, Article 7 44 The Palestinian Hamas, 16 45 The Palestinian Hamas, 30 46 Article 9 47 Article 7

20

sphere of the concept as well, suggesting that it encompasses not only violence, but the art, education, and ideology of all Muslim generations. In the Charter, then, jihad functions as the glue by which Hamas bound shared oppression to shared responsibility. For the Islamic Resistance Movement, the Palestinians were bound inextricably together not simply by depravity in occupation, but also by their religion and in turn, religious responsibility. The appeal of the concept of jihad lay in that it spoke to both a sense of collective duty and purpose of individual action. Whats more, the concept of jihad as espoused by Hamas combined a pan-Islamic notion of holy war as defense against heretical infringement upon the Muslim world at large48 with the ultranationalist jihad of the Islamic Jihad, which focused specifically on the conditions of Israeli occupation. In suggesting that each and every individual Muslim had the duty to wage jihad, be it intellectual, military, or ideological, Hamas created an identity with which desperate and disaffected Palestinians could rally, and also an operation by which they could individually struggle against the motionlessness and apparent futility of their own personal situation. Perhaps the most important characteristic of Hamas jihad was its fluidity. In a 1992 article that appeared in the British Journal of Palestine Studies, Milton-Edwards marveled at the prosaic way in which Hamas framed holy war as both internationally inclusive (and thus consistent with the panIslamic religious interpretation espoused by fundamentalist theorists) and at the same time decidedly focused on the circumstances of Israeli occupation. Applicable to more than just its notion of sacred struggle, this particular ability to operate with both unyielding religious consistency and at the same time tailor operations to political and social realities has, since the beginning, been the single most important organizational strength of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Room to Operate: the Inscrutable Maneuverability of Hamas While the Charter of Harakat al-Muqawam al-Islami had to frame a new militant religious ideology in the nationalist, populist, and novel terms that would attract Palestinians to the organization, so too did it have to install ideological loopholes by which the movement could adapt to changing
48

Represented most notably by Shaykh Abdallah Azzam

21

circumstances while maintaining the image of unwavering consistency. The credibility of the organization, and in turn, its operational success, would depend on its ability to maneuver within the reality of fluid political scenarios yet at the same time appear to remain rigidly committed to its principles of immalleable militancy and non-compromise. Extension of Culpability One important trait of Hamas was its ability to operate outside of the realm of disapprobation for the continued social and physical oppression of the Palestinian people. The Movement bolstered itself with the disillusion of citizens and disapproval of the contemporaneous PLO, yet has been able to avoid similar criticism. In remaining in a position of organizational subordination to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (later the Palestinian National Council), Hamas avoided the situation whereby it would be forced to take primary responsibility for new political initiative. While secular leadership retains the role of bargainer with Israel and foreign countries, it will continue to be the most visibly culpable for the continued occupation. The Charter of Hamas aids this position by suggesting radical sustained personal effort, rather than political bargaining, is the solution to the Palestinian crisis. Indeed, Hamas is not an organization that purports to be a panacea. According to its Charter, the end of liberation will not come from the Islamic Resistance Movement itself, but rather by the universal participation in the religious actions (most notably jihad) the banner of which is carried by Hamas. Thus the emphasis is, to some degree, shifted off of the organization as such and instead extended to the responsibility of all Palestinians (and more broadly, all Muslims) to engage in the process of liberation individually, as well as a collective. The movement suggests that it is only as strong as the people are united. In Article 14, Hamas internationalizes the sphere of this individual responsibility by invoking the holy significance of Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif/al-Aqsa mosque. Extending the call to jihad from a national to an international sphere provided yet another tool by which Hamas would be able to refocus antagonism away from itself. In 1989, Taraki argued that this strategy dispersed ideological centricity in a way that would make it hard for

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Hamas to mobilize Palestinians. Despite this, it remained an undeniable escape root for Hamas to circumvent criticism for failing to liberate Palestine. Delay of Gratification In Article Seven, Hamas introduces not only the concept of jihad, but also attempts to explain itself in the context of history, and position itself temporally in the context of the future. Foremost in the founders minds in 1987 was the way in which the credibility of the organization might be attacked. As Taraki suggested, the Muslim Brotherhood had to create a new group to carry out new militant participation in the intifada because the Brotherhood itself had been notoriously absent from the physical struggle for liberation up to that point49. It is thus that Article Seven of the Charter suggests that obstacles...placed by those who revolve in the orbit of Zionism had formerly made impossible the pursuit of Jihad. At the same time, it commits the organization to that pursuit and importantly, denies any strict timeline by which would promise to achieve results. In a line that would be repeated both in the charter and by spokespeople for the organization, Hamas suggested that the road is long and the suffering is great in the course of jihad and the sacred struggle for Palestine. While it commits itself to fulfilling the promise of Allah, no matter how long that may take, there is an implicit acknowledgment on the part of the Movement that the problem can not be solved within the lifetime of a single Muslim generation. By allowing deadlines to remain nebulous or non-existent, Hamas ensures that it cannot be blamed for lack of expediency in liberation. Indeed, turning this potential criticism on its head, Hamas commits itself to be the organization committed to toil no matter how long it may take, rather than the organization that promises deliverance in any immediate fashion. Later, the organization would enlist the religious concept of sabr (self-restraint, patience) to avoid confronting realities without acqueiesing to them.50 In a 1995 interview, spokesman Mahmud Zahhar reiterated that Hamas is not in a hurry. On some levels, this emphasis on delayed gratification and the duration of the struggle was a direct result of the Movements origins in the
49 50

Article 1 The Palestinian Hamas, 64

23

fundamentalism of the Muslim Brotherhood. Until the paradigm shift necessitated by the immediacy of the intifada, the Brotherhood had committed itself to the re-Islamicization and re-education of society that would eventually reward them with the first truly Islamic society since the time of Muhammeds companions. It is not surprising then, that even though Hamas accords immediate militancy with a new importance, it still takes time to emphasize the necessity of education. In Article Fifteen, the Charter synthesizes the theories of dawa and tarbiya manifest in the Mujamma operations with the emphasis on jihad that appealed to the primacy of Israeli occupation. Holy war required the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the people. The next article suggested that this education must comprise all aspects of Muslim existence, from history to religion to the tactics of the enemy. On some important level, these two clauses imply Hamas acceptance of its own organizational inability to liberate Palestine. Not only must the entire umma be involved in the struggle, the current participants must make provisions that the younger generations might continue the fight after their own time had passed. Remaining ever consistent in its religious basis, the Charter contents that: We must instill in the minds of the generations of Muslims that the Palestinian cause is a religious one and should be dealt with on this basis.51 Maneuverability with Relation to other Palestinian and International bodies Indeed, while the consistency of religious militancy is ostensibly preserved throughout, there is one article of the Charter that suggests that even religiously speaking, Hamas was aware of the necessity to maintain control over its own adaptability. In general, Islamic fundamentalist belief involved a return to the primary sources (the Quran and the hadith) to understand shariah law. Islamists espoused a golden era of Mohammed and his companions in which society had functioned on the word of God and sunna of the prophet. This society existed before multifarious interpretations had led later generations astray and farther away from true Islam. It is interesting then that Article Twenty-Three considers disagreements on particular viewpoints with other Islamic movements to be in the category of
51

Article 7

24

ijtihad (interpretation) as long as they have good intentions and devotion to Allah. The most important of the ideological release valves by which Hamas encoded its mutability were those that dealt with issues of Hamas relationship to other Palestinian liberation groups and foreign governments and organizations. Even more important than the Charters extension of culpability or refusal to pin the Movement into a functional timeline were those articles and statements which preserved its right to both disagree or cooperate with other organizations (or even participate in external peace discussions), and at the same time maintained strict rigidity of principle. The Charter tackles the issue of international peace conferences in Article Thirteen. Declaring boldly and remorselessly that giving up any part of Palestine is tantamount to giving up part of [the] religion, 52 Hamas takes a stance of uncompromising rigidity that, while appealing to the hopeless desperation of some, would seem to limit its political efficacy. Despite this, a closer reading of the Article reveals the way in which the organization allows itself the potential for participation in just such a conference. The second paragraph of the article caustically imagines international conferences as bargaining tables in which participants accept or reject offers, demanding specific conditions before making decisions with interminable consequences.
[But] the Islamic Resistance Movement knowing the parties comprising the conference and their past and present attitudes toward the problems of the Muslims does not believe that the conferences are capable of fulfilling the demands or restoring the rights of or doing justice to the oppressed. Those conferences are nothing but a means of enforcing the rule of the unbelievers in the land of the Muslims.53

Thus Hamas rejects the idea of international peace bargaining not in principle but rather in the fact of the futility of deliberating with those who have no interest in changing the situation. In suggesting that they know the past and present attitudes of participating parties, Hamas is rejecting the ideological and political positions of peace delegations, rather than the principle of a peaceful solution. While there is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad, this Article implicitly suggests that this has more to

52 53

Article 7 Ibid

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do with conference participants that any inherent impossibility of peaceful solution. Interestingly, this is not the sort of meaning that Hamas would have wanted its potential adherents to derive from the Article, and thus it is brilliant in the way that it shields this message behind the flowing rhetoric of ironclad commitment to non-compromise. What jumps out of the page is the forcefulness of Hamas message and presentation of itself as alternative to extant leadership, but underlying this is that attention to pragmatics which would ensure Hamas political adroitness.

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In 1993, Ziad Amu-Abr wrote in the Journal of Paelstine Studies that

It is evident that Hamass opposition is tempered by the realization of the hardships facing the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Despite vocal opposition, the organization does not wish to project itself as an obstructive force when there may be a chance, however slim, or finding a solution. Hamass opposition to the talks is further tempered by lack of available alternatives and awareness that the internal Palestinian balance of power still favors the PLO.

Indeed, the idea of cooperation or at the very least, coexistence with alternative Palestinian leadership is the central theme of Chapter Four of the Charter. Article Twenty-Three delineated that the Islamic Resistance Movement views other Islamic movements with respect and appreciation. It went on to minimize differences that arise about specific issues, relegating them to the realm of interpretation. Most importantly, the section commits Hamas to raising the banner of unity. This position seems somewhat inconsistent, especially from within the context of Hamas affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. During the 1980s, as violence and militancy became increasingly acceptable as political tactics, certain elements within the Muslim Brotherhood began a campaign of internal jihad to force those elements perceived as un-Islamic out of Palestinian society.54 Throughout the first-half of the decade, universities were the sites of physical clashes between Islamist and Nationalist and Leftist supporters. During this period and later, seditious rumors held that Israeli might even been supporting Islamists in an attempt to create discord within the Palestinian population.55 The most visible instance of this forced implementation of Islamist influence, however, came on January 7, 1980 when approximately 500 men marched from a mosque in Gaza city, attacking and burning movie theaters, liquor stores, and restaurants that served alcohol. The remarkable shift in attitude found in Hamas charter, then, must be attributed to the leaders recognition of the distinct political space in which the organization would be operating. While the group was framing itself as the alternative to extant leadership, its ostensible embracing of the others indicated recognition of its own peripheral position. In addition, the
54 55

The Palestinian Hamas, 24 Article 1

27

call to unity was part of the populism which Hamas was trying to enmesh with traditional Islam. In 1995, spokesman Mahmud Zahhar stated unambiguously that Civil war is a red line for Hamas that cannot be crossed at any price.56 Despite this, Hamas desired to reserve its right to disagreement. The remainder of Chapter Four takes pains to delineate the specific ways in which the Movement might protestor decry the action of one of its political opponents while ostensible preserving the banner of unity. Article Twenty-Four ensures that while Hamas does not allow slander or baseless condemnation of other organizations, it while not hesitate to point to the mistakewarn against itinsist on spelling out the truth and [apply] it to the given issue with impartiality. This is a function, the document claims, of the careful separation of a group itself and its positions or modes of conduct. While the aim of said group may remain right and true, disagreeable actions are to be summarily dealt with. Similar, Article TwentySix suggested that Hamas would not refrain from debating events, both local and international, regarding the Palestinian problem despite its favorable view of nationalist movements that are not loyal to the East or West. Indeed, this distinction among nationalist movements played an important role in the Charters discussion of alternative organizations. In Article Twelve and else where, the Movement had redefined nationalism, giving it a religious significance that imbued it with spirit and life. As elucidated in Article Twenty-Five, however, Hamas claims to respect and support nationalist movements even when not religious as long as they do not give their allegiance to the Communist East or the Crusader West.57 In making this claim, the organization gave itself an outlet by which to attack alternative Palestinian organizations that it had conflict with with. Similar to the argument against international peace conferences, any intraorganizational difficulties between Hamas and nationalist movements were derivative not of internal Palestinian weakness, but rather from some outside infringement which had poisoned the minds of Muslims. If, however, Hamas did choose to take issue with the policy of a rival political body, it could do so
56 57

Article 4 Article 7

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under the aegis of a criticism of that organizations complicity in the face of extra-national pressure. Thus could Hamas assure that it was definitely and irrevocably a source of support and assistance, both in speech and action, while at the same time maintain the politically expedient alternative position. Interestingly, the Charter also asserts that anything that runs contrary to or contradicts these orientations has been fabricated by the enemy or those who support it, with the purpose of sowing confusion, dividing the ranks, and entangling [us] in marginal issues. This comment spoke directly to the claim of some anti-Islamist detractors that Israeli had supported the movement during the 1980s in effort to confuse coordinated Palestinian rebellion efforts. The issue was destined to stay with the Movement. In a 1995 interview, Mahmad Zahhar called the claim absurd. Nevertheless, conflict between Hamas and secular leadership has, to a large extent, determined the political character of Palestinian resistance to Israeli rule since the beginning of the first intifada. The relationship of the Movement to the Palestinian Liberation Organization has persisted as the fundamental issue within the debate of political leadership. In the Charter, Hamas appealed to the unity of oppression in saying that our homeland is oneour plight is one, but affirmed that its own organization must maintain ideological distance from the secular body. In attributing the PLOs fault to the ideological invasion which has befallen the Arab world since the defeat of the Crusades, the document is able to maintain the front of companionship while being ever critical of the extant leadership from which it hoped to wrest a modicum of political power. At the time of its inception, Hamas religious alternative was meant, on some level, to appeal to the discontented among the PLO ranks. In embracing the organization while derogating its functional secularism, the young movement was able to both attract adherents from the disenchanted ranks and maintain its own political pliancy. It should be taken as a sign of strategic success that in its self-positioning with respect to ideology and politics, Hamas has ensured a perennial spot of contention when foreign peace initiatives propose a new cease-fire to the still dominant secular leadership.

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Conclusion As I conclude this paper, I cant help but think that maybe Maslow didnt quite have it figured out. In his hierarchy of needs, he said that the human instincts of survival necessarily supercede any sort of existential yearning. Indeed, he suggested that it is not until we are safe, well-fed, and generally content that we begin to wonder our whys. Situationally speaking, this may be true, but I wonder if it doesnt belie one of our deepest and most inextricable characteristics. For better or worse, evolution has given us brains capable of comprehending our own mortality. The knowledge that ones self is an ultimately finite thing leads to the central paradox of humanity. How is one to understand the value and meaning of ones own existence while living under the yoke of its inescapable finitude? What is worth struggling for when all struggles eventually end in dirt? Attempts to solve this paradox have colored social, political, and religious history; they have caused wars and revolutions. Indeed, our attempts to transcend our mortality have, more than anything else, determined what precisely it means to be human. The Palestinian world is one in which survival instincts are called upon daily. Devalued currency, increasing unemployment, and jailed wage-earners ensure that no meal passes without wondering worriedly about the next. Extended curfews, legalized sieges, and unannounced home invasions mean that eyes do not close without fearing the circumstances of their next opening. The reality of occupation ensures the possibility that what little is left could at any time be wrenched away. Why is it then, if those fundamental needs of satiation and security remain unsure, that Palestinians have found their way back to religion? Specifically, why has Islamic fundamentalism taken hold in certain segments of society? I believe that, along with food and safety, people have a deeply embedded and inherent need to understand themselves in a context beyond their day-to-day existence. While Maslow might have suggested that the more peoples immediate physiological needs go unmet, the less likely they are to think about greater meaning, I believe that, in many ways, it is precisely the opposite.

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Since 1988, Hamas has been a permanent fixture of Middle Eastern politics. This is amazing, especially considering that it paints itself in a decidedly a-, if not anti-, political light. Indeed, the organization has operated and gained strength by appealing to that desperate part of peoples nature that struggles against hopelessness while rejecting the oft-repeated and asyet unfilled promise of political solution. In so doing, it has maintained an amazingly strategic combination of religion, militancy, violence, and pragmatic consideration for fluid social dynamics that has allowed it to continue to cultivate adherents. The Charter of the organization was simply its earliest delineation of this principle of conservative extremism. Within it were sewn the seeds for a Movement that appeals both to the most dangerous potential of an oppressed populations desperation and the most pragmatic resource of a politicians tool belt. It is this aggregate, more than any either/or, that causes shudders from those who yearn for legal negotiation and cheers from those who had once felt themselves to be little more than bargaining tools in a conflict over which they had never had control. By no means has Hamas cultivated support from all or even a majority of Palestinians, but in its careful consideration of both pragmatics and religious militancy, it has ensured a position of influence in current and future deliberation about the centrally-defining international conflict of our political era.

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Bibliography Books Hafez, Mohammed M.: Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003 Black, Anthony: The History of Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001 Davidson, Lawrence: Islamic Fundamentalism, Westport:Greenwood Press, 1998 Amir, Samin: The Arab Nation, London: Zed Press, 1978 Choueiri, Youssef M: Islamic Fundamentalism, London: Printers Publishers Limited, 1998 Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela: The Palestinian Hamas, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000 Articles Article 1: Middle East Report, No. 156, Irans Revolution Turns Ten (Jan. Feb., 1989): 30-32 The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising Lisa Taraki. Article 2: Hamas: A Historical and Political Background. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1993): 5-19. Hamas: A Historical and Political Background Ziad Abu-Amr. Article 3: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1992): 48-53 The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: A Comparison of Ideas and Techniques Beverly Milton-Edwards. Article 4: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Spring, 1995), 81-88 Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct. An Interview with Mahmud Zahhar Mahmud Zahhar; Hussein Hijazi Article 5: Middle East Report, No. 189, The Kurdish Experience (Jul. Aug., 1994), 28-29 The Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Authority Graham Usher; Bassam Jarrar Article 6: Middle East Report, No. 191, Irans Revolutionary Impasse (Nov. Dec. 1994), 22-25. Arafat and the Opposition Graham Usher; Marwan Barghouti; Ghazi Abu Jiab Article 7:

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Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1993), 122-134 Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine Muhammed Maqdsi Article 8: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Autumn, 1992), 57-69 Reflections of the Peace Process: An Interview with Haydar Abd Al-Shafi Haydar Abd Al-Shafi Article 9: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Autumn, 1990), 1-23 Prelude to the Uprising in the Gaza Strip Ann M Lesch Article 10: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Autumn, 1989), 72-82 Changing Political Attitudes among Gaza Refugees Sara Roy Article 11: Middle East Report, No. 164/165, Intifada Year Three (May-Aug. 1990), 21-23 The PLO is Still Waging a Struggle for Recognition Rather Than for a Solution. Ali Jarbawi; Penny Johnson Article 12: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Autumn, 1993): 125-136 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Israeli and the Occupied Territories U.S. Department of State Article 13: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer, 1990), 96-105 Palestinian Radio and the Intifada Kirsten Nakjavani Bookmiller; Robert J. Bookmiller Article 14: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Summer, 1990), 64-85 The Intifada and the 1936-39 Uprising: A Comparison Kenneth W. Stein Article 15: Middle East Report, No. 164/165, Intifada Year Three (May Aug. 1990), 4-8 Limited Rebellion and Civil Society: The Uprisings Dilemma Salim Tamari Article 16: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Spring, 1990), 76-88 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989, The Occupied Territories U.S. Department of State Article 17: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Winter, 1990), 62-74 Bayt Sahur in Year II of the Intifada: A Personal Account Norman Finkelstein

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Article 18: Middle East Report, No. 179, Islam, The State and Democracy (Nov-Dec 1992) Left in Limbo: Leninist Heritage and Islamist Challenge Salim Tamari Article 19: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Spring, 1992), 114-125. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991: Israel and the Occupied Territories U.S. Department of State

Article 20: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Autumn, 1991), 17-35 The Impact of the Gulf War on Israeli and Palestinian Political Attitudes Don Peretz Article 21: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Autumn, 1991), 54-65 The PLO at the Crossroads Lamis Andoni Article 22: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring, 1991), 98-111 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990, Israel and the Occupied Territories U.S. Department of State Article 23: Middle East Report, No. 164/165, Intifada Year Three (May. Aug, 1990), 50-53 Christian, Muslim Palestinians Confront Sectarianism: Religion and Political Identity in Beit Sahour Glenn Bowman Article 24: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Autumn, 1992) 70-77 Reflections on the Peace Process: An Interview with Nabil Shaath Nabil Shaath Article 25: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Summer, 1992), 113-129 Human Rights Watch World Report 1992: The Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip Middle East Watch Article 26: Middle East Report, No. 168, No Place to Hide (Jan Feb 1991), 4-7. Samih Farsoun: A New Balance of Forces Samih Farsoun Article 27: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Autumn, 1989), 120-178 Documents and Source Material

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Article 28: Middle East Report, No. 155, The Middle East after Reagan (Nov. Dec. 1988), 38-41 Economic Dimensions of the Uprising Sheila Ryan Article 29: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1979), 81-112 Israeli Deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 1967-1978 (Part II) Ann M. Lesch

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