European Journal of Social Psychology Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.

37, 10571075 (2007)

Published online 1 February 2007 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.420

Biassed processing of persuasive information: on the functional equivalence of cues and message arguments
HANS-PETER ERB1*, ANTONIO PIERRO2, LUCIA MANNETTI2, SCOTT SPIEGEL3 AND ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI4
1 2

Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany University of Rome La Sapienza, Italy 3 Columbia University, USA 4 University of Maryland at College Park, USA

Abstract Research on persuasion has shown that inferences based on heuristic or peripheral cues can bias the subsequent processing of persuasive messages. Two studies (total N 296) examined the additional possibilities that a message argument can serve as a biassing factor and cue-related information can serve as the target of processing bias. It was demonstrated that a message argument can bias (a) the processing of subsequent other message arguments (Study 1) and (b) the processing of subsequent cue information (Study 2). Results are discussed within dual-process models and the recently developed unimodel of persuasion. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Signicant improvements in our understanding of how people form and change attitudes in response to persuasive communication have been accomplished by dual-process models of persuasion, namely Petty and Cacioppos Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and Chaiken and colleagues Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; e.g. Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Both models hold that under certain conditions the processing of information relevant to the issue under consideration (termed central route and systematic processing, respectively) can be biassed by factors exogenous to the message like source characteristics (e.g. Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994), recipients mood states (Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi 1994; Petty, Schuman, Richman, & Strathman, 1993), consensus among proponents (Darke et al., 1998; Erb, Bohner, Schmalzle, & Rank, 1998), and others (e.g. Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Ziegler, von Schwichow, & Diehl, 2005). Within this framework, the present article explores previously
*Correspondence to: Dr Hans-Peter Erb, Chemnitz University of Technology, Psychologisches Institut, Wilhelm-Raabe-Str. 43, D-09107 Chemnitz, Germany. E-mail: hans-peter.erb@phil.tu-chemnitz.de

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 15 September 2005 Accepted 10 December 2006

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unconsidered possibilities of what types of persuasive evidence may be the biassing factor and what type of persuasive evidence may be the target of bias in persuasive settings. According to both the ELM and the HSM, biassed processing reects an effect of some peripheral or heuristic factor on the valence of cognitive responses toward message content and subsequent attitude judgement. For example, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) observed that cognitive responses toward a message on a telephone answering machine were more positive when the communicator was perceived to be of high credibility (a magazine specialized in scientic product testing) versus low credibility (a promotional pamphlet of a discount department store chain). The effect occurred when (a) recipients were sufciently able and motivated to process the persuasive message thoroughly and (b) the message itself was neither clearly weak nor strong, but sufciently ambiguous to allow the biassing factor to contort its content. Biassed cognitive responses to the message, in turn, led to favourable or unfavourable attitude judgements toward the consumer product. The assumed underlying mechanism was that heuristic-based initial pre-judgements, positive (negative) in the case of a highly credible (incredible) source, coloured the valence of cognitive responses that recipients nally based their judgements on (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994, p. 461). Biassed processing can be empirically distinguished from a direct effect of the biassing factor on attitudes, if (a) cognitive responses reect the valence of the biassing factor and (b) biassed cognitive responses determine the nal attitude judgement. In this case, the effect of the initial heuristic-based pre-judgement on attitudes is indirect and mediated by the cognitive responses toward the message. A direct and unmediated effect of source credibility on attitudes would represent a case of heuristic or peripheral processing by rather neglect of systematic or central route processing (e.g. Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Petty & Wegener, 1999). Without exception, studies reporting biassed processing effects so far have treated factors exogenous to message content (e.g. heuristic cues, mood states etc.) as biassing factors and message content (arguments) as the target of bias. In fact, HSM-theorists have been explicit in postulating that the HSMs . . . bias hypothesis asserts that heuristic processing can inuence the nature of systematic processing when persuasive argumentation is ambiguous (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 336; emphasis ours). Similarly, Petty and Cacioppo (1986, p. 136, emphasis ours) stated that in biassed processing . . . some treatment variable either motivates or enables subjects to generate a particular kind of thought in response to a message. . . This theoretical and empirical treatment of the biassed processing phenomenon may lead to the impression that it is asymmetrical in the sense that only heuristic cues (HSM) or peripheral variables (ELM) can bias only the systematic (HSM) or central route processing (ELM) of message arguments. Against this background, we presently pose the question of whether the processing of any information may bias the processing of any other information, given that both have some relevance for the issue under consideration. With this regards, we refer to the unimodel of persuasion (Erb & Kruglanski, 2005; Erb, Kruglanski, Chun, Pierro, Mannetti, & Spiegel, 2003; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999; Pierro, Mannetti, Kruglanski, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2004; Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2005) that questions the need to distinguish between two qualitatively different processes. In terms of the unimodel, heuristic cues or peripheral information and message arguments form part of a more general category of persuasive evidence and should therefore be perceived as functional equivalent in the persuasion process. Kruglanski and Thompson (1999) reported initial evidence for such functional equivalence of cues and arguments. When made appropriately lengthy and complex, cue information (communicator characteristics) did not affect attitudes under low processing effort, unlike in previous studies where cue information was found to exert its effects under such conditions. It yielded consistent effects when processing effort was high, whereas in previous studies cue information typically yielded no effects under high effort. Conversely, message arguments when made short and simple yielded effects on
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attitudes when processing effort was low, mimicking a cue or peripheral effect in terms of dual-process models. Given functional equivalence of cues and arguments in the persuasion process, it should be possible to create situations in which (a) a message argument can serve as a biassing factor and (b) cue information (e.g. communicator characteristics) can serve as a target of bias. These possibilities were empirically explored in the following two studies. In Study 1, we investigated the previously unconsidered possibility that under processing motivation sufciently high to enable the effortful processing of subsequent information, an early message argument can bias the processing of a subsequent persuasive message. In Study 2, we explored the possibility that under high motivation an early message argument may bias the processing of subsequent source information.

STUDY 1 To study the biassing effects of an initial message argument on subsequent message arguments, we varied the quality of the initial argument: Some participants received an initial argument of a high quality and others of a low quality. All participants subsequently received the same set of message arguments of moderate persuasiveness. We additionally varied processing motivation by manipulating their sense of accountability for their judgements (Tetlock, 1985, 1992). Processing motivation was manipulated because this enabled us to empirically distinguish most clearly between a direct effect of the initial argument on attitudes under low motivation and the predicted biassing effect of the initial argument on subsequent message processing (see Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). Thus, the design was a 2 2 factorial (initial argument: weak vs. strong, processing motivation: low vs. high). We hypothesized that under both high and low motivation the nal attitude judgements would be more positive where the initial argument was of high versus low quality, still for different reasons. Under high-processing motivation the nal attitudes were expected to be mediated by biassed processing of the subsequent arguments, as indexed by the issue-related cognitive responses dedicated to those arguments. Under low-processing motivation, little biassing effect was expected, as relatively high motivation is necessary for the effortful processing of the subsequent information. Accordingly, we did not expect cognitive responses to the subsequent arguments in this condition to vary as a function of the initial argument quality. Rather, under low motivation we predicted the initial argument to have a direct impact on nal attitudes, mimicking a cue effect, unmediated by subsequent issue-related biassed processing. We added attitude measures pertaining to the specic aspects highlighted in the arguments of the subsequent message to the list of dependent variables. For this measures, a fan type interaction of argument quality and motivation was expected. Under high motivation biassed processing of these arguments would result in (un)favourable judgements in the strong (weak) argument condition. Under low motivation, where no biassing effect on the processing of these subsequent arguments was expected, these judgements would not be a function of the initial arguments quality.

Method Participants A total of 200 students (103 female and 96 male, one participant did not report gender, mean age 20.8 years) of various majors at the University of Maryland volunteered for a study on text
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comprehension. They were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions and received US$ 3 for their participation.

Stimulus Materials Participants read a persuasive message in favour of building a tunnel underneath the harbour of Rotterdam (The Netherlands). We chose this ctitious issue because the corresponding message arguments had already been extensively pre-tested and used in prior studies on biassed processing (Bohner et al., 2002; Erb et al., 1998). Moreover, a ctitious issue was assumed to prevent other factors (e.g. defending ones own pre-existing attitude; Chaiken et al., 1989) to exert bias. The persuasive message contained six arguments. Depending on the condition, the initial argument was either weak or strong. Specically, it read: The tunnel will bring great advantages for residents, because the trafc volume in adjacent neighbourhoods will be reduced by about 80% (4%). This means signicantly (somewhat) less noise and exhaust fumes to be endured by residents (weak version in parentheses additionally, the adjective great before advantages was omitted). The remaining ve arguments pertained to several additional aspects of the construction project, such as the benets it may bring the local construction industry, the reduction of delays on a highly frequented highway between the cities of Delft and Rotterdam, and the proposed construction of additional green areas as well as leisure sites along with the tunnel. These latter arguments were held constant across conditions and were of moderate persuasiveness.1

Procedure and Dependent Variables Students participated in groups of up to 10 members. Upon arriving at the laboratory, they received written instructions that their task was to evaluate a text as part of a study on text comprehension (the cover-story). They were instructed to form a general impression of the text. To induce high processing motivation, for half the participants the instructions admonished them to be sure to make informed choices when answering the questionnaire as at the conclusion of the study the experimenter would interview them about the reasons for their answers. No such instruction was given to participants in the low motivation condition (Tetlock, 1985, 1992). Participants who were made accountable for their judgements were expected to develop high processing motivation (e.g. Corneille, Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Walther, 1999; De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005) and thus more thoroughly elaborate on the subsequent message than participants who were not made accountable (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 314; Tetlock, 1983). After perusing the text at their own pace, participants were given 3 minutes to write down any thoughts they had during that process. They did so on a lined sheet, and were asked to enter each thought on a separate line. Two independent judges, blind to the experimental conditions and the hypotheses, categorized each thought as either issue-related or irrelevant (e.g. Id like to have a coffee). Each issue-related thought was then categorized as either pertaining to the content of the
In a pretest with these arguments, N 30 participants rated the persuasiveness of a total of 24 arguments on 9-point-scales, ranging from absolutely not convincing to absolutely convincing. Two conditions were created by presenting a weak and a strong version of each argument (pertaining to the same aspect of the construction project) in a between-subjects design. The argument on advantages for residents because of trafc and exhaust fume reduction (the initial argument) yielded M 6.17 in the strong and M 4.06 in the weak version, t (28) 2.79, p < 0.005. For the subsequent ambiguous message, arguments in the range between M 4.86 and M 5.22 were selected.
1

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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initial argument or pertaining to other aspects of the topic. Finally, every issue-related thought was coded as either favourable, neutral, or unfavourable with respect to the attitude object. Next, participants responded to a check on our motivational manipulation. Specically, they answered the question How carefully did you read the text? on a scale from 1: not at all carefully to 9: very carefully. They then indicated their agreement with several ller-items about text comprehension designed to uphold the cover-story (e.g. The text was easy to comprehend). These were followed by a check item on the argument quality manipulation. Specically, participants indicated their agreement with the statement: The arguments in favour of the tunnel were convincing, on a scale ranging from 1: do not agree at all to 9: fully agree. At that point, participants attitudes were assessed by (1) a single general question requesting their agreement with the statement: The tunnel in Rotterdam should be built, on a scale from 1: do not agree at all to 9:fully agree, and (2) ve specic questions pertaining to specic aspects of the tunnel mentioned in the subsequent arguments received by all the participants. These inquired into the extent to which participants agreed that (a) The tunnel would reduce trafc in the adjacent neighbourhoods; (b) . . . reduce the harmful consequences of noise and fume; (c) . . . would be good for the economy; (d) . . . would reduce trafc on the highway between Delft and Rotterdam; and (e) . . . would enhance the quality of life for Rotterdam residents. Answers to these questions were recorded on scales ranging from 1: do not agree at all to 9: fully agree. Then, participants were asked to describe in their own words what they thought the purpose of the study was. As it turned out, none of our participants was suspicious or guessed our real purpose. Finally, participants reported their gender, age and major. They were then thoroughly debriefed. In the high motivation condition they learned that no interview would take place, after all. This concluded the experiment. Participants were paid, thanked and dismissed.

Results Manipulation Checks Participants in the high motivation condition reported to have read the text more carefully (M 6.70) than participants in the low motivation condition (M 6.02), F (1, 196) 7.80, p < 0.007, for all other effects, p > 0.16. Thus, the accountability manipulation had the intended effect on processing motivation. Regarding perceived persuasiveness, participants reported to have found the presented arguments more convincing when the initial argument was strong (M 6.72) as compared to weak (M 5.71), F (1, 196) 13.77, p < 0.001, for all other effects, p > 0.17. Thus, the manipulation of argument quality was successful as well.

Attitude Measures First, we analysed the general attitude judgements. Results showed that participants agreed more that the tunnel should be built in the strong (M 6.64) than in the weak initial argument condition (M 5.53), F (1, 195) 22.33, p < 0.001. As expected, this effect was independent of motivation, for all other effects, F < 1. Additional contrast analyses revealed that the effect of the initial argument on this general attitude judgement was signicant for both low and high motivation conditions, both t (195) >2.76, both p < 0.007 (Table 1). Thus the expected main effect of argument quality on this measure was obtained.
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Table 1. General attitudes toward tunnel project, attitudes toward message aspects, cognitive responses toward the initial argument, and cognitive responses toward other issue-related aspects as function of motivation and the quality of the initial argument (Study 1) Low Motivation initial argument (a) General attitude (b) Attitudes toward message aspects (c) Cognitive responses toward initial argument (d) Cognitive responses toward other issue-related aspects Weak 5.52 (1.75) 6.29 (1.31) 0.04 (0.27) 0.17 (0.64) Strong 6.44 (1.51) 6.66 (1.50) 0.19 (0.20) 0.02 (0.68) Weak 5.53 (1.86) 5.93 (1.49) 0.05 (0.34) 0.04 (0.57) High Strong 6.84 (1.50) 6.76 (1.46) 0.10 (0.22) 0.21 (0.70)

Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses. Number of cases per cell from left to right for (a) and (b): 50, 50, 49, 50, and for (c) and (d): 46, 47, 47, 42. Higher numbers indicate more favourable attitudes (range from 1, unfavourable to 9, favourable) for (a) and (b), and more favourable thoughts (range from 1, exclusively unfavourable thoughts to 1, exclusively favourable thoughts) for (c) and (d).

Second, we combined attitude measures pertaining to the specic aspects highlighted in the subsequent arguments to form a single index (Cronbachs a 0.80). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of argument quality indicating that participants agreed more with this attitude measure when the initial argument was strong (M 6.69) as compared to weak (M 6.05), F (1, 195) 9.98, p < 0.003. The predicted interaction of argument quality and motivation in this unfocused ANOVA, however, did not to reach statistical signicance, F (1, 195) 1.53, p < 0.22, F < 1 for the main effect of motivation. To test the predicted, fan shaped, pattern of this interaction, we rst conducted a planned comparison analysis which revealed that under low motivation the quality of the initial argument did not signicantly affect attitudes toward the specic aspects of the subsequent message, t (195) 1.37, p > 0.17, whereas it did so under high motivation, t (195) 3.10, p < 0.003. Second, we conducted a contrast analysis to test the predicted pattern of means. Thus, the weak and the strong argument conditions received l 1 and l 1, respectively, under low motivation, and l 2 and l 2, respectively, under high motivation. The results of this analysis conrmed our prediction, t (195) 3.14, p < 0.003. In addition, this particular contrast t the pattern of means extremely well, capturing 96% of the between-condition variation (SSbetween 21.21; SScontrast 20.42), with any residual effect being far from signicant, F (2, 195) 0.19 (Abelson & Prentice, 1997). Finally, we carried out a regression analysis in which we used argument quality (dummy coded) as a predictor for the general attitude measure as well as for the attitude index pertaining to the subsequent aspects separately for the low and high motivation conditions. Under low motivation, initial argument quality did not predict attitudes toward aspects of the tunnel mentioned in the subsequent arguments ( 0.14, n.s.), nor did it do so after covarying out attitudes toward the initial argument ( 0.005, n.s.). Conversely under high motivation, initial argument quality did predict attitudes toward the subsequently mentioned aspects ( 0.30, p < 0.004), and this effect disappeared when we covaried out the attitudes toward the initial argument ( 0.06, n.s.). Taken together, the results of more focussed analyses suggest that the initial argument affected attitudes toward subsequently mentioned aspects for high but not for low motivation participants.
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 10571075 (2007) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

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A total of n 18 participants, equally distributed across conditions, X2 (df 1, n 18) 1.61, p > 0.20, did not list any relevant thoughts, and were omitted from the following analyses. Thought-valence indices of issue-related thoughts were created by subtracting the proportion of unfavourable thoughts from the proportion of favourable thoughts about the content of the initial argument and the content of other aspects of the issue for each participant. The possible range is from 1 (exclusively unfavourable thoughts) to 1 (exclusively favourable thoughts). The measure demonstrated a high inter-rater reliability (r 0.85, p < 0.001). Reliability coefcients for the valence of thoughts dedicated to the initial argument and to other aspects separately were somewhat lower, though still highly signicant (r 0.53, p < 0.001, and r 0.60, p < 0.001, respectively)2. First, the index for thoughts dedicated to the initial argument was subjected to a 2 2 ANOVA (Table 1). The analysis yielded a main effect of argument quality indicating that these thoughts were more favourable when the initial argument was strong (M 0.15) rather than weak (M 0.01), F (1, 178) 15.51, p < 0.001.3 Thus, thoughts about the initial argument were equally inuenced by the quality of this argument under low and high processing motivation. This interpretation was further conrmed by contrast analyses which showed that the differences between the weak and strong argument conditions were signicant for both low and high motivation conditions, t (82.5) 3.22, p < 0.003, and t (29.6) 2.50, p < 0.02, respectively. Additionally, these results attest further to the efcacy of our argument quality manipulation. With regards to thoughts about the subsequently mentioned aspects of the attitude issue, the ANOVA yielded only the predicted interaction effect, F (1, 178) 5.17, p < 0.03, and no main effect, all F < 1 (Table 1). Contrast analyses additionally conrmed that under low motivation the valence of thoughts about other aspects did not differ as function of the quality of the initial argument, t (178) 1.36, p > 0.17, whereas they did differ under high motivation, t (178) 1.80, p < 0.03. Thus, as expected, the biassing effect of the initial arguments quality on subsequent processing occurred to a greater extent (in the present case, only) under high- versus low-processing motivation. This interpretation was conrmed further in a mixed-model multi-variate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with type of thoughts (toward initial argument vs. toward other aspects) as an additional within-subjects factor. This analysis yielded a signicant three-way interaction of all our independent variables, F (1, 178) 5.17, p < 0.03, for all other effects involving the within-subjects factor, p > 0.20. According to this interaction, the valence of thoughts about the initial argument varied as a function of argument quality under both low and high motivation, whereas thoughts about issue aspects mentioned in the subsequent arguments varied as a function of argument quality only under high motivation. Mediation Analyses We conducted path analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to further explore the biassed processing effect under high motivation versus the direct effect of argument strength on attitudes under low motivation. The predictor variables in these analyses were the quality of the initial argument (dummy coded),
2 Whereas coders strongly agreed on the valence of each single thought, they converged to a somewhat lesser degree on determining whether the thought referred to the initial or to the subsequent arguments. It is such blending of thoughts what the biased processing of content arguments by another content argument means. Thus, raters jointly re-examined each single thought and solved their differences by discussion. Data reported below are based on the results of this procedure. Additional analyses for each rater separately did not yield any result signicantly different from the reported ndings. 3 Additionally, an unexpected main effect of motivation emerged due to the fact that under low motivation thoughts dedicated to the initial argument were more favourable (M 0.12) than under high motivation (M 0.02), F (1, 178) 4.91, p < 0.03. At present, we have no explanation why this effect occurred, but as such it does not interfere with our general interpretation. More important to our argument, the interaction term was not signicant, F < 1.

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Low Motivation Valenced Thoughts Initial Argument .32* (.35*) Initial Argument -.14 (-.20) Valenced Thoughts Other Aspects High Motivation Valenced Thoughts Initial Argument .25* (.21*) Initial Argument .27* (.09) Attitude .25* (.21) Attitude .13 .35* (.32*) .26*

.19 (.13) Valenced Thoughts Other Aspects

.62* (.60*)

Figure 1. Effects of initial arguments quality (dummy-coded 0: weak, 1: strong) on post-message attitudes mediated by valenced cognitive responses toward the initial argument and arguments in the message under conditions of low (upper panel) and high (lower panel) processing motivation (Study 1) Note. Coefcients appearing above lines are beta-weights for uncorrected paths. Coefcients in parentheses appearing below lines are beta-weights for corrected paths (thoughts about initial argument corrected for thoughts about other issue-related aspects and vice versa). p < 0.05.

valenced thoughts about the initial argument, valenced thoughts about aspects of the subsequent arguments, or both to correct for the respective effects of each other. The dependent variable was the attitude toward the tunnel project (see Figure 1). We found that under low motivation thoughts about the initial argument predicted the nal attitudes directly: The quality of the initial argument predicted valenced thoughts about this initial argument ( 0.32, p > 0.05), which in turn predicted attitudes ( 0.26, p < 0.05). Additionally, neither the path from thoughts about the initial argument to thoughts about the subsequent arguments ( 0.13, n.s.), nor the path from the dummy-coded initial argument variable to thoughts about subsequent arguments ( 0.14; 0.20 when corrected for thoughts about the initial argument, n.s.) proved signicant. Thus, this analysis did not indicate any bias in the processing of subsequent argumentsa result also indicative of shallow processing of the subsequent arguments under low motivation. The results are strikingly different under high motivation. In that condition, the quality of the initial argument predicted valenced thoughts about this particular argument ( 0.25; 0.21, when corrected for thoughts about other aspects, both p < 0.05). In turn, valenced thoughts about the initial argument predicted valenced thoughts about the subsequent arguments ( 0.27, p < 0.05). The effect
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of the initial argument on thoughts about the subsequent aspects of the issue was mediated by thoughts about the initial argument (z 2.05, p < 0.04, Sobel test). These latter thoughts predicted the nal attitude judgements ( 0.62; 0.60 when corrected for thoughts about the initial argument, both p < 0.05). The effect of thoughts about the initial argument on nal attitudes was mediated by thoughts about the subsequent aspects of the issue (z 2.48, p < 0.02, Sobel test). Additionally, the initially signicant direct path from valenced thoughts about the initial argument to attitudes ( 0.25, p < 0.05) became non-signicant when corrected for the effect of valenced thoughts about subsequent arguments ( 0.09, n.s.). These ndings suggest that the effect of the initial arguments quality on nal attitudes was mediated by cognitive responses toward other aspects of the attitude issue (e.g. Bohner et al., 1994; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Erb et al., 1998, for similar analyses).

Discussion In this study, we explored the biassing effect of an initial message argument on the processing of subsequent message arguments. Analyses revealed that, when participants were highly motivated to process the subsequent message, the valence of the initial argument affected not only the processing of this argument as such, but also the processing of the subsequent arguments. The outcomes of the latter then determined the nal attitude judgements. Under low motivation, the valence of thoughts about the initial argument determined attitudes directly without any biassed processing of the subsequent arguments. Recall that within the persuasion literature thus far only heuristic cues or other peripheral factors have been shown as capable of exerting bias on subsequent message processing. In contrast, in the present research the biassing factor consisted of a message argument. Moreover, under low motivation the initial argument produced effects on attitudes exactly like those ascribed by dual-process models to heuristic or peripheral processing, even though in terms of its contents it pertained to the substance of the issue (thus properly constituting a message argument) rather than to aspects exogenous to the issue (the way peripheral or heuristic cues were operationalised in prior research). Participants in the low motivation condition used the initial argument as a shortcut to nal attitude judgements to a relative neglect of subsequent message contents, just as in the low-motivation conditions of prior work participants used initial cue information to the neglect of subsequent message information. Thus, ndings under both low- and high- motivation conditions add evidence to the unimodel notion of functional equivalence of cues and arguments. STUDY 2 If any initial information can bias the processing of any subsequent information, it should be possible to create a situation wherein an early message argument would bias the subsequent processing of cue information (information exogenous to the substance of the issue) which would then form the basis of subsequent attitude judgements. In Study 2, we explored the possibility that the processing of subsequent source-related information can be biassed. In fact, persuasion research so far has never considered the possibility that source information can be the target of bias. We provided participants with the same weak or strong argument as in Study 1. This was followed by a relatively lengthy description of the communicator, ambiguous in its implication for attitude judgements. Unlike Study 1, wherein we varied the processing motivation at two levels, in the present experiment we kept it constant and high via accountability instructions delivered to all participants. Furthermore, we assumed that the biassing mechanism depends on the order of presentation, and more specically that the early information should be capable of biassing the later information but not
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vice versa (see also Erb et al., 1998; Erb et al., 2003). To investigate this assumption, we varied the order of presentation so that the brief argument preceded the source information in one condition and followed it in another. These arrangements resulted in a 2 (brief argument: weak vs. strong) x 2 (argument precedes vs. follows source description) between participants factorial design. We expected that the processing of the brief argument would bias the processing of the source information when it preceded the source information. Specically, we predicted that under those conditions, the nal attitudes would be mediated by the biassed processing of source information induced by the initial argument, as indexed by more positive (negative) thoughts dedicated to the communicator description. To allow for an additional test, we further included dependent measures on communicator attributions. In particular, we expected that biassed processing of the communicator description in the before condition would result in a more positive (negative) assessment of the communicator with regards to an attribute directly related to the issue referred to in the brief argument (in this case, perceived expertise in tunnel construction) in the strong (weak) argument condition. No such effect was expected in communicator attributes unrelated to the current issue (general expertise, trustworthiness, likeability). In the after condition, where no biassed processing was expected, we predicted that attitudes would be a direct function of argument quality, unmediated by source-related processing. Accordingly, neither thoughts dedicated to the communicator description nor perceived communicator expertise in tunnel construction would be a function of argument quality. Method Participants A total of 96 students (50 female and 46 male, mean age 20.4 years) of various majors at the University of Maryland volunteered for a study on text comprehension (cover-story). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions and received US$ 3 for their participation. Stimulus Materials As in Study 1, the stimulus materials pertained to the tunnel project in Rotterdam. We used the same brief (weak or strong) argument as in Study 1, and additionally a description of the communicator said to argue in favour of the tunnel. This individual was described as having some experience with planning trafc facilities (but not specically with tunnels), living with his family in the Rotterdam area where the tunnels impact would be greatest, running a construction company, and being nominated for an award by the Construction Industry Association of The Netherlands for his proposal of a Maas-Rhine Channel. The description was pre-tested to be ambiguous in terms of eliciting thoughts that were neither strongly positive nor strongly negative.4 Procedure and Dependent Variables The procedure closely followed that of Study 1. Note, that across conditions all participants of the present study expected to be interviewed at the end of the session, instituting a constantly high degree of accountability concerns (Tetlock, 1985, 1992).
4

In a pretest, N 24 students received the communicator description but no content argument under high accountability instructions (interview expected). They responded to a thought-listing procedure where thought valence toward the communicator description was neutral (M 0.03). Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 10571075 (2007) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

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After viewing the entire informational sequence, respondents recorded any thoughts they had while reading the material. Later, two independent judges categorized each thought as either pertaining to the brief initial argument, or to the communicators description. All other thoughts were coded as irrelevant.5 At that point, each relevant thought was rated as either favourable, neutral, or unfavourable (to the issue or to the communicator). Following the thought listing, participants indicated their agreement with ller items allegedly tapping text comprehension. The llers were followed by a manipulation check on the argument quality manipulation identical to that in Study 1. Participants then reported their attitudes by answering one general question: To what extent do you agree with the statement: The tunnel in Rotterdam should be built? and one question pertaining to the specic aspect of the tunnel project highlighted in the brief argument: The tunnel would reduce trafc in the adjacent neighbourhoods. Responses to these items were recorded on a scale ranging from 1: do not agree at all to 9: completely agree. Subsequently, participants answered four questions pertaining to the communicator (named Jan-Willem van Regum) again on scales ranging from 1: do not agree at all to 9: completely agree. Item (1) pertained to the communicator with respect to his expertise in the current issue. It read: (1) Jan-Willem van Regum is an expert in constructing tunnels. Items (2), (3) and (4) did not pertain to the issue under consideration. They read: (2) . . . is an expert in designing public trafc facilities, (3) . . . is trustworthy, and (4) . . . is a likeable person. Afterwards participants answered an open-ended suspicion-probe question, and it turned out that none guessed the real purpose of the study. Finally, they reported their gender, age and major. At the conclusion, participants were thanked, paid and thoroughly debriefed.

Results Manipulation Check Participants reported to have found the arguments more convincing when the initial argument was strong (M 6.00) as compared to weak (M 4.67), F (1, 95) 8.35, p < 0.006, for all other effects, F < 1. Thus, our manipulation of argument quality was successful.

Attitude Measures The general attitudes and attitudes toward the aspect highlighted in the brief argument were initially analysed separately. For both measures a signicant main effect of argument quality appeared, F (1, 92) 10.82, p < 0.001 and F (1, 91) 22.56, p < 0.001, for nal attitude and specic attitude, respectively, for all other effects, F < 1. For convenience, we combined these measures to form an overall index of attitude toward the tunnel (r 0.46, p < 0.001; see Table 2 for means). As can be expected, the ANOVA performed on this index yielded the same main effect of argument quality, F (1, 91) 22.10, p < 0.001, for all other effects, F < 1. Participants in the strong argument condition were more in favour of the tunnel (M 6.79) than participants in the weak argument condition (M 5.32). Additional contrast analyses revealed that the effect of the brief argument was signicant for both order
5 Some thoughts were issue-related but did neither pertain to the argument presented nor to the communicator. As these thoughts were too few to be analysed separately they were treated as irrelevant. Note that this treatment of those thoughts provides the most conservative test of our hypothesis. Control analyses in which these thoughts were included either as dedicated to the argument or to the communicator description did not yield any differences from the data reported below.

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Table 2. General attitudes toward tunnel project, perceived expertise of the communicator in tunnel construction, cognitive responses toward the brief argument, and cognitive responses toward the communicator description as a function of order of presentation and the quality of the brief argument (Study 2) Order of presentation Argument quality (a) General attitude (b) Perceived expertise in tunnel construction (c) Cognitive responses toward brief argument (d) Cognitive responses toward communicator description Weak 5.33 (1.93) 6.04 (2.12) 0.02 (0.51) 0.06 (0.55) After Strong 6.52 (1.37) 6.08 (2.15) 0.29 (0.51) 0.08 (0.45) Weak 5.30 (1.34) 5.22 (2.02) 0.07 (0.58) 0.18 (0.49) Before Strong 7.06 (1.39) 6.92 (1.61) 0.40 (0.36) 0.17 (0.52)

Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses. Number of cases per cell from left to right for (a) and (b): 23, 24, 24, 24, and for (c) and (d): 20, 22, 17, 19. Higher numbers indicate more favourable attitudes (range from 1, unfavourable to 9, favourable) for (a), higher perceived expertise (range from 1, low to 9, high) for (b), and more favourable thoughts (range from -1, exclusively unfavourable thoughts to 1, exclusively favourable thoughts) for (c) and (d).

conditions, t (45) 4.23, p < 0.001 and t (41.5) 2.46, p < 0.02, for before and after, respectively (separate variance estimate).

Communicator Attributions Regarding perceived expertise in tunnel construction, the ANOVA yielded a main effect of argument quality, F (1, 91) 4.57, p < 0.04, qualied by the predicted interaction of argument quality and order, F (1, 91) 4.14, p < 0.05, F < 1 for the main effect of order (Table 2). Contrast analyses revealed that the argument effect was signicant in the before condition, t (91) 2.93, p < 0.005, but not in the after condition, t < 1. With respect to perceived expertise in constructing trafc facilities, in accordance with predictions no signicant effect emerged, all p > 0.30, overall M 6.04. Unexpectedly, participants judged the communicators trustworthiness lower in the weak (M 4.23) than in the strong argument condition (M 5.26), F (1, 90) 5.39, p < 0.03, for all other effects, F < 1. Finally, participants did not rate the communicator as more or less likable depending on conditions, for all effects, p > 0.14, overall M 4.57.

Cognitive Responses A total of n 15 participants did not list any relevant thoughts, and were therefore omitted from the following analyses. They were equally distributed across conditions, X2 (df 1, n 15) 0.08, p > 0.78. Indices of thought valence were created by subtracting the proportion of unfavourable thoughts from the proportion of favourable thoughts about (a) the content of the argument and (b) the content of the communicator description for each participant. The possible range of these variables is from 1 (only unfavourable thoughts) to 1 (only favourable thoughts). The measure of valence for the thoughts about the argument (r 0.78, p < 0.001) and the measure of valenced thoughts about the communicator description (r 0.80, p < 0.001) had high inter-rater reliability. Thus, measures of thought-valence were averaged across raters. Control analyses for each rater separately did not yield any effect signicantly different from those reported below.
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First, the index for thoughts about the argument was subjected to a 2 2 ANOVA. This analysis yielded a signicant main effect for argument quality indicating that these thoughts were more favourable when the initial argument was strong (M 0.34) rather than weak (M 0.02), F (1, 74) 10.90, p < 0.002, for all other effects, F < 1. Contrast analyses proved that the difference between the weak and strong conditions was signicant for both order conditions, t (74) 2.89, p < 0.006, and t (74) 1.74, p < 0.05, for the before and after conditions, respectively (Table 2). Second, with regards to thoughts dedicated to the communicator description, the interaction between order and initial argument quality was not signicant, F (1, 74) 2.08, p < 0.16; in addition, there obtained a marginally signicant main effect of argument quality, F (1, 74) 2.66, p < 0.11. To clarify further the expected fan-type pattern of means, we rst conducted single cell comparisons which revealed that in the after condition the valence of thoughts about the communicator did not differ as a function of the initial arguments quality, t < 1, whereas it did so differ in the before condition, t (74) 2.09, p < 0.05. In addition, we conducted a contrast analysis. According to our hypothesis, the low and high initial arguments received l 1 and l 1 in the after condition, and l 2 and l 2 in the before condition. This focussed interaction test yielded a t (74) 1.96, p < 0.028. The contrast t the pattern of means quite well, capturing 80.33% of the between condition variation (SSbetween 1.2181; SScontrast 0.9785), with any residual effect being far from signicant, F (2, 74) 0.48. Thus, although the unfocussed ANOVA yielded only a marginal interaction effect, the more focussed analyses are consistent with the prediction that the biassing effect of the initial arguments quality on subsequent processing of communicator information did occur on thoughts dedicated to the communicator description, as expected.

Mediation Analyses The predictor variables in our mediational analyses were the quality of the argument (dummy coded) and either valenced thoughts about the argument, or valenced thoughts about communicator information, or both to correct for the effects of each on the other. The dependent variable was the attitude toward the tunnel project (Figure 2). In the after condition, valenced thoughts about the brief argument predicted attitudes directly ( 0.53, p < 0.05; corrected and uncorrected path are identical in this model because the correlation between argument thoughts and communicator thoughts is zero), and neither the path from thoughts about the argument to thoughts about the communicator ( 0.00, n.s.), nor the path from the dummy-coded argument variable to thoughts about the communicator description ( 0.02, n.s.) were signicant. Thus, this analysis did not indicate any biassed processing of communicator information. The results in this analysis closely resemble those found in the low motivation condition of Study 1. The results are very different in the before condition the quality of the brief argument predicted valenced thoughts about this argument ( 0.46, 0.36 when corrected for communicator thoughts, both p < 0.05). In turn, valenced thoughts about the initial argument predicted valenced thoughts about the communicator description ( 0.40, p < 0.05), and argument thoughts marginally mediated the initial argument effect on communicator thoughts (z 1.53, p 0.13, Sobel test). Communicator thoughts, in turn, predicted attitude judgements ( 0.44, 0.49 when corrected for thoughts about the argument, both p < 0.05), and communicator thoughts mediated the effect of argument thoughts on attitudes (z 2.02, p < 0.05, Sobel test). Additionally, the initially signicant direct path from thoughts about the argument to attitudes ( 0.59, p < 0.05) became non-signicant when corrected for the effect of thoughts about the communicator ( 0.24, n.s.). The latter nding indicates that the effect of argument quality on attitudes was mediated by cognitive responses toward the communicator. The
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After Condition Valenced Thoughts Argument .26 (.26) Brief Argument .02 (.02) Valenced Thoughts Communicator (.53*) Attitude .00 .21 (.21) .53*

Before Condition Valenced Thoughts Argument .46* (.36*) Brief Argument .40* (.24) Attitude .59*

.33* (.19) Valenced Thoughts Communicator

.44* (.49*)

Figure 2. Effects of the brief arguments quality (dummy-coded 0: weak, 1: strong) on post-message attitudes mediated by valenced cognitive responses toward the argument and the communicator information under conditions where the brief argument followed (upper panel) or preceded (lower panel) the communicator description (Study 2) Note. Coefcients appearing above lines are beta-weights for uncorrected paths. Coefcients in parentheses appearing below lines are beta-weights for corrected paths (thoughts about initial argument corrected for thoughts about communicator description and vice versa). p < 0.05.

results of this analysis parallel the ndings obtained in the high motivation condition of Study 1. In addition, this analysis complements the nding that attitudes toward the communicator were biassed by argument quality only in the before, but not in the after condition. Thus, the mediation analyses provided additional evidence for biassed processing of communicator information by the prior message argument under high motivation when the argument preceded, but not when it followed, the communicator information.

Discussion In this study, we found that an initial argument, weak or strong in its implication for the forwarded position, biassed the processing of subsequent information on the communicator, which in turn
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determined the nal attitude judgements. Thus, the biassed processing of the communicator description in this study had the same effect on attitudes as did the biassed processing of message arguments in prior studies (Study 1; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Petty et al., 1993.). The results also demonstrate the forward-feeding nature of biassed processing. Specically, a message argument biassed the processing of communicator information only when it preceded such information and not when it followed it, although processing motivation was high and the ambiguous communicator description was the same in all conditions. It appears that conclusions derived from prior processing can serve as evidential input, in which terms subsequent inferences are made: Whatever its content, an early information appeared capable of biassing the processing of subsequent information, but not vice versa. The present experiment further demonstrates that communicator-related thoughts can determine attitude judgements under conditions of high processing effort. Thus, not only the specic contents of the information presented (message arguments vs. source characteristics) but also the content of thoughts (issue-related vs. source-related) they elicit appear functionally equivalent with regards to their effects on subsequent attitudes.

GENERAL DISCUSSION In a persuasion context, recipients face manifold information types, some residing in the contents of the message (arguments), other in the persuasive context (e.g. source characteristics). Previous studies on the biassed processing phenomenon have treated message content as the target of bias and context variables as the biassing factor. The present work extends our comprehension of biassed processing in persuasion in that it demonstrates the previously unconsidered possibilities that (a) message content may represent a biassing factor and (b) context-related information may represent the target of bias under certain conditions. But what might such conditions be? Obviously, recipients need to be sufciently motivated and able to invest effort into the processing of the to be biassed information. Furthermore, it is necessary that the to be biassed information is sufciently ambiguous to allow the biassing factor to exert inuence on its interpretation. In addition to these widely accepted conditions (Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Petty & Wegener, 1999), the present Study 2 points to processing sequence as an additional factor. In this experiment the message argument exerted bias only when it preceded but not when it followed the communicator description. As in prior biassed processing research the putative biassing cues typically preceded the message information, this may have created the impression that the cues generally constitute the biassing factor and the message the target of the bias. The present analysis demonstrates, however, that it is the processing sequence that matters rather than the information type. Whether it be cues or message arguments as such, it is the early appearing information that is capable of introducing bias into the processing of the subsequent information whatever that may be. Such demonstration of functional equivalence of the cognitive responses elicited by cues and arguments with respect to judgement formation sheds new light on the biassed processing phenomenon. In particular, on the basis of prior research one may have expected that under the condition of high processing motivation recipients would engage in effortful processing of issue-related information (Chaiken, Duckworth, & Darke, 1999; Darke et al., 1998; Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer, 1999). With this regard, some dual-process theorists have explicitly denied the possibility that source-related information can form the basis for attitude judgements when processing effort is high. For example when commenting on Kruglanski and Thompsons (1999) ndings (see Introduction),
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Chaiken and colleagues (1999, p. 120) asked the question of . . . why highly motivated individuals, those presumed to be processing systematically, would ever be inuenced by factors such as source expertise? They interpreted Kruglanski and Thompsons (1999) results in terms of the HSMs biassed processing hypothesis, suggesting that . . . heuristic cues such as source credibility can bias the direction of systematic processing (e.g. elaborations of persuasive arguments, additional thoughts about the issue) when, for example arguments are ambiguous or absent. . . Novel and general thoughts about the issue mediated the effects of the source cue and involvement or distraction in each of the relevant (Kruglanski & Thompsons, 1999) studies (Chaiken et al., 1999, p. 120, parentheses and emphasis ours; see also Petty et al., 1999, p. 159). To prevent from misunderstanding, the case is not that dual-process models deny the possibility of extensive processing of cue or peripheral information. Petty and colleagues (1999, p. 157) stated that . . . one can engage in effortful scrutiny for merit of source factors, message factors and other factors. . .. Nevertheless, the extensive processing of source factors or other cue information refers to the peripheral route to persuasion as (p)eripheral route attitude changes are characterized by low degrees of issue-relevant elaboration. . ., and the qualitative distinction from central route processing is dened by . . . doing something other than elaborating issue-relevant information (Petty et al., 1999, p. 157; see also Chaiken et al., 1999, p. 119). Given that the single argument provided in the present Study 2 was an insufcient basis for issue-related processing, the dual-process conceptions suggest that recipients who process extensively would additionally generate their own thoughts about the issue. For example, Darke and colleagues (1998) were explicit in predicting how a biassing factor (in their case consensus information) would affect subsequent processing in case issue-related information is insufcient to warrant an informed judgement. As they put it, the biassing factor would . . . bias systematic processing because the absence of supportive arguments would probably allow for greater exibility in the valence of thoughts generated about the issue. Of course, in this case, any systematic processing would take the form of novel thoughts generated about the issue. . . (Darke et al., 1998, p. 1207, emphasize ours). Accordingly, recipients prone to invest high processing effort may well extensively elaborate on source information, but they will likely not base their judgements on source-related processing. Instead, they will engage in biassed issue-related processing. From this perspective, in the present Study 2 neither an argument effect on thoughts dedicated to the communicator nor an argument effect on communicator attributions was to be expected. In terms of the mediation analysis, neither a signicant path from valenced thoughts about the argument to valenced thoughts about the communicator, nor a signicant path from valenced thoughts about the communicator to the nal attitude judgements should have emerged. Instead, independent of whether the brief argument preceded or followed the communicator description, according to prior persuasion research one would have predicted thoughts about the issue to determine the attitudes. However, this was clearly not found in the present research. Although processing motivation was consistently high across conditions, systematic or central route processing in the present experiment was clearly dedicated to the communicator description (a heuristic or peripheral aspect) when it followed the brief initial argument. Thus, the processing and use of source information under conditions of extensive processing presently appears rather difcult to reconcile with dual-process predictions. Both the HSM and the ELM explicitly linked extensive processing to the use of issue-related information for judgement formation. Bias in source-related processing has not been considered so far, because biassed processing requires high processing effort, which typically refers to the systematic or central route processing of issue-related information. However, the ELM (unlike the HSM) features the multiple roles assumption (e.g. Petty & Cacippo, 1986; Petty et al., 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999) that holds that any variable may serve as a peripheral cue under some conditions and as a message argument under other conditions. Thus, the present results may be accommodated to the ELM by assuming (a) that the initial
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message argument (biassing factor) served the role of a peripheral cue in Study 1 and in the before condition of Study 2, but as a message argument in the after condition of Study 2, and (b) that the following message arguments (Study 1) and the source description in the after condition (but not in the before condition) of Study 2 served the role of message arguments. Although our data can be tted to such a conception, we prefer the notion of functional equivalence of cues and arguments for at least two reasons. First, it appears more parsimonious to assume functional equivalence than to distinguish between peripheral cues and arguments in the rst place and then postulate that either can function in the role of the respective other. Second, within the multiple role assumption the conditions that favour one prediction over the other are not specied. There is nothing in the multiple-roles assumption as stated thus far that would turn an argument into a cue or vice versa based on the ordinal position of the information presented (see Petty & Cacippo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999; Petty et al., 1999). Future research should address these and related issues. Aside from their theoretical implications, the present ndings have implications for applied settings as well. Imagine a communicator capable of presenting some strong and some more ambiguous arguments. Based on the present analysis, the stronger arguments presented up-front should exert positive bias on the processing of the subsequent arguments under conditions of high motivation or determine judgements directly when processing motivation is low. The nding that arguments can also bias source-related information (Study 2) may have considerable implications for settings in which perceptions of the endorser of a specic position are of particular interest to recipients. For instance, in political persuasion relatively high attention is devoted to information about politicians and their relations with each other (e.g. Zaller, 1987). Often, even those people assumed to devote considerable effort to the processing of political information (the politically aware) make judgements on the basis on who endorsed a particular position (e.g. Zaller, 1992), and extensive argumentation about political issues in the media can hardly be found (Kerkhof, 1999). The present analysis suggests, that in such contexts, people may use brief and easy to process issue-related information (message arguments) to derive judgements about politicians (the sources) via biassed source-perception which in turn may drive their nal judgements, for example in an election campaign. We conclude that studying such indirect effects of political persuasion can constitute one example of a productive approach to understanding attitude formation and change in real world context. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Hans-Peter Erb, Wirtschafts-, Organisations- und Sozialpsychologie, Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany; Antonio Pierro and Lucia Mannetti, Dipartimento di Psicologia dei processi di sviluppo e socializzazione, University of Rome La Sapienza, Italy; Scott Spiegel, Psychology Department, Columbia University, USA; Arie W. Kruglanski, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland at College Park, USA. This work was supported by NSF Grant SBR-9417422. We would like to thank Gerd Bohner for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, as well as Don Adam, Hawaa Almansouri, Wendy P. Eisner, and William C. Oakley, for their help in data collection and rating participants thought listings.

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Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 10571075 (2007) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp