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D. PRACTICE OF LA DEFINITION! Cayetano vs.

Monsod GR 100113 201 SCRA 210 September 1991 Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. -----February 16, 1959 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ Petitioner Alan F. Paguia v. Office of the President GR 176278 At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments confirmation of nominees. However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness, we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be. Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioners citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davides appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition,

contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question. On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide. The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness. First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution. Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. None of petitioners allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law. The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers contributions to the states coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, negating petitioners claim of illegal expenditure of scarce public funds. Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct. Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. _______________________________________________________________________________________

Philippine Lawyers Association vs Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Patent Director x-----------x Practice of law in the Philippines include such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their

oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing , may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the patent law and other laws applicable as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved. That part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial and quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decision are under the law taken to the Supreme Court.This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

Facts: On May 27, 1957, respondent Agrava issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations. Petitioner contends that anyone has passed the bar exams and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, has good standing, thus duly qualified to practice before the Patent Office, and therefore the act of requiring members of the Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to be allowed to practice before said office is a clear excess of his jurisdiction and violation of the law. On the other hand, respondent claimed that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he had prescribed and scheduled.

x x a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute x x x In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person x x x has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, x x x an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The x x x. Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself which provides: The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. x x x

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison: SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

Issue/s: WHETHER OR NOT MEMBERS OF THE BAR SHOULD FIRST TAKE AND PASS AN EXAMINATION GIVEN BY THE PATENT OFFICE BEFORE HE COULD BE ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW IS THE SAID OFFICE. whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitute or is included in the practice of law. WHETHER OR NOT DIRECTOR OF THE PATENT OFFICE IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION FOR PATENT ATTORNEYS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Decision: The petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.

Ratio Decideni the Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied). Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon

all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours). The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OCA vs. Ladaga OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001 Facts:Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court. During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her. This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.

THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession contemplated by law. DECISION: Reprimanded. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ADMISSION Judicial function: article V111 section 5 (5) -In re cunanan/ In re Almacen Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan Resolution Cunanan, et. al 18March1954 FACTS OF THE CASE: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. - An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.

- The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. - The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. - Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. - Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2/18/70)

FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb. He then vows to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum, so that people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court and that whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated. He ends his petition with a prayer that: a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial court denied

both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.- Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Requirements: ---see: RULE 138 Revised Penal code -- Letter of Atty. Mendoza BM no. 1153 March 9 2010 EN BANC [B.M. No. 1153, March 09, 2010] RE: LETTER OF ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA PROPOSING REFORMS IN THE BAR EXAMINATIONS THROUGH AMENDMENTS TO RULE 138 OF THE RULES OF COURT Sirs/Mesdames: Quoted hereunder, for your information,&nbsp; is a resolution of the&nbsp; Court En Bane dated</span> <span style="font-weight: bold;">March 9, 2010</span><br><br>"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).- The Court Resolved to <span style="font-weight: bold;">APPROVE </span>the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:<br><br><blockquote>SEC. 5. Additional requirement for other applicants.- All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.<br><br>No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.<br><br>A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.<br><br>SEC. 6. Pre-Law. - An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.<br><br>A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course.</blockquote><br>The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to <span style="font-weight: bold;">CIRCULARIZE</span> this resolution among all law schools in the country." Very truly yours,MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA\ --Re: 1999 Bar Examinations Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC B.M. Nos. 979 and 986 December 10, 2002

RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS, MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner. RESOLUTION BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he was directed "to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations." Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such course since 1967. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000 Resolution but his motion was denied. On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P. Purisima, father of petitioner, filed a Petition to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its Resolution of 27 November 2001 "noted without action" the said petition and further resolved "that no further pleadings will be entertained." On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his reasons why in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and regularly attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where he in fact took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law. Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he x x x enrolled in and passed the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x" was a "self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood." Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and affixing his signature on the space provided therefor, he requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Being "consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations," petitioner admitted that he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe had erroneously typed "Philippine Law School," instead of UST, on the space provided for the school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review course. Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review as Annex "D" of his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar review course in UST. To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of his payment of tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c) car pass to the UST campus; (d) individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review course in UST that petitioner was their classmate and that he attended the review course; (e) separate affidavits of five (5) UST students/acquaintances of petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the review lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to the attendance of petitioner in his review classes and lectures in Taxation and Bar Review Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g) affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff at the UST Law Department that she knew petitioner very well as he was among those who would arrive early and request her to open the reading area and turn on the airconditioning before classes started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification dated 22 July 1999 to the effect that petitioner was officially enrolled in and had completed the pre-bar review course in UST which started on 14 April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999. Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations because he thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion (Annex "D" of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his completion of the pre-bar review course. In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman of the 1995 Committee on Bar Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son and stated that his son took the pre-bar review course in UST and that he entry in his sons Petition that he took it in PLS is a "self-evident clerical error." He then poised the question that if there was really a falsehood and forgery in paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of the Petition, which would have been a fatal defect, why then was his son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations? Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary hearing on 30 October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions from petitioner who appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe. On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

"Considering petitioners explanation fortified by unquestionably genuine documents in support thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt. The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890, may be cited. In the said case, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to take the Lawyers Oath. In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar that the charge of Grave Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated April 8, 1998, he was already convicted. But the Court believed his explanation that he had no actual knowledge of his conviction. In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyers Oath, the Court stated, thus: It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyers oath. Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to do some introspection. In his letter, petitioners father also pleaded that the three (3) years denial of his sons request for oath-taking should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong that his son may have unwittingly committed. It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to practice law may be considered an ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any crime. As regards petitioners failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to submit another certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not only his enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with truth. Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in this Bar Matter 986, the Court declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not only Purisima but also Josenio Marquez Reoma, Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for their failure to submit within sixty days from the last day of the examinations the certification of completion of the pre-bar review course. However, the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20, 2000, acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the Court Resolution dated April 13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla, both were allowed to take the Lawyers Oath. In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the required certification was due to his honest belief and assumption that the UP College of Law, where he took his review course, had filed the required certification together with other required documents, was accepted. In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the required certification within the 60-day period was due to her erroneous impression that only the certification of enrollment and attendance was arequired, was likewise accepted. The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated that his f ailure to submit within the 60-day period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that he had substantially complied with the requirements for admission to the Bar Examinations because he thought that the required certificate of compleltition of the pre-bar review course is the same as the certificate of enrollment and attendance in the said course. The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioners explanation should also be given credit just like his three co-examinees. Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of Admission to the Bar of Blas Antonio M. Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of the Committee on Legal Education which recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on grounds of fairness, equal treatment and protection, considering that his co-accused in a criminal case have been allowed to take the lawyers oath. This Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27, 2001, that there was no reason to accord a different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and that the dispensation of justice should be even-handed and consistent." The recommendation is well taken. The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-bar review course in UST as he herein avows. The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST. Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of the pre-bar review course which was still on-going, this defect should not be attributed to petitioner considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is, the fact remains that there is such a certification issued by the UST which appears to

be genuine. This finding is backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty of Civil Law, that she was the one who released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999. Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of the subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence proferred by petitioner to establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking and completion" of the pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews render it difficult to record the attendance religiously of the reviewees every single day for several months. Considering petitioners explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least, petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath. The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioners father pleaded that "the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be enough penalty." It is time to move on. At this juncture it may be well to note the Courts growing concern over the apparent laxity of law schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times. For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar. WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986 is granted and examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999 Bar Examinations is now allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is further allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Panganiban, J., in the result. ---In re: Mallare: A.M. No. 533 April 29, 1968 IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE. REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was admitted to the practice of law on 5 March 1962. In his verified petition to take the bar examinations in 1961, he alleged that he is a citizen of the Philippines and that "his father is Esteban Mallare and his mother is Te Na, both Filipino citizens". (Personal Record, No. 17450, Bar Division) On 16 July 1962, the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo denounced the respondent to this Court as a Chinaman masquerading as a Filipino citizen and requested that the matter be investigated thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show that he has legally become a Filipino, steps be taken for striking his name from the roll of persons authorized to practice law. Acting upon the request, this Court, on 9 August 1962, referred the matter to its Legal Officer-Investigator for investigation and report. An investigation was thus held wherein the relator or complainant and the respondent appeared and adduced their respective evidence. The position of the respondent-lawyer is that he is a Filipino citizen based on the supposed citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare, alleged to be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, Ana Mallare and that the respondent's mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband upon their marriage. The respondent's second theory is that, having been declared a Filipino citizen in a final judgment in 1960 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon province, in its Civil Case No. 329-G (entitled, Vitaliano Itable vs. Artemio, Florencio, Paciencia, Esperanza and Raymundo Mallare) and his birth record, wherein he was originally registered as a Chinese, has likewise been ordered corrected to Filipino, by final judgment in Special Proceeding No. 3925 of the same court,1 his Filipino citizenship is conclusive, res judicata and binding to the government and to the world. Complainant Vivo disputed, on the facts, the respondent's first theory, and, on the second theory, claimed that the aforestated Civil Case No. 329-G (Itable vs. Mallare) was a simulated action calculated to obtain a judicial declaration of

Philippine citizenship and, after having obtained the said declaration, the respondent, together with his brothers and sisters, utilized the declaration to change their birth and alien registration the better to hide their true nationality, which is Chinese. The respondent denies the charge of simulating an action; and by way of defense, points out that Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not subject to collateral attack and, since his birth record and alien registration (and that of his brothers and sisters) have been corrected and cancelled, respectively, the question of their citizenship is now moot and academic. On respondent's first claim to citizenship by blood, the earliest datum that can be stated about the respondent's supposed ancestry is that in 1902,2 ex-municipal president Rafael Catarroja, then eight (8) years old, met for the first time Ana Mallare, the supposed paternal grandmother of the respondent, in Macalelon, Quezon. He had not seen her deliver or give birth to the baby boy, Esteban Mallare, father of the respondent, but met the supposed Filipina mother and Esteban Mallare years later when the boy was already eight (8) years old. (Annex "8," pp. 10-12, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1959, Civil Case No. 329-G, CFI of Quezon Province). There is no evidence that Ana Mallare was an "inhabitant of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine", as required by the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and she cannot, therefore, be considered a Filipina. That witness Catarroja, the respondent, and the latter's brothers and sisters, stated that Ana Mallare was a Filipina, as well as their testimonies in the civil case that she had not married her Chinese husband and that she is the true mother of Esteban Mallare, are more of opinion or conjecture than fact, utterly insufficient to overcome the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other (Rule 131, par. bb). "Every intendment of law and fact", says Article 220 of our Civil Code "leans toward the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of children." The respondent relies on three documents as indicative of the alleged Philippine citizenship of his father, Esteban Mallare. On 7 July 1926, Te Na, respondent's Chinese mother, was described in a landing certificate of residence issued to her, as "wife of P.I. citizen" and as wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen". (Annex "16", being Exh. "3" in Civil Case No. 329-G). On 20 February 1939, Esteban Dy Mallare executed an affidavit stating therein that when he reached the age of majority he had "definitely elected to be a Filipino citizen following the citizenship of my mother." (Annex "4" being Exh. "1" in Civil Case No. 329-G) And, in 1928, Esteban Mallare was a registered voter in Macalelon, Quezon. (Annex "7", being Exh. "2" in Civil Case No. 329-G). A landing certificate of residence issued under Section 7, Act 702 by the Collector of Customs is based upon an administrative ex parte determination of the evidence presented and the facts as stated by the applicant and, therefore, carries little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of the applicant's husband. In the instant case, the truth of Te Na's declarations when she applied for the landing certificate could have been inquired into had she been presented as a witness in these proceedings, but this was not done. The affidavit of Esteban Mallare, besides being self-serving, is not a substitute for a duly recorded election of Philippine citizenship, assuming that the affiant was qualified to so elect. When Esteban executed it, he was already thirty-six (36) years old and he executed it for the purpose, stated in the last paragraph, of making a change in a miscellaneous lease application wherein he had previously stated that he is a citizen of China. Nor can it be regarded as a re-affirmation of an alleged election of citizenship, since no such previous election was proven to have existed. Esteban Mallare's registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but this does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determinable by his blood ( jus sanguinis). Against these pretensions of Philippine citizenship, all the five (5) known children of the spouses Esteban Mallare and Te Na Artemio, Esperanza, Florencio, Paciencia and Raymundo, were registered at birth as children of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother and with the added detail that their parents were born in China. The birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare (Exh. "F") who was born on 25 October 1939, is particularly significant in this regard, because it bears the father's own signature. If Esteban Mallare was indeed a Filipino by choice, as stated by him in his aforementioned affidavit (Annex 4), then he should have so stated in this birth certificate of his daughter, instead, he admits, against his own interest, that he is a Chinese. Esteban Mallare's own death certificate (Exh. "C"), over the signature of his son, Artemio Mallare, shows against Artemio's own interest that Esteban was a Chinese, born in Fookiang, China; that he died on 5 June 1945, at the age of 42 and is buried at the Chinese cemetery, having resided in the Philippines for 28 years (Exh. "C"), i.e., only since 1917. The affidavit of Artemio denying that the signature in the aforesaid death certificate is his, is inadmissible and, therefore, should be rejected, as it was offered in evidence for the first time after trial was closed, as an annex to the respondent's memorandum with the investigator. The affiant was not examined thereon, and the affidavit is self-serving besides.

The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and their four (4) children (Raymundo was not yet born) were registered as aliens in 1942 in the then Division of Alien Statistics, pursuant to the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and Executive Order No. 25 of the then Executive Commission. (See letter of Jan. 18, 1963 from the Bureau of Immigration to the Legal Officer-Investigator, see also pp. 171 and 180-181, Vol. I, No. 4, Official Gazette, published during Japanese occupation.) . In addition, the respondent himself was again registered as an alien in 1950, his application thereto bearing his thumbprints and stating therein that he is a Chinese; that he belongs to the yellow race and that he had used these other names: "Tan Jua Gae", "Enciong" and "Jua Gac" (Exh. "N"). He had been a teacher in the Candon Chinese School (t.s.n., p. 17, Oct. 3, 1962). His explanation that it was his mother who registered him as an alien is flimsy; and, as stated hereinbefore, he did not present his mother as a witness. The evidence is thus clearly preponderant, if not overwhelming that the respondent's father, Esteban Mallare or "Mallari", also known as "Esteban Dy", "Esteban Dy Mallare" and "Esteban Tan", was and remained a Chinese until he died; consequently, the respondent's mother, admittedly a Chinese, retained her original citizenship and their offspring, respondent, Florencio Mallare, together with his brothers and sisters, are likewise Chinese nationals, through and through. We now turn to respondent's second defense of res judicata. There are certain marks of simulation that attended Civil Case No. 329-G, and indicating that it was brought to circumvent a previous unfavorable opinion of the Secretary of Justice denying cancellation of Mallare's alien registration (Op. No. 90, Ser. of 1955, dated March 31, 1955). The said civil case was instituted by the vendor (Vitaliano Itable) of a certain parcel of land to rescind the sale and recover the land sold from the vendees, who are the herein respondent and his brothers and sisters, on the ground that the said vendees are Chinese. The vendor-plaintiff practically abandoned the case; the vendees-defendants submitted evidence purporting to show their Filipino citizenship, and plaintiff neither cross examined nor presented rebuttal proof. After trial, the court, declaring the vendees as natural-born Filipino citizens, decided for the validity of the sale of the parcel of land. On the basis of the foregoing declaration by the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, the respondent and his brothers and sisters filed Special Proceeding No. 3925, in the same court, but in a different branch, for the "correction" of their birth records. The local fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, appeared but did not oppose the petition; wherefore, after hearing, the court granted the petition. Based on the same judicial declaration, the then Commissioner of Immigration De la Rosa (not the complainant) cancelled on June 8, 1960, the alien registration of the herein respondent and that of his brothers and sisters, and issued to them identification certificates recognizing them as Filipino citizens. Then Solicitor General Alafriz took the same position. Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not modes of acquiring Philippine citizenship; neither is the Chinese citizenship of the respondent converted to Filipino because certain government agencies recognized him as such. He remains, by jus sanguinis, a Chinese until he is naturalized.

It is noted that the declaration that the respondent and his brothers and sisters are Filipino citizens is stated in the dispositive portion of the decision in Civil Case No. 329-G, which was an action in personam. The pronouncement was not within the court's competence, because the declaration of the citizenship of these defendants was not the relief that was sought. At the time, the pronouncement was beyond judicial power, there being no law authorizing the institution of a judicial preceding to declare the citizenship of an individual (Danilo Channie Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960; Paralaran v. Republic, L-15047, Jan. 30, 1962; Tan Yu Chin v. Republic, L-15775, April 29, 1961; Tan v. Republic, L16108, October 31, 1961; Santiago vs. Commissioner, L-14653, Jan. 31, 1963; Comissioner vs. Domingo, L-21274, July 31, 1963; Lao Yap Diok, et al. v. Republic, L-19107-09, Sept. 30, 1964).

In the basic case Channie Tan vs. Republic, ante, this Court ruled as follows:1wph1.t

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to

one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960, reiterated in G.R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961).

The said judicial declaration3 was merely an incident to the adjudication of the rights of the parties to the controversy over land ownership. Their citizenship was not the thing adjudicated in the judgment and the declaration that they are Filipinos was but a necessary premise for the court to arrive at a conclusion that the sale of the realty was valid as between the parties. Not being the thing directly adjudicated, their declared citizenship is not res judicata, and cannot become conclusive.

The appearance of the fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, in Special Proceeding No. 3925 does not bind the state to the order of "correction" of the birth records because the proceeding was not instituted as in rem and, under no law had the state given its consent to be party thereto. For this reason, the fiscal's appearance was an unauthorized one.

It is noteworthy that in neither case relied upon by the respondent does it appear that his claim for citizenship was given adequate publication so as to apprise all concerned and give them opportunity to contest it or supply the corresponding public office any derogatory data that might exist against the alleged citizenship. Hence, neither decision constitutes res judicata on the issue of respondent's alleged Filipino nationality.

And certainly, the Supreme Court, acting pursuant to its inherent and constitutional authority, may not be precluded from inquiring into the citizenship of persons admitted to the practice of law, independently of any other court's findings in the cases or proceedings brought or instituted therein.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respondent Florencio Mallare is hereby declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the Philippine bar is revoked and he is hereby ordered to return immediately to this Court the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished, when it becomes final, to the Secretary of Justice, for such action as may be deemed warranted; and let another copy be sent to the Local Civil Registrar of Macalelon, Quezon, for purposes of record in the corresponding civil registry of births. So ordered. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Attorney's Roll Defined: PANGAN v. RAMOS AM 1053 Sept 7 1979 A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979 SANTA PANGAN, complainant vs.ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent, RESOLUTION ANTONIO, J.: This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name

of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname. This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath. The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 2 In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law. It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted. SO ORDERED Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., concur in the result. Santos, is on leave. _______________________________________________________________________________________ CHARACTERISTICS: B.M. 712 JULY 13 1995 (SEE) BM MARCH 19 1997 (SEE) IN RE: EDILLON In re Edilion In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO Held: All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. --_______________________________________________________________________________________________ PROFESSION NOT A BUSINESS Mauricio Ulep vs. Legal clinic BM No 553 June 17 1983 Docena vs. Atty Limon ______________________________________________________________________________________________

PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice. Counsel for the accused presented a Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in this case, this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. -----------------------

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