UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE STEVE SARICH, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly

situated persons Plaintiff, vs. STATE OF WASHINGTON Defendants, CLASS ACTION No. PETITION FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Comes now Plaintiff Steve Sarich pro se and alleges as follows:

I.PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. Plaintiff Steve Sarich and a class of others similarly situated challenge the constitutionality of SB 5073 the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act, and seek to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act SB 5073 from being enacted into law because it is unworkable. The Act is unconstitutional due to the fact it was impossible for the Governor of Washington State to give a sensible re-construction to the Act after removing the sections of the Act, which contained language she stated would subject Washington state employees to federal drug charges.

2. This action seeks to have the Act declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, both on its face and as applied to plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated, and to enjoin the Washington State government from enacting or enforcing it. 3. The Act's Constitutional flaws under the 14thst Amendment are the lack of definitions for the legislative purpose of the act, and the lack of sensible re-construction by the Governor of Washington State Christine Gregoire. The Constitutional flaws under the 14thst Amendment were created after the Act was vetoed to such a degree that the remaining Act is unconstitutional and violates the Due Process Clause, the 14th Amendment and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine. The Washington State Medical Cannabis Act, which goes into effect on July 22, 2011, does not explain if the current medical marijuana authorization form has to be renamed to a medical cannabis authorization form. Without this explanation or new form requirement, Washington State medical marijuana patients with medical marijuana authorizations would no longer have valid documentation according to the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act as of July 22, 2011, and could be subject to arrest and prosecution. II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This case arises under the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States and presents a federal question within this Court's jurisdiction under Article III of the federal Constitution and 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1361. 5. The Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201 et seq. 6. The Court has the authority to award costs and attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. 2412. 7. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. 1391(e).

III. ARGUMENTS 8. The plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated, seek declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201 et seq., for, inter alia, declaratory, temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunction relief, and such other and further relief as may be just and proper in accordance with law and equity, from current, and threatened deprivations of plaintiffs rights under the State of Washington, by the defendants acting individually and in concert to create a medical marijuana/cannabis law, that is not ascertainable and is unconstitutional. 9. The plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated allege the legislature and the Governor did not define in the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act whether the current Washington State medical marijuana authorization forms used by qualified Washington State medical marijuana patients would still be valid under the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act and that without that issue being clarified by the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act, the Act should be declared unconstitutional due to a violation of the Due Process Clause, the 14th Amendment, and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine.

IV. PARTIES
10. At all times material herein. Plaintiff Steve Sarich and a class of others similarly situated are residents of King County and elsewhere in the State of Washington. 11. Defendant State of Washington is a state of the United States duly incorporated, and organized under the laws of the State of Washington and the laws of the United States of America. Upon information and belief the State of Washington failed to protect the Washington State medical marijuana patient from being subjected to unconstitutional laws.

12. At all times referred to herein, Defendant State of Washington, acted under color of the laws, statutes, resolutions, regulations, policies, customs of the State of Washington, to create an unconstitutional Washington State Medical Cannabis Act in SB 5073.. V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 13. Plaintiff Steve Sarich brings this action as a medical marijuana patient and on behalf of all others similarly situated Washington State medical marijuana patients. The exact sizes of the effected amount of Patients are unknown to the Plaintiff, but Plaintiff believe the amount of the Patients are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; joinder is also impracticable because, due to the stigmatizing nature of the necessary medications, members are not likely to be willing to broadcast to the world that they require the use of medical marijuana to treat a chronic or terminal condition.

VI. FACTS
14. During the Washington State legislative session for 2011 the Washington State legislature constructed the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act SB 5073, which was intended to regulate the distribution of medical marijuana. On April 22, 2011 the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act SB 5073 was passed by the Washington State Senate after it had been approved by the House on April 11, 2001. On April 29, 2011, Governor Christine Gregoire signed the bill after vetoing numerous sections after she claimed the Act as passed by the legislature would subject state employees to federal drug charges. The Washington State Medical Cannabis Act SB 5073 is set to take effect July 22, 2011, without a definition of the term medical cannabis or clarification as to whether the current medical marijuana patient authorizations would still be legally valid under the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act. 15. As a direct and proximate result of; and said acts and failures to act of the Legislature and the Governor of the State of Washington, further described in the following paragraphs, the Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated will suffer injuries, including but
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not limited to: a. Violations of constitutional rights; c. Fear, emotional distress, death d. Pursuant to Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201 et seq. Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated are entitled to a Declaratory Judgment that defendant actions as described herein violate the Due Process Clause, 14th Amendment, and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, and, further is entitled to an Injunction to prevent defendant State of Washington from enacting the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act without codified explanations as to whether the current medical marijuana authorizations would continue to be valid under the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act or if new medical cannabis authorizations would be required by July 22, 2011. 16. The actions of the Defendants violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated, as further described below.

VII. CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT 1 VIOLATIONS OF 14TH AMENDMENT- SECTION 1- DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
17. Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated realleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in1 through 16 as though fully set forth herein; 18. Without addressing the issue of whether the current medical marijuana patient authorizations would still be legally valid under the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act, tens of thousands of Washington State medical marijuana patients would be illegal as of July 22, 2011, and entrapped into violations of law by the unconstitutional vagueness of the

Washington State Medical Cannabis Act. 19. Without addressing the issue of whether or not new medical cannabis patient authorizations are required under the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act, tens of thousands of Washington State medical marijuana patients would be illegal as of July 22, 2011, and entrapped into violations of law by the unconstitutional vagueness of the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act. Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those who are accused.(See Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948). ''Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warnings. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications.'' (See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 -09 (1972), quoted in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." [Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511 (1892)]

20. The legislature intended for the Washington State medical cannabis act SB 5073 to be clearly defined in section 201, and contained a definition of medical cannabis to be a THC concentration of greater than three-tenths of one percent. The Washington State Uniform Controlled Substances Act and the federal Controlled Substances Act do not define medical cannabis, and therefore cannot be used to define medical cannabis for the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act. The legislature also intended to regulate the dispensing, production, manufacturing, and processing of medical cannabis, and in their construction of SB 5073 intertwined their definition of regulating the dispensing, production, manufacturing, and processing of medical cannabis, with the definition of what medical cannabis is. Governor Gregoire, concerned with protecting state employees from the alleged consequences of violating federal drug laws , vetoed the entire definitions section, 201 of SB 5073. However, the dispensing, production, manufacturing, and processing of medical cannabis, was so intertwined with the definition of what medical cannabis is and the rest of SB 5073, that it was impossible for Governor Gregoire to give a sensible re-construction of SB 5073. The reconstruction of SB 5073 by Governor Gregoire has also left the statutory interpretation Act impossible for the courts since most of the surviving sections of the Act are without clarity and are unconstitutional. Clearly, the legislature intended to provide a specific definition for the term medical cannabis and how to regulate the dispensing, production, manufacturing, and processing of medical cannabis. Governor Gregoire, in her re-construction of SB 5073, failed to maintain the internal and external consistency of the original legislative purpose for SB 5073 as the legislature intended and failed to give a sensible re-construction of SB 5073. All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." [Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity

Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457; 12 S. Ct. 511 (1892)] 21. The re- construction of SB 5073 by Governor Gregoire has left its statutory interpretation impossible for the courts since the term medical cannabis as the legislature intended was vetoed by the Governor. Since the Governor did not offer a re-definition of medical cannabis after her veto of the definitions section, the court would be left with the task of applying an ordinary meaning of the term cannabis as found in the dictionary or federal and state drug control substances laws. However, this ordinary meaning of cannabis as found in the dictionary, or the federal and state drug control laws, would not have the same intent or definition as the medical cannabis that which the legislature intended in SB 5073. Given this dilemma the court could not give a harmonious interpretation of the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act without a definition as to what medical cannabis is as the Washington State legislature intended.

VIII. RELIEF REQUESTED

Wherefore, Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated respectfully requests the court; 22. Allow for a declaratory judgment: Declare that the state defendants would entrap Washington State citizens into violations of law, because the Act violates the Due Process clause, the 14th Amendment and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, because the Act does not specify whether the current medical marijuana patient authorizations are still legally valid, or whether or not a new medical cannabis patient authorization is be required to be compliant with the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act. 23. That this Court issues a temporary and a permanent injunction enjoining State, defendants, their subordinates, and their officers, successors, assigns and all
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persons in active concert or participation with them, by; Declaring that the defendants have violated the Due Process Clause, the 14th Amendment and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine. 24. A declaratory ruling that the Defendants have committed the other violations contained Herein. 25. Award costs and attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. 2412.

DATED this _____ day of June, 2011 By:

STEVE SARICH 46709 SE 161 S T ST NORTH BEND WA.98045

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the date and time indicated below, I caused to be served By professional courier, a copy of the documents and pleadings listed below upon the attorney of record for the defendants herein listed and indicated below.
1. PLAINTIFFS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 2. SUMMONS

Washington State Attorney Generals Office 1125 Washington Street SE PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100

DATED this _____ day of June, 2011 By:

STEVE SARICH 46709 SE 161 S T ST NORTH BEND WA.98045

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

STEVE SARICH, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons Plaintiff, vs. STATE OF WASHINGTON Defendant, NOTE ON MOTION CALENDER JULY 22, 2011 No. PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

I.INTRODUCTION
1. The Defendant is attempting to enforce an Act which would be so vague and confusing that it would violate the Due Process Clause, the 14th Amendment and the void for vagueness doctrine, because Washington State medical marijuana/cannabis patients would not be properly informed whether their medical marijuana patient authorizations are still valid under the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act. Qualified patients have no way to comply by July 22, 2011, so the courts must determine whether the Act is unconstitutional on its face before the Act takes effect.

2. Plaintiffs have filed a Complaint for Declaratory, and Injunctive relief. Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated seek a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo and prevent plaintiffs and others in a similar position from having to suffer irreparable harm pending the outcome at trial. .

II.ARGUMENT
3. Plaintiffs incorporate into this motion for preliminary injunction all statements, facts,

and claims made in the Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
4. A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interests. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc 129 S. Ct. 365,374 (2008)

LEGAL STANDARD
5. The Ninth Circuit recognizes two tests for demonstrating preliminary injunctive relief: The traditional test or an alternative sliding scale test. Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791,795 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the traditional test, a party must show: 1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, 3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and 4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases). Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). Where a party demonstrates that a public interest is involved, a district court must also examine whether the public interest favors the plaintiff. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992).Alternatively, a party seeking injunctive relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 must show either (1) a combination of likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of merits are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the moving party. Immigrant

Assistance Project of the L.A. County of Fedn of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 873 (9th Cir. 2002); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998). These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases. Roe, 134 F.3d at 1402 (quoting United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc.,982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992)); accord Sun Microsystems, 188F.3d at 1119. Thus, 'the greater the relative hardship to the moving party, the less probability of success must be shown.' Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Natl Ctr. For Immigrants Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984)). 6.Irreparable Injury A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that there is a well-grounded fear that a held right will be invaded and that the acts complained of are already resulting in, or will result in, actual and substantial injury. Le Maine v. Seals, 47 Wash.2d 259 (1955); Federal Way Family Physicians, Inc. v. Tacoma Stands Up for Life, 106 Wash.2d 261 (1986). The actual or anticipated injury must be irreparable. If the injury can be remedied at law, an injunction is not appropriate. Matthews v. national Collegiate Athletic Assn, 79 F.Supp.2d 1199 (1999). In this case, having law enforcement arrest sick and dying medical marijuana/cannabis patients and seize their only effective medical treatment options would undoubtedly cause irreparable harm. a. Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated have an established right to protect. Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated have been medical marijuana patients prior to the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act being enacted into law. Under the current Washington State medical marijuana law, and before the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act has taken effect, Plaintiffs and a class of others similarly situated have a clear interest in protecting his or hers medical treatment and rights under RCW 69.51A. Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated will suffer Irreparable Injury if they are entrapped into thinking

they are still valid Washington State Medical Marijuana patients while using their current Washington State medical marijuana patient authorizations, only to find out that they are now in violation of Washington State law, because they do not possess Washington State Medical Cannabis patient authorizations. In Addition, under the new Washington State Medical Cannabis Act, what is and is not medical cannabis is no longer defined as the legislature intended, so the name of the Act is now undefined. Therefore,the Act is unworkable, unconstitutional and should be declared void for vagueness.. 7. The Ability to Prevail on the Merits The defendant cannot show that the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act SB 5073 has addressed whether the Current medical marijuana patient authorizations are still valid or whether new medical cannabis forms are now required as of July 22, 2011.The legislature and the Governor failed to write in or describe an appropriate grandfather section which would allow for a gradual switch over from one law to the other..The defendants also cannot show that it was the intent of the legislature or the Governor to cause tens of thousands of Washington State medical marijuana/medical cannabis patients to be invalid as of July 22, 2011, and be arrested and prosecuted for not having a medical cannabis authorization as required by the Act. Common sense would dictate that the Plaintiffs and a class of others similarly situated would prevail on the merits. 8. The Balance of Potential Harm Favors Plaintiff Plaintiff and a class of others similarly situated are without clear instructions under the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act whether they will be invalid or illegal after July 22, 2011, because they do not have a medical cannabis patient authorizations. Tens of thousands of Washington State citizens will be entrapped by less charitable jurisdictions which will no doubt take advantage of the vagueness of the Washington State Medical Cannabis Acts lack of clear guidance on the issue of whether the current authorizations would be valid under the new Act. The potential harm of patients being invalided, arrested and successfully prosecuted because they do not possess a medical cannabis patient authorizations is real,particularly in the less charitable

jurisdictions, therefore, the balance of equities tips in plaintiffs favor, Winter, 129 S.Ct.at 374 9. Public Interest Favors Granting the Relief The public interest for creating workable and constitutional laws to enable qualified persons to use medical marijuana to treat their medical conditions has been well settled. Even the Governor of Washington State Christine Gregoire in her veto letter acknowledged that marijuana was effective if providing relief for qualified patients. In reading the remarks made by the Governor Gregoire, it is clear that the intent of the veto of the majority of SB 5073 was not to overly restrict medical marijuana use but to protect state employees from federal charges. Unfortunately in the process of removing those sections of the bill which would allegedly put state employees in jeopardy of federal criminal charges, the bill that remained was left unworkable and unconstitutional, without a definitions section in the Act it is now bereft of clear definition as to what is medical cannabis under the remaining orphan bill. In addition, the public would be outraged if tens of thousands of individual citizens would be arrested because the legislature did not clarify whether the current medical marijuana patient authorization would still be valid, or whether a new medical cannabis patient authorizations would be required before July 22, 2011. 10. The laws of the State of Washington reflect a public interest in favor of 1)

Allowing qualified medical marijuana patients to use medical marijuana to treat their medical conditions; 2) protecting the citizens of Washington State from unworkable and unconstitutional laws from being enacted to cause harm from entrapment, suffering or fatal outcomes; 3) violations of the Due Process Clause, the 14th Amendment, and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Therefore, there is a strong public interest in restraining the defendants from causing sick and dying medical marijuana/cannabis patients to be arrested because they have medical marijuana patient authorizations and not medical cannabis patient authorizations. 11. Alternative Standard

The alternative standard is also met by the plaintiff. 1. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits and Possibility of

Irreparable Injury The alternative standards are also found in the traditional standard examined above and are clearly met in this case. The alternative standard requires a showing that the case raises serious questions and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in the movants favor. This factor is very similar to the traditional standard which has already been discussed. However, under this standard there is no need to show a public interest. Instead, the movant must show that there are serious questions at issue. Even assuming, arguendo, that there are no public interest issues at stake in this case, there is no doubt but that the issues before the court are very serious in nature. The issue presented is whether qualified medical marijuana patients should be subjected to unworkable and unconstitutional laws, that would lead to entrapment, ineffective medical treatments, unnecessary suffering, or in some cases death. III. CONCLUSION
12. As detailed above, Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction easily meets every

prong of both the traditional and alternative sliding scale tests. FRCP 65 (c) requires a moving party to enter into a bond. However, since the plaintiffs and thousands of Washington State medical marijuana (cannabis) patients health and in some cases lives would be jeopardized, plaintiffs are asking for a nominal bond of 1 dollar. The defendants will not suffer any harm from this injunction and will simply have to wait until the unconstitutional Washington State Medical Cannabis Act can be sorted out by the courts or the legislature if the courts so indicate. 13. For the reasons above, plaintiffs request that the court grant this motion for preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendants from enacting the Washington State Medical Cannabis Act SB 5073. DATED this _____ day of June, 2011

By:
STEVE SARICH 46709 SE 161 S T ST NORTH BEND WA.98045

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the date and time indicated below, I caused to be served By professional courier, a copy of the documents and pleadings listed below upon the attorney of record for the defendants herein listed and indicated below.
1. PLAINTIFFS PETITION MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Washington State Attorney Generals Office 1125 Washington Street SE PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100

DATED this _____ day of June, 2011 By:

STEVE SARICH 46709 SE 161 S T ST NORTH BEND WA.98045