Re Assesing Pakistan

Reassessing Pakistan
Role of Two-Nation Theory
Anand K. Verma
Under the ausPices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
Lancer Publishers & Distributors
www. bharat-ra kshak. com First published in lndia by Lancer Publishers & Distributors 56 Gautam Nagar, New Delhi-1 10 049 lancerl @vsnl.com
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the publisher. All rights reserved Centre for Policy Research, 2001
Printed
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Printers Pvt. Ltd., New Dethi
lsBN 8't 7062287 5
Contents
Foreword Preface Summary 1. Introduction 2. Germination of Pakistan
Executive
7
11
13 19
34
3.
Two-Nation Theory Converts into lslamic
ldeology
59 79
4.
Forces 5" The Insoluble Equation: Indo-Pak Relations 6. The Cost of Two-Nation Theory
The Other Pillar: The Armed
103
126 146
7.
Conclusions: The Way
Out 1947
Appendices
1.
The Indian lndependence Act

Text of Letter of
161
Accession 3. UN Resolution - 13 August 1948

2.
201
245 209
4.
UN Resolution - 5 January
1949
Reassessrng Pakistan
5.
6. 7.
8,
Extract from a Despatch Published
in New York Times

The Tashkent Declaration The Simla Agreement
214
216 220
224
The Lahore Declaration

Securing Nuclear Peace
9.
232
10. Where Mountains Move:
The Story of Chagai

Bibliography
Index
245 269
273
Foreword
Political animosity between India and Pakistan is as old as the creation of Pakistan as a sovereign country by partitioning
of India by the British rulers. There must be something very basic obstructing the movement towards good neighbourly
relations between India and Pakistan all these fifty-three years after partition. The vast majority of the people living in both
these countries want them to resolve their differences at the soonest. The whole world counsels lhe same advice. The US President, Bill Clinton during a visit to the subcontinent in early 2000 had profoundly observed, "This era does not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders in blood' lt " rewards people who are partners in commerce and trade
Many people round the world believe that the Kashmir problem is at the heart of the alienation between the two countries. The leaders of the two countries at various points
during these troubled fifty-three years had privaiely agreed to accept a division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir more or
less along the present line of control, but had subsequently been unable to implement such proposals publicly. There are
enough indications from Pakistan's side that India and Pakistan cannot be friendly neighbours even if the Kashmir problem
were to be finally solved. General Pervez Musharraf, CEO of
Pakistan, is on record saying that even if the Kashmir issue were to be resolved, the proxy war would continue. One has, therefore, to look elsewhere to comprehend what is really
wrong between the two countries.

This study by my colleague, Professor Anand Verma seeks to provide an answer to the very basic question posed above.
In doing so, he has drawn on his experience as a former
Secretary to the Government of India in the Cabinet

Secretariat. According to him, the roots of this bilateral discord
lie in the two-nation theory. Plainly put, the two-nation theory is based onihe communal divide originating from the desire of a group to preserve its religious identity and using this as a communal card for continuously seeking political gains. The
communal approach was mainly the product of the nineteenth
century. lts conversion into a political weapon took place in the twentieth century. After partition, Pakistan has frequenfly
used this weapon through the lslamisation and Shariatisation
of the country. Today Pakistan appears to be rapidly moving towards the Talibanisation of the country.
General Musharraf, thus, quite candidly admits that the proxy war against India will not end even after the Kashmir
problem is out of the way. This is so because the virus of communalism will still be alive.
the communal orientation of the Pakistani establishment is the
It has generally not been recognised in lndia that
prime cause for the continuation of the India-Pakistan
Foreword
disharmony. According to this study, the attempts to resolve
Indo-Pak differences have, therefore, to proceed from a philosophical convergence of bilateral political relations and
' not merely from a territorial or materialistic perspective.
Both
countries now possess nuclear weapons. In the absence of
quicker and adequate progress towards ideological

reconciliation and sincere political commitment for maintaining good neighbourly relations, the dangers ahead from continuing
political rivalry can assume catastrophic dimensions for both countries
- more especially for
Pakistan.
Mr. Verma has presented a useful set of recommendations
in the last chapter showing us a way out of this bilateral

animosity. These recommendations, in my opinion, deserve serious consideration by both countries and by all those who
have an interest in the improvement of relations between these two countries. This is a thought-provoking book. lts
purpose will be amply served if it can ignite a new debate on
the causes and consequences of the ongoing India-Pakistan

political rivalry and lead to an enlightened search for a durable
solution following the norms of civil society. Both countries

need permanent peace and political cooperation for their long-
terni ebonomic development, for launching a war on poverty, unemployment and deprivation of basic human needs of a
vast majority of people in their societies.

Centre for Policy New
Research
Charan D Wadhva
Delhi
Officiating President & Professor
Mav 2001
Preface
lndo-Pak relations have defied all attempts at improvement in
years gone by since the partition of British India in 1947. Wars have been fought and peace settlements arrived at, but real peace has always eluded the two so far.
ls there something so fundamental in this that blanks out any vision of a better day?
relationship
I had observed Pakistan over a number of years in the

course of my official duties. I had felt that discussions in the corridors of power and analyses produced by academics,
media and think tanks often missed out on this essential point. Dr VA Pai Panandikar, then President of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, had become familiar with my views, which were expressed at occasional seminars after my official career had ended. He invited me to become a Visiting Professor at the Centre for Policy Research and suggested that I should prepare .a paper on 'Understanding
Pakistan'. The following pages enquire into the question of whether the relationship is doomed at some fundamental level'
The conclusion is that the two-nation theory is the culprit. lt will not allow a better daY to come.
tz
Reassesslng Pakistan
The prime purpose of this study is to reveal how this theory has impacted on the evolution of political life and the attitudes of the ruling establishments in Pakistan, and how,
therefore, a correct assessment of Pakistan cannot be made
without evaluating the impact of its role. Whether or not in pre-partition days the theory commanded adherents is not
too relevant for such a study.

Not being an academic, the academic's approach has not
been followed in the writing of this paper though care has been taken to identify sources when ma.king value judgments. Its purpose is to inform policy makers and draw attention to
the limits of policy making unless the root cause is first tackled.
Valuable guidance was received from Shri PR Chari, Director, lnstitute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi,
in the preparation .of this paper. Nalini, Kartik and Ketan took care of the computerwork involved, including word processing. My deep thanks to all of them for their assistance.
The views expressed in this paper are born out of my own convictions. They do not claim to represent or echo the thinking of any official agency. New Delhi Anand K. Verma
April 1,
200'1
Executive Summary
Fiftythree years have passed since Pakistan was born after oartition of India: but the relationship between the hro countries
remains as adversarial as it was on the day of partition. The causes lie in the philosophical foundation of the state of
Pakistan, the two-nation theory that has no precedent in history
or justification in political science. Three factors contributed to the evolution of this theory. The Muslim rule over India for centuries in the last millennium had given to the Muslims a feeling of superiority and a perception of belonging to the conquering race. Both these
disappeared with the advent of the British Raj, when a sense
of loss of grandeur and inferiority came to overpower them. Their leaders remained outside the pale of power when the
system of parliamentary democracy was tried in 1937 in India. That experiment convinced these leaders that the only way Muslims could get back their lost glory and again taste power
was to exploit Muslim sensitivities and susceptibilities and

ask the British for an exclusive territory within India as a state
where Muslims would be in a majority. The two-nation theory
was invented With this objective. lt received encouragement from certain British quarters that felt the need for a strategic
buffer between the Soviet Union and soon{o-be independent
14
India. The limited function of the two-nation theorv was onlv
to create Pakistan.
Jinnah had been an ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity in
the early part of his political career. When he transformed

later into a champion of Muslim interests, he still believed for
long in the necessity of a Hindu Muslim settlement within a united India. His frustration grew with the reluctance of the
Indian Congress to agree to a larger share of power for the
Muslims than warranted by their numbers. The two-nation

theory then became a tool of political expediency in the quest
for higher empowerment.
The artificial character of the theory was dramatically demonstrated by emergence of Bangladesh. More recently,
MQM leader Altaf Hussain has rubbished it by observing that
partition was one of the biggest blunders of mankind. Jinnah had wanted Pakistan to be a secular democratic country. After his death in September 1948, Pakistan took a
totally different dlrection under the influence of doctrinaire religious groups. The two-nation theory was now given a
historical foothold by converting it into an ideology of lslam, which became the guiding philosophy. Allah was identified as the principle of ultimate sovereignty. This caused Pakistan to run into two serious problems. One was the slow and steady increase of influence of the lslamic constitue4cy in the polity and politics of Pakistan. Groups like Jamaite-lslami came
out from the fringes of irrelevance and started developing
Executive Summary
lq
political muscles, wielding political clout, totally disproportionate
to their elected or mass support. Today, they have a voice in determining strategic policies of Pakistan, especially those
relating to India, Afghanistan and the lslamic world. They enjoy a certain partnership with government agencies in the
framing and execution of these policies. These developments led to the process of lslamisation and then Shariatisation' lt looks as though they could lead, in the end, to Talibanisation
as well.
The other problem arose from bestowing to Allah sovereignty over Pakistan. People of Pakistan, not being supreme, got deprived of being the final arbiter to confer
legitimacy to policies, institutions and governance The system
led to disparities and imbalances and consistent failure on values to be accepted with regard to nation, state and polity' This has enabled the Armed Forces to step into the seat of
power, which they thereafter never left, though sometimes
this power was exercised from the shadows. lslam and the Armed Forces have thus become the
tvvo
pillars on which the state of Pakistan rests. The animus against
the Hindus, which the protagonists of two-nation theory usecl for the creation of Pakistan, was now directed by both these institutions against lndia, which was seen as the land of the Hindus. The Armed Forces in the years of General Zia-ulHuq's presidency sought support from lslam to legitimatise their rLile and as a result, got heavily oriented to lslamic ideology. Zia spelt out that apart from guarding the nation's
16
boundaries, the Armed Forces were also responsible for protecting itsideological frontiers as soldiers of lslam. lmplicit faith in the two-nation theory is thus sogght to be instilled in the Armed Forces. Pakistan rests its claims to Kashmir on the two-nation theory, not on law of any kind. lt has gone to great lengths
to wrest Kashmir, engaged in wars, promoted subversion and
sabotage in J&K and the rest of India and is unwilling to hold

its hand. The option of solving the Kashmir issue on the basis
of Status quo has been available to Pakistan since a long time but it wants to incorporate all the Muslim areas of the state on the basis of this theory.
Pakistan is unable to come to terms of peace with India. Wrongly, its leadership still believes that Indians want to annul Pakistan. lt, therefore, looks for parity and balance of power
with |,ndia, not recognising that the balance of power will be goverined by geographical realities of the subcontinent. lts
military doctrine is largely shaped by its concerns about India.
Its nuclear weapon policy is lndia specific. There is no knowing to what extent Pakistan may go to harm Indian interests. lts lSl is trying to encircle India with a
web of insurgencies in the north and northeast. lSl's aim now
is to destroy the cultural and secular integrity of India and to
raise Jehad against India to Pan lslamic levels. Pervez Musharraf describes Jehad as the religious duty of every
Muslim. In the conte)d of Kashmir and India the thrust of this statement is obvious.
Executive Summarv
tt
There is still a belief in army circles in pakistan that no real peace process, which could decide against a military option, ever started between the two countries. This is a
dangerous thought which rubbishes the gains made in bilateral
accommodation made at Tashkent (1965), Simla (1972) and Lahore (1999). With a nuclear arsenal and rejection of no first
use (NFU) and evidence of irrationality displayed in the

imposition of all lndo-Pak military conflicts lrom i947 tilt 1999,
one cannot be comfortable with the season of uncertaintv these factors herald.
Confidence building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan have not been able to achieve much because political
will and steadfastness have been missing in pakistan ruling circles. There is practically no evidence available to indicate that Pakistan has a fall-back position or an exit policy in its
disputes with India, notably Kashmir. There, thus, arises a need to separate the philosophical
from the territorial aspects of the Pakistani problem with India. The contradictions and conflicts between the practices of two-
nation theory and secularism have to be first resolved since they heavily impinge on other matters.
Introduction
Fifty three years have gone by since Pakistan was born after
partition of India, but the relationship of the two countries

remains as adversarial as it was on the day of the partition.
A common historical background, geographical proximity and

negotiated agreement for partition should have heralded a
friendly neighbourliness. Such into reality.
a prospect never translated
Several factors contributed. Some were related to residual problems of partition such as division of stores and resources.
Some were imagined like the fears entertained in Pakistan
about India's reluctance to abide by partition. Some were caused by Indian policies with regard to Junagarh and Hyderabad, where Pakistan was without a justified locus
standi. The massacres on the eve of partition and immediately
thereafter were another provocation. The failure of effort to
grab Kashmir became a long standing hurt. But 53 years is

a long period during which the scars and anguishing memories
ZU
Reassessrno Pakistan
should have eased and normalcy in relationship forged. This did not come about. lnstead there is a monumental sense of animus in Pakistan against India and the ruling establishment
there nurtures
it.
The protagonists of the Pakistan movement were the

Muslim elite from regions of British India which are not parts
of Pakistan today: those regions which are, had not subscribed
to the idea till Pakistan was close to creation.

Even today, all the people of Pakistan are not touched by
the virus of anti Indianism. The Pathans, the Baluchis and

Sindhis by and large, unlike the Punjabis, of Pakistan do not
have pronounced negative sentiments for India. The astonishing feature is that when the citizens of the two
countries meet each other on a one to one basis on soils of
other countries they display a great deal of bonhomie. The real cause for continual estrangement at the national level
has to be looked for elsewhere.
It lies in the
philosophical fou4dation of the state of
Pakistan, the artificial two-nation theory. The theory has no precedent in history or justification in political science but it became the raison-de-etre of Pakistan. lt led to a change in
the nature of the state of Pakistan, set impossible tasks of parity and military balance with lndia, diverted the polity into
channels vastly differing from those in India and western
democracies, and came in the way of settling domestic national
obiectives and consolidation of national consensus.
Introduction
On account of this theory, Pakistan made itself, for quite

some time, the guardian of the assumed interests of the large
number of Muslims who had stayed back
in lndia
and
interceded on their behalf with the government of India to
score propaganda points. ln subsequent years, it tried to

exploit this segment and some others to weaken the Indian
state. The antagonistic approach of Pakistan was visible in

every international or local crisis affecting the two countries. During the 1962 China war, Pakistani sympathies were with
China. On issues dealing with non-alignment, non-proliferation,
Sri Lankan ethnic troubles, etc. Pakistan was always ranged against India.
Where did this two-nation theory come from? One has to
go back more than a millennium to get to the roots. Advent of lslam The origins are embedded in history. India had remained
culturally homogeneous through many' millennia. The rise of Buddhism had not caused communal disharmony. The first tremors occurred after the Arab invasion of AD 712. With the establishment of Muslim rule, conversions started, beginning with the followers of Buddhism, now under decline, and from
among the low castes of Hindus. The converts developed

into a distinct group. They were recipients of higher patronage
from the early Muslim rulers who were keen on creating a
wider constituency for themselves among the populace. The

pattern continued as the Mughals stretched their power across
the whole of north India. As the size of Muslim population

grew, the wise among the Mughal rulers, such as Akbar saw
the need to ensure that religious distinctiveness did not lead

to abnormal rigidities between the two segments of population.
He was all for assimilation and synthesis. The mood was

catching. Urdu was a product of synthesis. The founding Guru
of Sikhism had promotion of synthesis as an objective.

Setback to Synthesis
Aurangzeb caused a set back. His policies of persecution of
the non-Muslims created antagonisms between Hindus and

Muslims, but this remained a communal phenomenon. lt did
not turn them into wholesale enemies. Both in urban and

rural centres, Hindus and Muslims coexisted peacefully and kept their alienated feelings within bounds.
The Muslim rulers of the Mughal dynasty, and of kingdoms
in the south and elsewhere did not see themselves
as
foreigners in India. Some of them like Aurangzeb showed an excessive evangelic zeal and intolerance for other religions. Often religion and not ethnicity or cultural affiliation, dictated who should receive their patronage, but where issues of state
were involved, such rulers did not hesitate to move agalnst

co-relig ion ists.
lntroduction
z3
Emergence of the Political Factor

During the British Raj the dimension of politics was slowly added to the Hindu Muslim equation. The 1857 mutiny had brought Hindus and Muslims together against the British but
the latter considered the Muslims to be the bigger culprit. Disdain by the British and a sense of loss of glory had a
traumatic effect on the Muslims and for long they remained in
despairing isolation, depriving themselves of the early benefits
of the British period such as education and participation in

newly introduced industries. lsolation bred backwardness.
Syed Ahmed Khan was the first Muslim intellectual of the
period who made concerted efforts through education and
other reforms to get the Muslims into the mainstream of contempoiary developments. While on the one. hand he
influenbed the Muslims to come closer to the British to seek
their patronage and goodwill, on the other hand he advised

them to maintain a distance from the Hindus in order to create
a distinct space for themselves. Syed Ahmed Khan was

basically a social reformer and advocated no political causes
on behalf of the Muslims The British desire to introduce local self government in India at the beginning of the 20th century set the religious
and social leaders of the Muslim community wondering how best to make use of the forthcoming opportunity to advance
its interests. The concept of separate electorates
was
conceived for the purpose. The democratic traditions of Britain
24
ran counter to any such thought but they went with this principle. After all, the policy of divide and rule was in the long-term interests of the British Empire. The Muslim League (ML) was established in the year
'1906. lt was also the year of formal presentation of the demand
for a separate electorate on behalf of Muslims to the British. However, there was no thought of a separate nation behind this demand. The Lucknow Pact which came ten years later, climaxing efforts by Hindus and Muslim leaders joinfly to promote early grant of self-government to Indians, was acknowledged by Jinnah as an agreement which represented
the birth of a united Indian nation.
At this point of time Jinnah was identified as
an
ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity. The increasing teppo of the politics of Muslim empowerment converted him gradually
into a diehard exclusive supporter of Muslim interests. Jinnah,
however, commanded no mass following among Muslims or

the orthodox Muslim religious leaders. His politics and methods
were opposed by important Muslim personalities like Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and Sheikh Abdullah, who had much larger support among the Muslim
masses. The debates over the constitutional reforms in the country
during the first half of the 20th century gradually convinced
the British that they could not stay in India much longer.
Elections fought on the basis of separate electorates in 1937,
lntroduction
.E
which gave Indians the first real opportunity of participation in power, had given absolute majority to the Indian Congress in
all states except Bengal, Punjab, Sindh and Assam. The Muslim League received only 4.8 per cent of Muslim votes. Leaders like Jinnah realised that separate electorates had not ensured access to absolute power and an alternate
strategy had to be worked out, but time was also running out.
Quest for Empowerment

The quest for Muslim empowerment now took a new turn and
its protagonists now demanded throu(h ML's
Lahore
Resolution of March 23, 1940 "that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north western and
eastern zones
of lndia, should be grouped to
constitute
Independent states in which the constitutional units shall be autonomous and sovereign". The resolution did not use the word Pakistan. lt was silent about any two-nation theory. lt spoke about self-governance
for Muslims of north west and east India but not of the vast numbers who lived in the other parts of the country'
Presumably, if under the Muslim rulers the entire country had been converted to lslam, no such resolution would have been
necessary. The selective approach for the reconfiguration of British India underlined the absence of a universal principle
and emphasised reliance only on the existence of religious

maiorities.
The Lahore Resolution's vision of winning ultimate power for.the Muslims had strengthened the Muslim League,s position among Muslims of the country. In the ,1946 elections ML secured 428 of 492 possible Muslim seats in provinces and
all Muslim seats in the Central Assembly. lt took office in Sindh and Bengal. The British hurry to leave India and the obstinacy of the ML, born out of the new-found confidence
that it could claim to speak for Muslims as a whole, finally led the leadership of the Indian Congress including Gandhiji to
agree to partition and creation of Pakistan. Jinnah's quest for
absolute power had succeeded dramaticallv and rather

unexpectedly.
Two-Nation Theory
Pakistan was the climax of the politics of separatism, which had its genesis in the events, which followed the first Arab
invasion. The new state had to invent a grandiose explanation
for its creation. Along with the state was sanctified the twonation theory to rationalise the birth of the former which earlier
had found only an occasional mention. The new state went beyond what its Muslim leadership had hoped for or were quite prepared for. Questions like how it should be governed or what should be its ideology had not been thought out or
settled in advance even in outline. These constitute a question
mark even to this day.

Jinnah, believer as he was in democracy and constitutional
ways, wanted Pakistan to be a democratic secular country
lntroduction
27
where every citizen had equal rights and freedom to practice his religion. His death in September 1948 marked the beginning of a process that took Pakistan tortuously in quite the opposite direction. Nationhood is based on shared language, background, history, ethnicity, etc. rooted in the common cultural consciousness. Pakistan became a state
without these attributes of a nation. The two-nation theory had, therefore, to be preserved as an explanation and its assumptions worked into a doctrine, central to which was the
thought that Hindus and Muslims were two different mutually antagonistic nationalities.
lslam as an ldeologY
Soon, Jinnah's concept of secularism was formally given up. India replaced Hindus as the demonic figure. There also
started a search for a suitable ideology of Pakistan to succeed the concept of a two-nation theory. The Jamait-e-lslami (Jl)
and other lslamic orthodox groups took a leading part in this drive and succeeded in creating the perception that lslam could be the ideology of Pakistan. Abul Ala Maudoodi, Amir' Jamait-e-lslami, who before 1947 had been an opponent of
the movement for Pakistan, on the ground that the lslamic

Ummah should not be fractionated with different state frontiers,
now reinterpreted the movement as a religious movement of Muslims of India. Jinnah was posthumously conferred the distinction of being a leader of Muslim orthodoxy whose aims
were to create a theocratic nation.
28
In Maudoodi's,lslam, there was no place of honour for minorities or other sectarian beliefs. The turn of events in Pakistan by 1958 hdd caused its political establishment to
seek the goodwill and support of the conservative religious groups. Expulsion of Quadianis from the folds of lslam in 1974 under orders from a so called champion of democracy and liberal social values like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto provided an
index of the extent to which the ideological centre of pakistan had been shifted from founder Jinnah's concepts of a secular state.
Koran and Ahadith do not spell out a framework for a state. But for conservative theologians the Medina government
of Prophet Mohammed remains the only model to be followed.
In this model, Muslim people (Ummah) should remain

indivisible with a single caliph. This ideal polity is non_existent.
Muslims all over the world, according to their group genius, have made compromises with the contemporaneous reality.
and govern themselves on the basis of nation states. powerful
pulls are operating towards universalism and progresstve societies with many lslamic scholars describing lslam as
fundamentally secular. Two constraints have shaped the character of developments in pakistan - the two_nation theory
and its anti India ethos. The liberal elements in pakistan have
failed to checkmate the resulting reorientation towards lslamisation, and from there on to Shariatisation. Some now see a danger of Talibanisation.
lntroduction
29
lslamisation Targets lndia

The process of lslamisation has been carried out with the full
support of the authorities. lt is directed against lndia in certain
specific ways. Following
a UGC directive in 1981, history
books were rewritten identifying the creation of a completely lslamised state as the ultimate objective of Pakistan. Such a
theme has bred communal antagonism and freely allowed articulation of communal hatred. School textbooks expect a
child of fifth standard to be able to spell the differences

between a Hindu and a Muslim. In charts that teach alphabets
to younger children, (kaf) stands for a Kafir who is depicted by a picture of a man in a dhoti and a pigtail; and the alphabet
(zoye) for Zalim, with a picture resembling a Sikh. lt is evident
that the Pakistani establishment wants the entire country to

turn into lndia haters. When it is also stressed that the Armed Forces bear the responsibility of safeguarding the ideological frontiers of Pakistan, the nature of the agenda becomes even more explicit. The Pakistan Armed Forces have to defend or attack in the name of lslam. An enemy had to be found for the large permanent Armed Forces. Who else but India could qualify for the role of a permanent enemy?
Role of Armed Forces

The Army became the most important and effective institution
of Pakistan. No other worthwhile institution could be created in Pakistan by the political class which inherited power from
30
the British or which appeared on the scene later. The two

main leaders responsible for the creation of pakistan, Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, had died in September 194g and 1951 respectively, without having had enough time to do the groundwork for the creation of durable political institutions. The absence of such institutions was the principal factor which
had enabled General Ayub Khan to seize power in 195g and General Yahya Khan in 196g, General Zia-ul-Huq who seized
power in 1977 extensively used lslam and Jl to establish the legitimacy of his rule. As a matter of deliberate policy he introduced a religious slant into the Armed Forces. Viewed through the prism of religion, India appeared as a dangerous foe that had to be vanquished.
The Armed Forces of pakistan became the arbiters of internal and external security, civilian interludes made no difference. Thus, major issues like nuclear weapons, Afghanistan and India (including Kashmir) reflect the policy options of the Armed Forces. No civilian leader, no matter
how powerful he might have appeared, such as Nawaz Sharif,
has been able to stand against the Army. No civilian leader
of Pakistan has succeeded in crafting a policy
of
accommodation with India since the Army is opposed to it.
The National Security Doctrine

The two-nation theory is the guiding mantra of this mind set. The accentuating lslamic fervour in pakistan is investing it
lntroduction
JI
with Jehadi colours. Though Kashmir was treated originally as the unfinished agenda of partition, the objectives have since been enlarged. The activities of lSl, a creature of the GHQ Pakistan, unfold the nature of these objectives to be destabilisation of India, through weakening its secular
character and territorial and cultural integrity' The animus felt by these controllers of Pakistani destiny will not disappear
even if a solution to Kashmir is found on their terms' A national
security doctrine has not been enunciated in Pakistan but it can be inferred to be the destruction ofthe Indian state through
balkanisation. Acquisition of a nuclear weapon status by Pakistan seems to have emboldened Pakistan to work with greater zeal against India. Policymakers in lndia have to come to terms with this reality. Faith is often placed in confidence building measures (CBMs) in the hope that they will ultimately lead to a friendly environment that will facilitate the solution
of the difficult problems between India and Pakistan. The

two-nation theory and the resulting rigid and frigid thinking of the GHQ, Rawalpindi, would seem to lie well beyond the reach of any CBM that can be conceived in the foreseeable future. Several generational changes will be needed to alter the mode of their current thinking. tt is to be noted that many scholars of Pakistan consider Pakistan to be a failing state
but the deteriorating conditions, political, economic and social,
which earn it the label of a failing state, have not made its rulers turn to tasks of nation-building, lessening their focus on
India. The forces will change only if the agenda, dictated by the two-nation theory changes.
32
What are India's options in this scenario? India will have to work them out itself. Other nations, big or small, may be apprehensive about the future course of evolution of the lslamic or Talibanic ferment in pakistan but their policies will be limited by their own perceptions of thelr own national interests. Too much cannot be expected from them. lndian responses have to be governed by the ground realities as they are now, without any romantic sentimentalism or wishful thinking.
The chapter, which follows, goes into the history of

development of Muslim consciousness in India and examines
the nature of empowerment it sought. lt enquires into the

groMh'of the two-nation theory. The subsequent chapter looks at how the two-nation theory facilitated its replacement by lslam as the ideology of this state. This change oriented the ethos of the new state towards lslamlsation and sharpened
its anti-lndianism. The chapter thereafter will look at the nexus
between the orthodox lslamic groups and mil_bureaucratic power structure, which effectively converted anti_lndianism
into an article of faith, using the two-nation theory and lslam as the instruments. Subsequenfly, the nature of Indo_pakistan problems will be analysed to establish why they are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future conditioned as the rulers of Pakistan are with these two obsessions. Chapter 6 evaluates the costs, which the application of the two_nation
theory has imposed on the people of pakistan from the perspective of quality of life, which they face today as
lntroduction
compared to what it might have been if no such theory had surfaced. The question of whether the costs have been paid
in vain remains dangling in the air. The concluding chapter

suggests that since the adherence to this theory by Pakistan
makes Indo-Pakistan problems irresolvable, India has to address this theory directly and squarely to get out of the
impasse.
Will Pakistan be ready to bury the theory or modify it?

There will be hope in the future if it does; othemrise, the dark
period in the relationship will go on indefinitely, with some

cosmetic relief here and there.
Germination of Pakistan
Entry of lslam into the Subcontinent
The embryo of Pakistan, for Mohammed Ali Jinnah, its founder,
was conceived the moment the first Muslim set his foot on the subcontinent.l That was in AD 712 when Arabs invaded
Sindh for the first time. lslam got no foothold in the subcontinent with this invasion.
The next encounter with lslam took place 300 years later
when Mahmud of Ghazni made several forays into northern lndia from Afghanistan. Mahmud's principal objective was to loot. He also destroyed several Hindu temples including the
one at Somnath. The destruction of Somnath temple traumatised the Hindu mind and created long abiding
resentments.
Muslim power got established in northern India with the conquests of Muhammad Ghauri towards the end of the 12th century. A sultanate was set up by his successors at Delhi. The Lodhis and Mughals followed, extending Muslim power
right up to Bengal.
lslam spread as Muslim power expanded. The new adherents to lslam from the local population came mostly from the followers of Buddhism, which was already under
decline, and from the lower strata of Hindus, particularly the untouchable classes. Conversions were encouraged by the
Muslim establishment to expand their constituencv and increase their security. Assimilation and Coexistence The expanding Muslim population did not, however, create watertight compartments for the Muslims and Hindus. The
early Muslim leaders were alive to the need for securing the goodwill of their Hindu subjects and were keen to see Hindus
and Muslims live in peace side by side. This promoted a synthesis despite the obvious differences between Hinduism
and lslam. According to the historian Romila Thapar2 the communities exhibited a fair degree of assimilation in their pattern of living by the 16th century. Urdu is an excellent
example of this assimilative process at the popular level, which
enabled the ruler and the ruled to talk to each other in the
same common language. North Indian classical music and the monuments built by the Muslim rulers in the north are
other brilliant examples of the spirit of fusion which also

indicated that the Muslim rulers whose ancestry lay in Central
Asia, wished to be identified as the indigenous sons of the

subcontinent and not as foreiqners.
No doubt, there were excesses also against the Hindu religion by orthodox lslamic preachers and some members of the Muslim establishments but genocidal tendencies were by and large, absent. Sikhism was another product of the effort
at synthesis, with ideas borrowed from both religions, to reduce
the gulf between them. The monotheism of Sikhism was akin to monotheism of lslam. The emphasis of Sikhism on the establishment of a non-casteist society was intended to be an improvement on Hinduism, which permitted castes The emergence of Sikhism as a new religion in the 15th-16th century was influenced in no small way by the interaction between Hinduism and lslam. lslam spread to the southern parts of India also through Arab settlements on the Malabar Coast and the rise of Muslim kingdoms in the south. Here also, this phenomenon did not
lead to serious cultural clashes and by and large the adherents
of the two religions lived peacefully side-by-side.
The process of synthesis reached its zenith during the

rule of Akbar (1550-1605). While he expanded his empire up to the banks of the Godavari to the south and to the whole
of north India including Afghanistan, he was mindful about showing due respect to Hinduism. His desire to take the
Hindus with him is displayed by his inclusion in key positions
of several Hindu luminaries like Birbal and Todarmal.
He
married a Hindu princess and abolished the hated tax Jazia, levied on non-Muslims. He tried to propagate a new religion Deen-e-llahi, which represented an effort to smoothen the edges of antagonism between Hinduism and lslam.
JI
The foundations of mutual tolerance and respect were rudely shattered during Aurangzeb's rule (1658-1707).
Aurangzeb ruled as
a puritanical orthodox
Muslim,
discriminating against Hindus and their religious institutions, reimposing Jazia and closing the doors of state offices to them. Sikhs were likewise persecuted. Suddenly, the chasms between the communities began to widen. The non-Muslim
communities no longer identified themselves with the Emperor but the Muslims felt and behaved like the members of a ruling
class. lt is no wonder that in Pakistan, Aurangzeb is rated as
the best Muslim ruler of the subcontinent. The sobriquet is

given to him because he kept the ideology of lslam uppermost
in his mind as he ruled India, much like Pakistan has tried to
do after its formation. Religious and political intolerance was

the hallmark of his rule, much as it was to appear in Pakistani
politics later. But
if one were to search for evidence that
Muslims and Hindus had started to look upon each other as
people who could not coexist in this reign, one would be

looking in vain. Despite the excessive religious zeal, which Aurangzeb displayed during his rule, lndia, under him and
other Mughals, could not be called an lslamic state.
The Balance Changes The decline of the Mughal power after Aurangzeb and its final disintegration with the arrival of the British colonial rule resulted in radical changes in the balance between the religious communities of India. The Muslim upper classes
were the principal losers in status and influence. To begin

with, the British depended upon the serving members of the
Muslim nobility and administrative cadres but trust did not develop as the British were regarded as usurpers. Hindus played no role in intensifuing the mutual distrust. Instead they also had negative sentiments towards the British who were
viewed as foreigners. The War of Independence of 1857 was
a combined effort of the Hindus and Muslims. ln British eyes, Muslims were the larger culprits for the Mutiny as they termed
it and consequently, their aftitude towards the Muslims became
relatively harsher. This chain of events had the effect of sending the Muslim
community into
a shell. lt
became reluctant
to
accept
westernised ideas and the modifications introduced in the
fields of education, industry and trade. The community's

unwillingness to learn English, which was now to be the new medium of advancement in public life, shifted it by and large
to the backwaters of national life. On the other hand, the

Hindus and Sikhs did not display similar inhibitions and were
able to progress much faster in all fields. Reform movements
like the Arya Samaj and the Brahmo Samaj promoted by

Raja Ram Mohan Roy helped the growth of liberalism among
the Hindu$ in social and religious arenas, enabling them to

take longQr strides in their overall development. The Indian
National ngress
also started in the mode of a reform

seeking self-determination and finally
in 1885, and was seen to grow into a full-fledged

national
39
independence. The Congress was not structured on religious
lines and included leaders from all communities and faiths,

including the Muslims.
Focus on Muslim GommunitY

At this point, however, the general backwardness of the Muslim
community and the aloofness from the national mainstream had already become a cause for concern to the leaders of
the community. The most important contribution towards the uplift of the community came from Syed Ahmed Khan (181798) who set up an institution at Aligarh in 1875, which was to become a university eventually. Syed Ahmed Khan was both
a progressive as well as a devout Muslim. He wanted
his
community to embrace westernised ideas as well as English

education so that it could march in step with other communities
of the country but without losing its identity as a distinct presence in the country. To promote these objectives he favoured close links and cooperation with the British. His
vision helped Aligarh grow into a major ideological and political
centre of Muslim intelligentsia and its consciousness in later

years.
Syed Ahmed Khan's role in encouraging Muslim revivalism
is of considerable significance. His real thrust lay in attempts
to modernise lslamic practices and customs to conform to the currents and trends of contemporaneous times. There was
no political dimension to it. In the words of one
political
40
commentator: "On the intellectual front Syed Ahmed's mission
was to emphasise the rational, secular and scientific

dimensions in lslam and educate Muslims along modern lines,
in order to enable them to comprehend the objective and secuiar correlates of the religious and spiritual dimensions
and to incorporate these principles in their society and life."3
Syed Ahmed Khan's involvement with the interests of the
lndian Muslim community was, thus, apolitical. He did not believe in an lslamic political movement or approve of the
orthodox role of Ullemas. He supported Hindu Muslim unity but after the formation of Indian National Congress in 1885, moved away from the posture, believing that the Congress
would look after only Hindu interests. Adoption of this communal approach has been interpreted by some as amounting to a first overt step towards Pakistan.4 Jawahar
Lal Nehru, however, felt that Syed Ahmed Khan's opposition
to Congress grew out of his desire for British help and

cooperation.s Nehru quotes Syed Ahmed Khan "for having said that all persons in India, whatever their religion, belonged
to one and the same nation."

Syed Ahmed Khan was not the first Muslim reformer. This role rightly belongs to Syed Jamaluddin Afghani (183997) who also excelled as political activist. Afghani operated
on a wider canvas, with Muslims the world over in mind,

particularly those in West Asia. He really saw the Muslims as one Umma which should jointly struggle against Western influences and ideologies. Although Syed Ahmed Khan was
41
influenced by the thoughts of Afghani, the major difference between the two lay in the framework of their respective
approaches. Whereas, Afghani targeted the West for his rhetorical attacks, Syed did not wish to alienate the British
and wanted to confine himself to raising the consciousness of
Indian Muslims. For this reason Afghani was quite critical of
the doings of Syed Ahmed Khan.

Shah Waliullah (1703-62) was another Muslim reformer to cast an indelible impression on the Muslim mind in India. Like Afghani, Waliullah wanted to interpret the essence of Koran in the light of contemporary realities and synthesise it with advances in science, information and knowledge which
had considerably moved on beyond the social and political environments of ancient Arabia when the Koran was given to mankind. He believed in 'iitihad' which meant reflecting,
reinterpreting and updating the Koranic injunctions, to bring them in line with the developments which had since taken
place. Both Syed Ahmed Khan and later Mohammed lqbal embraced the principle of iitihad' and its compulsive logic that the core purpose of religious wisdom was not to be static
but to progress dynamically to bring guidance to an evolving society and its people. Syed Ahmed Khan's concerns
remained apolitical much to the chagrin of Afghani. Syed Ahmed Khan strove to bring about a consciousness of identity
among the Muslims of India, irrespective of where they lived in India, much like Waliullah who also wanted a consolidation
of Muslim identity throughout India and lslam to become an
42
effective cultural force. Necessarily, this caused communal overtones to creep in, which were later to acquire defining characteristics. Symbolism in the pursuit of independent
identity assumed importance. Urdu became a tool of exclusive
identification but it is important to remember that Urdu was
not identified as the language of another national group. However, this rising consciousness, which essentially was
communal, also gave birth to a query in the minds of some
people, whether
it would be
advantageous
to have an
exclusive area for practice of lslam and its cultural activities

without fear of domination or pressure by Hindus, the majority
community. As Muslim identification progressed to envelop
issues like employment avenues, repressive landlords,

schooling, political representation etc., the room for subjective and opportunistic exploitation of lslam became larger, widening
further the fissures between the Hindu and Muslim

communities.
Early indications by the British rulers of their desire to involve the locals in a measure of self rule set the leaders of
the Muslim community thinking how best to safeguard their interests. Thus arose the demand for separate electorates,
which was conveyed formally to Lord Minto, Viceroy, in 1906
when a Muslim delegation led by the Aga Khan called on him. The Muslim League was also formed the same year. Both these developments were proof of Muslim arousal in a political sense and whose leaders would not hesitate to use
the communal card to press their advantage. Communal
43
electorates went against the liberal political thought as it prevailed in Britain at that time but its use in India was not vetoed. This concept served the British lmperial interests of
Divide and Rule. The Muslim League had unequivocally come
out on the side of the British by providing in its constitution that it would be promoting feelings of loyalty for the British
among the Muslims of India.
Quest for Power Within an Indian Framework
In its quest for self-rule the Congress grudgingly accepted the principle of separate electorates in the Lucknow Pact (1916) in return for Muslim support to the Congress. The Encyclopaedia Britannica6 reports that Jinnah saw the development as the birth of a united Indian nation. At this
ooint of time Jinnah was a member of both the Congress and
the League. The two-nation theory had obviously not entered his horizons, or for that matter those of any other Muslim leader of any stature.
The Government of lndia Act of 1919 enacted the separate
electorates but other reforms did not measure up to the expectations of the Congress. A civil disobedience agitation
was launched which converted the Congress into a mass

movement. Another parallel exercise, the Khilafat movement, was launched by the Congress against the abolition of the
Muslim Caliphate in TurkeY.
44
The Khilafat movement of the 1920s offers an excellent insight for understanding the dynamics of the process of
increasing communalisation in the relationship between the
Hindu and Muslim communities. Muslim leaders in the movement like Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Mohammad Ali,
etc. were both Pan lslamics and Indian nationalists and they suc0eeded in garnering general support for the cause among
the Muslim masses of India. With Congress and Mahatma Gandhi also pitching in, the movement became a refreshing
symbol of Hindu Muslim unity. However, the Khilafat movement
did not succeed in its objective of preventing the demise of the Caliphate in Turkey and demonstrated that use of lslam as a political weapon could be counter-productive. Kemal
Ataturk used the movement to banish forever the interference of lslam in matters of state and converted Turkev into a secular
reoublic.
In India the mobilisation of Indian Muslims under the aegis
of Khilafat, however, added to the strengths of communalism after the movement had fizzled out. Disagreements flared up
on local issues, and ideological consolidation, which had been
built up in Muslim opinion, came in handy to bring up vehemence in outbursts of alleged outrages. There were eruptions of communal violence. One major incident of this
nature was when predominantly Muslim peasantry wreaked vengeance on Hindu landlords during the Moplah rebellion in the territory of present day Kerala, triggered by absence of long needed land reforms. There were actions and reactions
45
in both communities by vested interests, each trying to

safeguard and, if possible, to extend the frontiers of its own religious identification through religious propaganda and
conversion. Hindu Muslim unity, which had scaled remarkably high levels during Khilafat agitation, became a victim of politics
of religion.
The mass upsurge offered little opportunity to the Muslim League or Jinnah to consolidate their positions. Jinnah also
did not subscribe to the non-constitutional tactics of a mass uoheaval or to the use of politics for securing the narrow ends of religion. He resigned from the Congress in 1920. The
League also withdrew from the Lucknow Pact in 1922, finding that it inhibited its opportunities for growth. Neither Jinnah nor
the Muslim League at this point of time could claim to speak for the Muslims of India. The League's communal politics had made the leaders of the Muslim community in the country
examine the question of whether their lslamic religion conflicted with their Indian nationalism. Most important Muslims like
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were emphatic that no room for such a conflict existed, since religion operated in the personal
sphere and nationalism in the political sphere' Their sentiment is best expressed by Maulana Mohammed Ali in the following words: "Where God commands ....1 am a Muslim first, a Muslim second and a Muslim last and nothing but a Muslim.... But where India is concerned, where India's freedom is concerned, where the welfare of lndia is concerned, lam an Indian first,
an Indian second, an lndian last and nothing but an Indian,
46
....1 belong to two circles of equal size but which are not concentric. One is India and the other is Muslim.... We belong
to these circles ....and we can leave neither."T

While, thus, the nationalist Muslim leaders felt no dilemma between the needs of a personal religion and national destiny,
the Muslim League and Jinnah remained bent on exploiting the communal card to secure political power. The Congress
leaders were alive to such aspirations and were ready to offer adjustments. The Motilal Nehru Committee set uo in
1928 to prepare an outline for an Indian constitution proposed
that a balance should be maintained between the Hindu

majority and Muslim majority provinces."s But the League now
wanted 33 per cent reservations of all seats for the Muslims. The Nehru Committee was prepared to concede reservations proportionate to population only. Jinnah was dissatisfied by this formulation of the Nehru Committee but did not drive himself to the extreme position which he was to take later in 1940. He had not given up on the ,,necessity of a Hindu_ Muslim settlement.... and of a friendly and harmonious spirit
in this vast country of ours".s The results of the elections conducted in 1g37 under the 1935 Government of India Act, which gave a parliamentary
democratic set up to the provinces within a federal structure led to an intense soul searching within the League leadership.
Congress received absolute majority in all the provinces exceDt
Assam, Bengal, Punjab and Sindh. The League could secure only 104 out of the 489 seats under separate electorates. In
47
the Muslim majority state of Punjab it managed to get only one seat out of 86 and in Bengal 37 seats out of 119.10
The poor results clearly proved that the League could not speak for the Muslims of the country, and that its agenda had
not stirred the Muslims on the whole.
In keeping with its traditions, the Congress offered
to
include League representatives in the governments it formed in the provinces, provided they joined the Congress legislature parties. The League rejected the offer fearing ultimate selfliquidation, which would be totally contrary to its desire to capture power on its own. lt, therefore, concentrated on using the communal approach to the hilt. lt set about convincing the Muslim masses that in an independent India, there would be no way of escaping from an overarching framework, comprehensively dominated by Hindus.
In a reporl published in 1939, it sought to widen the

distance between the Muslims and Hindus by accusing the Congress provincial governments of systematic suppresslon
and oppression of Muslims. When these governments resigned
abruptly at the beginning of World War ll to protest against the Viceroy's committing India to the war on the side of the Allies, without any prior consultation with the Indian political leaders, Jinnah called for the occasion to be observed as a
day 'of deliverance and thanksgiving'. The call amounted to a crude attempt to hurt the sentiments of the vast numbers of
nationalists in the country, inflame Muslim opinion and convey
48
to the British the support of the Muslims, as represented by
the League, in the war against Germany.

Emphasis on Muslims as a Distinct Entity
Thanks to the efforts of Syed Ahmed Khan, separate electorates and the political ambitions of League leaders
including Jinnah, some academic interest had already been generated about Muslims being a distinct entity on their own.
In the 1930s, a few Muslim students of Cambridge University
coined the name Pakrsfan to refer to the contiguous Muslim

areas of Punjab, Afghanistan (i.e. Pakhtoons), Kashmir, Sindh
and Baluchistan. This name, born intellectually abroad, did not refer to Bengal, suggesting that no ideological
underpinnings were at the roots of the idea and the concept
was largely of an academic significance only.

Mohammed lqbal had echoed a similar concept in 1930 at the time of his presidential address to the Muslim League annual session:
"l would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sindh
and
Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self government within the British Empire or without the Empire, the formulation
of a consolidated northwest Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destinv of the Muslims at least of North West
lndia."11
Absence of Bengal from this formulation, even though Bengal had a larger number of Muslims, indicated that lqbal's
49
interests were confined only to a cultural contiguous majority
area of Muslims and not where large number of Muslims

lived but were not in a majority as in Bengal or the south. His declaration that "The life of lslam as a cultural force in this
country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory'.12 Use of phrases like 'within the British Empire' or
'as a cultural force in this country' rule out the possibility that lqbal had a specific model of governance for this cultural entity or was looking at the Muslim masses of India as a separate political unit. His concerns were autonomy not
political independence. The political framework he envisaged
was either British India or Independent India. His Muslim India
was thus to function from within India and religion was not the idiom of its foundation as a state. At best it could be said that lqbal's vision constituted an extension of the principle of separate electorate. i.e. to carve out a cultural area where local power would largely be in the hands of the Muslims. Jinnah's lhinking was evolving somewhat on the same lines. He had convinced himself that the best interests of Muslims would not be served if participation in power was
governed by the communal ratio of Hindus and Muslims. He
wanted the Muslims to have their own distinct space in power.
In an article in a British publication, he expressed his views

that "A constitution must be evolved that recognises that there
are in India two nations who must both share in the

governance of their common motherland."l3 lt should be noted
that the emphasis was on the splitting of 'governance', not on
splitting 'the common motherland'. The focus was not on an lslamic nation, but on an lslamic cultural home where lslam
could be practised by its adherants whichever way they

wanted.
The Lahore Resolution which was adopted on March 23, 1940 at the annual conference of the Muslim League and which became known as the Pakistan Resolution projected
this idea in a more concrete form, albeit without using the word Pakistan. lt said that "no constitutional plan would be
workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it was designed on the following basic principles, viz. that
geographically contiguous units were demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments
as may be necessary, that the areas in which Muslims were

numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, would be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units should be autonomous
and sovereign." This formulation was neither lslamic nor nationalistic. lt

relied only on contiguity and numbers but it left out from its ambit a very large number of Muslims who lived in India in
areas other than east or northwest. lslam was not used to define the goals or the political organisation of the entities
sought to be created. lt contained not even a hint of rebellion
against composite Indian nationalism. The people whom it

referred to shared only one common characteristic, religion, but no other characteristic which identify people as a nation
Germination
of
Pakistan
5'1
i.e. language, culture or ethnicity. The Lahore Resolution was,
thus, born not out of an overwhelming or all pervasive sense
of common identity. lts roots lay in the political frustration of

League leaders who were convinced that political power would
otheruise continue to elude them. Their claims of a two-nation
theory being at play was no more than use of "a tool of political expediency."l4
The British Approach

The British Government in London was not taken in by such posturing. Aware that it would be very difficult to maintain a
colonial empire after World War ll and mindful of the strong adverse sentiment generated by the Quit India movement of
1942, London was now in a mood to give self rule to India as
early as possible. The arrangements for the British departure
from the subcontinent and transfer of power to the Indians were to be made in consultation with them. Since they did not
recognise Muslims in India to be a nation, the federal framework was the point of their framework. The British regarded Muslims only as a minority, which could not be allowed to place a veto on the advance of the majority.ls This
was the conviction of the British Labour Government, which came into power in 1946. The earlier government of Winston
Churchill had other plans, which will be referred

Chapter V.
to
in
League Gains Support

The provincial elections had become overdue and were held
in 1946. The League leaders, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali
Khan,
Choudhary Khaliquzzaman etc. all came from Muslim minority provinces. They realised that they must at all cost build up support in the Muslim majority areas and such support would only be obtained through an intense campaign on communal lines. The political format was kept in a low profile and the religious idiom given the pride of place in the electioneering campaigns. The question of nationhood was hardly ever
mentioned but the spectre of Hindu repression was magnified
out of all proportions. The strategy worked. The League won 428 seats out of 492 Muslim seats in the provinces and all
the Muslim reserved seats in the Central Assembly. The League formed governments in Sindh and Bengal but in
Punjab this honour went to the Unionists who had 88 seats against the League's 87. The newly enhanced stature of the League made its leaders more intransigent and determined to split the country unless a formula could be devised which
would place governance in key sectors of Muslim majority

areas in their hands. The new Labour Government in UK, on assuming power in 1946, announced its readiness to grant independence to lndia and sent a Cabinet Mission of three ministers to work
out a constitutional scheme for transfer of power, while maintaining the integrity of lndia as a nation. The Mission
proposed a loose union with its centre administering defence, foreign affairs and communications, of provinces in communal
groupings, which were largely
to be
autonomous. Also
proposed was an interim government at the centre, with five members each from Congress and League, till a Constituent
Assembly could be elected. Both parties accepted the

proposals but had fundamental reservations, which ultimately
led to the rejection of the Cabinet Mission plan. The League's
acceptance was in the hope that it would pave the way for
the ultimate creation of Pakistan. The Congress objection

was to the parity in the government at the centre. Besides, it
insisted that the Constituent Assembly should be free to have
the last word on all issues on merits.

Jinnah now gave up the veneer of constitutional approach and called for a Direct Action Day to be observed on August
16, 1946 to force the pace of events in his favour. The Muslim
League government in Bengal announced this day to be a

public holiday. The League leaders could sense that the British
would now not take too long to leave India, and were ready to create mayhem to press their point. On this day Calcutta
suffered in communal riots with 20,000 casualties and 5,000 dead. This was followed by massive killings in Noakhali. The carnages established that the League had become a force to
be reckoned with in certain parts of the country.
54
Separatism Triumphs
The British Government announced June 1948 as the deadline
for its departure from India but partition or Pakistan was not
yet mentioned. Lord Mountbatten was sent as the Viceroy in March 1947 to execute the mandate. Mountbatten advanced
lndependence Day to August 15, 1947. No protracted negotiations were now possible to work towards a political
compromise. Congress leaders became resigned to accept
partition since the British were considering transferring power
province by province
if an agreement on some kind of a
federal structure for India still eluded them.

Pakistan, thus, came into existence on August 15, 1947.
With the partition of India, Jinnah was later to claim that he
achieved Pakistan for its people single-handed, with the

assistance only of his typewriter and secretary.16
lf
Jinnah
had not been born or if the whole of India had been converted
to lslam following conquests by Muslim conquerors, perhaps there would be no Pakistan today. Was Pakistan the logical
end of what has been called the two-nation theory? The Pakistan movement was neither a secessionist movement
nor a separatist movement. lt was basically just an anti Hindu movement in its final phases. League leaders including Jinnah
were by and large secular in personal outlook. They latched
on to lslam only when they discovered that it was the only
tool they had to carve out an area where their personal ambitions of political domination could be fulfilled. Prior to
Ge
rm
in
ation of
P aki
stan
that, from the time of Syed Ahmed Khan, Muslim aspirations
were limited to being a special interest group only, whose

purpose was to give the Muslims a common identity and help
it to claim a role in the unfolding arena of politics and selfrule.
Validity of Two-Nation Theory

To explain how an interest group developed dramatically into a state, the 'two-nation theory' was invented. lt was claimed
that Hindus and Muslims living in India constituted two nations. The theory stood effectively exploded when Bangladesh came
into existence. Emergence of Bangladesh was entirely the result of Bengali nationalism and lslam had no role whatsoever
in it. Furthermore, on achieving independence, Bangladesh jettisoned the notion that nationalism was religion based and
adopted secularism as its creed. More shocks may be in the
offing for Pakistan. The Muhajir Quami Movement leader Altaf
Hussain has said at a meeting in London, with support from
Sindhi, Baluch and Pakhtoon leaders that oartition was one of the biggest blunders of mankind.lT There is a vocal class
of intellectuals in Pakistan who have not hesitated

expressing that the theory was an artificial creation.
in
Events in J&K state as a freedom struggle began within
the state in the 1930s provide further proof that the twonation theory had no validity. The population of the Valley
was predominantly Muslim. From 1931, Sheikh Abdullah had
Reassessrtg Pakistan
started championing their demands and spearheading
political movement based on their grievances. In 1932 Sheikh
Abdullah founded the All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference to fight for the establishment of responsible
government in J&K. He realised that to secure this objective' all the communities in the state must have a united and non-
communal front. To facilitate this,
in 1939, the
Muslim
Conference was converted into a National Conference, which then functioned as a secular party. In India the Muslim League
was to adopt its Lahore Resolution just a few months later in March 1940. lt was thus clear that the politics of communalism had little attraction by and large for the Muslims of the Valley. Ghulam Abbas revived the Muslim Conference in 1941
with the support of the Muslim League. Approaches by Jinnah
to Sheikh Abdullah to align with the revived party to present a single front of Muslims were rejected by Sheikh Abdullah.'
In 1944, he came out with his 'New Kashmir' programme,

which placed its faith in secular politics rejecting the Muslim
League philosophy of a communal approach. The question arises: if a two-nation theory operated in India, why did it fail
to make an impact in J&K state? The answer is that no such

theory was operating.
Yet in Pakistan, awareness was generated that its birth

was entirely due to the phenomenon of the two-nation theory. Its acceptance has penetrated the psyche of the people, particularly the ruling classes. Pakistan's claims to the J&K
state can be traced to their belief in this theory. The two-
nation theory has
a built-in component of
deep-rooted
antagonism towards the other'nation', Hindus, now symbolised
as India. There has been no mellowing of this antagonism during the 53 years that India and Pakistan have existed as
independent countries. lt seems difficult, therefore, not to come
to a conclusion that a change for the better will not come about without a modification in the perceptions of Pakistan policy makers of this unnatural theory.
Nores
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. .
7
S lrtiza Hussain: 'Genesis of Pakistan in Historical Perspective',

Dawn, August 14, 2000.
Romifa Thapar: A History of lndiaYol. I P. 303, as quoted in /ndra Pakistan, The History of Unsolved Conflicts'Vol. 1, Lars Blinkenberg' Odense University Press, 1998, p. 22.
Saroosh lrfani: 'Progressive lslamic Movement', p.37 as quoted in 'lslam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Expeience', Ed. Asghar Khan, Zed Books Ltd. 1985. Percival Spear: 'A Histoty of lndia' p. 225, quoted by Blinkenberg' o. 31.
Jawahar Lal Nehru: Discovery of lndia, p. 347, as quoted by Blinkenberg p. 31 .

The Encyclopaedia Bitannica: 1962 Ed. Vol. 12, p. 173. Mohd Ali: 'Life: A Fragment' (Lahore: S.H. Ashraf 1946, p' 1 7-18) as quoted in 'Pakistan, A Nation ln Making', Shahid Javed Burki' West View Press: Boulder and London, p. '16. Durga Das: 'lndia From Curzon To Nehru & Aftef, pages 127-128 as quoted in Blinkenberg p. 34. Hector Bolitho:. 'Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan' Oxford, 1954-69 p. 94, vide Blinkenberg P. 35.
8. 9.
10. SJ Burki: 'Pakistan, A Nation in Making', p. 16.
58
11. AM Zaidi: 'Evolution of Muslim Political Thought ln lndia'Vol ly, p. 67, quoted in'lslam, Politics and the State', ed. Asghar Khan,
o. 78.
12.
rbid.
',|3. Time and Tide: March 9, 1940 as quoted by Blinkenberg, p.39.
14. Qureshi: 'Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered', pacific Affairs (Winter

1972-73) p. 56'1, as quoted in "Potitics in pakistan: The Struggle For Legitimacf, West View Press, 1984, p. 50.
15. Statement March 15, 1946, of Prime Minister CR Atlee quoted in "Pakistan Resolution to lndia" ed. Latif Ahmed Shenivani. Dava
Publishing House, Delhi, p. 96.
16. CH Phillip and MD Wainwright: 'Paftition of India', p. 32, quoted trom 'lslam, Politics and Sfate' ed. Asghar Khan, p. 169.
17. Times of lndia, Sept. 19, 2000.
Two-Nation TheorY Converts
into lslamic ldeologY

Jinnah's Secular APProach
In the final analysis it was the religious sentiment that was exploited by the Muslim League to secure Pakistan but Pakistan was not intended to be a theocratic state in the perception of its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah. He had emphasised on this fundamental point both before and after
Pakistan was formed. In a speech at a conference of Muslim
legislators in Delhi on April 11,1946, he had observed"'What are we fighting for? What are we aiming at? lt is not for a theocracy, nor for a theocratic state."
1
After Pakistan had come into being he had said, "Pakistan was not going to be a theocratic state, to be ruled by priests
with a divine mission."2

For Jinnah, religion was not unimportant, but social and economic development of the people, a state with sound
OU
political institutions, accountability and a just society were values of equal significance. Bred on concepts of Western
liberalism, Jinnah wanted the new state to be guided by secular idealism, not narrow-minded religious orthodoxy. He indicated
this point at the inaugural address itself to the Constituent

Assembly:
"We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens of one state. We should keep that in front of
us as our ideal. And you will find that in course of time,

Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal
faith of the individual, but in the political sense as the citizens
of one nation."3
The above quoted statement of Jinnah also suggests that
in the founder's thinking, the two-nation theory had no further
role to play in Pakistan and he wanted the animus against
the Hindus, a valuable instrument for advancing the

propaganda for creation of Pakistan, to be buried forever. But
with his death in September 1948, Pakistan started treading a path, not charted out by him, and the question of religion as Pakistan's ideology suddenly became a compelling issue. The initiative was wrested by lslamic parties and groups
led by Maulana Maudoodi, Amir Jamaile-lslami (Jl). lronically,
Maudoodi had stubbornly opposed the Muslim League's plan

for the creation of Pakistan on the grounds that such a demand
went against the spirit of universalism of lslam. In Maudoodi's
Two-Nation Theory Convefts into lstamic
ldeology
61
eyes, Jinnah and his colleagues were not good Muslims as they were trying to split the Muslim Ummah and the agitation
they were spearheading was unlslamic. In Maudoodi's

interpretation of lslamic political thought, there was neither a room for democracy nor for nationalism in an lslamic polity'
Gonservatives to the Fore

Yet, soon after Pakistan's birth, Maudoodi's political philosophy
underwent a dramatic change. Accepting the reality of the new state, he changed the focus of his activities towards justifying its birth. His earlier ideological opposition was transformed into efforts to give the new state a new ideology' the ideology of lslam. The two-nation theory was, thus, to be given a new lease of life. Maudoodi came out with fresh interpretations. The 'unlslamic' movement for Pakistan was now declared to have been a religious movement, which would enable the real Muslims to lead the country in the glorious ways of lslam. Jinnah became a good Muslim for having led such a drive. All such concepts as a Pakistani nation and
Muslim nationalism stood legitimised. There remained,

however, a deep-rooted reservation. Western style democratic values were still an anathema, even with the new prescriptions'
The objectives resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly on March 7, 1949, moved the ethos of Pakistan
away from the dreams of Jinnah and relocated its ideological
centre of gravity
in lslam. The resolution placed ultimate
62
sovereignty over Pakistan in Allah's hands. "The sovereignty of the people was exercisable only within limits prescribed by Him." lslam would thus serye as the overarching fountain for constitutional values. "The principles of democracy, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by lslam shall be fully observed." Minorities were promised freedom ,,to profess
and practise their religions and develop their cultures.,' The context cleady indicated that this freedom to the non-Muslims to order their spiritual and temporal lives would be within the concepts governed by the principles of lslam.a
The Objectives Resolution had the effect of giving pakistan
a permanent reorientation towards lslam though it was
not
said that Pakistan was an lslamic state or that lslam would be the ideology of the state. The reorientation was largely a
response to the need to give continuity to the two-nation theory and to emphasise that lslam was the raison-de-etre of
Pakistan. lt was intended to serve a binding function.
Bonding Role for lslam

The binding function was greaily relevant to pakistan since it was not yet a nation state but was actually a state nation. Stalin had defined a nation as a historically evolved, stable
community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in the community of
culture.s The subjective factor of identity also plays a role in defining a nation. Pakistan, at its inception, consisted of ethno-
Two-Nation Theory Converts
nto lslamic ldeology
linguistic groups, which did not share many of those

characteristics, which could identify them as one nation. Pir Pagara was an exponent of Sindhi nationalism whose political
objectives for Sindh differed widely from those of Jinnah. The
Pakhtoon and Baluch tribes had long enjoyed a sovereign or quasi-sovereign status in the British as well as pre British
period. The Punjabis had not been converted into supporters
of the Pakistan idea until the close of the 1940s. The Bengalis
were manifestly different from the people who lived in the

western segment of what became Pakistan. Religion was the only connecting link. There was, thus, a compulsive need to
use lslam to define Pakistan as a nation.

The orthodox and religious groups like the Jl interpreted
the Objectives Resolution as sanctifying lslam to be the

ideology of Pakistan but there has been no official document
till today, making a proclamation to this effect. The anomaly

can be explained in several ways. Firstly, lslam means different
things to different people in the absence of consensus on

interpretation of its texts and history. lslam itself creates neither
ecclesiastical authority nor accords to the class of Ullemas a defining role. Shias and Sunnis differ widely among themselves
and Sunni doctrines are variously applied by the four independent schools that have sprouted from them. Declaration of Qadianis as a non-Muslim minority was an
eloquent commentary on the spirit of tolerance of the selfappointed guardians of lslam in Pakistan. Secondly, lslam never became an issue in popular perception. The people of
64
Pakistan, by and large, displayed secular tendencies, differentiating between the roles of religion in personal life
and political life. In elections, the results always showed that
the religious groups exist in the margins of political

consciousness of the people. Thirdly, certain lslamic concepts,
while integral to lslam, cannet be reconciled with the evolving

modern universally accepted principles of relationship between
state, polity and governance. The classical lslamic thought insists that all authority over mankind belongs to Allah, which
implies that people's sovereignty as enshrined in a constitution,
cannot be the source of the supreme law of the country. This abstract notion of Allah's sovereignty offers no practical way
of determining what he favours or disfavours in terms of

institutions and policies and, therefore, whether something is
lslamic or non lslamic becomes only an interpretative exercise.
The Ullema class in Pakistan from its early days have

capitalised on these grey shades and unleashed campaigns
that have succeeded in setting Pakistan on a continually widening path of lslamisation. The influence the religious
groups were able to wield was far in excess of their political support in the country. They could do so because the ruling military, bureaucratic and feudal establishment in the country recognised early that with lslamic groups on their side, they would be able to dominate governance of the country. lslam, therefore, became a pillar of the state, the preservation of
one being synonymous with the preservation of the other. This also gave a continuity to the sentiments of those who
Two-Nation Theory Convefts into lslamic ldeology
had been in the vanguard of the movement for Pakistan, and
who were now members of the elite of the new nation, who
had felt the non Muslims to be a threat to their interests then
and who now believed that such threats had assumed even more dangerous oVertones after Pakistan's formation!
Animus Continued The Pakistan idea had been developed on the communal
plank of "negative non Hinduism". The League leaders had
targeted Congress as
representative of Hindu interests.
The adversarial approach had become a matter of principle

and faith and was to be seen in operation at every turn and
twist of politics in the country. Days before India was

partitioned, as members of the Viceroy's executive council, the League's objective, as noted by one scholar was "to fight rather than cooperate" and its next step was to boycott the Constituent Assembly.6 With regard to the Princely States
which were to be forbidden by the Independence Act to declare
themselves independent and sovereign, "the League did not
show as much eagerness to persuade the states within the borders of Pakistan to join the new state as to dissuade Indian states from joining the Indian Union.... it was one of
their major tasks to prevent the consolidation of lndia, to

Balkanise it, if possible, in order to make the inevitable contrast
between India and Pakistan in size and population look

unimportant".T
oo
Other events relating to the partition and episodes

thereafter augmented Pakistan's suspicions and hatred against
lndia, which was identified as Hindu rather than secular by the League leadership. The communal massacres of 1947, creating a refugee influx, the division of assets notably the military stores between lndia and Pakistan after the departure of the British, the Indus water dispute, and the incorporation of Junagarh into India (November, 1947) and Hyderabad (September, 1948) were cited in Pakistan as instances of
malevolent intentions of India against Pakistan. The Radcliffe
Award, giving Gurdaspur, the district that provided Indian access to J&K state to India, had elicited severe condemnation from Jinnah himself. Following this award, he was to describe
Pakistan as moth-eaten and truncated. Some statements in India nostalgically hoping for reunification of the two countries or giving expression to the majority view in the Congress that partition was unfortunate, were seized upon in Pakistan to
claim that lndia would try to undo Pakistan. The Pakistani establishment relied on the haro-nation theory and lslam to
sustain a combative mood against India.
Jinnah might have hoped that the truncated and motheaten structure of Pakistan would be somewhat rectified by
the incorporation of J&K state into Pakistan but the simple logic behind his ordering a tribal incursion into the state, foltowed by infiltration of regular military troops, was the twonation theory. Being a Mustim majority princely entity, he
wanted to make sure that it became a part of Pakistan. As
Two-Nation Theory Convefts into lslamic
ldeology
67
has been noted earlier, the influential Muslim political leaders
in the state, like Sheikh Abdullah had no belief in such
theory. Accession of the state to India that inevitably followed,
became in the Pakistan eyes a fraud by India. The tensions,
which grew out of this forcible application of the two-nation

theory, set the tone of all future relationships between India
and Pakistan. The establishment in Pakistan felt that India had now also become a military threat to Pakistan. Frequent
recourse to lslam became one of the ways to combat the psychological pressures of such perceptions. There also commenced a drive to strengthen the Armed Forces, which have since grown into one of the largest in the world. lslam
and Armed Forces have thus become the bedrock of the foundation of Pakistan.
Moves Towards lslamisation
Pakistan, however, did not move full throttle towards

lslamisation until General Zia-ul-Haq arrived on the scene in 1977 as a military dictator. The earlier period marked a tug
of war between liberal politicians and western oriented bureauoatic-military hierarchy on one hand and the lslampasand orthodox parties and Ullemas on the other, over how much polity and governance could be lslamised. The former wished to keep the levers of power in their own hands but could not publicly go against the increasing lslamic demands
of the latter. The latter, using lslam as an instrument, were anxious to get a foothold in the structure of power. There
often was a compromise between the two, which allowed the
former's political, economic and social interests to remain intact by and large, while at the same time not obstructing growth of orthodoxy. A demand for declaring Qadianis as
non-Muslims in '1953 was thus not effectively countered by
the establishment. The first Pakistani Constitution of
1956
declared the country lslamic but gave no legislative or policy role to lslamic groups. Only a Muslim could be the Head of
the State but the Prime Minister was to be the fountainhead of all executive power. The constitution provided that no law
contrary to the injunctions of lslam could be enacted but took
away the power of the Judiciary to intervene if such a law actually got passed by the National Assembly.
Nevertheless, the role of the Ullema had increased in the
body politic of Pakistan and it became all too evident during the '1965 election campaigns for the office of the President
under the 1962 Constitution. The candidates were Fatima, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah's own sister, and General Ayub Khan who had seized power in 1957 and
fathered Pakistan's second Constitution of 1962. The elections
were indirect and the voters were the basic democrats,

members of the Village and Union Councils, known as basic
democracies. Fatima was supported by Jl, Ayub took recourse
to lslam to neutralise her. At his instances several lslamic

clerics issued fatwas against a woman becoming the head of
a state in an lslamic country. Ayub Khan's use of lslam for political purposes marked the beginnings of a relationship
Two-Nation Theory Convefts into lslamic ldeology
between the military as an institution and orthodox groups, which was to lead to greater lslamisation of the country. The Bangladesh crisis of 1971 saw a deepening of these
bonds. The orthodox Muslim groups of West Pakistan like the
Jl believed that the Bengali Muslim culture had been heavily influenced by the Bengali Hindus such as Rabindranath
Tagore and in the eyes of the former such influences were
unlslamic. These groups gave unstinted support to army action
in East Pakistan and participated in peace committees
to
pacifi7 people there. When Bangladesh eventually came into
existence, the Army was not blamed but the Bengali Hindus
who "used Bengali nationalism io punish innocent West

Pakistanis for sins they had not committed."s
Demand for Nizam-i-Mustafa

In the elections in 1970, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's
Party had emerged as the single largest party in West Pakistan, Bhutto had denounced the Tashkent Agreement
(January 1966) entered into between India and Pakistan, to
end the Indo-Pak war, and had resigned from his Foreign Minister's job in Ayub Khan's cabinet. Bhutto had vowed several times during his election campaigns to fight for a thousand years with India. His anti-lndianism and his social
slogan of 'Roti, Kapda and Makan' (bread, clothing and shelter)
were the secret of his success in the elections. After his assumption of power in the residual Pakistan (December
1971), Bhutto's hold on power started slipping away as the people's disenchantment started growing over his failure to redeem his promises of economic progress and social uplift and his preference for personalised rule over development of durable institutions. The religious groups mounted an assault
on him and his governance, calling for the introduction of

'Nizam-i-Mustafa', (administration of the Prophet). Though not lslamic by temperament, Bhutto sought to buy peace with the orthodox groups throulgh concessions. Qadianis were finally declared non-Muslims by law. Friday was made into a weekly holiday. Orthodox groups were allowed to get a foothold in
the educational system. General Zia-ul-Haq's military coup of 1977 ended the socialist experiment of Bhutto and introduced an era during which the political philosophy of lslamic orthodoxy was to make momentous advances. In seeking legitimacy for his rule, Zia leaned more and more towards values and
interpretation of lslamic tenets. Religious groups, particularly the Jl, saw this as an opportunity to penetrate into the power structure of the state through which they could influence the polity even more. Each served the most intense need of the
other and together they brought more obscurantism into

Pakistan than had ever existed before.
G
rowth of obscurantism
of course, ensured that the two-nation theory would remain in place and relations with India could not change for the better.
Their collaboration distanced modernity from Pakistan and led to an environment, which hampered the return of democracy to Pakistan post Zia.
Two-Nation Theory Converts into lslamic
ldeology
71
Rewriting of History Zia started with a missionary zeal and left no one in doubt that he considered lslamisation of Pakistan society as his
paramount duty. Objectives of education were fundamentally
altered and the history of Pakistan rewriften so that new doctrines could be imbibed from a tender age and the citizen grew with a proper ideological identity. Secular and liberal values were to be eliminated and substituted with lslamic ones. Under the 1981 directives from the University Grants Commission for the rewriting of history books, the students
were to be educated to accept without reservation, Pakistan as an lslamised state and lslam as its ideology. The themes
of the rewritten history textbooks were then generally the

following:
1. The 'ideology of Pakistan' both as
a historical force which
motivated the movement for Pakistan as well as its raisonde-etre.
2.
3.
The depiction of Jinnah as a man of orthodox religious views who sought the creation of a theocratic state.
A move to establish the Ullema as the genuine heroes of the Pakistan Movement.
4.
An emphasis on ritualistic lslam, together with a rejection of liberal interpretations of the religion and generation of communal antagonism."e
The 'ideology of Pakistan', still without a definition in any official document, thus came to be invested with the status of
national dogma. Jinnah had never used this phrase. The words
had been used for the first time in 1951 in the manifesto of
Jl, which had also clarified that efforts to include secularism or any other foreign ideology as tantamount to hifting at the
roots of Pakistan. Recognition of the phrase was not merely
an index of the influence of the Jl with the establishment; it also signified to what extent lslam was considered essential for the preservation of the prevailing state order.
The new history textbooks describe the two-nation theory as the original parent of ideology of Pakistan and the latter as
the inheritor of the mantle of the former. The two-nation theory,
therefore, still remains
a basic element in the thinking
processes of the establishment. The emphasis in the textbooks
on the ritualistic observances of lslam enabled them to underplay the social and egalitarian aspects of lslam.
Emphasis on lslam exacerbated feelings against non-Muslims such as the Hindus and the Qadianis. Lectures from the pulpits
were often laced with propaganda of communal hatred. The

Hindu was described as forever conspiring to seek domination.
The interests of both the religious orthodox and the military were served by sultably linking such images with India.
Zia's Priorities
On seizing power (July 1977) Zia had announced that elections
would be held within three months but his oriorities soon
Two-Nation Theory Convefts into lslamic
ldeology
73
changed to lslamising Pakistan. Many of his pronouncements
in this context would have done Maulana Maudoodi proud.

He categorically stated that lslamisation of Pakistani society had become his top priority and elections could not be held until this objective had been secured. He even challenged the concept of elections on adult suffrage and questioned the principle of the rule by majority if it failed to arrive at correct lslamic decisions. lf the minority view was correct according
to lslamic injunctions he wanted it to prevail over the majority

view. In this way, by indicating that Koran and Sunnah would
be his guides, he sought a divine right to rule, unmindful of the temporal requirements of contemporary political thought
and domestic needs. Zia took his lslamic zeal to defining a new role for the Armed Forces. He called them protectors of
the ideological frontiers as well, not just territorial frontiers, since Pakistan was created on the basis of the two-nation theory and its ideology made them soldiers of lslam.1o
After the declaration of the Objectives Resolution in March
1949 that lslam would be the backdrop of constitutional values,
the progress of lslam in constitutional provisions had been creeping and halting. The first Constituent Assembly had recommended a committee of five Ullemas to monitor lslamic
applications. The first Constitution (1956), enacted after ten
years of deliberations, declared Pakistan to be an lslamic

Republic. While also declaring that no laws repugnant to Koran
and Sunnah would be enacted, it provided no specific mechanism to ensure this. The second Constitution (1962)
74
dropped 'lslamic' from the title of the Republic and created an
advisory Council of lslamic ldeology to enable "Muslims of

Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the principles
and concepts of lslam". The Republic was again made lslamic
through the first Amendment of 1963, in deference to the

pressure brought by the Ullemas. The third Constitution (1973),
enacted during Bhutto's period, for the first time made lslam the state religion, which was an acknowledgement of socialist Bhutto's compromise with the forces of religion. All members
of the Council of Ministers had to be Muslims. An lslamic Council was to review existing laws to ensure that none
repugnant to Koran or Sunnah remained on the statute books.
Zia's programme added great substance to the lslamisation process, but only in specified fields, which largely interested the orthodox elements. Shariat benches were set up in each provincial High Court with an appellate bench in the Supreme Court in '1979 but the provincial benches were replaced by a
Federal Shariat Court in 1980. Four Hudood Ordinances were
issued prescribing Koranic punishments like amputation,

stoning to death, etc. for offences like theft and adultery. Higher representation was given to the Ullema in the Council
of lslamic ideology. Prayer breaks were officially introduced

in government offices. An lslamic university was brought into
existence in lslamabad. The educational system was

reorganised, as already mentioned. Women were subjected
to a dress code and discouraged from participation in sports, stage activities, etc. A compulsory tax of Zakat was made
Two-Nation Theory Convefts into Islamic
ldeology
75
applicable to certain investments. The Ahmedias, already declared non-Mustims by Bhutto's regime, were now prohibited
from calling their religious places as Masjids or using Koranic verses or lslamic symbols. In June 1988' a Sharia ordinance
was issued declaring Sharia to be the supreme source of laws and 'the grand norm for guidance for policy making'
The Objectives Resolution had envisaged two classes of citizens for Pakistan, Muslims and non-Muslims, not with identical rights. Zia's policy of lslamisation which eventually converted into one of Shariatisation divided Muslims also' leading to sectarianism and large scale sectarian violence, apart from the targeting of the non-Muslims' The Sunnis and the Shias established their own militant organisations, Sipahe-Sahiban and Sipah-e-Mohammed to fight each other' Now
the Sunnis are demanding declaration of Shias as
non-
Muslims. The Zakat funding of Madrassas in Punjab increased from Rs.9.4 million in 1980-81 to Rs.68.96 million in 1986-
87, their number going up from 636 to 2084 in the same

period. A student of 5th class, apart from knowledge of Koran was expected to state clearly the differences between a Muslim
and a Hindu. The pictorial aid for teaching alphabets at the primary level had 'kaf and 'zoye' standing for Kafir and Zalim respectively, with illustrative pictures of a Hindu Pandit and
turbaned Sikh respectively. The virus of hatred was not only kept flourishing, but its scope was also being extended' The Blasphemy Law against religious minorities was another benchmark in this murkY exercise'
Zia's policies have made the orthodox groups an integral part of the political parameters of the country even though their public support has not grown. The civilian governments
that followed Zia's regime have had to go along with the

Shariatised polity. During her second stint as Prime Minister (1993 October to 1996 November) Benazir Bhutto had tried
to amend the Blasphemy Law but the effort had to
be
abandoned following intense opposition. General Pawez Musharraf who seized power through a coup on October 12,
1999 twice had to bow down to pressures from the religious
groups, first when he withdrew the amendments to this very

law, and second, when he amended the Provincial Constitution
Order 2000, by restoring all the lslamic features of the 1973
Constitution that had been dropped after his coup. His directives to the Madrassas to fill up a questionnaire seeking
statistical data have been treated with contempt, suggesting that lslamic might is now stronger thanthe might of the Armed Forces in Pakistan. The presence in neighbouring Afghanistan of the Taliban
who accept no moderatibn and who have spawned a new form of lslamic extremism constitute a danger to all countries in the region. The Taliban believe that their Jehad brought down to its knees one super power, the Soviet Union. They
have strong links with fundamentalist organisations in pakistan
and together they dream of creating a new Ummah across the world, much in the image of what the Muslims achieved in the 7th and 8th centuries. In 1988, the Taliban Supremo
Two-Nation Theory Convefts into Islamic
ldeology
77
Mullah Omar had declared support for Jehad in Kashmir.
General Musharraf has echoed the same thought later, converting Jehad over Kashmir into state policy. Volunteers
for Jehad are training at several centres, the most notable of which are Darool-ul-uloom, Haqqania of Maulana Samiul Huq and Muridke, head quarters of Lashkar-e-Toiba. Samiul Huq would like to lay his hands on a nuclear bomb if he can get it, no doubt to carry forward his aim of a Muslim International through an lslamic bomb. The animus, nurtured by the twonation theory, has been taken to monumental heights by its succeeding Avatar, the ldeology of Pakistan.
Nores
1. 2. 3. 4, 5. 6. 7. 8.
Fatahyab Ali Khan: 'Objective of Pakistan Movement', lslamabad Daily, Muslim, May 4, 1984, as quoted by Saroosh ffiani, 'The Progressive lslamic Movemenf', ed. Asghar Khan, p.62. From a broadcast to USA, recorded in Feb 1948, quoted in F Ali Khan, 'Objective' .
3. K Bahadur: 'The Jamait-l-lslami' of Pakistan, Lahore, Progressive
Books, 1978, p. 50, as quoted by Abbas Rashid, 'Pakistan, The ldeological Dimension, p. 83, ed. Asghar Khan. Ardeshir Cowasji: Frontier Post, July 4-5, 2000, as quoted in Pot of August 1, 2000, p. 3160. Feroze Ahmed: 'Pakisfa n's Problems of National lntegration', p. 229, ed. Asghar Khan.
Percivaf Spear: 'A History of lndia'p. 235, as quoted by Blinkenberg,
p. 44.
Sisir Gupta: op cit, p.45, as quoted by Blinkenberg p. 52. Azhar Hamid: et al 'Mutalliyah-l-Pakistan', (lslamabad, Allama lqbal Open University, 1983), p. 32, as quoted in'lslam, Politics and Slate', ed. Asghar Khan, p. '175.
78
Reassessrng Pakistan Pawez Amir Ali Hoodbhoy and Abdul Hamid Nayyar: 'Rewiting History of Pakistan', p. 165, Asghar Khan et al.
Press Ltd. 2000. o. 181.
9.
10. Hasan-Askari Rizvi: 'Military, State and Society Pakistan', Macmillan
The Other Pillar:

The Armed Forces
The Vacuum at the Start
The Muslim League whose campaign led to the birth of

Pakistan could hardly be called a grass roots party until after 1940 when the Pakistan Resolution was adopted The League might have operated at the national level before 1940 but its mass base developed only in the 1940s when several Muslim politicians from the Muslim majority provinces also joined its ranks. In the short period available to them before Pakistan became a reality, they had neither been able to create a party structure going down to the people of all regions nor
create a vision of Pakistan in terms of
socio-politico-
economic entity. In a sense they were not ready for Pakistan when it came and had no framework drawn out to deal with
the popular aspirations that surfaced. The ill health and death in September 1948' of founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah, prevented Pakistan from benefiting
by the constitutional and western liberal values, which he had
cherished. The assassination in October 1951 of Liaqat Ali

Khan, his second in command who also had a national stature,
amounted to the removal of a benign presence that would
have worked for establishing durable representative and participatory institutions and processes in the new country.
The lesser leaders who succeeded them and who were mosfly
drawn from the feudal classes in Punjab were not wedded to such ideals. This environment suited the bureaucratic military complex which was the inheritor of the British legacy of colonial culture
and which had remained intact in the post independence milieu. lt constituted the steel framework on which rested the real responsibilities of governance while the political class feuded in the Constituent Assembly, on such questions as
the form of government, role of lslam, parity between the two wings of Pakistan, issues relating to federalism, etc. The more
the politicians from various regions quarrelled among

themselves, the more grew the strength of this g1oup. Over time, the feudal aristocracy of Punjab and the commercial
and industrial elite also allied with them to safeguard their own economic and other interests.
None of the Muslim intellectuals or political stalwarts who had contributed to the build up of the pakistan idea before partition had examined the question whether the existence of
a common identity as Muslims would prove sufficient
to
The Other Pillar: The Armed Forces
81
obliterate separate cultural consciousness of the same Muslim
masses and help evolve a sense of political brotherhood,

weeding out parochial considerations. Even a cursory look at the history of lslamic people will show that religion was never
an adequate vehicle to bridge the gaps dividing people on

the basis of their historical experiences, traditions, languages and culture. The lslamic concept of one Ummah had ceased to be a practical reality after the Ummaids in AD 650 splintered
into different political units. Fundamentalists like the lkhwanul
Mussalmeen had been dreaming about uniting the Muslim
world again by rejecting class differences, different political

structures and separate cultural awareness but the modern Muslim is unwilling to accept that the state and religion are one. After the adoption of the Objectives Resolution by the ConstituentAssembly in 1949, conferring on lslam the role of
an anchor, the Ullema class had hoped that in due course they would be able to establish their hegemony over the state
on the strength of their lslamic credentials. The bureaucratic military complex, with their values inherited from the British,
in their early phase, would only accept that the prevailing social environment called for an interface between politics and religion but they could in n0 way be considered synonymous with each other. Thus evolved a role for them, to keep the conservatives of religion at bay while ensuring
that the absence of a sense of Pakistani nationalism did not lead to the ruin of the state"
dz
Military Becomes the Key Factor

The first decade of Pakistan's existence was marked by great
political confusion and turmoil. The Muslim League, which

became the ruling party after independence had leaders in
the government who hailed by and large from provinces left

behind in India. They failed to strike roots in the new state of Pakistan. No viable alternative political leadership evolved. The available political leaders seemed to display little respect
for parliamentary values and were disinclined to close their differences to speedily work out an agreed constitution for
Pakistan. Inevitably, the bureaucracy acquired an ascending
role in policy and decision-making, supported from the sidelines by the military. In 1954 the Constituent Assembly
was dissolved by Governor General Ghulam Mohammed, a
former civil servant, when the draft constitution proposed that
the governor general should only be a figurative Head of

State, as in India. A second Constituent Assembly was called into session, which gave Pakistan its first Constitution in 1956.
Political management in the period till then had increasingly

come into the hands of the bureaucratic military establishment
that functioned more or less in an authoritarian manner with
no respect for democratic norms. The period 1947-58 saw a change of seven Prime Ministers and eight Cabinets. But
between January 1951 and 1961 there had been only one Commander-in-Chief Mohammed Ayub Khan, who
in
1958
displaced lskander Miza as the President and abolished the
1956 Constitution. He was also the Defence Minister from
83
October 1954 to August 1955. Till the seizure of power by

Ayub Khan, the larger corps of officers and men of the Pakistan
Armed Forces had maintained a non-political but disciplined and professional image. The military was also by and large
a cohesive force, with its personnel hailing mainly from Punjab
and to a lesser extent from the Pakhtoons. The mindless political squabbling of the groups jockeying for power had
corrupted the political processes and created an impression
in the people's mind that their welfare and survival of the state could only be guaranteed by the Armed Forces. The
Press, independent politicians and even some army circles
had started whispering for the Army to take over directly the governance of the country. In the popular view, the Armed Forces thus, had already become the main pillar of strength
of the state. Moreover, the Armed Forces constituted the best-
organised institution in the country. With Kashmir having

become a live issue between India and Pakistan in September 1947, the ruling elite had allocated large funds to the Armed
Forces each year to maintain a strong defence profile. Ayub's military takeover was intended to establish political
and economic order in the country and he went about the

tasks with a military man's ethos of authority, discipline and hierarchy. The military became central to his administration.
The bureaucracy felt obliged to co-operate, reversing the

pecking order in which the two had functioned till then. The
system Ayub created, the basic democracies, under his 1962
Constitution, was designed to establish a strong Presidency
84
with "controlled democracy" in which political dialogue, process
and participation were of secondary importance. Ayub Khan had been disillusioned by the political theatre enacting every
now and then in the Constituent Assembly in the early 1950s
and had come to believe that principles of Western style

democracy were unsuitable to bring about social and economic
development. His system too in the long run, failed to receive popular acceptability since it proved inadequate to deal with
the political and economic aspirations of the different

categories of general masses, such as the political parties,
students, professionals, poor and unemployed. But in the
meanwhile, the military had been able to establish a dominating voice in all the core policy and decision making
mechanisms, especially in the strategic field.
The military had been the true strength of Ayub Khan,
and he took care to ensure that it developed a stake in governance and became partial to the system being developed, turning a blind eye towards dissatisfaction in the civil society as it started emerging from the inadequacies of
the 1962 Constitution. The Constitution of 1962 provided that
for the first 20 years after its commencement, the defence

portfolio would always be held by a senior military officer who
had been a lieutenant general or equivalent. A system of oermanent secondment of defence personnel to the Civil
Service of Pakistan began in 1960. Though this practice was
discontinued in 1963, another process of placing senior retiring
officers from the three services in public corporations or
85
autonomous bodies or in ambassadorial assignments was initiated. The system of granting agricultural land for service
rendered was continued with greater vigour. The military was
given a role in socio economic s'ectors through utilisation of
their services and resources in five-year plan projects.
A Temporary Eclipse in 1969 in a Spate of Agitations

Ayub had to go because while he kept his supporters in uniform in good humour, he was unable to provide to the
larger masses of the people distributive justice and free political
participation and expression. His exit and succession amounted to another coup by the military. Under the 1962 Constitution, on the President's resignation, the Speaker of the National Assembly took over temporarily as Acting
President, with election of the new President being completed
in 90 days. The Army Brass decided, in violation of
the
constitution, that General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, the
Army Chief should succeed Ayub as the President. Martial

Law was back with Yahya Khan assuming the Presidency on
25 March 1969 and the military becoming the focus of power.
Yahya Khan, abrogated the constitution, promised reforms and restoration of democratic and civilian rule, but the deepseated alienation of Bengali East Pakistan proved to be his
Waterloo.
In the elections for the National Assembly held under the
Legal Framework order of March 1970, the Awami League
86
under Mujibur Rehman with its six-point formula had emerged
with a clear majority (167 out of 313). The Bengalis of East
Pakistan, though in
a majority in Pakistan had
been
consistently deprived of political, economic and cultural rights

by the West Wing, which had the reigns of power in its hands.
The six-point formula was aimed at restoring the balance and removing the oppression by the West. The military wanted some modifications in this formula before transfer of power to
Mujibur Rehman, who, as the new Prime Minister, would have also had a decisive voice in the framing of the new constitution.
The military felt that if Mujibur did not agree to some

accommodation, military power could be used against him.
Use of troops to tame the Bengalis converted their opposition
into a full-fledged civil war, resulting in the emergence in

1971of East Pakistan as an independent nation, Bangladesh.
The debacle aroused resentment in the rank and file of the

military, forcing Yahya Khan and the ruling clique of generals
to quit. Power was transferred to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto whose

Pakistan Peoples' Party had swept the polls in West Pakistan
in the elections to the National Assembly.

The demoralisation brought about by these events in the
military and the diminution in the public esteem for them enabled Bhutto to establish civilian primacy over them. The
new Constitution of 1973 made its subversion or abrogation
by unconstitutional means or force an act of high treason punishable with life imprisonment or death. Despite these
factors, Bhutto was unable to minimise the role of the Armed
The Other Pillar The Armed Forces
87
Forces in the system. With the vivisection of Pakistan, its defence needs were seen to have grown, requiring the
strengthening of the clout of the military.
A secret
nuclear
programme was launched in which the support of the military
leadership was crucial. Bhutto also relied heavily upon the military for dealing with serious law and order problems such
as the tribal nationalist insurgency in Baluchistan in 1973 and tribal uprising in Dir in 1976. However, Bhutto started gradually
losing his standing and goodwill with the people and the military as he turned more and more to personalised and
autocratic rule, denying political opposition legitimate space to function democratically. The creation by him of a new paramilitary force, Federal Security Force (1972)' was seen as a counterforce to the military. The rigged general elections
ol
1977 in which the PPP won 155 out of 200 seats for the
National Assembly led to a wide ranging anti Bhutto agitation during which opposition groups appealed directly to the Armed
Forces to topple Bhutto from office. Beleaguered, Bhutto

himself took to consulting the military brass on political matters.
The ultimate question again became one of the legitimacy of the Government, and the military was being made the arbitrator by both the sides. The deepening crisis had aroused the top brass to consider whether a solution other than another military
intervention was in sight. General Zia-ul-Haq, the Army Chief,
linally decided that a military take over was the only answer. He struck on July 5, 1977, paving'way for the third military regime of Pakistan. The coup also ignored the provisions
88
relating to treason in the prevailing constitution, thereby demonstrating once again the absolute irrelevance of the constitution for the Armed Forces. Military - The Bedrock The military remained the bedrock of Zia's regime, which
marked the longest Martial Law reign (July 1977 to December
1985) in Pakistan so far. Even after Martial Law withdrawal,
he remained President and Chief of Army Staff till his death (August 19BB). Even though a fagade of civilianisation was
created after the withdrawal of Martial Law, a mix of senior
generals and top bureaucrats ruled the country. A large number of military officials were inducted into the governing
system to augment the military's supremacy. National security
policy, particularly that relating to India, Afghanistan and nuclear matters, came under their direct control.
The military's move into a more privileged status continued
with Zia contriving to give it an expanded role as protectors of Pakistan's ideological frontiers and lslamic identity. He felt that Pakistan's creation on the basis of the two-nation theory made them soldiers of lslam with a duty to safeguard the
country from internal and external dangers. The military brass
wanted the concept given a constitutional standing so that it could legitimately participate in decision-making and intervene
in the event of a national crisis. More military officers were diverted to civilian positions of influence under government
RO
control. The policy of distributing agriculture land and housing
plots continued with greater vigour to perpetuate the feeling
that a military government was good for one and all in the military. Besides, the system of placement of military officers
in civilian jobs in the governmental sectors, autonomous

bodies. etc., secured for it wide penetration in all walks of life.
Today the Armed Forces directly control vast commercial and industrial interests also. The Army Fauji Foundation has become the largest industrial group in the country. lt runs schools, colleges, hospitals, and joint ventures with foreign companies. The Army Welfare Centre operates sugar and woollen mills, cement plants, projects in power generation, petrochemicals, aviation, pharmaceuticals, agro sectors, etc.,
financial institutions, insurance companies and a host of small-
scale businesses. The Air Force and Navy have foundations
of their own which operate separate strings of businesses. Besides, the Ministry of Defence runs many defence
production units like ordnance and arms producing factories,
aeronautical complexes, etc., producing components for aircraft and other material. The Army Chief also has under him many service providing groups like telecommunications, border roads, frontier works, etc. Recently, a new opening was given to the army personnel in WAPDA to oversee power distribution. General Parvez Mushanaf who carried out a military coup against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October
12, lggg has carried out army penetration into civil administration to its utmost limits. There is now an army
90
Reassess/ng Pakistan
supervisor to monitor the performance of every major civilian

unit.
Backstage Control of the Military

And yet, when Zia-ul-Haq was killed in an air crash in August 1988, his successor as Army Chief, General A2al Beg and his senior colleagues did not wish a government of a military
man to take over. The experience of the three military regimes
(of Ayub, Yahya and Zia) had brought home the reality that
a military led government offered no panacea for curing the

basic problems of political, economic and social development
of the nation which had plagued it during civilian rule and

solutions, however imperfect, must be sought through a system
of participative institutions and processes, which the framework
of elective democracy alone ensured. Beg and his top brass were pragmatic enough to accept the limits of possibilities of
growth of political institutions under a military regime and were no longer desirous of asserting military supremacy directly in the governance of the country. The constitutional
processes under the amended (by Zia) 1973 Constitution were
allowed to work but there was never any doubt where power
resided. The understanding was that so long as the

professional and corporate interests of the Armed Forces were
not threatened, a fagade of civilian supremacy could be allowed to be maintained.

Between 1988 and '1999, four general elections were held.
These elections threw up four elected Prime Ministers, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif twice each. These elections

contributed to the development of civil society and enhanced
its expectations but the political leadership did not again

measure up to their expectations. The military leaders were
much disappointed at the continued failure of the civilians to
ensure effective governance. Their own conviction grew that without their monitoring, the turmoil in the polity would remain
uncontrolled. The conference of Corps Commanders became
an important institution within the military, functioning like a politburo, which kept an eagle eye on the economic and political management of the government in power. The Army
Chief emerged as the most important member of the Troika' a term coined to refer to the group of three most powerful personages in Pakistan, the other two being the President and the Prime Minister. The Troika provided a forum for consensus building between civil and military perspectives on all problematic issues facing the decision makers' The
Army Chiefs was always the dominating voice. In the removal
of the four Prime Ministers mentioned earlier, the role of the Army Chief was the most decisive. In this period, two Presidents also had to go, Ghulam lshaqque Khan (1993) and Faroukh Leghari (1998); in their exit too the Army Chief had an important role
The never-ending fragility of the party system created a dilemma for the military leadership. Since the constitution conferred no constitutional role to them to participate in the
exercise of power, they could do so only from the shadows.
92
In October 1998 the then Army Ghief, General Jehangir Karamat, with the agreement of the senior commanders mooted a suggestion for the creation of a National Security
Council, backed by competent advisers and a think tank of experts for evolving credible policies to tackle the ongoing
national problems in the political, economic and security zones.
Such an arrangement would give the military a direct and

legitimate voice in the decision making at the highest level
and would do away with the fiction that the military in Pakistan
was subordinate to the civilian government. Nawaz Sharif, in
his second term as Prime Minister, with nearly 65 per cent seats in the National Assembly, had become the most powerful
Prime Minister that Pakistan ever had. He had already had a
President (Faroukh Leghari),
a Chief Justice of
Pakistan
(Sajjad Ali Shah) and a Chief of Staff (Navy) quit their offices
for one reason or other. Karamat chose to resign rather than create
standoff when Nawaz Sharif disapproved of his
statement. General Parvez Musharraf was appointed the new
Chief. With his successes, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto earlier, Nawaz turned to a personalised style of governance, packing
loyalists into key positions. This style took little notice of the ground situation that military sensitiveness had to be factored
into important decisions or its independence in in-house

matters such as postings, promotions and transfers had to be
respected. Nawaz got disillusioned with Musharraf also when
he resisted the former's efforts to dominate the military

apparatus. He tried to dismiss him in October 1999 but this
time he had overestimated his strength. There was
an
immediate institutional response from the military. On October
12, 1999, he himself got sacked through an army coup, the
fourth in Pakistani history. Nawaz's removal once again demonstrated that the military would not tolerate any compromise with what it saw as its legitimate domain of
supervening interests.
Today the corporate and institutional interests of the military have reached such a peak that any attack on them
from any direction invites an immediate counter-attack by their
top leadership. In a real sense, the military in Pakistan has become ungovernable by the civilians. Three Constitutions,
of 1956, 1962, and 1973, have tried different formulae and political engineering to give democracy to Pakistan,
subordinating the military to civilian instltutions and authority
but each of these got subverted. Under the doctrine of necessity, the military has demonstrated that it accepts no
fetters on its supremacy, no limits to its course of action and no questioning of its judgment. The civilians, therefore, play
second fiddle to the Armed Forces. The military, thus, considers no one within the country as worthy of its respect.
lf at all, it will pay heed only to external operators that control
agencies, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as Pakistan's economic well being has become highly dependent on the doles it receives from them; or suppliers of arms, nuclear material, etc. This ascendancy now gives the
military an overriding veto in determining national security
94
policies and the military prevail even if the civilian leadership
has reservations. The Supreme Court has given Musharraf three years to
restore full constitutional rule and return Pakistan to democracy. This time, a new form of democracy is likely to return, a democracy with a constitutional status given to the
Armed Forces, legitimising their salience into governance and perhaps acknowledging the de facto veto they exercise.
lslamisation of the Military

The military personnel inherited by Pakistan on independence
were not ideologically motivated except that the Mohajirs among them chose to serve in Pakistan like other Mohajirs
chose to make the new state their home. The officers in this
class constituted 12 per cent of the whole. Like the other Mohajir class of 1947, they harboured a certain animus against
the Hlndus. The post independence recruited officer class

could not escape being affected by the pulls and pressures
operatlng in the contemporary scenario. According to Dr Akmal
Hussain "during the mid 1960s and '1970s the social origin of the officer corps shifted towards the petite bourgeoisie in the
urban areas and in the countryside. This shift in the class origins of the officer corps was accompanied by increasing
ideological factionalism in terms of a fundamentalist religious
ethos on the one hand and a liberal left wing ethos on the othe/'.r Two events, Pakistan's defeat in the Bangladesh War
of
1971 and Zia's rule between 1977 and 1988, gave a
tremendous push to the fundamentalist orientation.

The demoralisation caused by the defeat made the soldier
look inwards to fathom its causes and generally find solace in the explanations of the obscurantist. Orthodox groups like
the Jamait-e-lslami and the Tabligh Jamaat were thus able to
spread their influence in the Armed Forces. When Zia appeared on the scene, his search for legitimacy drew him towards lslamisation and an organic alignment with political
forces with lslam high on their agenda, Zia allowed lslamic propaganda among the military personnel by such groups
and was even said to have permitted secret Jl cells to be established in the Armed Forces. His decision to send young
officers to the universities to study, where also the
Jl
had
been given a free hand, accentuated their lslamic orientation. Two other factors aided the surge towards such propensities.
The '1979 lranian revolution provided the additional edge to the zeal of such people. The struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union was directed on Pan lslamic lines, creating a sense of lslamic unity. Personnel from the Armed Forces were deeply involved in this struggle and when the Soviets
withdrew finally, the victory was celebrated as a successful Jehad. the technique of which could also be utilised in the
J&K state and elsewhere. Zia was always expressive of his convictions about the salience of lslam in the life and thinking of the soldier. ln a
foreword to Brigadier SK Malik's book, Ihe Koranic Concept
96
of War, he said, "The professional soldier in a Muslim Army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim State, cannot become
'professional' if in all his activities he does not take on 'the colour of Allah"'.'? Dealing with an enemy is thus, not just a professional duty;
it has to be also an lslamic duty for
Pakistani soldier. lf India is to be identified as an enemy, for professional purposes, Zia's exhortation is to identify India as
an enemy from the lslamic angle also.

lslamic teachings form a regular part of the curriculum of defence training institutions and Staff Colleges in Pakistan.
Post Zia military leadership has worried over excessive commitment withirt the Armed Forces to lslam distorting objective professionalism while some others worry over
creeping secularism through westernised thinking and

doctrines. But all emphasise that core values of lslam should
be maintained. Colonel Abdul Qayyum who has given lectures
at the Staff College, Quetta, defines it very simply.
The
Pakistani must not be merely "a professional soldier, engineer,
or doctor" but must use this (western education) to become "Muslim soldiers, Muslim engineers, Muslim doctors, Muslim officers and Musllm men".3 A secular approach is ruled out forever. lslamic groups such as the Jamait-e-lslami on the other hand want "a joint front of the lslamists and the Armed
Forces against the common enemy of lslam - a coalition of Hindu-Jewish and Western imperialism...." and rail "against
those who want to sideline lslamic officers or belittle the lslamic
character of the garrison".a
Animus Against India

In the debate between faith and professionalism, faith is thus
placed higher. For the Muslim of Pakistan, as seen earlier,
the Hindu is the natural enemy. The land of Hindus thus becomes ideologically a land of adversaries, a permanent enemy for its large forces. A conversation with a colonel in
charge of training at a regimental centre reported by Stephen Cohen graphically illustrates this point:
"Q: What do you teach the recruits about potential enemies?
A: As it happens, we don't have to teach them anything,

everybody in the country knows who is the enemy! The threat, who is the enemy we don't teach them this in the syllabus but somehow they all know!
Q: What about the Afghans or Russian Muslim troops?
A:
Oh! There is no question, we will go wherever we have
to - Arabia, lran, anywhere - they have taken an oath, that is not a problem, but of course they would go more readily and happily to the other direction. As for the Russians, well, they [the other ranks] would have no hesitation; perhaps fighting the Afghans there would be
some, but against the Russians there will be no hesitation.
We all know they are atheists and, again, we group them
with the Hindus. ......"5 Distrust of the Hindu is fundamental and monumental.
For the Pakistani military all Indians are Hindus. The existence
OR
of Muslim Indians is taken note of only by the lSl for using

them as fodder for their operations of intelligence, subversion and sabotage. How fundamental this distrust is can be judged
from the following quotation from a Staff College course

document relating to Pakistani analysis of Indian nuclear plans:
"ln no field is the inquiry into Indian intentions
more
revealing of the Indian mind than in the field of her nuclear
development. The official line that lndia is developing her
nuclear power potential for peaceful uses only. is well known. The instinctive Pakistani reaction to it, shaped by
centuries of close association with the Hindu mind from
Chanakya to Pannikar and Subrahmanyam, is equally
well known."6
Rigid images about the Hindus had been present in the psyche of so called Muslim martial classes i.e. the Punjabis
and Pathans from pre partition days. They believed themselves
to be the descendants of the conquerors from West
and
Central Asia who had established Muslim rule in India and whom they considered to be superior to the indigenous people
on account of the perceived exaltedness of their religion. The personnel of the Pakistan military on the formation of Pakistan
had carried the baggage of these concepts. The teaching material of military training institutions reflected this. Before the defeats of 1965 and 1971 a general conviction existed that a Pakistani soldier was more than a match to ten or so
Hindu soldiers.
National Security Doctrine

The military doctrine of Pakistan has been shaped largely by
concerns about India. Maoist guerrilla warfare has been studied in the context of Kashmir and the current proxy war
there would seem to be a refinement of some Maoist concepts. Defeats in the 1 965, 1 971 , and 1999 (Kargil) wars have given
rise to a sense of collective hatred in the Armed Forces, which has augmented age-old misjudgements about India.
Generals of today are the captains and majors indoctrinated
with religious passion during Zia days. lt is difficult for them
to come to terms with India.

The range and scale of operations of lSl, a wholly military
controlled outfit, provide an adequate testimony about the military's ultimate intentions. Their target is no longer the
territorial integrity of India; lSl targets its social, religious and cultural integrity as well. The lSl masterminded the guerrilla campaign in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, forcing it to withdraw. Their trainees of yesteryears are the Taliban of
today, ruling over Afghanistan with an lslamic zeal unmatched
in recent times. Their blueprint for India seeks to wrest Kashmir
out of the Indian Union through a proxy war, destroy its secular
fabric and balkanise its polity. The two-nation theory and the
ideology of lslam have brought Pakistan to a point where destruction of lndia seems to have become the unstated national security doctrine and preoccupation of the ruling
military establishment.
100
The Nuclear Policy In this context, the possession of nuclear weapons by the Pakistani Armed Forces becomes a matter of grave concern
for India. Given their psyche there can be no certainty that they will never be tempted to use these against India, irrespective of the consequences which could follow for
Pakistan. Any scenario can serve as an excuse or be treated
as a provocation. There is a Pakistani acceptance that at

least on three occasions in the last two decades the leadership there had examined the use of nuclear potential against India.i
On a number of occasions, Pakistani leadership has demonstrated a propensity towards irrational military behaviour. Kargil was the latest exhibition of such foolhardiness. lt showed that existential deterrence did not operate as a check. On the contrary, the military strategic
planners in Pakistan went by the calculations that the Indian policy of no first use would deter India from crossing the Line
of Control or the international border. This was sheer reckless
nuclear blackmail on the part of Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear programme is lndia specific. Leaders of that country have not hesitated from saying that they reserve the right of a nuclear
strike against India under certain circumstances and that is why they do not subscribe to the pdnciple of no first use. A
small coterie of people there decides on such issues without
recourse to wider consultations or true understanding of where
Pakistani interests actually lie. lt will be futile to try to analyse what those circumstances might be when a Pakistani nuclear
101
bomb might be launched. Past behaviour, a deep sense of insecurity and the two-nation theory make a rational judgement on Pakistani future behaviour impossible to arrive at. This is
one fit case for the worst-case scenario to determine policy
options
Pakistan is always vainly searching for balance of power
with India but it is refusing to recognise, what other countries

of the world are now coming to recognise, namely that India
does not try to change this balance, it is built on the geographical realities of the subcontinent.
lf the former Chief of Army Staff, General Karamat is to be believed "no real peace process has ever been started
between lndia and Pakistan which could decide against a military option and in favour of peace."8 This statement
underlines that the Tashkent Declaration, Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration all stand rubbished in the eyes of the Pakistani military. No wonder Kargil occurred and may recur
again, all because the two-nation theory admits of no solution
of Kashmir unless it is on terms favourable to Pakistan.
Nores
Akmal Hussain: 'Pakistan, The Cisis of the Sfate' p. 208, ed. Asghar Khan 'lslam, Politics and State'.
Stephen Cohen: 'Ihe Pakistan Army',1998 edition, Oxford, Pakistan
Paperbacks, Karachi, p. 86. Abdul Qayyum:'On Striving to be a Muslim', Lahore lslamic book centre, 1978, as quoted by Stephen Cohen, Ihe Pakistan Army, p.
95-96.
lmtiaz Alam: News, Nov. 1 , 2000 as quoted in Pot, November 16, 2O00. o. 4722. Stephen Cohen:
o
'Ihe Pakistan Army'p.4Q.
Command and Staff College, Quetta, Staff Course: 'Military System:
lndia', quoted by Stephen Cohen 'Ihe Pakistan Amy' p.78.

Agha Shahi, Air Marshall Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Abdul Sattar: Ihe /Vews, Oct. 5, 1998. These high personages, policy makers of yester years, refer to three episodes of mid 1980 (Kahuta), 1987 (Brasstacks)
and 1990 (which brought Robert Gates, US Dy. National Security

Adviser, to India and Pakistan) as illustrating the value of Pakistani nuclear capability. Sattar is now Foreign Minister in Musharrafs
cabinet.
Dawn: Od.8, 2000 as reported in Pot, November 13, 2000,
p.
4675. General Karamat was addressing Pakistan Professional Forum
at Dubai on 'Peace in South Asia, Opportunities and Challenges'

on October 26,
2OOO.
The Insoluble Equation:

lndo-Pak Relations
Pakistan's Hunger for Kashmir
The two-nation theory has mired Indo-Pak relationship into an intractable problem in Kashmir. More than a half-century
has gone by after independence and four wars fought during this period but no real progress has taken place towards a
solution.
The Pakistani case is that the alphabet K in the original concept of Pakistan, to be created on the basis of two-nation theory, had stood for Kashmir and, therefore, it must get included in the territory of Pakistan. However the British Government, at the time of division of India, had not made the principle of two-nation theory applicable to the princely
states. With the lapse of the British paramountcy, the choice before the rulers of these states was to accede either to India
or to Pakistan, depending upon geographical compulsions
104
and requirement of the welfare of the subjects of these states.
The states did not have the option of automatic recognition
as independent under international law if the instrument of

accession was not signed. The instrument of accession signed
by the ruler was the legal cover for the transfer of the sovereignty over the state to India or Pakistan, as the case
might be.
The Maharaja of J&K signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan on August 15, 1947 to preserve the status quo as
it existed till then, pending other arrangements to be finalised.
The Maharaja proposed a similar relationship with India but India wanted time to think it over. Pakistan, meanwhile, had
other plans. lts leadership was aware that the doctrine of two nations had few followers among the Muslims of J&K state
and, therefore, the fact of Kashmir being a Muslim majority area was not compelling enough for the Maharaja to decide
in favour of accession to Pakistan. The standstill agieement
notwithstanding, in the mode of raiders from across the Khyber
Pass in the earlier centuries, Pakistan incited tribals from its Western regions to infiltrate into the state and capture it by force for Pakistan. By October 20, 1947 two thousand tribals had entered Muzaffarabad and by October 27, they were in
Baramulla. The tribal incursion had already made the Maharaja
approach India with an offer of accession so that military support could be made available to the state to fight the infiltrants. The Instrument of Accession was acceoted on October 27, 1947. Since accession came under abnormal
The lnsoluble Equation: lndo-Pak Relations
105
circumstances, India on its own offered to settle the question of confirming accession by a reference to the people, after
Kashmir had been cleared of the raiders. lt is to be noted that
this offer was not a legal requirement of accession, which had acquired independent legal validity once the Instrument
of Accession, was accepted by lndia. With accession the J&K
state became an integral inviolable part of India.
The Indian military was now sent to J&K to drive out the raiders. Some Pakistani soldiers, on leave, were already in
the state fighting along with the raiders but in April 1948, the
Pakistan Government decided formally to introduce their troops
into Kashmir, to take on the lndian troops which had been making headway. Senior Pakistan military officials later claimed that the Pakistan troops fought with great tenacity
since they believed that the two-nation theory had given them
a right to Kashmir.l Approach to Security Council

Direct appeals from India to Pakistan to stop ihe infiltration of the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals into the state and settle bilaterally all questions relating to Kashmir having failed,'lndia
approached the Security Council on January 1, 1948 "to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance (to the invaders to cross into India), which is an act of aggression against India". Pakistan denied giving assistance and claimed that it was discouraging "the tribal
'106
movement by all means short of war". In its counter complaint,
Pakistan tried to widen the issue, to include all the problems between the two countries, charging India of reservations on partition, genocide and fraudulently bringing about Kashmir's accession to itself. The Security Council established the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on January 20, 1948 to look into the facts. A commitment was forthcoming from both sides for a plebiscite in Kashmir. However, neither
the Security Council nor the UNCIP took any steps to have
the legality of Kashmir's accession to India examined through
the International Court of Justice. This failure had the effect

of unfairly discounting India's legal claims on Kashmir and of
giving Pakistan an uncalled for equality of status in the dispute.
It was in the highest traditions of democracy and fair play
that India had made the reference to the Security Council

over Kashmir. Once the Instrument of Accession was signed,
India acquired sovereignty over the state and could have pursued the military option of driving out the invaders. While
accepting the accession, the offer to ascertain the will of the
people was made suo moto. India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru had been an idealist who placed too much faith in the
Western powers taking an objective view in the Security

Council. Nehru at that time had little experience in real politik
and could not anticipate that the real issue of Pakistan aggression would never be judged in the Security Council.
The Insoluble Equation: Indo-Pak Relations
107
Unrevealed Strategic Aims

Evidence is now forthcoming suggesting that after the Quit lndia movemenlof 1942, the British elements both in London and New Delhi of the Churchillian school had felt concerned over how a revived effort by the Soviet Union to expand
southwards in the post World War ll period should be countered since the British would eventually be leaving the
subcontinent. They did not think that an India ruled by people
of the Congress ideology would protect Western strategic

interests in the area. The Muslim League had been supportive of the British during this period and was, therefore, considered
reliable for safeguarding these interests even after the departure of the British. A new state of Pakistan in the North Western part of British India was considered an ideal buffer'
The British, therefore, egged on Jinnah to insist on a Pakistan' Jinnah is quoted as having said that he was offered Pakistan on a platter in 1945.'?This vision of a would-be strategic ally'
after Pakistan was created, perhaps explains why the Security Council, under the influence of Western powers, was reluctant
to come down hard on Pakistan. Eventually, as subsequent events proved, the Western powers did succeed in roping in the countries of the region through the Baghdad Pact and CENTO to create a strong bulwark to contain the USSR' Pakistani Aggression Underplayed Aware of this sympathy, Pakistan's strategy in the UN remained throughout to claim a locus in the administration of
108
the state and to stall demands for the withdrawal of infiltrating
tribesmen and Pakistan nationals from it. The first major Security Council resolution on the subject was of April 21,
1948, which directly asked Pakistan to arrange withdrawal of
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, after which the bulk of Indian troops was also to be withdrawn. The resolution asked
the state government to invite major political groups to

participate at the ministerial levels while plebiscite was being prepared. Pakistan conveyed their non-acceptance of the
resolution and proposed amendments for stationing of Pakistani troops in all Muslim majority areas of the state and participation of the Azad Kashmir Government, Muslim
Conference and National Conference in equal numbers in the interim government. India found the suggestion for participation
by all groups in the government of the state to be incompatible
with her sovereignty over the state. This suggestion also amounted to recognising the authority of those who were administering the seized parts of the state. India, therefore, rejected the resolution,
When the UNCIP visited Pakistan in July 1948 for the first time, the Pakistan Government informed them about the
entry of Pakistani troops into the state in May in "self defence";
This admission of what constituted formal aggression under international law was not immediately reported to the Security Council or India by the UNCIP even though it amounted to fool-proof confirmatory evidence of India's original complaint of Pakistani aggression. Such partiality for Pakistan became
The lnsoluble Equation: Indo-Pak
Relations
09
the hallmark of the Western attitudes throughout the course of Security Council debates on Kashmir and ultimately
convinced lndia that it was futile to expect idealism to be the currency of international relationships. Already Prime Minister Nehru's mind was thinking of a more practical way of dealing with the problem. In one of the meetings with UNCIP in India Nehru indicated that a division of the state between India and
Pakistan could be considered for resolving the problem. Sheikh
Abdullah had also come round to a similar view. He did not
think independence was a real option for J&K state and felt holding a plebiscite would prove too difficult. He, therefore,
favoured partition with the Valley and Jammu going to India.3
UNCIP did not project this option due to Pakistan's total

disagreement.
UN Recipe for Kashmir
The two most important Security Council resolutions

concerning India's complaint were of August 13, 1948 and
January
5,
1949. The first called for
a truce, asked for
withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the state since it constituted
a material change in the situation from what was originally

represented by Pakistan in the Security Council, and stipulated
a plebiscite for determining the future of Kashmir. India was to withdraw a bulk of her troops after UNCIP had notified her of vacation of the state by Pakistani forces and tribesmen.
The local authorities in POK were allowed to administer areas
under their occupation and to retain their forces but their
110
quantum and nature were not mentioned. Withdrawal of troops
was to precede steps for holding the plebiscite. The second resolution established a ceasefire from January 1, 1949. The UNCIP also accepted lndian conditions that the state would retain sovereignty over territories evacuated by Pakistan, no
recognition would be extended to 'Azad Kashmir Government' and Pakistan would not be involved in the holding of plebiscite. India also suggested that methods other than plebiscite could
also be considered for ascertaining the wishes of the

Kashmiris. lt was also agreed that residual lndian and J&K State Forces would take care of the security requirements of
the state. The Pakistani desire to accept a ceasefire now appeared to have been guided by an assessment that the
Indian military had been able to establish a dominating position
for themselves.
An agreement over the ceasefire line was arrived at a meeting in July 1949 at Karachi. Thereafter, the problems of
disposing of the Azad Kashmir forces, numbering 50,000 quantifying the bulk of Indian troops to be withdrawn and administration of Northern Areas proved insoluble due to
insistence by Pakistan on equality with India following the ceasefire and on simultaneous reduction of forces on the two
sides. Both Pakistani demands militated against India's

sovereignty over the state and the artificial dispute so created by Pakistan had the effect of postponing plebiscite which was what Pakistan apparently wanted since it was quite fearful at
this stage that the Kashmiris would opt for India in
The lnsoluble Eouation: Indo-Pak Relations
111
referendum. For India, holding of a plebiscite under normalised
circumstance would have posed no problem but Pakistan's

objective was to seek it under abnormal circumstances. Thus, the two resolutions, even though accepted by the two parties, could not be implemented except for the truce. The stalemate
created by Pakistan by not withdrawing its troops continues
till today.
Finally, in December 1949 UNCIP reported failure to implement the framework of the resolution of August 1 3, 1948
and suggested arbitration to the Security Council for examining how to bring about demilitarisation on the two sides. General
McNaughton of Canada was appointed the mediator for the purpose on December 17, 1949 but he also reported failure
on February 3, 1950. McNaughton had
proposed
demilitarisation in stages on both sides, consistent with requirements for maintenance of security and local law and order. His proposals dealt with Azad Kashmir forces as well as the J&K State Militia. The programme of demilitarisation
was to be applicable to Northern Areas also but its administration was to continue with local authorities. McNaughton's scheme again took little notice of the basic factor of India's complaint, sought to balance India and
Pakistan in Kashmir and ignored the legal weight of India's sovereignty over Kashmir. His propositions on demilitarisation were. therefore, non-starters. Sir Owen Dixon, an Australian jurist, was then appointed the UN representative by the Security Council on April 12, 1950 with a mandate to make appropriate suggestions in all contingencies.
112
UN Representative Finds Plebiscite No Longer Feasible

Dixon was not prepared to label Pakistan an aggressor since
the Security Council had not given any such finding but he "was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of
Kashmir was crossed on October 20, 1947, it was contrary to
international law and when the units of the Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state, that too was inconsistent
with international law." But the Security Council was not

prepared to support international law in J&K perhaps because
some of its powerful members had an agenda of their own,

as menlioned earlier. In his final report to the Security Council, Dixon expressed the opinion that plebiscite no longer appeared
to be a feasible solution for Kashmir and partition of the state

and allocation of the Valley through some acceptable method
would seem to be the only way out. He recommended no further course of action by the Security Council leaving it to India and Pakistan to negotiate among themselves a final solution. Both India and Pakistan were not unfavourable to
the idea of partitioning with the fate of the Valley being decided
by a plebiscite but there was wide divergence over the manner
of holding plebiscite.
The Security Council appointed another UN representative,
Dr Frank Graham, a US diplomat, on April 30, 1951 to look into the question of demilitarisation but he also could not get an agreement by the two sides on the quantum of troops or civilian armed forces to be retained on either side of the
ceasefire line. He reported final failure on March 27. 1953.
113
Ad Hoc Agreement Not Perpetually Binding

In 1957 the Security Council resumed its consideration of the
matter following
a new
reference from Pakistan over the
expected adoption of a constitution for the J&K state by the
state assembly. The president of the Council, G Jarring of

Sweden was named on February 21, 1957 to look into the
matter. Jarring suggested an arbitrator be appointed to

examine whether Part I of the resolution of August 13, 1948
had been implemented by Pakistan. Part I had asked the two parties to refrain from taking any measures to augment their
military potential in Kashmir and
it was India's case that
Pakistan had failed to carry out the obligations flowing from the ban imposed on augmenting military potential in the state.
India, however, could not accept the concept of arbitration,

being inconsistent with its legal sovereignty over the state. In
his report Jarring drew attention to "the fact that the

implementation of the international agreement of an ad hoc character which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may
become progressively more difficult because the situation with
which they were to cope had tended to change". During debates in the Council which followed his report, Jarring
suggested referring to the International Court of Justice certain
legal aspects of the problem of Kashmir. While India was positive to this approach, Pakistan wanted a political rather
than a judicial consideration and is understood to have used
diplomatic channels to convey to others that the proposal was not a good one.4
114
The Security Council now asked Dr Frank Graham to resume his efforts but nothing worthwhile came out of them
since Graham was not ready to examine who was at fault for non-implementation of the two main resolutions of August
1948 and January 1949. As Jarring had underlined, the

situation in J&K and elsewhere had not remained static. The J&K Assembly had adopted a new constitution for Kashmir
on November 17, 1956, reaffirming that the "State is and. shall be an integral part of the Indian Union." Pakistan had joined in military alliances with the West, making itself a part
of the cold war intrigues. Pakistan had also started flirting
with China. In any case, India had earlier given indications to the Security Council that plebiscite, originally promised, could
not forever remain the only means of ascertaining the wishes
of the people of the state. So far as India was concerned,

Kashmir now became a closed issue with the Security Council
and hereafter for the resolution of the J&K issue a bilateral approach with Pakistan would be considered to be the only acceptable way. lt also became evident that India would not be averse to a solution on the basis of status quo. Apart from Pakistan, a great deal of responsibility lies with the Security Council for failure to give due consideration
to India's original complaint of January 1948. lt could have

taken the opinion of the International Court of Justice right in the beginning or later whether the state's accession to India
in October 1947 had legal validity. lt should have given
finding after due evaluation of the core question of Pakistan's
44E,
aggression against the state
in
1947
. lt should have
investigated whether governance of the state after accession
was by legitimate authority. lt should have also given a flnding
whether the forces on the other side of the ceasefire line were phantoms of Pakistan or composed of genuine rebels
against the state" By not examining these major questions, the Security Council, in the final analysis, proved itself to be partisan, tilting towards Pakistan without due legal or factual
basis.
At the end of 1949, India had proposed a
no-war
declaration to Pakistan. lt was rejected on the grounds that no method of settling outstanding issues had accompanied it.
The offer was remade in 1954 and was again turned down
for the same reasons. Ayub Khan, after his military takeover, offered to lndia in May 1959, joint defence of the subcontinent
provided solutions were found for the Kashmir and Indus water
disputes and mutual disarmament was agreed to. ln September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed after
intricate diplomacy by the World Bank. Absence of any two-
nation theory implications in this exercise was certainly a positive element towards its success. Under Western pressure in the post 1962 Indo-China war period, there was a general effort to make some progress on Kashmir. The lndian
proposals centred on partition of the state along the ceasefire
line and a no-war declaration. Pakistan's partition
plan
envisaged the Pakistan occupied portion of the Valley and a substantial part of Jammu going to her share. There was thus no meeting point for any progress to be recorded.
116
Pakistan Forces the lssue

Failing in its objective of integrating Kashmir into Pakistan
through UN or bilateral contacts, Pakistan now again thought
of using force, like Jinnah in
1947, jettisoning political

a
alternatives. There had been throughout this period
continuous strident anti India campaign during which threats of a Jehad were a recurring feature. The Dawn of October 6,
1960 had reported a declaration by Ayub Khan that the Pakistani Army would not allow Kashmir to remain unsolved
indefinitely. The crisis in the Rann of Kutch in early 1965 was
a prelude to the war that Pakistan forced later that year.

The problem in the Rann of Kutch really involved the demarcation of the border in Gujarat with Pakistan but on April 4, 1965 Pakistani military had attacked Gujarat Police
posts. The intention appeared to be to probe Indian will and military preparedness to face a Pakistan military onslaught.
Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's comment at that time was that Kutch was not a dispute in itself: it was a part of a much bigger issue the heart of which was in the Srinagar Valley. The Kutch issue was settled through a tribunal which
awarded to India on February
1
9, 1 968 all of the areas wrongly
claimed by Pakistan except 300 sq. miles out of 3,500 sq.

miles.
Actually, the Rann of Kutch episode was part of a larger Pakistani design, codenamed Operation Gibraltar. In August
1965, as in 1947 , a large number of infiltrators who had been
117
trained as guerrillas were sent across the ceasefire line by

Pakistan in the hope that they would be able to work up a
revolt against the state in favour of Pakistan. As the Pakistani
invaders were being beaten up in Kashmir, Pakistan on

September 1, mounted an open armoured attack across the international border in the Chhamb district in order to sever
Kashmir from lndia. American supplied Patton tanks received under US military aid programme, about which the Americans
had assured lndia of their being not used against India, were put into use in the war. The Indian policy had been declared
to be to treat any attack on J&K as an attack on India. India

was thus forced to retaliate across Lahore anci Sialkot sectors
compelling Pakistan to abandon its offensive in J&K. The Security Council managed to arrange a ceasefire between
the two countries on September 22, 1965 without Pakistan achieving any of its political objectives behind its invasion of Kashmir. The US stopped its military aid to Pakistan, a
consequence highly negative to the latter's interests. The
political terms of mutual disengagement wer'e discussed under
Soviet auspices at Tashkent in the first half of January 1966.
The Tashkent Declaration issued at the end of the meeting

was barren for Pakistan so far as its original objectives were concerned. The declaration confirmed an affirmation by both
India and Pakistan to settle their disputes through peaceful

means.
This affirmation notwithstanding, Pakistan launched a surprise attack on Indian airfields, in 1971. This war proved
118
very costly for Pakistan. lt lost its eastern wing, which became
a new nation, Bangladesh. The Simla Agreement of June/

July 1972, which followed after peace had returned between
the two countries, specifically provided that all differences

between the two countries should be settled by peaceful
means through bilateral discussions. The agreement specifically mentioned "a final settlement of the problem of
Jammu and Kashmir", through such discussions. lt was tacitly
understood that this framework would govern the ultimate settlement on Kashmir along the ceasefire line but Bhutto,
Pakistani Prime Minister who signed the Simla Agreement,

could not subsequently receive approval of this idea by vested
interests within his country.
The Psyche of Animus

The emergence of Bangladesh was a severe indictment of
the two-nation theory and brought about the annulment of the
historical absurdity, that was Pakistan with its two wings a
thousand miles apart. The desire for military parity should

have ended in Pakistan. Instead, the emergence marked the addition of revenge as an additional motive in the long list of
negative sentiments harboured by the Pakistani establishment.
An India specific nuclear programme was now initiated in Pakistan from which also grew later, a missile development
effort. Militancy in Punjab was encouraged and fomented in the eighties. A new shape was given to insurgency in J&K from 1989. The Simla spirit was thus observed more in the
Where Mountains Move: The Story of Chagai
259
control authority for its strategic forces, did not exist at that
time. In this meeting, the two agenda points of the DCC

meeting of 15 May 1998 were decided. Firstly, Pakistan would
give a matching and befitting response to India by conducting

nuclear tests of its own. Secondly, the task would be assigned
to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who were
the best equipped and most experienced to carry out the

tests.
On 1B May 1998, the Chairman of the PAEC was again

summoned to the Prime Minister House where he was relayed
the decision of the DCC. 'Dhamaka kar dein' ('Conduct the

explosion') were the exact words used by the Prime Minister
to inform him of the Government's decision to conduct the nuclear tests. The PAEC Chairman went back to his office
and gave orders.to his staff to prepare for the tests and called
for an urgent extraordinary meeting of the top
PAEC
executives, scientists and engineers. Simultaneously, GHQ and Air Headquarters issued orders to the relevant quarters
in 12 Corps, Quetta, the National Logistics Cell (NLC) the Army Aviation Corps and No. 6 (Air Transport Support) Squadron at Chaklala Air Base respectively to extend the necessary support to the PAEC in this regard. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) also directed the national airline, PlA, io make available a Boeing 737 passenger aircraft at short notice for the ferrying of PAEC officials, scientists, engineers and technicians to Baluchistan.
260
When news reached Dr AQ Khan at KRL that the task had been assigned to PAEC, he lodged a strong protest with the Chief of the Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat. The Army Chief, in turn, called the Prime Minister. Amongst the
two, it was decided that KRL personnel would also be involved
in the nuclear test preparations and present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC.
In the meantime, PAEC convened a meeting to decide the modus operandi, quantity and size of the nuclear tests to
be conducted. This meeting was chaired by Dr lshfaq Ahmed
and attended by Dr Samar Mubarakmand and other highranking executives, scientists and engineers of the PAEC. lt
was decided that since the Indian nuclear tests had presented
Pakistan with an opportunity to conduct nuclear tests for the first time after 14 years of having conducted only cold tests, the maximum benefit should be derived from this opportunity.
It
was, therefore, decided, that multiple tests would be carried
out of varying yields as well as the live testing of the triggering
mechanisms. Since the five vertical shaft tunnels at Ras Koh Hills and the single horizontal shaft tunnel at Kharan had the capability to collectively host a total of six tests, therefore, it
was resolved that six different nuclear devices of different

designs, sizes and yields would be selected, all of which had
been previously cold tested.

lmmediately afterwards, began the process of fitness and
quality checks of the various components of the nuclear

devices and the testing equipment. A large but smooth logistics
tol
operation also got under way with the help of the Pakistan Army and Air Force. This operation involved moving men and equipment as well as the nuclear devices to the Chagai test sites from various parts of the country.
On 19 May 1998, two teams comprising of 140 PAEC scientists, engineers and technicians left for Chagai,
Baluchistan on two separate PIA Boeing 737 flights. Also on board were teams from the Wah Group' the Theoretical Group,
the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) and the

Diagnostics Group. Some of the men and equipment were transported via road using NLC trucks escorted by the
members of the Special Services Group (SSG), the elite commando force of the Pakistan Army.
The nuclear devices were themselves flown in completely
knocked down (KD) sub-assembly form on two flights of Pakistan Air Force C-130 Hercules tactical transport aircraft from Rawalpindi to Chagai, escorted even within Pakistani airspace by four PAF F-16s armed with air{o-air missiles. At the same time, PAF F-7MP air defence fighters, also armed with air-to-air missiles, were on Combat Air Patrol (CAP) guarding the aerial frontiers of Pakistan against intruders.
Both the nuclear devices (the bomb mechanism, the HMX explosive shields and casing) and the fissile material (the highly enriched uranium components) were divided into two consignments and flown separately on two independent flights
of the Hercules. The PAEC did not want to put all its nuclear eggs in one basket in case something adverse was to happen
262
to the aircraft. The security of the devices and the
fissile
material was so strict that that PAF F-16 escort pilots had been secretly given standing orders that in the unlikely event
of the C-'130 being hijacked or flown outside of
Pakistani
airspace, they were to shoot down the aircraft before it left Pakistan's airspace. The F-16s were ordered to escort the C-
130 at a designated airfield in Baluchistan with their radio communications equipment turned off so that no orders, in
the interim, could be conveyed to them to act othenarise. They
were also ordered to ignore any orders to the contrary that got through to them during the duration of the flight even if such orders originated from Air Headquarters.
Once in Chagai, the sub-assembled parts of the nuclear devices were carefully offloaded from the aircraft and were
separately taken in their sub-assembled form to the five 'Zero
Rooms' in the kilometre long tunnels at Ras Koh Hills in Chagai. Dr Samar Mubarakmand personally supervised the complete assembly of all five nuclear devices. Diagnostic cables were thereafter laid from the tunnel to the telemetry.
The cables connected all five nuclear devices with a command
observation post 10 km away. Afterwards,
complete
simulated test was carried out by tele-command. This process
of preparing the nuclear devices and laying of the cables and
the establishment of the fully functional command

observation post took five davs to complete.
and
On 25 May 1998, soldiers of the Pakistan Army 12 Corps arrived to seal the tunnel. They were supervised by engineers
and technicians from the Pakistan Army Engineering Corps' the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) and the Special
himself Development Works (SD\A/). Dr Samar Mubarakmand walked a total of 5 kilometres back and forth in the hot tunnels
checking and re-checking the devices and the cables which would be forever buried under the concrete' Finally, the cables were plugged into nuclear devices. The process of the sealing
the tunnel thereafter began with the mixing of the cement and
the sand and their pouring into the tunnels' lt took a total of 6,000 cement bags to seal the tunnel and twice the amount
of sand. The tunnels were sealed and plugged by the afternoon 26 May 1998 and by the afternoon ot 27 May 1998, the cement had completely dried out due to the excessive heat of the desert. After the engineers certified that the concrete had hardened and the site was fit for the tests it was
communicated to the Prime Minister via the GHQ that the site
was ready.
The date and time for Pakistan's rendezvous with destiny was set for 3:00 p.m. to the afternoon of 28 May 1998'
Pakistan's'Finest Hour'
28 May 1998 dawned with an air alert over all military and
strategic installations of Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force had earlier been put on red alert to respond to the remote but real
possibility of a joint lndo-lsraeli pre-emptive strike against its
264
Reassessrnq pakistan
nuclear installations. Pakistan thought it fit to be safe rather than sorry. PAF F-16A and F-7Mp air defence fighters were scrambled from air bases around the country to remain vigilant
and prepared for any eventuality

Before twilight, the automatic data transmission link from all Pakistani seismic stations to the outside world was switched
off.
At Chagai, it was a clear day, Bright, warm and sunny

without a cloud in sight. All personnel, civil and military, were evacuated from 'Ground Zero' except for members of the
Diagnostics Group and the firing team. They had been involved in digging out and removing some equipment lying there since 1978"
Ten members of the team reached the Observation post (OP) located 10 kilometres away from Ground Zero. The firing equipment was checked for one last time at 1:30 p.m. and prayers were offered. An hour later, at 2:30 p.m., a batile_
camouflaged Pakistan Army Aviation Mil Mi-g helicopter carrying the team of observers including pAEC Chairman, Dr lshfaq Ahmed, KRL Director, Dr Ae Khan, and four other scientists from KRL including Dr Fakhr Hashmi. Dr Javed
Ashraf Mirza, Dr M Nasim Khan and S Mansoor Ahmed arrived at the site. Also accompanying them was a pakistan Army
team headed by Lieutenant General Zulfikar Ali, Chief of the Comb Division
Where Mountains Move: The Storv of Chaoai
265
At 3:00 p.m, a truck carrying the last lot of the personnel and soldiers involved in the site preparations passed by the
OP. Soon afterwards, the all-clear was given to conduct the
test as the site had been fully evacuated.

Amongst the 20 men present, one young man, Muhammad
Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer, who had designed the triggering mechanism, was selected to push the button. He
was asked to recite 'All Praise be to Allah' and oush the button. At exactiy 3:16 p.m. Pakistan Standard Time (PST),
the button was pushed and Muhammad Arshad stepped from obscurity into history.
As soon as the button was pushed, the control system

was taken over by computer. The signal was passed through
the air-link initiating six steps in the firing sequence while at
the same time bypassing, one after the other, each of the
security systems put in place to prevent accidental detonation. Each step was confirmed by the computer, switching on power
supplies for each stage. On the last leg of the sequence, the
high voltage power supply responsible for detonatlng the nuclear devices was activated.
As the firing sequence passed through each level and

shut down the safety switches and activating the power supply,
each and every step was being recorded by the computer via the telemetry which is an apparatus for recording readings of
an instrument and transmitting them via radio. A radiationhardened television camera with soecial lenses recorded the outer surface of the mountain.
zoo
As the firing sequence continued through its stages, 20

pairs of eyes were glued on the mountain '10 kilometres away.
There was deafening silence within and outside of the OP.
The high voltage electrical power wave simultaneously reached the triggers in all the explosive HMX lenses on all
five devices with microsecond synchronisation.
A short while after the button was pushed, the earth in and around the Ras Koh Hills trembled. The OP vibrated.
Smoke and dust burst out through the five points where the
nuclear devices were buried. The mountain shook and changed colour as the dust from thousands of years was
dislodged from its surface. lts black granite rock turning white as de-oxidisation occurred from the fierce radioactive nuclear forces operating from within. A huge cloud of beige dust then envelooed the mountain.
In the OP, shouts of 'Nara-e-Takbeer!' and 'Allah-o-Akbar!'
(God is Great) went up. The time-frame, from the moment when the button was
oushed to the moment the detonations inside the mountain took place, was thirty seconds. For those in the OP, watching
in pin-drop silence with their eyes focused on the mountain,

those thirty seconds were the longest in their lives. lt was the culmination of a journey, which started over 20 years ago. lt
was the moment of truth and triumph against heavy odds, trials and tribulations. At the end of those thirty seconds lay
Pakistan's date with destinv.
Where Mountains Move' The Story of Chagai
267
The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs would later describe it as 'Pakistan's finest hour'. Pakistan had become
the world's 7th nuclear power and the flrst nuclear weapons
state in the lslamic World.

Two days later, on 30 May 1998, Pakistan conducted its sixth nuclear tdst at Kharan, a flat desert valley 150 km to the south of the Ras Koh Hills. This was a miniaturised device giving a yield which was 60 per cent of the first tests. A small hillock now rises in a crater in what used to be flat desert, marking the ground zero of the nuclear test there.
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Bahadur, Kalim: 'Democracy in Pakistan, Crisis and

Conflicts', New Delhi, 1998.
Banerjee, Deepankar (ed): 'CBMs in South Asia: Potential
and Possibilities', Colombo, 2000.
4.
Baxter, Craig and Charles Kennedy" (ed),'Pakistan, 1997',
Boulder, 1998.
5
6.
Blinkenberg, Lars.'lndia-Pakistan, The History of Unsolved
Conflicts', Vol I and ll, Odense, Denmark, 1998.

Boliiho. Hector: 'Jinnah, Crcatorof Pakislan', Oxford, 1954r)v.
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8. 9.
Brines, Russel: 'The Indo-Pakistan Conflict', London, 1968.
Burki, Shahid Javed: 'Paklsfan,
Nation in the Making',
Boulder, 1986.
Cohen, Stephen
P:'-fhe
Pakistan
Army', Delhi, 1998.
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11. Das, Durga: 'Sardar Patel's Conespondence, 1945-50,
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13. Finkle, Jason
N and Richard W Gable, (eds):'Political Development and Social Change', New York, 1971.
'f
4. Gupta, HR:'Ihe Kutch Affail, Delhi, 1969.
15. Gupta, Sisir: 'Kashmlr, A Study in lndo-Pakistan Relations',
New Delhi, 1966.

16. Hayes, Louis D: 'Politics
in Pakistan: The Struggle for
Legitimacy', Boulder, 1984.

17. Hodsen, HY: 'The Great Divide', London, 1969.
1
8" Huq, Mahbub-ul-Haq'.'Human Development in South Asia'
Karachi, 1997.
1
9. lnternatonal Institute of Strategic Studies, 'Military Balance'
uK,
R? 21
1999-2000
20. Jarring, Gunnar: 'Memoies', Vol land ll, Stockholm, 1981-
. Khan, Akbar:'Raiders in Kashmir, Karachi, 1970.
22.Khan, Ayub: 'Friends, Not Masters', London, 1967.

23. Khan, Mohammed Asghar (ed); '/s/am, Politics and the Stafe'" London. 1985
BibtiograPhY
New York, 1965.
271
24. Kissinger, Henry (ed): 'Problems of National Strategl
'1954' 25. Korbel, Joseph: 'Danger in Kashmil, Princeton,
26. Lamb, Alistair: 'Crlsis rn Kahsmir" London' 1966'

27
. Maley,
1988.
Wi lliam (ed):' Afg h ani stan and the Talib an', London,
28. Menon, YP'. 'The Story of tntegration of lndian Sfates',
Calcutta, 1956.
29. Nehru, Jawaharlal: 'Discovery of lndia', 1946' 30. Phillips, CH and Mary D Wainwright: 'The Paftition of India, Policies and Perspectlves', London, 1970 31. Rashid, Ahmed: 'Taliban', London, 2000 32. Rizvi, Hasan Ahktar. 'Military' State and Society in Pakistan', New York, 2000"
33. Sharma, Rajeev (ed):
'Ihe
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2001. 34. Sipri Year Book, Stockholm, 1999. 35. Spear, Percival: 'A History of lndia', Penguin, 1968'
36. Thapar, Romila:
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Penguin,
England, 1966. 37. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: 'World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer, 1996', Washington, 1997'
272
38. Wirsing, Robert G'.
Reassessrng pakistan
'lndia, Pakistan and the Kashmir
Dispute', London, 1 998.

39. Wotld Development Reporf, 'Knowledge for Development,,
World Bank, 1999.
lndex
Abbas, Ghulam. Afghani,
56
Baghdad Pact 107 Bangladesh
Abdullah, Sheikh. 24' 55, 56,
67 Syed Jamaluddin 40,
l4'
55' 69' 94' 118'
122' 140' 142 Beg' General Afzal 90 Bhutto' Benazir' 76' 90

Bhutto' Zulfikar
Afghanistan. 15, 30, 34' 36'
76' 95, gg, 122, 124, 1gO' 135, 141 , 148, 14E Agni. 137 Ahadith. 28 Ahmed, Qazi Hossain. 123, 151 Ahmedias. 75
Akbar, EmPeror. 36
Ali, Maulana Mohammed 44'
41
Ali 28' 69' 70'
74, 75, 86, 87' 1 16' 1 18 Birbal' Raia 36

Blasphemy Law 75' 76' 130 Brahmo Samaj 38
Buddhism 2l ' 35
C 53
'
45
52' All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Cabinet Mission
Conference.56 Arya Samai. 38 Ataturk, Kemal. 44 Aurangzeb.2?,37

Azad Kashmir Forces. 110,
Cambridge UniverSity- 48
CENTO 107' 133 Chashma Reprocessing Plant'

136
111 Azad Kashmir Government l0S Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam' 24, 44,45
China'
21
Churchill' Winston 5l
'
114' 123'
144
ClA 138'
Cohen' StePhen 9T Confidence Building Measures
(cBM) 17, 31,120, 121'
157
274
Reassesslng pakistan Harkatul-Mujah ideen. 122
Controlled Democracy. 84 Crossette, Barbara.

'l 19
Hatf. 137
Hizbul Mujahideen. 122 Hudood Ordinances. 74, 130 Huq, Maulana Samiul. 77 Hussain, Altaf. 14,55 Hussain, Dr Akmal. 94 Hyderabad. 19, 66
Darool-ul-uloom. 77 Deen-e-ilahi. 36 Direct Action Day. 53 Dixon, Sir Owen. 111

E
East Pakistan. 85, 86

F
ljtihad. 41 lkhwanul Mussalmeen.

81
Independence 1857, War of. 23,
Federal Security Force. 87 Independence Act. 65

G
Indian National Congress.
14,
Gandhi, Mahatma. 44 Gandhi, Rajiv. 119 Gates, Robert. 138, 139 Germany. 48 Ghauri, Muhammad. 34, 137 Ghazni, Mahmud of. 34 Government of India Act 1919.
43
25, 38, 39, 40, 43 - 46, 53, 65, 107, 152

Indonesia. 130 lndus Water Treaty. 115 lnstrument of Accession. 104 106
International Court of Justice.

106, 113
International Monetary Fund. 93
Government of India Act 1935.

46
Iqbal, Mohammed. 48 lnter Services lntelligence (lSl). 16, 31, 99, 121, 123, 129 lslamisation. 29, 71, 73
Graham, Dr Frank. 112, 114

H
Hamoodur Rehman Commission. 143
lndex J
275
Khaliquzzaman, Choudhary. 52 Khan Aga. 42 Khan, Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali.

1?R
J&K, Maharaja of. 104 J&K. 16, 55, 56, 66, 95, 104, 105, 110
131
114, 117
115,
Khan, General Ayub. 30, 68, 69,
Jamait-e-lslami (Jl). 14, 27, 30, 60, 63, 72, 95,96, 122, 123,
148
82,83,84,85, 115, 116

Khan, General Yahya. 30, 85,
do
Jamait-ul-Ullema. 122, 148
Khan, Khan Abdul Gaffar. 24 Khan, Liaqat Ali. 30, 52, 80
Janing, G. 113, 114

Jazia. 36, 37
Khan, President
Ghulam
Jehad. 76, 77, 55, 116, 123,

124, 135, 141, 151, 154, 157.
a
lshaqque.9l Khan, Sir Syed Ahmed. 23, 39,

40, 41, 48, 55
Khilafat Movement. 43, 44, 45 Khyber Pass. 104 Koran. 28, 41, 74, 75
L Lahore Declaration. A,{ 4A
'17
qR
Jinnah, Fatima. 68
Jinnah, Mohammed Ali. 14,24 -
28, 30, 34, 43 - 47, 49, 52 54, 59
- 61,66,68,71,72,
, 101 , 121
79, 107, 116, 126, 148, 154

Junagarh. 19, 66
K
Lahore Resolution. 25, 26, 50, Kahuta. 135, 138 Kanupp. 135 Karamat, General Jehangir. 92,
101
Lashkar-e-Toiba. 77, 122 Leghari, President Faroukh.

92
91
,
Line of Actual Control. 123 Lucknow Pact.24, 45

M
Kargil. 99, 100, 120, 121,139 Kashmir. 16, 19, 30, 31, 77, 83, 99, 101,103, 104, 109, 111124, 139, 153
155
Madrassas. 75,76, 151
276 Malaysia.
130 95
Nepal. 122 Nizam-i-Mustafa. 70
Malik, Brigadier SK.
Markaz-e-Dawah-ul-lrshad
(MDt). 122, 123 'Maudoodi, Amir Abul Ala. 27, 28, 60, 61,
No First Use Treaty. 152

NSCN. 122
73
0
Objectives Resolution 1949. 62,
111 Minto, Lord, Viceroy. 42 Miza, lskander. 82 Mohajir. 94, 142

McNaughton, General. Mohammed, Governor Ghulam.
63, 73,
81
Omar, Mullah. 77 Operation Brasstacks. 138 Operation Gibraltar. 116 Osama bln Laden. 136
General
82 46 14, 54
Moolah Rebellion. 44 Motilal Nehru Committee. Mountbatten, Lord.

P
Pagara, Pir. 63
Muhajir Quami Movement.
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

(POK). 109, 139
Pakistan People's Party. 69, 86,
87
55
Muridke.
77 16, 89, 92, 94, 123, 151, 135

- 26,
53, 59, 60,
Musharraf, General Pervez.
76,77,
157
Muslim Bomb.
Pakistani Constitution, First (1956). 68, 73,82,93

Pakistani Constitution, Second
(1962). 68, 73, 83, 84, 93
Muslim League (ML).24
42
- 48,52,
65,
Pakistani Constitution, Third

(1973), 74, 86, 90, 93
79, 107, 152 Mutiny 1857. 23, 38
PLA. 122
Plebiscite. 106,108,110,
12,
N
National Conference. 56, Nehru, Jawahar
153
106 Lal. 40, 106
Prithvi. 1 37
Provisional Constitutional Order.
151
277
O 96 Quadianis. 28, 63,68,72 Quit lndia Movement. 51,107

Qayyum, Colonel Abdul.
Sir Creek.
127
Soviet Union. 13, 76, 99' 107' 135' 144, 147 Sri Lanka.
Stalin. 62
21
'
133
P
Radcliffe Award.
Standstill Agreement l04
66 86 38
Sunnah. 74
T
Rann of Kutch. 116 Rehman. Mujibur.
Roy, Raja Ram Mohan.
Tagore, Rabindranath. 69
Taliban. 32.76, 99, 124
S
SMRC.
SAPTA.
Talibanisation. 15, 28
134 123 134

- 117
Tashkent Agreement. 17, 69'
Saeed, Mohammed.
101,117' 151
Thapar, Romila. 35 Todarmal, Raja. 36
137 SEATO. 133

Sattar, Abdul. Security Council. 105 Shah, Sajjad Ali. 92
Tulbul Barrage' 127

Turkey. 43, 44
137 Shahi, Agha. 138 Shariat Court. 74 Shariat. 74

Shaheen.
ULFA. 122
UN Commission for India

109,
111
&
Pakistan (UNCIP). 106' 108'
76 Sharif, Nawaz. 30, 89, 91 - 93, 120, 151

Shariatisation. 15, 28, 75, Sikhism. 22, 36
Simla Agreement. 17, 101,
Urdu.22,35' 42 ussR. 107

V
VajPaYee, Atal Behari. 120,121
118,
151
slPRt. 131, 132
278
Waliullah, Shah. Weiner, Myron.
41 140
Zakat. 74, 75 Zia-ul-Huq, General. 15, 30, 67,
132 World Trade Organisation. 133

World Bank. 93, 115,
World War ll. 47 Wullar Barrage. 134
76,87, 88, 90, 95, 96, 99, 119, 120, 152

70

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Reassessing Pakistan

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Two-Nation Theory Converts into lslamic

Conclusions: The Way

The Indian lndependence Act

Accession 3. UN Resolution - 13 August 1948

Extract from a Despatch Published

in New York Times

The Lahore Declaration

10. Where Mountains Move:

The Story of Chagai

were to be finally solved. General Pervez Musharraf, CEO of

wrong between the two countries.

In doing so, he has drawn on his experience as a former

Secretary to the Government of India in the Cabinet

It has generally not been recognised in lndia that

prime cause for the continuation of the India-Pakistan

disharmony. According to this study, the attempts to resolve

' not merely from a territorial or materialistic perspective.

countries now possess nuclear weapons. In the absence of

quicker and adequate progress towards ideological

political rivalry can assume catastrophic dimensions for both countries

- more especially for

Mr. Verma has presented a useful set of recommendations

in the last chapter showing us a way out of this bilateral

the causes and consequences of the ongoing India-Pakistan

solution following the norms of civil society. Both countries

vast majority of people in their societies.

Officiating President & Professor

I had observed Pakistan over a number of years in the

too relevant for such a study.

was to exploit Muslim sensitivities and susceptibilities and

where Muslims would be in a majority. The two-nation theory

India. The limited function of the two-nation theorv was onlv

the early part of his political career. When he transformed

Muslims than warranted by their numbers. The two-nation

for higher empowerment.

out from the fringes of irrelevance and started developing

political muscles, wielding political clout, totally disproportionate

pillars on which the state of Pakistan rests. The animus against

sabotage in J&K and the rest of India and is unwilling to hold

use (NFU) and evidence of irrationality displayed in the

partition of India, but the relationship of the two countries

A common historical background, geographical proximity and

friendly neighbourliness. Such into reality.

a prospect never translated

Some were imagined like the fears entertained in Pakistan

thereafter were another provocation. The failure of effort to

grab Kashmir became a long standing hurt. But 53 years is

The protagonists of the Pakistan movement were the

to the idea till Pakistan was close to creation.

the virus of anti Indianism. The Pathans, the Baluchis and

philosophical fou4dation of the state of

obiectives and consolidation of national consensus.

On account of this theory, Pakistan made itself, for quite

number of Muslims who had stayed back

interceded on their behalf with the government of India to

score propaganda points. ln subsequent years, it tried to

state. The antagonistic approach of Pakistan was visible in

among the low castes of Hindus. The converts developed