Kosi Deluge

The Worst Is Still To Come

September 2008

The report of the Fact Finding Mission on the

Kosi

1
Kosi Deluge: The Worst Is Still To Come: The report of the fact finding mission
on the Kosi

Written and edited by Sudhirendar Sharma and Gopal Krishna for and on behalf of
the Fact Finding Mission to the Kosi river basin in North Bihar, March 1-9, 2008.

The multi-disciplinary Fact Finding Mission comprised of noted flood expert Dr

Dinesh Mishra, development analyst Dr Sudhirendar Sharma, ecological
campaigner Pandurang Hegde, environmental researcher Gopal Krishna, river
ecologist, Rakesh Jaiswal and landscape architect Laxman Singh.

Associate members of the Fact Finding Mission included: Manas Bihari Verma, C Uday
Shankar, Rakesh Bhatt, Kavinder Pandey, Kameshwar Singh and Amarnath.

The Fact Finding Mission wishes to acknowledge the support of the Ashoka
Innovators for the Public towards this mission, however, it is not obligatory for it
(Ashoka) to concur with the contents of this report, in parts or in full.

The members of the Fact Finding Mission wish to acknowledge the support and
guidance of activists and experts who spared time for sharing their experiences and
insights that helped develop an understanding on the issues and concerns related to
recurring floods in the Kosi river basin. The support of Barh Mukti Abhiyaan is
gratefully acknowledged.

Any part(s) of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means, verbal, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
authors. However, the authors request attribution of the source such that the
information and perspectives contained in the report get widely disseminated.

This report has been published in public interest and has hence been placed in public
domain for wider distribution and circulation. The authors and the mission members
would be encouraged if they receive critical views on the contents of this report.

This report has been published by Sudhirendar Sharma, under the aegis of the
Ashoka Innovators for the Public, for and on behalf of the Fact Finding Mission. For
further information on any aspect of this report, contact the following: Sudhirendar
Sharma (sudhirendar@vsnl.net), Gopal Krishna (krishnagreen@gmail.com) and
Dinesh Mishra (mishradk@sify.com)

For copies of the report,

Fact Finding Mission

c/o Dr Sudhirendar Sharma
7 Triveni, A6 Paschim Vihar
New Delhi 110063

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Preface
The 2008 Kosi deluge may have been adequately flashed by the print and electronic
media, but the diagnosis and prescription has remained largely predictable and
grossly repetitive. No wonder, the floods in the Kosi have turned into an annual ritual
of aerial surveys, flood relief, dubious assurances, judicial probe and the like. The
objective of the Fact Finding Mission, undertaken prior to the deluge, was to get a
first-hand account of the altered land architecture, on account of misguided and
failed engineering, that plays involuntary host to the manmade floods each year.

For what we witnessed cannot be easily transcribed into words, wondering how
politicians get a better sense of the situation while flying over a submerged
landmass! We salute the incredible resilience of people of north Bihar who were- at
the time of our travel through the region in the first week of March 2008- preparing
for the annual event (floods) to occur. They were seemingly resigned to their fate at
the hands of the outdated science of flood control. Unlike politicians and engineers
who consider the river worth `taming’, the flood-affected people continue to regard it
as `mother’!

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The official perception on the Kosi must change, sooner the better! There is an
urgent need to acknowledge peoples’ perception in building an integrated framework
for co-existence within the river basin. This will warrant radical actions, of `doing’ as
well as some `undoing’, for which a political will based on engagement with a cross-
section of the society is of utmost importance. The hydrocratic arrogance must
make room for political humility. David Hume had rightly remarked: `When men are
most sure and arrogant, they are commonly most mistaken!’.

The Fact Finding Mission is convinced that the aggravated problem of the Kosi is well
beyond technical and engineering solutions, as most of these lie submerged under
the deluge anyway. It demands commonsense solution based on closer observations
of ground realities and peoples’ perception. A mix of short-term measures and long-
term strategies ought to be put in place through creative pooling of expertise into a
new institutional mechanism that may not only promise but deliver on a timeline too.
This is possible and doable!

Sudhirendar Sharma, Dinesh Mishra and Gopal Krishna

Unveiled Prophecy
The dilapidated state of the Bhimnagar barrage on river Kosi, inside Nepalese
territory north of Bihar, could not convince the Fact Finding Mission about its tenacity
to hold its designed discharge of 950,000 cusecs. It was observed that the silt
choked east bank and the west bank canals emanating from the barrage, with their
combined irrigation capacities reduced by two-third on account of defunct silt
ejectors, could only add pressure on the main structure and the already weakened
embankments upstream.

Speaking to the press at Patna on March 9, 2008, the Fact Finding Mission issued a
press note that had warned: `..not only are floods in Bihar manmade but that the
worse is yet to come should political economy of flood control continue to promote
embankment as only solution to the scourge of floods.’ Embankments symbolize
present and proposed structural flood control measures. That the worst will
come so soon could not have been predicted although it had the making of a
catastrophe in it.

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That the upstream breach will be created by less than 1/7 th of the designed discharge
has turned our prophecy into an understatement. As the unprecedented 8th breach in
last five decades, this first major rupture upstream of the barrage, tossed up
familiar pictures of human misery, predictable stories on failed hydrocracy, frequent
allegations of relief misappropriation and misplaced disaster management
interventions, the Fact Finding Mission painfully reiterates and reaffirms its
assessment that:

`The Worst Is Still To Come’

As flood waters recede and the trading of charges subside, the hapless victims will be
left to fend for themselves yet again. That has been the story of Kosi and its floods,
year after year, decade after decade; justifying the title of the `Sorrow of Bihar’
given to her. If Don Williams’ profound words about `God’ were to be rephrased in
the present context, these would read: Kosi talks incessantly but, as it turns out,
hydrocracy is found deaf.

Being deaf, the government and media have conveniently converted the recurring
floods in Kosi into a myth, ignoring how misplaced governmental intervention
through junk science of flood control continues to enjoy political patronage of the
kind unheard of. No wonder, flood-relief-flood cycle over past five decades has been
turned into a lucrative engagement for a failed state and an apathetic society.

Band-aid Dilemma
As irresistible maggi noodles get dropped and mineral water bottles get ferried
across to the flood-affected areas in 14 districts of Bihar, insult is being hurled at
hapless 3 million people impacted by the deluge that the media has unequivocally
termed as `man made injury’. Band-aid is being applied to the injury, as breach
plugging works gets underway to bring the river back to its `original’ course.

Conservative estimates indicate that the breach on the embankment at Kusaha (in
Nepal) may not get fully plugged before March 2009, the unwritten assumption being
that till then the river will flow at or below the current level of discharge. This
assumption may be seriously flawed as Kosi gets its peak flow towards the closing
stages of the rainy season, the maximum ever discharge in Kosi has been a
whopping 913,000 cusecs on October 5, 1968. Since floods are known to follow a

5
pattern, one wishes that the river does not embarrass the engineers’ fraternity and
their masters any further.

That the embankments have been temporary solution to the scourge of floods and
that these have outlived their age three times over raises serious question on
strengthening them to plug the breach in the present scheme of things. It creates a
set of discomforting scenarios and compelling questions:

• Will reinforcing a breached portion of the over-aged dilapidated embankment not

leave the remaining stretch of the embankment vulnerable, even at the present
level of discharge? But if band-aid is not applied the human misery may continue
for long.

• Given the present timeline the breach is unlikely to be plugged before March
2009, by which time a sizeable population would have (hopefully) moved to
alternate locations. Should then the river not be allowed to follow its new course?

• As the existing embankments were neither designed as permanent solutions nor

have these proved to be so, how far investment in maintaining them can be
justified even if it means providing temporary relief in such calamity?

In a politically charged atmosphere, any act of `undoing’ may amount to treason

that no government can ill-afford. As in the past breaches, the idea will be to wriggle
out of the present emergency even if it amounts to doing what has driven the
present crises. The illusion of having tamed the river has been perpetuated over the
past fifty years, pushing the unsuspecting masses to remain victims of the effects
without being aware that the state has accepted the manmade causes. The Fact
Finding Mission was shocked to observe that the vicious cycle of annual floods has
been conveniently kept in motion.

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 The Kosi Empire

Kosi river has an impressive empire that extends on a massive landmass in Nepal and India,
making it a transboundary river of immense significance. With an incredible catchment area of
95,646 square kilometers, which includes Mount Everest and Kanchenjunga, it joins the Ganga
before picking on contributions from Kamla, Baghmati, Budhi Gandak and Bhutahi Balan rivers
within Bihar. As it gorges past Chatara, the river traverses 48 kilometers in Nepal terai before
fanning out into 15 streams in north Bihar. Over the last 250 years, the Kosi River has shifted its
course over 160 kilometers, from east to west, making north Bihar its undisputed playground.

Owing to seven major tributaries contributing their waters, it is called Sapta Koshi in Nepal. The
Sun Koshi, the Tama Koshi or Tamba Koshi, the Dudh Koshi, the Indravati, the Likhu, the Arun
and the Tamore or Tamar. The Dudh Koshi joins the Sun Koshi at village Harkapur. At Triveni Sun
the Koshi is joined by the Arun and the Tamar, after which the river is called Sapta Koshi. As it
descends from the mountains, it is simply called the Kosi. The river travels a distance of 729 km
from its source, at 21,000 ft altitude, to the confluence with the Ganga, of which 260 km flow is
within Indian territory.

Changed Course
The proclamation that the Kosi has changed its course yet again absolves all those
who may have engineered the conditions for the river to do so, diluting the `human
folly’ adage being attached to the current deluge. That the river, one of the most
vibrant Himlayan rivers, has changed its course several times in recorded history is
known but what seemingly gets ignored is that the natural change in course was not
only subtle but has a definite purpose to extend its ecological services to uncovered
areas.

Given the fact that the Kosi has been embanked for at least 135 km downstream
from the site of the breach at Kusaha, the flow having once left the embanked river
could at no point have rejoined that course. Consequently, the river was compelled to
go into three of its previous channels viz., Sursar, Mirchaiya and Belhi. In all, the
meandering river has 15 different channels (options) through which it flows/has
flown. Since the change in course was sudden and on account of failed embankment,
4 panchayats in Nepal and 14 districts in Bihar were caught unaware by misdirected
waters from the Kosi.

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Locating a river as a blue streak on the map and feeling its currents while traversing
through it makes a world of difference. The Fact Finding Mission had an opportunity
to undertake a boat ride along the then main course of the Kosi, called Tilyuga which
till 1948 was an independent river, to get a feel of the living waters of the river
during March 2008. Moving against the current it was observed that through its
gentle meander the river was engaged in the `act’ of enriching the land by
depositing rich silt. However, it was slowly but steadily corroding its embankment to
liberate itself from its jacket.

Under extraneous pressure, the river has undoubtedly lost its freedom of expression.
Like some of its tributaries, Kosi is one of the important land-building rivers of the
Indo-Gangetic plains. It shifts course because it has to offload its silt load. However,
in the process the flowing water doesn’t lose its memory. To a non-scientist, the idea
that water has a memory is not particularly astonishing but to a scientist who holds
the mechanistic world view – a Newtonian perspective – it may seem on the sidelines
of conventional science. Einstein worldview alone can help understand the world as a
series of physical forces in dynamic interplay with complex energetic forces

Following the works of French biochemist, Jacques Benveniste, it has become evident
that as water travels it not only carries physical information but picks up more subtle
information as well. It responds to every change in its surroundings by expanding,
contracting, or making rhythmical waves, changing billions of times a second. And
as it changes it not only picks up physical information but responds appropriately,
something the Kosi waters did while breaching the weak embankment at Kusaha.
Thereafter, the river may have used its accumulated memory to stay on its past
course.

What may seem a dramatic change in the Kosi’s course has indeed been an act by
the river to liberate itself from the jacket to which it had been confined? The fact that
the Kosi resorts to such tactics frequently reaffirms the fact that jacketing has limited
its prime ecological responsibility to which it has stood committed for several
millennia.

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 Kathmandu Calling

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Nepal Prime Minister has regretted the suicidal agreement on Kosi, signed in 1954, as the main
cause behind the flooding of the Nepali territory every year. Nepal’s sense of grievance on the
poor quality of design, inefficient implementation and bad maintenance of structure on Kosi may
not be fully justified because the treaty revels itself as outdated and unfair to both the parties.

The treaty has remained quite pronounced because a carrot of Kosi High Dam, first raised in
1948, has been dangling before the flood victims as one of the `permanent’ solutions to the
problem of recurring floods. Ironically, embankments as temporary solution have become
reasonably permanent whereas the `permanent’ solution has remained elusive. What is
`permanent’ and how permanent is `permanence’?

It must be acknowledged that the proposed site of the Kosi High Dam falls in a geologically
unstable seismic zone, any undertaking of that scale may endanger the lives of millions up to the
controversial Farraka Barrage. Also manifest insincerity in proposing the dam for flood control
must be condemned because the dam is proposed to tap the hydro-power potential.

From a strategic defence perspective neither should India propose it nor should Nepal undertake
such initiatives with any party. The treaty must be made realistic in admitting that there can be
no technology that can find a `permanent’ solution for a river whose silt yield is highest in the
world. The litmus test for a credible, fair and democratic treaty lies in providing treatment for
permanent water-logging that has come to characterize the Kosi region.

The Fact Finding Mission witnessed that besides the Kosi, other rivers like Kamala, Bhutahi Balan
and Bagmati too face the same problems. The team was bewildered to note that the business of
embankment construction has resumed for taming the Bagmati and the tributaries of Mahananda.
Clearly, the lessons from human misery have not been learnt.

India’s Leader of the Opposition too has called for immediate review of Indo-Nepal Kosi Treaty.
Without doubt, continuing with the same treaty would tantamount to riding a dead horse. In
2004, it was reported that the Maoists had subverted plans for a survey of the proposed Kosi
dam. Changed circumstances require deft diplomacy and new hydraulic approach to disprove
Mark Twain’s contention that `whisky is for drinking and water is for fighting over’. The treaty
must acknowledge that technology can only help create irreparable problems.

Killer Embankments
There was a time when anyone wishing to die was directed to go to Purnea because
the Kosi river once used to flow through that district. Thanks to embankment, the
river had shifted its course westward to Saharasa. However, much to the anguish of
the local residents the latest breach has brought the river and its folklore back to
Purnea.

The Kosi’s embankments have a long and intriguing history. One reference that is
worth mentioning relates to the prophetic observations made by a British Engineer
Captain F C Hirst in 1908. Said he, “In recent times, on the left bank of the Kosi, in
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Kosi Agreement between India and Nepal was made in April 1954, between the Government of the
Kingdom of Nepal. This was result of India’s desire of constructing a barrage, head-works and other
appurtenant work [s] about 3 miles upstream of Hanuman Nagar town on the Kosi River with afflux and
flood banks, canals and protective works, on land lying within the territories of Nepal, for the purpose of
flood control, irrigation, generation of hydroelectric power and prevention of erosion of Nepal areas on the
right side of the river, upstream of the barrage. Nepal agreed to the construction of the said barrage,
head-works and other connected works by and at the cost of India in consideration of the benefits.
9
the Purnea district, private enterprise has copied the work of the makers of the Bir
Bund (an embankment), giving temporary relief, which, as will be seen later, is
probably a menace to future welfare.” Without any regard to such wisdom and
accumulated evidences of the negative impact of embankments, the Bihar
government has turned `temporary’ solution into permanence by building over 3,465
kilometer long embankments to jacket some of its major rivers.

The Fact Finding Mission observed massive earth-moving work along the Bagmati
river in Muzzafarpur. It is a shocking reality that once a major river gets jacketed it
becomes imperative for the proponents to jacket the tributaries as well; else the so-
called protected area by the embanked river will become vulnerable to flooding by
the other. The cycle of embankment perpetuates itself as vested interests take a slice
from each unloading of earth on a new site. It has been reliably learnt that Rs. 792
crore package to tame the Bagmati has been approved and another proposal to
embank the tributaries of Mahananda at an estimated cost of Rs. 850 crore has been
planned.

Embankment has been a double edged sword. It jackets the river with the
engineering assumption that a reduced cross section of the river will indeed increase
its velocity and the power to dredge its base. Neither has happened in the case of
the Kosi as its massive cross section, varying in length from 9 to 16 km at different
locations along its length, has become a silt-dumping ground. Nothing could have
been more shocking for the members of the Mission to observe from atop the
embankment that the river bed was several feet higher than the adjoining land. The
high lands and low lands have been separated by the ubiquitous embankment,
turning the low lying area permanently water-logged as the natural drainage from
the area gets choked.

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 Benipur beseized

A pair of embankments along the Bagmati river is under construction from Runni Saidpur in
Sitamarhi to Hayaghat in Darbhanga district in Bihar. The Bagmati has a length of about 270
kilometres in Bihar. Benipur, is the ancestral village of legendary Ram Briksha Benipuri, a noted
Hindi litterateur, has faced sedimentation due to the flood waters. The villagers were outraged
when state’s benign response ‘through its relief measures’ was mentioned. In his
acclaimed piece Barh Ke Beta (Son of Flood), Benipuri who equated relief seeking with
begging wrote- do not be afraid of floods. In the absence of floods there will be no
fishes and no fertile land. Do not look at skies that are laden with politicians, engineers
and officials on calamity survey for the salvation of the victims! Thatched houses had to
be constructed above some of the pucca buildings to accommodate the flood victims, who had to
stay in these makeshift huts for over two months. The house of Ram Briksha Benipuri had to be
cleared of about two feet of mud to celebrate his birthday on 23 December last year. The entire
kharif crop was washed away and the 750 acres land of the village has now been covered under
sand.

The planners and engineers must be complemented for altering the geography of the
area, turning the Kosi basin into a permanent watery grave for millions. It is tragic
that a worst flood only sends alarming signals, emergency aerial surveys and fresh
relief packages being the temporary outcome. That an estimated 1 million people in
380 villages are permanently trapped between the Kosi embankments and an
estimated 8 million are faced with acute water-logging outside of the embankments
are hard facts that continue to get ignored, year after year. Is there an annual
drainage management plan for this region inhabited by these people?

While the Fact Finding Mission observed that there was general discontent among
people about the disastrous impact of embankments, there has been lack of
consensus on what must be done with these failed structures. This is a result of
the fissures that has been engineered by the politicians. As people continue to
cope up with the inevitability of living either inside or outside of the embankment,
they have seemingly facilitated the politician-engineer-contractor nexus to go about
doing its business. The impact of embankments has been left unattended:

• The jacketing of the Kosi has prevented its annual estimated silt load of 92.5
million cubic meters from spreading and improving soil fertility in the basin.
Conversely, the deposition of silt has contributed to increasing the river bed by as

11
 much as 4 meters. Consequently, the raised bed of the river has obstructed the
adjoining drainage (water) from entering the river course, creating permanent
water-logging in as much as 8,360 square kilometer area, or 16 per cent of the
total area of north Bihar.

• Far from protecting land from floods, embankments have contributed to

increasing flood prone area in the state from a low of 2.5 million hectares in the
1950’s to as high as 6.8 million hectares now. Not only that, the four-day flood of
the 50’s has become a four-month ordeal now. People were used to dealing with
the river on equal terms a’la living with floods, as the behaviour of unobstructed
river was predictable. Caging Kosi has made a tiger out of a cat, making the
river ferocious and unpredictable.

Shockingly, however, people living within the two embankments of the river do not
exist as per government records. And those outside of the embankments remain at
the mercy of occasional breach on the one hand and the rising waters on account of
obstruction of drainage into the river on the other. But for those who build and
maintain these, embankments have become a losing proposition forever. Such well-
entrenched beneficiaries have an incestuous relationship with the embankments and
their victims that preventrational vulnerability assessment based interventions to
remove the impediments to the drainage of the ecological flow of water.

Lessons Unlearnt

All endeavors at course correction at this stage must be both short-term as well as
long term that addresses crying concerns that go beyond the exigencies of the
upcoming parliamentary elections. It must take into account how did the
transformation of flood dependent agrarian regimes into flood vulnerable landscapes
took place since it was primarily driven by the need to secure private property in
land, which was a key concern of the colonial powers. It `soon disrupted natural flow
regimes and ended up aggravating flood lines and thereby opening up the deltas to
enhanced flood vulnerability; Constructed a network of roads, railway lines, and
bridges, which by running in the east- west direction ended up interrupting natural
drainage lines that mostly dropped from north to south! These structures, in time,
not unexpectedly, began to unsettle a complex and fragile arrangement for drainage.’

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Thus, north Bihar has been deprived of the most fertile land in the world. 2 The Royal
Commission of Agriculture had blamed lack of adequate drainage for it. Traditional
systems made the agricultural districts of north Bihar Ganga basin prosperous in the
early part of the 19th century. The neglect of that system over the years led to the
area being impoverished by the late 19th century.

It was revealed to the team members of the Fact Finding Mission from the narratives
of the villagers that no political party both within the state and at the center can be
absolved of acts of omission and commission that has brought perennial misery to
north Bihar. It is their policy decisions that have contributed to it. Having invented
explicit lame excuses umpteen times, the politicians and their acolytes of all hues are
now arguing that the river has changed its course and it now wants to move to east.
In the absence of even an iota of accountability towards habitual criminal neglect,
the million dollar question posed by flood experts that remains unanswered is: why
were the embankments constructed along the river supposedly to prevent the river
from moving either east or west?

Incessant annual fiscal flow for maintenance, raising, strengthening and re-
sectioning of embankments has created powerful vested interests whose lobbying
powers across all political parties is so enormous that no one wishes to become
unpopular among contractors both at the center and at the state by arguing against
embankments. Even when there is wisdom within the government, it fails to muster
enough political courage, making the absence of a so-called welfare state quite
conspicuous. The manifest political patronage that nurtures a hydraulic capitalism of
sort has ensured a staus quo, which has resulted in dehumanizing misery faced by
millions of people year after year.

Embankments have breached, it is breaching and it would breach again. Law of

unintended consequences is clearly at work.

The Fact Finding Mission was aghast to observe that neither central nor Bihar
government `conducts any survey to assess the effect of flood control measures on
socio-economic condition of the society’. The Experts Committee to Review the
2
Rohan D'Souza, Framing India's Hydraulic Crises: The Politics of the Modern Large Dam, Monthly Review
Press Jul/Aug 2008

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Implementation of recommendations of the Rashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood
Commission, 1980) corroborates our observations. Submitted to the Government of
India in March 2003, the Commission had noted, `Systematic study has not been
carried out on the utility of zamindari embankment as it is under the supervision of
District Administration and Revenue Department’.

Ironically, following 2004 floods of Bihar, Prime Minister’s Task Force for Flood
Management/ Erosion Control had recommended `Community Participation in
maintenance of embankments should be encouraged’ among other things. It is,
however, another matter that though benefits to be derived from as well as the
possible inconveniences due to floods (and flood control works) are undoubtedly of
great relevance to the people, their participation during the planning, implementation
and subsequent operation and maintenance has been deemed irrelevant by the
`credible agencies of the people’s government’.

The Flood damages are primarily collected by District Collectors of the region,
however it is inexplicable as to how despite the losses being recorded embankments
still find unquestionable support within both state and central government. The
structural solutions like these have culminated in the recurring and perennial
problem of water-logging on an estimates 16 per cent of cultivable area in north
Bihar. This water-logging is entirely due to the embankments and creation of canal
network without proper drainage system in place. The construction of railway lines,
roads, canals and urban settlements without proper drainage system in place has
further deteriorated the condition.

Blunders Galore

Drainage problem, be it in Kosi or Mumbai, has failed to alter the policy regime of the
country that favours structural solutions regardless of the natural drainage it may
impede. Proposals like High Dam on Kosi is as good as jumping from the frying pan
into the fire if the experience with embankments is anything to go by. No one seems
willing to examine existing failures and learn from it. Vested interests that procreate
during crisis find status quo more beneficial.

Union Ministry of Water Resources misled the Rajya Sabha on March 11, 2008 on the
issue of ‘Floods in North Bihar’ by claiming, “Government has taken various steps in

14
the direction of water management to stop the flood in north Bihar coming from the
rivers of Nepal. To control the floods in rivers Baghmati and Kamala-Balan in north
Bihar, the government has approved two schemes, namely, (i) Raising and
strengthening of embankments along River Baghmati at an estimated cost of Rs
135.16 crore and (ii) Raising and strengthening of embankments along River Kamala
at an estimated cost of Rs 52.09 crore.”

Despite ground facts and published data confirming the role of embankments in
aggravating and sustaining water-logging in north Bihar, the hydrocracy of the
country continues to mislead the government (and its elected representatives) into
believing that embankments are indeed the solution to the problem. If there is one
chink worthy of judicial probe then the obsession with embankment is clearly
frontrunner as it has `earned the state the dubious distinction of being the leading
claimant of this kind of manmade submergence.’ The Fact Finding Mission was
shocked to note that there has been no significant shift in the way the Kosi issue was
perceived in the 1950’s and in 2008.

The first five-year plan prepared in 1952 made a rather bold statement, `The
construction of large dams to store these flood waters is the most effective way of
preventing flood damage’. In pursuance of this policy statement, Union Minister for
Planning and Irrigation & Power had made a statement in the Parliament on
September 3, 1954, saying, “I may in the conclusion express the conviction that
floods in the country can be contained and managed”. However, within two years
`conviction’ gave room for `doubt’ when the same minister had informed the
Parliament on July 27, 1956 that `absolute immunity from flood damage was not
physically possible even in the distant future, because of the unpredictability of
several natural forces which might cause unprecedented situation and, that `we shall
have to learn to live with floods to an extent’.

Since the issue of high dam will resurface in the upcoming negotiations with Nepal, it
is pertinent to refer to the observations of the National Flood Commission, 1980:
“The flood problem being more acute in the basins of rivers originating from the
Himalayas, the reservoirs for flood moderation have to be sited in the Himalayan
region, where there are complex problems to be dealt with in putting up large dams
due to geological, seismic and topographical constraints. Because of narrow valleys,

15
capacities of reservoirs on Himalayan Rivers are not very large. Also, the rivers carry
very large silt charge. These factors limit the economic life of the reservoirs, which,
in turn, affects the economic feasibility of the project”.

Refusing to learn from the consistent failure of flood control and management efforts
of the recent past, the Government of Bihar had sought central assistance of Rs
17,059 crore through its `Bihar Floods 2007-Proposals for Special Plan Assistance’ to
repeat the past mistakes which include embankments and desilting. What has
conveniently been forgotten that the proposal to desilt heavily silt laden rivers like
the one debauching into the Gangetic plains from Himalayas has been rejected by
the National Flood Commission. Previous attempt at Eastern Kosi Main Canal in the
past was without any success as no one knew where to dump the excavated
material!

The Union Water Resources Ministry has taken the Parliament for a ride by stating,
`Government of India has initiated steps for creation of storages in the Nepal
territory, which will help in mitigating the problem of floods being faced in north
Bihar.’ It has been said time and again that the government would negotiate with
Nepal to construct a dam over the Kosi as a placebo to calm down the victims during
each flood season.

In the context of interlinking of rivers as a ‘potent’ solution, the ministry had also
informed the Parliament, ` Six intra-state link proposals have been identified in Bihar
by the state government of Bihar, namely, (i) Kohra-Chandravat, (ii) Burhi-Gandak-
None-Baya-Ganga, (iii) Bagmati-Burhi-Gandak through Belwabhar, (iv) Kosi-Ganga,
(v) Kosi-Mechi (Indian portion) and (vi) Karmanasha-Suara links in Bihar. The state
government of Bihar has commenced the study of these intra-state links.
Inteestingly, however, a ‘Report of the Expert Committee’ to study impact of
interlinking of rivers on Bihar (April 2005, Chapter III, p16) says, “…But the
proposed Sapt Kosi Dam has not been provided with any flood cushion which should
be provided for flood moderation…”

Instead of undertaking urgent measures to undo the damages that appear beyond
redemption, the Fact Finding Mission has observed that such proposals condone and
encourage massive land use change that has adversely affected the ecosystem of the

16
region contributing to the rupture of its carrying capacity. Ignoring this, large-scale
storage structures impound and divert river water get justified on the basis that
floods are caused due to upstream catchment. It is myopically claimed that
controlling this catchment water through large dams will reduce flooding in the
downstream, the stored water can be utilised to generate power and for irrigation in
the flood plains.

It is disgusting to observe that after compounding the misery of north Bihar through
embankments; those living today in the flood-affected region are being promised
other ecologically disastrous projects like the Barahkshetra Dam and interlinking of
rivers which is like proposing one catastrophe to solve another.

Omissions & Commissions

About 40 million hectares of land in the country is liable to flooding, out of which
Central Water Commission (CWC)3 claims that 32 million hectares is `protectable’,
out of which around 16.5 million hectares has been provided with `reasonable
degree of protection’.

CWC is responsible for flood forecasts but its predictions need to be taken with a
pinch of salt because till date there has been no independent assessment about the
accuracy or effectiveness of its forecasts. Also it needs to be assessed how specific
the forecasts are and if they are reaching in time to the concerned that are going to
benefit from it. It also needs to be assessed as to how well the forecasts reflect
ground realities. It needs to be checked as to how many of the floods were not
forecast by the CWC, though they could have forecast the same.

One of the CWC forecast4 makes interesting reading. On September 15, 2006, CWC
website made a forecast that Kamala Balan river near Jhanjharpur in north Bihar was
flowing at 49.33 m, above warning level of 49 m, hence as per CWC definition, a
flood was forecast. Some newspapers uncritically published the forecast as facts,
saying Kamala Balan was in floods. When a journalist in Delhi called his contact in

3
Central Water Commission under the Ministry of Water Resources is maintaining 157 flood forecasting
stations on 62 major rivers comprising of 8 river basins spread over 13 States.

4
South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (SANDRP) is a voluntary initiative. It published a widely
respected journal called Dams, Rivers & People
17
Jhanjharpur, he was told that the river had very little water there. It later came to
light that the warning level mark on the river at Jhanjharpur is submerged in sand.

Ganga Flood Control Commission (GFCC)5, one of the key promoters of dams and
embankments as a flood control solutions acted with exemplary promptness at its
35th and 36th meeting held in 2005 and 2006 by discussing progress made in
implementation of recommendations of National Flood Commission of 1980
pertaining to Ganga basin.

In post independent India no story of human misery caused by mismanagement of

floods would be complete without implicit or explicit reference to the
recommendations of the National Flood Commission6 and its 207 recommendations
made. It said that no credible assessment of performance of the embankments over
any river has been done by any state. Neither it has been done till date nor the
recommendations have been complied with. The Flood Commission had observed,
`Any assessment of the partial negation of these benefits, due to accumulated
drainage water over the protected area from year to year, were also not done. The
annual benefits from embankments were, therefore, by and large, a matter of overall
opinion of some individual, with no supporting data. We were, therefore, reluctant to
draw any conclusion from the trend of such opinions.’

Another noteworthy official effort has been the Report of the Government of India’s
National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development on the issue of
`Flood Control and Flood Management’ (1999). It reiterates: `… there are no
5
Ganga Flood Control Commission (GFCC) was set up in 1972. GFCC has divided Ganga basin into 23 river
system viz. Gomati, Adhwara, Ghaghra, Mahananda, Kamla-Balan, Punpun, Ajoy, Bagmati, Gandak, Burhi
Gandak Kosi, Mayurakshi, Damodar, Kiul-Harohar, Yamuna, Tons, Ramganga, Badua-Chandan,
Rupnarayan-Haldi-Rasulpur, Jalangi, Sone, Tidal rivers and Main Ganga system and Comprehensive Master
Plans for flood management in all these river systems have been completed between 1975-1990. These
comprehensive plans were then circulated to the concerned State Governments for preparing specific
schemes for implementation in order of priority. Follow up action from the State Govt. is awaited. Due to
rapid changes in the behaviour of the rivers, in Ganga basin and for other reasons, it was considered
necessary to update the Master Plans for flood management of all the river systems. This work was
started in 1986 and till March 2002, GFCC has updated Master Plans for nineteen river system viz.
Gomati, Ghghra, Mahananda, Adhwara, Kamla-Balan, Bagmati, Burhi Gandak, Kiul-Harohar, Damodar,
Punpun, Mayurakshi, Ramganga, Jalangi, Tons, Yamuna, Ajay, Badua Chandan, Roopnarayan-Haldi-
Rasalpur and tidal river system. These comprehensive Plans have been circulated to the concerned State
Governments for further follow up action.

6
Rashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood Commission) was set up in July 1976 under the Chairmanship of
Jaysukhlal Hathi, the main TOR of the Commission was to review the flood protection measures
undertaken since 1954 with special reference to construction of embankments and to evolve a
comprehensive approach to the problem of floods. This is the only really comprehensive review of flood
management policies and practices in post independent India, so let us look in some detail the findings of
the commission.
18
universal solutions, which can provide complete protection against floods. The
country has, therefore, to shift its strategy towards efficient management of flood
plains, flood proofing including disaster preparedness and response planning and
flood forecasting and warning and other non structural measures such as disaster
relief, flood fighting including public health measures and flood insurance.’ These
recommendations have not been implemented so far.

In October 2001, the Union Ministry of Water Resources set up an Expert Committee
to review the implementation of recommendations of the National Flood Commission.
This committee has also submitted its report. This Committee identified the
bottlenecks faced by the State Government in its implementation and suggested
measures for implementation of recommendations made by National Flood
Commission for effective flood management. If this was not enough, the Union
Ministry of Water Resources set up an Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of
R. Rangachari to review recommendations of the Flood Commission. The Committee
came to the same conclusion: the recommendations have not been implemented by
the states. The Committee has identified 40 important recommendations for
implementation on priority, which the Ministry of Water Resources has accepted.
These have been forwarded to the states as well as central Government agencies for
follow-up.

This Committee has summed up the main difficulties in implementation of the

recommendations: `…. that uncontrolled and serious incursion is taking place into
the flood plains and river beds and lack of infrastructure as major bottle necks being
faced. Unabated and unplanned intrusion into the flood plains and river beds,
sometimes with the approval or acquiescence of Government has now reached
alarming dimensions. If this is not managed, flood losses will continue to mount.
Flood damage assessment, from year to year, is not being done realistically or on
scientific basis. It underlines the lack of representative, scientific and credible post-
project performance evaluations of past flood management works is a serious
handicap’.

No effort has been made by either the Bihar government or the central government
to respond to the glaring denunciation regarding misplaced claims about the
usefulness of flood control measures. The Fact Finding Team was shocked to find that

19
so far there has been no performance evaluation in order to justify the expenditure
incurred on various flood control works and their impacts on the socio-economic
development of the so-called `protected area’.

Unmindful of the recommendations of the Flood Commission and the National Water
Policy, 2002 that sought increased adoption of non-structural measures like flood
plain zoning, in practice structural measures like the embankments construction
under way on Bagmati demonstrate how sane solutions are being ignored. GFCC is
reported to be preparing the master plans, sub-basin wise, for the whole Ganga
basin for flood management and also reviewing these master plans on the basis of
information received from the State government.

The Fact Finding Team has been surprised at the Expert Committee’s observation,
`Bihar has expressed difficulty in separating out the area affected by flood
inundation & drainage congestion’ and its insensitive assertion, `…even though the
law may be against it …much of river beds, drains and diara lands, are encroached
upon. While touring Bihar, it was noted that the old drainage courses of the Kosi are
now being cultivated, preventing drainage.’ The Committee seems unable to
discriminate between livelihood compulsion, legal necessity and law of unintended
consequences despite the fact that the beds of the embanked rivers are silting up
resulting in ineffectiveness of the age-old embankments in confining the flood
waterswithin the river side.

Besides the most recently constituted yet another routine committee in the
aftermath of the breach in Kosi embankment in August 2008, the Fact Finding team
has come across several committees constituted both by the Bihar and the Central
government that have looked at the annual embankment disasters without giving
due attention to massive drainage crisis that is crying for attention. (see annexure)

CWC’s Annual Report 2005-6, notes that Action Plan on Flood Management has been
finalized. It is acknowledged that `not much progress has been made in the
implementation of its recommendations’ of any of these Commissions, Committees
and various Task Forces. Going by the past experience, it does not require
superhuman intelligence to conclude that insincere and unpardonable governmental

20
callousness is deliberate and is aimed at exacerbating the flood crisis in order to
facilitate `fishing in the troubled waters’ for some invincible vested interests.

Nothing can illustrate the fate of various committees, commissions and Task Forces
better than what R Rangachari, Chairman, Expert Committee said on August 19,
2008. In a personal communication, he said, `I am not aware as to what follow up
actions were all taken on this Report. It is my impression that really not much has
been done to implement the suggestions made by the committee's report.’
Rangachari has been on Prime Minister’s Task Force on Flood Control as well.

Surprisingly, India is adopting an Ostrich Policy. While terming the floods as a

`national calamity’ Indian Prime Minister and the Bihar Chief Minister reiterated their
support for embankments, dams and de-silting as effective flood control measures
despite the fact that the former’s has life span of 25 years and the latter has a life
span of 37 years. It must be remembered that one is yet to witness any `credible
agency’ present a rational and reasonable method of de-silting Kosi river that brings
92.5 million cubic meters of silt every year after the experience of having de-silted
Eastern Kosi Main Canal.

Failure to adopt Integrated Flood Management approach and inaction in the

implementation of the recommendations of National Flood Commission and all the 11
Five Year Plans with regard to citizens’ participation, land-use plan, drainage and
flood plain zoning has created a manmade disaster, multiple displacements and
almost unfathomable migration that remains unacknowledged. But 'development'
that destroyed the lives of people of this region still flows along the same course.
Things have come to such as pass that both official flood victims and official flood
protected people have been turned into either relief seekers for good or Bihari
migrant workers who are facing parochial and racist onslaught in Delhi, Gujarat,
Punjab, Haryana, Maharshtra, Assam, Karnataka and other places.

Both central and state government refuse to make anyone liable and accountable
because every relevant `credible government agency’ has decayed beyond repair.
They seem to love annual fiscal flow for outdated embankment repair works and
relief operations and if popular narratives are anything to go by every political party

21
gets a share in it. There is a political consensus to maintain and perpetuate the
status quo.

Compelling Question
Thanks to extensive coverage by the media, both print and electronic, the Kosi
deluge has caught the imagination of all and sundry, forcing the hydrocracy to come
up with credible options to bring the recurring phenomenon to a halt. Can the
hydrocracy which contributed to the present crises have answers to undo it? If the
findings of the Fact Finding Mission are anything to go by, it can only further
complicate the matter in a rush to overcoming its past follies.

The Fact Finding Mission is convinced that not only has Delhi got its flood action plan
consistently wrong over the years, so has Patna. Consequently, it becomes
convenient to transfer the entire blame on Kathmandu. Like floods, it is an annual
ritual for politicians in Bihar to reiterate that Nepal has released water and that a
high dam on the Kosi in Nepal the only solution to control floods. Little do
unsuspecting masses realize that if there is no dam how water could be stored
upstream? But the myth persists!

Since 1937, when the idea of a dam in Nepal was first mooted, the high dam on the
Kosi has remained elusive and may remain so. Like the embankments, the chances
for the proposed 269 meters high dam to go wrong are self evident. While silt
deposition by the river is one major issue impacting dam’s lifespan, its proposed
location in Nepal’s Brahkshetra will capture only 78 per cent of river’s catchment
leaving significant 22 per cent flows dangerously unattended.

Given its distinct geo-morphological features and complicated hydrological

characters, the Kosi is one of the Himalayan rivers that has yet to be understood in
its entirety. Consequently, engineering solutions to the enigma of the Kosi call for
radical and multi-layered steps:

Dismantling Embankments: Having argued that the embankments is the root

cause of the present crises, the Fact Finding Mission is of the opinion that firm
position may need to be taken to remedy the situation. Though considered unlawful,
trapped communities have time and again engaged in creating artificial breaches for

22
draining their accumulated water from their surroundings. Although opinions are
divided within the Kosi basin, amidst engineers and amongst social activists, general
perception does favour removal of embankments provided the act of demolishing
does not create undesired conditions.

Interestingly, however, there has been precedence of embankment demolition in

India. The embankments created along a length of 32 kilometers on river Damodar
in 1854 were demolished in the year 1869. The British had soon realized that far
from controlling floods, the embankments were submerging fertile lands for which
the colonial rulers were forced to provide compensation. The first-ever compensation
of Rs 60,000 on account of submergence due to embankment failure was given to a
farmer in 1896 in then Bardwan district.

If compensation clause were to be enforced in the present times, the state will not
only be dissuaded from creating more embankments but may resort to phased-
manner demolition of the existing embankments. The Fact Finding Mission is in
favour of phased demolition of embankments by temporary relocation of the affected
families. If a deluge can involuntarily dislocate large mass of people, there is no
reason why temporary relocation cannot be implemented?

Room for the River: Having failed to tame rivers Rhine and Meuse, the Dutch
hydrocracy has come to the conclusion that absolute safety from flooding could not
be guaranteed through technical-infrastructural measures. They further argue that
traditional mechanisms for policy-making based on assumedly `rational’ and
uncontested expert knowledge can no longer be taken for granted.

Taking a detour from the infrastructural measures the Dutch hydrocracy has now
adopted spatial flood protection measures called `room for the river’. The new
approach not only warrants informed public debate but is based on broad political
support. It is measures like these that need to be discussed and negotiated with
communities in north Bihar, but not before the political stables in Patna (and in Delhi)
get cleansed of their misconceptions!

The Fact Finding Commission demands a white paper on the current deluge, as also
the reasons for sustained floods in the Kosi basin. Unless the erring officials and

23
institutions are held accountable, not only will the folly of the past get repeated but
fresh approaches and strategies would be hard to implement. It is clear from the
origin, functions and constitution of the institutions dealing with water resources.
They are all structured for planning, design and implementation of large projects. It
is also clear that they do not even intend to be participation oriented or open bodies.
These institutions have failed to encompass the needs, resources and priorities of
whole river basin. Therefore, a complete overhaul of the existing institutions is a
dire necessity.

This white paper must address the drainage congestion crisis to start rethinking on
current policies that diagnoses the problem and the adverse consequences of the so-
called solutions that have caused huge increase in the flood prone area. The paper
must assess Kosi’s meandering nature coupled with its maximum available energy
producing currents for river basin management based on a comprehensive
assessment of the river system.

The paper must reveal the contours of state's misplaced faith in engineering alone
that has stopped the natural process of `landbuilding' by these rivers, a process that
had ushered in necessary socio-cultural conditions for emergence of `civilisation'. It
must make a case for multi-disciplinary intervention and probe ways and means of
draining vast stretches of waterlogged land because no civilized ‘welfare’ or even
‘development’ state can afford to keep its most fertile lands under water.

Besides, it must uncover state’s pretensions of colossal ignorance regarding the

primary function of floodwater--draining out excess water and the fact that no
embankment has yet been built or can be built in future that will not breach.

24
Notes & References:

1.. Jaisukhlal Hathi, National Commission on Floods (Rashtiya Barh Ayog): Union Ministry of
Water Resources claims that nearly one third of the flood prone area had been afforded
reasonable protection by 1976. Having made these claims it occurred to the Ministry that it
has gained “considerable experience had also been gained in planning, implementation and
performance of the flood protection and control measures. Advancement in technology had
taken place not only in India but also in the world over.” The National Flood Control
Programme was launched in 1954 for the first time, in the country but it decided to set up the
Rashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood Commission) in 1976 to evolve a coordinated, integrated
and scientific approach to the flood control problems in the country and for formulation of a
flood control policy. The Rashtriya Barh Ayog was headed by a Part-time Chairman.
Commissions’ terms of reference were as follows:- 1. To review the flood protection measures
undertaken since 1954 and to make an evaluation of the benefits and effectiveness of the
measures undertaken so far with special reference to embankments in reducing the damage
2. To identify the areas where a large number of Zamindari and/or unauthorized
embankments, bunds and spurs etc., exist; to assess the effect of such constructions on the
flood problem; and suggest remedial measures 3. To identify the areas where construction of
roads, highways, railways etc., and other encroachments into drains have aggravated flood
problems and to suggest measures for improvements including legislative action, if any 4. To
analyze the damage caused by floods in recent years and to identify areas requiring
immediate flood protection measures 5. To evolve a comprehensive approach to the problem
of floods in the country keeping in view the need for optimum and multi-purpose utilization of
water resources as also the role of soil conservation and afforestation in flood control 6. To
make an analysis of the cost and benefits of flood protection measures 7. To suggest criteria
for taking up flood protection measures and means of mobilizing resources therefore 8. To
recommend proper land use in the flood plains with a view to minimize damage and to ensure
overall increase in agriculture production 9. To examine the existing arrangements for
maintenance of flood protection works and recommend measures for improving the same
10. To review the existing administrative and organizational set up for flood control at the
Centre and in the States and suggest improvements where necessary, flood control to include
flood forecasting and warning, flood fighting, formulation and implementation of flood
protection measures 11. To examine the present procedure of assessing flood damage and
suggest improvements 12. To examine any other matter related to floods and flood control
and make suitable recommendations.

2. Dinesh Kumar Mishra, Barh Mukti Abhiyan, India

3 Himanshu Thakkar, South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (SANDRP), India

4. K Sinha & R Srivastava, Central Water Commission, India

5. A K Jha & D P Mathria, Joint Project Office-Sapta Kosi Sun Kosi Investigation, Nepal
6. R Rangachari, Centre for Policy Research, India

7. Integrated Water Resources Development: A Plan for Action, Report of The National
Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development, Government of India

8 Bihar Floods 2007-Proposals for Special Plan Assistance, Government of Bihar

9. Tenth Five Year Plan’s Working Group

10. Eleventh Five Year Plan’s Working Group

11. Report of The Experts Committee to Review The Implementation of recommendations Of

Rashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood Commission)

25
12. Report of Task Force for Flood Management/Erosion Control, Government of India

Annexure

Brief Note on Flood Committees and their Reports

Bihar government appointed a committee in 1962 to look into the problems of the flood-
affected area. The Development Commissioner of the State, the Land Reforms Commissioner
and the Chief Administrator of the Kosi Project were members of the committee. The
committee achieved nothing.

Kosi Technical Committee of Bihar headed by Kanwar Sain, former Chairman, Central Water
Commission was appointed in 1965 “to make study of the residual flood problems of the Kosi
river and suggest the future steps”. The committee submitted its report in 1966. It
recommended construction of a second barrage lower down at Dagmara for reducing the
gradient, velocity and the erosive force of the river. Subsequently, again set up a committee
with Kanwar Sain as its Chairman that submitted its report in April, 1971. It recommended
continuous and proper maintenance of the barrage and embankments and a second control
structure at Dagmara.

The state government constituted another committee in 1967 under the chairmanship of the
Kosi Area Development Commissioner whose job was to suggest programmes for the
embankment victims in the sectors of agriculture, cooperation, industrial development and
economic rehabilitation.

After the 1974 flood, Bihar government appointed Kosi Board of Consultants to look into the
flood damages and suggest means to combat floods under the Chairmanship of Kanwar Sain,
former Chairman of CWC. It reiterated the idea of construction the Barahkshetra Dam on the
Kosi and said that the embankments could only be a temporary solution to the flood problem
of the state.

A High Level Committee on Patna Floods was set up by the state government to look at the
causes of the floods after the severe floods of 1975 in the Ganga and Sone which submerged
large areas of Patna city and caused havoc. It submitted its report in January 1976. The
committee recommended the remodeling of the drainage system in the rural area and raising
of embankments.

In 1981, another committee under the chairmanship of Chandra Kishor Pathak, former
chairman of Saharsa District Board, was constituted by the state government to look into the
problems of economic rehabilitation of the embankment victims. This committee gave its
report in 1982 and the Government accepted its recommendations in 1987. Acting on the
recommendations of the Pathak Committee, the state government constituted Kosi Pirit Vikas
Pradhikar (Kosi Sufferers Development Authority) in the same year. But the Authority remains
a defunct body.

In the aftermath of 1987 floods, a committee under the Chairmanship of Naresh Chandra was
appointed by Bihar Government to look into the causes and remedy of floods in the state. The
Report is gathering dust somewhere in the Central Water Commission.

Most recently, Bihar government constituted a high-level specialist committee for suggesting
measures to check recurring flood in Bihar. The committee headed by Nilendu Sanyal, former
chief engineer was formed on August 31, 2007 to suggest immediate short and long term
strategies to control flood. The committee submitted its report on February 22, 2008 to the
chief minister. The other members of the committee included: Z S Tarapore, retired director,
Central Water Power Research Centre (Pune), GS Purva, chief engineer, Central Water
Commission (New Delhi), MU Gani, member, Ganga Flood Control Commission (Bihar) and
Brajbhushan Prasad Singh, chief engineer (planning and monitoring), state water resources
department, and LP Singh, director (planning), Ganga Flood Control Commission.

26
At the central level in order to implement the country-wide programme of flood control a
Central Flood Control Board was constituted in 1954 under the Chairmanship of the then Union
Minister of Irrigation and Power with representation of the concerned flood prone States and
Union Ministries such as Railways, Transport etc., as its members. The Central Flood Control
Board, in its 16th meeting held in November, 1977, decided that since the irrigation, flood
control and drainage aspects could not be dealt with in isolation and since in almost all the
States, the Ministers in charge of Irrigation were also in charge of Flood Control, the subject of
flood control could be discussed in the State Irrigation Ministers’ Conference, wherein the flood
control aspects are also being deliberated. It is not know what happened to CFCB thereafter,
but there is no mention of the CFCB in the reports after 1980.

Following the constitution of the CFCB, four other flood control commissions were set up,
including the Ganga Flood Control Commission, the Brahmaputra Flood Control Commission,
and a Flood commission for Central and North West India and one for Deccan areas, with the
objective of preparation of integrated flood management plans of the river basins. In addition,
some of the flood prone states also set up flood commissions. The National Commission on
Floods had chairman of the Ganga and Brahmaputra Flood Commission as members. The
Brahmaputra Flood Control Commission seems to have been dissolved around 1980 and in
1981, the Brahmaputra Board was constituted through an act of Parliament.

In April 1957, the Government of India set up a High Level Committee on Floods mostly
related to the policy on the strategy to provide flood control, mainly in view of divided opinion
on flood protection through embankments. The Committee submitted its reports in December
1957 and November 1958. The committee made a number of recommendations, including
emphasizing that priority should be given to soil conservation and watershed development
works and that comprehensive appraisal of the embankment schemes should be taken up
before their inclusion in the plans. The committee was formed to review the flood control
measures taken up after the adoption of the National Flood Policy in 1954. Among the
recommendations, the committee said that non-physical measures like flood warning,
forecasting to be made integral part of the flood control departments, flood plain zoning and
flood insurance should be taken up.

A Committee on Scientific Flood Forecasting in the country was set up in 1963 to review the
flood warning system. It submitted its report in 1965, recommending setting up of flood
forecasting centers and sub-centres all over the country.

In February 1964, a Ministers’ Committee on Flood Control was constituted, which submitted
its report in December 1964. The committee emphasized the need for preparation of long-
range plans for flood control, coordination of flood control with other uses and improvement in
the system of collection of flood damage statistics.

A Committee on Flood Control in the Adhwara Group of North Bihar headed by Jafer Ali was
also appointed in October 1964 to make an assessment of the problems of floods in the rivers
between the Bagmati and the Kamabalan to evolve adequate plan for flood control on these
rivers. It recommended channelisation of the river Darbhanga-Bagmati diversion of part of the
discharge of river Bagmati into the old course of the river Kamla, provision of embankment in
the reaches where the rivers spill and provision of adequate number of sluices in the
embankments.

In August 1965, a North Bihar Drainage Committee was constituted headed by Jafar Ali to
make a detailed study of the drainage requirements in North Bihar which traversed by the
Bagmati, Kamla, Pahar, Kankai, Mahananda, Gandak and Kosi rivers. The committee made
recommendations for provision for adequate drainage systems in Irrigated areas and
additional waterways for road and railway bridges and adequate drainage sluices in the
embanked portions.

During the floods of 1970, the 5th Conference of the State Ministers of Irrigation and Power
recommended setting up of Minister’s Committee on Floods and Flood Relief to go into the
reasons for the heavy loss of lives and to draw suitable proposals for avoiding loss of lives in
27
future. This committee headed by Union Deputy Minister for Irrigation and Power submitted its
report in March 1972 recommending long range comprehensive plans of flood control and
state legislation to prevent encroachment on the rivers and natural drainage channels.

Gandak High Level Committee headed by A C Mitra was set up in 1971 to study behaviour
Gandak river from Indo-Nepal border and to evaluate the works undertaken by state
governments from time to time. The committee submitted its report in March, 1974. It
recommended strengthening of the embankments already constructed and investigation of
multi-purpose reservoirs in the upper catchment of the Gandak river..

Report of the Working Group on Flood Control brought out in November, 1978 by the Union
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation made a number of important recommendations, including
the need for the state governments to “critically examine all major existing works and put up
proposals for stabilizing existing benefits” and that the “long term effects (of embankments)
on river regimes are yet to be evaluated”.

Quite like the flood commission, no one seems to know as to what happened to the
recommendations of the Committee for Flood Management in Ganga basin constituted in 1987
that was, headed by Secretary, Water Resources.

In September, 1996 Central Government have constituted five Task Forces on flood related
issues and the reports of these Task Forces have been sent to the respective State
Governments for taking up necessary follow up action. Its fate is also unknown.

In response of unprecedented floods of 1998, the Government of India set up an Expert Group
in November 1998, headed by Chairman, GFCC and members representing the states of UP &
Bihar for suggesting effective flood control measures for Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The reports
of the Expert Group and their recommendations have been sent to the State Governments for
their consideration and implementation. It is not known what the recommendations of the
Expert Group were.

The Central Ground Water Board constituted an internal group to undertake a study to prepare
a conceptual framework for estimating the additional ground water resources that could be
available by arresting the surplus monsoon run-off and storing in the sub-surface aquifer.
Accordingly a conceptual framework of a National Perspective Plan for recharge to ground
water by utilizing surplus monsoon run-off has been prepared.

Status report incorporating a review of the status of implementation of various

recommendations of National Flood Commission by the States/other Agencies was prepared in
February, 1987 and circulated to all the states with a request to expeditiously implement the
various recommendations. A comprehensive review made in 1987 by Central Water
Commission indicated the up-to-date status on implementation. The Working Group on Flood
Control for the VII Five Year Plan (1985-90) identified 25 important recommendations for
immediate implementation. The Working Group on Flood Control Programme for X Five Year
Plan in its report presented in August 2001 made a review of implementation and found that
these have mostly remained unimplemented. It again emphasized the need to implement the
25 important recommendations on a priority basis in its report submitted during 2001. It has
also recommended setting up an Integrated Commission for examination of the flood problem
and suggesting measures to tackle the same.

To study the problem of silting in rivers, the Government of India set up a multi disciplinary
committee in 2002. Its report is not available in the public domain.

The Tenth Plan (2002-2007) document recommended setting up of yet another commission.
The Working Group on Flood Control Programme for the 10th Plan in its report submitted to
the Planning Commission had recommended, “It would be desirable to consider setting up an
Integrated Flood Management Commission to go into all the details and make review of the
flood management programme in the country”. The Mid Term Appraisal of the 10th Plan said
that in view of the report of the Task Force in 2004, this suggestion “could be deferred for
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consideration in the 11th Plan”. The Working Group recommended setting up of this new
Commission to review the follow-up action taken on the recommendations made by the Flood
Commission.

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