City of Iloilo vs. Legaspi Facts: Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo enacted Regulation Ordinance No.

. 2001-037 granting authority to its City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay, It was approved by City Mayor Malabor. Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of Manuela Yusay, through her administratrix of the estate making a formal offer to purchase their property for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor and landless residents of the city in line with the citys housing development program. Counter-proposal of the administrators was not accepted. Petioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treas, filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain against private respondents. Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession alleging that since it has deposited with the Court the amount of P2,809,696.50 representing fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration, it may immediately take possession of the property in accordance with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160. Private respondents opposed the motion arguing that counsels of the parties had agreed that the lower court will resolve the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession after petitioner shall have rested its case after trial on the merits. They added that in view of the defects as to form and substance of the amended complaint, the issuance of a writ of possession ceases to be a ministerial duty on the court; hence, there is a need for a court hearing.

Petitioner avers that the Amended Complaint it filed complies with both requisites of ED thus entitling it to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance thereof becoming ministerial on the part of the lower court even without any hearing. On the other hand, private respondents allege that the Amended Complaint is not sufficient in form and substance since it failed to allege compliance with the mandatory requirements for the exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes of socialized housing. Private respondents argue that petitioner waived its right to ask for the immediate possession since it took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine (9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession

Issue: (1) W/N requisites for eminent domain have been complied with YES (2) W/N petitioner waived its right for immediate possession NO Held: (1) YES. REQUISITES for immediate entry (1) The filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial.

For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. In this case, the sufficiency of the Amended Complaint was further confirmed by public respondent when he set the case for pre-trial and hearing. (2) Petitioner did not waive its right. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time limit as to when a local government may immediately take possession of the real property. Said section provides that the local government unit may take immediate possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on its current tax declaration. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession. LIMITATIONS FOR THE EXERCISE Lagcao vs. Labra Facts: Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City. Petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. Then, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to

sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance. On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. MTTC and RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 17726 which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. Ordinance No. 18437 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional. TC dismissed

ISSUE: (1) W/N Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes. HELD: Under Section 48 of RA 7160,9 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,10 local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances. Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowners right to private property, which is as much a constitutionallyprotected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Whether directly exercised by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights. For this reason, the need for a painstaking scrutiny cannot be overemphasized. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late ExJustice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila, those are strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners? property without any attempt to first acquire

the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners? property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.20 We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners? right to due process. It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners? lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.21 Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional

infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate: first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160; second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance; third, the fact that petitioners? small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances. Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and the use of short-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings have not achieved the desired results. Over the years, the government has tried to remedy the worsening squatter problem. Far from solving it, however, government?s kid-glove approach has only resulted in the multiplication and proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted areas. A pro-poor program that is well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and truly respectful of everyone?s basic rights is what this problem calls for, not the improvident enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small private lots in no rational fashion

Filstream International Company vs. CA Facts: Petitioner, Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties subject of dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land. Petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the against the occupants of the abovementioned parcels of land (herein private respondents in G. R. No. 128077) on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. PR appealed to RTC and CA but was denied. The decision in the ejectment suit became final and executory. During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner Filstream. Meanwhile, City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of petitioner then occupied by private respondents. An ordinance was again passed declaring the expropriation of certain lands. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream.

A writ of possession was issued by RTC Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain as well as a motion to quash the writ of possession. They alleged that: (1) no valid cause of action (2) the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ of execution issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 4 in the ejectment suit; (3) violation of the constitutional guarantee against non-impairment of obligations and contracts (4) price offered was too low hence violative of the just compensation provision of the constitution and the said amount is without the certification of the City Treasurer for availability of funds. (5) Ordinance No. 7813 is a void enactment for it was approved without a public hearing and violative of the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts ((6) the price is too low and unconscionable violating the just compensation provision of the constitution, and the said writ is tainted with infirmity considering the absence of a certification from the City of Manila that there is an immediately available fund for the subject expropriation. *Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the properties and the existence of a final and executory judgment against private respondents ordering the latter's ejectment from the premises. Private respondents' claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event which has rendered the enforcement of petitioner's rights moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit of herein private respondents. For its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its power of

eminent domain within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioner's properties for public use. ISSUE: W/N the City of Manila complied with the conditions for a valid exercise of eminent domain HELD: NO. There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this dispute. The judgment in the ejectment suit became final and executory after private respondents failed to interpose any appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already become final and executory. However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409). Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing

the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use. The State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

Masikip vs. City of Pasig Facts: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. Respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." Petitioner opposed.

and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan) (B) PLAINTIFF HAS ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED. (C) EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT DEFENDANTS PROPERTY MAY BE EXPROPRIATED BY PLAINTIFF, THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED FAR EXCEEDS SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P78,000.00) TC dismissed complaint on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.

Issue: W/N it encompasses public necessity Held: NO. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners. Petitioner contends that: (A) THERE IS NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED. (According to petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs Reyes Facts The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community Facts: City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] alleged that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land, that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites,

would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. CFI ruled against petitioner. Plaintiff theorized that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE: W/N determining public purpose is a judicial function. HELD: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right

some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTA Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately

be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. Issue: W/N ordinance enacted is an exercise of police power Held:

NO. Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.' The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or

the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SORSOGON vs. VDA de Villaroya Facts: Lower court promulgated a decision in the recovery of real property case in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors, the private respondents herein, and against the defendant, the petitioner herein Petitioner manifested its willingness to pay to the private respondents the value of the subject parcels of land as mandated in the court's decision. Provincial Board of Sorsogon enacted Resolution No. 340 appropriating the amount of P49,500.00 for the payment of the subject parcel of land. Writ of execution is returned unsatisfied. The delay in the payment was caused by the requirements prescribed by the Provincial Auditor before payment could be effected. The private respondents questioned the requirements prompting the Provincial Auditor to refer the matter to the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA). Lower court through then Presiding Judge Aquilino Bonto ordered the private respondents to comply with the requirements set up by the COA. The lower court stated that the requirements were made purely in consonance with auditing rules and regulations and were not a whim or caprice designed to cause a protracted delay in the actual payment.

Notwithstanding the private respondents' compliance with the stated requirements, no payment was effected by the petitioner Issue: Held: The additional requirement charging the private respondents with the duty to have the corresponding title issued in the name of the municipality free from all liens and encumbrances as a condition before the release of the payment for the value of the land is UNREASONABLE. The dispositive portion of the decision explicitly states that in case the petitioner favors payment of the value of the land, the private respondents are ordered to execute a conveyance in favor of the petitioner. The respondents have complied with all the requirements originally imposed by COA. The petitioner cannot, therefore, deny payment to the private respondents. The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. There should be some kind of swift and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level bureaucrats.