Dimaporo vs. Mitra (1991) MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR.

, Speaker, House of Representatives, and HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of Representatives, respondents

Ponente: Davide, Jr., J. Facts: Petitioner Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. In January 1990, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM with the Comelec. Upon being informed of this development, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives (HOR) excluded petitioner s name from the Roll of Members of the HOR pursuant to Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881)1 enacted in 1985. He was excluded from all proceedings of the House, was not paid the emoluments due his office, and his office suites were occupied by other persons. When he lost his bid for the gubernatorial race, petitioner expressed his intention to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected Member of Congress. He is now claiming that Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution which provides specific grounds by which the term of members of the House can be shortened2. Issues: 1. 2. W/N Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is operative under the 1987 Constitution W/N the respondent Speaker and/or respondent Secretary by administrative act could exclude petitioner from the rolls of the HOR

Held/Ratio: 1. Petitioner No. The provision cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress. Respondents Yes. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in the said provision falls within the term voluntary renunciation of office in Sec. 7(2), Art. VI of the Constitution. Court Yes. Term is different from tenure of office. The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature. However, the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not even exist at all. Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, NOT his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion. Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution provides that all public officers to the exclusion of the President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office as provided by law. This clearly recognizes that the 4 grounds found in Art. VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are NOT

Under the rule expression unius est exclusion 3 alterius , the statute is repugnant to the pertinent constitutional provisions since it provides for the shortening of a congressman s term of office on a ground not provided for in the present Constitution. If it were the intent of the framers to include the provisions of Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, they should have incorporated it in the 1987 Constitution.
1

The grounds mentioned in the Constitution cannot be exclusive since there are other modes of shortening the tenure of office of a Member of Congress such as resignation, death, and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office which are not included in the enumeration.

Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881): Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
2

Sec. 7(2), Art. VI: Voluntary renunciation of office. Sec. 13, Art. VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries. Sec. 16(3), Art. VI: Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior. Sec. 17, Art. VI: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest.
3

The expression of one thing excludes all others.

He cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed, pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution.

Petitioner s filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise because he is presumed to be aware of existing laws.

exclusive. The legal maxim should not be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute because the maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. It serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest. Petitioner failed to discern that the purpose of the statutory provision is not to cut short the term of office of public officials but rather to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office. Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881 makes it clear that should incumbent public officials fail in their candidacy for another office, they cannot go back to their former position. This is in perfect consonance with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. The ground for forfeiture in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec. 7, Art. VI of the Constitution. As discussed by Constitutional Commissioners, the filing of the certificate of candidacy is already an overt act of an intention to relinquish the office currently held. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder of such an office is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

2. Petitioner No. Respondents so-called administrative act cannot be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office because only the courts can interpret laws. Respondents Yes. Their questioned administrative act is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers. Court Yes. Since the legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy have already been spelled out in Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881, respondents cannot be said to have indulged in any statutory interpretation. Both of them perform ministerial functions as administrative officers and it was their duty to remove petitioner s name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blg. 881. They cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing such duty because it might hinder the transaction of public business. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.