Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents. Godofredo Reyes for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission. Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf. No appearance for other respondents. LAUREL, J.: This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows: (1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; (2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes; (3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office; (4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution: [No. 8] RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA. Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935. (5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified; (6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: 6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia. (7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period; (8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation; (9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal"; (10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest." The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for: (a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly; (b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly; (c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed; (e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines. On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses: (a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court; (b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules: (c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie. The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense: (a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes; (b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission; (c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission

of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition; (d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto; (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable; ( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court; (g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar. The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936. There was no appearance for the other respondents. The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.

The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution. The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited

further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government. But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers. In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld. Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose

constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance. The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.) The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified

executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President. Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows: The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows: (6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices. During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft: xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask

from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission. Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined. Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election is not contested? Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested. Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay. Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question. However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged. Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated. Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate. Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications. Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members." Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest. Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield? THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires. Mr. ROXAS. Willingly. Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members? Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason. Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission. Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct. Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members. Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission. Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members? Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission. Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested. Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose. Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been raised. Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge. In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The ele