Andrew Gregg HY 101.

Fall 04 12-03-04 Stephen Warring

Hannibals Battle Near Cannae

In the year 216 BCE the Carthaginian army, led by Hannibal Barca, nearly obliterated the entire Roman army on a battlefield near the city of Cannae. Though heavily outnumbered and wearied from previous campaigns the Carthaginians defeated their Roman adversaries due to their more numerous and skilled Cavalry, and the expert leadership of Hannibal. The Roman army was massive. From all accounts it stood at around 85,000-90,000 soldiers. This, according to Polybius, was composed of sixteen Roman legions and both Roman Consuls. These 85k+ soldiers consisted of: 40,000 allied infantrymen, 40,000 citizen infantrymen and roughly 9,600 horsemen (Polybius 107). The Roman infantry was very skilled and had broken through Hannibals lines in earlier battles, but the Roman cavalry, had performed consistently badly, (Goldsworthy 102). The Romans set up with their cavalry on either side and the entire mass of infantry in the center (96). Hannibals forces numbered about half of that of the Romans. All told he led around 40,000 infantrymen and 10,000 cavalry (Polybius, 114). Hannibals troops must have looked like an army thrown together at the last minute. It contained many different nationalities, weapons and armor. His infantry

included: Africans clad in Roman uniforms captured from previous battles, Gauls with round-tipped longswords who fought bare-chested, and Spaniards with pointed shortswords clad in bright white tunics (Livy, 351-353). His cavalry was made up of nearly equal portions of Gaelic, Spanish and Numidians. Hannibal positioned the Numidians on his right flank and both his Gaelic and Spanish cavalry on the left. This left him with twice as many horse on his left as their

Roman counterparts (Goldsworthy 108). Hannibals infantry were set up with the Gauls and Spanish in front between the two cavalry flanks, and with the African infantry divided into equal groups in the rear on either side (Goldsworthy 110). The Romans made many choices about the battle, not all of them with fruitful results. On the day before the battle Hannibal positioned his men on a field that would maximize his cavalrys abilities. Paulus, the Roman consul in charge, refused to fight him at this location. The next day Varro, the other

Roman consul, was given charge for the day and immediately set his troops into formation on another plain near Cannae believing the high ground around Cannae would protect his left flank and the river would protect his right (Livy 347351). This plane was also much narrower than the one Hannibal had chosen for combat, which Varro hoped would limit the cavalrys ability to maneuver. The Roman and allied cavalry were positioned on the flanks only to hold off Hannibals horse while their massive infantry was to destroy the Carthaginian infantries. In addition the Roman infantrymen were positioned closer together than usual, which sacrificed mobility in order to maximize brute force (Goldsworthy, 103). When Hannibals first offer of battle was refused by the Romans, he sent a detachment of troops to assault the Roman water gatherers in order to provoke the Romans to attack (Polybius 112). Livy tells us that the only thing that kept the Romans from falling for this was the fact that Varro, the elder consul, was in charge for the day and would not give Hannibal battle on a field of his choosing (347-349). When Hannibal saw the Roman army form the next day across the river he immediately set his troops opposite them. After setting his men in place, Hannibal made a shift in formation by bringing the center of his infantry farther forward in a rounded spearhead formation. He must have known the densely packed Roman lines would break through and formed his men so that they would

breach the center first, causing those pouring through to be flanked on either side by his remaining infantry (Goldsworthy, 111-112). The Africans in the rear were Hannibals best infantry and were positioned on either side leaving a gap in the center indicating that he had planned for the Romans to break through by allowing room for his Gauls and Spaniards to flee (Polybius 115). The Numidians were organized fighters and supported each other by using moving clusters of cavalry in order to provide a constant threat. They were positioned on one side to stall the Roman left flank while the more numerous Gaelic and Spanish cavalry were sent to demolish the Roman horsemen on the right side. After defeating these the Gaels and Spaniards would turn and launch an assault at the Roman infantrys rear (Goldsworthy 112). Hannibal hoped that by the time they reached the Romans they would already be fighting on three sides (Polybius 116). The battle seems to have gone nearly exactly as Hannibal had planned. It began with the usual skirmishing of a screen of light infantrymen... which ended without any real advantage (Goldsworthy 114). Goldsworthy also tells us that the infantry moved first, but before the main lines of infantry had clashed, Hasdrubal led his Spanish and Gaelic horsemen in a direct charge against the Roman cavalry on the right. (119). Soon after that he informs us that the Roman right wing was routed and were, for the most part, killed or dispersed and would take no further part in the fighting, (126). As these two cavalry forces battled the Roman front line met with Hannibals Gauls and Spaniards, and eventhough they were heavily outnumbered Hannibals men held out for a long time. However, not able to maintain this fervor they began to retreat. Their retreat was slow at first but eventually they broke and ran (Goldsworthy 143). The Romans of

course pursued them as the consuls poured more and more men into the center causing them to become an unorganized mob, cutting down on the control of their officers. This lack of control put less pressure on the retreating lines as the

Roman mass passed between the as yet unused African infantry. The 10,000 fresh Libyans gripped both flanks of the Roman mass like a vice stopping their charge dead. The confusion this must have cause in the Roman troops must have been doubled by the fact that the Libyans were wearing Roman uniforms! Uniforms the Africans, Hannibals best infantry, had gleaned from earlier battles. (Goldsworthy 147-148). The Celtic and Spanish troops, encouraged by the halt of the Roman charge, turned and formed a third wall to prevent the Romans from spreading out and overwhelming the Africans. The Romans were now forced to fight on a limited perimeter against fresh units while surrounded on three sides with little or no room to maneuver (Goldsworthy, 148). It was about this time that the first wave of Hannibals cavalry re-grouped after having defeated the Roman right flank. they then charged the left flanks cavalry division, which had

remained in stalemate with the Numidians the entire time. Spotting the charge the Roman horses fled and the Numidians pursued them while the Gaelic and Spanish cavalry continued their charge past them to assail the preoccupied Roman mob (Goldsworthy 149-150). After the Romans had been completely surrounded, Hannibals forces continued to press them closer together and eventually wore them down (Goldsworthy 153). The battle of Cannae was significant in many ways. First of all the death of 50,000 Roman soldiers and the Consul Varro struck a tremendous blow to the Roman army. The fact that over half of the Roman tribunes and up to one third of the Roman senators were also slain in the same battle put the Roman government in a very bad state (Goldsworthy 154-156). The near total

annihilation of the Roman army also gave Hannibal even more free reign, if that is possible, to go wherever and do whatever he wanted to in Italy. The battle at Cannae still remains a case study for military leaders and historians to this day due to the defeat of such a large, nearly undefeated army by a force of half its

size.

Bibliography

Goldsworthy, Adrian. Cannae. London, Cassell Military. 2001. Livius, Titus. Livy. vol 5. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U. Press. 1919. 14 vols. Polybius. The histories of Polybius. trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. London. Macmillan, 1889. Internet Ancient History Sourcebook. ed. Paul Halsall. July 1998. Fordham U. <http:\\www.fordham.edu\halsall\ancient\polybius-cannae.html>