Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 1> This is a still from video of the July 12th 2010 riots in Ardoyne1. Apart from the palpable tension between protesters and authorities, a striking aspect of the scene is that nearly every party is involved in monitoring, being monitored, or both. It recalls a piece by the artist Dan Graham from 1977, Performer/Audience/Mirror, where he seeks to describe the different conditions of objectication and subjectication taking place between audience members, performer, and viewers.

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 2> In it we have the different participants (Graham, his audience, and the camera) in different states of observation of each other, while Graham is continuously verbalising descriptions of himself and the audience in detail. The mirror provides an objective description of observers, and the performer provides a subjective description; by subverting the normal viewer/viewed dialectic, Graham turns the act of observation onto itself 2. In the Ardoyne scene, we see a corresponding situation. The nationalist protesters are in the midst of sit-down protest to prevent the unionist Orange Parade from passing through this catholic section of Crumlin Road. Police are recording information on protesters and agitators, for use in future surveillance, investigations and arrest 3; while protesters record video to document wrongdoing by authorities and for publicity purposes 4; additionally, news media record the interactions between both. In this scene, surveillance is the site of a struggle for control, and the conict present disrupts the expected hierarchy of surveillant and surveilled. In the context of public space, surveillance serves functions of protection and security for people, property and possessions; it simultaneously acts as a system of control, monitoring, assessing and inuencing behaviour, often for economic and political as well as for safety reasons. Technological developments in the late twentieth century have permitted state and commercial bureaucracies to expand extensive surveillance assemblages to cover many spheres of daily life. 5
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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 3>Benthams panopticon prison 6. A theoretical model developed by Michel Foucault for this system of close observation as a means of controlling behaviour is the Panopticon, Jeremy Benthams design for a radial plan prison. The prisoners are located around the perimeter of the plan, with a single watchtower located at its centre. Prisoners are unaware of whether or not they are being viewed from the watchtower, and so are reduced to continuously behaving as though they are being observed, making it such that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action 7. He who is subject to a eld of visibility, and knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power, he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relations in which he simultaneously plays both roles, he becomes the principle of his own subjection 8. Similarities between this surveillance mechanism and modern CCTV systems have been observed by researchers in recent years: Mike Davis has drawn parallels between the
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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

panopticon and shopping malls, with their control rooms, CCTV cameras, and security guards 9; Alan Reeve has called the use of CCTV in urban situations clearly reminiscent of what Foucault has described as the disciplinary society, in his use of the metaphor of the panopticon as a device of total surveillance in a rationally ordered society 10; and Nicholas Fyfe and Jon Bannister note that the product of such intensive surveillance is, as both Bentham and the proponents of CCTV claim, the deterrent of deviant behaviour and the possibility of rapid intervention at any moment if something suspicious is detected, and regard the expansion of CCTV throughout Britain as a vast, dispersed, electronic panopticon 11. Much of the literature on electronic surveillance of public space is dominated by this model, perhaps to an unhelpful degree; the differences between an unbuilt eighteenthcentury prison and contemporary public space raise some problems, not least being the subjects ability to leave the space being observed 12. Additionally, academic analyses of CCTV in urban contexts are typically executed in stable, westernised democracies. Little has been done to explore the breakdown of this model when dealing with hostile populations resistant to government control. For context, a web search on scholarly articles on surveillance and city brings up, in the rst 30 results, 9 UK cities, 4 US cities, 2 Australian cities, 1 European city, and two largely westernised and stable asian cities, Singapore and Hong Kong. Some statistics on the previously mentioned electronic panopticon in the UK:

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

SHETLANDS ISLANDS COUNCIL 101

FIFE 1,350

EDINBURGH 446

NEWCASTLE 650 BELFAST 400

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 1,454

COLBY BOROUGH COUNCIL 90 CAMDEN 488 BRISTOL 772 WESTMINSTER 310 CITY OF LONDON 619 WANDSWORTH 1,113

PORTSMOUTH 1,454

<image 4> CCTV cameras per local council. A selection of towns throughout the UK. 13 Council-owned cameras in public spaces have increased from roughly 21,000 to 56,377 in less than ten years. Even small, rural areas have CCTV systems: Scottish Borders has 58; Corby Borough Council has 90; Shetlands Islands Council has 101. In metropolitan areas, Bristol has 772, Edinburgh has 446, Newcastle has 650, and Belfast has 400. In London, famously the most heavily-surveilled city in the world, Westminster has 310, Camden has
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Kevin Walsh

488, City of London has 619; and Wandsworth has 1,113. The town councils with the most CCTV cameras in public spaces are Fife, with 1,350, and Portsmouth and Nottinghamshire, with 1,454 each 13. These gures, obtained through FOI requests, do not include cameras operated by private individuals, by central government, by trafc management agencies, or by transport agencies, so the real number of security cameras in public space in Britain is undoubtedly much higher. Indeed there is a distinct lack of information available on exact numbers of private- and government-operated CCTV cameras. Two gures abound in the media: that the average Londoner is caught on camera 300 times a day, and that there are 4.2 million cameras in the UK. Unfortunately, both of these gures were generated by extrapolating extremely small samples. Other gures are 3.2 million (generated by extrapolating from world CCTV sales) and 1.4 million (calculated by the number of control rooms in the UK) 14; both of these gures use data sets that are far from complete. Clearly there is a need for a more accurate way to estimate CCTV coverage. Briey, two models for empirically-based methodologies:

<image 5> In August 2009, 50 volunteers joined the the Vancouver Public Space Network in mapping over 2000 security cameras in downtown Vancouver 15.

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 6> A similar approach was taken by the Surveillance Camera Players, a New York-based artists collective, in the early 2000s; Walking tours of about 15-20 people were organised around different parts of Manhattan, and maps such as this produced 16. Both of these methods required a large amount of organisation and volunteers.

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

The aim of this research paper was to survey and then compare the extent of electronic surveillance of public space in an area of Belfast, and an area of an equivalently sized city in Britain with no similar history of conict. An additional goal of the paper was to develop a new methodology for assessing the extent of CCTV surveillance over large areas. Ideally this methodology should be empirical, rather than extrapolating from other data sets, and capable of being executed quickly.

<image 7> photo by James Green. Google Street View is a technology featured in the web application Google Maps and the stand-alone application Google Earth that provides panoramic views from various positions along many streets in the world. It was launched on May 25, 2007, originally only in several cities in the United States, and has since gradually expanded to include more cities and rural areas worldwide. In March 2009, cities in the United Kingdom were added, Belfast among them 17.

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 8> Google Street View. Shankill road, Belfast. It provides researchers the possibility of examining city streets building by building, without any great technical expertise. Resolution is generally high enough to pick out security cameras. Parts of the city which would take hours to survey in the eld can be viewed very quickly. The survey was also supplemented with information from city council publicity, news reports, and existing Freedom of Information requests 18, 19.

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 9> Google Street View. Cromac Street, Belfast. The scope of this paper is limited to those security cameras which are a) visible to the public and b) are located such that they record at least a part of a publicly accessible external space. Of concern is surveillance which can alter behaviour; we can say for our purposes that hidden cameras do not. Similarly, cameras on private property can be be considered not to inuence behaviour of individuals in public space. The camera types are broken down into three rough categories: Those operated by government institutions, identied by being on public or institutionally owned property and being of a homogenous type; Trafc cameras, limited to speed detection and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems; and Privately owned and operated cameras.

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Kevin Walsh

<image 10> Google Street View. Elswick Road, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.

<image 11> Google Street View. Stanhope Street, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. Some practical limitations to this methodology: It is the nature of CCTV systems to be in a constant, subtle state of ux, with small variations in characteristics over time that are not immediately obvious. The data in this set dates from 2009 - it is possible that small portions are already out of date.
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Kevin Walsh

In the methodology used here, no qualitative distinction is made between different types of camera, e.g. A small camera watching a doorway is given the same weighting as a camera observing an entire street. There is scope for further renement of methodology here. A relatively major drawback at this point is the limited access to pedestrianised urban areas. For this survey, other sources as listed previously were used to supplement the data in inaccessible areas. In future, Google plans to expand the service to pedestrian areas, as it already has in parts of the United States.
NEWCASTLE area: 115 km2 population: 273,600

BELFAST area: 113 km2 population: 267,500

<image 12> Newcastle-upon-Tyne was chosen to compare with Belfast as it has an equivalently sizedpopulation, similar urban area, and a similar economic history as an industrial centre. It differs crucially in that it has no history of urban conict.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

BELFAST

<image 13> Both sample areas were selected such that they took in part of the commercial zone of each city, and extended to the edge of the suburbs to where some indications of the rural hinterlands become apparent. This was done to ensure that all levels of density within the city were sampled from. The survey, conducted as described above, yielded a raw gure of 474 cameras in the Belfast study area and 339 in the Newcastle study area.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

BELFAST

<image 14> Surveillance camera distribution.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

BELFAST

TRAFFIC CAMERAS PRIVATE CAMERAS GOVERNMENT CAMERAS

<image 15> Surveillance camera distribution by type.

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400 TOTAL: 339 CAMERAS

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

300 500

Kevin Walsh

200 400 194 PRIVATE CAMERAS TOTAL: 339 CAMERAS 100 300 76 TRAFFIC CAMERAS

0 200

194 PRIVATE CAMERAS

100

NEWCASTLE

76 TRAFFIC CAMERAS

500

TOTAL: 474 CAMERAS

400

300 500

TOTAL: 474 CAMERAS 276 PRIVATE CAMERAS

200 400

100 300 192 GOVERNMENT CAMERAS 0 200 6 TRAFFIC CAMERAS 276 PRIVATE CAMERAS

BELFAST

<image 16> Surveillance camera quantities by type.

100

192 GOVERNMENT CAMERAS 0 6 TRAFFIC CAMERAS

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

BELFAST

<image 17> Study areas broken up into lateral divisions for analysis. An advantage of the longitudinal nature of the sample is the ability to divide it into 250m wide strips as shown. Graphing the data quantitatively by section provides a prole for that section of the city.

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60 50

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30 20 10 0

BELFAST

70 60 50 40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30

<image 18> Longitudinal distribution by type

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Splitting this into its components, differences between the two cities start to become 10 apparent.
0

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60 50

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30 20 10 0

BELFAST

70 60 50 40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30

<image 19> Longitudinal distribution of trafc surveillance cameras.

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Automatic 10 trafc monitoring cameras are little used in Belfast; we must assume that Government-operated cameras are used for this purpose, as well as for security purposes. In Newcastle, they occur at the inner and outer edges of the lower-density residential 0 areas, and in the city centre.

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60 50

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30 20 10 0

BELFAST

70 60 50 40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30

<image 20> Longitudinal distribution of government-operated surveillance cameras.

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Government-controlled cameras are used far more intensively in Belfast. However they 10 appear to be concentrated more at particular points rather than evenly spread throughout the study area, as occurs in Newcastle. 0

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60 50

Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30 20 10 0

BELFAST

70 60 50 40 70 30 60 20 50 10 40 0 30

<image 21> Longitudinal distribution of privately-operated surveillance cameras.

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A contrary 10 condition occurs with private cameras. A relatively even fall-off pattern from denser areas to rural areas occurs in Belfast, while concentration of privately-operated cameras is0conned to smaller areas in Newcastle, evident in the spikes at various distances from the city centre.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 22> Google Street View. Bell Close, Belfast.

NEWCASTLE

BELFAST

<image 23> Government-operated cameras, and police stations.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

When police installations are added to the maps, the even vs. concentrated spread for government-operated cameras identied in the prole graphs is more pronounced. In Belfast there are very few government-operated cameras that exist isolated from a government building or installation. In contrast there are far fewer police buildings in the Newcastle study area, with an homogenous distribution of isolated cameras through certain neighbourhoods.

<image 24> Google Street View. Tamworth Road, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

NEWCASTLE

Kevin Walsh

BELFAST

<image 25> Government-operated cameras, police stations and visual connections between installations.

<image 26> Google Street View. Westlink motorway, Belfast. A quantitative measure of the effectiveness of a spatial surveillance network is in the extent of area observed, and a qualitative measure is in the variety of viewing angles
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afforded operators. Newcastle offers several (7) high points for camera installations at the top of high-rise housing blocks. The PSNI in Belfast have erected three viewing masts within the study area, which, due to the absence of visible telecommunications equipment, appear to be purely for surveillance purposes. However Newcastles distributed network of lower level cameras likely covers more area than Belfasts concentration of installations at certain nodes, because occlusions are reduced and the orientation of cameras can often be remotely adjusted. There is also a qualitative advantage to Newcastles homogenous distribution of cameras. Blind spots are reduced, and key arteries and roads can be covered from two angles or more, allowing individuals and vehicles to be tracked and followed more easily. Belfast has a less extensive network of cameras which maintain this line of sight with one another; mainly conned to complexes in the city centre and a part of the Westlink motorway. Looking at the data for private cameras in the context of neighbourhood functions also highlights differences between the two cities. In the residential areas of the Newcastle study area, private security cameras are largely conned to central streets serving local commercial interests. In the visibly segregated neighbourhoods of the Belfast study area, private security cameras are more evenly distributed throughout.
NEWCASTLE

PREDOMINANTLY CATHOLIC PREDOMINANTLY PROTESTANT RESIDENTIAL SHOPPING STREET PRIVATE CAMERAS

RESIDENTIAL AREAS RESIDENTIAL SHOPPING STREET PRIVATE CAMERAS

BELFAST

PREDOMINANTLY CATHOLIC PREDOMINANTLY PROTESTANT RESIDENTIAL SHOPPING STREET PRIVATE CAMERAS

<image 27> Privately-operated cameras and neighbourhoods.

RESIDENTIAL AREAS RESIDENTIAL SHOPPING STREET PRIVATE CAMERAS

A closer look at these residential-commercial zones indicates that there is a signicantly higher frequency of private security cameras along the length of these streets in Newcastle - an average of one camera every 33 metres, as opposed to one every 112 metres in Belfast.
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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

NEWCASTLE

Newcastle

Phillips Street
8 no. cameras 145m 1 camera/18.1m

Stanhope Street
6 no. cameras 107m 1 camera/17.8m

Westgate Street
38 no. cameras 1362m 1 camera/35.8m

Adelaide Terrace
11 no. cameras 469m 1 camera/42.6m

63 no. cameras 2083m total 1 camera/33.1m

BELFAST

Belfast

Shankill Road
12 no. cameras 1145m 1 camera/95.4m

Springeld Road
5 no. cameras 756m 1 camera/151.2m

Commercial Streets Camera Frequency

17 no. cameras 1901m total 1 camera/111.8m

<image 28> Privately-operated cameras, local shopping areas, and camera frequency. What conclusions about Belfast can be drawn from these analyses? 1. The authorities in Belfast have chosen not to install many isolated street level security cameras in residential neighbourhoods as is typical in Newcastle. 2. Within the centres of ethnically segregated residential neighbourhoods there is a lower than normal requirement for privately-operated electronic surveillance. These two pieces of information obliquely imply the three main actors in conict in public space in Belfast; the police force, the unionist communities, and the nationalist communities.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 29> Google Street View. Donegall Pass, Belfast. 1. The fact that the authorities are unwilling to install and maintain a network of surveillance cameras within either the unionist or nationalist neighbourhoods as they have in Newcastle indicates that the same level of absolute control is not present as it is in other parts of the UK. A likely reason for this is that surveillance cameras installed in these areas are at risk of being removed by residents, and this is borne out by several news reports of cameras being dismantled in unionist and nationalist areas over the past decade 20.

<image 30> Google Street View. Crumlin Road, Belfast. Security cameras operated by the government, then, are a subtle indicator of a spatial boundary where control passes, partially at least, from one authority to another.
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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 31> Google Street View. Shankill, Belfast. 2. The lower frequency of private security cameras within the centres of unionist and nationalist areas is probably not due to an overall lower level of crime, or less access to surveillance technologies; rather it likely points to an alternative surveillance regime in these areas, one indicative of a spatial structure unique to Belfast. This quote is from a former Republican paramilitary, discussing the confusion over which side actually murdered Lenny Murphy, head of the notorious Shankill butchers. It was his own done it, not the Provies (PIRA). It was his own shot him. Provies wouldnt have gone up into Glencairn in the heart of a Loyalist area and sit there for six hours waiting for him. No way they were sitting for six hours in a van waiting on him coming. Ambushed him in a 100 percent Loyalist area! They havent got the guts to do that. No way. You smell them! Its knowing and smelling and instinct. Even a child of three years old would know that there was a stranger in the area. Its a tribal sort of instinct. They would know right away there was a stranger in their midst. A stranger couldnt have sat there in a car for so long. Ive known some brave men, and I can tell you nobody would sit for six hours in the other community. Ive done some fucking wee tricks in my time, but I never fucking sat for six hours. Id sit for six minutes and stiff him, but that was my lot.21 [my emphasis] This account clearly indicates the aversion individuals from one community have to any spatial transgression into the other community, and the visibility of an outsider within the boundaries of a community. It indicates a tradition of community surveillance, operating to enforce a spatial distinction between the two areas, with the medium between the two zones known as the interface. From Boal and Murray: Because of the physical segregation of the two groups [Protestant and Catholic], most of the inter-group clashes have taken place along the boundaries between the Protestant
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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

and Catholic areas. The inner parts of these areas have remained relatively free, a haven for the second type of conict manifestation, intimidation. 22 Intimidation here refers to confrontations between outsiders and residents within their communities. The everyday passive surveillance carried out by community dwellers, once a behaviour necessary for survival, takes the place, to an extent at least, of what would account for normal levels of private electronic surveillance. So, in relation to the survey carried out, power and control in sectarian terms can be understood to be inversely related to electronic surveillance intensity. This addition can be made to Allen Feldmans diagram of the community-interface-community 23:

Domestic/Commercial Surveilllance Intensity

<image 32>

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

To return to the Ardoyne ash-point riots of July 2010:

<image 33> Field surveillance being conducted by the PSNI during the 12th of July disturbances at the Ardoyne24.

<image 34> Field surveillance being conducted by the PSNI during the 12th of July disturbances at the Ardoyne24.
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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 35> Mobile surveillance vehicles during the 12th of July disturbances at the Ardoyne24.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 36> Mobile surveillance vehicles during the 12th of July disturbances at the Ardoyne25.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

<image 37> Aerial surveillance footage from the 12th of July disturbances at the Ardoyne25.

<image 38> Aerial surveillance footage from the 12th of July disturbances at the Ardoyne25.

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Legacies of Urban Conict: Mapping Surveillance in Belfast

Kevin Walsh

The authorities here are operating at a point in time and space that is largely outside of their territory of control. Surveillance is still used, as a method of observation, data collection, and as part of an attempt to establish control, but its inuence as a spatial signier is limited by the PSNIs dependence on mobile methods of surveillance. In contrast with the seamless incorporation of surveillance into the everyday entourage of the Newcastle urban situation, the itinerant nature of police surveillance at this event establishes them as temporary transgressors rather than as a party with a legitimate territorial claim. This study shows how Belfast, with a spatial structure reecting the sectarian nature of its population, resists the typical surveillance regime exemplied in Newcastle, enforcing a police strategy of fortied nodes combined with temporary intensication, rather than a distributed network. This study also illustrates the usefulness of surveillance camera mapping as an element of urban analysis. Because of its nature as a territorial signier, surveillance can be used to map power relationships spatially. Although state authorities with standardised surveillance apparatus are the most identiable, the absence of, or variations in the distribution of, other surveillance regimes can also be used to identify other, possibly competing, hierarchies of control.

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1. Still taken from amateur footage. www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbnQdK8IskE. 13th July 2010. Accessed 15th September 2010. 2. Graham, Dan. Two-Way Mirror Power. Ed. A. Alberro. MIT Press, 1999. p124-135. 3. PSNI release images of Ardoyne riot suspects. www.bbc.co.uk. British Broadcasting Corporation, August 1st 2010. 4. One such group to use this event for publicity purposes was the socialist republican political party irg. See www.eirigi.org/galleries/videos.html. 5. Lyon, David. Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Polity Press, 2007. p47. 6. Bentham, Jeremy. The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Ed. J. Bowring. W. Tait, 1843. Postscript, Part II, Plate II. 7. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 2nd ed. Penguin, 1977. p201. 8. Ibid., p202-203. 9. Davis, Mike. City of Quartz. Verso, 1990. p244. 10. Reeve, Alan. The panopticanisation of shopping: CCTV and leisure consumption. Surveillance, CCTV and Social Control. C. Norris, J. Moran and G. Armstrong (eds.) Ashgate, 1998. p69-87. 11. Fyfe, Nicholas, and Bannister, Jon. City Watching: Closed Circuit Television in Public Spaces. The Urban Geography Reader. Eds. Nicholas Fyfe, Judith Kenny. Routledge, 2005. p367. 12. Ibid. 5, p57. 13. Local council controlled CCTV cameras treble in a decade. www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk. Big Brother Watch UK, 16th December 2009. 14. Brooke, Heather. A sharp focus on CCTV. Wired UK, 1st April 2010. 15. Dalton, Richard J. Volunteers map Vancouver's public surveillance cameras. www.vancouversun.com. The Vancouver Sun, 23rd August 2009. 16. Surveillance Camera Players. We Know You Are Watching. Factory School, 2006. p95-131. 17. Google Street View. wikipedia.com. Accessed 15th September 2010. 18. CCTV Coverage and Information. www.whatdotheyknow.com. Freedom of Information request to Newcaste-Upon-Tyne City Council by Chris Dunn, 31st October 2008. Accessed 14th September 2010. 19. Safer Belfast CCTV. www.belfastcity.gov.uk/councilmmunitysafety/cctv.asp. Belfast City Council, accessed 14th September 2010. 20. CCTV cameras damaged. www.bbc.co.uk. British Broadcasting Corporation, 11th July 2002. 21. Feldman, Allan. Formations of Violence. The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland. The University of Chicago Press, 1991. p76-7. 22. Boal, F. W., and Murray, Russell. A City in Conict. Geographical Magazine, 1977. p370. 23. Ibid. 21, p35. 24. Eirig. Stills taken from publicity footage. www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1XDd0h12TI. 13th July 2010. Accessed 15th September 2010. 25. Stills taken from News Report. BBC News. British Broadcasting Corporation, 14th July 2010.

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