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Iraqs vanishing Air Force

What happened to the Iraqi Air Force during Operation Iraqi Freedom? Why were no combats reported and what survives today? More importantly, when will a restructured and re-equipped Iraqi air arm be formed? Anthony Tucker-Jones reports on how the Iraqi Air Force cut a deal with Washington.

Above: Sand-blasted and long out of service, this Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle bomber became one of the many decoys parked on Iraqi airfields to lure Coalition aircraft away from more operational types.

American troops triumphantly burst into Saddam International Airport (SIA) and Rashid military air base, both just outside Baghdad, in early April 2003. Only at the former was there any real resistance and to the Americans amazement there was no sign of the once powerful Al Quwwat Al Jawwiya al Iraqiya or Iraqi Air Force (IrAF). While little was expected of the IrAF in 2003, no one thought it would vanish completely. Evidence indicates that the IrAF was either bought off like the Republican Guard or simply threatened into submission. US military planners wanted to secure SIA and take out the main Iraqi fighter bases at al-Asad, al-Taqqadum and Rashid, so they cut a deal with some of the more moderate elements of the IrAF. It remains unclear what level of complicity IrAF Commander Lt Gen Hamid Raja Shalah al-Tikriti had with Washington, but the fact remains the Iraqis did not put up a single aircraft. Unlike the senior Republican Guard and intelligence officers who are believed to have betrayed Saddam Hussein, Gen Shalah was listed on Americas Iraqi Top 55 deck of cards as number 17.

Saddam Hussein declared in August 2002 If they come, we are ready. We will fight them on the streets, from the rooftops, from house to house. We will never surrender. Interestingly, he said nothing about fighting them in the air. At the same time Gen Shalah had claimed categorically that, Our air forces fighters are ready to confront and defeat the aggressors if they dare to approach our territories. Iraqi MiG-29s shooting down Coalition unmanned aerial vehicles was one thing, taking on the latest American air superiority fighters was quite another.

The following month the Coalition made it very clear, when over 100 aircraft attacked Iraqs H3 air base in September 2002, that if the IrAF resisted it would be destroyed. Officially, the raid was part of the enforcement of the southern no-fly zone, but in reality it was placing a calling card which the IrAF could not fail to miss. After that Washington secretly put out feelers to individual IrAF commanders advising them not to resist, and replies came back to the effect that they might indeed prefer the alternative. The senior IrAF leadership comprised Gen Hamid Rajah Shalah, IrAF Commander; Gen Saad Ahmad Naji, Assistant for Operations; Gen Ibrahim Ali Youssef, Commander of Aviation: Gen Sabah Mutlik, Commander of Training and Gen Hussein Zibin, Commander IrAF Intelligence (though in 2002 was believed to be the Iraqi Army Aviation Corps (IrAAC) commander).

Above: Once the fastest aircraft in the IrAF, the highly-valued Soviet-supplied MiG-25R Foxbat B fleet was reduced to an unserviceable group of grounded airframes. This is No 351-05.

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