An Impoverished Neutrality?

Public Manager Values in Local Government, Penang, Malaysia

ALI HAIDAR, LIM HONG HAI and L E N PUL L IN

This article considers the issue of public managers values at the local government level in Penang, Malaysia. It is an empirical study that explores survey and interview responses to develop an understanding of the values public managers assume in their relationship with politicians in office. The findings indicate that the dominance of the ruling coalition party in Penang appears to have pushed Penang council officers towards a more passive and impoverished neutrality ethic and the adoption on occasion of responsive values. We see no reason to be sanguine that this might not also be the case with council officers in others states and of civil servants at other levels of Malaysian government. One of the main public management issues that has never been satisfactorily resolved is to whom public servants should be loyal. A mapping exercise has identified no less than a dozen kinds of objects of loyalty for the civil servant, yet there is disagreement on their constitution and focus (Waldo, 1985). The problem is significantly reduced if we confine ourselves to the interface between politicians in office and civil servants (Gregory, 1991; 1997; Aberbach et al., 1981; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988a; 1988b; 1990) as we do in this present study, but it still remains. Constitutionalists in countries with Westminster-based systems have insisted that civil servants owe primary if not sole loyalty to political superiors, as they are the duly elected representatives of the people (Armstrong, 1989). This loyalty should be manifest through civil servants following an ethic of neutrality, giving their best advice to political superiors and faithfully carrying out laws and policies decided by them (Armstrong, 1989; Quinlan, 1993). However, the neutrality ethic has come under pressure from different and somewhat opposing perspectives. For example, politicians in power, unhappy with the indifference and lack of policy or ideological commitment of neutral civil servants, have demanded greater sympathy and responsiveness to their political goals and
Local Government Studies, Vol.30, No.1 (Spring 2004), pp.88107 ISSN 0300-3930 print DOI: 10.1080/0300393042000230948 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

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agendas (Keating, 1990; 1995). There is a view that these demands have been met to some extent through the triumph of managerialism in some countries (OFaircheallaigh et al., 1999). In others, including the UK, developments such as the alleged politicisation of the civil service have been attributed as much to the longevity of one-party government as to the new managerial culture (Painter and Isaac-Henry, 1997: 3045), but what do we mean by these terms? To begin with, we can safely state that managerialism is characterised by an emphasis on delegating work to managers, holding them responsible for results and focusing on outputs rather than procedures (Hughes, 1998). It also embraces the introduction of greater competition within the public sector, the corporatisation of government agencies, replacing job-for-life employment relationships with performance-based, fixed-term or contract employment. It can also include replacing or diminishing the power over employment matters by public service boards and empowering politicians to hire and fire public servants at their will (Hughes, 1998). For some observers, the changing nature of public servant employment has been one of the most contentious aspects of managerialism (Parker, 1989; Considine, 1988; Self, 1995). These observers argue that the empowerment of politicians over the human resource aspect of the employment of public servants threatens the official with a conscience (Parker, 1989: 345), and that politicians in their search for greater control over public servants have weakened the legitimate role of public servants in the constitutional system, and have threatened official independence and the ethic of public service (Parker, 1989: 3434). Furthermore, as a result of managerialism, public servants could become loyal instruments of ministerial authority (Considine, 1988: 8). Others note that managerialism can lead to public servants telling their political superiors what they want to hear, to tailoring their actions or their style to the whim of the moment and not having an eye on the public interest (Waterford, 1988 in Keating, 1990: 394). Similarly, managerialism can displace or imperil the capacity for public managers to act as the communitys conscience ... and promote the public interest through an ethical regard for community welfare and the common good (Uhr, 1990: 25). In addition to the real or potential threat to neutrality values posed by managerialism, it is also argued that the relationship between politicians and public servants is associated with the nature of the political structure in which they exist (Williams, 1985). For example, public servant values are likely to be significantly different in a political environment where there are periodic changes in government compared to one where a single political party is in power over an extended period (Painter and Isaac-Henry, 1997). It follows that one effect of single party dominance may be for public

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servants to be more vulnerable to demands for responsive behaviour when there is no effective opposition party challenging political power. The primacy of the neutrality ethic in governing politicalcivil servant relationships has also been questioned, due to serious problems arising from its practice (Jackson, 1987; OToole, 1990). These problems mainly emanate from politicians in office and are exacerbated by responsive civil servants. To counter this development, some external critics would have non-partisan civil servants transcend strict or sole loyalty to political superiors in order to serve a putatively larger common good or public interest (Jackson, 1987; 1988; OToole, 1990; Wamsley et al., 1990). Although not indifferent to the public interest under the neutrality ethic, civil servants are urged by these observers to make the public interest their primary loyalty. Civil servants would still be loyal to political superiors but only on the condition that their superiors policies serve the public interest. Civil servants have been urged to assume this trustee role by writers in various countries, including the USA (Wamsley et al., 1990), Britain (OToole, 1990) and Australia (Jackson, 1988; 1987). The conflicting prescriptions of neutrality, responsiveness and trusteeship raise concerns about the actual acceptance and practice by civil servants, as it has long been recognised that the way ethical dilemmas are handled is critical to the overall health and welfare of the political system (Gortner, 1991: 15). It is a matter of good governance to ascertain and determine the values that guide the behaviour of civil servants in relation to ruling politicians. Irrespective of the need, this process has been insufficiently performed in Malaysia. For example, the general studies of the values of Malaysian federal civil servants (Scott, 1968; Puthucheary, 1978) are not focused on politicalcivil servant relations. While local government in Malaysia has been the subject of extensive previous study (Norris, 1980; Cheema and Hussain, 1978; Tennant, 1973b; Beaglehole, 1974), most studies were conducted more than 20 years ago and have mainly been confined to local government reform (Cheema and Hussain, 1978; Beaglehole, 1974; Norris, 1974), local government elections (Tennant, 1973a), urbanisation (Cheema, 1974) and financial management (Tayib et al., 1999). We seek to begin to redress the lack of knowledge in this area in Malaysia by examining the values that guide council officers in their relationship with councillors.
MALAYSIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTEXT

Local government, the third tier in the administrative structure of Malaysian government, is the creature of the states, which are themselves the second tier of government. The British colonial rulers established local authorities

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in Malaysia and introduced elections as the first step towards elected state and federal governments. Beginning with Penang in 1951, local council elections were gradually extended to other urban and semi-urban areas. Malaysia gained independence in 1957 and in 1965 local government elections throughout Malaysia were suspended (Norris, 1980: 23). Following this suspension, local governments were subsequently restructured and consolidated into a fewer number of larger councils. Since 1976, these restructured bodies comprised two types of authority, the municipal council or the district council. At the present time the country has 40 municipal and 110 district councils. The mayor or president of the local authority is the administrative head, they are usually career civil servants appointed to the task. They report to a council comprising 824 members (councillors). The councillors are not democratically elected to these positions; the state government appoints each of them on a three-year term. Councillor appointments in National Front-controlled states maintain an equilibrium in accordance with the balances of party within the National Front, and to the exclusion of opposition sympathisers regardless of qualification (Norris, 1980: 92). In non-National Front states the ruling party makes councillor appointments. The municipal and district councils comprise similar operating structures with a council secretary reporting directly to the mayor or president. The council secretary and mayor/president are federal, career service civil servants appointed by the state government. The council secretary is effectively a type of chief executive officer that oversees the operation of the various council departments, headed and staffed by civil servants employed by the council. The president is effectively the head of council and presides over council meetings, policy-making and other business. The councillors make policy and other decisions following recommendations from various council committees. They are also the key decision-makers in the appointment of senior council officers and their subsequent employment conditions, including promotion, remuneration and dismissal. In the context of this present study, it is important to accentuate that Malaysian civil servants, at all three tiers of government, inherited the Westminster tradition of neutrality in relation to their political superiors (Milne, 1967). In the 1960s, Malaysian civil servants followed Western-type democratic values and assumed a subordinate position to elected politicians (Milne, 1967: 157). Contemporary leaders of the Malaysian civil service continue to reaffirm the neutrality tradition (Sarji, 1993: 46). However, irrespective of the continued internal support for a neutral civil service, there has been long-standing pressure from the dominant ruling coalition in Malaysia for greater civil servant responsiveness (Crouch, 1996: 1324;

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Ali, 2000; Lim, 2001: 18990). This coalition, now known as the National Front, has been in continuous power at the federal level and in almost all states since independence from the British in 1957. The coincidence of the Westminster tradition of neutrality, the appointment rather than election of councillors, their key decision-making role in senior council officer employment and an unbroken rule by a dominant coalition party combine to make Malaysian local government civil servants an appropriate group for the study of public service values.
S TUDY SETTING

The study is set in the state of Penang, one of the 13 states of the Federation of Malaysia. Penang provides a suitable environment to test the values that guide council officers in their relationship with councillors. As previously identified, Penang was the first British-type local government formed in Malaysia (Norris, 1980), the first local government in Malaysia to hold democratic elections, and Penang council officers were the first public servants in Malaysia to be introduced to the Westminster tradition of public service neutrality. However, these are not the only reasons to situate this study in Penang. The Malaysian federal government and most of the states of peninsular Malaysia, except Trengganu and Kelantan, have been under the control of the same coalition party since Malaysian independence in 1957. Importantly, Penang is the only state where none of the individual parties in the ruling coalition hold an absolute majority in the State Legislative Assembly (SLA). The four main parties representing the coalition in Penang State are the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the two Chinese-based political parties of Malaysia, the Malay Chinese Association (MCA) and Gerakan within the Barisan National Party (BN) and the Malaysian Indian Congress. Penang is also the only state in Malaysia where the majority of the population is non-Malay. The balance of political power at the state level in Malaysia is a crucial issue in the context of this discussion. It is logical to expect that the coalition SLA in Penang will provide a greater degree of check and balance within the political arm of government than that of any other state in Malaysia. This check and balance should, in theory, provide an appropriate environment for the practice of neutral values in public service. Especially when coupled with the long historical tradition of neutrality experienced by Penang council officers. In itself this is not a remarkable conclusion and does not in isolation justify a study of this nature, unless there is or has been another variable or dimension that threatens or has threatened council officer neutrality in Malaysia. In our view, this threat arises from the general

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nature of council officer employment in Malaysia. Even though Malaysia has not introduced a managerialist perspective in public management, all human resource matters relating to local government officers come under the direct control of councillors. As discussed previously, the empowerment of politicians over the employment of public servants has been argued by some observers to be a potential threat to public service ethics (Parker, 1989; Uhr, 1990; Considine, 1988) and, hence, to the neutrality of Penang council officers.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The current public management values literature has a preoccupation with normative ethics and a consequential sparsity of empirical analysis (Rainey, 1992; Menzel, 1993). It largely treats public management values as a collective or portmanteau concept (Richards and Smith, 1968: 157) with few attempts to systematically distinguish and classify its various dimensions (Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996; Maranto and Skelley, 1992). A sampling of the literature or official codes cannot fail to show variations in the number and kind of values that civil servants should uphold and the order of their importance. This inherent variability suggests the usefulness of specifying the nature of public management values issues being examined (for example, in terms of relationships or interfaces with various significant others) and developing an empirical framework comprising meaningful value categories. We achieve rigour in this present study by limiting our focus to politicalcivil servant role relations and by developing an appropriate dimensional approach to the study of public manager values consistent with that developed by Pratchett and Wingfield (1996) and Maranto and Skelley (1992). We do not pretend that this approach encompasses the multitude of views on what public service ethics comprises. We identify three main dimensions in respect of civil servants relationships with their political superiors (Table 1). These are the object of obedience, the degree of anonymity, and the degree of partisanship. A civil servants position on each of these dimensions will collectively form his/her value profile in relation to political superiors. This may vary from one civil servant to another. For heuristic purposes, three distinct ideal type (Weber, 1949) value-patterns are identified, these are labelled neutral, responsive and trustee (Table 1). Each ideal pattern offers a benchmark against which changing values and perceptions can be analysed and current values compared. In the context of our ideal types, neutral civil servants owe obedience to the law and to their political superiors conditional upon the latter acting within the law (Table 1). They are non-partisan, party neutral but not

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TAB L E 1

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VAL U E D I M E N S I O NS AND PAT T E RNS I N P OL I T I CAL CIV IL SERVA N T RELATIO N S

Dimensions Neutral Object of Obedience Partisanship Anonymity Law/Minister Non-Partisan Anonymous

Patterns Responsive Minister/Party Partisan Non-Anonymous Trustee Society/The Public Partisan Non-Anonymous

politically neutered (Uhr, 1987: 22) in their dealings with political superiors. Neutrality implies a division of role between civil servants and political superiors, where civil servants participate in the policy process by providing honest and frank advice. In doing so they take into account the goals of political superiors, the policy merits and the public interest. They faithfully implement lawful policies and instructions decided by political superiors, even if they do not agree with them (Heclo, 1975; Spann, 1973; Thompson, 1985). In this relationship civil servants are expected to be anonymous; not to make public comments or divulge information except with proper authorisation from or on behalf of political superiors (Williams, 1985; Kernaghan, 1976). Responsive civil servants also obey their political superiors (Table 1). However, they do not confine themselves to the letter and spirit of existing law but are committed believers who would go about doing whatever was necessary to achieve [their superiors] policy goals (Aberbach and Rockman, 1994: 466). Responsive civil servants provide advice and information that support their superiors policy objectives. In this pursuit they might suppress adverse information and even cook data to further the interests of their superiors (Rourke, 1992: 545). It follows that responsive civil servants eschew anonymity and would not hesitate to make public comments and manage information to increase support for the policies and goals of their superiors. Civil servants following the trustee value-pattern see society or the public as the ultimate object of obedience (Table 1). They are non-partisan in relation to political parties but see themselves as non-elected trustees of the sovereign power. They exercise that power with special sensitivity to the public interest (Buchanan, 1975: 426). Trustees serve their superiors so long as the latter work for the public interest (Jackson, 1988: 247). They promote the public interest in their advice, will only implement policies consistent with the public interest and will resist policies that are not. Their resistance includes speaking out against mistaken policies, leaking information, whistle-blowing, and even secret white-anting from within if necessary (Jackson, 1988). Jackson argues that there are occasions when

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leaking serves the public interest. Leaking may always be illegal but it is not always unethical or immoral (1988: 248). Civil servants who subscribe to the trustee value-pattern forsake anonymity to promote the public interest.
METHODOLOGY

The local government restructuring of the mid-1970s left Penang with two municipal councils: Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang (MPPP) and Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai (MPSP), or Penang Island Municipal Council and Seberang Perai Municipal Council. The MPPP administers an area of approximately 293 square kilometres with a multi-ethnic population of about 600,000. The MPSP is the largest local authority in Malaysia covering an area of 738 square kilometres with a multi-ethnic population of about 391,000 in 2000 (ESCAP, 2001). Both councils comprise 24 appointed councillors. The research methodology adopted a combination of questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews to determine the position of Penang council officers (PCOs) on each of the value dimensions identified above (Table 1). In line with our interest in the values of civil servants that deal directly with politicians in office, the target group was the heads and deputy heads of administrative departments. Both MPPP and MPSP have nine departments each. Each department has a head and one or more deputies comprising a total of 42 civil servants or, as we term them in this article, Penang Council Officers (PCOs). There were 32 responses to the questionnaire survey (75 per cent of our target group). Of these, 21 were from MPPP and the other 11 from MPSP. The questionnaire survey sought responses to a set of discrete questions testing each of the value patterns. The main aim of this approach was to provide a broad understanding of the main patterns of the respondents received behaviour that could later be verified, followed up and/or supplemented by the interview process. The survey respondents represented all MPPP departments and the majority of MPSP departments, a diversity that should enhance confidence in our findings (Felts and Schumann, 1997: 364). On the other hand, there are possible limitations arising from social desirability bias in self-reporting as well as from the respondents interpretation of value terms and the absence of reference to specific cases of value conflict (Frederick and Weber, 1990: 128). To reduce and help overcome these limitations, the survey findings, as previously identified, were verified through the use of semi-structured interviews (Bryant and Pullin, 1997; Brannen, 1992).

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Table 2 indicates the proportion of council officers who agreed, were not sure or disagreed with each variable in the neutrality value-pattern. It can be seen from the table that there is considerable support for neutral values in the majority of the dimensions tested. In the obedience dimension, the findings indicate very strong support that the PCOs will impartially implement council policy in accordance with rules and regulations (91 per cent), while the majority (69 per cent) supported the view that they will only carry out the lawful orders of councillors. The respondents also strongly supported the neutral value of non-partisanship. When advising councillors they will provide views and information on all relevant matters even if they do not coincide with those of the councillors (81 per cent) and this extended to considering the preferences of their superiors and the public interest (84 per cent). Table 3 indicates the proportion of respondent support or otherwise for each dimension in the responsive value pattern. The data shows little or no support for each of the responsive value dimensions. In terms of the obedience dimension, only a few respondents (19 per cent) appeared willing to promote councillor interests during the course of policy implementation and even fewer (13 per cent) were comfortable with the notion of blind obedience and implementing all of their superiors orders, even illegal ones. When it came to responsive partisanship, again, only a few respondents (19 per cent) agreed that they would limit their views and information to that which supported their superiors policy preferences and none of them (zero per cent) agreed that they would provide policy formulation advice which supported the councillors policy preferences and nothing else. In concert with their seeming overall desire for anonymity in public management, very few (13 per cent) of PCOs indicated that they would make public comment that promoted support for councillors.
TAB L E 2 NE UT RAL I T Y DI ME NS I ON RE S PO N SES

Dimension Tested Obedience

Variables

Agree Unsure Disagree % % % 3 22 16 9 0 6 9 3 6 0

I implement policies impartially and in accordance 91 with rules and regulations. Obedience I carry out only the lawful orders of the councillors. 69 Partisanship When advising, I provide views and information on 81 all relevant matters, even if they do not coincide with those of the councillors. Partisanship In providing policy formulation advice, I consider 84 both the preferences of my superior and the public interest. Anonymity I never make public comment or disclose information 100 without proper authorisation.

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TAB L E 3 RESPONSIVE DIMENSION RESPONSES

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Dimension Tested Obedience

Variables

Agree Unsure Disagree % % % 13 19 19 0 13 13 22 16 25 23 75 59 66 75 65

I implement all orders of my superior even if they are not lawful or are against the public interest. Obedience I promote the interests of the councillors and the ruling party while I implement policies. Partisanship While advising councillors, I only provide views and information that support their policy preferences. Partisanship When providing policy formulation advice, I consider the preferences of my superior and nothing else. Anonymity I only make public comments and disclose information that promotes public support for the councillors.

Table 4 indicates the proportion of council officers who agreed, were not sure or disagreed with each variable in the trustee value-pattern. Support for this pattern was positive but weaker and more mixed than support for the neutral value-pattern. While there was strong support (84 per cent) for using their discretion when implementing policies to make them as far as possible in the public interest, there was much less support from respondents (45 per cent) for only implementing those policies which are in the public interest. Similarly, while there was support in the partisanship dimension for adopting the public interest as the primary concern in policy formulation (59 per cent), there was less support (47 per cent) for only providing councillors with advice that promotes the public interest. The final dimension in the trustee pattern is anonymity, the willingness or otherwise of a PCO to go public without proper authorisation and disclose information about policies which were against the PCOs view of the public interest. The findings indicate that none of the respondents agreed with this statement (zero per cent) and they would avoid making public comment or disclosure in this respect. Although the above discussion indicates some support for trustee values among the respondents, there was only majority support when they were implementing policy (84 per cent) and in policy formulation (59 per cent). These statements can both be interpreted as non-confrontational and they promote a passive rather than active trustee focus. In contrast, a minority of the respondents would only implement policies that were in the public interest (45 per cent) and only provide advice that promoted the public interest (47 per cent). Importantly, although they are trustee-oriented, these statements require more active trustee behaviour on the part of the PCO and hence entail more risk of exposure. The most active trustee statement, which indicated the willingness of the PCO to make unauthorised public comment

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TAB L E 4

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T RUS T E E DI ME NS I ON RE S P ON SES

Dimension Tested Obedience

Variables

Agree Unsure Disagree % % % 45 84 47 59 0 32 9 22 28 10 23 6 31 13 90

I only implement policies which, in my view, are in the public interest. Obedience When implementing policies, I use my discretion to make them as consistent as possible with the public interest. Partisanship While advising, I only provide views and information that promote the public interest. Partisanship When providing policy formulation advice my primary consideration is to promote the public interest. Anonymity I comment publicly or disclose information on policies which, in my view, are against the public interest, even when it is not expressly authorised by my superior.

on policies they considered against the public interest, received no support at all from the respondents. These survey findings suggest that while public servants may identify with trustee values, the majority will tend to adopt passive rather than active ways of manifesting their support for these values. This finding is more consistent with the traditional view of neutrality rather than trustee-type values. In the remainder of this section we consider the interview and other data to further expand upon and qualify the quantitative data considered so far. It is interesting to note that the neutral value-pattern is the only one supported by the survey respondents across all dimensions. We argue that neutrality has endured in this environment partly because PCOs believe that the councillors, as political representatives, have the right to decide on and direct the policy framework. One departmental head supported this view by pointing out that we do not have council election[s] but the fact that they [councillors] are appointed by the State government means they are also supposed to be representing the general public. There was undeniable recognition among council officers of the constitutionally established role division between officers and politicians. The officers acknowledgment and unqualified acceptance of this role division was summed up by one officer who stated that: The councillors are the policy makers in council so they are the decision makers, council is something like a mini sort of parliament. Whenever council wants to make a decision in terms of policy they are the ones who have the final say. As far as officers [are concerned] ... we are running [the] day to day administrative work, we are doing the day to day programs approved by council. But whenever there is a need for new guidelines, new policies then we are the technical

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officers, our responsibilities are to study and present [our findings] to the council for a decision. The legitimacy of council and the council officers duty to obey was summed up by one interview respondent who stated that as an officer: of the council I am supposed to defend the council decision. I am paid to do so. I am not here to express my own personal views My duty is to the council not to individual councillors. So if the council has made that decision then I would defend the decision by rationalising and supporting that decision. That is the way I have been trained that is the way I think There are lot of decisions the council rejects, I may disagree with council but I have one duty to support and defend the decision of the council, otherwise I should not be here. The same officer limited their involvement and responsiveness to councillor and public interest demands by stating that they would not do things beyond [the] call of my duty, for instance trying to get support of the public and to stir up things. The issue of technical expertise in the context of the role division between council officers and politicians was emphasised by another council officer who argued that while council officers bring their technical expertise to the policy process not every decision is a matter of technical opinion. Furthermore, it was stated that council officers are quite incapable of making the contributions that politicians make as councillors take political factors into account and [these factors] are more important than technical factors. Neutrality has also endured because it serves as a protective shield for PCOs against pressure from councillors. The interviews identified that some councillors are quite assertive and at times very aggressive in pursuing their own policy and political objectives and aspirations which they expect PCOs to support. When undue pressure of this nature occurs, the PCOs use neutrality as a screen or barrier to protect themselves from charges of noncompliant and non-supportive behaviour. However, political pressure has unmistakably affected the practice of neutrality. PCOs play safe by adopting a very formal approach to their role. For example, some of those interviewed insist that their views are recorded when their advice is ignored but most simply take the attitude that their job finishes when their advice is tendered. Many are reluctant, even scared, to take a firm stand on policy issues because fingers will be pointed by councillors. One PCO indicated that we do not want to exercise our discretion because we feel that the councillors will come after us. Another was more forthright and stated that:

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We have a group of politicians, our councillors. They have an issue to follow, why should you come out and be victimised, be accused? Some of our colleagues have been harassed or intimidated even in [a] full meeting [of the council]. The relationship is no more conducive. The councillors are telling the officers off no more fearless advice! PCOs practice passive rather than active neutrality due to a combination of pressures. These range from aggressive politicians, to a perceived lack of protection from their senior compatriots, to the professed tenuous nature of their employment relationship. In terms of aggressiveness, there was a strong indication that councillors insisted that officers be flexible and sympathetic towards their constituents when implementing laws and applying them to particular cases. In both the questionnaire and interviews, PCOs reported that councillors frequently intervene and usually get their way during the implementation process. The outcome is an apparent responsiveness on the part of these public servants. This helps to explain why, of all the statements on responsiveness in Table 3, council officer disagreement is weakest with respect to their promoting the interests of the councillors and the ruling party while implementing policies. However, it was made clear during the interviews that their compliance with councillor requests of this kind is involuntary, even coerced. One officer stated that they: get hammered in the council. Sometimes they [councillors] criticise me on personalities. I am very very upset [by] it. I know the councillors, they try to stir you up It is very annoying. They do not ask you in [a] polite manner [but] in a very rough manner because councillors think that they are the employers, they think they are the boss, they think they have the right to engage you, fire you and dismiss you, they come with that type of feeling, every one of these guys [has] a lot of ego that they are higher and superior and more conversant than the professionals in the organisation. The officers also felt quite insecure in taking a firm stand on matters of policy interpretation and implementation. They perceived they would not be protected by the secretary and president of their councils in the event of a serious confrontation with councillors. The secretary and the president of their councils are public servants and, quite logically, there was a strong feeling that these leadership positions should support their fellow public servants, but this does not happen. The officers argued that the individuals in these leadership positions were more vulnerable to councillor power than they were. If the councillors took a stand that these leaders did not follow, then they were likely to be dismissed or transferred. This lack of solidarity

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within the ranks of council officers was associated with a take care of yourself culture where officers felt isolated, exposed and susceptible to councillor pressure when policy issues are contentious and confronting. This is sick. An officer who is looking for some kind of guidance and support, you may not find it there; he is on his own. No group support If you want to do things properly, interpret things properly, there is nobody to take care of you, nobody is here to protect you; there is no godfather here. This perceived lack of desire to take a firm stand on matters of policy interpretation and implementation is also associated with the nature of the employment relationship of the council officers themselves. Those interviewed were acutely conscious of their dependency on councillors for ongoing employment in their respective council. Staffing in local government is the direct responsibility of the authorities [the councillors], which have the right, subject to few exceptions, to appoint and dismiss (Norris, 1980: 6). Under the Local Government Act 1976, the appointed councillors have an important, and at times decisive, influence over officer selection, promotion and salary increases (LGA, 1976: s.16). While there are council committees which make these human resource decisions, the councillors have significant representation on them and are in effect the power brokers in any significant human resource decision. The majority of PCOs viewed the role of councillors in respect of their promotion and continued employment as decisive, with a significant capability to take disciplinary action against non-conformists. It has been argued that public managers cannot complain about the requirement to be obedient (Jackson, 1988; Thompson, 1985). They are morally obliged to obey the lawful commands of their political superiors and accept these duties on their own volition. The moment they find these duties disagreeable they are free to resign (Jackson, 1988; Thompson, 1985). However, the implicit assumption underlying this argument is a labour market context where there are alternative employment choices for those with the particular skills of public servants, which is not the case in Malaysia. There are three factors which limit or confine the public manager employment choice in Malaysia. First, although there have been proposals in the past to establish a country-wide local government service in Malaysia, it remains a wish rather than a reality. As a result, council officers are employed by and serve a specific local government council with little or no opportunity to transfer or move within the service to other councils. In reality, labour market opportunities for local government officers are extremely limited. Second, the long-term political rule by a dominant coalition party means there are

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few, if any, public employment opportunities that the coalition party cannot influence. Therefore, if you upset one part of the political elite you are likely to limit the chance of public employment elsewhere. As a consequence, with few employment alternatives, PCOs are highly vulnerable to the displeasure of councillors. Finally, the neutrality principle, as a Westminster style of public administration solution for securing a competent civil service under competitive party politics, requires for its sustenance some measure of restraint or discipline on the part of political parties in power (Williams, 1985). One such restraint is provided by the alternation of parties in power. This alternation also restrains PCOs from opportunistically taking sides to further their careers. The continued rule by a dominant party, with little or no prospect of party alternation, weakens the incentives and restraints for both ruling politicians and PCOs, tempting politicians to demand more responsiveness and PCOs to succumb to such temptation. We earlier identified that the trustee value-pattern received some support in the survey findings. This is because PCOs saw themselves as more objective and able to see the public interest more clearly than the appointed councillors, who often pursued narrow, sectional interests. However, our respondents reported that they generally refrain from resisting or arguing against councillors preferences or decisions on the grounds that these preferences were contrary to the public interest. This is consistent with the questionnaire response in Table 4, where none of them supported violating the norm of anonymity by speaking out against mistaken policies. However, their agreement (84 per cent) that they use their discretion to consider the public interest while implementing policies does not conflict, because one action is confrontational and the other is not. We can conclude, then, that the majority of officers use their discretion to promote the public interest only when there is no risk of open confrontation with councillors, and their support for the trustee values is more passive than active.
DISCUSSION

Matters of convention, political traditions and circumstances primarily condition the values guiding politicalcivil servant relations in parliamentary systems. The overall picture emerging in this study is one of predominantly neutral PCOs who further the public interest when opportune, without risking open conflict with councillors; PCOs who also resort to responsive behaviour when circumstances dictate that it is prudent to do so, especially during policy implementation. This pragmatic elemental combination of the various value-patterns and the reasons offered for such behaviour suggest an image of PCOs trying to cope with multiple and

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conflicting expectations in a complex and difficult environment. An environment that is not of their making and not entirely to their liking. This coping occurs in a way that avoids serious conflict with their political superiors. Avoidance is needed not only for self-protection but also for maintaining a workable relationship essential for their effectiveness as council officers. The coping also serves to minimise dissonance for PCOs themselves. It allows the respondents to see themselves as neutral professionals who serve a larger purpose, namely the public interest. True, they promote the public interest only when circumstances permit and at times they even engage in responsive behaviour. However, both these seeming departures from neutrality are seen as a necessary and pragmatic adaptation to a recalcitrant political world and, as such, are not seen as seriously compromising their role conception. Civil service neutrality, the bedrock of parliamentary systems, endures as the main value-pattern governing councillorofficer relations in local government in Penang. However, it has also undergone some changes, which we suggest are associated with PCOs coping with political conditions. Below we highlight these changes and comment on their implications for council performance. First, however, it merits notice that the changes to neutrality have come not from PCOs fealty to the public interest but from other sources. The trustee value-pattern persists alongside but does not seriously challenge neutrality. The former is accepted and presumably to some extent practised, but only in a passive way so as to minimise conflict with political superiors. Some would probably find it heartening that PCOs still find meaning and appeal in serving the public interest. Those troubled or revolted by politicians excesses may wish for a more robust trustee role and defence of the public interest by these PCOs. However, civil service trusteeship of the public interest does not sit well with democratic theory (Burke, 1986: 317) and is particularly scorned in parliamentary systems with their clear and unified political hierarchy (Quinlan, 1993: 542). To those who believe that civil service trusteeship of the public interest is both proper and properly subject to legitimate political authority, when it conflicts with the managers duty up the line, it takes second place (Corbett, 1996: 198), the behaviour of PCOs in this regard may be just what it should be. Indeed, such a non-confrontational and subordinated promotion of the public interest by civil servants is often seen as an integral part of an extended notion of neutrality itself (Richards and Smith, 1968). Our evidence indicates that the practice of neutrality by PCOs is more passive than active. It is passive because PCOs do not feel secure enough in the current political environment to speak their mind openly and frankly when advising at least some of the councillors. This adaptive slide towards

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passive neutrality by defensive and even demoralised PCOs deprives councillors of the full benefit of civil service advice. Such an outcome negates to some extent the rationale for according permanent tenure to PCOs and confidentiality in their advice to political superiors. This diminution of neutrality can fairly be regarded as an impoverishment of the values of PCOs, as its effect on council performance would appear to be unequivocally and entirely adverse. Councillors who are secure in power tend to demand greater responsiveness from PCOs. Given this, one may feel relieved that responsiveness in the Penang local government context finds little favour among PCOs and that their responsive behaviour is confined to compliance with councillor requests in specific cases of administration. However, this responsive behaviour, even though involuntary, is a departure from the impartial implementation of laws by a neutral civil service. As such, PCO acceptance of it constitutes a further impoverishment of neutral values. Nor should its obvious downside be overlooked simply because it is commonly practised. If rampant or unchecked, particularistic interventions by councillors and subservience by PCOs seriously risk cheapening the currency of the law. This increases public cynicism and further encourages citizens to resort to political influence in their dealings with the civil service. It should be pointed out that a highly politicised administration is a different matter, and hence criticism of it detracts not at all from the principle that administrative decisions are properly subject to political review and reconsideration in a democracy.
CONCLUSION

We find that the dominance of the ruling coalition appears to have pushed PCOs towards a more passive and impoverished neutrality ethic. Consideration needs to be given to whether this is also true of council officers in other states and of civil servants at other levels of the Malaysian government. However, we see no reason to be sanguine. Penang is the only Malaysian state in which no single party in the ruling coalition has a majority of seats in the state legislature or in the local councils. This diversity imposes a higher degree of inter-party check and balance within the ruling coalition in Penang than in other states. Yet we have found that PCOs have succumbed somewhat to political pressures to be more responsive. If this has happened in Penang, where there is the longest history of British administration, which emphasises neutrality values and checks and balances among political parties, a fortiori the same effect is likely to be more pronounced in other National Front-controlled states. It is also likely to be pronounced at the federal level, where a single coalition

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partner is dominant and holds a clear majority of legislative and/or council seats. This also applies to the states of Kelantan and Trengganu controlled by the main Malay opposition party of PAS. Clearly, the interests of good governance suggest that more research and greater public attention to the values of Malaysian civil servants would not be remiss in a society that prides itself on state led development.

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