Essays in Radical Empiricism, by William James PDF

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!ssays in "adical !mpiricism

#sychologist $and philosopher% William &ames wrote influential books on the young science of psychology, educational psychology, psychology of religious e'perience and mysticism, and on the philosophy of pragmatism. James interacted with a wide array of writers and scholars throughout his life, including his godfather Ralph Waldo Emerson, his godson William James Sidis, as well as Charles Sanders Peirce, Bertrand Russell, Josiah Royce, Ernst Mach, John Dewey, Walter ippmann, Mar! "wain, #oratio $lger, Jr%, #enri Bergson and Sigmund &reud% #ere, courtesy of the Pro'ect (uten)erg, Brian &oley, and Christine D% you find his in eBoo! format% En'oy* We would lo+e to hear your feed)ac!, suggestions a)out new topics- .deas a)out impro+ements- i!e to share your e/perience and ma!e it an eBoo!, White Paper, chec!0listPlease let us !now through http,11www%amareway%org1 "here, you can also read more on related topics% "han!s*
EDITORS PREFACE
"he present +olume is an attempt to carry out a plan which William James is !nown to ha+e formed se+eral years )efore his death% .n 2345 he collected reprints in an en+elope which he inscri)ed with the title 6Essays in Radical Empiricism78 and he also had duplicate sets of these reprints )ound, under the same title, and deposited for the use of students in the general #ar+ard i)rary, and in the Philosophical i)rary in Emerson #all% "wo years later Professor James pu)lished The Meaning of Truth and A Pluralistic Universe, and inserted in these +olumes se+eral of the articles which he had intended to use in the 6Essays in Radical Empiricism%7 Whether he would ne+ertheless ha+e carried out his original plan, had he li+ed, cannot )e certainly !nown% Se+eral facts, howe+er, stand out +ery clearly% .n the first place, the articles included in the original plan )ut omitted from his later +olumes are indispensa)le to the understanding9Pg i+: of his other writings% "o these articles he repeatedly alludes% "hus, in The Meaning of Truth ;p% 2<5=, he says, >"his statement is pro)a)ly e/cessi+ely o)scure to any one who has not read my two articles 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7 and 6$ World of Pure E/perience%7? @ther allusions ha+e )een indicated in the present te/t% .n the second place, the articles originally )rought together as 6Essays in Radical Empiricism7 form a connected whole% Aot only were most of them written consecuti+ely within a period of two years, )ut they contain numerous cross0references% .n the third place, Professor James regarded 6radical empiricism7 as an independent doctrine% "his he asserted e/pressly, > et me say that there is no logical conne/ion )etween pragmatism, as . understand it, and a doctrine which . ha+e recently set forth as 6radical empiricism%7 "he latter stands on its own feet% @ne may entirely re'ect it and still )e a pragmatist%? ; Pragmatism, 2345, Preface, p% i/%= &inally, Professor James came toward the end of his life to regard 6radical empiricism7 as more 9Pg +:fundamental and more important than 6pragmatism%7 .n the Preface to The Meaning of Truth ;2343=, the author gi+es the following e/planation of his desire to continue, and if possi)le conclude, the contro+ersy o+er pragmatism, >. am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which . gi+e the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the esta)lishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first0rate importance in ma!ing radical empiricism pre+ail? ;p% /ii=% .n preparing the present +olume, the editor has therefore )een go+erned )y two moti+es% @n the one hand, he has sought to preser+e and ma!e accessi)le certain important articles not to )e found in Professor James7s other )oo!s% "his is true of Essays i, ii, i+, +, +iii, i/, /, /i, and /ii% @n the other hand, he has sought to )ring together in one +olume a set of essays treating systematically of one independent, coherent, and fundamental doctrine% "o this end it has seemed )est to include three essays ;iii, +i, and +ii=, which, although included in the original plan, were afterwards reprinted elsewhere8 9Pg +i:and
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one essay, /ii, not included in the original plan% Essays iii, +i, and +ii are indispensa)le to the consecuti+eness of the series, and are so interwo+en with the rest that it is necessary that the student should ha+e them at hand for ready consultation% Essay /ii throws an important light on the author7s general 6empiricism,7 and forms an important lin! )etween 6radical empiricism7 and the author7s other doctrines% .n short, the present +olume is designed not as a collection )ut rather as a treatise% .t is intended that another +olume shall )e issued which shall contain papers ha+ing )iographical or historical importance which ha+e not yet )een reprinted in )oo! form% "he present +olume is intended not only for students of Professor James7s philosophy, )ut for students of metaphysics and the theory of !nowledge% .t sets forth systematically and within )rief compass the doctrine of 6radical empiricism%7 $ word more may )e in order concerning the general meaning of this doctrine% .n the Preface to the Will to Believe ;2B3B=, Professor 9Pg +ii:James gi+es the name >radical empiricism? to his >philosophic attitude,? and adds the following e/planation, >. say 6empiricism,7 )ecause it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses lia)le to modification in the course of future e/perience8 and . say 6radical,7 )ecause it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unli!e so much of the halfway empiricism that is current under the name of positi+ism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all e/perience has got to sCuare? ;pp% +ii0+iii=% $n 6empiricism7 of this description is a >philosophic attitude? or temper of mind rather than a doctrine, and characteriDes all of Professor James7s writings% .t is set forth in Essay /ii of the present +olume% .n a narrower sense, 6empiricism7 is the method of resorting to particular experiences for the solution of philosophical pro)lems% Rationalists are the men of principles, empiricists the men of facts% ; Some Problems of Philosophy, 9Pg +iii:p% EF8 cf% also, ibid., p% GG8 and Pragmatism, pp% 3, F2%= @r, >since principles are uni+ersals, and facts are particulars, perhaps the )est way of characteriDing the two tendencies is to say that rationalist thin!ing proceeds most willingly )y going from wholes to parts, while empiricist thin!ing proceeds )y going from parts to wholes%? ; Some Problems of Philosophy, p% EF8 cf% also ibid., p% 3B8 and A Pluralistic Universe, p% 5%= $gain, empiricism >remands us to sensation%? ; p. cit., p% <HG%= "he >empiricist +iew? insists that, >as reality is created temporally day )y day, concepts %%% can ne+er fitly supersede perception%%%% "he deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual e/perience%? ; Some Problems of Philosophy, pp% 244, 35%= Empiricism in this sense is as yet characteristic of Professor James7s philosophy as a !hole% .t is not the distincti+e and independent doctrine set forth in the present )oo!% "he only summary of 6radical empiricism7 in this last and narrowest sense appears in the Preface to The Meaning of Truth ;pp% /ii0/iii=8 9Pg i/:and it must )e reprinted here as the !ey to the te/t that follows%92: >Radical empiricism consists ;2= first of a postulate, ;<= ne/t of a statement of fact, ;E= and finally of a generaliDed conclusion%? ;2= >"he postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms dra!n from experience% ;"hings of an une/periencea)le nature may e/ist ad li)itum, )ut they form no part of the material for philosophic de)ate%=? "his is >the principle of pure e/perience? as >a methodical postulate%? ;Cf% )elow, pp% 2F3, <G2%= "his postulate corresponds to the notion which the author repeatedly attri)utes to Shadworth #odgson, the notion >that realities are only what they are 6!nown as%7? ; Pragmatism, p% F48 "arieties of #eligious $xperience, p% GGE8 The Meaning of Truth, pp% GE, 22B%= .n this sense 6radical empiricism7 and pragmatism are closely allied% .ndeed, if pragmatism )e defined as the assertion that >the meaning of any proposition can always )e )rought down to some 9Pg /:particular conseCuence in our future practical e/perience, %%% the point lying in the fact that the e/perience must )e particular rather than in the fact that it must )e acti+e? ;Meaning of Truth, p% <24=8 then pragmatism and the a)o+e postulate come to the same thing% "he present )oo!, howe+er, consists not so much in the assertion of this postulate as in the use of it% $nd the method is successful in special applications )y +irtue of a certain >statement of fact? concerning relations% ;<= >"he statement of fact is that the relations bet!een things% con&unctive as !ell as dis&unctive% are &ust as much matters of direct particular experience% neither more so nor less so% than the things themselves %? ;Cf% also A Pluralistic Universe, p% <B48 The Will to Believe, p% <5B%= "his is the central doctrine of the present )oo!% .t distinguishes 6radical empiricism7 from the >ordinary empiricism? of #ume, J% S% Mill, etc%, with which it is otherwise allied% ;Cf% )elow, pp% G<0GG%= .t pro+ides an empirical and relational +ersion of 6acti+ity,7 9Pg /i:and so distinguishes the author7s +oluntarism from a +iew with which it is easily confusedIthe +iew which upholds a pure or transcendent acti+ity% ;Cf% )elow, Essay +i%= .t ma!es it possi)le to
escape the +icious dis'unctions that ha+e thus far )affled philosophy, such dis'unctions as those )etween consciousness and physical nature, )etween thought and its o)'ect, )etween one mind and another, and )etween one 6thing7 and another% "hese dis'unctions need not )e 6o+ercome7 )y calling in any >e/traneous trans0empirical connecti+e support? ; Meaning of Truth, Preface, p% /iii=8 they may now )e avoided )y regarding the dualities in Cuestion as only differences of empirical relationship among common empirical terms% "he pragmatistic account of 6meaning7 and 6truth,7 shows only how a +icious dis'unction )etween 6idea7 and 6o)'ect7 may thus )e a+oided% "he present +olume not only presents pragmatism in this light8 )ut adds similar accounts of the other dualities mentioned a)o+e% "hus while pragmatism and radical empiricism 9Pg /ii:do not differ essentially when regarded as methods, they are independent when regarded as doctrines% &or it would )e possi)le to hold the pragmatistic theory of 6meaning7 and 6truth,7 without )asing it on any fundamental theory of relations, and without e/tending such a theory of relations to residual philosophical pro)lems8 without, in short, holding either to the a)o+e 6statement of fact,7 or to the following 6generaliDed conclusion%7 ;E= >"he generaliDed conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs% in short% no extraneous trans'empirical connective support% but possesses in its o!n right a concatenated or continuous structure %? When thus generaliDed, 6radical empiricism7 is not only a theory of !nowledge comprising pragmatism as a special chapter, )ut a metaphysic as well% .t e/cludes >the hypothesis of trans0empirical reality? ;Cf% )elow, p% 23F=% .t is the author7s most rigorous statement of his theory that reality is an >e/perience0continuum%? 9Pg /iii:; Meaning of Truth, p% 2F<8 A Pluralistic Universe, ect% +, +ii%= .t is that positi+e and constructi+e 6empiricism7 of which Professor James said, > et empiricism once )ecome associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has )een associated with irreligion, and . )elie+e that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will )e ready to )egin%? ; p. cit., p% E2G8 cf% ibid., ect% +iii, passim8 and The "arieties of #eligious $xperience, pp% F2F0F<5%= "he editor desires to ac!nowledge his o)ligations to the periodicals from which these essays ha+e )een reprinted, and to the many friends of Professor James who ha+e rendered +alua)le ad+ice and assistance in the preparation of the present +olume% Ralph Barton Perry% Cam)ridge, January B, 232<% Massachusetts%
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.% ..% ...% .J% J% J.% J...% Does 6Consciousness7 E/ist$ World of Pure E/perience "he "hing and its Relations #ow "wo Minds Can Know @ne "hing 2 E3 3< 2<E
"he Place of $ffectional &acts in a World of Pure 2E5 E/perience "he E/perience of $cti+ity a Aotion de Conscience 2FF 234 <4H
J..% "he Essence of #umanism
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.s Radical Empiricism SolipsisticMr% Pit!in7s Refutation of 6Radical Empiricism7 #umanism and "ruth @nce More .nde/
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L..% $)solutism and Empiricism 9Pg 2:
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6"houghts7 and 6things7 are names for two sorts of o)'ect, which common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to each other% Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, has +aried in the past in her e/planations of it, and may )e e/pected to +ary in the future% $t first, 6spirit and matter,7 6soul and )ody,7 stood for a pair of eCuipollent su)stances Cuite on a par in weight and interest% But one day Kant undermined the soul and )rought in the transcendental ego, and e+er since then the )ipolar relation has )een +ery much off its )alance% "he transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist Cuarters to stand for e+erything, in empiricist Cuarters for almost nothing% .n the hands of such writers as Schuppe, Rehm!e, Aatorp, MMnster)ergIat any rate in his earlier writings, Schu)ert0Soldern and others, the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, )eing only a name for the fact that the 6content7 of e/perience is (no!n% .t loses personal form and acti+ityIthese passing o+er to the contentIand )ecomes a )are Be!usstheit or Be!usstsein )berhaupt, of which in its own right a)solutely nothing can )e said%9Pg <: . )elie+e that 6consciousness,7 when once it has e+aporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether% .t is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles% "hose who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left )ehind )y the disappearing 6soul7 upon the air of philosophy% During the past year, . ha+e read a num)er of articles whose authors seemed 'ust on the point of a)andoning the notion of consciousness,9E: and su)stituting for it that of an a)solute e/perience not due to two factors% But they were not Cuite radical enough, not Cuite daring enough in their negations% &or twenty years past . ha+e mistrusted 6consciousness7 as an entity8 for se+en or eight years past . ha+e suggested its non0e/istence to my students, and tried to gi+e them its pragmatic eCui+alent in realities of e/perience% .t seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to )e openly and uni+ersally discarded%9Pg E: "o deny plumply that 6consciousness7 e/ists seems so a)surd on the face of itIfor undenia)ly 6thoughts7 do e/istIthat . fear some readers will follow me no farther% et me then immediately e/plain that . mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, )ut to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function% "here is, . mean, no a)original stuff or Cuality of )eing,9G: contrasted with that of which material o)'ects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made8 )ut there is a function in e/perience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this9Pg G: Cuality of )eing is in+o!ed% "hat function is (no!ing% 6Consciousness7 is supposed necessary to e/plain the fact that things not only are, )ut get reported, are !nown% Whoe+er )lots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still pro+ide in some way for that function7s )eing carried on% My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which e+erything is composed, and if we call that stuff 6pure e/perience,7 then !nowing can easily )e e/plained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure e/perience may enter% "he relation itself is a part of pure e/perience8 one of its 6terms7 )ecomes the su)'ect or )earer of the !nowledge, the !nower,9F: the other )ecomes the o)'ect !nown% "his will need much e/planation )efore it can )e understood% "he )est way to get it understood is to contrast it with the alternati+e +iew8 and for that we may ta!e the recentest alternati+e, that in which the e+aporation of the definite soul0 su)stance has proceeded as far as it can go without )eing yet complete% .f neo0Kantism has e/pelled earlier forms of dualism, we shall ha+e e/pelled all forms if we are a)le to e/pel neo0Kantism in its turn%9Pg F:
&or the thin!ers . call neo0Kantian, the word consciousness to0day does no more than signaliDe the fact that e/perience is indefeasi)ly dualistic in structure% .t means that not su)'ect, not o)'ect, )ut o)'ect0plus0su)'ect is the minimum that can actually )e% "he su)'ect0o)'ect distinction meanwhile is entirely different from that )etween mind and matter, from that )etween )ody and soul% Souls were detacha)le, had separate destinies8 things could happen to them% "o consciousness as such nothing can happen, for, timeless itself, it is only a witness of happenings in time, in which it plays no part% .t is, in a word, )ut the logical correlati+e of 6content7 in an E/perience of which the9Pg H: peculiarity is that fact comes to light in it, that a!areness of content ta!es place% Consciousness as such is entirely impersonalI6self7 and its acti+ities )elong to the content% "o say that . am self0conscious, or conscious of putting forth +olition, means only that certain contents, for which 6self7 and 6effort of will7 are the names, are not without witness as they occur% "hus, for these )elated drin!ers at the Kantian spring, we should ha+e to admit consciousness as an 6epistemological7 necessity, e+en if we had no direct e+idence of its )eing there% But in addition to this, we are supposed )y almost e+ery one to ha+e an immediate consciousness of consciousness itself% When the world of outer fact ceases to )e materially present, and we merely recall it in memory, or fancy it, the consciousness is )elie+ed to stand out and to )e felt as a !ind of impalpa)le inner flowing, which, once !nown in this sort of e/perience, may eCually )e detected in presentations of the outer world% >"he moment we try to fi/ our attention upon consciousness and to see !hat, distinctly, it is,? says a recent writer,9Pg 5: >it seems to +anish% .t seems as if we had )efore us a mere emptiness% When we try to introspect the sensation of )lue, all we can see is the )lue8 the other element is as if it were diaphanous% Net it can )e distinguished, if we loo! attenti+ely enough, and !now that there is something to loo! for%?9H: >Consciousness? ;Bewusstheit=, says another philosopher, >is ine/plica)le and hardly descri)a)le, yet all conscious e/periences ha+e this in common that what we call their content has this peculiar reference to a centre for which 6self7 is the name, in +irtue of which reference alone the content is su)'ecti+ely gi+en, or appears %%% While in this way consciousness, or reference to a self, is the only thing which distinguishes a conscious content from any sort of )eing that might )e there with no one conscious of it, yet this only ground of the distinction defies all closer e/planations% "he e/istence of consciousness, although it is the fundamental fact of psychology, can indeed )e laid down as certain, can )e )rought out )y analysis, )ut can neither )e defined nor deduced from anything )ut itself%?95: 9Pg B: 6Can )e )rought out )y analysis,7 this author says% "his supposes that the consciousness is one element, moment, factorI call it what you li!eIof an e/perience of essentially dualistic inner constitution, from which, if you a)stract the content, the consciousness will remain re+ealed to its own eye% E/perience, at this rate, would )e much li!e a paint of which the world pictures were made% Paint has a dual constitution, in+ol+ing, as it does, a menstruum9B: ;oil, siDe or what not= and a mass of content in the form of pigment suspended therein% We can get the pure menstruum )y letting the pigment settle, and the pure pigment )y pouring off the siDe or oil% We operate here )y physical su)traction8 and the usual +iew is, that )y mental su)traction we can separate the two factors of e/perience in an analogous wayInot isolating them entirely, )ut distinguishing them enough to !now that they are two%9Pg 3: -Aow my contention is e/actly the re+erse of this% $xperience% * believe% has no such inner duplicity+ and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes% not by !ay of subtraction% but by !ay of addition Ithe addition, to a gi+en concrete piece of it, of other sets of e/periences, in connection with which se+erally its use or function may )e of two different !inds% "he paint will also ser+e here as an illustration% .n a pot in a paint0shop, along with other paints, it ser+es in its entirety as so much salea)le matter% Spread on a can+as, with other paints around it, it represents, on the contrary, a feature in a picture and performs a spiritual function% Just so, . maintain, does a gi+en undi+ided portion of e/perience, ta!en in one conte/t of associates, play the part of a !nower, of a state of mind, of 6consciousness78 while in a different conte/t the same undi+ided )it of e/perience plays the part of a thing !nown, of9Pg 24: an o)'ecti+e 6content%7 .n a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing% $nd, since it can figure in )oth groups simultaneously we ha+e e+ery right to spea! of it as su)'ecti+e and o)'ecti+e )oth at once% "he dualism connoted )y such dou)le0)arrelled terms as 6e/perience,7 6phenomenon,7 6datum,7 6"orfindung7Iterms which, in philosophy at any rate, tend more and more to replace the single0)arrelled terms of 6thought7 and 6thing7Ithat dualism, . say, is still preser+ed in this account, )ut
reinterpreted, so that, instead of )eing mysterious and elusi+e, it )ecomes +erifia)le and concrete% .t is an affair of relations, it falls outside, not inside, the single e/perience considered, and can always )e particulariDed and defined% "he entering wedge for this more concrete way of understanding the dualism was fashioned )y oc!e when he made the word 6idea7 stand indifferently for thing and thought, and )y Ber!eley when he said that what common sense means )y realities is e/actly what the philosopher means )y ideas% Aeither oc!e9Pg 22: nor Ber!eley thought his truth out into perfect clearness, )ut it seems to me that the conception . am defending does little more than consistently carry out the 6pragmatic7 method which they were the first to use% .f the reader will ta!e his own e/periences, he will see what . mean% et him )egin with a perceptual e/perience, the 6presentation,7 so called, of a physical o)'ect, his actual field of +ision, the room he sits in, with the )oo! he is reading as its centre8 and let him for the present treat this comple/ o)'ect in the common0sense way as )eing 6really7 what it seems to )e, namely, a collection of physical things cut out from an en+ironing world of other physical things with which these physical things ha+e actual or potential relations% Aow at the same time it is 'ust those self'same things which his mind, as we say, percei+es8 and the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus7s time downwards has )een 'ust one long wrangle o+er the parado/ that what is e+idently one reality should )e in two places at once, )oth in outer space and in a person7s mind% 6Representati+e79Pg 2<: theories of perception a+oid the logical parado/, )ut on the other hand they +iolate the reader7s sense of life, which !nows no inter+ening mental image )ut seems to see the room and the )oo! immediately 'ust as they physically e/ist% "he puDDle of how the one identical room can )e in two places is at )ottom 'ust the puDDle of how one identical point can )e on two lines% .t can, if it )e situated at their intersection8 and similarly, if the 6pure e/perience7 of the room were a place of intersection of two processes, which connected it with different groups of associates respecti+ely, it could )e counted twice o+er, as )elonging to either group, and spo!en of loosely as e/isting in two places, although it would remain all the time a numerically single thing% Well, the e/perience is a mem)er of di+erse processes that can )e followed away from it along entirely different lines% "he one self0identical thing has so many relations to the rest of e/perience that you can ta!e it in disparate systems of association, and treat it as9Pg 2E: )elonging with opposite conte/ts%93: .n one of these conte/ts it is your 6field of consciousness78 in another it is 6the room in which you sit,7 and it enters )oth conte/ts in its wholeness, gi+ing no prete/t for )eing said to attach itself to consciousness )y one of its parts or aspects, and to outer reality )y another% What are the two processes, now, into which the room0e/perience simultaneously enters in this way-9Pg 2G: @ne of them is the reader7s personal )iography, the other is the history of the house of which the room is part% "he presentation, the e/perience, the that in short ;for until we ha+e decided !hat it is it must )e a mere that= is the last term of a train of sensations, emotions, decisions, mo+ements, classifications, e/pectations, etc%, ending in the present, and the first term of a series of similar 6inner7 operations e/tending into the future, on the reader7s part% @n the other hand, the +ery same that is the terminus ad ,uem of a lot of pre+ious physical operations, carpentering, papering, furnishing, warming, etc%, and the terminus a ,uo of a lot of future ones, in which it will )e concerned when undergoing the destiny of a physical room% "he physical and the mental operations form curiously incompati)le groups% $s a room, the e/perience has occupied that spot and had that en+ironment for thirty years% $s your field of consciousness it may ne+er ha+e e/isted until now% $s a room, attention will go on to disco+er endless new details in it% $s your mental state merely, few new ones will emerge under attention7s eye% $s a room, it will ta!e an earthCua!e, or a gang of men, and in any case a certain amount of time, to destroy it% $s your su)'ecti+e state, the closing of your eyes, or any instantaneous play of your fancy will suffice% .n the real world, fire will consume it% .n your mind, you can let fire play o+er it without effect% $s an outer o)'ect, you must pay so much a month to inha)it it% $s an inner content, you may occupy it for any length of time rent0free% .f, in short, you follow it in the mental9Pg 2F: direction, ta!ing it along with e+ents of personal )iography solely, all sorts of things are true of it which are false, and false of it which are true if you treat it as a real thing e/perienced, follow it in the physical direction, and relate it to associates in the outer world% --So far, all seems plain sailing, )ut my thesis will pro)a)ly grow less plausi)le to the reader when . pass from percepts to concepts, or from the case of things presented to that of things remote% . )elie+e, ne+ertheless, that here also the same law holds good% .f we ta!e conceptual manifolds, or memories, or fancies, they also are in their first intention mere )its of pure
e/perience, and, as such, are single thats which act in one conte/t as o)'ects, and in another conte/t figure as mental states% By ta!ing them in their first intention, . mean ignoring their relation to possi)le perceptual e/periences with which they may )e connected, which they may lead to and terminate in, and which then they may )e supposed to9Pg 2H: 6represent%7 "a!ing them in this way first, we confine the pro)lem to a world merely 6thought0of7 and not directly felt or seen% 924: "his world, 'ust li!e the world of percepts, comes to us at first as a chaos of e/periences, )ut lines of order soon get traced% We find that any )it of it which we may cut out as an e/ample is connected with distinct groups of associates, 'ust as our perceptual e/periences are, that these associates lin! themsel+es with it )y different relations,922: and that one forms the inner history of a person, while the other acts as an impersonal 6o)'ecti+e7 world, either spatial and temporal, or else merely logical or mathematical, or otherwise 6ideal%7 9Pg 25: "he first o)stacle on the part of the reader to seeing that these non0perceptual e/periences ha+e o)'ecti+ity as well as su)'ecti+ity will pro)a)ly )e due to the intrusion into his mind of percepts, that third group of associates with which the non0perceptual e/periences ha+e relations, and which, as a whole, they 6represent,7 standing to them as thoughts to things% "his important function of the non0perceptual e/periences complicates the Cuestion and confuses it8 for, so used are we to treat percepts as the sole genuine realities that, unless we !eep them out of the discussion, we tend altogether to o+erloo! the o)'ecti+ity that lies in non0perceptual e/periences )y themsel+es% We treat them, 6!nowing7 percepts as they do, as through and through su)'ecti+e, and say that they are wholly constituted of the stuff called consciousness, using this term now for a !ind of entity, after the fashion which . am see!ing to refute%92<: 9Pg 2B: $)stracting, then, from percepts altogether, what . maintain is, that any single non0perceptual e/perience tends to get counted twice o+er, 'ust as a perceptual e/perience does, figuring in one conte/t as an o)'ect or field of o)'ects, in another as a state of mind, and all this without the least internal self0diremption on its own part into consciousness and content% .t is all consciousness in one ta!ing8 and, in the other, all content% . find this o)'ecti+ity of non0perceptual e/periences, this complete parallelism in point of reality )etween the presently felt and the remotely thought, so well set forth in a page of MMnster)erg7s -rund.)ge, that . will Cuote it as it stands% >. may only thin! of my o)'ects,? says Professor MMnster)erg8 >yet, in my li+ing thought they stand )efore me e/actly as percei+ed o)'ects would do, no matter how different the two ways of apprehending them may )e in their genesis% "he )oo! here lying on the ta)le )efore me, and the )oo! in the ne/t room of which . thin! and which . mean to get, are )oth in the same sense gi+en realities for me, realities which . ac!nowledge and of which . ta!e9Pg 23: account% .f you agree that the perceptual o)'ect is not an idea within me, )ut that percept and thing, as indistinguisha)ly one, are really e/perienced there% outside, you ought not to )elie+e that the merely thought0of o)'ect is hid away inside of the thin!ing su)'ect% "he o)'ect of which . thin!, and of whose e/istence . ta!e cogniDance without letting it now wor! upon my senses, occupies its definite place in the outer world as much as does the o)'ect which . directly see%? >What is true of the here and the there, is also true of the now and the then% . !now of the thing which is present and percei+ed, )ut . !now also of the thing which yesterday was )ut is no more, and which . only remem)er% Both can determine my present conduct, )oth are parts of the reality of which . !eep account% .t is true that of much of the past . am uncertain, 'ust as . am uncertain of much of what is present if it )e )ut dimly percei+ed% But the inter+al of time does not in principle alter my relation to the o)'ect, does not transform it from an o)'ect !nown into a mental state%%%%9Pg <4: "he things in the room here which . sur+ey, and those in my distant home of which . thin!, the things of this minute and those of my long0+anished )oyhood, influence and decide me ali!e, with a reality which my e/perience of them directly feels% "hey )oth ma!e up my real world, they ma!e it directly, they do not ha+e first to )e introduced to me and mediated )y ideas which now and here arise within me%%%% "his not0me character of my recollections and e/pectations does not imply that the e/ternal o)'ects of which . am aware in those e/periences should necessarily )e there also for others% "he o)'ects of dreamers and hallucinated persons are wholly without general +alidity% But e+en were they centaurs and golden mountains, they still would )e 6off there,7 in fairy land, and not 6inside7 of oursel+es%?92E:9Pg <2: "his certainly is the immediate, primary, naOf, or practical way of ta!ing our thought0of world% Were there no perceptual world to ser+e as its 6reducti+e,7 in "aine7s sense, )y )eing 6stronger7 and more genuinely 6outer7 ;so that the whole merely thought0of world seems wea! and inner in comparison=, our world of thought would )e the only world, and would en'oy
complete reality in our )elief% "his actually happens in our dreams, and in our day0dreams so long as percepts do not interrupt them% $nd yet, 'ust as the seen room ;to go )ac! to our late e/ample= is also a field of consciousness, so the concei+ed or recollected room is also a state of mind8 and the dou)ling0up of the e/perience has in )oth cases similar grounds% "he room thought0of, namely, has many thought0of couplings with many thought0of things% Some of these couplings are inconstant, others are sta)le% .n the reader7s personal history the room occupies a single dateIhe saw it only once perhaps, a year ago% @f the house7s history, on the other hand, it forms a permanent ingredient% Some couplings ha+e the curious stu))ornness, to )orrow Royce7s term, of fact8 others show the fluidity of fancyIwe let them come and go as we please% (rouped with9Pg <<: the rest of its house, with the name of its town, of its owner, )uilder, +alue, decorati+e plan, the room maintains a definite foothold, to which, if we try to loosen it, it tends to return, and to reassert itself with force%92G: With these associates, in a word, it coheres, while to other houses, other towns, other owners, etc%, it shows no tendency to cohere at all% "he two collections, first of its cohesi+e, and, second, of its loose associates, ine+ita)ly come to )e contrasted% We call the first collection the system of e/ternal realities, in the midst of which the room, as 6real,7 e/ists8 the other we call the stream of our internal thin!ing, in which, as a 6mental image,7 it for a moment floats% 92F: "he room thus again gets counted twice o+er% .t plays two different rPles, )eing -edan(e and -edachtes, the thought0of0an0o)'ect, and the o)'ect0thought0of, )oth in one8 and all this without parado/ or mystery, 'ust as the same material thing may )e )oth low and high, or small and great, or )ad and good, )ecause of its relations to opposite parts of an en+ironing world% 9Pg <E: $s 6su)'ecti+e7 we say that the e/perience represents8 as 6o)'ecti+e7 it is represented% What represents and what is represented is here numerically the same8 )ut we must remem)er that no dualism of )eing represented and representing resides in the e/perience per se% .n its pure state, or when isolated, there is no self0splitting of it into consciousness and what the consciousness is 6of%7 .ts su)'ecti+ity and o)'ecti+ity are functional attri)utes solely, realiDed only when the e/perience is 6ta!en,7 i.e., tal!ed0of, twice, considered along with its two differing conte/ts respecti+ely, )y a new retrospecti+e e/perience, of which that whole past complication now forms the fresh content% "he instant field of the present is at all times what . call the 6pure7 e/perience% .t is only +irtually or potentially either o)'ect or su)'ect as yet% &or the time )eing, it is plain, unCualified actuality, or e/istence, a simple that% .n this9Pg <G: na/f immediacy it is of course valid8 it is there, we act upon it8 and the dou)ling of it in retrospection into a state of mind and a reality intended there)y, is 'ust one of the acts% "he 6state of mind,7 first treated e/plicitly as such in retrospection, will stand corrected or confirmed, and the retrospecti+e e/perience in its turn will get a similar treatment8 )ut the immediate e/perience in its passing is always 6truth,792H: practical truth, something to act on, at its own mo+ement% .f the world were then and there to go out li!e a candle, it would remain truth a)solute and o)'ecti+e, for it would )e 6the last word,7 would ha+e no critic, and no one would e+er oppose the thought in it to the reality intended%925: 9Pg <F: . thin! . may now claim to ha+e made my thesis clear% Consciousness connotes a !ind of e/ternal relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of )eing% The peculiarity of our experiences% that they not only are% but are (no!n% !hich their 0conscious1 ,uality is invo(ed to explain% is better explained by their relations2these relations themselves being experiences2to one another. -7 Were . now to go on to treat of the !nowing of perceptual )y conceptual e/periences, it would again pro+e to )e an affair of e/ternal relations% @ne e/perience would )e the !nower, the other the reality !nown8 and . could perfectly well define, without the notion of 6consciousness,7 what the !nowing actually and practically amounts toIleading0towards, namely, and terminating0in percepts, through a series of transitional e/periences which the world supplies% But . will not treat of this, space )eing insufficient%92B: . will rather consider a few o)'ections that are sure to )e urged against the entire theory as it stands%9Pg <H:
7 &irst of all, this will )e as!ed, >.f e/perience has not 6conscious7 e/istence, if it )e not partly made of 6consciousness,7 of what then is it made- Matter we !now, and thought we !now, and conscious content we !now, )ut neutral and simple 6pure e/perience7 is something we !now not at all% Say !hat it consists ofIfor it must consist of somethingIor )e willing to gi+e it up*? "o this challenge the reply is easy% $lthough for fluency7s sa!e . myself spo!e early in this article of a stuff of pure e/perience, . ha+e now to say that there is no general stuff of which e/perience at large is made% "here are as many stuffs as there are 6natures7 in the things e/perienced% .f you as! what any one )it of pure e/perience is made of, the answer is always the9Pg <5: same, >.t is made of that, of 'ust what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, )rownness, hea+iness, or what not%? Shadworth #odgson7s analysis here lea+es nothing to )e desired%923: E/perience is only a collecti+e name for all these sensi)le natures, and sa+e for time and space ;and, if you li!e, for 6)eing7= there appears no uni+ersal element of which all things are made% 7"he ne/t o)'ection is more formida)le, in fact it sounds Cuite crushing when one hears it first%9Pg <B: >.f it )e the self0same piece of pure e/perience, ta!en twice o+er, that ser+es now as thought and now as thing?Iso the o)'ection runsI>how comes it that its attri)utes should differ so fundamentally in the two ta!ings% $s thing, the e/perience is e/tended8 as thought, it occupies no space or place% $s thing, it is red, hard, hea+y8 )ut who e+er heard of a red, hard or hea+y thought- Net e+en now you said that an e/perience is made of 'ust what appears, and what appears is 'ust such ad'ecti+es% #ow can the one e/perience in its thing0function )e made of them, consist of them, carry them as its own attri)utes, while in its thought0function it disowns them and attri)utes them elsewhere% "here is a self0contradiction here from which the radical dualism of thought and thing is the only truth that can sa+e us% @nly if the thought is one !ind of )eing can the ad'ecti+es e/ist in it 6intentionally7 ;to use the scholastic term=8 only if the thing is another !ind, can they e/ist in it constituti+ely and energetically% Ao simple su)'ect can ta!e the same ad'ecti+es and at one time )e Cualified )y it, and at another time )e merely 6of7 it, as of something only meant or !nown%? "he solution insisted on )y this o)'ector, li!e many other common0sense solutions, grows the less satisfactory the more one turns it in one7s mind% "o )egin with, are thought and thing as heterogeneous as is commonly said-9Pg <3: Ao one denies that they ha+e some categories in common% "heir relations to time are identical% Both, moreo+er, may ha+e parts ;for psychologists in general treat thoughts as ha+ing them=8 and )oth may )e comple/ or simple% Both are of !inds, can )e compared, added and su)tracted and arranged in serial orders% $ll sorts of ad'ecti+es Cualify our thoughts which appear incompati)le with consciousness, )eing as such a )are diaphaneity% &or instance, they are natural and easy, or la)orious% "hey are )eautiful, happy, intense, interesting, wise, idiotic, focal, marginal, insipid, confused, +ague, precise, rational, casual, general, particular, and many things )esides% Moreo+er, the chapters on 6Perception7 in the psychology0 )oo!s are full of facts that ma!e for the essential homogeneity of thought with thing% #ow, if 6su)'ect7 and 6o)'ect7 were separated 6)y the whole diameter of )eing,7 and had no attri)utes in common, could it )e so hard to tell, in a presented and recogniDed material o)'ect, what part comes in through the sense0organs and what part comes 6out of one7s own9Pg E4: head7- Sensations and appercepti+e ideas fuse here so intimately that you can no more tell where one )egins and the other ends, than you can tell, in those cunning circular panoramas that ha+e lately )een e/hi)ited, where the real foreground and the painted can+as 'oin together%9<4: Descartes for the first time defined thought as the a)solutely une/tended, and later philosophers ha+e accepted the description as correct% But what possi)le meaning has it to say that, when we thin! of a foot0rule or a sCuare yard, e/tension is not attri)uta)le to our thought- @f e+ery e/tended o)'ect the ade,uate mental picture must ha+e all the e/tension of the o)'ect itself% "he difference )etween o)'ecti+e and su)'ecti+e e/tension is one of relation to a conte/t solely% .n the mind the +arious e/tents maintain no necessarily stu))orn order relati+ely to each other, while 9Pg E2:in the physical world they )ound each other sta)ly, and, added together, ma!e the great en+eloping Qnit which we )elie+e in and call real Space% $s 6outer,7 they carry themsel+es ad+ersely, so to spea!, to one another, e/clude one another and maintain their distances8 while, as 6inner,7 their order is loose, and they form a durcheinander in which unity is lost%9<2: But to argue
from this that inner e/perience is a)solutely ine/tensi+e seems to me little short of a)surd% "he two worlds differ, not )y the presence or a)sence of e/tension, )ut )y the relations of the e/tensions which in )oth worlds e/ist% Does not this case of e/tension now put us on the trac! of truth in the case of other Cualities- .t does8 and . am surprised that the facts should not ha+e )een noticed long ago% Why, for e/ample, do we call a fire hot, and water wet, and yet refuse to say that our mental state, when it is 6of7 these o)'ects, is either wet or hot- 6.ntentionally,7 at any rate, and 9Pg E<:when the mental state is a +i+id image, hotness and wetness are in it 'ust as much as they are in the physical e/perience% "he reason is this, that, as the general chaos of all our e/periences gets sifted, we find that there are some fires that will always )urn stic!s and always warm our )odies, and that there are some waters that will always put out fires8 while there are other fires and waters that will not act at all% "he general group of e/periences that act, that do not only possess their natures intrinsically, )ut wear them ad'ecti+ely and energetically, turning them against one another, comes ine+ita)ly to )e contrasted with the group whose mem)ers, ha+ing identically the same natures, fail to manifest them in the 6energetic7 way%9<<: . ma!e for myself now an e/perience of )laDing fire8 . place it near my )ody8 )ut it does not warm me in the least% . lay a stic! upon it, and the stic! either )urns or remains green, as . please% . call up water, and pour it on the fire, and a)solutely no difference ensues% . account9Pg EE: for all such facts )y calling this whole train of e/periences unreal, a mental train% Mental fire is what won7t )urn real stic!s8 mental water is what won7t necessarily ;though of course it may= put out e+en a mental fire% Mental !ni+es may )e sharp, )ut they won7t cut real wood% Mental triangles are pointed, )ut their points won7t wound% With 6real7 o)'ects, on the contrary, conseCuences always accrue8 and thus the real e/periences get sifted from the mental ones, the things from our thoughts of them, fanciful or true, and precipitated together as the sta)le part of the whole e/perience0chaos, under the name of the physical world% @f this our perceptual e/periences are the nucleus, they )eing the originally strong e/periences% We add a lot of conceptual e/periences to them, ma!ing these strong also in imagination, and )uilding out the remoter parts of the physical world )y their means8 and around this core of reality the world of la/ly connected fancies and mere rhapsodical o)'ects floats li!e a )an! of clouds% .n the clouds, all sorts of rules are +iolated9Pg EG: which in the core are !ept% E/tensions there can )e indefinitely located8 motion there o)eys no Aewton7s laws% 7-"here is a peculiar class of e/periences to which, whether we ta!e them as su)'ecti+e or as o)'ecti+e, we assign their se+eral natures as attri)utes, )ecause in )oth conte/ts they affect their associates acti+ely, though in neither Cuite as 6strongly7 or as sharply as things affect one another )y their physical energies% . refer here to appreciations, which form an am)iguous sphere of )eing, )elonging with emotion on the one hand, and ha+ing o)'ecti+e 6+alue7 on the other, yet seeming not Cuite inner nor Cuite outer, as if a diremption had )egun )ut had not made itself complete%9<E:9Pg EF: E/periences of painful o)'ects, for e/ample, are usually also painful e/periences8 perceptions of lo+eliness, of ugliness, tend to pass muster as lo+ely or as ugly perceptions8 intuitions of the morally lofty are lofty intuitions% Sometimes the ad'ecti+e wanders as if uncertain where to fi/ itself% Shall we spea! of seducti+e +isions or of +isions of seducti+e things@f wic!ed desires or of desires for wic!edness- @f healthy thoughts or of thoughts of healthy o)'ects- @f good impulses, or of impulses towards the good- @f feelings of anger, or of angry feelings- Both in the mind and in the thing, these natures modify their conte/t, e/clude certain associates and determine others, ha+e their mates and incompati)les% Net not as stu))ornly as in the case of physical Cualities, for )eauty and ugliness, lo+e and hatred, pleasant and painful can, in certain comple/ e/periences, coe/ist% .f one were to ma!e an e+olutionary construction of how a lot of originally chaotic pure e/periences )ecame gradually differentiated into an orderly inner and outer world, the whole theory would turn upon one7s success in e/plaining how or why the Cuality of an e/perience, once acti+e, could )ecome less so, and, from )eing an energetic attri)ute in some cases, elsewhere lapse into the status of an9Pg EH: inert or merely internal 6nature%7 "his would )e the 6e+olution7 of the psychical from the )osom of the physical, in which the esthetic, moral and otherwise emotional e/periences would represent a halfway stage% 7--But a last cry of non possumus will pro)a)ly go up from many readers% >$ll +ery pretty as a piece of ingenuity,? they will say, >)ut our consciousness itself intuiti+ely contradicts you% We, for our part, (no! that we are conscious% We feel our
thought, flowing as a life within us, in a)solute contrast with the o)'ects which it so unremittingly escorts% We can not )e faithless to this immediate intuition% "he dualism is a fundamental datum, et no man 'oin what (od has put asunder%? My reply to this is my last word, and . greatly grie+e that to many it will sound materialistic% . can not help that, howe+er, for ., too, ha+e my intuitions and . must o)ey them% et the case )e what it may in others, . am as confident as . am of anything that, in9Pg E5: myself, the stream of thin!ing ;which . recogniDe emphatically as a phenomenon= is only a careless name for what, when scrutiniDed, re+eals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my )reathing% "he 6. thin!7 which Kant said must )e a)le to accompany all my o)'ects, is the 6. )reathe7 which actually does accompany them% "here are other internal facts )esides )reathing ;intracephalic muscular ad'ustments, etc%, of which . ha+e said a word in my larger Psychology=, and these increase the assets of 6consciousness,7 so far as the latter is su)'ect to immediate perception8 9<G: )ut )reath, which was e+er the original of 6spirit,7 )reath mo+ing outwards, )etween the glottis and the nostrils, is, . am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers ha+e constructed the entity !nown to them as consciousness% That entity is fictitious% !hile thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.9Pg EB: . wish . might )elie+e myself to ha+e made that plausi)le in this article% .n another article . shall try to ma!e the general notion of a world composed of pure e/periences still more clear%
F(()*()!S+
9<: 9Reprinted from the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods , +ol% i, Ao% 2B, Septem)er 2, 234G% &or the relation )etween this essay and those which follow, cf% )elow, pp% FE0FG% Ed%: 9E: $rticles )y Baldwin, Ward, Bawden, King, $le/ander and others% Dr% Perry is fran!ly o+er the )order% 9G: 9Similarly, there is no >acti+ity of 6consciousness7 as such%? See )elow, pp% 254 ff%, note% Ed%: 9F: .n my Psychology . ha+e tried to show that we need no !nower other than the 6passing thought%7 9 Principles of Psychology, +ol% i, pp% EEB ff%: 9H: (% E% Moore, Mind, +ol% /ii, A% S%, 9234E:, p% GF4% 95: Paul Aatorp, $inleitung in die Psychologie, 2BBB, pp% 2G, 22<% 9B: >&igurati+ely spea!ing, consciousness may )e said to )e the one uni+ersal sol+ent, or menstruum, in which the different concrete !inds of psychic acts and facts are contained, whether in concealed or in o)+ious form%? (% "% add, Psychology% 4escriptive and $xplanatory, 2B3G, p% E4% 93: 9&or a parallel statement of this +iew, cf% the author7s Meaning of Truth, p% G3, note% Cf% also )elow, pp% 23H0235% Ed%: 924: 9&or the author7s recognition of >concepts as a co0ordinate realm? of reality, cf% his Meaning of Truth, pp% G<, 23F, note8 A Pluralistic Universe, pp% EE30EG48 Some Problems of Philosophy, pp% F40F5, H50548 and )elow, p% 2H, note% (i+ing this +iew the name 6logical realism,7 he remar!s elsewhere that his philosophy >may )e regarded as somewhat eccentric in its attempt to com)ine logical realism with an otherwise empiricist mode of thought? ; Some Problems of Philosophy, p% 24H=% Ed%: 922: #ere as elsewhere the relations are of course experienced relations, mem)ers of the same originally chaotic manifold of non0perceptual e/perience of which the related terms themsel+es are parts% 9Cf% )elow, p% G<%: 92<: @f the representati+e function of non0perceptual e/perience as a whole, . will say a word in a su)seCuent article, it leads too far into the general theory of !nowledge for much to )e said a)out it in a short paper li!e this% 9Cf% )elow, pp% F< ff%: 92E: MMnster)erg, -rund.)ge der Psychologie, +ol% i, p% GB% 92G: Cf% $% % #odder, The Adversaries of the Sceptic, pp% 3G033% 92F: &or simplicity7s sa!e . confine my e/position to 6e/ternal7 reality% But there is also the system of ideal reality in which the room plays its part% Relations of comparison, of classification, serial order, +alue, also are stu))orn, assign a definite place to the room, unli !e the incoherence of its places in the mere rhapsody of our successi+e thoughts% 9Cf% a)o+e, p% 2H%:
92H: Aote the am)iguity of this term, which is ta!en sometimes o)'ecti+ely and sometimes su)'ecti+ely% 925: .n the Psychological #evie! for July 9234G:, Dr% R% B% Perry has pu)lished a +iew of Consciousness which comes nearer to mine than any other with which . am acCuainted% $t present, Dr% Perry thin!s, e+ery field of e/perience is so much 6fact%7 .t )ecomes 6opinion7 or 6thought7 only in retrospection, when a fresh e/perience, thin!ing the same o)'ect, alters and corrects it% But the correcti+e e/perience )ecomes itself in turn corrected, and thus e/perience as a whole is a process in which what is o)'ecti+e originally fore+er turns su)'ecti+e, turns into our apprehension of the o)'ect% . strongly recommend Dr% Perry7s admira)le article to my readers% 92B: . ha+e gi+en a partial account of the matter in Mind, +ol% /, p% <5, 2BBF 9reprinted in The Meaning of Truth, pp% 20G<:, and in the Psychological #evie!, +ol% ii, p% 24F, 2B3F 9partly reprinted in The Meaning of Truth, pp% GE0F4:% See also C% $% Strong7s article in the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% i, p% <FE, May 2<, 234G% . hope myself +ery soon to recur to the matter% 9See )elow, pp% F< ff%: 923: 9Cf% Shadworth #odgson, The Metaphysic of $xperience , +ol% i% passim+ The Philosophy of #eflection , )!% ii, ch% i+, R E% Ed%: 9<4: Spencer7s proof of his 6"ransfigured Realism7 ;his doctrine that there is an a)solutely non0mental reality= comes to mind as a splendid instance of the impossi)ility of esta)lishing radical heterogeneity )etween thought and thing% $ll his painfully accumulated points of difference run gradually into their opposites, and are full of e/ceptions% 9Cf% Spencer, Principles of Psychology, part +ii, ch% /i/%: 9<2: . spea! here of the complete inner life in which the mind plays freely with its materials% @f course the mind7s free play is restricted when it see!s to copy real things in real space% 9<<: 9But there are also >mental acti+ity trains,? in which thoughts do >wor! on each other%? Cf% )elow, p% 2BG, note% Ed%: 9<E: 9"his topic is resumed )elow, pp% 2E5 ff% Ed%: 9<G: 9Principles of Psychology, +ol% i, pp% <330E4F% Cf% )elow, pp% 2H30252 ;note=%: 9Pg E3:
-A W("8. (F #0"! !2#!"-!*,!4596

.t is difficult not to notice a curious unrest in the philosophic atmosphere of the time, a loosening of old landmar!s, a softening of oppositions, a mutual )orrowing from one another on the part of systems anciently closed, and an interest in new suggestions, howe+er +ague, as if the one thing sure were the inadeCuacy of the e/tant school0solutions% "he dissatisfaction with these seems due for the most part to a feeling that they are too a)stract and academic% ife is confused and supera)undant, and what the younger generation appears to cra+e is more of the temperament of life in its philosophy, e+en though it were at some cost of logical rigor and of formal purity% "ranscendental idealism is inclining to let the world wag incomprehensi)ly, in spite of its $)solute Su)'ect and his unity of purpose% Ber!eleyan idealism is a)andoning the principle of parsimony and da))ling in panpsychic speculations% Empiricism flirts with teleology8 and, strangest of all, natural realism, so long decently )uried, raises its head a)o+e the turf, and finds glad hands outstretched from the most unli!ely Cuarters to help it to its feet again% We are all )iased )y our personal feelings, . !now, and . am personally discontented with e/tant solutions8 so . seem to read the signs of a great unsettlement, as if the uphea+al of more real conceptions and more fruitful methods were imminent, as if a true landscape might result, less clipped, straight0edged and artificial%9Pg G4: .f philosophy )e really on the e+e of any considera)le rearrangement, the time should )e propitious for any one who has suggestions of his own to )ring forward% &or many years past my mind has )een growing into a certain type of Weltanschauung% Rightly or wrongly, . ha+e9Pg G2: got to the point where . can hardly see things in any other pattern% . propose, therefore, to descri)e the pattern as clearly as . can consistently with great )re+ity, and to throw my description into the )u))ling +at of pu)licity where, 'ostled )y ri+als and torn )y critics, it will e+entually either disappear from notice,
or else, if )etter luc! )efall it, Cuietly su)side to the profundities, and ser+e as a possi)le ferment of new growths or a nucleus of new crystalliDation% -. "adical !mpiricism . gi+e the name of 6radical empiricism7 to my Weltanschauung% Empiricism is !nown as the opposite of rationalism% Rationalism tends to emphasiDe uni+ersals and to ma!e wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of )eing% Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the e/planatory stress upon the part, the element, the indi+idual, and treats the whole as a collection and the uni+ersal as an a)straction% My description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and ma!es of the whole9Pg G<: a )eing of the second order% .t is essentially a mosaic philosophy, a philosophy of plural facts, li!e that of #ume and his descendants, who refer these facts neither to Su)stances in which they inhere nor to an $)solute Mind that creates them as its o)'ects% But it differs from the #umian type of empiricism in one particular which ma!es me add the epithet radical% "o )e radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly e/perienced, nor e/clude from them any element that is directly e/perienced% &or such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations% and any (ind of relation experienced must be accounted as 0real1 as anything else in the system% Elements may indeed )e redistri)uted, the original placing of things getting corrected, )ut a real place must )e found for e+ery !ind of thing e/perienced, whether term or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement% Aow, ordinary empiricism, in spite of the fact that con'uncti+e and dis'uncti+e relations9Pg GE: present themsel+es as )eing fully co0ordinate parts of e/perience, has always shown a tendency to do away with the connections of things, and to insist most on the dis'unctions% Ber!eley7s nominalism, #ume7s statement that whate+er things we distinguish are as 6loose and separate7 as if they had 6no manner of connection,7 James Mill7s denial that similars ha+e anything 6really7 in common, the resolution of the causal tie into ha)itual seCuence, John Mill7s account of )oth physical things and sel+es as composed of discontinuous possi)ilities, and the general pul+eriDation of all E/perience )y association and the mind0dust theory, are e/amples of what . mean%9<H:9Pg GG: "he natural result of such a world0picture has )een the efforts of rationalism to correct its incoherencies )y the addition of trans0e/periential agents of unification, su)stances, intellectual categories and powers, or Sel+es8 whereas, if empiricism had only )een radical and ta!en e+erything that comes without disfa+or, con'unction as well as separation, each at its face +alue, the results would ha+e called for no such artificial correction% #adical empiricism, as . understand it, does full &ustice to con&unctive relations, without, howe+er, treating them as rationalism always tends to treat them, as )eing true in some supernal way, as if the unity of things and their +ariety )elonged to different orders of truth and +itality altogether% --. ,onjuncti e "elations Relations are of different degrees of intimacy% Merely to )e 6with7 one another in a uni+erse of discourse is the most e/ternal relation that terms can ha+e, and seems to in+ol+e nothing whate+er as to farther conseCuences% Simultaneity and time0inter+al come ne/t, and then space0ad'acency and distance% $fter them, similarity and difference, carrying the possi)ility of many inferences% "hen relations of acti+ity, tying terms into series in+ol+ing9Pg GF: change, tendency, resistance, and the causal order generally% &inally, the relation e/perienced )etween terms that form states of mind, and are immediately conscious of continuing each other% "he organiDation of the Self as a system of memories, purposes, stri+ings, fulfilments or disappointments, is incidental to this most intimate of all relations, the terms of which seem in many cases actually to compenetrate and suffuse each other7s )eing%9<5: Philosophy has always turned on grammatical particles% With, near, ne/t, li!e, from, towards, against, )ecause, for, through, myIthese words designate types of con'uncti+e relation arranged in a roughly ascending order of intimacy and inclusi+eness% A priori, we can imagine a uni+erse of withness )ut no ne/tness8 or one of ne/tness )ut no li!eness, or of li!eness with no acti+ity, or of acti+ity with no purpose, or of purpose with no ego% "hese would )e uni+erses, each with its own grade of unity% "he uni+erse of human e/perience is, )y one or another of its parts, of each and all these grades% Whether or not it possi)ly en'oys some still more a)solute grade of union does not appear upon the surface%9Pg GH: "a!en as it does appear, our uni+erse is to a large e/tent chaotic% Ao one single type of connection runs through all the e/periences that compose it% .f we ta!e space0relations, they fail to connect minds into any regular system% Causes and purposes o)tain only among special series of facts% "he self0relation seems e/tremely limited and does not lin! two
different sel+es together% Prima facie, if you should li!en the uni+erse of a)solute idealism to an aCuarium, a crystal glo)e in which goldfish are swimming, you would ha+e to compare the empiricist uni+erse to something more li!e one of those dried human heads with which the Dya!s of Borneo dec! their lodges% "he s!ull forms a solid nucleus8 )ut innumera)le feathers, lea+es, strings, )eads, and loose appendices of e+ery description float and dangle from it, and, sa+e that they terminate in it, seem to ha+e nothing to do with one another% E+en so my e/periences and yours float and dangle,9Pg G5: terminating, it is true, in a nucleus of common perception, )ut for the most part out of sight and irrele+ant and unimagina)le to one another% "his imperfect intimacy, this )are relation of !ithness )etween some parts of the sum total of e/perience and other parts, is the fact that ordinary empiricism o+er0emphasiDes against rationalism, the latter always tending to ignore it unduly% Radical empiricism, on the contrary, is fair to )oth the unity and the disconnection% .t finds no reason for treating either as illusory% .t allots to each its definite sphere of description, and agrees that there appear to )e actual forces at wor! which tend, as time goes on, to ma!e the unity greater% "he con'uncti+e relation that has gi+en most trou)le to philosophy is the co'conscious transition, so to call it, )y which one e/perience passes into another when )oth )elong to the same self% $)out the facts there is no Cuestion% My e/periences and your e/periences are 6with7 each other in +arious e/ternal ways, )ut mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours in a way in which yours and mine ne+er pass9Pg GB: into one another% Within each of our personal histories, su)'ect, o)'ect, interest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous %9<B: Personal histories are processes of change in time, and the change itself is one of the things immediately experienced % 6Change7 in this case means continuous as opposed to discontinuous transition% But continuous transition is one sort of a con'uncti+e relation8 and to )e a radical empiricist means to hold fast to this con'uncti+e relation of all others, for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole )e made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into our philosophy% "he holding fast to this relation means ta!ing it at its face +alue, neither less nor more8 and to ta!e it at its face +alue means first of all to ta!e it 'ust as we feel it, and not to confuse oursel+es with a)stract tal! about it, in+ol+ing words that dri+e us to in+ent secondary conceptions in order to neutraliDe their suggestions and to ma!e our actual e/perience again seem rationally possi)le%9Pg G3: What . do feel simply when a later moment of my e/perience succeeds an earlier one is that though they are two moments, the transition from the one to the other is continuous% Continuity here is a definite sort of e/perience8 'ust as definite as is the discontinuity'experience which . find it impossi)le to a+oid when . see! to ma!e the transition from an e/perience of my own to one of yours% .n this latter case . ha+e to get on and off again, to pass from a thing li+ed to another thing only concei+ed, and the )rea! is positi+ely e/perienced and noted% "hough the functions e/erted )y my e/perience and )y yours may )e the same ;e.g., the same o)'ects !nown and the same purposes followed=, yet the sameness has in this case to )e ascertained e/pressly ;and often with difficulty and uncertainty= after the )rea! has )een felt8 whereas in passing from one of my own moments to another the sameness of o)'ect and interest is un)ro!en, and )oth the earlier and the later e/perience are of things directly li+ed%9Pg F4: "here is no other nature, no other whatness than this a)sence of )rea! and this sense of continuity in that most intimate of all con'uncti+e relations, the passing of one e/perience into another when they )elong to the same self% $nd this whatness is real empirical 6content,7 'ust as the whatness of separation and discontinuity is real content in the contrasted case% Practically to e/perience one7s personal continuum in this li+ing way is to !now the originals of the ideas of continuity and of sameness, to !now what the words stand for concretely, to own all that they can e+er mean% But all e/periences ha+e their conditions8 and o+er0su)tle intellects, thin!ing a)out the facts here, and as!ing how they are possi)le, ha+e ended )y su)stituting a lot of static o)'ects of conception for the direct perceptual e/periences% >Sameness,? they ha+e said, >must )e a star! numerical identity8 it can7t run on from ne/t to ne/t% Continuity can7t mean mere a)sence of gap8 for if you say two things are in immediate contact, at the contact how can they )e two- .f, on the other hand, you put a relation of9Pg F2: transition )etween them, that itself is a third thing, and needs to )e related or hitched to its terms% $n infinite series is in+ol+ed,? and so on% "he result is that from difficulty to difficulty, the plain con'uncti+e e/perience has )een discredited )y )oth schools, the empiricists lea+ing things permanently dis'oined, and the rationalist remedying the looseness )y their $)solutes or Su)stances, or whate+er other fictitious agencies of union they may ha+e employed%9<3: &rom all which artificiality we can )e sa+ed )y a couple of simple reflections, first, that con'unctions and separations are, at all e+ents, co0 ordinate phenomena which, if we ta!e e/periences at their face +alue, must )e accounted eCually real8 and second, that if we insist on treating things as really separate when they are gi+en as continuously 'oined, in+o!ing, when union is reCuired, transcendental principles to o+ercome the separateness we ha+e assumed, then we ought to stand ready to perform the
con+erse act% We ought to in+o!e higher principles of disunion, also, to ma!e our merely e/perienced dis'unctions more truly real% &ailing thus, we ought to let the originally gi+en continuities stand on their own )ottom% We ha+e no right to )e lopsided or to )low capriciously hot and cold%9Pg F<: ---. )he ,ogniti e "elation "he first great pitfall from which such a radical standing )y e/perience will sa+e us is an artificial conception of the relations bet!een (no!er and (no!n% "hroughout the history of philosophy the su)'ect and its o)'ect ha+e )een treated as a)solutely discontinuous entities8 and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former, or the 6apprehension7 )y the former of the latter, has assumed a parado/ical character which all sorts of theories had to )e in+ented to o+ercome% Representati+e theories put a mental 6representation,7 6image,7 or 6content7 into the gap, as a sort of intermediary% Common0sense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our mind a)le to clear it )y a self0transcending leap% "ranscendentalist theories left it impossi)le to tra+erse )y9Pg FE: finite !nowers, and )rought an $)solute in to perform the saltatory act% $ll the while, in the +ery )osom of the finite e/perience, e+ery con'unction reCuired to ma!e the relation intelligi)le is gi+en in full% Either the !nower and the !nown are, ;2= the self0same piece of e/perience ta!en twice o+er in different conte/ts8 or they are ;<= two pieces of actual e/perience )elonging to the same su)'ect, with definite tracts of con'uncti+e transitional e/perience )etween them8 or ;E= the !nown is a possible e/perience either of that su)'ect or another, to which the said con'uncti+e transitions !ould lead, if sufficiently prolonged% "o discuss all the ways in which one e/perience may function as the !nower of another, would )e incompati)le with the limits of this essay%9E4: . ha+e 'ust treated of type 2, the !ind of !nowledge called perception%9E2: "his is the type of case in which the mind en'oys direct 6acCuaintance7 with a present o)'ect% .n the other types the mind has 6!nowledge0a)out7 an o)'ect not immediately there% @f type <, the simplest sort of conceptual !nowledge, . ha+e gi+en some account in two 9earlier: articles%9E<: "ype E can always formally and hypothetically )e reduced to type <, so that a )rief description of that type will put the present reader sufficiently at my point of +iew, and ma!e him see what the actual meanings of the mysterious cogniti+e relation may )e%9Pg FG: Suppose me to )e sitting here in my li)rary at Cam)ridge, at ten minutes7 wal! from 6Memorial #all,7 and to )e thin!ing truly of the latter o)'ect% My mind may ha+e )efore it only the name, or it may ha+e a clear image, or it may ha+e a +ery dim image of the hall, )ut such intrinsic differences in the image ma!e no difference in its cogniti+e function% Certain extrinsic phenomena, special e/periences of con'unction, are what impart to the image, )e it what it may, its !nowing office% 9Pg FF: &or instance, if you as! me what hall . mean )y my image, and . can tell you nothing8 or if . fail to point or lead you towards the #ar+ard Delta8 or if, )eing led )y you, . am uncertain whether the #all . see )e what . had in mind or not8 you would rightly deny that . had 6meant7 that particular hall at all, e+en though my mental image might to some degree ha+e resem)led it% "he resem)lance would count in that case as coincidental merely, for all sorts of things of a !ind resem)le one another in this world without )eing held for that reason to ta!e cogniDance of one another% @n the other hand, if . can lead you to the9Pg FH: hall, and tell you of its history and present uses8 if in its presence . feel my idea, howe+er imperfect it may ha+e )een, to ha+e led hither and to )e now terminated+ if the associates of the image and of the felt hall run parallel, so that each term of the one conte/t corresponds serially, as . wal!, with an answering term of the others8 why then my soul was prophetic, and my idea must )e, and )y common consent would )e, called cogniDant of reality% "hat percept was what . meant, for into it my idea has passed )y con'uncti+e e/periences of sameness and fulfilled intention% Aowhere is there 'ar, )ut e+ery later moment continues and corro)orates an earlier one% .n this continuing and corro)orating, ta!en in no transcendental sense, )ut denoting definitely felt transitions, lies all that the (no!ing of a percept by an idea can possibly contain or signify % Where+er such transitions are felt, the first e/perience (no!s the last one% Where they do not, or where e+en as possi)les they can not, inter+ene, there can )e no pretence of !nowing% .n this latter case the e/tremes will )e 9Pg F5:connected, if connected at all, )y inferior relationsI)are li!eness
or succession, or )y 6withness7 alone% Knowledge of sensi)le realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of e/perience% .t is made8 and made )y relations that unroll themsel+es in time% Whene+er certain intermediaries are gi+en, such that, as they de+elop towards their terminus, there is e/perience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting'point thereby becomes a (no!er and their terminus an ob&ect meant or (no!n % "hat is all that !nowing ;in the simple case considered= can )e !nown0as, that is the whole of its nature, put into e/periential terms% Whene+er such is the seCuence of our e/periences we may freely say that we had the terminal o)'ect 6in mind7 from the outset, e+en although at the outset nothing was there in us )ut a flat piece of su)stanti+e e/perience li!e any other, with no self0transcendency a)out it, and no mystery sa+e the mystery of coming into e/istence and of )eing gradually followed )y other pieces of su)stanti+e e/perience, with9Pg FB: con'uncti+ely transitional e/periences )etween% "hat is what we mean here )y the o)'ect7s )eing 6in mind%7 @f any deeper more real way of )eing in mind we ha+e no positi+e conception, and we ha+e no right to discredit our actual e/perience )y tal!ing of such a way at all% . !now that many a reader will re)el at this% >Mere intermediaries,? he will say, >e+en though they )e feelings of continuously growing fulfilment, only separate the !nower from the !nown, whereas what we ha+e in !nowledge is a !ind of immediate touch of the one )y the other, an 6apprehension7 in the etymological sense of the word, a leaping of the chasm as )y lightning, an act )y which two terms are smitten into one, o+er the head of their distinctness% $ll these dead intermediaries of yours are out of each other, and outside of their termini still%? But do not such dialectic difficulties remind us of the dog dropping his )one and snapping at its image in the water- .f we !new any more real !ind of union aliunde, we might )e entitled9Pg F3: to )rand all our empirical unions as a sham% But unions )y continuous transition are the only ones we !now of, whether in this matter of a !nowledge0a)out that terminates in an acCuaintance, whether in personal identity, in logical predication through the copula 6is,7 or elsewhere% .f anywhere there were more a)solute unions realiDed, they could only re+eal themsel+es to us )y 'ust such con'uncti+e results% "hese are what the unions are !orth, these are all that !e can ever practically mean )y union, )y continuity% .s it not time to repeat what otDe said of su)stances, that to act li(e one is to be one-9EE: Should we not say here that to )e e/perienced as continuous is to )e really continuous, in a world where e/perience and reality come to the same thing- .n a picture gallery a painted hoo! will ser+e to hang a painted chain )y, a painted ca)le will hold a painted ship% .n a world where )oth the terms and their distinctions are affairs of e/perience, con'unctions that are e/perienced must )e at least as real as anything else% "hey will )e 6a)solutely7 real con'unctions, if we ha+e no transphenomenal $)solute ready, to derealiDe the whole e/perienced world )y, at a stro!e% .f, on the other hand, we had such an $)solute, not one of our opponents7 theories of !nowledge could remain standing any )etter than ours could8 for the distinctions as well as the con'unctions of e/perience would impartially fall its prey% "he whole Cuestion of how 6one7 thing can !now 6another7 would cease to )e a real one at all in a world where otherness itself was an illusion%9EG:9Pg H4: So much for the essentials of the cogniti+e relation, where the !nowledge is conceptual in type, or forms !nowledge 6a)out7 an o)'ect% .t consists in intermediary e/periences ;possi)le, if not actual= of continuously de+eloping progress, and, finally, of fulfilment, when the sensi)le percept, which is the o)'ect, is reached% "he percept here not only verifies the concept, pro+es its function of !nowing that percept to )e true, )ut the percept7s e/istence as the terminus of the chain of intermediaries creates the function% Whate+er terminates that chain was, )ecause it now pro+es itself to )e, what the concept 6had in mind%7 9Pg H2: "he towering importance for human life of this !ind of !nowing lies in the fact that an e/perience that !nows another can figure as its representative, not in any Cuasi0miraculous 6epistemological7 sense, )ut in the definite practical sense of )eing its substitute in +arious operations, sometimes physical and sometimes mental, which lead us to its associates and results% By e/perimenting on our ideas of reality, we may sa+e oursel+es the trou)le of e/perimenting on the real e/periences which they se+erally mean% "he ideas form related systems, corresponding point for point to the systems which the realities form8 and )y letting an ideal term call up its associates systematically, we may )e led to a terminus which the corresponding real term would ha+e led to in case we had operated on the real world% $nd this )rings us to the general Cuestion of su)stitution%9Pg H<:
-7. Substitution .n "aine7s )rilliant )oo! on 6.ntelligence,7 su)stitution was for the first time named as a cardinal logical function, though of course the facts had always )een familiar enough% What, e/actly, in a system of e/periences, does the 6su)stitution7 of one of them for another mean$ccording to my +iew, e/perience as a whole is a process in time, where)y innumera)le particular terms lapse and are superseded )y others that follow upon them )y transitions which, whether dis'uncti+e or con'uncti+e in content, are themsel+es e/periences, and must in general )e accounted at least as real as the terms which they relate% What the nature of the e+ent called 6superseding7 signifies, depends altogether on the !ind of transition that o)tains% Some e/periences simply a)olish their predecessors without continuing them in any way% @thers are felt to increase or to enlarge their meaning, to carry out their purpose, or to )ring us nearer to their goal% "hey9Pg HE: 6represent7 them, and may fulfil their function )etter than they fulfilled it themsel+es% But to 6fulfil a function7 in a world of pure e/perience can )e concei+ed and defined in only one possi)le way% .n such a world transitions and arri+als ;or terminations= are the only e+ents that happen, though they happen )y so many sorts of path% "he only function that one e/perience can perform is to lead into another e/perience8 and the only fulfilment we can spea! of is the reaching of a certain e/perienced end% When one e/perience leads to ;or can lead to= the same end as another, they agree in function% But the whole system of e/periences as they are immediately gi+en presents itself as a Cuasi0chaos through which one can pass out of an initial term in many directions and yet end in the same terminus, mo+ing from ne/t to ne/t )y a great many possi)le paths% Either one of these paths might )e a functional su)stitute for another, and to follow one rather than another might on occasion )e an ad+antageous thing to do% $s a matter of9Pg HG: fact, and in a general way, the paths that run through conceptual e/periences, that is, through 6thoughts7 or 6ideas7 that 6!now7 the things in which they terminate, are highly ad+antageous paths to follow% Aot only do they yield inconcei+a)ly rapid transitions8 )ut, owing to the 6uni+ersal7 character9EF: which they freCuently possess, and to their capacity for association with one another in great systems, they outstrip the tardy consecutions of the things themsel+es, and sweep us on towards our ultimate termini in a far more la)or0 sa+ing way than the following of trains of sensi)le perception e+er could% Wonderful are the new cuts and the short0circuits which the thought0paths ma!e% Most thought0paths, it is true, are su)stitutes for nothing actual8 they end outside the real world altogether, in wayward fancies, utopias, fictions or mista!es% But where they do re0enter reality and terminate therein, we su)stitute them always8 and with these su)stitutes we pass the greater num)er of our hours%9Pg HF: "his is why . called our e/periences, ta!en all together, a Cuasi0chaos% "here is +astly more discontinuity in the sum total of e/periences than we commonly suppose% "he o)'ecti+e nucleus of e+ery man7s e/perience, his own )ody, is, it is true, a continuous percept8 and eCually continuous as a percept ;though we may )e inattenti+e to it= is the material en+ironment of that )ody, changing )y gradual transition when the )ody mo+es% But the distant parts of the physical world are at all times a)sent from us, and form conceptual o)'ects merely, into the perceptual reality of which our life inserts itself at points discrete and relati+ely rare% Round their se+eral o)'ecti+e nuclei, partly shared and common and partly discrete, of the real physical world, innumera)le thin!ers, pursuing their se+eral lines of physically true cogitation, trace paths that intersect one another only at discontinuous perceptual points, and the rest of the time are Cuite incongruent8 and around all the nuclei9Pg HH: of shared 6reality,7 as around the Dya!7s head of my late metaphor, floats the +ast cloud of e/periences that are wholly su)'ecti+e, that are non0su)stitutional, that find not e+en an e+entual ending for themsel+es in the perceptual worldIthe mere day0dreams and 'oys and sufferings and wishes of the indi+idual minds% "hese e/ist !ith one another, indeed, and with the o)'ecti+e nuclei, )ut out of them it is pro)a)le that to all eternity no interrelated system of any !ind will e+er )e made% "his notion of the purely su)stitutional or conceptual physical world )rings us to the most critical of all the steps in the de+elopment of a philosophy of pure e/perience% "he parado/ of self0transcendency in !nowledge comes )ac! upon us here, )ut . thin! that our notions of pure e/perience and of su)stitution, and our radically empirical +iew of con'uncti+e transitions, are 4en(mittel that will carry us safely through the pass%9Pg H5: 7. What (bjecti e "eference -s. Whosoe+er feels his e/perience to )e something su)stitutional e+en while he has it, may )e said to ha+e an e/perience that reaches )eyond itself% &rom inside of its own entity it says 6more,7 and postulates reality e/isting elsewhere% &or the transcendentalist, who holds !nowing to consist in a salto mortale across an 6epistemological chasm,7 such an idea presents
no difficulty8 )ut it seems at first sight as if it might )e inconsistent with an empiricism li!e our own% #a+e we not e/plained that conceptual !nowledge is made such wholly )y the e/istence of things that fall outside of the !nowing e/perience itselfI)y intermediary e/periences and )y a terminus that fulfils- Can the !nowledge )e there )efore these elements that constitute its )eing ha+e come- $nd, if !nowledge )e not there, how can o)'ecti+e reference occur"he !ey to this difficulty lies in the distinction )etween !nowing as +erified and completed, and the same !nowing as in transit9Pg HB: and on its way% "o recur to the Memorial #all e/ample lately used, it is only when our idea of the #all has actually terminated in the percept that we !now 6for certain7 that from the )eginning it was truly cogniti+e of that% Qntil esta)lished )y the end of the process, its Cuality of !nowing that, or indeed of !nowing anything, could still )e dou)ted8 and yet the !nowing really was there, as the result now shows% We were virtual !nowers of the #all long )efore we were certified to ha+e )een its actual !nowers, )y the percept7s retroacti+e +alidating power% Just so we are 6mortal7 all the time, )y reason of the +irtuality of the ine+ita)le e+ent which will ma!e us so when it shall ha+e come% Aow the immensely greater part of all our !nowing ne+er gets )eyond this +irtual stage% .t ne+er is completed or nailed down% . spea! not merely of our ideas of impercepti)les li!e ether0wa+es or dissociated 6ions,7 or of 6e'ects7 li!e the contents of our neigh)ors7 minds8 . spea! also of ideas which we might +erify if we would ta!e the trou)le, )ut which we hold for9Pg H3: true although unterminated perceptually, )ecause nothing says 6no7 to us, and there is no contradicting truth in sight% To continue thin(ing unchallenged is% ninety'nine times out of a hundred% our practical substitute for (no!ing in the completed sense. $s each e/perience runs )y cogniti+e transition into the ne/t one, and we nowhere feel a collision with what we elsewhere count as truth or fact, we commit oursel+es to the current as if the port were sure% We li+e, as it were, upon the front edge of an ad+ancing wa+e0crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all we co+er of the future of our path% .t is as if a differential Cuotient should )e conscious and treat itself as an adeCuate su)stitute for a traced0out cur+e% @ur e/perience, inter alia, is of +ariations of rate and of direction, and li+es in these transitions more than in the 'ourney7s end% "he e/periences of tendency are sufficient to act uponIwhat more could we ha+e done at those moments e+en if the later +erification comes complete"his is what, as a radical empiricist, . say to9Pg 54: the charge that the o)'ecti+e reference which is so flagrant a character of our e/periences in+ol+es a chasm and a mortal leap% $ positi+ely con'uncti+e transition in+ol+es neither chasm nor leap% Being the +ery original of what we mean )y continuity, it ma!es a continuum where+er it appears% . !now full well that such )rief words as these will lea+e the hardened transcendentalist unsha!en% Con'uncti+e e/periences separate their terms, he will still say, they are third things interposed, that ha+e themsel+es to )e con'oined )y new lin!s, and to in+o!e them ma!es our trou)le infinitely worse% "o 6feel7 our motion forward is impossi)le% Motion implies terminus8 and how can terminus )e felt )efore we ha+e arri+ed- "he )arest start and sally forwards, the )arest tendency to lea+e the instant, in+ol+es the chasm and the leap% Con'uncti+e transitions are the most superficial of appearances, illusions of our sensi)ility which philosophical reflection pul+eriDes at a touch% Conception is our only trustworthy instrument, conception and the $)solute wor!ing hand in hand% Conception9Pg 52: disintegrates e/perience utterly, )ut its dis'unctions are easily o+ercome again when the $)solute ta!es up the tas!% Such transcendentalists . must lea+e, pro+isionally at least, in full possession of their creed%9EH: . ha+e no space for polemics in this article, so . shall simply formulate the empiricist doctrine as my hypothesis, lea+ing it to wor! or not wor! as it may% @)'ecti+e reference, . say then, is an incident of the fact that so much of our e/perience comes as an insufficient and consists of process and transition% @ur fields of e/perience ha+e no more definite )oundaries than ha+e our fields of +iew% Both are fringed fore+er )y a more that continuously de+elops, and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds% "he relations, generally spea!ing, are as real here as the terms are, and the only complaint of the transcendentalist7s with which . could at all sympathiDe would )e his charge that, )y first ma!ing !nowledge to consist in e/ternal relations as . ha+e done, and )y then confessing that nine0tenths of the time these are not actually )ut only +irtually there, . ha+e !noc!ed the solid )ottom out of the whole )usiness, and palmed off a su)stitute of !nowledge for the genuine thing% @nly the admission, such a critic might say, that our ideas are self0transcendent and 6true7 already, in ad+ance of the e/periences that are to terminate them, can )ring solidity )ac! to !nowledge in a world li!e this, in which transitions and terminations are only )y e/ception fulfilled%9Pg 5<: "his seems to me an e/cellent place for applying the pragmatic method% When a dispute arises, that method consists in auguring what practical conseCuences would )e different if one side rather than the other were true% .f no difference can )e
thought of, the dispute is a Cuarrel o+er words% What then would the self0transcendency affirmed to e/ist in ad+ance of all e/periential mediation or termination, )e (no!n'as- What would it practically result in for us, were it true.t could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our e/pectations and practical9Pg 5E: tendencies into the right path8 and the right path here, so long as we and the o)'ect are not yet face to face ;or can ne+er get face to face, as in the case of e'ects=, would )e the path that led us into the o)'ect7s nearest neigh)orhood% Where direct acCuaintance is lac!ing, 6!nowledge a)out7 is the ne/t )est thing, and an acCuaintance with what actually lies a)out the o)'ect, and is most closely related to it, puts such !nowledge within our grasp% Ether0wa+es and your anger, for e/ample, are things in which my thoughts will ne+er perceptually terminate, )ut my concepts of them lead me to their +ery )rin!, to the chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deeds which are their really ne/t effects% E+en if our ideas did in themsel+es carry the postulated self0transcendency, it would still remain true that their putting us into possession of such effects !ould be the sole cash'value of the self'transcendency for us % $nd this cash0+alue, it is needless to say, is verbatim et literatim what our empiricist account pays in% @n pragmatist principles therefore, a dispute9Pg 5G: o+er self0transcendency is a pure logomachy% Call our concepts of e'ecti+e things self0transcendent or the re+erse, it ma!es no difference, so long as we don7t differ a)out the nature of that e/alted +irtue7s fruitsIfruits for us, of course, humanistic fruits% .f an $)solute were pro+ed to e/ist for other reasons, it might well appear that his !nowledge is terminated in innumera)le cases where ours is still incomplete% "hat, howe+er, would )e a fact indifferent to our !nowledge% "he latter would grow neither worse nor )etter, whether we ac!nowledged such an $)solute or left him out% So the notion of a !nowledge still in transitu and on its way 'oins hands here with that notion of a 6pure e/perience7 which . tried to e/plain in my 9essay: entitled 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7 "he instant field of the present is always e/perience in its 6pure7 state, plain unCualified actuality, a simple that, as yet undifferentiated into thing and thought, and only +irtually classifia)le as o)'ecti+e fact or as some one7s opinion a)out fact% "his is as true9Pg 5F: when the field is conceptual as when it is perceptual% 6Memorial #all7 is 6there7 in my idea as much as when . stand )efore it% . proceed to act on its account in either case% @nly in the later e/perience that supersedes the present one is this na/f immediacy retrospecti+ely split into two parts, a 6consciousness7 and its 6content,7 and the content corrected or confirmed% While still pure, or present, any e/perienceImine, for e/ample, of what . write a)out in these +ery linesIpasses for 6truth%7 "he morrow may reduce it to 6opinion%7 "he transcendentalist in all his particular !nowledges is as lia)le to this reduction as . am, his $)solute does not sa+e him% Why, then, need he Cuarrel with an account of !nowing that merely lea+es it lia)le to this ine+ita)le condition- Why insist that !nowing is a static relation out of time when it practically seems so much a function of our acti+e life- &or a thing to )e +alid, says otDe, is the same as to ma!e itself +alid% When the whole uni+erse seems only to )e ma!ing itself +alid and to )e still incomplete ;else why its ceaseless changing-= why, of9Pg 5H: all things, should !nowing )e e/empt- Why should it not )e ma!ing itself +alid li!e e+erything else- "hat some parts of it may )e already +alid or +erified )eyond dispute, the empirical philosopher, of course, li!e any one else, may always hope% 7-. )he ,onterminousness of .ifferent :inds4;<6 With transition and prospect thus enthroned in pure e/perience, it is impossi)le to su)scri)e to the idealism of the English school% Radical empiricism has, in fact, more affinities with natural realism than with the +iews of Ber!eley or of Mill, and this can )e easily shown% &or the Ber!eleyan school, ideas ;the +er)al eCui+alent of what . term e/periences= are discontinuous% "he content of each is wholly immanent, and there are no transitions with which they are consu)stantial and through which their )eings may unite% Nour Memorial #all and mine, e+en when )oth are percepts, are wholly out of connection with each other% @ur li+es are a congeries of solipsisms, out of which in strict logic only a (od could compose a uni+erse e+en of discourse% Ao dynamic currents run )etween my o)'ects and your o)'ects% Ae+er can our minds meet in the same%9Pg 55: "he incredi)ility of such a philosophy is flagrant% .t is 6cold, strained, and unnatural7 in a supreme degree8 and it may )e dou)ted whether e+en Ber!eley himself, who too! it so religiously, really )elie+ed, when wal!ing through the streets of ondon, that his spirit and the spirits of his fellow wayfarers had a)solutely different towns in +iew% "o me the decisi+e reason in fa+or of our minds meeting in some common o)'ects at least is that, unless . ma!e that supposition, . ha+e no moti+e for assuming that your mind e/ists at all% Why do . postulate your mind- Because . see your )ody acting in a certain way% .ts gestures, facial mo+ements, words and conduct generally, are 6e/pressi+e,7 so . deem it
actuated as my own is, )y an inner life li!e mine% "his argument from analogy is my9Pg 5B: reason, whether an instincti+e )elief runs )efore it or not% But what is 6your )ody7 here )ut a percept in my field- .t is only as animating that o)'ect, my o)'ect, that . ha+e any occasion to thin! of you at all% .f the )ody that you actuate )e not the +ery )ody that . see there, )ut some duplicate )ody of your own with which that has nothing to do, we )elong to different uni+erses, you and ., and for me to spea! of you is folly% Myriads of such uni+erses e+en now may coe/ist, irrele+ant to one another8 my concern is solely with the uni+erse with which my own life is connected% .n that perceptual part of my uni+erse which . call your )ody, your mind and my mind meet and may )e called conterminous% Nour mind actuates that )ody and mine sees it8 my thoughts pass into it as into their harmonious cogniti+e fulfilment8 your emotions and +olitions pass into it as causes into their effects% But that percept hangs together with all our other physical percepts% "hey are of one stuff with it8 and if it )e our common possession, they must )e so li!ewise% &or instance, your9Pg 53: hand lays hold of one end of a rope and my hand lays hold of the other end% We pull against each other% Can our two hands )e mutual o)'ects in this e/perience, and the rope not )e mutual also- What is true of the rope is true of any other percept% Nour o)'ects are o+er and o+er again the same as mine% .f . as! you !here some o)'ect of yours is, our old Memorial #all, for e/ample, you point to my Memorial #all with your hand which * see% .f you alter an o)'ect in your world, put out a candle, for e/ample, when . am present, my candle ipso facto goes out% .t is only as altering my o)'ects that . guess you to e/ist% .f your o)'ects do not coalesce with my o)'ects, if they )e not identically where mine are, they must )e pro+ed to )e positi+ely somewhere else% But no other location can )e assigned for them, so their place must )e what it seems to )e, the same%9EB: 9Pg B4: Practically, then, our minds meet in a world of o)'ects which they share in common, which would still )e there, if one or se+eral of the minds were destroyed% . can see no formal o)'ection to this supposition7s )eing literally true% @n the principles which . am defending, a 6mind7 or 6personal consciousness7 is the name for a series of e/periences run together )y certain definite transitions, and an o)'ecti+e reality is a series of similar e/periences !nit )y different transitions% .f one and the same e/perience can figure twice, once in a mental and once in a physical conte/t ;as . ha+e tried, in my article on 6Consciousness,7 to show that it can=, one does not see why it might not figure thrice, or four times, or any num)er of times, )y running into as many different mental conte/ts, 'ust as the same point, lying at their intersection, can )e continued into many different lines% $)olishing any num)er of conte/ts would not destroy the e/perience itself or its other conte/ts, any more than a)olishing some of the point7s linear continuations would destroy the others, or destroy the point itself% . well !now the su)tle dialectic which insists9Pg B2: that a term ta!en in another relation must needs )e an intrinsically different term% "he cru/ is always the old (ree! one, that the same man can7t )e tall in relation to one neigh)or, and short in relation to another, for that would ma!e him tall and short at once% .n this essay . can not stop to refute this dialectic, so . pass on, lea+ing my flan! for the time e/posed%9E3: But if my reader will only allow that the same 6 no!7 )oth ends his past and )egins his future8 or that, when he )uys an acre of land from his neigh)or, it is the same acre that successi+ely figures in the two estates8 or that when . pay him a dollar, the same dollar goes into his poc!et that came out of mine8 he will also in consistency ha+e to allow that the same o)'ect may concei+a)ly play a part in, as )eing related to the rest of, any num)er of otherwise entirely different minds% "his is enough for my present point, the common0sense notion of minds sharing the same o)'ect offers no special logical or epistemological difficulties of its own8 it stands or falls with the general possi)ility of things )eing in con'uncti+e relation with other things at all%9Pg B<: .n principle, then, let natural realism pass for possi)le% Nour mind and mine may terminate in the same percept, not merely against it, as if it were a third e/ternal thing, )ut )y inserting themsel+es into it and coalescing with it, for such is the sort of con'uncti+e union that appears to )e e/perienced when a perceptual terminus 6fulfils%7 E+en so, two hawsers may em)race the same pile, and yet neither one of them touch any other part e/cept that pile, of what the other hawser is attached to% .t is therefore not a formal Cuestion, )ut a Cuestion of empirical fact solely, whether, when you and . are said to !now the 6same7 Memorial #all, our minds do terminate at or in a numerically identical percept% @)+iously, as a plain matter of fact, they do not% $part from color0)lindness and such possi)ilities, we see the #all in different perspecti+es% Nou may )e on one side of it and . on another% "he percept of each of us, as he sees the surface of the #all, is moreo+er only his pro+isional terminus% "he9Pg BE: ne/t thing )eyond my percept is not your mind, )ut more percepts of my own into which
my first percept de+elops, the interior of the #all, for instance, or the inner structure of its )ric!s and mortar% .f our minds were in a literal sense conterminous, neither could get )eyond the percept which they had in common, it would )e an ultimate )arrier )etween themIunless indeed they flowed o+er it and )ecame 6co0conscious7 o+er a still larger part of their content, which ;thought0transference apart= is not supposed to )e the case% .n point of fact the ultimate common )arrier can always )e pushed, )y )oth minds, farther than any actual percept of either, until at last it resol+es itself into the mere notion of impercepti)les li!e atoms or ether, so that, where we do terminate in percepts, our !nowledge is only speciously completed, )eing, in theoretic strictness, only a +irtual !nowledge of those remoter o)'ects which conception carries out% .s natural realism, permissi)le in logic, refuted then )y empirical fact- Do our minds ha+e no o)'ect in common after all9Pg BG: Nes, they certainly ha+e Space in common% @n pragmatic principles we are o)liged to predicate sameness where+er we can predicate no assigna)le point of difference% .f two named things ha+e e+ery Cuality and function indiscerni)le, and are at the same time in the same place, they must )e written down as numerically one thing under two different names% But there is no test disco+era)le, so far as . !now, )y which it can )e shown that the place occupied )y your percept of Memorial #all differs from the place occupied )y mine% "he percepts themsel+es may )e shown to differ8 )ut if each of us )e as!ed to point out where his percept is, we point to an identical spot% $ll the relations, whether geometrical or causal, of the #all originate or terminate in that spot wherein our hands meet, and where each of us )egins to wor! if he wishes to ma!e the #all change )efore the other7s eyes% Just so it is with our )odies% "hat )ody of yours which you actuate and feel from within must )e in the same spot as the )ody of yours which . see or touch from without% 6"here7 for me means9Pg BF: where . place my finger% .f you do not feel my finger7s contact to )e 6there7 in my sense, when . place it on your )ody, where then do you feel it- Nour inner actuations of your )ody meet my finger there, it is there that you resist its push, or shrin! )ac!, or sweep the finger aside with your hand% Whate+er farther !nowledge either of us may acCuire of the real constitution of the )ody which we thus feel, you from within and . from without, it is in that same place that the newly concei+ed or percei+ed constituents ha+e to )e located, and it is through that space that your and my mental intercourse with each other has always to )e carried on, )y the mediation of impressions which . con+ey thither, and of the reactions thence which those impressions may pro+o!e from you% .n general terms, then, whate+er differing contents our minds may e+entually fill a place with, the place itself is a numerically identical content of the two minds, a piece of common property in which, through which, and o+er which they 'oin% "he receptacle of certain of9Pg BH: our e/periences )eing thus common, the e/periences themsel+es might some day )ecome common also% .f that day e+er did come, our thoughts would terminate in a complete empirical identity, there would )e an end, so far as those e/periences went, to our discussions a)out truth% Ao points of difference appearing, they would ha+e to count as the same% 7--. ,onclusion With this we ha+e the outlines of a philosophy of pure e/perience )efore us% $t the outset of my essay, . called it a mosaic philosophy% .n actual mosaics the pieces are held together )y their )edding, for which )edding the Su)stances, transcendental Egos, or $)solutes of other philosophies may )e ta!en to stand% .n radical empiricism there is no )edding8 it is as if the pieces clung together )y their edges, the transitions e/perienced )etween them forming their cement% @f course such a metaphor is misleading, for in actual e/perience the more su)stanti+e and the more transiti+e parts run into each other continuously, there is in general9Pg B5: no separateness needing to )e o+ercome )y an e/ternal cement8 and whate+er separateness is actually e/perienced is not o+ercome, it stays and counts as separateness to the end% But the metaphor ser+es to sym)oliDe the fact that E/perience itself, ta!en at large, can grow )y its edges% "hat one moment of it proliferates into the ne/t )y transitions which, whether con'uncti+e or dis'uncti+e, continue the e/periential tissue, can not, . contend, )e denied% ife is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected8 often, indeed, it seems to )e there more emphatically, as if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing0line of the )attle, were li!e the thin line of flame ad+ancing across the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to )urn% .n this line we li+e prospecti+ely as well as retrospecti+ely% .t is 6of7 the past, inasmuch as it comes e/pressly as the past7s continuation8 it is 6of7 the future in so far as the future, when it comes, will ha+e continued it% "hese relations of continuous transition e/perienced are what ma!e our e/periences9Pg BB: cogniti+e% .n the simplest and completest cases the e/periences are cogniti+e of one another% When one of them terminates a pre+ious series of them with
a sense of fulfilment, it, we say, is what those other e/periences 6had in +iew%7 "he !nowledge, in such a case, is +erified8 the truth is 6salted down%7 Mainly, howe+er, we li+e on speculati+e in+estments, or on our prospects only% But li+ing on things in posse is as good as li+ing in the actual, so long as our credit remains good% .t is e+ident that for the most part it is good, and that the uni+erse seldom protests our drafts% .n this sense we at e+ery moment can continue to )elie+e in an e/isting beyond% .t is only in special cases that our confident rush forward gets re)u!ed% "he )eyond must, of course, always in our philosophy )e itself of an e/periential nature% .f not a future e/perience of our own or a present one of our neigh)or, it must )e a thing in itself in Dr% Prince7s and Professor Strong7s sense of the termIthat is, it must )e an e/perience for itself whose relation to other things we translate into the action9Pg B3: of molecules, ether0wa+es, or whate+er else the physical sym)ols may )e%9G4: "his opens the chapter of the relations of radical empiricism to panpsychism, into which . can not enter now%9G2: "he )eyond can in any case e/ist simultaneouslyIfor it can )e e/perienced to have existed simultaneouslyIwith the e/perience that practically postulates it )y loo!ing in its direction, or )y turning or changing in the direction of which it is the goal% Pending that actuality of union, in the +irtuality of which the 6truth,7 e+en now, of the postulation consists, the )eyond and its !nower are entities split off from each other% "he world is in so far forth a pluralism of which the unity is not fully e/perienced as yet% But, as fast as +erifications come, trains of e/perience, once separate, run into one another8 and that is why . said, earlier in my article, that the unity of the world is on the whole undergoing increase% "he uni+erse continually grows in Cuantity )y new e/periences that graft themsel+es upon the older mass8 )ut these +ery new e/periences often help the mass to a more consolidated form% 9Pg 34: "hese are the main features of a philosophy of pure e/perience% .t has innumera)le other aspects and arouses innumera)le Cuestions, )ut the points . ha+e touched on seem enough to ma!e an entering wedge% .n my own mind such a philosophy harmoniDes )est with a radical pluralism, with no+elty and indeterminism, moralism and theism, and with the 6humanism7 lately sprung upon us )y the @/ford and the Chicago schools%9G<: . can not, howe+er, )e sure that all these doctrines are its necessary and indispensa)le allies% .t presents so many points of difference, )oth from the common sense and from the idealism that ha+e made our philosophic language, that it is almost as9Pg 32: difficult to state it as it is to thin! it out clearly, and if it is e+er to grow into a respecta)le system, it will ha+e to )e )uilt up )y the contri)utions of many co0 operating minds% .t seems to me, as . said at the outset of this essay, that many minds are, in point of fact, now turning in a direction that points towards radical empiricism% .f they are carried farther )y my words, and if then they add their stronger +oices to my fee)ler one, the pu)lication of this essay will ha+e )een worth while%
F(()*()!S+
9<F: 9Reprinted from the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ., 234G, Ao% <4, Septem)er <3, and Ao% <2, @cto)er 2E% Pp% F<05H ha+e also )een reprinted, with some omissions, alterations and additions, in The Meaning of Truth, pp% 24<02<4% "he alterations ha+e )een adopted in the present te/t% "his essay is referred to in A Pluralistic Universe, p% <B4, note F% Ed%: 9<H: 9Cf% Ber!eley, Principles of 5uman 6no!ledge, .ntroduction8 #ume, An $n,uiry 7oncerning 5uman Understanding, sect% +ii, part ii ;Sel)y0Bigge7s edition, p% 5G=8 James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the 5uman Mind , ch% +iii8 J% S% Mill, An $xamination of Sir William 5amilton1s Philosophy, ch% /i, /ii8 W% K% Clifford, 8ectures and $ssays, pp% <5G ff%: 9<5: 9See >"he E/perience of $cti+ity,? )elow, pp% 2FF02B3%: 9<B: "he psychology )oo!s ha+e of late descri)ed the facts here with appro/imate adeCuacy% . may refer to the chapters on 6"he Stream of "hought7 and on the Self in my own Principles of Psychology, as well as to S% #% #odgson7s Metaphysic of $xperience, +ol% i, ch% +ii and +iii% 9<3: 9See >"he "hing and its Relations,? )elow, pp% 3<02<<%: 9E4: &or )re+ity7s sa!e . altogether omit mention of the type constituted )y !nowledge of the truth of general propositions% "his type has )een thoroughly and, so far as . can see, satisfactorily, elucidated in Dewey7s Studies in 8ogical Theory% Such propositions are reduci)le to the S0is0P form8 and the 6terminus7 that +erifies and fulfils is the SP in com)ination% @f course percepts may )e in+ol+ed in the mediating e/periences, or in the 6satisfactoriness7 of the P in its new position%
9E2: 9See a)o+e, pp% 302F%: 9E<: 9>@n the &unction of Cognition,? Mind, +ol% /, 2BBF, and >"he Knowing of "hings "ogether,? Psychological #evie!, +ol% ii, 2B3F% "hese articles are reprinted, the former in full, the latter in part, in The Meaning of Truth, pp% 20F4% Ed%: "hese articles and their doctrine, unnoticed apparently )y any one else, ha+e lately gained fa+ora)le comment from Professor Strong% 9>$ Aaturalistic "heory of the Reference of "hought to Reality,? 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% i, 234G%: Dr% Dic!inson S% Miller has independently thought out the same results 9>"he Meaning of "ruth and Error,? Philosophical #evie!, +ol% ii, 2B3E8 >"he Confusion of &unction and Content in Mental $nalysis,? Psychological #evie!, +ol% ii, 2B3F:, which Strong accordingly du)s the James0Miller theory of cognition% 9EE: 9Cf% #% otDe, Metaphysi(, RR E50E3, 35, 3B, <GE%: 9EG: Mr% Bradley, not professing to !now his a)solute aliunde, ne+ertheless derealiDes E/perience )y alleging it to )e e+erywhere infected with self0contradiction% #is arguments seem almost purely +er)al, )ut this is no place for arguing that point out% 9Cf% &% #% Bradley8 Appearance and #eality% passim+ and )elow, pp% 24H02<<%: 9EF: @f which all that need )e said in this essay is that it also can )e concei+ed as functional, and defined in terms of transitions, or of the possi)ility of such% 9Cf% Principles of Psychology, +ol% i, pp% G5E0GB4, +ol% ii, pp% EE50EG48 Pragmatism, p% <HF8 Some Problems of Philosophy, pp% HE05G8 Meaning of Truth, pp% <GH0<G5, etc% Ed%: 9EH: 9Cf% )elow, pp% 3E ff%: 9E5: 9Cf% >#ow "wo Minds Can Know @ne "hing,? )elow, pp% 2<E02EH%: 9EB: "he notion that our o)'ects are inside of our respecti+e heads is not seriously defensi)le, so . pass it )y% 9E3: 9"he argument is resumed )elow, pp% 242 sC% Ed%: 9G4: @ur minds and these e'ecti+e realities would still ha+e space ;or pseudo0space, as . )elie+e Professor Strong calls the medium of interaction )etween 6things0in0themsel+es7= in common% "hese would e/ist !here, and )egin to act !here, we locate the molecules, etc%, and !here we percei+e the sensi)le phenomena e/plained there)y% 9Cf% Morton Prince, The 9ature of Mind% and 5uman Automatism, part i, ch% iii, i+8 C% $% Strong, Why the Mind 5as a Body, ch% /ii%: 9G2: 9Cf% )elow, p% 2BB8 A Pluralistic Universe, ect% i+0+ii%: 9G<: . ha+e said something of this latter alliance in an article entitled 6#umanism and "ruth,7 in Mind, @cto)er, 234G% 9Reprinted in The Meaning of Truth, pp% F20242% Cf% also >#umanism and "ruth @nce More,? )elow, pp% <GG0<HF%: 9Pg 3<:
--)H! )H-*= A*. -)S "!8A)-(*S4>;6

E/perience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent% "he acti+e sense of li+ing which we all en'oy, )efore reflection shatters our instincti+e world for us, is self0luminous and suggests no parado/es% .ts difficulties are disappointments and uncertainties% "hey are not intellectual contradictions% When the reflecti+e intellect gets at wor!, howe+er, it disco+ers incomprehensi)ilities in the flowing process% Distinguishing its elements and parts, it gi+es them separate names, and what it thus dis'oins it can not easily put together% Pyrrhonism accepts the irrationality and re+els in its dialectic ela)oration% @ther philosophies try, some )y ignoring, some )y resisting, and some )y turning the dialectic procedure against itself, negating its first negations, to restore the fluent sense of life again, and let redemption ta!e the place of innocence% "he perfection with which any philosophy may do this is the measure of its human success and of its importance in philosophic history% .n 9the last essay:, 6$ World of Pure E/perience,7 . tried my own hand s!etchily at the pro)lem, resisting certain first steps of dialectics )y insisting in a general way that the immediately e/perienced con'uncti+e relations are as real as anything else% .f my s!etch is not to appear too na/f, . must come closer to details, and in the present essay . propose to do so%9Pg 3E:
6Pure e/perience7 is the name which . ga+e to the immediate flu/ of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories% @nly new0)orn )a)es, or men in semi0coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or )lows, may )e assumed to ha+e an e/perience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite !hat, tho7 ready to )e all sorts of whats8 full )oth of oneness9Pg 3G: and of manyness, )ut in respects that don7t appear8 changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can )e caught% Pure e/perience in this state is )ut another name for feeling or sensation% But the flu/ of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these salient parts )ecome identified and fi/ed and a)stracted8 so that e/perience now flows as if shot through with ad'ecti+es and nouns and prepositions and con'unctions% .ts purity is only a relati+e term, meaning the proportional amount of un+er)aliDed sensation which it still em)odies% &ar )ac! as we go, the flu/, )oth as a whole and in its parts, is that of things con'unct and separated% "he great continua of time, space, and the self en+elope e+erything, )etwi/t them, and flow together without interfering% "he things that they en+elope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in others% Some sensations coalesce with some ideas, and others are irreconcila)le% Sualities9Pg 3F: compenetrate one space, or e/clude each other from it% "hey cling together persistently in groups that mo+e as units, or else they separate% "heir changes are a)rupt or discontinuous8 and their !inds resem)le or differ8 and, as they do so, they fall into either e+en or irregular series% .n all this the continuities and the discontinuities are a)solutely co0ordinate matters of immediate feeling% "he con'unctions are as primordial elements of 6fact7 as are the distinctions and dis'unctions% .n the same act )y which . feel that this passing minute is a new pulse of my life, . feel that the old life continues into it, and the feeling of continuance in no wise 'ars upon the simultaneous feeling of a no+elty% "hey, too, compenetrate harmoniously% Prepositions, copulas, and con'unctions, 6is,7 6isn7t,7 6then,7 6)efore,7 6in,7 6on,7 6)eside,7 6)etween,7 6ne/t,7 6li!e,7 6unli!e,7 6as,7 6)ut,7 flower out of the stream of pure e/perience, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream, as naturally as nouns and ad'ecti+es do, and they melt into it again as fluidly when we apply them to a new portion of the stream%9Pg 3H: -.f now we as! why we must thus translate e/perience from a more concrete or pure into a more intellectualiDed form, filling it with e+er more a)ounding conceptual distinctions, rationalism and naturalism gi+e different replies% "he rationalistic answer is that the theoretic life is a)solute and its interests imperati+e8 that to understand is simply the duty of man8 and that who Cuestions this need not )e argued with, for )y the fact of arguing he gi+es away his case% "he naturalist answer is that the en+ironment !ills as well as sustains us, and that the tendency of raw e/perience to e/tinguish the e/perient himself is lessened 'ust in the degree in which the elements in it that ha+e a practical )earing upon life are analyDed out of the continuum and +er)ally fi/ed and coupled together, so that we may !now what is in the wind for us and get ready to react in time% #ad pure e/perience, the naturalist says, )een always perfectly healthy, there would ne+er9Pg 35: ha+e arisen the necessity of isolating or +er)aliDing any of its terms% We should 'ust ha+e e/perienced inarticulately and unintellectually en'oyed% "his leaning on 6reaction7 in the naturalist account implies that, whene+er we intellectualiDe a relati+ely pure e/perience, we ought to do so for the sa!e of redescending to the purer or more concrete le+el again8 and that if an intellect stays aloft among its a)stract terms and generaliDed relations, and does not reinsert itself with its conclusions into some particular point of the immediate stream of life, it fails to finish out its function and lea+es its normal race unrun% Most rationalists nowadays will agree that naturalism gi+es a true enough account of the way in which our intellect arose at first, )ut they will deny these latter implications% "he case, they will say, resem)les that of se/ual lo+e% @riginating in the animal need of getting another generation )orn, this passion has de+eloped secondarily such imperious spiritual needs that, if you as! why another generation ought to )e )orn at all, the answer is, 6Chiefly9Pg 3B: that lo+e may go on%7 Just so with our intellect, it originated as a practical means of ser+ing life8 )ut it has de+eloped incidentally the function of understanding a)solute truth8 and life itself now seems to )e gi+en chiefly as a means )y which that function may )e prosecuted% But truth and the understanding of it lie among the a)stracts and uni+ersals, so the intellect now carries on its higher )usiness wholly in this region, without any need of redescending into pure e/perience again%
.f the contrasted tendencies which . thus designate as naturalistic and rationalistic are not recogniDed )y the reader, perhaps an e/ample will ma!e them more concrete% Mr% Bradley, for instance, is an ultra0rationalist% #e admits that our intellect is primarily practical, )ut says that, for philosophers, the practical need is simply "ruth% "ruth, moreo+er, must )e assumed 6consistent%7 .mmediate e/perience has to )e )ro!en into su)'ects and Cualities, terms and relations, to )e understood as truth at all% Net when so )ro!en it is less consistent than e+er% "a!en raw, it is all9Pg 33: un0distinguished% .ntellectualiDed, it is all distinction without oneness% 6Such an arrangement may !or(, )ut the theoretic pro)lem is not sol+ed%7 "he Cuestion is 6ho! the di+ersity can e/ist in harmony with the oneness%7 "o go )ac! to pure e/perience is una+ailing% 6Mere feeling gi+es no answer to our riddle%7 E+en if your intuition is a fact, it is not an understanding% 6.t is a mere e/perience, and furnishes no consistent +iew%7 "he e/perience offered as facts or truths 6. find that my intellect re'ects )ecause they contradict themsel+es% "hey offer a comple/ of di+ersities con'oined in a way which it feels is not its way and which it can not repeat as its own%%%% &or to )e satisfied, my intellect must understand, and it can not understand )y ta!ing a congeries in the lump%79GG: So Mr% Bradley, in the sole interests of 6understanding7 ;as he concei+es that function=, turns his )ac! on finite e/perience fore+er% "ruth must lie in the opposite direction, the direction of the $)solute8 and this !ind of rationalism and naturalism, or ;as . will now call it= pragmatism, wal! thenceforward upon opposite paths% &or the one, those intellectual products are most true which, turning their face towards the $)solute, come nearest to sym)oliDing its ways of uniting the many and the one% &or the other, those are most true which most successfully dip )ac! into the finite stream of feeling and grow most easily confluent with some particular wa+e or wa+elet% Such confluence not only pro+es the intellectual operation to ha+e )een true ;as an addition may 6pro+e7 that a su)traction is already rightly performed=, )ut it constitutes, according to pragmatism, all that we mean )y calling it true% @nly in so far as they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, )ac! into sensi)le e/perience again, are our a)stracts and uni+ersals true or false at all%9GF:9Pg 244: --.n Section J. of 9the last essay:, . adopted in a general way the common0sense )elief that one and the same world is cogniDed )y our different minds8 )ut . left undiscussed the dialectical arguments which maintain that this is logically a)surd% "he usual reason gi+en for its )eing a)surd is that it assumes one o)'ect ;to wit, the world= to stand in two relations at once8 to my mind, namely, and again to yours8 whereas a term ta!en in a second relation can not logically )e the same term which it was at first%9Pg 242: . ha+e heard this reason urged so often in discussing with a)solutists, and it would destroy my radical empiricism so utterly, if it were +alid, that . am )ound to gi+e it an attenti+e ear, and seriously to search its strength% &or instance, let the matter in dispute )e term M, asserted to )e on the one hand related to 8, and on the other to 98 and let the two cases of relation )e sym)oliDed )y 82M and M29 respecti+ely% When, now, . assume that the e/perience may immediately come and )e gi+en in the shape 82M29, with no trace of dou)ling or internal fission in the9Pg 24<: M, . am told that this is all a popular delusion8 that 82M29 logically means two different e/periences, 82M and M29, namely8 and that although the $)solute may, and indeed must, from its superior point of +iew, read its own !ind of unity into M7s two editions, yet as elements in finite e/perience the two M7s lie irretrie+a)ly asunder, and the world )etween them is )ro!en and un)ridged% .n arguing this dialectic thesis, one must a+oid slipping from the logical into the physical point of +iew% .t would )e easy, in ta!ing a concrete e/ample to fi/ one7s ideas )y, to choose one in which the letter M should stand for a collecti+e noun of some sort, which noun, )eing related to 8 )y one of its parts and to 9 )y another, would inwardly )e two things when it stood outwardly in )oth relations% "hus, one might say, 6Da+id #ume, who weighed so many stone )y his )ody, influences posterity )y his doctrine%7 "he )ody and the doctrine are two things, )etween which our finite minds can disco+er no real sameness, though the same name co+ers )oth of them%9Pg 24E: $nd then, one might continue, 6@nly an $)solute is capa)le of uniting such a non0identity%7 We must, . say, a+oid this sort of e/ample, for the dialectic insight, if true at all, must apply to terms and relations uni+ersally% .t must )e true of a)stract units as well as of nouns collecti+e8 and if we pro+e it )y concrete e/amples we must ta!e the simplest, so as to a+oid irrele+ant material suggestions% "a!en thus in all its generality, the a)solutist contention seems to use as its ma'or premise #ume7s notion 6that all our distinct perceptions are distinct e/istences, and that the mind ne+er percei+es any real conne/ion among distinct e/istences%79GH: Qndou)tedly, since we use two phrases in tal!ing first a)out 6 M7s relation to 87 and then a)out 6M7s relation to 9,7 we must )e ha+ing, or must ha+e had, two distinct perceptions8Iand the rest would then seem to follow
duly% But the starting0point of the reasoning here seems to )e the fact of the two phrases8 and this suggests that the argument may )e merely +er)al% Can it )e that the whole dialectic consists in attri)uting to the e/perience tal!ed0a)out a constitution similar to that of the language in which we descri)e it- Must we assert the o)'ecti+e dou)le0ness of the M merely )ecause we ha+e to name it twice o+er when we name its two relations-9Pg 24G: Candidly, . can thin! of no other reason than this for the dialectic conclusion89G5: for, if we thin!, not of our words, )ut of any simple concrete matter which they may )e held to signify, the e/perience itself )elies the parado/ asserted% We use indeed two separate concepts in analyDing our o)'ect, )ut we !now them all the while to )e )ut su)stitutional, and that the M in 82M and the M in M29 mean ;i.e., are capa)le of leading to and terminating in= one self0same piece, M, of sensi)le e/perience% "his persistent identity of certain units ;or emphases, or points, or o)'ects, or mem)ersIcall them what you will= of the e/perience0continuum, is 'ust one of those con'uncti+e9Pg 24F: features of it, on which . am o)liged to insist so emphatically%9GB: &or samenesses are parts of e/perience7s indefeasi)le structure% When . hear a )ell0stro!e and, as life flows on, its after image dies away, . still har! )ac! to it as 6that same )ell0stro!e%7 When . see a thing M, with 8 to the left of it and 9 to the right of it, . see it as one M8 and if you tell me . ha+e had to 6ta!e7 it twice, . reply that if . 6too!7 it a thousand times . should still see it as a unit%9G3: .ts unity is a)original, 'ust as the multiplicity of my successi+e ta!ings is a)original% .t comes un)ro!en as that M, as a singular which . encounter8 they come )ro!en, as those ta!ings, as my plurality of operations% "he unity and the separateness are strictly co0ordinate% . do not easily fathom why my opponents should find the separateness so much more easily understanda)le that they must needs infect the whole of finite e/perience with it, and relegate the unity ;now ta!en as a )are postulate and no longer as a thing positi+ely percei+a)le= to the region of the $)solute7s mysteries% . do not easily fathom this, . say, for the said opponents are a)o+e mere +er)al Cui))ling8 yet all that . can catch in their tal! is the su)stitution of what is true of certain words for what is true of what they signify% "hey stay with the words,Inot returning to the stream of life whence all the meaning of them came, and which is always ready to rea)sor) them% 9Pg 24H: -7 &or aught this argument pro+es, then, we may continue to )elie+e that one thing can )e !nown )y many !nowers% But the denial of one thing in many relations is )ut one application of a still profounder dialectic difficulty% Man can7t )e good, said the sophists, for man is man and good is good8 and #egel9F4: and #er)art in their day, more recently $% Spir,9F2: and most recently and ela)orately of all, Mr% Bradley, informs us that a term can logically only )e a punctiform unit, and that not one of the con'uncti+e relations )etween things, which e/perience seems to yield, is rationally possi)le% 9Pg 245: @f course, if true, this cuts off radical empiricism without e+en a shilling% Radical empiricism ta!es con'uncti+e relations at their face +alue, holding them to )e as real as the terms united )y them%9F<: "he world it represents as a collection, some parts of which are con'uncti+ely and others dis'uncti+ely related% "wo parts, themsel+es dis'oined, may ne+ertheless hang together )y intermediaries with which they are se+erally connected, and the whole world e+entually may hang together similarly, inasmuch as some path of con'uncti+e transition )y which to pass from one of its parts to another may always )e discerni)le% Such determinately +arious hanging0together may )e called concatenated union, to distinguish it from the 6through0and0through7 type of union,9Pg 24B: 6each in all and all in each7 ;union of total conflux, as one might call it=, which monistic systems hold to o)tain when things are ta!en in their a)solute reality% .n a concatenated world a partial conflu/ often is e/perienced% @ur concepts and our sensations are confluent8 successi+e states of the same ego, and feelings of the same )ody are confluent% Where the e/perience is not of conflu/, it may )e of conterminousness ;things with )ut one thing )etween=8 or of contiguousness ;nothing )etween=8 or of li!eness8 or of nearness8 or of simultaneousness8 or of in0 ness8 or of on0ness8 or of for0ness8 or of simple with0ness8 or e+en of mere and0ness, which last relation would ma!e of howe+er dis'ointed a world otherwise, at any rate for that occasion a uni+erse 6of discourse%7 Aow Mr% Bradley tells us that none of these relations, as we actually e/perience them, can possi)ly )e real%9FE: My ne/t duty, accordingly, must )e to rescue radical empiricism from Mr% Bradley% &ortunately, as it seems to me, his general contention, that the +ery notion of relation is unthin!a)le clearly, has )een successfully met )y many critics%9FG: 9Pg 243:
.t is a )urden to the flesh, and an in'ustice )oth to readers and to the pre+ious writers, to repeat good arguments already printed% So, in noticing Mr% Bradley, . will confine myself to the interests of radical empiricism solely% 7 "he first duty of radical empiricism, ta!ing gi+en con'unctions at their face0+alue, is to class some of them as more intimate and some as more e/ternal% When two terms are similar, their +ery natures enter into the relation%9Pg 224: Being !hat they are, no matter where or when, the li!eness ne+er can )e denied, if asserted% .t continues predica)le as long as the terms continue% @ther relations, the !here and the !hen, for e/ample, seem ad+entitious% "he sheet of paper may )e 6off7 or 6on7 the ta)le, for e/ample8 and in either case the relation in+ol+es only the outside of its terms% #a+ing an outside, )oth of them, they contri)ute )y it to the relation% .t is e/ternal, the term7s inner nature is irrele+ant to it% $ny )oo!, any ta)le, may fall into the relation, which is created pro hac vice, not )y their e/istence, )ut )y their casual situation% .t is 'ust )ecause so many of the con'unctions of e/perience seem so e/ternal that a philosophy of pure e/perience must tend to pluralism in its ontology% So far as things ha+e space0relations, for e/ample, we are free to imagine them with different origins e+en% .f they could get to be, and get into space at all, then they may ha+e done so separately% @nce there, howe+er, they are additives to one another, and, with no pre'udice to their natures, all sorts of space0relations may super+ene9Pg 222: )etween them% "he Cuestion of how things could come to )e anyhow, is wholly different from the Cuestion what their relations, once the )eing accomplished, may consist in% Mr% Bradley now affirms that such e/ternal relations as the space0relations which we here tal! of must hold of entirely different su)'ects from those of which the a)sence of such relations might a moment pre+iously ha+e )een plausi)ly asserted% Aot only is the situation different when the )oo! is on the ta)le, )ut the boo( itself is different as a )oo!, from what it was when it was off the ta)le%9FF: #e admits that >such e/ternal relations seem possi)le and e+en e/isting%%%% "hat you do not alter what you compare or rearrange in space seems to common sense Cuite o)+ious, and that on9Pg 22<: the other side there are as o)+ious difficulties does not occur to common sense at all% $nd . will )egin )y pointing out these difficulties%%%% "here is a relation in the result, and this relation, we hear, is to ma!e no difference in its terms% But, if so, to what does it ma!e a difference- 94oesn1t it ma(e a difference to us onloo(ers% at least: : and what is the meaning and sense of Cualifying the terms )y it- 9Surely the meaning is to tell the truth about their relative position. 9FH:: .f, in short, it is e/ternal to the terms, how can it possi)ly )e true of them- 9 *s it the 0intimacy1 suggested by the little !ord 0of%1 here% !hich * have underscored% that is the root of Mr. Bradley1s trouble:: %%% .f the terms from their inner nature do not enter into the relation, then, so far as they are concerned, they seem related for no reason at all%%%% "hings are spatially related, first in one way, and then )ecome related in another way, and yet in no way themsel+es are altered8 for the relations, it is said, are )ut e/ternal% But . reply that, if9Pg 22E: so, . can not understand the lea+ing )y the terms of one set of relations and their adoption of another fresh set% "he process and its result to the terms, if they contri)ute nothing to it 9 Surely they contribute to it all there is 0of1 it;: seem irrational throughout% 9*f 0irrational1 here means simply 0non'rational%1 or nondeductible from the essence of either term singly% it is no reproach+ if it means 0contradicting1 such essence% Mr. Bradley should sho! !herein and ho!.: But, if they contri)ute anything, they must surely )e affected internally% 9 Why so% if they contribute only their surface: *n such relations as 0on1 0a foot a!ay%1 0bet!een%1 0next%1 etc.% only surfaces are in ,uestion. : %%% .f the terms contri)ute anything whate+er, then the terms are affected 9in!ardly altered:: )y the arrangement%%%% "hat for wor!ing purposes we treat, and do well to treat, some relations as e/ternal merely . do not deny, and that of course is not the Cuestion at issue here% "hat Cuestion is %%% whether in the end and in principle a mere e/ternal relation 9 i.e.% a relation !hich can change !ithout forcing its terms<Pg ==>? to change their nature simultaneously : is possi)le and forced on us )y the facts%?9F5: Mr% Bradley ne/t re+erts to the antinomies of space, which, according to him, pro+e it to )e unreal, although it appears as so prolific a medium of e/ternal relations8 and he then concludes that >.rrationality and e/ternality can not )e the last truth a)out things% Somewhere there must )e a reason why this and that appear together% $nd this reason and reality must reside in the whole from which terms and relations are a)stractions, a whole in which their internal connection must lie, and out of which from the )ac!ground appear those fresh results which ne+er could ha+e come from the premises%? $nd he adds that >Where the whole is different, the terms that Cualify and contri)ute to it must so far )e different%%%% "hey are altered so far only 95o! far: farther than externally% yet not through and through: : )ut still they are altered%%%% . must insist that in each case the terms are Cualified )y their whole 9 @ualified ho!:24o their external<Pg ==A? relations% situations% dates% etc.% changed as these are in the ne! !hole% fail to ,ualify them 0far1 enough: :, and that in the second case there is a whole
which differs )oth logically and psychologically from the first whole8 and . urge that in contri)uting to the change the terms so far are altered%? Aot merely the relations, then, )ut the terms are altered, und .!ar 6so far%7 But 'ust ho! far is the whole pro)lem8 and 6through0and0through7 would seem ;in spite of Mr% Bradley7s somewhat undecided utterances9FB:= to )e the full Bradleyan answer% "he 6whole7 which he here treats as primary and determinati+e of each part7s manner of 6contri)uting,7 simply must, when it alters, alter in its entirety% "here must )e total conflu/ of its parts, each into and through each other% "he 6must7 appears here as a Machtspruch, as an ipse dixit of Mr% Bradley7s a)solutistically tempered 6understanding,7 for he candidly confesses that how the parts do differ as they contri)ute to different wholes, is un!nown to him%9F3:9Pg 22H: $lthough . ha+e e+ery wish to comprehend the authority )y which Mr% Bradley7s understanding spea!s, his words lea+e me wholly uncon+erted% 6E/ternal relations7 stand with their withers all unwrung, and remain, for aught he pro+es to the contrary, not only practically wor!a)le, )ut also perfectly intelligi)le factors of reality%9Pg 225: 7Mr% Bradley7s understanding shows the most e/traordinary power of percei+ing separations and the most e/traordinary impotence in comprehending con'unctions% @ne would naturally say 6neither or )oth,7 )ut not so Mr% Bradley% When a common man analyDes certain !hats from out the stream of e/perience, he understands their distinctness as thus isolated% But this does not pre+ent him from eCually well understanding their com)ination with each other as originally experienced in the concrete, or their confluence with new sensi)le e/periences in which they recur as 6the same%7 Returning into the stream of sensi)le presentation, nouns and ad'ecti+es, and thats and a)stract !hats, grow confluent again, and the word 6is7 names all these e/periences of con'unction% Mr% Bradley understands the isolation of the a)stracts, )ut to understand the com)ination is to him impossi)le%9H4: >"o under9Pg 22B:stand a comple/ AB,? he says, >. must )egin with A or B% $nd )eginning, say with A, if . then merely find B, . ha+e either lost A, or . ha+e got )eside A, 9the !ord 0beside1 seems here vital% as meaning a con&unction 0external1 and therefore unintelligible : something else, and in neither case ha+e . understood%9H2: &or my intellect can not simply unite a di+ersity, nor has it in itself any form or way of togetherness, and you gain nothing if, )eside A and B, you offer me their con'unction in fact% &or to my intellect that is no more than another e/ternal element% $nd 6facts,7 once for all, are for my intellect not true unless they satisfy it%%%% "he intellect has in its nature no principle of mere togetherness%?9H<: 9Pg 223: @f course Mr% Bradley has a right to define 6intellect7 as the power )y which we percei+e separations )ut not unionsI pro+ided he gi+e due notice to the reader% But why then claim that such a maimed and amputated power must reign supreme in philosophy, and accuse on its )ehoof the whole empirical world of irrationality- .t is true that he elsewhere attri)utes to the intellect a proprius motus of transition, )ut says that when he loo!s for these transitions in the detail of li+ing e/perience, he 6is una)le to +erify such a solution%79HE: Net he ne+er e/plains what the intellectual transitions would )e li!e in case we had them% #e only defines them negati+ely Ithey are not spatial, temporal, predicati+e, or causal8 or Cualitati+ely or otherwise serial8 or in any way relational as we naO+ely trace relations, for relations separate terms, and need themsel+es to )e hoo!ed on ad infinitum% "he nearest approach he ma!es to descri)ing a truly intellectual transition is where he spea!s of9Pg 2<4: A and B as )eing 6united, each from its own nature, in a whole which is the nature of )oth ali!e%79HG: But this ;which, pace Mr% Bradley, seems e/Cuisitely analogous to 6ta!ing7 a congeries in a 6lump,7 if not to 6swamping7= suggests nothing )ut that conflux which pure e/perience so a)undantly offers, as when 6space,7 6white7 and 6sweet7 are confluent in a 6lump of sugar,7 or !inesthetic, dermal, and optical sensations confluent in 6my hand%79HF: $ll that . can +erify in the transitions which Mr% Bradley7s intellect desiderates as its proprius motus is a reminiscence of these and other sensi)le con'unctions ;especially space0 con'unctions=, )ut a reminiscence so +ague that its originals are not recogniDed% Bradley in short repeats the fa)le of the dog, the )one, and its image in the water% With a world of particulars, gi+en in lo+eliest union, in con'unction definitely +arious, and +ariously de9Pg 2<2:finite, the 6how7 of which you 6understand7 as soon as you see the fact of them,9HH: for there is no 6how7 e/cept the constitution of the fact as gi+en8 with all this gi+en him, . say, in pure e/perience, he as!s for some ineffa)le union in the a)stract instead, which, if he gained it, would only )e a duplicate of what he has already in his full possession% Surely he a)uses the pri+ilege which society grants to all us philosophers, of )eing puDDle0headed%
Polemic writing li!e this is odious8 )ut with a)solutism in possession in so many Cuarters, omission to defend my radical empiricism against its )est !nown champion would count as either superficiality or ina)ility% . ha+e to conclude that its dialectic has not in+alidated in the least degree the usual con'unctions )y which the world, as e/perienced, hangs so +ariously together% .n particular it lea+es an empirical theory of !nowledge9H5: intact, and lets us continue to )elie+e with common sense that one o)'ect may )e !nown, if we ha+e any ground for thin!ing that it is !nown, to many !nowers% 9Pg 2<<: .n 9the ne/t essay: . shall return to this last supposition, which seems to me to offer other difficulties much harder for a philosophy of pure e/perience to deal with than any of a)solutism7s dialectic o)'ections%
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9GE: 9Reprinted from The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods , +ol% ii, Ao% <, January 23, 234F% Reprinted also as $ppendi/ $ in A Pluralistic Universe, pp% EG50EH3% "he author7s corrections ha+e )een adopted in the present te/t% Ed%: 9GG: 9&% #% Bradley, Appearance and #eality, second edition, pp% 2F<02FE, <E, 22B, 24G, 24B0243, F54%: 9GF: Compare Professor Mac ennan7s admira)le Auseinanderset.ung with Mr% Bradley, in The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ., 9234G:, pp% G4E ff%, especially pp% G4F0G45% 9GH: 9#ume, Treatise of 5uman 9ature, $ppendi/, Sel)y0Bigge7s edition, p% HEH%: 9G5: "echnically, it seems classa)le as a 6fallacy of composition%7 $ duality, predica)le of the two wholes, 82M and M2 9, is forthwith predicated of one of their parts, M% 9GB: See a)o+e, pp% G< ff% 9G3: . may perhaps refer here to my Principles of Psychology, +ol% i, pp% GF3 ff% .t really seems 6weird7 to ha+e to argue ;as . am forced now to do= for the notion that it is one sheet of paper ;with its two surfaces and all that lies )etween= which is )oth under my pen and on the ta)le while . writeIthe 6claim7 that it is two sheets seems so )raDen% Net . sometimes suspect the a)solutists of sincerity* 9F4: 9&or the author7s criticism of #egel7s +iew of relations, cf% Will to Believe, pp% <5B0<53% Ed%: 9F2: 9Cf% $% Spir, 4en(en und Wir(lich(eit, part i, )!% iii, ch% i+ ;containing also account of #er)art=% Ed%: 9F<: 9See a)o+e, pp% G<, G3%: 9FE: #ere again the reader must )eware of slipping from logical into phenomenal considerations% .t may well )e that we attribute a certain relation falsely, )ecause the circumstances of the case, )eing comple/, ha+e decei+ed us% $t a railway station we may ta!e our own train, and not the one that fills our window, to )e mo+ing% We here put motion in the wrong place in the world, )ut in its original place the motion is a part of reality% What Mr% Bradley means is nothing li!e this, )ut rather that such things as motion are nowhere real, and that, e+en in their a)original and empirically incorrigi)le seats, relations are impossi)le of comprehension% 9FG: Particularly so )y $ndrew Seth Pringle0Pattison, in his Man and the 7osmos8 )y % "% #o)house, in chapter /ii ;>"he Jalidity of Judgment?= of his Theory of 6no!ledge8 and )y &% C% S% Schiller, in his 5umanism, essay /i% @ther fatal re+iews ;in my opinion= are #odder7s, in the Psychological #evie!, +ol% i, 92B3G:, p% E458 Stout7s in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 23420<, p% 28 and Mac ennan7s in 9The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% i, 234G, p% G4E:% 9FF: @nce more, don7t slip from logical into physical situations% @f course, if the ta)le )e wet, it will moisten the )oo!, or if it )e slight enough and the )oo! hea+y enough, the )oo! will )rea! it down% But such collateral phenomena are not the point at issue% "he point is whether the successi+e relations 6on7 and 6not0on7 can rationally ;not physically= hold of the same constant terms, a)stractly ta!en% Professor $% E% "aylor drops from logical into material considerations when he instances color0contrast as a proof that A, 6as contra0distinguished from B, is not the same thing as mere A not in any way affected7 ;$lements of Metaphysics, p% 2GF=% Aote the su)stitution, for 6related7 of the word 6affected,7 which )egs the whole Cuestion%
9FH: But >is there any sense,? as!s Mr% Bradley, pee+ishly, on p% F53, >and if so, what sense in truth that is only outside and 6a)out7 things-? Surely such a Cuestion may )e left unanswered% 9F5: Appearance and #eality, second edition, pp% F5F0F5H% 9FB: . say 6undecided,7 )ecause, apart from the 6so far,7 which sounds terri)ly half0hearted, there are passages in these +ery pages in which Mr% Bradley admits the pluralistic thesis% Read, for e/ample, what he says, on p% F5B, of a )illiard )all !eeping its 6character7 unchanged, though, in its change of place, its 6e/istence7 gets altered8 or what he says, on p% F53, of the possi)ility that an a)stract Cuality $, B, or C, in a thing, 6may throughout remain unchanged7 although the thing )e altered8 or his admission that in red0hairedness, )oth as analyDed out of a man and when gi+en with the rest of him, there may )e 6no change7 ;p% FB4=% Why does he immediately add that for the pluralist to plead the non0mutation of such a)stractions would )e an ignoratio elenchi- .t is impossi)le to admit it to )e such% "he entire elenchus and inCuest is 'ust as to whether parts which you can a)stract from e/isting wholes can also contri)ute to other wholes without changing their inner nature% .f they can thus mould +arious wholes into new gestalt,ualitBten, then it follows that the same elements are logically a)le to e/ist in different wholes 9whether physically a)le would depend on additional hypotheses:8 that partial changes are thin!a)le, and through0and0through change not a dialectic necessity8 that monism is only an hypothesis8 and that an additi+ely constituted uni+erse is a rationally respecta)le hypothesis also% $ll the theses of radical empiricism, in short, follow% 9F3: p. cit., pp% F550F53% 9H4: So far as . catch his state of mind, it is somewhat li!e this, 6Boo!,7 6ta)le,7 6on7Ihow does the e/istence of these three a)stract elements result in this )oo! )eing li+ingly on this ta)le% Why isn7t the ta)le on the )oo!- @r why doesn7t the 6on7 connect itself with another )oo!, or something that is not a ta)le- Mustn7t something in each of the three elements already determine the two others to it, so that they do not settle elsewhere or float +aguely- Mustn7t the !hole fact be pre'figured in each part, and e/ist de &ure )efore it can e/ist de facto- But, if so, in what can the 'ural e/istence consist, if not in a spiritual miniature of the whole fact7s constitution actuating e+ery partial factor as its purpose- But is this anything )ut the old metaphysical fallacy of loo!ing )ehind a fact in esse for the ground of the fact, and finding it in the shape of the +ery same fact in posse- Somewhere we must lea+e off with a constitution )ehind which there is nothing% 9H2: $pply this to the case of 6)oo!0on0ta)le7* W% J% 9H<: p. cit., pp% F54, F5<% 9HE: p. cit., pp% FHB, FH3% 9HG: p. cit., p% F54% 9HF: #ow meaningless is the contention that in such wholes ;or in 6)oo!0on0ta)le,7 6watch0in0poc!et,7 etc%= the relation is an additional entity bet!een the terms, needing itself to )e related again to each* Both Bradley ; op. cit., pp% E<0EE= and Royce ;The World and the *ndividual, +ol% i, p% 2<B= lo+ingly repeat this piece of profundity% 9HH: "he 6why7 and the 6whence7 are entirely other Cuestions, not under discussion, as . understand Mr% Bradley% Aot how e/perience gets itself )orn, )ut how it can )e what it is after it is )orn, is the puDDle% 9H5: $)o+e, p% F<% 9Pg 2<E:
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.n 9the essay: entitled 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7 . ha+e tried to show that when we call an e/perience 6conscious,7 that does not mean that it is suffused throughout with a peculiar modality of )eing ;6psychic7 )eing= as stained glass may )e suffused with light, )ut rather that it stands in certain determinate relations to other portions of e/perience e/traneous to itself% "hese form one peculiar 6conte/t7 for it8 while, ta!en in another conte/t of e/periences, we class it as a fact in the
physical world% "his 6pen,7 for e/ample, is, in the first instance, a )ald that, a datum, fact, phenomenon, content, or whate+er other neutral or am)iguous name you may prefer to apply% . called it in that article a 6pure e/perience%7 "o get classed either as a physical pen or as some one7s percept of a pen, it must assume a9Pg 2<G: function, and that can only happen in a more complicated world% So far as in that world it is a sta)le feature, holds in!, mar!s paper and o)eys the guidance of a hand, it is a physical pen% "hat is what we mean )y )eing 6physical,7 in a pen% So far as it is insta)le, on the contrary, coming and going with the mo+ements of my eyes, altering with what . call my fancy, continuous with su)seCuent e/periences of its 6ha+ing )een7 ;in the past tense=, it is the percept of a pen in my mind% "hose peculiarities are what we mean )y )eing 6conscious,7 in a pen% .n Section J. of another 9essay:9H3: . tried to show that the same that, the same numerically identical pen of pure e/perience, can enter simultaneously into many conscious conte/ts, or, in other words, )e an o)'ect for many different minds% . admitted that . had not space to treat of certain possi)le o)'ections in that article8 )ut in 9the last essay: . too! some of the o)'ections up% $t the end of that 9essay: . said that still more formida)le0sounding o)'ections remained8 so, to lea+e my pure0e/perience theory in as strong a state as possi)le, . propose to consider those o)'ections now%9Pg 2<F: "he o)'ections . pre+iously tried to dispose of were purely logical or dialectical% Ao one identical term, whether physical or psychical, it had )een said, could )e the su)'ect of two relations at once% "his thesis . sought to pro+e unfounded% "he o)'ections that now confront us arise from the nature supposed to inhere in psychic facts specifically% Whate+er may )e the case with physical o)'ects, a fact of consciousness, it is alleged ;and indeed +ery plausi)ly=, can not, without self0 contradiction, )e treated as a portion of two different minds, and for the following reasons% .n the physical world we ma!e with impunity the assumption that one and the same material o)'ect can figure in an indefinitely large num)er of different processes at once% When, for instance, a sheet of ru))er is pulled at its four corners, a unit of ru))er in the middle of the sheet is affected )y all four of the9Pg 2<H: pulls% .t transmits them each, as if it pulled in four different ways at once itself% So, an air0particle or an ether0particle 6compounds7 the different directions of mo+ement imprinted on it without o)literating their se+eral indi+idualities% .t deli+ers them distinct, on the contrary, at as many se+eral 6recei+ers7 ;ear, eye or what not= as may )e 6tuned7 to that effect% "he apparent parado/ of a distinctness li!e this sur+i+ing in the midst of compounding is a thing which, . fancy, the analyses made )y physicists ha+e )y this time sufficiently cleared up% But if, on the strength of these analogies, one should as!, >Why, if two or more lines can run through one and the same geometrical point, or if two or more distinct processes of acti+ity can run through one and the same physical thing so that it simultaneously plays a rPle in each and e+ery process, might not two or more streams of personal consciousness include one and the same unit of e/perience so that it would simultaneously )e a part of the e/perience of all the different minds-? one would )e chec!ed )y thin!ing of a certain peculiarity )y9Pg 2<5: which phenomena of consciousness differ from physical things% While physical things, namely, are supposed to )e permanent and to ha+e their 6states,7 a fact of consciousness e/ists )ut once and is a state% .ts esse is sentiri8 it is only so far as it is felt8 and it is unam)iguously and uneCui+ocally e/actly !hat is felt% "he hypothesis under consideration would, howe+er, o)lige it to )e felt eCui+ocally, felt now as part of my mind and again at the same time not as a part of my mind, )ut of yours ;for my mind is not yours=, and this would seem impossi)le without dou)ling it into two distinct things, or, in other words, without re+erting to the ordinary dualistic philosophy of insulated minds each !nowing its o)'ect representati+ely as a third thing,Iand that would )e to gi+e up the pure0 e/perience scheme altogether% Can we see, then, any way in which a unit of pure e/perience might enter into and figure in two di+erse streams of consciousness without turning itself into the two units which, on our hypothesis, it must not )e-9Pg 2<B: -"here is a way8 and the first step towards it is to see more precisely how the unit enters into either one of the streams of consciousness alone% Just what, from )eing 6pure,7 does its )ecoming 6conscious7 once mean-
.t means, first, that new e/periences ha+e super+ened8 and, second, that they ha+e )orne a certain assigna)le relation to the unit supposed% Continue, if you please, to spea! of the pure unit as 6the pen%7 So far as the pen7s successors do )ut repeat the pen or, )eing different from it, are 6energetically7954: related to it, it and they will form a group of sta)ly e/isting physical things% So far, howe+er, as its successors differ from it in another well0determined way, the pen will figure in their conte/t, not as a physical, )ut as a mental fact% .t will )ecome a passing 6percept,7 my percept of that pen% What now is that decisi+e well0determined way.n the chapter on 6"he Self,7 in my Principles<Pg =CD? of Psychology, . e/plained the continuous identity of each personal consciousness as a name for the practical fact that new e/periences952: come which loo! )ac! on the old ones, find them 6warm,7 and greet and appropriate them as 6mine%7 "hese operations mean, when analyDed empirically, se+eral tolera)ly definite things, +iD%, 2% "hat the new e/perience has past time for its 6content,7 and in that time a pen that 6was78 <% "hat 6warmth7 was also a)out the pen, in the sense of a group of feelings ;6interest7 aroused, 6attention7 turned, 6eyes7 employed, etc%= that were closely connected with it and that now recur and e+ermore recur with un)ro!en +i+idness, though from the pen of now, which may )e only an image, all such +i+idness may ha+e gone8 E% "hat these feelings are the nucleus of 6me78 G% "hat whate+er once was associated with them was, at least for that one moment, 6mine7Imy implement if associated with hand0feelings, my 6percept7 only, if only eye0feelings and attention0feelings were in+ol+ed%9Pg 2E4: "he pen, realiDed in this retrospecti+e way as my percept, thus figures as a fact of 6conscious7 life% But it does so only so far as 6appropriation7 has occurred8 and appropriation is part of the content of a later experience wholly additional to the originally 6pure7 pen% That pen, +irtually )oth o)'ecti+e and su)'ecti+e, is at its own moment actually and intrinsically neither% .t has to )e loo!ed )ac! upon and used, in order to )e classed in either distincti+e way% But its use, so called, is in the hands of the other e/perience, while it stands, throughout the operation, passi+e and unchanged% .f this pass muster as an intelligi)le account of how an e/perience originally pure can enter into one consciousness, the ne/t Cuestion is as to how it might concei+a)ly enter into two% --@)+iously no new !ind of condition would ha+e to )e supplied% $ll that we should ha+e to postulate would )e a second su)seCuent9Pg 2E2: e/perience, collateral and contemporary with the first su)seCuent one, in which a similar act of appropriation should occur% "he two acts would interfere neither with one another nor with the originally pure pen% .t would sleep undistur)ed in its own past, no matter how many such successors went through their se+eral appropriati+e acts% Each would !now it as 6my7 percept, each would class it as a 6conscious7 fact% Aor need their so classing it interfere in the least with their classing it at the same time as a physical pen% Since the classing in )oth cases depends upon the ta!ing of it in one group or another of associates, if the superseding e/perience were of wide enough 6span7 it could thin! the pen in )oth groups simultaneously, and yet distinguish the two groups% .t would then see the whole situation conforma)ly to what we call 6the representati+e theory of cognition,7 and that is what we all spontaneously do% $s a man philosophiDing 6popularly,7 . )elie+e that what . see myself writing with is dou)leI. thin! it in its relations to physical nature, and9Pg 2E<: also in its relations to my personal life8 . see that it is in my mind, )ut that it also is a physical pen% "he parado/ of the same e/perience figuring in two consciousnesses seems thus no parado/ at all% "o )e 6conscious7 means not simply to )e, )ut to )e reported, !nown, to ha+e awareness of one7s )eing added to that )eing8 and this is 'ust what happens when the appropriati+e e/perience super+enes% "he pen0e/perience in its original immediacy is not aware of itself, it simply is, and the second e/perience is reCuired for what we call awareness of it to occur%95<: "he difficulty of understanding what happens here is, therefore, not a logical difficulty, there is no contradiction in+ol+ed% .t is an ontological difficulty rather% E/periences come on an enormous scale, and if we ta!e9Pg 2EE: them all together, they come in a chaos of incommensura)le relations that we can not straighten out% We ha+e to a)stract different groups of them, and handle these separately if we are to tal! of them at all% But how the e/periences e+er get themselves made, or !hy their characters and relations are 'ust such as appear, we can not )egin to understand% (ranting, howe+er, that, )y hoo! or croo!,
they can get themsel+es made, and can appear in the successions that . ha+e so schematically descri)ed, then we ha+e to confess that e+en although ;as . )egan )y Cuoting from the ad+ersary= 6a feeling only is as it is felt,7 there is still nothing a)surd in the notion of its )eing felt in two different ways at once, as yours, namely, and as mine% .t is, indeed, 6mine7 only as it is felt as mine, and 6yours7 only as it is felt as yours% But it is felt as neither by itself, )ut only when 6owned7 )y our two se+eral remem)ering e/periences, 'ust as one undi+ided estate is owned )y se+eral heirs%9Pg 2EG: -7 @ne word, now, )efore . close, a)out the corollaries of the +iews set forth% Since the acCuisition of conscious Cuality on the part of an e/perience depends upon a conte/t coming to it, it follows that the sum total of all e/periences, ha+ing no conte/t, can not strictly )e called conscious at all% .t is a that, an $)solute, a 6pure7 e/perience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentia)le into thought and thing% "his the post0Kantian idealists ha+e always practically ac!nowledged )y calling their doctrine an *dentitBtsphilosophie% "he Cuestion of the Beseelung of the $ll of things ought not, then, e+en to )e as!ed% Ao more ought the Cuestion of its truth to )e as!ed, for truth is a relation inside of the sum total, o)taining )etween thoughts and something else, and thoughts, as we ha+e seen, can only )e conte/tual things% .n these respects the pure e/periences of our philosophy are, in themsel+es considered, so many little a)solutes, the philosophy of pure e/perience9Pg 2EF: )eing only a more comminuted *dentitBtsphilosophie%95E: Meanwhile, a pure e/perience can )e postulated with any amount whate+er of span or field% .f it e/ert the retrospecti+e and appropriati+e function on any other piece of e/perience, the latter there)y enters into its own conscious stream% $nd in this operation time inter+als ma!e no essential difference% $fter sleeping, my retrospection is as perfect as it is )etween two successi+e wa!ing moments of my time% $ccordingly if, millions of years later, a similarly retrospecti+e e/perience should anyhow come to )irth, my present thought would form a genuine portion of its long0span conscious life% 6&orm a portion,7 . say, )ut not in the sense that the two things could )e entitati+ely or su)stanti+ely oneIthey cannot, for they are numerically discrete factsI)ut only in the sense that the functions of my present thought, its !nowledge, its purpose, its content and 6consciousness,7 in short, )eing inherited, would )e continued practically9Pg 2EH: unchanged% Speculations li!e &echner7s, of an Earth0soul, of wider spans of consciousness en+eloping narrower ones throughout the cosmos, are, therefore, philosophically Cuite in order, pro+ided they distinguish the functional from the entitati+e point of +iew, and do not treat the minor consciousness under discussion as a !ind of standing material of which the wider ones consist%95G:
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9HB: 9Reprinted from The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ii, Ao% 5, March E4, 234F%: 9H3: >$ World of Pure E/perience,? a)o+e, pp% E3032% 954: 9&or an e/planation of this e/pression, see a)o+e, p% E<%: 952: . call them 6passing thoughts7 in the )oo!Ithe passage in point goes from pages EE4 to EG< of +ol% i% 95<: Shadworth #odgson has laid great stress on the fact that the minimum of consciousness demands two su)feelings, of which the second retrospects the first% ;Cf% the section 6$nalysis of Minima7 in his Philosophy of #eflection, +ol% i, p% <GB8 also the chapter entitled 6"he Moment of E/perience7 in his Metaphysic of $xperience, +ol% i, p% EG%= 6We li+e forward, )ut we understand )ac!ward7 is a phrase of Kier!egaard7s which #Tffding Cuotes% 9#% #Tffding, >$ Philosophical Confession,? 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ii, 234F, p% BH%: 95E: 9Cf% )elow, pp% 235, <4<%: 95G: 9Cf% A Pluralistic Universe, ect% i+, 6Concerning &echner,7 and ect% +, 6"he Compounding of Consciousness%7: 9Pg 2E5:
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Common sense and popular philosophy are as dualistic as it is possi)le to )e% "houghts, we all naturally thin!, are made of one !ind of su)stance, and things of another% Consciousness, flowing inside of us in the forms of conception or 'udgment, or concentrating itself in the shape of passion or emotion, can )e directly felt as the spiritual acti+ity which it is, and !nown in contrast with the space0filling o)'ecti+e 6content7 which it en+elopes and accompanies% .n opposition to this dualistic philosophy, . tried, in 9the first essay: to show that thoughts and things are a)solutely homogeneous as to their material, and that their opposition is only one of relation and of function% "here is no thought0stuff different from thing0stuff, . said8 )ut the same identical piece9Pg 2EB: of 6pure e/perience7 ;which was the name . ga+e to the materia prima of e+erything= can stand alternately for a 6fact of consciousness7 or for a physical reality, according as it is ta!en in one conte/t or in another% &or the right understanding of what follows, . shall ha+e to presuppose that the reader will ha+e read that 9essay:% 95H: "he commonest o)'ection which the doctrine there laid down runs up against is drawn from the e/istence of our 6affections%7 .n our pleasures and pains, our lo+es and fears and angers, in the )eauty, comicality, importance or preciousness of certain o)'ects and situations, we ha+e, . am told )y many critics, a great realm of e/perience intuiti+ely recogniDed as spiritual, made, and felt to )e made, of consciousness e/clusi+ely, and different in nature from the space0 filling !ind of )eing which is en'oyed )y physical o)'ects% .n Section J..% of 9the first essay:, . treated of this class of e/periences +ery inadeCuately,9Pg 2E3: )ecause . had to )e so )rief% . now return to the su)'ect, )ecause . )elie+e that, so far from in+alidating my general thesis, these phenomena, when properly analyDed, afford it powerful support% "he central point of the pure0e/perience theory is that 6outer7 and 6inner7 are names for two groups into which we sort e/periences according to the way in which they act upon their neigh)ors% $ny one 6content,7 such as hard, let us say, can )e assigned to either group% .n the outer group it is 6strong,7 it acts 6energetically7 and aggressi+ely% #ere whate+er is hard interferes with the space its neigh)ors occupy% .t dents them8 is impenetra)le )y them8 and we call the hardness then a physical hardness% .n the mind, on the contrary, the hard thing is nowhere in particular, it dents nothing, it suffuses through its mental neigh)ors, as it were, and interpenetrates them% "a!en in this group we call )oth it and them 6ideas7 or 6sensations78 and the )asis of the two groups respecti+ely is the different type of interrelation, the mutual impenetra)ility, 9Pg 2G4: on the one hand, and the lac! of physical interference and interaction, on the other% "hat what in itself is one and the same entity should )e a)le to function thus differently in different conte/ts is a natural conseCuence of the e/tremely comple/ reticulations in which our e/periences come% "o her offspring a tigress is tender, )ut cruel to e+ery other li+ing thingI)oth cruel and tender, therefore, at once% $ mass in mo+ement resists e+ery force that operates contrariwise to its own direction, )ut to forces that pursue the same direction, or come in at right angles, it is a)solutely inert% .t is thus )oth energetic and inert8 and the same is true ;if you +ary the associates properly= of e+ery other piece of e/perience% .t is only towards certain specific groups of associates that the physical energies, as we call them, of a content are put forth% .n another group it may )e Cuite inert% .t is possi)le to imagine a uni+erse of e/periences in which the only alternati+e )etween neigh)ors would )e either physical interaction or complete inertness% .n such a world the9Pg 2G2: mental or the physical status of any piece of e/perience would )e uneCui+ocal% When acti+e, it would figure in the physical, and when inacti+e, in the mental group% But the uni+erse we li+e in is more chaotic than this, and there is room in it for the hy)rid or am)iguous group of our affectional e/periences, of our emotions and appreciati+e perceptions% .n the paragraphs that follow . shall try to show, ;2= "hat the popular notion that these e/periences are intuiti+ely gi+en as purely inner facts is hasty and erroneous8 and ;<= "hat their am)iguity illustrates )eautifully my central thesis that su)'ecti+ity and o)'ecti+ity are affairs not of what an e/perience is a)originally made of, )ut of its classification% Classifications depend on our temporary purposes% &or certain purposes it is con+enient to ta!e things in one set of relations, for other purposes in another set% .n the two cases their conte/ts are apt to )e different% .n the case of our affectional e/periences we ha+e no permanent and steadfast purpose that9Pg 2G<: o)liges us to )e consistent, so we find it easy to let them float am)iguously, sometimes classing them with our feelings, sometimes with more physical realities, according to caprice or to the con+enience of the moment% "hus would
these e/periences, so far from )eing an o)stacle to the pure e/perience philosophy, ser+e as an e/cellent corro)oration of its truth% &irst of all, then, it is a mista!e to say, with the o)'ectors whom . )egan )y citing, that anger, lo+e and fear are affections purely of the mind% "hat, to a great e/tent at any rate, they are simultaneously affections of the )ody is pro+ed )y the whole literature of the James0 ange theory of emotion%955: $ll our pains, moreo+er, are local, and we are always free to spea! of them in o)'ecti+e as well as in su)'ecti+e terms% We can say that we are aware of a painful place, filling a certain )igness in our organism, or we can say that we are inwardly in a 6state7 of pain% $ll our ad'ecti+es of9Pg 2GE: worth are similarly am)iguousI. instanced some of the am)iguities 9in the first essay:%95B: .s the preciousness of a diamond a Cuality of the gem- or is it a feeling in our mind- Practically we treat it as )oth or as either, according to the temporary direction of our thought% 6Beauty,7 says Professor Santayana, 6is pleasure o)'ectified78 and in Sections 24 and 22 of his wor!, The Sense of Beauty, he treats in a masterly way of this eCui+ocal realm% "he +arious pleasures we recei+e from an o)'ect may count as 6feelings7 when we ta!e them singly, )ut when they com)ine in a total richness, we call the result the 6)eauty7 of the o)'ect, and treat it as an outer attri)ute which our mind percei+es% We disco+er )eauty 'ust as we disco+er the physical properties of things% "raining is needed to ma!e us e/pert in either line% Single sensations also may )e am)iguous% Shall we say an 6agreea)le degree of heat,7 or an 6agreea)le feeling7 occasioned )y the degree of heat- Either will do8 and language would lose most of its esthetic and rhetorical +alue9Pg 2GG: were we for)idden to pro'ect words primarily connoting our affections upon the o)'ects )y which the affections are aroused% "he man is really hateful8 the action really mean8 the situation really tragicIall in themsel+es and Cuite apart from our opinion% We e+en go so far as to tal! of a weary road, a giddy height, a 'ocund morning or a sullen s!y8 and the term 6indefinite7 while usually applied only to our apprehensions, functions as a fundamental physical Cualification of things in Spencer7s 6law of e+olution,7 and dou)tless passes with most readers for all right% Psychologists, studying our perceptions of mo+ement, ha+e unearthed e/periences in which mo+ement is felt in general )ut not ascri)ed correctly to the )ody that really mo+es% "hus in optical +ertigo, caused )y unconscious mo+ements of our eyes, )oth we and the e/ternal uni+erse appear to )e in a whirl% When clouds float )y the moon, it is as if )oth clouds and moon and we oursel+es shared in the motion% .n the e/traordinary case of amnesia of the Re+% Mr% #anna, pu)9Pg 2GF:lished )y Sidis and (oodhart in their important wor! on Multiple Personality, we read that when the patient first reco+ered consciousness and >noticed an attendant wal! across the room, he identified the mo+ement with that of his own% #e did not yet discriminate )etween his own mo+ements and those outside himself%?953: Such e/periences point to a primiti+e stage of perception in which discriminations afterwards needful ha+e not yet )een made% $ piece of e/perience of a determinate sort is there, )ut there at first as a 6pure7 fact% Motion originally simply is8 only later is it confined to this thing or to that% Something li!e this is true of e+ery e/perience, howe+er comple/, at the moment of its actual presence% et the reader arrest himself in the act of reading this article now% 9o! this is a pure e/perience, a phenomenon, or datum, a mere that or content of fact% 6#eading1 simply is% is there8 and whether there for some one7s consciousness, or there for physical nature, is a Cuestion not yet put% $t the moment, it is there for9Pg 2GH: neither8 later we shall pro)a)ly 'udge it to ha+e )een there for )oth% With the affectional e/periences which we are considering, the relati+ely 6pure7 condition lasts% .n practical life no urgent need has yet arisen for deciding whether to treat them as rigorously mental or as rigorously physical facts% So they remain eCui+ocal8 and, as the world goes, their eCui+ocality is one of their great con+eniences% "he shifting place of 6secondary Cualities7 in the history of philosophy9B4: is another e/cellent proof of the fact that 6inner7 and 6outer7 are not coefficients with which e/periences come to us a)originally stamped, )ut are rather results of a later classification performed )y us for particular needs% "he common0sense stage of thought is a perfectly definite practical halting0place, the place where we oursel+es can proceed to act unhesitatingly% @n this stage of thought things act on each other as well as on us )y means of their secondary9Pg 2G5: Cualities% Sound, as such, goes through the air and can )e intercepted% "he heat of the fire passes o+er, as such, into the water which it sets a0)oiling% .t is the +ery light of the arc0 lamp which displaces the dar!ness of the midnight street, etc% By engendering and translocating 'ust these Cualities, acti+ely efficacious as they seem to )e, we oursel+es succeed in altering nature so as to suit us8 and until more purely intellectual, as distinguished from practical, needs had arisen, no one e+er thought of calling these Cualities su)'ecti+e% When, howe+er, (alileo, Descartes, and others found it )est for philosophic purposes to class sound, heat, and light along with pain and pleasure as purely mental phenomena, they could do so with impunity%9B2:
E+en the primary Cualities are undergoing the same fate% #ardness and softness are effects on us of atomic interactions, and the atoms themsel+es are neither hard nor soft, nor solid nor liCuid% SiDe and shape are deemed9Pg 2GB: su)'ecti+e )y Kantians8 time itself is su)'ecti+e according to many philosophers89B<: and e+en the acti+ity and causal efficacy which lingered in physics long after secondary Cualities were )anished are now treated as illusory pro'ections outwards of phenomena of our own consciousness% "here are no acti+ities or effects in nature, for the most intellectual contemporary school of physical speculation% Aature e/hi)its only changes, which ha)itually coincide with one another so that their ha)its are descri)a)le in simple 6laws%79BE: "here is no original spirituality or materiality of )eing, intuiti+ely discerned, then8 )ut only a translocation of e/periences from one world to another8 a grouping of them with one set or another of associates for definitely practical or intellectual ends% . will say nothing here of the persistent am)iguity of relations% "hey are undenia)le parts of pure e/perience8 yet, while common sense and what . call radical empiricism stand9Pg 2G3: for their )eing o)'ecti+e, )oth rationalism and the usual empiricism claim that they are e/clusi+ely the 6wor! of the mind7Ithe finite mind or the a)solute mind, as the case may )e% "urn now to those affecti+e phenomena which more directly concern us% We soon learn to separate the ways in which things appeal to our interests and emotions from the ways in which they act upon one another% .t does not !or( to assume that physical o)'ects are going to act outwardly )y their sympathetic or antipathetic Cualities% "he )eauty of a thing or its +alue is no force that can )e plotted in a polygon of compositions, nor does its 6use7 or 6significance7 affect in the minutest degree its +icissitudes or destiny at the hands of physical nature% Chemical 6affinities7 are a purely +er)al metaphor8 and, as . 'ust said, e+en such things as forces, tensions, and acti+ities can at a pinch )e regarded as anthropomorphic pro'ections% So far, then, as the physical world means the collection of contents that determine in each other certain9Pg 2F4: regular changes, the whole collection of our appreciati+e attri)utes has to )e treated as falling outside of it% .f we mean )y physical nature whate+er lies )eyond the surface of our )odies, these attri)utes are inert throughout the whole e/tent of physical nature% Why then do men lea+e them as am)iguous as they do, and not class them decisi+ely as purely spiritual"he reason would seem to )e that, although they are inert as regards the rest of physical nature, they are not inert as regards that part of physical nature which our own s!in co+ers% .t is those +ery appreciati+e attri)utes of things, their dangerousness, )eauty, rarity, utility, etc%, that primarily appeal to our attention% .n our commerce with nature these attri)utes are what gi+e emphasis to o)'ects8 and for an o)'ect to )e emphatic, whate+er spiritual fact it may mean, means also that it produces immediate )odily effects upon us, alterations of tone and tension, of heart0)eat and )reathing, of +ascular and +isceral action% "he 6interesting7 aspects of things are thus9Pg 2F2: not wholly inert physically, though they )e acti+e only in these small corners of physical nature which our )odies occupy% "hat, howe+er, is enough to sa+e them from )eing classed as a)solutely non0o)'ecti+e% "he attempt, if any one should ma!e it, to sort e/periences into two a)solutely discrete groups, with nothing )ut inertness in one of them and nothing )ut acti+ities in the other, would thus recei+e one chec!% .t would recei+e another as soon as we e/amined the more distincti+ely mental group8 for though in that group it )e true that things do not act on one another )y their physical properties, do not dent each other or set fire to each other, they yet act on each other in the most energetic way )y those +ery characters which are so inert e/tracorporeally% .t is )y the interest and importance that e/periences ha+e for us, )y the emotions they e/cite, and the purposes they su)ser+e, )y their affecti+e +alues, in short, that their consecution in our se+eral conscious streams, as 6thoughts7 of ours, is mainly ruled% Desire introduces them8 interest9Pg 2F<: holds them8 fitness fi/es their order and connection% . need only refer for this aspect of our mental life, to Wundt7s article 6Qe)er psychische CausalitUt,7 which )egins Jolume L% of his Philosophische Studien%9BG: .t thus appears that the am)iguous or amphi)ious status which we find our epithets of +alue occupying is the most natural thing in the world% .t would, howe+er, )e an unnatural status if the popular opinion which . cited at the outset were correct% .f 6physical7 and 6mental7 meant two different !inds of intrinsic nature, immediately, intuiti+ely, and infalli)ly discerni)le, and each fi/ed fore+er in whate+er )it of e/perience it Cualified, one does not see how there could e+er ha+e arisen any
room for dou)t or am)iguity% But if, on the contrary, these words are words of sorting, am)iguity is natural% &or then, as soon as the relations of a thing are sufficiently +arious it can )e sorted +ariously%9Pg 2FE: "a!e a mass of carrion, for e/ample, and the 6disgustingness7 which for us is part of the e/perience% "he sun caresses it, and the Dephyr wooes it as if it were a )ed of roses% So the disgustingness fails to operate within the realm of suns and )reeDes,Iit does not function as a physical Cuality% But the carrion 6turns our stomach7 )y what seems a direct operationIit does function physically, therefore, in that limited part of physics% We can treat it as physical or as non0physical according as we ta!e it in the narrower or in the wider conte/t, and con+ersely, of course, we must treat it as non0mental or as mental% @ur )ody itself is the palmary instance of the am)iguous% Sometimes . treat my )ody purely as a part of outer nature% Sometimes, again, . thin! of it as 6mine,7 . sort it with the 6me,7 and then certain local changes and determinations in it pass for spiritual happenings% .ts )reathing is my 6thin!ing,7 its sensorial ad'ustments are my 6attention,7 its !inesthetic alterations are my 6efforts,7 its +isceral pertur)ations are my 6emotions%79Pg 2FG: "he o)stinate contro+ersies that ha+e arisen o+er such statements as these ;which sound so parado/ical, and which can yet )e made so seriously= pro+e how hard it is to decide )y )are introspection what it is in e/periences that shall ma!e them either spiritual or material% .t surely can )e nothing intrinsic in the indi+idual e/perience% .t is their way of )eha+ing towards each other, their system of relations, their function8 and all these things +ary with the conte/t in which we find it opportune to consider them% . thin! . may conclude, then ;and . hope that my readers are now ready to conclude with me=, that the pretended spirituality of our emotions and of our attri)utes of +alue, so far from pro+ing an o)'ection to the philosophy of pure e/perience, does, when rightly discussed and accounted for, ser+e as one of its )est corro)orations%
F(()*()!S+
95F: 9Reprinted from The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ii, Ao% 22, May <F, 234F%: 95H: .t will )e still )etter if he shall ha+e also read the 9essay: entitled 6$ World of Pure E/perience,7 which follows 9the first: and de+elops its ideas still farther% 955: 9Cf% The Principles of Psychology, +ol% ii, ch% //+8 and >"he Physical Basis of Emotion,? The Psychological #evie!, +ol% i, 2B3G, p% F2H%: 95B: 9See a)o+e, pp% EG, EF%: 953: Page 24<% 9B4: 9Cf% Janet and SVailles, 5istory of the Problems of Philosophy, trans% )y Monahan, part i, ch% iii%: 9B2: 9Cf% Descartes, Meditation ii8 Principles of Philosophy, part i, L J...%: 9B<: 9Cf% $% E% "aylor, $lements of Metaphysics, )!% iii, ch% i+%: 9BE: 9Cf% K% Pearson, -rammar of Science, ch% iii%: 9BG: .t is enough for my present purpose if the appreciati+e characters )ut seem to act thus% Belie+ers in an acti+ity an sich, other than our mental e/periences of acti+ity, will find some farther reflections on the su)'ect in my address on 6"he E/perience of $cti+ity%7 9"he ne/t essay% Cf% especially, p% 2H3% Ed%: 9Pg 2FF:
7)H! !2#!"-!*,! (F A,)-7-)B4A96

Brethren of the Psychological $ssociation, .n casting a)out me for a su)'ect for your President this year to tal! a)out it has seemed to me that our e/periences of acti+ity would form a good one8 not only )ecause the topic is so naturally interesting, and )ecause it has lately led to a good deal of rather inconclusi+e discussion, )ut )ecause . myself am growing more and more interested in a certain
systematic way of handling Cuestions, and want to get others interested also, and this Cuestion stri!es me as one in which, although . am painfully aware of my ina)ility to communicate new disco+eries or to reach definiti+e conclusions, . yet can show, in a rather definite manner, how the method wor!s%9Pg 2FH: "he way of handling things . spea! of, is, as you already will ha+e suspected, that !nown sometimes as the pragmatic method, sometimes as humanism, sometimes as Deweyism, and in &rance, )y some of the disciples of Bergson, as the Philosophie nou+elle% Professor Wood)ridge7s 3ournal of Philosophy9BH: seems unintentionally to ha+e )ecome a sort of meeting place for those who follow these tendencies in $merica% "here is only a dim identity among them8 and the most that can )e said at present is that some sort of gestation seems to )e in the atmosphere, and that almost any day a man with a genius for finding the right word for things may hit upon some unifying and conciliating formula that will ma!e so much +aguely similar aspiration crystalliDe into more definite form% . myself ha+e gi+en the name of 6radical empiricism7 to that +ersion of the tendency in Cuestion which . prefer8 and . propose, if you will now let me, to illustrate what . mean )y radical empiricism, )y applying it to acti+ity9Pg 2F5: as an e/ample, hoping at the same time incidentally to lea+e the general pro)lem of acti+ity in a slightlyI. fear +ery slightlyI more managea)le shape than )efore% Mr% Bradley calls the Cuestion of acti+ity a scandal to philosophy, and if one turns to the current literature of the su)'ectI his own writings includedIone easily gathers what he means% "he opponents cannot e+en understand one another% Mr% Bradley says to Mr% Ward, >. do not care what your oracle is, and your preposterous psychology may here )e gospel if you please8 %%% )ut if the re+elation does contain a meaning, . will commit myself to this, either the oracle is so confused that its signification is not disco+era)le, or, upon the other hand, if it can )e pinned down to any definite statement, then that statement will )e false%?9B5: Mr% Ward in turn says of Mr% Bradley, >. cannot e+en imagine the state of mind to which his description applies%%%% 9.t: reads li!e an unintentional tra+esty9Pg 2FB: of #er)artian psychology )y one who has tried to impro+e upon it without )eing at the pains to master it%?9BB: MMnster)erg e/cludes a +iew opposed to his own )y saying that with any one who holds it a "erstBndigung with him is >grundsBt.lich ausgeschlossen?8 and Royce, in a re+iew of Stout,9B3: hauls him o+er the coals at great length for defending 6efficacy7 in a way which ., for one, ne+er gathered from reading him, and which . ha+e heard Stout himself say was Cuite foreign to the intention of his te/t% .n these discussions distinct Cuestions are ha)itually 'um)led and different points of +iew are tal!ed of durcheinander% ;2= "here is a psychological Cuestion, >#a+e we perceptions of acti+ity- and if so, what are they li!e, and when and where do we ha+e them-? ;<= "here is a metaphysical Cuestion, >.s there a fact of acti+ity- and if so, what idea must we frame of it- What is it li!eand what9Pg 2F3: does it do, if it does anything-? $nd finally there is a logical Cuestion, ;E= >Whence do we (no! acti+ity- By our own feelings of it solely- or )y some other source of information-? "hroughout page after page of the literature one !nows not which of these Cuestions is )efore one8 and mere description of the surface0 show of e/perience is proferred as if it implicitly answered e+ery one of them% Ao one of the disputants, moreo+er, tries to show what pragmatic conseCuences his own +iew would carry, or what assigna)le particular differences in any one7s e/perience it would ma!e if his ad+ersary7s were triumphant% .t seems to me that if radical empiricism )e good for anything, it ought, with its pragmatic method and its principle of pure e/perience, to )e a)le to a+oid such tangles, or at least to simplify them somewhat% "he pragmatic method starts from the postulate that there is no difference of truth that doesn7t ma!e a difference of fact somewhere8 and it see!s to determine the meaning of all differences of9Pg 2H4: opinion )y ma!ing the discussion hinge as soon as possi)le upon some practical or particular issue% "he principle of pure e/perience is also a methodical postulate% Aothing shall )e admitted as fact, it says, e/cept what can )e e/perienced at some definite time )y some e/perient8 and for e+ery feature of fact e+er so e/perienced, a definite place must )e found somewhere in the final system of reality% .n other words, E+erything real must )e e/periencea)le somewhere, and e+ery !ind of thing e/perienced must somewhere )e real% $rmed with these rules of method let us see what face the pro)lems of acti+ity present to us% By the principle of pure e/perience, either the word 6acti+ity7 must ha+e no meaning at all, or else the original type and model of what it means must lie in some concrete !ind of e/perience that can )e definitely pointed out% Whate+er ulterior 'udgments we may e+entually come to ma!e regarding acti+ity, that sort of thing will )e what the 'udgments are a)out% "he
first step to ta!e, then, is to as! where in the stream of e/perience we seem to find what9Pg 2H2: we spea! of as acti+ity% What we are to thin! of the acti+ity thus found will )e a later Cuestion% Aow it is o)+ious that we are tempted to affirm acti+ity where+er we find anything going on% "a!en in the )roadest sense, any apprehension of something doing, is an e/perience of acti+ity% Were our world descri)a)le only )y the words 6nothing happening,7 6nothing changing,7 6nothing doing,7 we should unCuestiona)ly call it an 6inacti+e7 world% Bare acti+ity then, as we may call it, means the )are fact of e+ent or change% 6Change ta!ing place7 is a uniCue content of e/perience, one of those 6con'uncti+e7 o)'ects which radical empiricism see!s so earnestly to reha)ilitate and preser+e% "he sense of acti+ity is thus in the )roadest and +aguest way synonymous with the sense of 6life%7 We should feel our own su)'ecti+e life at least, e+en in noticing and proclaiming an otherwise inacti+e world% @ur own reaction on its monotony would )e the one thing e/perienced there in the form of something coming to pass%9Pg 2H<: "his seems to )e what certain writers ha+e in mind when they insist that for an e/perient to )e at all is to )e acti+e% .t seems to 'ustify, or at any rate to e/plain, Mr% Ward7s e/pression that we are only as we are acti+e,934: for we are only as e/perients8 and it rules out Mr% Bradley7s contention that >there is no original e/perience of anything li!e acti+ity%? 932: What we ought to say a)out acti+ities thus elementary, whose they are, what they effect, or whether indeed they effect anything at allIthese are later Cuestions, to )e answered only when the field of e/perience is enlarged% Bare acti+ity would thus )e predica)le, though there were no definite direction, no actor, and no aim% Mere restless DigDag mo+ement, or a wild *deenflucht, or #hapsodie der Wahrnehmungen, as Kant would say,93<: would constitute an acti+e as distinguished from an inacti+e world% 9Pg 2HE: But in this actual world of ours, as it is gi+en, a part at least of the acti+ity comes with definite direction8 it comes with desire and sense of goal8 it comes complicated with resistances which it o+ercomes or succum)s to, and with the efforts which the feeling of resistance so often pro+o!es8 and it is in comple/ e/periences li!e these that the notions of distinct agents, and of passi+ity as opposed to acti+ity arise% #ere also the notion of causal efficacy comes to )irth% Perhaps the most ela)orate wor! e+er done in descripti+e psychology has )een the analysis )y +arious recent writers of the more comple/ acti+ity0situations%93E: .n their descriptions, e/Cuisitely9Pg 2HG: su)tle some of them,93G: the acti+ity appears as the gestalt,ualitBt or the fundirte inhalt ;or as whate+er else you may please to call the con'uncti+e form= which the content falls into when we e/perience it in the ways which the descri)ers set forth% "hose factors in those relations are what we mean )y acti+ity0situations8 and to the possi)le enumeration and accumulation of their circumstances and ingredients there would seem to )e no natural )ound% E+ery hour of human life could contri)ute to the picture gallery8 and this is the only fault that one can find with such descripti+e industryIwhere is it going to stop- @ught we to listen fore+er to +er)al pictures of what we ha+e already in concrete form in our own )reasts-93F: "hey ne+er ta!e us off the superficial plane% We !new the facts alreadyIless spread out and separated, to )e sureI)ut we !new them still% We always felt our own acti+ity, for e/ample, as 6the e/pansion of an idea with which our Self is identified, against an o)stacle78 93H: and the following out of such a definition through a multitude of cases ela)orates the o)+ious so as to )e little more than an e/ercise in synonymic speech% 9Pg 2HF: $ll the descriptions ha+e to trace familiar outlines, and to use familiar terms% "he acti+ity is, for e/ample, attri)uted either to a physical or to a mental agent, and is either aimless or directed% .f directed it shows tendency% "he tendency may or may not )e resisted% .f not, we call the acti+ity immanent, as when a )ody mo+es in empty space )y its momentum, or our thoughts wander at their own sweet will% .f resistance is met, its agent complicates the situation% .f now, in spite of resistance, the original tendency continues, effort ma!es its appearance, and along with effort, strain or sCueeDe% Will, in the narrower sense of the word, then comes upon the scene, when9Pg 2HH:e+er, along with the tendency, the strain and sCueeDe are sustained% But the resistance may )e great enough to chec! the tendency, or e+en to re+erse its path% .n that case, we ;if 6we7 were the original agents or su)'ects of the tendency= are o+erpowered% "he phenomenon turns into one of tension simply, or of necessity succum)ed0to, according as the opposing power is only eCual, or is superior to oursel+es% Whosoe+er descri)es an e/perience in such terms as these descri)es an e/perience of acti+ity% .f the word ha+e any meaning, it must denote what there is found% There is complete acti+ity in its original and first intention% What it is 6!nown0 as7 is what there appears% "he e/periencer of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains% #e feels the tendency, the
o)stacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passi+e gi+ing up, 'ust as he feels the time, the space, the swiftness or intensity, the mo+ement, the weight and color, the pain and pleasure, the comple/ity, or whate+er remaining characters the situation may in+ol+e% #e goes through all that e+er can )e imagined where9Pg 2H5: acti+ity is supposed% .f we suppose acti+ities to go on outside of our e/perience, it is in forms li!e these that we must suppose them, or else gi+e them some other name8 for the word 6acti+ity7 has no imagina)le content whate+er sa+e these e/periences of process, o)struction, stri+ing, strain, or release, ultimate ,ualia as they are of the life gi+en us to )e !nown% Were this the end of the matter, one might thin! that whene+er we had successfully li+ed through an acti+ity0situation we should ha+e to )e permitted, without pro+o!ing contradiction, to say that we had )een really acti+e, that we had met real resistance and had really pre+ailed% otDe somewhere says that to )e an entity all that is necessary is to gelten as an entity, to operate, or )e felt, e/perienced, recogniDed, or in any way realiDed, as such%935: .n our acti+ity0e/periences the acti+ity assuredly fulfils otDe7s demand% .t ma!es itself gelten% .t is witnessed at its wor!% Ao matter what acti+ities there may really )e in this e/traordinary uni+erse of ours, it is impossi)le9Pg 2HB: for us to concei+e of any one of them )eing either li+ed through or authentically !nown otherwise than in this dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt purpose against felt o)stacles and o+ercoming or )eing o+ercome% What 6sustaining7 means here is clear to anyone who has li+ed through the e/perience, )ut to no one else8 'ust as 6loud,7 6red,7 6sweet,7 mean something only to )eings with ears, eyes, and tongues% "he percipi in these originals of e/perience is the esse8 the curtain is the picture% .f there is anything hiding in the )ac!ground, it ought not to )e called acti+ity, )ut should get itself another name% 9Pg 2H3: "his seems so o)+iously true that one might well e/perience astonishment at finding so many of the a)lest writers on the su)'ect flatly denying that the acti+ity we li+e through in these situations is real% Merely to feel acti+e is not to )e acti+e, in their sight% "he agents that appear in the e/perience are not real agents, the resistances do not really resist, the effects that appear are not really effects at all%93B: .t9Pg 254: is e+ident from this that mere descripti+e analysis of any one of our acti+ity0e/periences is not the whole story, that there is something still to tell about them that has led such a)le writers to concei+e of a Simon'pure acti+ity, of an acti+ity an sich, that does, and doesn7t9Pg 252: merely appear to us to do, and compared with whose real doing all this phenomenal acti+ity is )ut a specious sham% "he metaphysical Cuestion opens here8 and . thin! that the state of mind of one possessed )y it is often something li!e this, >.t is all +ery well,? we may imagine him saying, >to tal! a)out certain e/perience0series ta!ing on the form of feelings of acti+ity, 'ust as they might ta!e on musical or geometric forms% Suppose that they do so8 suppose we feel a will to stand a strain% Does our feeling do more than record the fact that the strain is sustained- "he real acti+ity, meanwhile, is the doing of the fact8 and what is the doing made of )efore the record is made% What in the will enables it to act thus- $nd these trains of e/perience themsel+es, in which acti+ities appear, what ma!es them go at all- Does the acti+ity in one )it of e/perience )ring the ne/t )it into )eing- $s an9Pg 25<: empiricist you cannot say so, for you ha+e 'ust declared acti+ity to )e only a !ind of synthetic o)'ect, or con'uncti+e relation e/perienced )etween )its of e/perience already made% But what made them at all- What propels e/perience )berhaupt into )eing- There is the acti+ity that operates8 the acti+ity felt is only its superficial sign%? "o the metaphysical Cuestion, popped upon us in this way, . must pay serious attention ere . end my remar!s8 )ut, )efore doing so, let me show that without lea+ing the immediate reticulations of e/perience, or as!ing what ma!es acti+ity itself act, we still find the distinction )etween less real and more real acti+ities forced upon us, and are dri+en to much soul0 searching on the purely phenomenal plane% We must not forget, namely, in tal!ing of the ultimate character of our acti+ity0e/periences, that each of them is )ut a portion of a wider world, one lin! in the +ast chain of processes of e/perience out of which history is made% Each partial process, to him who li+es through it, defines itself )y its origin and its9Pg 25E: goal8 )ut to an o)ser+er with a wider mind0 span who should li+e outside of it, that goal would appear )ut as a pro+isional halting0place, and the su)'ecti+ely felt acti+ity would )e seen to continue into o)'ecti+e acti+ities that led far )eyond% We thus acCuire a ha)it, in discussing acti+ity0e/periences, of defining them )y their relation to something more% .f an e/perience )e one of narrow span, it will )e mista!en as to what acti+ity it is and whose% Nou thin! that you are acting while you are only o)eying someone7s push% Nou thin! you are doing this, )ut you are doing something of which you do not dream% &or instance, you thin! you are )ut drin!ing this glass8 )ut you are really creating the li+er0cirrhosis that will end your days% Nou thin! you are 'ust dri+ing this )argain, )ut, as Ste+enson says somewhere, you are laying down a lin! in the policy of man!ind%
(enerally spea!ing, the onloo!er, with his wider field of +ision, regards the ultimate outcome of an acti+ity as what it is more really doing8 and the most previous agent9Pg 25G: ascertaina)le, )eing the first source of action, he regards as the most real agent in the field% "he others )ut transmit that agent7s impulse8 on him we put responsi)ility8 we name him when one as!s us 6Who7s to )lame-7 But the most pre+ious agents ascertaina)le, instead of )eing of longer span, are often of much shorter span than the acti+ity in +iew% Brain0cells are our )est e/ample% My )rain0cells are )elie+ed to e/cite each other from ne/t to ne/t ;)y contiguous transmission of !ata)olic alteration, let us say= and to ha+e )een doing so long )efore this present stretch of lecturing0 acti+ity on my part )egan% .f any one cell0group stops its acti+ity, the lecturing will cease or show disorder of form% 7essante causa% cessat et effectusIdoes not this loo! as if the short0span )rain acti+ities were the more real acti+ities, and the lecturing acti+ities on my part only their effects- Moreo+er, as #ume so clearly pointed out,933: in my mental acti+ity0 situation the words physically to )e9Pg 25F: uttered are represented as the acti+ity7s immediate goal% "hese words, howe+er, cannot )e uttered without intermediate physical processes in the )ul) and +agi ner+es, which processes ne+ertheless fail to figure in the mental acti+ity0series at all% "hat series, therefore, since it lea+es out +itally real steps of action, cannot represent the real acti+ities% .t is something purely su)'ecti+e8 the facts of acti+ity are elsewhere% "hey are something far more interstitial, so to spea!, than what my feelings record% "he real facts of acti+ity that ha+e in point of fact )een systematically pleaded for )y philosophers ha+e, so far as my information goes, )een of three principal types% "he first type ta!es a consciousness of wider time0span than ours to )e the +ehicle of the more real acti+ity% .ts will is the agent, and its purpose is the action done% "he second type assumes that 6ideas7 struggling with one another are the agents, and that the pre+alence of one set of them is the action%9Pg 25H: "he third type )elie+es that ner+e0cells are the agents, and that resultant motor discharges are the acts achie+ed% Aow if we must de0realiDe our immediately felt acti+ity0situations for the )enefit of either of these types of su)stitute, we ought to !now what the su)stitution practically in+ol+es% What practical difference ought it to ma(e if, instead of saying naO+ely that 6.7 am acti+e now in deli+ering this address, . say that a !ider thin(er is active, or that certain ideas are active, or that certain nerve'cells are active, in producing the result"his would )e the pragmatic meaning of the three hypotheses% et us ta!e them in succession in see!ing a reply% .f we assume a wider thin!er, it is e+ident that his purposes en+elope mine% . am really lecturing for him8 and although . cannot surely !now to what end, yet if . ta!e him religiously, . can trust it to )e a good end, and willingly conni+e% . can )e happy in thin!ing that my acti+ity transmits his impulse, and that his ends prolong my own% So long as . ta!e him9Pg 255: religiously, in short, he does not de0realiDe my acti+ities% #e tends rather to corro)orate the reality of them, so long as . )elie+e )oth them and him to )e good% When now we turn to ideas, the case is different, inasmuch as ideas are supposed )y the association psychology to influence each other only from ne/t to ne/t% "he 6span7 of an idea or pair of ideas, is assumed to )e much smaller instead of )eing larger than that of my total conscious field% "he same results may get wor!ed out in )oth cases, for this address is )eing gi+en anyhow% But the ideas supposed to 6really7 wor! it out had no pre+ision of the whole of it8 and if . was lecturing for an a)solute thin!er in the former case, so, )y similar reasoning, are my ideas now lecturing for me, that is, accomplishing unwittingly a result which . appro+e and adopt% But, when this passing lecture is o+er, there is nothing in the )are notion that ideas ha+e )een its agents that would seem to guarantee that my present purposes in lecturing will )e prolonged% * may ha+e ulterior de+elopments in +iew8 )ut there9Pg 25B: is no certainty that my ideas as such will wish to, or )e a)le to, wor! them out% "he li!e is true if ner+e0cells )e the agents% "he acti+ity of a ner+e0cell must )e concei+ed of as a tendency of e/ceedingly short reach, an 6impulse7 )arely spanning the way to the ne/t cellIfor surely that amount of actual 6process7 must )e 6e/perienced7 )y the cells if what happens )etween them is to deser+e the name of acti+ity at all% But here again the gross resultant, as * percei+e it, is indifferent to the agents, and neither wished or willed or foreseen% "heir )eing agents now congruous with my will gi+es me no guarantee that li!e results will recur again from their acti+ity% .n point of fact, all sorts of other results do occur% My mista!es, impotencies, per+ersions, mental o)structions, and frustrations generally, are also
results of the acti+ity of cells% $lthough these are letting me lecture now, on other occasions they ma!e me do things that . would willingly not do% "he Cuestion Whose is the real activity: is thus tantamount to the Cuestion What !ill be the actual results:9Pg 253: .ts interest is dramatic8 how will things wor! out- .f the agents are of one sort, one way8 if of another sort, they may wor! out +ery differently% "he pragmatic meaning of the +arious alternati+es, in short, is great% .t ma!es no merely +er)al difference which opinion we ta!e up% Nou see it is the old dispute come )ac!* Materialism and teleology8 elementary short0span actions summing themsel+es 6)lindly,7 or far foreseen ideals coming with effort into act% AaO+ely we )elie+e, and humanly and dramatically we li!e to )elie+e, that acti+ities )oth of wider and of narrower span are at wor! in life together, that )oth are real, and that the long0span tendencies yo!e the others in their ser+ice, encouraging them in the right direction, and damping them when they tend in other ways% But how to represent clearly the modus operandi of such steering of small tendencies )y large ones is a pro)lem which metaphysical thin!ers will ha+e to ruminate upon for many years to come% E+en if such control should e+entually grow clearly pictura)le,9Pg 2B4: the Cuestion how far it is successfully e/erted in this actual world can )e answered only )y in+estigating the details of fact% Ao philosophic !nowledge of the general nature and constitution of tendencies, or of the relation of larger to smaller ones, can help us to predict which of all the +arious competing tendencies that interest us in this uni+erse are li!eliest to pre+ail% We !now as an empirical fact that far0seeing tendencies often carry out their purpose, )ut we !now also that they are often defeated )y the failure of some contempti)ly small process on which success depends% $ little throm)us in a statesman7s meningeal artery will throw an empire out of gear% . can therefore not e+en hint at any solution of the pragmatic issue% . ha+e only wished to show you that that issue is what gi+es the real interest to all inCuiries into what !inds of acti+ity may )e real% $re the forces that really act in the world more foreseeing or more )lind- $s )etween 6our7 acti+ities as 6we7 e/perience them, and those of our ideas, or of our )rain0cells, the issue is well0defined%9Pg 2B2: . said a while )ac!9244: that . should return to the 6metaphysical7 Cuestion )efore ending8 so, with a few words a)out that, . will now close my remar!s% .n whate+er form we hear this Cuestion propounded, . thin! that it always arises from two things, a )elief that causality must )e e/erted in acti+ity, and a wonder as to how causality is made% .f we ta!e an acti+ity0situation at its face0+alue, it seems as if we caught in flagrante delicto the +ery power that ma!es facts come and )e% . now am eagerly stri+ing, for e/ample, to get this truth which . seem half to percei+e, into words which shall ma!e it show more clearly% .f the words come, it will seem as if the stri+ing itself had drawn or pulled them into actuality out from the state of merely possi)le )eing in which they were% #ow is this feat performed- #ow does the pulling pull- #ow do . get my hold on words not yet e/istent, and when they come )y what means ha+e . made them come- Really it is the pro)lem of creation8 for in the end the Cuestion is, #ow do9Pg 2B<: . ma!e them be- Real acti+ities are those that really ma!e things )e, without which the things are not, and with which they are there% $cti+ity, so far as we merely feel it, on the other hand, is only an impression of ours, it may )e maintained8 and an impression is, for all this way of thin!ing, only a shadow of another fact% $rri+ed at this point, . can do little more than indicate the principles on which, as it seems to me, a radically empirical philosophy is o)liged to rely in handling such a dispute% .f there be real creati+e acti+ities in )eing, radical empiricism must say, somewhere they must )e immediately li+ed% Somewhere the that of efficacious causing and the !hat of it must )e e/perienced in one, 'ust as the what and the that of 6cold7 are e/perienced in one whene+er a man has the sensation of cold here and now% .t )oots not to say that our sensations are falli)le% "hey are indeed8 )ut to see the thermometer contradict us when we say 6it is cold7 does not a)olish cold as a specific nature from the uni+erse% Cold is in the arctic9Pg 2BE: circle if not here% E+en so, to feel that our train is mo+ing when the train )eside our window mo+es, to see the moon through a telescope come twice as near, or to see two pictures as one solid when we loo! through a stereoscope at them, lea+es motion, nearness, and solidity still in )eingIif not here, yet each in its proper seat elsewhere% $nd where+er the seat of real causality is, as ultimately !nown 6for true7 ;in ner+e0processes, if you will, that cause our feelings of acti+ity as well as the mo+ements which these seem to prompt=, a philosophy of pure e/perience can consider the real causation as no other nature of thing than that which e+en in our most erroneous e/periences appears to )e at wor!% E/actly what appears there is what we mean )y wor!ing, though we may later come to learn that wor!ing was not e/actly there% Sustaining, perse+ering, stri+ing, paying with effort as we go, hanging
on, and finally achie+ing our intentionIthis is action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, )y a pure e/perience0 philosophy, the wherea)outs of it9Pg 2BG: anywhere can )e discussed% #ere is creation in its first intention, here is causality at wor!%9242: "o treat this offhand as the )are illusory surface of a world whose real causality is an unimagina)le ontological principle hidden in the cu)ic deeps, is, for the more empirical way of thin!ing, only animism in another shape% Nou e/plain your gi+en fact )y your 6principle,7 )ut the principle itself, when you loo! clearly at it, turns out to )e nothing )ut a pre+ious little spiritual copy of the fact% $way from that one and only !ind of fact your mind, considering causality, can ne+er get%924<: 9Pg 2BF: . conclude, then, that real effectual causation as an ultimate nature, as a 6category,7 if you li!e, of reality, is &ust !hat !e feel it to be, 'ust that !ind of con'unction which our own acti+ity0series re+eal% We ha+e the whole )utt and )eing of it in our hands8 and the healthy thing9Pg 2BH: for philosophy is to lea+e off gru))ing underground for what effects effectuation, or what ma!es action act, and to try to sol+e the concrete Cuestions of where effectuation in this world is located, of which things are the true causal agents there, and of what the more remote effects consist% &rom this point of +iew the greater su)limity traditionally attri)uted to the metaphysical inCuiry, the gru))ing inCuiry, entirely disappears% .f we could !now what causation really and transcendentally is in itself, the only use of the !nowledge would )e to help us to recogniDe an actual cause when we had one, and so to trac! the future course of operations more intelligently out% "he mere a)stract inCuiry into causation7s hidden nature is not more su)lime than any other inCuiry eCually a)stract% Causation inha)its no more su)lime le+el than anything else% .t li+es, apparently, in the dirt of the world as well as in the a)solute, or in man7s unconCuera)le mind% "he worth and interest of the world consists not in its elements, )e these elements9Pg 2B5: things, or )e they the con'unctions of things8 it e/ists rather in the dramatic outcome in the whole process, and in the meaning of the succession stages which the elements wor! out% My colleague and master, Josiah Royce, in a page of his re+iew of Stout7s Analytic Psychology924E: has some fine words on this point with which . cordially agree% . cannot agree with his separating the notion of efficacy from that of acti+ity altogether ;this . understand to )e one contention of his= for acti+ities are efficacious whene+er they are real acti+ities at all% But the inner nature )oth of efficacy and of acti+ity are superficial pro)lems, . understand Royce to say8 and the only point for us in sol+ing them would )e their possi)le use in helping us to sol+e the far deeper pro)lem of the course and meaning of the world of life% ife, says our colleague, is full of significance, of meaning, of success and of defeat, of hoping and of stri+ing, of longing, of desire, and of inner +alue% .t is a total presence that em)odies worth% "o li+e our own li+es )etter in this presence is the true reason why we wish to !now the elements of things8 so e+en we psychologists must end on this pragmatic note%9Pg 2BB: "he urgent pro)lems of acti+ity are thus more concrete% "hey are all pro)lems of the true relation of longer0span to shorter0 span acti+ities% When, for e/ample, a num)er of 6ideas7 ;to use the name traditional in psychology= grow confluent in a larger field of consciousness, do the smaller acti+ities still co0e/ist with the wider acti+ities then e/perienced )y the conscious su)'ect- $nd, if so, do the wide acti+ities accompany the narrow ones inertly, or do they e/ert control- @r do they perhaps utterly supplant and replace them and short0circuit their effects- $gain, when a mental acti+ity0process and a )rain0cell series of acti+ities )oth terminate in the same muscular mo+ement, does the mental process steer the neural processes or not- @r, on the other hand, does it independently short0circuit their effects- Such are the Cuestions that we must )egin with% But so far am . from suggesting any definiti+e answer to such9Pg 2B3: Cuestions, that . hardly yet can put them clearly% "hey lead, howe+er, into that region of panpsychic and ontologic speculation of which Professors Bergson and Strong ha+e lately enlarged the literature in so a)le and interesting a way%924G: "he results of these authors seem in many respects dissimilar, and . understand than as yet )ut imperfectly8 )ut . cannot help suspecting that the direction of their wor! is +ery promising, and that they ha+e the hunter7s instinct for the fruitful trails%
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9BF: President7s $ddress )efore the $merican Psychological $ssociation, Philadelphia Meeting, Decem)er, 234G% 9Reprinted from The Psychological #evie!, +ol% /ii, Ao% 2, Jan%, 234F% $lso reprinted, with some omissions, as $ppendi/ B, A Pluralistic Universe, pp% E540E3G% Pp% 2HH02H5 ha+e also )een reprinted in Some Problems of Philosophy, p% <2<% "he present essay is referred to in ibid., p% <23, note% "he author7s corrections ha+e )een adopted for the present te/t% Ed%:
9BH: 9The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods.: 9B5: Appearance and #eality, second edition, pp% 22H0225%I@)+iously written at Ward, though Ward7s name is not mentioned% 9BB: 9Mind, +ol% /ii, 2BB5, pp% F5E0F5G%: 9B3: Mind, A% S%, +ol% +i, 92B35:, p% E53% 934: 9aturalism and Agnosticism, +ol% ii, p% <GF% @ne thin!s naturally of the peripatetic actus primus and actus secundus here% 9>$ctus autem est duplex, primus et secundus% $ctus Cuidem primus est forma, et integritas sei% $ctus autem secundus est operatio%? "homas $Cuinas, Summa Theologica, edition of eo L..., ;2B3G=, +ol% i, p% E32% Cf% also Blanc, 4ictionnaire de Philosophie, under 6acte%7 Ed%: 932: 9Appearance and #eality, second edition, p% 22H%: 93<: 96riti( der reinen "ernunft% Wer(e, ;234F=, +ol% i+, p% 224 ;trans% )y Ma/ MMller, second edition, p% 2<B=%: 93E: . refer to such descripti+e wor! as add7s ; Psychology% 4escriptive and $xplanatory, part i, chap% +, part ii, chap% /i, part iii, chaps% //+ and //+i=8 as Sully7s ; The 5uman Mind, part +=8 as Stout7s ;Analytic Psychology, )oo! i, chap% +i, and )oo! ii, chaps% i, ii, and iii=8 as Bradley7s ;in his long series of analytic articles on Psychology in Mind=8 as "itchener7s ; utline of Psychology, part i, chap% +i=8 as Shand7s ; Mind, A% S%, iii, GG38 i+, GF48 +i, <B3=8 as Ward7s ; Mind, /ii, H58 FHG=8 as o+eday7s ;Mind, A% S%, /, GFF=8 as ipps7s ;Jom &Mhlen, Wollen und Den!en, 234<, chaps% ii, i+, +i=8 and as Bergson7s ;#evue Philosophi,ue, ..., 2=Ito mention only a few writings which . immediately recall% 93G: "heir e/istence forms a curious commentary on Prof% MMnster)erg7s dogma that will0attitudes are not descri)a)le% #e himself has contri)uted in a superior way to their description, )oth in his Willenshandlung, and in his -rund.)ge 9der Psychologie:, part ii, chap% i/, R 5% 93F: . ought myself to cry peccavi, ha+ing )een a +oluminous sinner in my own chapter on the will% 9 Principles of Psychology, +ol% ii, chap% //+i%: 93H: 9Cf% &% #% Bradley, Appearance and #eality, second edition, pp% 3H035%: 935: 9Cf% a)o+e, p% F3, note%: 93B: "erborum gratiE, >"he feeling of acti+ity is not a)le, ,uE feeling, to tell us anything a)out acti+ity? ; o+eday, Mind, A% S%, +ol% /, 92342:, p% GHE=8 >$ sensation or feeling or sense of acti+ity %%% is not, loo!ed at in another way, an e/perience of acti+ity at all% .t is a mere sensation shut up within which you could )y no reflection get the idea of acti+ity%%%% Whether this e/perience is or is not later on a character essential to our perception and our idea of acti+ity, it, as it comes first, is not in itself an e/perience of acti+ity at all% .t, as it comes first, is only so for e/traneous reasons and only so for an outside o)ser+er? ;Bradley, Appearance and #eality, second edition, p% H4F=8 >.n dem "Utig!eitsgefMhle liegt an sich nicht der geringste Beweis fMr das Jorhandensein einer psychischen "Utig!eit? ;MMnster)erg, -rund.)ge der Psychologie=% . could multiply similar Cuotations and would ha+e introduced some of them into my te/t to ma!e it more concrete, sa+e that the mingling of different points of +iew in most of these author7s discussions ;not in MMnster)erg7s= ma!e it impossi)le to disentangle e/actly what they mean% . am sure in any case, to )e accused of misrepresenting them totally, e+en in this note, )y omission of the conte/t, so the less . name names and the more . stic! to a)stract characteriDation of a merely possi)le style of opinion, the safer it will )e% $nd apropos of misunderstandings, . may add to this note a complaint on my own account% Professor Stout, in the e/cellent chapter on 6Mental $cti+ity,7 in +ol% i of his Analytic Psychology, ta!es me to tas! for identifying spiritual acti+ity with certain muscular feelings and gi+es Cuotations to )ear him out% "hey are from certain paragraphs on 6the Self,7 in which my attempt was to show what the central nucleus of the acti+ities that we call 6ours7 is% 9Principles of Psychology, +ol% i, pp% <330E4F%: . found it in certain intracephalic mo+ements which we ha)itually oppose, as 6su)'ecti+e,7 to the acti+ities of the transcorporeal world% . sought to show that there is no direct e+idence that we feel the acti+ity of an inner spiritual agent as such ;. should now say the acti+ity of 6consciousness7 as such, see 9the first essay:, 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7=% "here are, in fact, three distinguisha)le 6acti+ities7 in the field of discussion, the elementary acti+ity in+ol+ed in the mere that of e/perience, in the fact that something is going on, and the farther specification of this something into two !hats, an acti+ity felt as 6ours,7 and an acti+ity ascri)ed to o)'ects% Stout, as . apprehend him, identifies 6our7 acti+ity with that of the total e/perience0process, and when . circumscri)e it as a part
thereof, accuses me of treating it as a sort of e/ternal appendage to itself ;Stout, op. cit., +ol% i, pp% 2H<02HE=, as if . 6separated the acti+ity from the process which is acti+e%7 But all the processes in Cuestion are acti+e, and their acti+ity is insepara)le from their )eing% My )oo! raised only the Cuestion of !hich acti+ity deser+ed the name of 6ours%7 So far as we are 6persons,7 and contrasted and opposed to an 6en+ironment,7 mo+ements in our )ody figure as our acti+ities8 and . am una)le to find any other acti+ities that are ours in this strictly personal sense% "here is a wider sense in which the whole 6choir of hea+en and furniture of the earth,7 and their acti+ities, are ours, for they are our 6o)'ects%7 But 6we7 are here only another name for the total process of e/perience, another name for all that is, in fact8 and . was dealing with the personal and indi+idualiDed self e/clusi+ely in the passages with which Professor Stout finds fault% "he indi+idualiDed self, which . )elie+e to )e the only thing properly called self, is a part of the content of the world e/perienced% "he world e/perienced ;otherwise called the 6field of consciousness7= comes at all times with our )ody as its centre, centre of +ision, centre of action, centre of interest% Where the )ody is is 6here78 when the )ody acts is 6now78 what the )ody touches is 6this78 all other things are 6there7 and 6then7 and 6that%7 "hese words of emphasiDed position imply a systematiDation of things with reference to a focus of action and interest which lies in the )ody8 and the systematiDation is now so instincti+e ;was it e+er not so-= that no de+eloped or acti+e e/perience e/ists for us at all e/cept in that ordered form% So far as 6thoughts7 and 6feelings7 can )e acti+e, their acti+ity terminates in the acti+ity of the )ody, and only through first arousing its acti+ities can they )egin to change those of the rest of the world% 9Cf% also A Pluralistic Universe, p% EGG, note B% Ed%: "he )ody is the storm centre, the origin of co0ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that e/perience0train% E+erything circles round it, and is felt from its point of +iew% "he word 6.,7 then, is primarily a noun of position, 'ust li!e 6this7 and 6here%7 $cti+ities attached to 6this7 position ha+e prerogati+e emphasis, and, if acti+ities ha+e feelings, must )e felt in a peculiar way% "he word 6my7 designates the !ind of emphasis% . see no inconsistency whate+er in defending, on the one hand, 6my7 acti+ities as uniCue and opposed to those of outer nature, and, on the other hand, in affirming, after introspection, that they consist in mo+ements in the head% "he 6my7 of them is the emphasis, the feeling of perspecti+e0 interest in which they are dyed% 933: 9$n,uiry 7oncerning 5uman Understanding, sect% +ii, part i, Sel)y0Bigge7s edition, pp% HF ff%: 9244: Page 25<% 9242: et me not )e told that this contradicts 9the first essay:, 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7 ;see especially page E<=, in which it was said that while 6thoughts7 and 6things7 ha+e the same natures, the natures wor! 6energetically7 on each other in the things ;fire )urns, water wets, etc%= )ut not in the thoughts% Mental acti+ity0trains are composed of thoughts, yet their mem)ers do wor! on each other, they chec!, sustain, and introduce% "hey do so when the acti+ity is merely associational as well as when effort is there% But, and this is my reply, they do so )y other parts of their nature than those that energiDe physically% @ne thought in e+ery de+eloped acti+ity0series is a desire or thought of purpose, and all the other thoughts acCuire a feeling tone from their relation of harmony or oppugnancy to this% "he interplay of these secondary tones ;among which 6interest,7 6difficulty,7 and 6effort7 figure= runs the drama in the mental series% .n what we term the physical drama these Cualities play a)solutely no part% "he su)'ect needs careful wor!ing out8 )ut . can see no inconsistency% 924<: . ha+e found myself more than once accused in print of )eing the assertor of a metaphysical principle of acti+ity% Since literary misunderstandings retard the settlement of pro)lems, . should li!e to say that such an interpretation of the pages . ha+e pu)lished on Effort and on Will is a)solutely foreign to what . meant to e/press% 9 Principles of Psychology, +ol% ii, ch% //+i%: . owe all my doctrines on this su)'ect to Renou+ier8 and Renou+ier, as . understand him, is ;or at any rate then was= an out and out phenomenist, a denier of 6forces7 in the most strenuous sense% 9Cf% Ch% Renou+ier, $s,uisse d1une 7lassification SystFmati,ue des 4octrines Philosophi,ues ;2BBF=, +ol% ii, pp% E340E3<8 $ssais de 7riti,ue -FnFrale ;2BF3=, +ol% ii, RR i/, /iii% &or an ac!nowledgment of the author7s general inde)tedness to Renou+ier, cf% Some Problems of Philosophy, p% 2HF, note% Ed%: Single clauses in my writing, or sentences read out of their connection, may possi)ly ha+e )een compati)le with a transphenomenal principle of energy8 )ut . defy anyone to show a single sentence which, ta!en with its conte/t, should )e naturally held to ad+ocate that +iew% "he misinterpretation pro)a)ly arose at first from my defending ;after Renou+ier= the indeterminism of our efforts% 6&ree will7 was supposed )y my critics to in+ol+e a supernatural agent% $s a matter of plain history the only 6free will7 . ha+e e+er thought of defending is the character of no+elty in fresh acti+ity0situations% .f an acti+ity0process is the form of a whole 6field of consciousness,7 and if each field of consciousness is not only in its totality uniCue ;as is now commonly admitted= )ut has its elements uniCue ;since in that situation they are all dyed in the total= then no+elty is perpetually entering the world and what happens there is not pure
repetition, as the dogma of the literal uniformity of nature reCuires% $cti+ity0situations come, in short, each with an original touch% $ 6principle7 of free will if there were one, would dou)tless manifest itself in such phenomena, )ut . ne+er saw, nor do . now see, what the principle could do e/cept rehearse the phenomenon )eforehand, or why it e+er should )e in+o!ed% 924E: Mind, A% S%, +ol% +i, 2B358 cf% pp% E3<0E3E% 924G: 9Cf% A Pluralistic Universe, ect% +i ;on Bergson=8 #% Bergson, 7reative $volution, trans% )y $% Mitchell8 C% $% Strong, Why the Mind has a Body, ch% /ii% Ed%: 9Pg 234:
7-)H! !SS!*,! (F H0:A*-S:4CD96

#umanism is a ferment that has 6come to stay%7924H: .t is not a single hypothesis or theorem, and it dwells on no new facts% .t is rather a slow shifting in the philosophic perspecti+e, ma!ing things appear as from a new centre of interest or point of sight% Some writers are strongly conscious of the shifting, others half unconscious, e+en though their own +ision may ha+e undergone much change% "he result is no small confusion in de)ate, the half0conscious humanists often ta!ing part against the radical ones, as if they wished to count upon the other side%9245: 9Pg 232: .f humanism really )e the name for such a shifting of perspecti+e, it is o)+ious that the whole scene of the philosophic stage will change in some degree if humanism pre+ails% "he emphasis of things, their foreground and )ac!ground distri)ution, their siDes and +alues, will not !eep 'ust the same%924B: .f such per+asi+e conseCuences )e in+ol+ed in humanism, it is clear that no pains which philosophers may ta!e, first in defining it, and then in furthering, chec!ing, or steering its progress, will )e thrown away% .t suffers )adly at present from incomplete definition% .ts most systematic ad+ocates, Schiller and Dewey, ha+e pu)lished fragment9Pg 23<:ary programs only8 and its )earing on many +ital philosophic pro)lems has not )een traced e/cept )y ad+ersaries who, scenting heresies in ad+ance, ha+e showered )lows on doctrinesIsu)'ecti+ism and scepticism, for e/ampleIthat no good humanist finds it necessary to entertain% By their still greater reticences, the anti0humanists ha+e, in turn, perple/ed the humanists% Much of the contro+ersy has in+ol+ed the word 6truth%7 .t is always good in de)ate to !now your ad+ersary7s point of +iew authentically% But the critics of humanism ne+er define e/actly what the word 6truth7 signifies when they use it themsel+es% "he humanists ha+e to guess at their +iew8 and the result has dou)tless )een much )eating of the air% $dd to all this, great indi+idual differences in )oth camps, and it )ecomes clear that nothing is so urgently needed, at the stage which things ha+e reached at present, as a sharper definition )y each side of its central point of +iew% Whoe+er will contri)ute any touch of sharpness will help us to ma!e sure of what7s9Pg 23E: what and who is who% $nyone can contri)ute such a definition, and, without it, no one !nows e/actly where he stands% .f . offer my own pro+isional definition of humanism9243: now and here, others may impro+e it, some ad+ersary may )e led to define his own creed more sharply )y the contrast, and a certain Cuic!ening of the crystalliDation of general opinion may result% "he essential ser+ice of humanism, as . concei+e the situation, is to ha+e seen that though one part of our experience may lean upon another part to ma(e it !hat it is in any one of several aspects in !hich it may be considered% experience as a !hole is self'containing and leans on nothing% Since this formula also e/presses the main contention of transcendental idealism, it needs a)undant e/plication to ma!e it9Pg 23G: unam)iguous% .t seems, at first sight, to confine itself to denying theism and pantheism% But, in fact, it need not deny either8 e+erything would depend on the e/egesis8 and if the formula e+er )ecame canonical, it would certainly de+elop )oth right0wing and left0wing interpreters% . myself read humanism theistically and pluralistically% .f there )e a (od, he is no a)solute all0e/periencer, )ut simply the e/periencer of widest actual conscious span% Read thus, humanism is
for me a religion suscepti)le of reasoned defence, though . am well aware how many minds there are to whom it can appeal religiously only when it has )een monistically translated% Ethically the pluralistic form of it ta!es for me a stronger hold on reality than any other philosophy . !now ofIit )eing essentially a social philosophy, a philosophy of 6co,7 in which con'unctions do the wor!% But my primary reason for ad+ocating it is its matchless intellectual economy% .t gets rid, not only of the standing 6pro)lems7 that monism engenders ;6pro)lem of e+il,7 6pro)lem of freedom,7 and the9Pg 23F: li!e=, )ut of other metaphysical mysteries and parado/es as well% .t gets rid, for e/ample, of the whole agnostic contro+ersy, )y refusing to entertain the hypothesis of trans0empirical reality at all% .t gets rid of any need for an a)solute of the Bradleyan type ;a+owedly sterile for intellectual purposes= )y insisting that the con'uncti+e relations found within e/perience are faultlessly real% .t gets rid of the need of an a)solute of the Roycean type ;similarly sterile= )y its pragmatic treatment of the pro)lem of !nowledge 9a treatment of which . ha+e already gi+en a +ersion in two +ery inadeCuate articles:%9224: $s the +iews of !nowledge, reality and truth imputed to humanism ha+e )een those so far most fiercely attac!ed, it is in regard to these ideas that a sharpening of focus seems most urgently reCuired% . proceed therefore to )ring the +iews which * impute to humanism in these respects into focus as )riefly as . can%9Pg 23H: -.f the central humanistic thesis, printed a)o+e in italics, )e accepted, it will follow that, if there )e any such thing at all as !nowing, the !nower and the o)'ect !nown must )oth )e portions of e/perience% @ne part of e/perience must, therefore, either ;2= Know another part of e/perienceIin other words, parts must, as Professor Wood)ridge says,9222: represent one another instead of representing realities outside of 6consciousness7Ithis case is that of conceptual !nowledge8 or else ;<= "hey must simply e/ist as so many ultimate thats or facts of )eing, in the first instance8 and then, as a secondary complication, and without dou)ling up its entitati+e single0ness, any one and the same that must figure alternately as a thing !nown and as a !nowledge of the thing, )y reason of two di+ergent !inds of conte/t into which, in the general course of e/perience, it gets wo+en%922<: 9Pg 235: "his second case is that of sense0perception% "here is a stage of thought that goes )eyond common sense, and of it . shall say more presently8 )ut the common0sense stage is a perfectly definite halting0place of thought, primarily for purposes of action8 and, so long as we remain on the common0sense stage of thought, o)'ect and su)'ect fuse in the fact of 6presentation7 or sense0perceptionIthe pen and hand which . now see writing, for e/ample, are the physical realities which those words designate% .n this case there is no self0transcendency implied in the !nowing% #umanism, here, is only a more comminuted *dentitBtsphilosophie%922E: .n case ;2=, on the contrary, the representati+e e/perience does transcend itself in !nowing the other e/perience that is its o)'ect% Ao one can tal! of the !nowledge of the one )y the other without seeing them as numerically distinct entities, of which the one lies )eyond the other and away from it, along some direction9Pg 23B: and with some inter+al, that can )e definitely named% But, if the tal!er )e a humanist, he must also see this distance0inter+al concretely and pragmatically, and confess it to consist of other inter+ening e/periencesIof possi)le ones, at all e+ents, if not of actual% "o call my present idea of my dog, for e/ample, cogniti+e of the real dog means that, as the actual tissue of e/perience is constituted, the idea is capa)le of leading into a chain of other e/periences on my part that go from ne/t to ne/t and terminate at last in +i+id sense0perceptions of a 'umping, )ar!ing, hairy )ody% "hose are the real dog, the dog7s full presence, for my common sense% .f the supposed tal!er is a profound philosopher, although they may not be the real dog for him, they mean the real dog, are practical su)stitutes for the real dog, as the representation was a practical su)stitute for them, that real dog )eing a lot of atoms, say, or of mind0stuff, that lie !here the sense0perceptions lie in his e/perience as well as in my own%9Pg 233: --"he philosopher here stands for the stage of thought that goes )eyond the stage of common sense8 and the difference is simply that he 6interpolates7 and 6e/trapolates,7 where common sense does not% &or common sense, two men see the same identical real dog% Philosophy, noting actual differences in their perceptions, points out the duality of these latter, and
interpolates something )etween them as a more real terminusIfirst, organs, +iscera, etc%8 ne/t, cells8 then, ultimate atoms8 lastly, mind0stuff perhaps% "he original sense0termini of the two men, instead of coalescing with each other and with the real dog0o)'ect, as at first supposed, are thus held )y philosophers to )e separated )y in+isi)le realities with which, at most, they are conterminous% $)olish, now, one of the percipients, and the interpolation changes into 6e/trapolation%7 "he sense0terminus of the remaining percipient is regarded )y the philosopher as not Cuite reaching reality% #e has only carried the procession of e/periences, the philosopher thin!s,9Pg <44: to a definite, )ecause practical, halting0place somewhere on the way towards an a)solute truth that lies )eyond% "he humanist sees all the time, howe+er, that there is no a)solute transcendency e+en a)out the more a)solute realities thus con'ectured or )elie+ed in% "he +iscera and cells are only possi)le percepts following upon that of the outer )ody% "he atoms again, though we may ne+er attain to human means of percei+ing them, are still defined perceptually% "he mind0stuff itself is concei+ed as a !ind of e/perience8 and it is possi)le to frame the hypothesis ;such hypotheses can )y no logic )e e/cluded from philosophy= of two !nowers of a piece of mind0stuff and the mind0stuff itself )ecoming 6confluent7 at the moment at which our imperfect !nowing might pass into !nowing of a completed type% E+en so do you and . ha)itually represent our two perceptions and the real dog as confluent, though only pro+isionally, and for the common0sense stage of thought% .f my pen )e inwardly made of mind0stuff, there is no confluence no! )etween9Pg <42: that mind0stuff and my +isual perception of the pen% But concei+a)ly there might come to )e such confluence8 for, in the case of my hand, the +isual sensations and the inward feelings of the hand, its mind0stuff, so to spea!, are e+en now as confluent as any two things can )e% "here is, thus, no )reach in humanistic epistemology% Whether !nowledge )e ta!en as ideally perfected, or only as true enough to pass muster for practice, it is hung on one continuous scheme% Reality, howsoe+er remote, is always defined as a terminus within the general possi)ilities of e/perience8 and what !nows it is defined as an e/perience that 0represents1 it% in the sense of being substitutable for it in our thin(ing )ecause it leads to the same associates, or in the sense of 0pointing to it1 through a chain of other e/periences that either inter+ene or may inter+ene% $)solute reality here )ears the same relation to sensation as sensation )ears to conception or imagination% Both are pro+isional or final termini, sensation )eing only the terminus at which the practical man ha)itually stops,9Pg <4<: while the philosopher pro'ects a 6)eyond7 in the shape of more a)solute reality% "hese termini, for the practical and the philosophical stages of thought respecti+ely, are self0supporting% "hey are not 6true7 of anything else, they simply are, are real% "hey 6lean on nothing,7 as my italiciDed formula said% Rather does the whole fa)ric of e/perience lean on them, 'ust as the whole fa)ric of the solar system, including many relati+e positions, leans, for its a)solute position in space, on any one of its constituent stars% #ere, again, one gets a new *dentitBtsphilosophie in pluralistic form%922G: -7 .f . ha+e succeeded in ma!ing this at all clear ;though . fear that )re+ity and a)stractness )etween them may ha+e made me fail=, the reader will see that the 6truth7 of our mental operations must always )e an intra0e/periential affair% $ conception is rec!oned true )y common sense when it can )e made to lead to a9Pg <4E: sensation% "he sensation, which for common sense is not so much 6true7 as 6real,7 is held to )e provisionally true )y the philosopher 'ust in so far as it covers ;a)uts at, or occupies the place of= a still more a)solutely real e/perience, in the possi)ility of which to some remoter e/perient the philosopher finds reason to )elie+e% Meanwhile what actually does count for true to any indi+idual trower, whether he )e philosopher or common man, is always a result of his apperceptions% .f a no+el e/perience, conceptual or sensi)le, contradict too emphatically our pre0 e/istent system of )eliefs, in ninety0nine cases out of a hundred it is treated as false% @nly when the older and the newer e/periences are congruous enough to mutually appercei+e and modify each other, does what we treat as an ad+ance in truth result% 9#a+ing written of this point in an article in reply to Mr% Joseph7s criticism of my humanism, . will say no more a)out truth here, )ut refer the reader to that re+iew%922F:: .n no case, howe+er, need truth9Pg <4G: consist in a relation )etween our e/periences and something archetypal or trans0e/periential% Should we e+er reach a)solutely terminal e/periences, e/periences in which we all agreed, which were superseded )y no re+ised continuations, these would not )e true, they would )e real, they would simply be, and )e indeed the angles, corners, and linchpins of all reality, on which the truth of e+erything else would )e stayed% @nly such other things as led to these )y satisfactory con'unctions would )e
6true%7 Satisfactory connection of some sort with such termini is all that the word 6truth7 means% @n the common0sense stage of thought sense0presentations ser+e as such termini% @ur ideas and concepts and scientific theories pass for true only so far as they harmoniously lead )ac! to the world of sense% . hope that many humanists will endorse this attempt of mine to trace the more essential features of that way of +iewing things% . feel almost certain that Messrs% Dewey and9Pg <4F: Schiller will do so% .f the attac!ers will also ta!e some slight account of it, it may )e that discussion will )e a little less wide of the mar! than it has hitherto )een%
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924F: 9Reprinted from The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ii, Ao% F, March <, 234F% $lso reprinted, with slight changes in The Meaning of Truth, pp% 2<202EF% "he author7s corrections ha+e )een adopted for the present te/t% Ed%: 924H: 9Written apropos of the appearance of three articles in Mind, A% S%, +ol% /i+, Ao% FE, January, 234F, >6$)solute7 and 6Relati+e7 "ruth,? #% #% Joachim8 >Professor James on 6#umanism and "ruth,7? #% W% B% Joseph8 >$pplied $/ioms,? $% Sidgwic!% @f these articles the second and third >continue the humanistic ;or pragmatistic= contro+ersy,? the first >deeply connects with it%? Ed%: 9245: Professor Baldwin, for e/ample% #is address 6@n Selecti+e "hin!ing7 ; Psychological #evie!, 9+ol% +:, 2B3B, reprinted in his +olume, 4evelopment and $volution= seems to me an unusually well0written pragmatic manifesto% Ae+ertheless in 6"he imits of Pragmatism7 ;ibid., 9+ol% /i:, 234G=, he ;much less clearly= 'oins in the attac!% 924B: "he ethical changes, it seems to me, are )eautifully made e+ident in Professor Dewey7s series of articles, which will ne+er get the attention they deser+e till they are printed in a )oo!% . mean, 6"he Significance of Emotions,7 Psychological #evie!, +ol% ii, 92B3F:, p% 2E8 6"he Refle/ $rc Concept in Psychology,7 ibid., +ol% iii, 92B3H:, p% EF58 6Psychology and Social Practice,7 ibid., +ol% +ii, 92344:, p% 24F8 6.nterpretation of Sa+age Mind,7 ibid., +ol% i/, 9234<:, p% <258 6(reen7s "heory of the Moral Moti+e,7 Philosophical #evie!, +ol% i, 92B3<:, p% F3E8 6Self0realiDation as the Moral .deal,7 ibid., +ol% ii, 92B3E:, p% HF<8 6"he Psychology of Effort,7 ibid., +ol% +i, 92B35:, p% GE8 6"he E+olutionary Method as $pplied to Morality,7 ibid., +ol% /i, 9234<:, pp% 245, EFE8 6E+olution and Ethics,7 Monist, +ol% +iii, 92B3B:, p% E<28 to mention only a few% 9243: 9"he author employs the term 6humanism7 either as a synonym for 6radical empiricism7 ;cf% e.g., a)o+e, p% 2FH=8 or as that general philosophy of life of which 6radical empiricism7 is the theoretical ground ;cf% )elow, p% 23G=% &or other discussions of 6humanism,7 cf% )elow, essay /i, and The Meaning of Truth, essay iii% Ed%: 9224: 9@mitted from reprint in Meaning of Truth% "he articles referred to are 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7 and 6$ World of Pure E/perience,7 reprinted a)o+e%: 9222: .n Science, Ao+em)er G, 234G, p% F33% 922<: "his statement is pro)a)ly e/cessi+ely o)scure to any one who has not read my two articles, 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7 and 6$ World of Pure E/perience%7 922E: 9Cf% a)o+e, p% 2EG8 and )elow, p% <4<%: 922G: 9Cf% a)o+e, pp% 2EG, 235%: 922F: 9@mitted from reprint in Meaning of Truth% "he re+iew referred to is reprinted )elow, pp% <GG0<HF, under the title >#umanism and "ruth @nce More%? Ed%: 9Pg <4H:
7--8A *()-(* .! ,(*S,-!*,!4CC@6

Je +oudrais +ous communiCuer CuelCues doutes Cui me sont +enus au su'et de la notion de Conscience Cui rWgne dans tous nos traitVs de psychologie% @n dVfinit ha)ituellement la Psychologie comme la Science des faits de Conscience, ou des phFnomGnes, ou encore des Ftats de la Conscience% Su7on admette Cu7elle se rattache X des moi personnels, ou )ien Cu7on la croie impersonnelle X la faYon du >moi transcendental? de Kant, de la Be!usstheit ou du Be!usstsein )berhaupt de nos contemporains en $llemagne, cette conscience est tou'ours regardVe comme possVdant une essence propre, a)solument distincte de l7essence des choses matVrielles, Cu7elle a le don mystVrieu/ de reprVsenter et de9Pg <45: connaZtre% es faits matVriels, pris dans leur matVrialitV, ne sont pas FprouvFs, ne sont pas o)'ets d1expFrience, ne se rapportent pas% Pour Cu7ils prennent la forme du systWme dans leCuel nous nous sentons +i+re, il faut Cu7ils apparaissent, et ce fait d7apparaZtre, sura'outV X leur e/istence )rute, s7appelle la conscience Cue nous en a+ons, ou peut0[tre, selon l7hypothWse panpsychiste, Cu7ils ont d7eu/0m[mes% JoilX ce dualisme in+VtVrV Cu7il sem)le impossi)le de chasser de notre +ue du monde% Ce monde peut )ien e/ister en soi, mais nous n7en sa+ons rien, car pour nous il est e/clusi+ement un o)'et d7e/pVrience8 et la condition indispensa)le X cet effet, c7est Cu7il soit rapportV X des tVmoins, Cu7il soit connu par un su'et ou par des su'ets spirituels% @)'et et su'et, +oilX les deu/ 'am)es sans lesCuelles il sem)le Cue la philosophie ne saurait faire un pas en a+ant% "outes les Vcoles sont d7accord lX0dessus, scolastiCue, cartVsianisme, !antisme, nVo0!antisme, tous admettent le dualisme fondamental% e positi+isme ou agnosticisme de nos9Pg <4B: 'ours, Cui se piCue de rele+er des sciences naturelles, se donne +olontiers, il est +rai, le nom de monisme% Mais ce n7est Cu7un monisme +er)al% .l pose une rValitV inconnue, mais nous dit Cue cette rValitV se prVsente tou'ours sous deu/ >aspects,? un cPtV conscience et un cPtV matiWre, et ces deu/ cPtVs demeurent aussi irrVducti)les Cue les attri)uts fondamentau/, Vtendue et pensVe, du Dieu de SpinoDa% $u fond, le monisme contemporain est du spinoDisme pur% @r, comment se reprVsente0t0on cette conscience dont nous sommes tous si portVs X admettre l7e/istence- .mpossi)le de la dVfinir, nous dit0on, mais nous en a+ons tous une intuition immVdiate, tout d7a)ord la conscience a conscience d7elle0 m[me% DemandeD X la premiWre personne Cue +ous rencontrereD, homme ou femme, psychologue ou ignorant, et elle +ous rVpondra Cu7elle se sent penser, 'ouir, souffrir, +ouloir, tout comme elle se sent respirer% Elle perYoit directement sa +ie spirituelle comme une espWce de courant intVrieur, actif, lVger, fluide, dVlicat, diaphane pour ainsi9Pg <43: dire, et a)solument opposV X Cuoi Cue ce soit de matVriel% Bref, la +ie su)'ecti+e ne paraZt pas seulement [tre une condition logiCuement indispensa)le pour Cu7il y ait un monde o)'ectif Cui apparaisse, c7est encore un VlVment de l7e/pVrience m[me Cue nous Vprou+ons directement, au m[me titre Cue nous Vprou+ons notre propre corps% .dVes et Choses, comment donc ne pas reconnaZtre leur dualisme- Sentiments et @)'ets, comment douter de leur hVtVrogVnVitV a)soluea psychologie soi0disant scientifiCue admet cette hVtVrogVnVitV comme l7ancienne psychologie spiritualiste l7admettait% Comment ne pas l7admettre- ChaCue science dVcoupe ar)itrairement dans la trame des faits un champ o\ elle se parCue, et dont elle dVcrit et Vtudie le contenu% a psychologie prend 'ustement pour son domaine le champ des faits de conscience% Elle les postule sans les critiCuer, elle les oppose au/ faits matVriels8 et sans critiCuer non plus la notion de ces derniers, elle les rattache X la conscience par le lien mystVrieu/ de la connaissance, de, l7aperception Cui, pour elle, est9Pg <24: un troisiWme genre de fait fondamental et ultime% En sui+ant cette +oie, la psychologie contemporaine a f[tV de grands triomphes% Elle a pu faire une esCuisse de l7V+olution de la +ie consciente, en conce+ant cette derniWre comme s7adaptant de plus en plus complWtement au milieu physiCue en+ironnant% Elle a pu Vta)lir un parallVlisme dans le dualisme, celui des faits psychiCues et des V+Vnements cVrV)rau/% Elle a e/pliCuV les illusions, les hallucinations, et 'usCu7X un certain point, les maladies mentales% Ce sont de )eau/ progrWs8 mais il reste encore )ien des pro)lWmes% a philosophie gVnVrale surtout, Cui a pour de+oir de scruter tous les postulats, trou+e des parado/es et des emp[chements lX o\ la science passe outre8 et il n7y a Cue les amateurs de science populaire Cui ne sont 'amais perple/es% Plus on +a au fond des choses, plus on trou+e d7Vnigmes8 et '7a+oue pour ma part Cue depuis Cue 'e m7occupe sVrieusement de psychologie, ce +ieu/ dualisme de matiWre et de pensVe, cette hVtVrogVnVitV posVe comme a)solue des deu/ essences, m7a tou'ours prVsentV des9Pg <22: difficultVs% C7est de CuelCues0unes de ces difficultVs Cue 'e +oudrais maintenant +ous entretenir%
D7a)ord il y en a une, laCuelle, '7en suis con+aincu, +ous aura frappVs tous% Prenons la perception e/tVrieure, la sensation directe Cue nous donnent par e/emple les murs de cette salle% Peut0on dire ici Cue le psychiCue et le physiCue sont a)solument hVtVrogWnes- $u contraire, ils sont si peu hVtVrogWnes Cue si nous nous plaYons au point de +ue du sens commun8 si nous faisons a)straction de toutes les in+entions e/plicati+es, des molVcules et des ondulations VthVrVes, par e/emple, Cui au fond sont des entitVs mVtaphysiCues8 si, en un mot, nous prenons la rValitV naO+ement et telle Cu7elle nous est donnVe tout d7a)ord, cette rValitV sensi)le d7o\ dVpendent nos intVr[ts +itau/, et sur laCuelle se portent toutes nos actions8 eh )ien, cette rValitV sensi)le et la sensation Cue nous en a+ons sont, au moment o\ la sensation se produit, a)solument identiCues l7une X l7autre% a rValitV est l7aperception m[me% es mots >murs de cette salle? ne signifient Cue cette )lancheur fraZche et sonore9Pg <2<: Cui nous entoure, coupVe par ces fen[tres, )ornVe par ces lignes et ces angles% e physiCue ici n7a pas d7autre contenu Cue le psychiCue% e su'et et l7o)'et se confondent% C7est Ber!eley Cui le premier a mis cette +VritV en honneur% $sse est percipi. Aos sensations ne sont pas de petits duplicats intVrieurs des choses, elles sont les choses m[mes en tant Cue les choses nous sont prVsentes% Et Cuoi Cue l7on +euille penser de la +ie a)sente, cachVe, et pour ainsi dire pri+Ve, des choses, et Cuelles Cue soient les constructions hypothVtiCues Cu7on en fasse, il reste +rai Cue la +ie pu)liCue des choses, cette actualitV prVsente par laCuelle elles nous confrontent, d7o\ dVri+ent toutes nos constructions thVoriCues, et X laCuelle elles doi+ent toutes re+enir et se rattacher sous peine de flotter dans l7air et dans l7irrVel8 cette actualitV, dis0'e, est homogWne, et non pas seulement homogWne, mais numVriCuement une, a+ec une certaine partie de notre +ie intVrieure% JoilX pour la perception e/tVrieure% Suand on s7adresse X l7imagination, X la mVmoire ou9Pg <2E: au/ facultVs de reprVsentation a)straite, )ien Cue les faits soient ici )eaucoup plus compliCuVs, 'e crois Cue la m[me homogVnVitV essentielle se dVgage% Pour simplifier le pro)lWme, e/cluons d7a)ord toute rValitV sensi)le% Prenons la pensVe pure, telle Cu7elle s7effectue dans le r[+e ou la r[+erie, ou dans la mVmoire du passV% .ci encore, l7Vtoffe de l7e/pVrience ne fait0elle pas dou)le emploi, le physiCue et le psychiCue ne se confondent0ils pas- Si 'e r[+e d7une montagne d7or, elle n7e/iste sans doute pas en dehors du r[+e, mais dans le r[+e elle est de nature ou d7essence parfaitement physiCue, c7est comme physiCue Cu7elle m7apparaZt% Si en ce moment 'e me permets de me sou+enir de ma maison en $mVriCue, et des dVtails de mon em)arCuement rVcent pour l7.talie, le phVnomWne pur, le fait Cui se produit, Cu7est0il- C7est, dit0on, ma pensVe, a+ec son contenu% Mais encore ce contenu, Cu7est0il- .l porte la forme d7une partie du monde rVel, partie distante, il est +rai, de si/ mille !ilomWtres d7espace et de si/ semaines de temps, mais reliVe X la salle o\ nous sommes par une foule de choses, o)'ets9Pg <2G: et V+Vnements, homogWnes d7une part a+ec la salle et d7autre part a+ec l7o)'et de mes sou+enirs% Ce contenu ne se donne pas comme Vtant d7a)ord un tout petit fait intVrieur Cue 'e pro'etterais ensuite au loin, il se prVsente d7em)lVe comme le fait VloignV m[me% Et l7acte de penser ce contenu, la conscience Cue '7en ai, Cue sont0ils- Sont0ce au fond autre chose Cue des maniWres rVtrospecti+es de nommer le contenu lui0m[me, lorsCu7on l7aura sVparV de tous ces intermVdiaires physiCues, et reliV X un nou+eau groupe d7associVs Cui le font rentrer dans ma +ie mentale, les Vmotions par e/emple Cu7il a V+eillVes en moi, l7attention Cue '7y porte, mes idVes de tout X l7heure Cui l7ont suscitV comme sou+enir- Ce n7est Cu7en se rapportant X ces derniers associVs Cue le phVnomWne arri+e X [tre classV comme pensFe8 tant Cu7il ne se rapporte Cu7au/ premiers il demeure phVnomWne ob&ectif% .l est +rai Cue nous opposons ha)ituellement nos images intVrieures au/ o)'ets, et Cue nous les considVrons comme de petites copies,9Pg <2F: comme des calCues ou dou)les, affai)lis, de ces derniers% C7est Cu7un o)'et prVsent a une +i+acitV et une nettetV supVrieures X celles de l7image% .l lui fait ainsi contraste8 et pour me ser+ir de l7e/cellent mot de "aine, il lui sert de rFducteur% Suand les deu/ sont prVsents ensem)le, l7o)'et prend le premier plan et l7image >recule,? de+ient une chose >a)sente%? Mais cet o)'et prVsent, Cu7est0il en lui0m[me- De Cuelle Vtoffe est0il fait- De la m[me Vtoffe Cue l7image% .l est fait de sensations8 il est chose perYue% Son esse est percipi, et lui et l7image sont gVnVriCuement homogWnes% Si 'e pense en ce moment X mon chapeau Cue '7ai laissV tout X l7heure au +estiaire, o\ est le dualisme, le discontinu, entre le chapeau pensV et le chapeau rVel- C7est d7un +rai chapeau absent Cue mon esprit s7occupe% J7en tiens compte pratiCuement comme d7une rValitV% S7il Vtait prVsent sur cette ta)le, le chapeau dVterminerait un mou+ement de ma main, 'e l7enlW+erais% De m[me ce chapeau conYu, ce chapeau en idVe, dVterminera tantPt la direction de mes pas% J7irai le prendre%9Pg <2H: 7idVe Cue '7en ai se continuera 'usCu7X la prVsence sensi)le du chapeau, et s7y fondra harmonieusement% Je conclus donc Cue,I)ien Cu7il y ait un dualisme pratiCueIpuisCue les images se distinguent des o)'ets, en tiennent lieu, et nous y mWnent, il n7y a pas lieu de leur attri)uer une diffVrence de nature essentielle% PensVe et actualitV sont faites d7une seule et m[me Vtoffe, Cui est l7Vtoffe de l7e/pVrience en gVnVral%
a psychologie de la perception e/tVrieure nous mWne X la m[me conclusion% Suand '7aperYois l7o)'et de+ant moi comme une ta)le de telle forme, X telle distance, on m7e/pliCue Cue ce fait est d] X deu/ facteurs, X une matiWre de sensation Cui me pVnWtre par la +oie des yeu/ et Cui donne l7VlVment d7e/tVrioritV rVelle, et X des idVes Cui se rV+eillent, +ont X la rencontre de cette rValitV, la classent et l7interprWtent% Mais Cui peut faire la part, dans la ta)le concrWtement aperYue, de ce Cui est sensation et de ce Cui est idVe- 7e/terne et l7interne, l7Vtendu et l7inVtendu, se fusionnent9Pg <25: et font un mariage indissolu)le% Cela rappelle ces panoramas circulaires, o\ des o)'ets rVels, rochers, her)e, chariots )risVs, etc%, Cui occupent l7a+ant0plan, sont si ingVnieusement reliVs X la toile Cui fait le fond, et Cui reprVsente une )ataille ou un +aste paysage, Cue l7on ne sait plus distinguer ce Cui est o)'et de ce Cui est peinture% es coutures et les 'oints sont impercepti)les% Cela pourrait0il ad+enir si l7o)'et et l7idVe Vtaient a)solument dissem)la)les de natureJe suis con+aincu Cue des considVrations pareilles X celles Cue 'e +iens d7e/primer auront dV'X suscitV, cheD +ous aussi, des doutes au su'et du dualisme prVtendu% Et d7autres raisons de douter surgissent encore% .l y a toute une sphWre d7ad'ectifs et d7attri)uts Cui ne sont ni o)'ectifs, ni su)'ectifs d7une maniWre e/clusi+e, mais Cue nous employons tantPt d7une maniWre et tantPt d7une autre, comme si nous nous complaisions dans leur am)iguOtV% Je parle des CualitVs Cue nous apprFcions, pour ainsi dire, dans les9Pg <2B: choses, leur cPtV esthVtiCue, moral, leur +aleur pour nous% a )eautV, par e/emple, o\ rVside0t0elle- Est0elle dans la statue, dans la sonate, ou dans notre esprit- Mon collWgue X #ar+ard, (eorge Santayana, a Vcrit un li+re d7esthVtiCue,9225: o\ il appelle la )eautV >le plaisir o)'ectifiV?8 et en +VritV, c7est )ien ici Cu7on pourrait parler de pro'ection au dehors% @n dit indiffVremment une chaleur agrVa)le, ou une sensation agrVa)le de chaleur% a raretV, le prVcieu/ du diamant nous en paraissent des CualitVs essentielles% Aous parlons d7un orage affreu/, d7un homme haOssa)le, d7une action indigne, et nous croyons parler o)'ecti+ement, )ien Cue ces termes n7e/priment Cue des rapports X notre sensi)ilitV Vmoti+e propre% Aous disons m[me un chemin pVni)le, un ciel triste, un coucher de soleil super)e% "oute cette maniWre animiste de regarder les choses Cui paraZt a+oir VtV la faYon primiti+e de penser des hommes, peut trWs )ien s7e/pliCuer ;et M% Santayana, dans un autre li+re tout rVcent,922B: 9Pg <23: l7a )ien e/pliCuVe ainsi= par l7ha)itude d7attri)uer X l7o)'et tout ce Cue nous ressentons en sa prVsence% e partage du su)'ectif et de l7o)'ectif est le fait d7une rVfle/ion trWs a+ancVe, Cue nous aimons encore a'ourner dans )eaucoup d7endroits% Suand les )esoins pratiCues ne nous en tirent pas forcVment, il sem)le Cue nous aimons X nous )ercer dans le +ague% es CualitVs secondes elles0m[mes, chaleur, son, lumiWre, n7ont encore au'ourd7hui Cu7une attri)ution +ague% Pour le sens commun, pour la +ie pratiCue, elles sont a)solument o)'ecti+es, physiCues% Pour le physicien, elles sont su)'ecti+es% Pour lui, il n7y a Cue la forme, la masse, le mou+ement, Cui aient une rValitV e/tVrieure% Pour le philosophe idValiste, au contraire, forme et mou+ement sont tout aussi su)'ectifs Cue lumiWre et chaleur, et il n7y a Cue la chose0en0soi inconnue, le >noumWne,? Cui 'ouisse d7une rValitV e/tramentale complWte% Aos sensations intimes conser+ent encore de cette am)iguOtV% .l y a des illusions de mou+ement Cui prou+ent Cue nos premiWres9Pg <<4: sensations de mou+ement Vtaient gVnVralisVes% C7est le monde entier, a+ec nous, Cui se mou+ait% Maintenant nous distinguons notre propre mou+ement de celui des o)'ets Cui nous entourent, et parmi les o)'ets nous en distinguons Cui demeurent en repos% Mais il est des Vtats de +ertige o\ nous retom)ons encore au'ourd7hui dans l7indiffVrenciation premiWre% Jous connaisseD tous sans doute cette thVorie Cui a +oulu faire des Vmotions des sommes de sensations +iscVrales et musculaires% Elle a donnV lieu X )ien des contro+erses, et aucune opinion n7a encore conCuis l7unanimitV des suffrages% Jous connaisseD aussi les contro+erses sur la nature de l7acti+itV mentale% es uns soutiennent Cu7elle est une force purement spirituelle Cue nous sommes en Vtat d7aperce+oir immVdiatement comme telle% es autres prVtendent Cue ce Cue nous nommons acti+itV mentale ;effort, attention, par e/emple= n7est Cue le reflet senti de certains effets dont notre organisme est le siWge, tensions musculaires au cr^ne et au gosier, arr[t ou passage de la respiration, afflu/ de sang, etc%9Pg <<2:
De CuelCue maniWre Cue se rVsol+ent ces contro+erses, leur e/istence prou+e )ien clairement une chose, c7est Cu7il est trWs difficile, ou m[me a)solument impossi)le de sa+oir, par la seule inspection intime de certains phVnomWnes, s7ils sont de nature physiCue, occupant de l7Vtendue, etc%, ou s7ils sont de nature purement psychiCue et intVrieure% .l nous faut tou'ours trou+er des raisons pour appuyer notre a+is8 il nous faut chercher la classification la plus pro)a)le du phVnomWne8 et en fin de compte il pourrait )ien se trou+er Cue toutes nos classifications usuelles eussent eu leurs motifs plutPt dans les )esoins de la pratiCue Cue dans CuelCue facultV Cue nous aurions d7aperce+oir deu/ essences ultimes et di+erses Cui composeraient ensem)le la trame des choses% e corps de chacun de nous offre un contraste pratiCue presCue +iolent X tout le reste du milieu am)iant% "out ce Cui arri+e au dedans de ce corps nous est plus intime et important Cue ce Cui arri+e ailleurs% .l s7identifie a+ec notre moi, il se classe a+ec lui% $me, +ie, souffle, Cui saurait )ien les distinguer e/actement- M[me nos images et nos9Pg <<<: sou+enirs, Cui n7agissent sur le monde physiCue Cue par le moyen de notre corps, sem)lent appartenir X ce dernier% Aous les traitons comme internes, nous les classons a+ec nos sentiments affectifs% .l faut )ien a+ouer, en somme, Cue la Cuestion du dualisme de la pensVe et de la matiWre est )ien loin d7[tre finalement rVsolue% Et +oilX terminVe la premiWre partie de mon discours% J7ai +oulu +ous pVnVtrer, Mesdames et Messieurs, de mes doutes et de la rValitV, aussi )ien Cue de l7importance, du pro)lWme% Suant X moi, aprWs de longues annVes d7hVsitation, '7ai fini par prendre mon parti carrVment% Je crois Cue la conscience, telle Cu7on se la reprVsente communVment, soit comme entitV, soit comme acti+itV pure, mais en tout cas comme fluide, inVtendue, diaphane, +ide de tout contenu propre, mais se connaissant directement elle0m[me, spirituelle enfin, 'e crois, dis0'e, Cue cette conscience est une pure chimWre, et Cue la somme de rValitVs concrWtes Cue le mot conscience de+rait cou+rir, mVrite une toute autre description, description, du reste, Cu7une philosophie attenti+e au/ faits et9Pg <<E: sachant faire un peu d7analyse, serait dVsormais en Vtat de fournir ou plutPt de commencer X fournir% Et ces mots m7amWnent X la seconde partie de mon discours% Elle sera )eaucoup plus courte Cue la premiWre, parce Cue si 'e la dV+eloppais sur la m[me Vchelle, elle serait )eaucoup trop longue% .l faut, par consVCuent, Cue 'e me restreigne au/ seules indications indispensa)les% $dmettons Cue la conscience, la Be!usstheit, conYue comme essence, entitV, acti+itV, moitiV irrVducti)le de chaCue e/pVrience, soit supprimVe, Cue le dualisme fondamental et pour ainsi dire ontologiCue soit a)oli et Cue ce Cue nous supposions e/ister soit seulement ce Cu7on a appelV 'usCu7ici le contenu, le *nhalt, de la conscience8 comment la philosophie +a0t0elle se tirer d7affaire a+ec l7espWce de monisme +ague Cui en rVsultera- Je +ais t^cher de +ous insinuer CuelCues suggestions positi+es lX0dessus, )ien Cue 'e craigne Cue, faute du dV+eloppement nVcessaire, mes idVes ne rVpandront pas une clartV trWs grande% Pour+u Cue '7indiCue un9Pg <<G: commencement de sentier, ce sera peut0[tre asseD% $u fond, pourCuoi nous accrochons0nous d7une maniWre si tenace X cette idVe d7une conscience sura'outVe X l7e/istence du contenu des choses- PourCuoi la rVclamons0nous si fortement, Cue celui Cui la nierait nous sem)lerait plutPt un mau+ais plaisant Cu7un penseur- A7est0ce pas pour sau+er ce fait indVnia)le Cue le contenu de l7e/pVrience n7a pas seulement une e/istence propre et comme immanente et intrinsWCue, mais Cue chaCue partie de ce contenu dVteint pour ainsi dire sur ses +oisines, rend compte d7elle0m[me X d7autres, sort en CuelCue sorte de soi pour [tre sue et Cu7ainsi tout le champ de l7e/pVrience se trou+e [tre transparent de part en part, ou constituV comme un espace Cui serait rempli de miroirsCette )ilatVralitV des parties de l7e/pVrience,IX sa+oir d7une part, Cu7elles sont a+ec des CualitVs propres8 d7autre part, Cu7elles sont rapportVes X d7autres parties et suesIl7opinion rVgnante la constate et l7e/pliCue par un dualisme fondamental de constitution9Pg <<F: appartenant X chaCue morceau d7e/pVrience en propre% Dans cette feuille de papier il n7y a pas seulement, dit0on, le contenu, )lancheur, minceur, etc%, mais il y a ce second fait de la conscience de cette )lancheur et de cette minceur% Cette fonction d7[tre >rapportV,? de faire partie de la trame entiWre d7une e/pVrience plus comprVhensi+e, on l7Vrige en fait ontologiCue, et on loge ce fait dans l7intVrieur m[me du papier, en l7accouplant X sa )lancheur et X sa minceur% Ce n7est pas un rapport e/trinsWCue Cu7on suppose, c7est une moitiV du phVnomWne m[me% Je crois Cu7en somme on se reprVsente la rValitV comme constituVe de la faYon dont sont faites les >couleurs? Cui nous ser+ent X la peinture% .l y a d7a)ord des matiWres colorantes Cui rVpondent au contenu, et il y a un +Vhicule, huile ou colle, Cui les tient en suspension et Cui rVpond X la conscience% C7est un dualisme complet, o\, en employant certains procVdVs, on peut sVparer chaCue VlVment de l7autre par +oie de soustraction% C7est ainsi Cu7on nous assure Cu7en faisant un grand effort d7a)straction introspecti+e, nous pou+ons9Pg <<H: saisir notre conscience sur le +if, comme une acti+itV spirituelle pure, en nVgligeant X peu prWs complWtement les matiWres Cu7X un moment donnV elle Vclaire%
Maintenant 'e +ous demande si on ne pourrait pas tout aussi )ien ren+erser a)solument cette maniWre de +oir% Supposons, en effet, Cue la rValitV premiWre soit de nature neutre, et appelons0la par CuelCue nom encore am)igu, comme phFnomGne, donnF, "orfindung% Moi0m[me '7en parle +olontiers au pluriel, et 'e lui donne le nom d7 expFriences pures% Ce sera un monisme, si +ous +ouleD, mais un monisme tout X fait rudimentaire et a)solument opposV au soi0disant monisme )ilatVral du positi+isme scientifiCue ou spinoDiste% Ces e/pVriences pures e/istent et se succWdent, entrent dans des rapports infiniment +ariVs les unes a+ec les autres, rapports Cui sont eu/0m[mes des parties essentielles de la trame des e/pVriences% .l y a >Conscience? de ces rapports au m[me titre Cu7il y a >Conscience? de leurs termes% .l en rVsulte Cue des groupes d7e/pVriences se font remarCuer et9Pg <<5: distinguer, et Cu7une seule et m[me e/pVrience, +u la grande +ariVtV de ses rapports, peut 'ouer un rPle dans plusieurs groupes X la fois% C7est ainsi Cue dans un certain conte/te de +oisins, elle serait classVe comme un phVnomWne physiCue, tandis Cue dans un autre entourage elle figurerait comme un fait de conscience, X peu prWs comme une m[me particule d7encre peut appartenir simultanVment X deu/ lignes, l7une +erticale, l7autre horiDontale, pour+u Cu7elle soit situVe X leur intersection% Prenons, pour fi/er nos idVes, l7e/pVrience Cue nous a+ons X ce moment du local o\ nous sommes, de ces murailles, de cette ta)le, de ces chaises, de cet espace% Dans cette e/pVrience pleine, concrWte et indi+ise, telle Cu7elle est lX, donnVe, le monde physiCue o)'ectif et le monde intVrieur et personnel de chacun de nous se rencontrent et se fusionnent comme des lignes se fusionnent X leur intersection% Comme chose physiCue, cette salle a des rapports a+ec tout le reste du )^timent, )^timent Cue nous autres nous ne connaissons et ne connaZtrons pas%9Pg <<B: Elle doit son e/istence X toute une histoire de financiers, d7architectes, d7ou+riers% Elle pWse sur le sol8 elle durera indVfiniment dans le temps8 si le feu y Vclatait, les chaises et la ta)le Cu7elle contient seraient +ite rVduites en cendres% Comme e/pVrience personnelle, au contraire, comme chose >rapportVe,? connue, consciente, cette salle a de tout autres tenants et a)outissants% Ses antVcVdents ne sont pas des ou+riers, ce sont nos pensVes respecti+es de tout X l7heure% BientPt elle ne figurera Cue comme un fait fugitif dans nos )iographies, associV X d7agrVa)les sou+enirs% Comme e/pVrience psychiCue, elle n7a aucun poids, son ameu)lement n7est pas com)usti)le% Elle n7e/erce de force physiCue Cue sur nos seuls cer+eau/, et )eaucoup d7entre nous nient encore cette influence8 tandis Cue la salle physiCue est en rapport d7influence physiCue a+ec tout le reste du monde% Et pourtant c7est de la m[me salle a)solument Cu7il s7agit dans les deu/ cas% "ant Cue nous ne faisons pas de physiCue spVculati+e,9Pg <<3: tant Cue nous nous plaYons dans le sens commun, c7est la salle +ue et sentie Cui est )ien la salle physiCue% De Cuoi parlons0nous donc si ce n7est de cela, de cette m[me partie de la nature matVrielle Cue tous nos esprits, X ce m[me moment, em)rassent, Cui entre telle Cuelle dans l7e/pVrience actuelle et intime de chacun de nous, et Cue notre sou+enir regardera tou'ours comme une partie intVgrante de notre histoire% C7est a)solument une m[me Vtoffe Cui figure simultanVment, selon le conte/te Cue l7on considWre, comme fait matVriel et physiCue, ou comme fait de conscience intime% Je crois donc Cu7on ne saurait traiter conscience et matiWre comme Vtant d7essence disparate% @n n7o)tient ni l7une ni l7autre par soustraction, en nVgligeant chaCue fois l7autre moitiV d7une e/pVrience de composition dou)le% es e/pVriences sont au contraire primiti+ement de nature plutPt simple% Elles deviennent conscientes dans leur entier, elles deviennent physiCues dans leur entier8 et c7est par voie d1addition Cue ce rVsultat se rValise% Pour9Pg <E4: autant Cue des e/pVriences se prolongent dans le temps, entrent dans des rapports d7influence physiCue, se )risant, se chauffant, s7Vclairant, etc%, mutuellement, nous en faisons un groupe X part Cue nous appelons le monde physiCue% Pour autant, au contraire, Cu7elles sont fugiti+es, inertes physiCuement, Cue leur succession ne suit pas d7ordre dVterminV, mais sem)le plutPt o)Vir X des caprices Vmotifs, nous en faisons un autre groupe Cue nous appelons le monde psychiCue% C7est en entrant X prVsent dans un grand nom)re de ces groupes psychiCues Cue cette salle de+ient maintenant chose consciente, chose rapportVe, chose sue% En faisant dVsormais partie de nos )iographies respecti+es, elle ne sera pas sui+ie de cette sotte et monotone rVpVtition d7elle0m[me dans le temps Cui caractVrise son e/istence physiCue% Elle sera sui+ie, au contraire, par d7autres e/pVriences Cui seront discontinues a+ec elle, ou Cui auront ce genre tout particulier de continuitV Cue nous appelons sou+enir% Demain, elle aura eu sa place dans chacun de nos passVs8 mais les prVsents di+ers au/Cuels tous9Pg <E2: ces passVs seront liVs demain seront )ien diffVrents du prVsent dont cette salle 'ouira demain comme entitV physiCue% es deu/ genres de groupes sont formVs d7e/pVriences, mais les rapports des e/pVriences entre elles diffWrent d7un groupe X l7autre% C7est donc par addition d7autres phVnomWnes Cu7un phVnomWne donnV de+ient conscient ou connu, ce n7est pas par un dVdou)lement d7essence intVrieure% a connaissance des choses leur survient, elle ne leur est pas immanente% Ce n7est le fait ni d7un moi transcendental, ni d7une Be!usstheit ou acte de conscience Cui les animerait chacune% $lles se
connaissent l1une l1autre, ou plutPt il y en a Cui connaissent les autres8 et le rapport Cue nous nommons connaissance n7est lui0m[me, dans )eaucoup de cas, Cu7une suite d7e/pVriences intermVdiaires parfaitement suscepti)les d7[tre dVcrites en termes concrets% .l n7est nullement le mystWre transcendant o\ se sont complus tant de philosophes% Mais ceci nous mWnerait )eaucoup trop loin% Je ne puis entrer ici dans tous les replis de la9Pg <E<: thVorie de la connaissance, ou de ce Cue, +ous autres .taliens, +ous appeleD la gnosVologie% Je dois me contenter de ces remarCues VcourtVes, ou simples suggestions, Cui sont, 'e le crains, encore )ien o)scures faute des dV+eloppements nVcessaires% PermetteD donc Cue 'e me rVsumeItrop sommairement, et en style dogmatiCueIdans les si/ thWses sui+antes, =o 8a 7onscience% telle ,u1on l1entend ordinairement% n1existe pas% pas plus ,ue la MatiGre% H la,uelle Ber(eley a donnF le coup de grEce+ Co 7e ,ui existe et forme la part de vFritF ,ue le mot de I7onscienceJ recouvre% c1est la susceptibilitF ,ue possGdent les parties de l1expFrience d1Ktre rapportFes ou connues+ Lo 7ette susceptibilitF s1expli,ue par le fait ,ue certaines expFriences peuvent mener les unes aux autres par des expFriences intermFdiaires nettement caractFrisFes% de telle sorte ,ue les unes se trouvent &ouer le rMle de choses connues% les autres celui de su&ets connaissants+ >o n peut parfaitement dFfinir ces deux rMles<Pg CLL? sans sortir de la trame de l1expFrience mKme% et sans invo,uer rien de transcendant+ Ao 8es attributions su&et et ob&et% reprFsentF et reprFsentatif% chose et pensFe% signifient donc une distinction prati,ue ,ui est de la derniGre importance% mais ,ui est d1ordre &@AC".@AAE seulement% et nullement ontologi,ue comme le dualisme classi,ue se la reprFsente+ No $n fin de compte% les choses et les pensFes ne sont point fonciGrement hFtFrogGnes% mais elles sont faites d1une mKme Ftoffe% Ftoffe ,u1on ne peut dFfinir comme telle% mais seulement Fprouver% et ,ue l1on peut nommer% si on veut% l1Ftoffe de l1expFrience en gFnFral.
F(()*()!S+
922H: 9$ communication made ;in &rench= at the &ifth .nternational Congress of Psychology, in Rome, $pril E4, 234F% .t is reprinted from the Archives de Psychologie, +ol% +, Ao% 25, June, 234F%: Cette communication est le rVsumV, forcVment trWs condensV, de +ues Cue l7auteur a e/posVes, au cours de ces derniers mois, en une sVrie d7articles pu)liVs dans le 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, 234G et 234F% 9"he series of articles referred to is reprinted a)o+e% Ed%: 9225: The Sense of Beauty, pp% GG ff% 922B: The 8ife of #eason 9+ol% i, >Reason in Common Sense,? p% 2G<:% 9Pg <EG:
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-S "A.-,A8 !:#-"-,-S: S(8-#S-S)-,34CCE6
.f all the criticisms which the humanistic Weltanschauung is recei+ing were as sachgemBss as Mr% Bode7s,92<4: the truth of the matter would more rapidly clear up% Aot only is it e/cellently well written, )ut it )rings its own point of +iew out clearly, and admits of a perfectly straight reply% "he argument ;unless . fail to catch it= can )e e/pressed as follows,
.f a series of e/periences )e supposed, no one of which is endowed immediately with the self0transcendent function of reference to a reality )eyond itself, no moti+e will occur within the series for supposing anything )eyond it to e/ist% .t will remain su)'ecti+e, and contentedly su)'ecti+e, )oth as a whole and in its se+eral parts% 9Pg <EF: Radical empiricism, trying, as it does, to account for o)'ecti+e !nowledge )y means of such a series, egregiously fails% .t can not e/plain how the notion of a physical order, as distinguished from a su)'ecti+ely )iographical order, of e/periences, e+er arose% .t pretends to e/plain the notion of a physical order, )ut does so )y playing fast and loose with the concept of o)'ecti+e reference% @n the one hand, it denies that such reference implies self0transcendency on the part of any one e/perience8 on the other hand, it claims that e/periences point% But, critically considered, there can )e no pointing unless self0 transcendency )e also allowed% "he con'uncti+e function of pointing, as . ha+e assumed it, is, according to my critic, +itiated )y the fallacy of attaching a )ilateral relation to a term a ,uo, as if it could stic! out su)stanti+ely and maintain itself in e/istence in ad+ance of the term ad ,uem which is eCually reCuired for it to )e a concretely e/perienced fact% .f the relation )e made concrete, the term ad ,uem is in+ol+ed, which would mean ;if . succeed in9Pg <EH: apprehending Mr% Bode rightly= that this latter term, although not empirically there, is yet noetically there, in ad+anceIin other words it would mean that any e/perience that 6points7 must already ha+e transcended itself, in the ordinary 6epistemological7 sense of the word transcend% Something li!e this, if . understand Mr% Bode7s te/t, is the upshot of his state of mind% .t is a reasona)le sounding state of mind, )ut it is e/actly the state of mind which radical empiricism, )y its doctrine of the reality of con'uncti+e relations, see!s to dispel% . +ery much fearIso difficult does mutual understanding seem in these e/alted regionsIthat my a)le critic has failed to understand that doctrine as it is meant to )e understood% . suspect that he performs on all these con'uncti+e relations ;of which the aforesaid 6pointing7 is only one= the usual rationalistic act of su)stitutionIhe ta!es them not as they are gi+en in their first intention, as parts constituti+e of e/perience7s li+ing flow, )ut only as they appear in retrospect, each fi/ed as a9Pg <E5: determinate o)'ect of conception, static, therefore, and contained within itself% $gainst this rationalistic tendency to treat e/perience as chopped up into discontinuous static o)'ects, radical empiricism protests% .t insists on ta!ing con'unctions at their 6face0+alue,7 'ust as they come% Consider, for e/ample, such con'unctions as 6and,7 6with,7 6near,7 6plus,7 6towards%7 While we li+e in such con'unctions our state is one of transition in the most literal sense% We are e/pectant of a 6more7 to come, and )efore the more has come, the transition, ne+ertheless, is directed to!ards it% . fail otherwise to see how, if one !ind of more comes, there should )e satisfaction and feeling of fulfilment8 )ut disappointment if the more comes in another shape% @ne more will continue, another more will arrest or deflect the direction, in which our e/perience is mo+ing e+en now% We can not, it is true, name our different li+ing 6ands7 or 6withs7 e/cept )y naming the different terms towards which they are mo+ing us, )ut we live their specifications and differences )efore those9Pg <EB: terms e/plicitly arri+e% "hus, though the +arious 6ands7 are all )ilateral relations, each reCuiring a term ad ,uem to define it when +iewed in retrospect and articulately concei+ed, yet in its li+ing moment any one of them may )e treated as if it 6stuc! out7 from its term a ,uo and pointed in a special direction, much as a compass0needle ;to use Mr% Bode7s e/cellent simile= points at the pole, e+en though it stirs not from its )o/% .n Professor #Tffding7s massi+e little article in The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods,92<2: he Cuotes a saying of Kier!egaard7s to the effect that we li+e forwards, )ut we understand )ac!wards% Qnderstanding )ac!wards is, it must )e confessed, a +ery freCuent wea!ness of philosophers, )oth of the rationalistic and of the ordinary empiricist type% Radical empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also, and refuses to su)stitute static concepts of the understanding for transitions in our mo+ing life% $ logic similar to that which my critic seems to employ9Pg <E3: here should, it seems to me, for)id him to say that our present is, while present, directed towards our future, or that any physical mo+ement can ha+e direction until its goal is actually reached% $t this point does it not seem as if the Cuarrel a)out self0transcendency in !nowledge might drop- .s it not a purely +er)al dispute- Call it self0transcendency or call it pointing, whiche+er you li!eIit ma!es no difference so long as real transitions towards real goals are admitted as things gi+en in e/perience, and among e/perience7s most indefeasi)le parts% Radical empiricism, una)le to close its eyes to the transitions caught in actu, accounts for the self0transcendency or the pointing ;whiche+er you may call it= as a process that occurs within e/perience, as an empirically mediated thing of which a
perfectly definite description can )e gi+en% 6Epistemology,7 on the other hand, denies this8 and pretends that the self0 transcendency is unmediated or, if mediated, then mediated in a super0empirical world% "o 'ustify this pretension, epistemology has first to9Pg <G4: transform all our con'unctions into static o)'ects, and this, . su)mit, is an a)solutely ar)itrary act% But in spite of Mr% Bode7s mal0treatment of con'unctions, as . understand themIand as . understand himI. )elie+e that at )ottom we are fighting for nothing different, )ut are )oth defending the same continuities of e/perience in different forms of words% "here are other criticisms in the article in Cuestion, )ut, as this seems the most +ital one, . will for the present, at any rate, lea+e them untouched%
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9223: 9Reprinted from The 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ii, Ao% 3, $pril <5, 234F%: 92<4: 9B% #% Bode, >6Pure E/perience7 and the E/ternal World,? 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% ii, 234F, p% 2<B%: 92<2: Jol% ii, 9234F:, pp% BF03<% 9Pg <G2:
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$lthough Mr% Pit!in does not name me in his acute article on radical empiricism,92<E: 9%%%: . fear that some readers, !nowing me to ha+e applied that name to my own doctrine, may possi)ly consider themsel+es to ha+e )een in at my death% .n point of fact my withers are entirely unwrung% . ha+e, indeed, said92<G: that 6to )e radical, an empiricism must not admit into its constructions any element that is not directly e/perienced%7 But in my own radical empiricism this is only a methodological postulate, not a conclusion supposed to flow from the intrinsic a)surdity of transempirical o)'ects% . ha+e ne+er felt the slightest respect for the idealistic9Pg <G<: arguments which Mr% Pit!in attac!s and of which &errier made such stri!ing use8 and . am perfectly willing to admit any num)er of noumenal )eings or e+ents into philosophy if only their pragmatic +alue can )e shown% Radical empiricism and pragmatism ha+e so many misunderstandings to suffer from, that it seems my duty not to let this one go any farther, uncorrected% Mr% Pit!in7s 6reply7 to me,92<F: 9%%%: perple/es me )y the o)scurity of style which . find in almost all our younger philosophers% #e as!s me, howe+er, two direct Cuestions which . understand, so . ta!e the li)erty of answering% &irst he as!s, Do not e/perience and science show 6that countless things are92<H: e/perienced as that which they are not or are only partially-7 . reply, Nes, assuredly, as, for e/ample, 6things7 distorted )y refracti+e media, 6molecules,7 or whate+er else is ta!en to )e more ultimately real than the immediate content of the percepti+e moment% 9Pg <GE: Secondly, >.f e/perience is self0supporting92<5: ;in any intelligi)le sense= does this fact preclude the possi)ility of ;a= something not e/perienced and ;)= action of e/perience upon a noumenon-? My reply is, $ssuredly not the possi)ility of eitherIhow could it- Net in my opinion we should )e wise not to consider any thing or action of that nature, and to restrict our uni+erse of philosophic discourse to what is e/perienced or, at least, e/periencea)le%92<B:
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92<<: 9Reprinted from the 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% iii, Ao% <H, Decem)er <4, 234H8 and ibid., +ol% i+, Ao% G, &e)ruary 2G, 2345, where the original is entitled >$ Reply to Mr% Pit!in%? Ed%: 92<E: 9W% B% Pit!in, >$ Pro)lem of E+idence in Radical Empiricism,? ibid., +ol% iii, Ao% <G, Ao+em)er <<, 234H% Ed%: 92<G: 9$)o+e, p% G<% Ed%: 92<F: 9>.n Reply to Professor James,? 3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% i+, Ao% <, January 25, 2345% Ed%: 92<H: Mr% Pit!in inserts the clause, 6)y reason of the +ery nature of e/perience itself%7 Aot understanding 'ust what reason is meant, . do not include this clause in my answer% 92<5: 9See a)o+e, p% 23E% Ed%: 92<B: 9Elsewhere, in spea!ing of 6reality7 as >conceptual or perceptual e/periences,? the author says, >"his is meant merely to e/clude reality of an 6un!nowa)le7 sort, of which no account in either perceptual or conceptual terms can )e gi+en% .t includes, of course, any amount of empirical reality independent of the !nower%? Meaning of Truth, p% 244, note% Ed%: 9Pg <GG:
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Mr% Joseph7s criticism of my article 6#umanism and "ruth792E4: is a useful contri)ution to the general clearing up% #e has seriously tried to comprehend what the pragmatic mo+ement may intelligi)ly mean8 and if he has failed, it is the fault neither of his patience nor of his sincerity, )ut rather of stu))orn tric!s of thought which he could not easily get rid of% Minute polemics, in which the parties try to re)ut e+ery detail of each of the other7s charges, are a useful e/ercise only to the disputants% "hey can )ut )reed confusion in a reader% . will therefore ignore as much as possi)le the te/t of )oth our articles ;mine was inadeCuate enough= and treat once more the general o)'ecti+e situation% 9Pg <GF: $s . apprehend the mo+ement towards humanism, it is )ased on no particular disco+ery or principle that can )e dri+en into one precise formula which thereupon can )e impaled upon a logical s!ewer% .t is much more li!e one of those secular changes that come upon pu)lic opinion o+er0night, as it were, )orne upon tides 6too full for sound or foam,7 that sur+i+e all the crudities and e/tra+agances of their ad+ocates, that you can pin to no one a)solutely essential statement, nor !ill )y any one decisi+e sta)% Such ha+e )een the changes from aristocracy to democracy, from classic to romantic taste, from theistic to pantheistic feeling, from static to e+olutionary ways of understanding lifeIchanges of which we all ha+e )een spectators% Scholasticism still opposes to such changes the method of confutation )y single decisi+e reasons, showing that the new +iew in+ol+es self0contradiction, or tra+erses some fundamental principle% "his is li!e stopping9Pg <GH: a ri+er )y planting a stic! in the middle of its )ed% Round your o)stacle flows the water and 6gets there all the same%7 .n reading Mr% Joseph, . am not a little reminded of those Catholic writers who refute Darwinism )y telling us that higher species can not come from lower )ecause minus ne,uit gignere plus, or that the notion of transformation is a)surd, for it implies that species tend to their own destruction, and that would +iolate the principle that e+ery reality tends to perse+ere in its own shape% "he point of +iew is too myopic, too tight and close to ta!e in the inducti+e argument% Nou can not settle Cuestions of fact )y formal logic% . feel as if Mr% Joseph almost pounced on my words singly, without gi+ing the sentences time to get out of my mouth% "he one condition of understanding humanism is to )ecome inducti+e0minded oneself, to drop rigorous definitions, and follow lines of least resistance 6on the whole%7 >.n other words,? Mr% Joseph may pro)a)ly say, >resol+e your intellect into a !ind of slush%? >E+en so,? . ma!e reply,I>if you will9Pg <G5: consent to use no politer word%? &or humanism,
concei+ing the more 6true7 as the more 6satisfactory7 ;Dewey7s term= has to renounce sincerely rectilinear arguments and ancient ideals of rigor and finality% .t is in 'ust this temper of renunciation, so different from that of pyrrhonistic scepticism, that the spirit of humanism essentially consists% Satisfactoriness has to )e measured )y a multitude of standards, of which some, for aught we !now, may fail in any gi+en case8 and what is 6more7 satisfactory than any alternati+e in sight, may to the end )e a sum of pluses and minuses, concerning which we can only trust that )y ulterior corrections and impro+ements a ma/imum of the one and a minimum of the other may some day )e approached% .t means a real change of heart, a )rea! with a)solutistic hopes, when one ta!es up this +iew of the conditions of )elief% "hat humanism7s critics ha+e ne+er imagined this attitude inwardly, is shown )y their in+aria)le tactics% "hey do not get into it far enough to see o)'ecti+ely and from9Pg <GB: without what their own opposite notion of truth is% Mr% Joseph is possessed )y some such notion8 he thin!s his readers to )e full of it, he o)eys it, wor!s from it, )ut ne+er e+en essays to tell us what it is% "he nearest he comes to doing so is where92E2: he says it is the way >we ought to thin!,? whether we )e psychologically compelled to or not% @f course humanism agrees to this, it is only a manner of calling truth an ideal% But humanism e/plicates the summariDing word 6ought7 into a mass of pragmatic moti+es from the midst of which our critics thin! that truth itself ta!es flight% "ruth is a name of dou)le meaning% .t stands now for an a)stract something defined only as that to which our thought ought to conform8 and again it stands for the concrete propositions within which we )elie+e that conformity already reignsIthey )eing so many 6truths%7 #umanism sees that the only conformity we e+er ha+e to deal with concretely is that )etween our su)'ects and our predicates, using these words in a +ery9Pg <G3: )road sense% .t sees moreo+er that this conformity is 6+alidated7 ;to use Mr% Schiller7s term= )y an indefinite num)er of pragmatic tests that +ary as the predicates and su)'ects +ary% .f an S gets superseded )y an SP that gi+es our mind a completer sum of satisfactions, we always say, humanism points out, that we ha+e ad+anced to a )etter position in regard to truth% Aow many of our 'udgments thus attained are retrospecti+e% "he S7es, so the 'udgment runs, were SP7s already ere the fact was humanly recorded% Common sense, struc! )y this state of things, now rearranges the whole field8 and traditional philosophy follows her e/ample% "he general reCuirement that predicates must conform to their su)'ect, they translate into an ontological theory% $ most pre+ious Su)'ect of all is su)stituted for the lesser su)'ects and concei+ed of as an archetypal Reality8 and the conformity reCuired of predicates in detail is reinterpreted as a relation which our whole mind, with all its su)'ects and predicates together, must get into9Pg <F4: with respect to this Reality% .t, meanwhile, is concei+ed as eternal, static, and unaffected )y our thin!ing% Conformity to a non0human $rchetype li!e this is pro)a)ly the notion of truth which my opponent shares with common sense and philosophic rationalism% When now #umanism, fully admitting )oth the naturalness and the grandeur of this hypothesis, ne+ertheless points to its sterility, and declines to chime in with the su)stitution, !eeping to the concrete and still lodging truth )etween the su)'ects and the predicates in detail, it pro+o!es the outcry which we hear and which my critic echoes% @ne of the commonest parts of the outcry is that humanism is su)'ecti+istic altogetherIit is supposed to la)or under a necessity of 6denying trans0perceptual reality%792E<: .t is not hard to see how this misconception of humanism may ha+e arisen8 and humanistic writers, partly from not ha+ing sufficiently guarded their e/pressions, and partly from not ha+ing yet >got round? ;in the po+erty of their9Pg <F2: literature= to a full discussion of the su)'ect, are dou)tless in some degree to )lame% But . fail to understand how any one with a wor!ing grasp of their principles can charge them wholesale with su)'ecti+ism% . myself ha+e ne+er thought of humanism as )eing su)'ecti+istic farther than to this e/tent, that, inasmuch as it treats the thin!er as )eing himself one portion of reality, it must also allow that some of the realities that he declares for true are created )y his )eing there% Such realities of course are either acts of his, or relations )etween other things and him, or relations )etween things, which, )ut for him, would ne+er ha+e )een traced% #umanists are su)'ecti+istic, also in this, that, unli!e rationalists ;who thin! they carry a warrant for the a)solute truth of what they now )elie+e in in their present poc!et=, they hold all present )eliefs as su)'ect to re+ision in the light of future e/perience% "he future e/perience, howe+er, may )e of things outside the thin!er8 and that this is so the humanist may )elie+e as freely as any other !ind of empiricist philosopher%9Pg <F<: "he critics of humanism ;though here . follow them )ut dar!ly= appear to o)'ect to any infusion whate+er of su)'ecti+ism into truth% $ll must )e archetypal8 e+ery truth must pre0e/ist to its perception% #umanism sees that an enormous Cuantity of truth must )e written down as ha+ing pre0e/isted to its perception )y us humans% .n countless instances we find it most satisfactory to )elie+e that, though we were always ignorant of the fact, it always !as a fact that S was SP% But humanism
separates this class of cases from those in which it is more satisfactory to )elie+e the opposite, e%g%, that S is ephemeral, or P a passing e+ent, or SP created )y the percei+ing act% @ur critics seem on the other hand, to wish to uni+ersaliDe the retrospecti+e type of instance% Reality must pre0e/ist to e+ery assertion for which truth is claimed% $nd, not content with this o+eruse of one particular type of 'udgment, our critics claim its monopoly% "hey appear to wish to cut off #umanism from its rights to any retrospection at all%9Pg <FE: #umanism says that satisfactoriness is what distinguishes the true from the false% But satisfactoriness is )oth a su)'ecti+e Cuality, and a present one% $rgo ;the critics appear to reason= an o)'ect, ,uE true, must always for humanism )e )oth present and su)'ecti+e, and a humanist7s )elief can ne+er )e in anything that li+es outside of the )elief itself or ante0dates it% Why so preposterous a charge should )e so current, . find it hard to say% Aothing is more o)+ious than the fact that )oth the o)'ecti+e and the past e/istence of the o)'ect may )e the +ery things a)out it that most seem satisfactory, and that most in+ite us to )elie+e them% "he past tense can figure in the humanist7s world, as well of )elief as of representation, Cuite as harmoniously as in the world of any one else% Mr% Joseph gi+es a special turn to this accusation% #e charges me92EE: with )eing self0contradictory when . say that the main categories of thought were e+ol+ed in the course of e/perience itself% &or . use these +ery9Pg <FG: categories to define the course of e/perience )y% E/perience, as . tal! a)out it, is a product of their use8 and yet . ta!e it as true anteriorly to them% "his seems to Mr% Joseph to )e an a)surdity% . hope it does not seem such to his readers8 for if e/periences can suggest hypotheses at all ;and they notoriously do so= . can see no a)surdity whate+er in the notion of a retrospecti+e hypothesis ha+ing for its o)'ect the +ery train of e/periences )y which its own )eing, along with that of other things, has )een )rought a)out% .f the hypothesis is 6satisfactory7 we must, of course, )elie+e it to ha+e )een true anteriorly to its formulation )y oursel+es% E+ery e/planation of a present )y a past seems to in+ol+e this !ind of circle, which is not a +icious circle% "he past is causa existendi of the present, which in turn is causa cognoscendi of the past% .f the present were treated as causa existendi of the past, the circle might indeed )e +icious% Closely connected with this pseudo0difficulty is another one of wider scope and greater9Pg <FF: complicationImore e/cusa)le therefore%92EG: #umanism, namely, as!ing how truth in point of fact is reached, and seeing that it is )y e+er su)stituting more satisfactory for less satisfactory opinions, is there)y led into a +ague historic s!etch of truth7s de+elopment% "he earliest 6opinions,7 it thin!s, must ha+e )een dim, unconnected 6feelings,7 and only little )y little did more and more orderly +iews of things replace them% @ur own retrospecti+e +iew of this whole e+olution is now, let us say, the latest candidate for 6truth7 as yet reached in the process% "o )e a satisfactory candidate, it must gi+e some definite sort of a picture of what forces !eep the process going% @n the su)'ecti+e side we ha+e a fairly definite pictureIsensation, association, interest, hypothesis, these account in a general way for the growth into a cosmos of the relati+e chaos with which the mind )egan% But on the side of the o)'ect, so to call it roughly, our +iew is much less satisfactory%9Pg <FH: @f which of our many o)'ects are we to )elie+e that it truly !as there and at wor! )efore the human mind )egan- "ime, space, !ind, num)er, serial order, cause, consciousness, are hard things not to o)'ectifyIe+en transcendental idealism lea+es them standing as 6empirically real%7 Su)stance, matter, force, fall down more easily )efore criticism, and secondary Cualities ma!e almost no resistance at all% Ae+ertheless, when we sur+ey the field of speculation, from Scholasticism through Kantism to Spencerism, we find an e+er0recurring tendency to con+ert the pre0human into a merely logical o)'ect, an un!nowa)le ding'an'sich, that )ut starts the process, or a +ague materia prima that )ut recei+es our forms%92EF: "he reasons for this are not so much logical as they are material% We can postulate an e/tra0mental that freely enough ;though some idealists ha+e denied us the pri+ilege=, )ut when we ha+e done so, the !hat of it is hard9Pg <F5: to determine satisfactorily, )ecause of the oppositions and entanglements of the +ariously proposed !hats with one another and with the history of the human mind% "he literature of speculati+e cosmology )ears witness to this difficulty% #umanism suffers from it no more than any other philosophy suffers, )ut it ma!es all our cosmogonic theories so unsatisfactory that some thin!ers see! relief in the denial of any primal dualism% $)solute "hought or 6pure e/perience7 is postulated, and endowed with attri)utes calculated to 'ustify the )elief that it may 6run itself%7 Both these truth0claiming hypotheses are non0dualistic in the old mind0and0matter sense8 )ut the one is monistic and the other pluralistic as to the world process itself% Some humanists are non0dualists of this sortI. myself am one und .!ar of the pluralistic )rand% But dou)tless dualistic humanists also e/ist, as well as non0dualistic ones of the monistic wing%
Mr% Joseph pins these general philosophic difficulties on humanism alone, or possi)ly on me alone% My article spo!e +aguely of a9Pg <FB: 6most chaotic pure e/perience7 coming first, and )uilding up the mind%92EH: But how can two structureless things interact so as to produce a structure- my critic triumphantly as!s% @f course they can7t, as purely so0 named entities% We must ma!e additional hypotheses% We must )eg a minimum of structure for them% "he (ind of minimum that might ha+e tended to increase towards what we now find actually de+eloped is the philosophical desideratum here% "he Cuestion is that of the most materially satisfactory hypothesis% Mr% Joseph handles it )y formal logic purely, as if he had no acCuaintance with the logic of hypothesis at all% Mr% Joseph again is much )ewildered as to what a humanist can mean when he uses the word !nowledge% #e tries to con+ict me92E5: of +aguely identifying it with any !ind of good% Knowledge is a difficult thing to define )riefly, and Mr% Joseph shows his own constructi+e hand here e+en less than in the rest of his9Pg <F3: article% . ha+e myself put forth on se+eral occasions a radically pragmatist account of !nowledge,92EB: the e/istence of which account my critic pro)a)ly does not !now ofIso perhaps . had )etter not say anything a)out !nowledge until he reads and attac!s that% . will say, howe+er, that whate+er the relation called !nowing may itself pro+e to consist in, . can thin! of no concei+a)le !ind of ob&ect which may not )ecome an o)'ect of !nowledge on humanistic principles as well as on the principles of any other philosophy%92E3: . confess that . am pretty steadily hampered )y the ha)it, on the part of humanism7s critics, of assuming that they ha+e truer ideas than mine of truth and !nowledge, the nature of which . must !now of and can not need to ha+e re0defined% . ha+e conseCuently to reconstruct these ideas in order to carry on the discussion ;. ha+e e%g% had to do so in some parts9Pg <H4: of this article= and . there)y e/pose myself to charges of caricature% .n one part of Mr% Joseph7s attac!, howe+er, . re'oice that we are free from this em)arrassment% .t is an important point and co+ers pro)a)ly a genuine difficulty, so . ta!e it up last% When, following Schiller and Dewey, . define the true as that which gi+es the ma/imal com)ination of satisfactions, and say that satisfaction is a many0dimensional term that can )e realiDed in +arious ways, Mr% Joseph replies, rightly enough, that the chief satisfaction of a rational creature must always )e his thought that what he )elie+es is true, whether the truth )rings him the satisfaction of collateral profits or not% "his would seem, howe+er, to ma!e of truth the prior concept, and to relegate satisfaction to a secondary place% $gain, if to )e satisfactory is what is meant )y )eing true, !hose satisfactions, and !hich of his satisfactions, are to countDiscriminations notoriously ha+e to )e made8 and the upshot is that only rational candidates and9Pg <H2: intellectual satisfactions stand the test% We are then dri+en to a purely theoretic notion of truth, and get out of the pragmatic atmosphere altogether% $nd with this Mr% Joseph lea+es usItruth is truth, and there is an end of the matter% But he ma!es a +ery pretty show of con+icting me of self0stultification in according to our purely theoretic satisfactions any place in the humanistic scheme% "hey crowd the collateral satisfactions out of house and home, he thin!s, and pragmatism has to go into )an!ruptcy if she recogniDes them at all% "here is no room for disagreement a)out the facts here8 )ut the destructi+e force of the reasoning disappears as soon as we tal! concretely instead of a)stractly, and as!, in our Cuality of good pragmatists, 'ust what the famous theoretic needs are !nown as and in what the intellectual satisfactions consist% Mr% Joseph, faithful to the ha)its of his party, ma!es no attempt at characteriDing them, )ut assumes that their nature is self0e+ident to all% $re they not all mere matters of consistencyIand emphatically not of consistency9Pg <H<: )etween an $)solute Reality and the mind7s copies of it, )ut of actually felt consistency among 'udgments, o)'ects, and manners of reacting, in the mind- $nd are not )oth our need of such consistency and our pleasure in it concei+a)le as outcomes of the natural fact that we are )eings that de+elop mental habitsIha)it itself pro+ing adapti+ely )eneficial in an en+ironment where the same o)'ects, or the same !inds of o)'ects, recur and follow 6law7- .f this were so, what would ha+e come first would ha+e )een the collateral profits of ha)it, and the theoretic life would ha+e grown up in aid of these% .n point of fact this seems to ha+e )een the pro)a)le case% $t life7s origin, any present perception may ha+e )een 6true7Iif such a word could then )e applica)le% ater, when reactions )ecame organiDed, the reactions )ecame 6true7 whene+er e/pectation was fulfilled )y them% @therwise they were 6false7 or 6mista!en7 reactions% But the same class of o)'ects needs the same !ind of reaction, so the impulse to react consistently must gradually ha+e )een esta)lished, with a9Pg <HE: disappointment felt whene+er the results frustrated e/pectation% #ere is a perfectly plausi)le germ for all our higher consistencies% Aowadays, if an o)'ect claims from us a reaction of the !ind ha)itually accorded only to the opposite class of o)'ects, our mental machinery
refuses to run smoothly% "he situation is intellectually unsatisfactory% "o gain relief we see! either to preser+e the reaction )y re0interpreting the o)'ect, or, lea+ing the o)'ect as it is, we react in a way contrary to the way claimed of us% Aeither solution is easy% Such a situation might )e that of Mr% Joseph, with me claiming assent to humanism from him% #e can not appercei+e it so as to permit him to gratify my claim8 )ut there is enough appeal in the claim to induce him to write a whole article in 'ustification of his refusal% .f he should assent to humanism, on the other hand, that would drag after it an unwelcome, yea incredi)le, alteration of his pre+ious mental )eliefs% Whiche+er alternati+e he might adopt, howe+er, a new eCuili)rium of intellectual consistency would in the end )e reached% #e would feel,9Pg <HG: whiche+er way he decided, that he was now thin!ing truly% But if, with his old ha)its unaltered, he should simply add to them the new one of ad+ocating humanism Cuietly or noisily, his mind would )e rent into two systems, each of which would accuse the other of falsehood% "he resultant situation, )eing profoundly unsatisfactory, would also )e insta)le% "heoretic truth is thus no relation )etween our mind and archetypal reality% .t falls !ithin the mind, )eing the accord of some of its processes and o)'ects with other processes and o)'ectsI6accord7 consisting here in well0defina)le relations% So long as the satisfaction of feeling such an accord is denied us, whate+er collateral profits may seem to inure from what we )elie+e in are )ut as dust in the )alanceIpro+ided always that we are highly organiDed intellectually, which the ma'ority of us are not% "he amount of accord which satisfies most men and women is merely the a)sence of +iolent clash )etween their usual thoughts and statements and the limited sphere of sense0perceptions in which their li+es9Pg <HF: are cast% "he theoretic truth that most of us thin! we 6ought7 to attain to is thus the possession of a set of predicates that do not contradict their su)'ects% We preser+e it as often as not )y lea+ing other predicates and su)'ects out% .n some men theory is a passion, 'ust as music is in others% "he form of inner consistency is pursued far )eyond the line at which collateral profits stop% Such men systematiDe and classify and schematiDe and ma!e synoptical ta)les and in+ent ideal o)'ects for the pure lo+e of unifying% "oo often the results, glowing with 6truth7 for the in+entors, seem pathetically personal and artificial to )ystanders% Which is as much as to say that the purely theoretic criterion of truth can lea+e us in the lurch as easily as any other criterion% . thin! that if Mr% Joseph will )ut consider all these things a little more concretely, he may find that the humanistic scheme and the notion of theoretic truth fall into line consistently enough to yield him also intellectual satisfaction%
F(()*()!S+
92<3: 9Reprinted without change from Mind, A% S%, +ol% /i+, Ao% FG, $pril, 234F, pp% 234023B% Pages <GF0<G5, and pp% <H20 <HF, ha+e also )een reprinted in The Meaning of Truth, pp% FG0F5, and pp% 350244% "he present essay is referred to a)o+e, p% <4E% Ed%: 92E4: 96#umanism and "ruth7 first appeared in Mind, A% S%, +ol% /iii, Ao% F<, @cto)er, 234G% .t is reprinted in The Meaning of Truth, pp% F20242% Cf% this article passim% Mr% #% W% B% Joseph7s criticism, entitled >Professor James on 6#umanism and "ruth,7? appeared in Mind, A% S%, +ol% /i+, Ao% FE, January, 234F% Ed%: 92E2: p. cit., p% E5% 92E<: 9Cf% a)o+e, pp% <G20<GE%: 92EE: p. cit., p% E<% 92EG: 9"his: Mr% Joseph deals with ;though in much too pettifogging and logic0chopping a way= on pp% EE0EG of his article% 92EF: Compare some ela)orate articles )y M% e Roy and M% Wil)ois in the #evue de MFtaphysi,ue et de Morale, +ols% +iii, i/, and /, 92344, 2342, and 234<%: 92EH: 9Cf% The Meaning of Truth, p% HG%: 92E5: 9Joseph, op. cit., p% EH%: 92EB: Most recently in two articles, >Does 6Consciousness7 E/ist-? and >$ World of Pure E/perience%? 9See a)o+e, pp% 20 32%: 92E3: &or a recent attempt, effecti+e on the whole, at sCuaring humanism with !nowing, . may refer to Prof% Wood)ridge7s +ery a)le address at the Saint ouis Congress, >"he &ield of ogic,? printed in Science, A% N%, Ao+em)er G, 234G%
9Pg <HH:
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Ao see!er of truth can fail to re'oice at the terre0X0terre sort of discussion of the issues )etween Empiricism and "ranscendentalism ;or, as the champions of the latter would pro)a)ly prefer to say, )etween .rrationalism and Rationalism= that seems to ha+e )egun in Mind%92G2: .t would seem as if, o+er concrete e/amples li!e Mr% J% S% #aldane7s, )oth parties ought ine+ita)ly to come to a )etter understanding% $s a reader with a strong )ias towards .rrationalism, . ha+e studied his article92G<: with the li+eliest admiration of its temper and its painsta!ing effort to )e clear% But the cases discussed failed to satisfy me, and . was at first tempted to write a Aote animad+erting upon them in detail% "he growth of the lim), the sea7s contour, the +icarious functioning of the ner+e0centre, the digitalis curing the heart, are unfortunately9Pg <H5: not cases where we can see any through'and'through conditioning of the parts )y the whole% "hey are all cases of reciprocity where su)'ects, supposed independently to e/ist, acCuire certain attri)utes through their relations to other su)'ects% "hat they also exist through similar relations is only an ideal supposition, not +erified to our understanding in these or any other concrete cases whatsoe+er% .f, howe+er, one were to urge this solemnly, Mr% #aldane7s friends could easily reply that he only ga+e us such e/amples on account of the hardness of our hearts% #e !new full well their imperfection, )ut he hoped that to those who would not spontaneously ascend to the Aotion of the "otality, these cases might pro+e a spur and suggest and sym)oliDe something )etter than themsel+es% Ao particular case that can )e )rought forward is a real concrete% "hey are all a)stractions from the Whole, and of course the >through0and0through? character can not )e found in them% Each of them still contains among its elements what we call things, grammatical su)'ects,9Pg <HB: forming a sort of residual caput mortuum of E/istence after all the relations that figure in the e/amples ha+e )een told off% @n this >e/istence,? thin!s popular philosophy, things may li+e on, li!e the winter )ears on their own fat, ne+er entering relations at all, or, if entering them, entering an entirely different set of them from those treated of in Mr% #aldane7s e/amples% "hus if the digitalis were to wea!en instead of strengthening the heart, and to produce death ;as sometimes happens=, it would determine itself, through determining the organism, to the function of >!ill? instead of that of >cure%? "he function and relation seem ad+entitious, depending on what !ind of a heart the digitalis gets hold of, the digitalis and the heart )eing facts e/ternal and, so to spea!, accidental to each other% But this popular +iew, Mr% #aldane7s friends will continue, is an illusion% What seems to us the >e/istence? of digitalis and heart outside of the relations of !illing or curing, is )ut a function in a wider system of relations, of which, pro hac vice, we ta!e no account% "he larger system9Pg <H3: determines the existence 'ust as a)solutely as the system >!ill,? or the system >cure,? determined the function of the digitalis% $scend to the a)solute system, instead of )iding with these relati+e and partial ones, and you shall see that the law of through0and0throughness must and does o)tain% @f course, this argument is entirely reasona)le, and de)ars us completely from chopping logic a)out the concrete e/amples Mr% #aldane has chosen% .t is not his fault if his categories are so fine an instrument that nothing )ut the sum total of things can )e ta!en to show us the manner of their use% .t is simply our misfortune that he has not the sum total of things to show it )y% et us fall )ac! from all concrete attempts and see what we can do with his notion of through0and0throughness, a+owedly ta!en in abstracto% .n a)stract systems the >through0and0through? .deal is realiDed on e+ery hand% .n any system, as such, the mem)ers are only members in the system% $)olish the system and you a)olish its mem)ers, for you ha+e concei+ed them through no9Pg <54: other property than the a)stract one of mem)ership% Aeither rightness nor leftness, e/cept through )i0laterality% Aeither mortgager nor mortgagee, e/cept through mortgage% "he logic of these cases is this,I *f $, then B8 )ut if B, then $, wherefore if either, Both8 and if not Both, Aothing% .t costs nothing, not e+en a mental effort, to admit that the a)solute totality of things may )e organiDed e/actly after the pattern of one of these >through0and0through? a)stractions% .n fact, it is the pleasantest and freest of mental mo+ements% #us)and ma!es, and is made )y, wife, through marriage8 one ma!es other, )y )eing itself other8 e+erything self0created through its oppositeIyou go round li!e a sCuirrel in a cage% But if you stop and reflect upon what you are a)out, you lay )are the e/act point at issue )etween common sense and the >through0and0through? school%
What, in fact, is the logic of these a)stract systems- .t is, as we said a)o+e, .f any Mem)er, then the Whole System8 if not the Whole System, then Aothing% But how can ogic9Pg <52: possi)ly do anything more with these two hypotheses than com)ine them into the single dis'uncti+e propositionI>Either this Whole System, 'ust as it stands, or Aothing at all%? .s not that dis'unction the ultimate word of ogic in the matter, and can any dis'unction, as such, resol+e itself- .t may )e that Mr% #aldane sees how one horn, the concept of the Whole System, carries real e/istence with it% But if he has )een as unsuccessful as . in assimilating the #egelian re0editings of the $nselmian proof,92GE: he will ha+e to say that though ogic may determine !hat the system must )e, if it is, something else than ogic must tell us that it is% Mr% #aldane in this case would pro)a)ly consciously, or unconsciously, ma!e an appeal to &act, the dis'unction is decided, since no)ody can dispute that now, as a matter of fact, something, and not nothing, is% We must therefore, he would pro)a)ly say, go on to admit the Whole System in the desiderated sense% .s not then the +alidity of the 9Pg <5<:$nselmian proof the nucleus of the whole Cuestion )etween ogic and &act- @ught not the efforts of Mr% #aldane and his friends to )e principally de+oted to its elucidation- .s it not the real door of separation )etween Empiricism and Rationalism- $nd if the Rationalists lea+e that door for a moment off its hinges, can any power !eep that a)stract, opaCue, unmediated, e/ternal, irrational, and irresponsi)le monster, !nown to the +ulgar as )are &act, from getting in and contaminating the whole sanctuary with his presence- Can anything pre+ent &aust from changing >$m $nfang war das Wort? into >$m $nfang war die "hat-? Aothing in earth or hea+en% @nly the $nselmian proof can !eep &act out of philosophy% "he Cuestion, >Shall &act )e recogniDed as an ultimate principle-? is the whole issue )etween the Rationalists and the Empiricism of +ulgar thought% @f course, if so recogniDed, &act sets a limit to the >through0and0through? character of the world7s rationality% "hat rationality might9Pg <5E: then mediate )etween all the mem)ers of our conception of the world, )ut not )etween the conception itself and reality% Reality would ha+e to )e gi+en, not )y Reason, )ut )y &act% &act holds out )lan!ly, )rutally and )lindly, against that uni+ersal deliCuescence of e+erything into logical relations which the $)solutist ogic demands, and it is the only thing that does hold out% #ence the ire of the $)solutist ogicIhence its non0recognition, its 6cutting7 of &act% "he reasons it gi+es for the 6cutting7 are that &act is speechless, a mere word for the negation of thought, a +acuous un!nowa)ility, a dog0in0the0manger, in truth, which ha+ing no rights of its own, can find nothing else to do than to !eep its )etters out of theirs% "here are two points in+ol+ed here, first the claim that certain things ha+e rights that are a)solute, u)iCuitous and all per+asi+e, and in regard to which nothing else can possi)ly e/ist in its o!n right8 and second that anything that denies this assertion is pure negati+ity with no positi+e conte/t whatsoe+er%9Pg <5G: "a!e the latter point first% .s it true that what is negati+e in one way is there)y con+icted of incapacity to )e positi+e in any other way- "he word >&act? is li!e the word >$ccident,? li!e the word >$)solute? itself% "hey all ha+e their negati+e connotation% .n truth, their whole connotation is negati+e and relati+e% $ll it says is that, whate+er the thing may )e that is denoted )y the words, other things do not control it% Where fact, where accident is, they must )e silent, it alone can spea!% But that does not pre+ent its spea!ing as loudly as you please, in its own tongue% .t may ha+e an inward life, self0 transparent and acti+e in the ma/imum degree% $n indeterminate future +olition on my part, for e/ample, would )e a strict accident as far as my present self is concerned% But that could not pre+ent it, in the moment in !hich it occurred, from )eing possi)ly the most intensely li+ing and luminous e/perience . e+er had% .ts Cuality of )eing a )rute fact ab extra says nothing whate+er as to its inwardness% .t simply says to outsiders, 6#ands off*79Pg <5F: $nd this )rings us )ac! to the first point of the $)solutist indictment of &act% .s that point really anything more than a fantastic disli!e to letting anything say 6#ands off7- What else e/plains the contempt the $)solutist authors e/hi)it for a freedom defined simply on its >negati+e? side, as freedom >from,? etc%- What else prompts them to deride such freedomBut, disli!e for disli!e, who shall decide- Why is not their disli!e at ha+ing me >from? them, entirely on a par with mine at ha+ing them >through? me. !now +ery well that in tal!ing of disli!es to those who ne+er mention them, . am doing a +ery coarse thing, and ma!ing a sort of intellectual @rson of myself% But, for the life of me, . can not help it, )ecause . feel sure that li!es and disli!es must )e among the ultimate factors of their philosophy as well as of mine% Would they )ut admit it* #ow sweetly we then could hold con+erse together* "here is something finite a)out us )oth, as we now stand% We do not !now the $)solute Whole yet% Part of it is still negati+e to us% $mong9Pg <5H: the !hats of it still stal!s a mo) of opaCue thats, without which we cannot
thin!% But 'ust as . admit that this is all possi)ly pro+isional, that e+en the $nselmian proof may come out all right, and creation may )e a rational system through0and0through, why might they not also admit that it may all )e otherwise, and that the shadow, the opacity, the negati+ity, the >from?0ness, the plurality that is ultimate, may ne+er )e wholly dri+en from the scene% We should )oth then )e a+owedly ma!ing hypotheses, playing with .deals% $h* Why is the notion of hypothesis so a)horrent to the #egelian mind$nd once down on our common le+el of hypothesis, we might then admit scepticism, since the Whole is not yet re+ealed, to )e the soundest logical position% But since we are in the main not sceptics, we might go on and fran!ly confess to each other the moti+es for our se+eral faiths% . fran!ly confess mineI. can not )ut thin! that at )ottom they are of an _sthetic and not of a logical sort% "he >through0and0through? uni+erse seems to9Pg <55: suffocate me with its infalli)le impecca)le all0per+asi+eness% .ts necessity, with no possi)ilities8 its relations, with no su)'ects, ma!e me feel as if . had entered into a contract with no reser+ed rights, or rather as if . had to li+e in a large seaside )oarding0house with no pri+ate )ed0room in which . might ta!e refuge from the society of the place% . am distinctly aware, moreo+er, that the old Cuarrel of sinner and pharisee has something to do with the matter% Certainly, to my personal !nowledge, all #egelians are not prigs, )ut . somehow feel as if all prigs ought to end, if de+eloped, )y )ecoming #egelians% "here is a story of two clergymen as!ed )y mista!e to conduct the same funeral% @ne came first and had got no farther than >. am the Resurrection and the ife,? when the other entered% >* am the Resurrection and the ife,? cried the latter% "he >through0and0through? philosophy, as it actually e/ists, reminds many of us of that clergyman% .t seems too )uttoned0up and white0cho!ered and clean0sha+en a thing to spea! for the +ast slow0)reathing unconscious9Pg <5B: Kosmos with its dread a)ysses and its un!nown tides% "he >freedom? !e want to see there is not the freedom, with a string tied to its leg and warranted not to fly away, of that philosophy% > et it fly away,? we say, >from us* What then-? $gain, . !now . am e/hi)iting my mental grossness% But again, *ch (ann nicht anders. . show my feelings8 why !ill they not show theirs- . !now they have a personal feeling a)out the through0and0through uni+erse, which is entirely different from mine, and which . should +ery li!ely )e much the )etter for gaining if they would only show me how% "heir persistence in telling me that feeling has nothing to do with the Cuestion, that it is a pure matter of a)solute reason, !eeps me for e+er out of the pale% Still seeing a that in things which ogic does not e/pel, the most . can do is to aspire to the e/pulsion% $t present . do not e+en aspire% $spiration is a feeling% What can !indle feeling )ut the e/ample of feeling- $nd if the #egelians !ill refuse to set an e/ample, what can they e/pect the rest of9Pg <53: us to do- "o spea! more seriously, the one fundamental Cuarrel Empiricism has with $)solutism is o+er this repudiation )y $)solutism of the personal and _sthetic factor in the construction of philosophy% "hat we all of us ha+e feelings, Empiricism feels Cuite sure% "hat they may )e as prophetic and anticipatory of truth as anything else we ha+e, and some of them more so than others, can not possi)ly )e denied% But what hope is there of sCuaring and settling opinions unless $)solutism will hold parley on this common ground8 and will admit that all philosophies are hypotheses, to which all our faculties, emotional as well as logical, help us, and the truest of which will at the final integration of things )e found in possession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the )est di+ining power-
Fy William &ames "#E J$R.E".ES @& RE .(.@QS ELPER.EACE, $ S"QDN .A #QM$A A$"QRE% (ifford ectures deli+ered at Edin)urgh in 23420234<% B+o% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 234<% PR$(M$".SM, $ AEW A$ME &@R S@ME @ D W$NS @& "#.AK.A(, P@PQ $R EC"QRES @A P#. @S@P#N% B+o% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 2345%
"#E ME$A.A( @& "RQ"#, $ SESQE "@ >PR$(M$".SM%? B+o% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 2343% $ P QR$ .S".C QA.JERSE, #.BBER" EC"QRES @A "#E PRESEA" S."Q$".@A .A P#. @S@P#N% B+o% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 2343% S@ME PR@B EMS @& P#. @S@P#N, $ BE(.AA.A( @& $A .A"R@DQC".@A "@ P#. @S@P#N% B+o% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 2322% ESS$NS .A R$D.C$ EMP.R.C.SM% B+o% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 232<% "#E W. "@ BE .EJE, $AD @"#ER ESS$NS .A P@PQ $R P#. @S@P#N% 2<mo% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 2B35% MEM@R.ES $AD S"QD.ES% B+o% Aew Nor!, ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 2322% "#E PR.AC.P ES @& PSNC#@ @(N% < +ols%, B+o% Aew Nor!, #enry #olt ` Co% ondon, Macmillan ` Co% 2B34% PSNC#@ @(N, BR.E&ER C@QRSE% 2<mo% Aew Nor!, #enry #olt ` Co% ondon, Macmillan ` Co% 2B3<% "$ KS "@ "E$C#ERS @A PSNC#@ @(N, $AD "@ S"QDEA"S @A S@ME @& .&E7S .DE$ S% 2<mo% Aew Nor!, #enry #olt ` Co% ondon, Bom)ay, and Calcutta, ongmans, (reen ` Co% 2B33% #QM$A .MM@R"$ ."N, "W@ SQPP@SED @BJEC".@AS "@ "#E D@C"R.AE% 2Hmo% Boston, #oughton Mifflin Co% ondon, $rchi)ald Consta)le ` Co% 2B3B% "#E ."ER$RN REM$.AS @& #EARN J$MES% Edited, with an .ntroduction, )y William James% With Portrait% Crown B+o% Boston, #oughton Mifflin Co% 2BBF%
Sources Special than!s to Wi!ipedia, which pro+ided the )ac!)one of the main content of this )oo!let, and allows to distri)ute it under a Creati+e Common licence%
Appendi' G AmAre Way in more details 5appiness and Meaning O A!are and Accepting P Meaningful and Motivated P Active and Attentive P #esilient and #espectful P $ating QProperlyR and $xercising $m$re stands for )eing, a A G Aware and $ccepting a : G :eaningful and Moti+ated a A G Acti+e and $ttenti+e a " G "esilient and Respectful S E Eating properly and $xercising
C.C
Aware Accepting
How to calculate it3

:eaningful :oti ated Acti e Attenti e "esilient "espectful !ating !'ercising
E/planation of +aria)les% Being, A, Aware of how we see things, our strengths, +alues and )iases8 and also Accepting them% :, :eaningful, doing what matters8 and also moti+ated to li+e 'oyfully for the )enefit of all% AC,Acti e and do what we consider appropriate in a gi+en conte/t8 and also )eing attenti e to the feed)ac! coming from the conte/t where we act% ", "esilient, )ecause in life there are )oth positi+e and challenging e+ents, it is )etter to accept and admit it, and !eep wal!ing in appropriate directions8 and also "espectful, !eeping a genuinely !ind attitude% !, !ating properly, feeding our )odies and minds with healthy food, feelings and thoughts8 and also !'ercising, )ecause it has )een pro+en than lac! of e/ercise is a cause of stress% ;b=, if there are additional aspects considered too important to )e included in the rest of the formula, they can )e weighted and graded here &or each +aria)le, please specify, w, weight, importance gi+en to each aspect ;sum of all weights should )e 244= g, grade, rating gi+en to each aspect ;each grade is a +alue )etween 4 and 2= .f you want to use a spreadsheet, where you can insert the +alues and see them automatically calculated, you can use, http,11spsh%amareway%org1
2%<
What does it mean3 $m$re formula is meant to )e descripti+e and pre+enti+e, )ut not predicti+e% "hat is, it Cuantifies the current situation, and the strengths and wea!nesses we should )e aware of and act upon% Regardless of what the num)er says, we are always responsi)le, here and now, for our happiness, so a high result means we should !eep )uilding our happiness as we ha+e successfully done so far, and a lower result means there are aspects to act upon to impro+e our li+es% @ne of the formula7s strengths is its unli!eness to reach @ne, the perfect score, or cero% "his formula is useful so we can impro+e our awareness a)out the situation so far, and )uild a )etter present% @nce the formula ser+ed its purposes, we can mo+e on% Because the ultimate happiness is not reaching num)er 2, it is in finding and renewing the appropriate life0dynamics% .f we can accept the way life is, and the fact that different people assign different weights and grades to the pillars of their happiness, and still respect and care a)out all of us, doing our )est for the mutual happiness, we are on the way to )uild together a lasting happy li+ing% "his is a scale to interpret the o+erall result of the formula, D-D.;+ "his is an unli!ely result, so please dou)le chec! each +alues inserted% .f +alues are correct, it is possi)le the perception of your SWB tends toward emphasiDing the non0positi+e aspects, or that there is a short0term serious issue% "his means there is a need to wor! on all your priorities to ma!e them more satisfying to you in the medium term% D.;C-D.@D+ Nour le+el of SWB could )e higher, if you are closer to 4%E2 result% .f you are closer to 4%F, you are near an e/act a+erage +alue where you percei+e the same +alue of positi+e and non0positi+e components in your life% .n )oth cases, )y wor!ing on the $m$re +aria)les ;starting from the ones with higher weight and lower grade=, you can su)stantially impro+e your well0)eing% D.@C-D.ED+ Nou tend towards an optimal le+el of SWB% Nou feel happy, and li!ely e/perienced most or at least many of the happiness dfringe )enefitsd% Nou li!ely li+e 'oyfully e+eryday, no matter the ups and downs we all ha+e, you can ma!e the )est of them for yourself and the people around you% D.EC-C+ "his result is unli!ely to )e reached, so please dou)le chec! each +alues inserted% .f +alues are correct, you are achie+ing the ma/imum le+el of SWB, which you can sustain )y li+ing 'oyfully % "o interpret the +alue of each $m$re +aria)le, you can use the same scale% .f a +aria)le is high in weight, and low in grade, then it reCuires attention and action to impro+e it% .f a +aria)le is low in weight, and high in grade, then you may as! yourself if its grade is slightly o+er estimated% We suggest to calculate your $m$re .nde/ once per wee! for the first F wee!s% "hen, to calculate it once per month% Please ma!e sure to start from scratch at each calculation, meaning you should not chec! +alues assigned in the past8 after calculating your current $m$re .nde/, you can then chec! what changed compared to the pre+ious calculations% .f you want to )e reminded a)out monthly calculation, you can register the $m$re newsletter on% http,11www%amareway%org1
C.; Where are references and further information3 http,11www%amareway%org1 ;@fficial we)site= http,11www%amareway%org1personal0de+elopment0free0personal0de+elopment0e)oo!s1 ;&ree eBoo!s, $m$re applied to )logging, social media, etc%= Su)'ecti+e well0)eing )log ;Re+iew of research a)out Su)'ecti+e well0)eing=

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org - Subjecti e well-being blog

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