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The Future of American Power

Dominance and Decline in Perspective

The twenty-rst century began with a very unequal distribution of power resources. With ve percent of the worlds population, the United States accounted for about a quarter of the worlds economic output, was responsible for nearly half of global military expenditures, and had the most extensive cultural and educational softpower resources. All this is still true, but the future of U.S. power is hotly debated. Many observers have interpreted the 2008 global nancial crisis as the beginning of American decline. The National Intelligence Council, for example, has projected that in 2025, the U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished. Power is the ability to attain the outcomes one wants, and the resources that produce it vary in dierent contexts. Spain in the sixteenth century took advantage of its control of colonies and gold bullion, the Netherlands in the seventeenth century proted from trade and nance, France in the eighteenth century beneted from its large population and armies, and the

Jo seph S . N ye, Jr., is University D istinguished Service Professor at H arvard University. Parts of this essay are drawn from his forthcoming book, The Future of Power (PublicAairs, 2011).

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Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

United Kingdom in the nineteenth century derived power from its primacy in the Industrial Revolution and its navy. This century is marked by a burgeoning revolution in information technology and globalization, and to understand this revolution, certain pitfalls need to be avoided. First, one must beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Nations are not like humans, with predictable life spans. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the peak of its power, and even then it did not succumb to the rise of another state. For all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern barbarians and nonstate actors. In an information-based world, power diusion may pose a bigger danger than power transition. Conventional wisdom holds that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the information age, the state (or the nonstate actor) with the best story may sometimes win.

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T he Future ofA meri Pow er can

Pow er today i di buted i a pattern s stri n t resem bl a com pl t hat es ex hree-di ensi m onal chess gam e.O n the top chessboard, m ii pow er i l ltary s argel uni ar and the y pol , U ni States i lkel to retai pri acy ted si y n m f qui som e ti e.O n the m i e chessor te m ddl board,econom i pow er has been m ul c ti pol for m ore than a decade,w i the ar th U ni States,E urope,Japan,and C hi ted na as the m aj pl or ayers and others gai ng ni i i portance.T he bottom chessboard n m i the real of transnati s m onalrel ons.It ati i udes nonstate actors as di ncl verse as bankers w ho el ectroni l transfer f caly unds, terrori w ho tra c w eapons,hackers sts w ho threaten cybersecuri and chalenges ty, l such as pandem i and clm ate change. cs i O n thi bottom board,pow er i w i y s s del di used,and i m akes no sense to speak t ofuni ari m ul pol ty,or hegem ony. pol ty, ti ari In i nterstate polti the m ost i pori cs, m tant factor w ilbe the conti ng return l nui of A si to the w orl stage.In 1750,A si a d a had m ore than hal the w orl s popul on f d ati and econom i output.B y 1900,after the c Industri R evol on i E urope and al uti n the U ni States,A si s share shrank to ted a one-fth of gl obaleconom i output.B y c 2050,A si w ilbe w el on i w ay back to a l l ts i hi ts stori share.T he ri of C hi and cal se na Indi m ay create i a nstabii but thi i a lty, ss probl w i precedents,and hi em th story suggests how polci can aect the outcom e. i es f orever T he w ord declne m i up tw o . i xes di erent di ensi m ons:absol declne,i ute i n the sense of decay,and rel ve decl ne, ati i i w hi the pow er resources of other n ch states grow or are used m ore eecti y. vel T he anal w i h B ri i declne i m i ogy t t sh i s sl ng.T he U ni K i eadi ted ngdom had naval suprem acy and an em pi on w hi t sun re ch he never set,butby W orl W ar I,the country d ranked onl f h am ong t greatpow ers y ourt he i i share of m ii n ts ltary personnel f h i , ourt n gdp,and thi i m ii spendi W i rd n ltary ng. th the ri of nati se onal sm ,protecti the i ng em pi becam e m ore of a burden than an re asset.For al the tal of an A m eri em l k can pi t U ni ed St es has m ore f re, he t at reedom of act on t t U ni ed K i i han he t ngdom di A nd d. w hereas the U ni K i ted ngdom f aced ri ng si nei ghbors,G erm any and R ussi t U ni ed a, he t States benets from bei surrounded by ng tw o oceans and w eaker nei ghbors. D espi such di te erences,A m eri cans are prone to cycl of belef i thei ow n es i n r declne.T he Foundi Fathers w orri i ng ed aboutcom pari sons to the R om an republc. i C harl D i es ckens observed a century and a hal ago,If i i vi f ts ndi dualci zens,to a ti m an,are t be beleved,[t U ni ed St es] o i he t at al ays i depressed,and al ays i st w s w s agnat ed, and al ays i at an al i cri s,and w s arm ng si never w as otherw i In the l hal cense. ast f tury,belef i A m eri declne rose after i n can i the Sovi U ni l et on aunched Sputni i 1 k n 957, after Presi dent R i chard N i s econom i xon c HEGEMONIC DECLINE? adj m ent and t oi shocks i t 1 ust s he l n he 970s, It i currentl fashi s y onabl to com pare the and after the cl ng of rust-bel i e osi t ndusU ni Statespow er to thatofthe U ni ted ted tri and the budgetdeci i the R eagan es ts n Ki ngdom a cent ago and t pr cta si - era.T en years l ,A m eri ury o edi m ater cans beleved i iarhegem oni declne.Som e A m eri l c i cans that the U ni States w as the sol superted e reactem ot onaly t t i ofdeclne,but pow er and now pols show that m any i l o he dea i , l i w oul be counteri ti and ahi cal beleve i declne agai t d ntui ve stori i n i n. to beleve that the U ni States w ilhave i ted l P undi l ent the i lty ofW ashts am nabii a preponderant share of pow er resources i on t cont st es such as A f ngt o rol at ghani an st

fore ign affairs . November / December 2010

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or Iran,but they alow the gol gl l den ow of the past to col thei apprai s.T he or r sal U ni Statespow er i not w hat i used ted s t to be,buti al never realy w as as greatas t so l assum ed.A fter W orl W ar II,the U ni d ted States had nucl w eapons and an overear w hel i preponderance of econom i m ng c pow er but nonethel w as unabl to preess e ventt l ofC hi t rol back com he oss na, o l m uni i E astern E urope,to overcom e sm n stal ate i the K orean W ar to stop the em n , l ofN orth V i oss etnam ,or to di odge the sl C astro regi e i C uba.Pow er m easured m n i resources rarel equal pow erm easured i n y s n preferred outcom es,and cycl ofbelef es i i declne revealm ore about psychol n i ogy than they do about realshi i pow er fts n resources.U nfortunatel m i y, staken belefs i i declne at hom e and abroad can n i l to dangerous m i ead stakes i polcy. n i
CHINA ON THE RISE

For m ore than a decade,m any have vi ed ew C hi as the m ost l kel contender to na i y bal ance U . pow er or surpass i Som e S. t. draw anal es to the chal enge that ogi l i peri G erm any posed to the U ni m al ted Ki ngdom at the begi ng of the l nni ast century.A recentbook (by M arti Jacques) n i even ti ed W hen C hi R ulesthe W orld: s tl na T he E nd ofthe W es ern W orld and the B i t rth ofa New G lobal O rder.G ol an Sachs has dm proj ected that the totalsi of C hi s ze na econom y w ilsurpass that of the U ni l ted States i 2027. n YetC hi has a l w ay to go to equal na ong the pow er resources of the U ni States, ted and i sti lfaces m any obstacl to i t l es ts devel opm ent.E ven i overal C hi f l nese gdp passed that of the U ni States around ted 2030,t t o econom i al hough roughl he w es, t y equi enti si w oul notbe equi ent val n ze, d val i com posi on.C hi w oul sti lhave n ti na d l

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fore ign affairs . Volume 89 No. 6

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Jos S. Nye,Jr eph .
a vast underdevel oped countrysi and i de, t w oul have begun to face dem ographi d c probl s f em rom t del he ayed eect ofi s ones t chid polcy.Per capi i l i ta ncom e provi a des m easure of the sophi cati of an econsti on om y.A ssum i a si percentC hi ng x nese gdp grow t rat and onl t o percentA m eri h e y w can gdp grow th rate after 2030,C hi w oul na d probabl not equalthe U ni States i y ted n per capi i ta ncom e unti som eti e around l m the m i e ofthe century.In other w ords, ddl C hi s i pressi econom i grow th rate na m ve c and i ncreasi popul on w illkel l ng ati l i y ead the C hi nese econom y to pass the U . S. econom y i totalsi i a few decades, n ze n but that i not the sam e as equalty. s i M oreover l near proj ons can be ,i ecti m i eadi and grow th rates general y sl ng, l sl as econom i reach hi ow es gher l s evel of devel opm ent.C hi s authori an na tari polti system has show n an i pressi i cal m ve capabii to harness the country pow er lty s , butw hether the governm entcan m ai n ntai that capabi i over the l l ty onger term i a s m ystery both to outsi ders and to C hi nese l eaders.U nlke Indi w hi w as born w i i a, ch th a dem ocrati consti on,C hi has not c tuti na yet found a w ay to sol the probl of ve em dem ands for polti parti pati (i not i cal ci on f dem ocracy) thattend to accom pany ri ng si per capi i ta ncom e.W hether C hi can na devel a f ul t m anages an expandop orm a hat i urban m i e cl regi ng ddl ass, onali nequalty, i ruralpoverty,and resent entam ong et c m hni m i ti rem ai to be seen. nori es ns Som e have argued that C hi ai s na m to chalenge the U ni Statesposi on l ted ti i E ast A si and,eventualy,the w orl n a l d. E ven i thi w ere an accurate assessm ent f s of C hi s current i na ntenti (and even ons the C hi nese them sel cannot know the ves vi s off ew uture generati ons),i i doubtf ts ul thatC hi w ilhave the m ii capabii na l ltary lty

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