THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

FIELD REpORT
Covering Air-Raid Protection
and Allied Subjects in
KOBE JAPAN
.".( LASS,";
v'/- --. "<,
/ ()
<;;1
0
REGRADED\"
f5( RDfR SfC ARMY
By TAG PER;;;
8 Z 196
),', -. - /,>" ,

Civilian Defense Div'!\( ,j "0':' .
Febcuary 1947
"&IS'ltl6FHiD
II
THE UNITED STATES
STR.ATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
FIELD REPORT
Covering Air-Raid Protection
and Allied Subjects in
KOBE JAPAN
Febtwf)' 194'7
RESfRICfED
--
v
x_ Ezbibitlt:
llap: 80Illb Damap A.... of Kot..I.pu_
Chart: WartltlM AdIIIIDlItraUq Orpnl..... of ..... ".
,-.. ...
Chart: OrpnbaUoa of the Alr-D.rena. of
H7oI'O P1'eteeture ... A.a
llap: Adllllniatntift Dlatrieta and Locatl_ of Polb OdIc..
HYllSO A.-3
Chart: Air Dd'CIIM in HrOlO Prefecture (-"owIna elWna of
command). A+<I
Air Raiu-'HyotrO Prefeeturll_I9-4/i (,u report.ed by the
HyOllO Prefectural omce) A-5
Map of Kobe. Sbo'trin. Siren Locationa and of Eal:h B
PeMlOnnel of the Control Cenl.er of Hfop Prefecture aDd
Tlwir Dutie:tl . C
of Form of Coll8Oll"-ted Report u Submitted by
Head of Damage-Emmal.e Sub-Mction o( Alr-Defe-Me Sec-
tion of tbe Police Diviaion of H)"OCO Preferture-.... 0
Map: Bomb Damage Areu of Kobe, Japan ($bowina- fire dis-
tricts, fire lrtationa and lire equipment in and out of KrTiee
alter 1 July 19451_ _ E
Omilted___ _ F
Air_Ra.id-Proteetion Report.-Ka......ki Shipbuikliq Yarda in
Kobe Harbor_. __ __ G
Air-Raid-Protec:tion Report-Kobe Steel Worb H
Hea''Y IJKlU.'Itriea (Kobe Shi pyard and
Worb) (with AnneJ[ea I_I and 1-21____ ,
Air-Raid Protection of DepartllH'nt SlOn___ __ _ J
Theater AirRaid Protec:tio,,-_ _
Air_Raid Proledion in Schools L
Special Air_lkfense COrpl Orpnizatioa and Table of Equip..
ment for Kobe Third Middle SchooL 30l
lltlap of KGbe Harbor_. .. _ _ _ __ ,
Table of Contents of Book Entitled MGt-nenl Operational Out-
line of Kobe Harbor Air Defelllle
M
__ 0
(Reference Item No. 28)
Air_Reid_Defense RegulatioM for Control of Shippina: in Kobe
Harbor _ , _ _ __.._.__.. P
Omitted.. .. _M Q
Go'erning Seeurit,r Ua:hlinr (Tnl18lacion of See-
tion Covering Ibrbo. Lightinlrl _. _...... ...__._..__ R
Omitted ._. ._ _ .. _._.. S
Directions for Encouraging Cily EI.cuation-Uyogo Prefec-
ture (Published OVCr the Mayors aignature and .ddreued
to the citizCDs of Kobe, 27 JBnUIr)' 1944) T
(Reference Item No. 39)
,

10
10
H
15
16
1.
l'
23
26
26
,.
31
33
"
'I
41
..
" ..
50
60
SO
63
73
75
78
,.
80
"65
"
"
I.
Introduction
Air_Raid Defenlle in Kobe and
II. Administnth-e Structure for
HyOfO Prefecture
SIllal ._., ..
AuxiliarY Pollee and F re . G 'J Block ASIIOeiatioftll
, . hbo hood Grou\ (TOlll," ..III',
Nelg.r F'" ted Block Auociations (Rncgo
(Clcobn) and era
e'lOhi) -
Orpniption and Opention of JapaneseCi\ilian Defen.'le
Air-Raid Warnina: .. .....-- -.
Control Centen
Incident Control
Unuploded Bombs.__.---' _. ---.-.
Fire Ser'-kes_.__ ._. -.- - .....--.. ,--.---...-
Fire Protection_.. ... , ..-
Fire Pre"ention . .._. _
Emergeney Medical Serviee. . _
Emeraency Medical SeniCC- ...
Red Croa --- -----
)lortuarY Senia! ._....__ ..._.. ._ - --_.-..
RCllCUe Sen-ice _. __ - __..... ---._.- .....
PO<\:t-Raid Cleannce..._._. _
Protection of Factoriell. IlIlItallatioM and Buildinp De,'oted
co Publie UlIe ._ ----.... ---- -.-. -.-----.- ...--
FactorY Air-Raid Prot.l.'ct.ion...__. __ _.. _
Air_Raid Protection of Publie Buildinp - - _ .
Rail d Air_Raid Proteetion __ _ __:_ __ .
:\ational CommunicatioM Air-Raid Proteeu.on.-._ _-
Harbor Air.Raid Protection and Port Seeuncy._ --
Pa.ui\-e-DefeJl$f! InstallatioM and Precautions .
Protecth'e Lighting ._ _ ---.. _ .._ .
Shelters _ --.-- .
Call-Proteetion Service .
Camouflage _ __ ._ ._ .
Conduet of the Public during an Air Raid __
Summariell
TABLE Of CONTENT'S

1\'.
,'.
Ill.
VI.
- co ., Of .. "u ,.-.:,!oo,
VII. Evacuation and Welfare _ .
EIaeuation .
POlIt-Raid Emergeney Welfare_ .
War Damage Claims..... . __
VI II. Training of Civilian.Defense Perannnel and the Public
IX. Hefennte NOwlI .
!
:;
"c
v
w
1. INTRODUcnON
1. arla!i"c 3;U and impor'ollce.-a. Kobe Is (6) Cotton and lilt tatOt .......
didedly YOl,lthfu[ in contrlll<l with the andent e. In view of Kobe'. eomparaUnJ7 ...
eitj\ll< of Tok)'o, Kyoto and <>uka. Within the characterlatiel! aDd exten8lve IDdUlb1al ....
lifetIme of of the. people still livin&, in lishmenta, if effective alr.rald.protel:tlon ___
Kobe, it hM gro"'n from a flshin&, villa,e to the ures were to be found anywhere in Japan, thia
leadin&, port of Japan, would appear to be the lorical place,
b. The city o"'ed it.8 &,rowtb directly to Ad_ 2. Pkl/wital aapula of Ihe titll.-a, Kobe
miral "ieit in 1854 and the subsequent P08!lC!l3e8 a scenic backgr(lund in the form (If II
(lJlCning of Japan t(l iuternational trade. As mountain ran,e with a maximum ...I... vation of
trade expanded and shiPII increa!led in siZt!, 2,225 feoll ("R(lkko" Or "six lleak" m(luntain)_
O!J.llka's port facilities became inadC(JuaU!. Be- The city limits extend well into the mounlains
cause of ita situation on the delta of the Yodo where uceHent reservoil"ll for supplyin, the
river, the [)Or! is shallow, provides an ineffce_ city with water "'ere maintained. The area
tive muddy anchorage. and ie constantly filling along the base of this range and up the moun.
in. But Kobe faces no such problema. In terma tainside contained a better_tban_a'-erage reai-
of depth. ancborage and protection afforded to dential area. induding a number of achools,
shipping, it is one of the flneat portll in the clubs and hotels, and it was leas densely popu_
Orient and tbe primary port, not only for ita lated than tbe remainder of th... city_ Due to
own producta, but also for the exports and im_ that fact and w its relati"ely greater diatance
porta of Osaka, K)'oto and otber large cities in from primal")' targeta, it ....lLS seri(lusly dam_
the same area. Kobe's relation to Osaka paral_ aged than the 10"'er sections of tbe cit)-, Tbe
leis thnt of Yokohama to Toky(l, mountain range. however. forced the city t(l
c, Tbe characteristics of Kobe were: expand length,,-ise along the coast and has
(1) New construction. tended to crowd the business sections, the ware-
(2) Relative freedom from the restricth'e houses, and the finandal roneerns into a small
traditions of the older cities. area. The diatricts extending from the main
(3) An unusually cosmopolitan atmos_ railroM line to the harbor were densely popu_
pbere. lated and badly This rondition ap.
(4) A high degree of Western influence. plied not onl}- to tbe businl!ll8 district but also
(Kobe was the only cit} outside of Tokyo 1(1 the o,...r-erowded industrial areaa on either
!'08>lessing a large English newspaper owned side of it, containing factories, steel plants and
lind edite.:l by Occidentals, and its TX'Pulation shipbuilding works directly adjoining One an_
contained more Occidental re1l.identa in pro- other. In spite of being modern,
portion to its than an)' otber Japanese Kobe's business and manufacturing distriets.as
city.) well as the many poorer residential areaS $lInd_
(5) A rrlati,.ely vigorous city gO"ernmen! wiehed in between them. ""ere extremel)" '"Ul-
lind chamber of commerce. nerable to both explosh-.. lind incendiary oombs.
d_ The primary ee<ltlomic activities (If Kobe b. Hyogo prefecture (3.213 ;JQuarB miles)
were; extends from the Inland Sea to the Sea of Japan
(I) Shipping and the sen'icing, of ships northward from Kobo! aCross a narrow section
(coal, oil, water. provisions. and repairs). (lr the main isiand of Hondo. The island of
(2) Shipbuilding. Awaji (the largeJlt in the Inland Sea) is also
(3) Production of rubber ll:oods (If all kinds under the jurisdiction of lhe prefecture. H)'ogu
(manufaelured largely by hundreds of small. 46 counties or gUN (four of them on
scale factories dotting the dt)) , the island (If Awajl) as well as Be'-eral indus-
(4) Match manufacture (in reeent years Iriallowns in addition 10 the cit) of Kobe. Tbe
c1ooel)' tied in with the Swedish match monop- most important of these are Nishinomi)'a.
oly). .'''ksshi, l1ami ana Himeji. The population or
(5) Steel works. lI)"ogo l'rdeeture, c."clusive of l<:obe, was
,,,...,
,,,,,.,..,,.,,,,
X II
. . E' (on of Refugee$- yOgi)
M "" l'oinlg for Carrying Out \ReUa l ..... U
. April. 19H....... . .
(Rcferellc<l Item 1\0. 40)
. P by Hyogo Pn'-
Tra"al:tlion Sumn,ary of pU Captains. Ma)'ors
rectUN' 13 NO"ember 1944. to 0 1 fOld
of and Amag8aaki. Hcgarding the E\'aeuatioll 0
and Y{Hlng People.... , ... . .
. ll' Law (Revised Ed,tlOn)
.... Sen'lce A o",ance _ t f\ 1137 (tr/lllala-
17 December, In.n. Imp.mal ReSi'-rtp 0.,
lion)
'I "mum Estimate of In-
War Properly_Damllgllln3umnce--" axl X
aured Value for Buildings..
RESTRICTED
1
drilia -..e ...
raid of ilardi 11, _
RriaaaIJ' to 6npt boQ ehIIai ....
oftlcial orp'-"-'"filii
delrtroJ' lalp part of thetr 'ntII
more than olfset elfortol to Improve protec1l..
meaaUrelI prior to the nnt ma.lII ndd of 111M I.
After that. O\'er 70 percent of Kolle WAll either
destroyed or lID serlouaty damqed all to mate It
ineffeeti ..e .s production eenter. The fune.
tional relatiomhlp of fe... undarnapd .....
.... 110 dillDrpnized .nd factory labor 10 dill-
pened and demoralized that the city "'aa virtu.
ally for ....r production from that time
till the end of the ..-:ar,
6. C"Mlell 0,"" e8utt.-. In notinrthe in.
adequ.dea of equipment .nd planning to meet
the "olurne ot bombll dropped. the time factor
should not be o"erlooked, Offici.ls and le.der"
of c!\'ilisn airr.idProtection organizationa re-
peatedb' lItated that the) "'ould ha,'e been in
better poailion to _ the ioeendiary .ttaco.
if the entire ,"OIume of bombll had been dropped
within. few rnlnuteL ThIs ...as the hy'potMMa
On whkh their original plana "'ere baaed, the
being that the slteugth of Japan'.
.Ir force "'u "uch that aD American raid o"er
the Japanese mainl.nd would Dec:elllIIrlb' be
lIitlIndrun aff.i,. Raids lasting I to 2 hours
simply were not contempl.led, The result wu
that cruci.l .ir.raidProtaction equipment ,"'aa
exhaU"ted considerably before the raid ended
.nd that lhe organization .nd the planned op..
eratiooa of the ''arioua pbuea of airraid pro..
tection "'ere not lIe:rible encugh 10 pennit dec:.
Ii"e coordination co"enOS" a prok>n,ced period.
BJ' tbe time. lIIlI$II raid ended. Iirea were out
of rontrol .nd air-raid_protec:tion force:tl "-ere
disorganize<! .nd their etrorts futile.
b. The congestion in the bu"in .nd indW!-
trial di>nriet.a. the O"ercrowding in the poorer
residential 8CCtion" Ih.t lIurrounded them, .nd
the phyaical cll.racterl"tiCll of all these .reas
were aa to make them uceedinglS \'ul_
oerabk! 10 both exploai\'e and ioeerodiary bombs.
Had the blure of the maaa raids been antici.
it i. improbable. conaidering the inade-
qullCT of the .ir.raid_protection equipment
....ilable in the cit), or in all J.pan for that
maUer. that the effectll of the .ir raida on Kobe
could ha,.., been minimized to any great extent.
3
b. The raid of '--'" t. Itt&.... a .....
tlvely one (11'2.8 toM of bomt.) d'ertl...
few Inllltl!d aediona ib the ahlpbaildbta' and
are. on the peninaula GUndlnC_want
Just I!OOlh of the heart of the city. It did. how.
ever.lert the cltJ', particularly the Iarlrer eon.
th.. need for more .ir.r.id.
protectIOn meaHures.
1', The raid of M.rch 17. 19t1; (1.991 tona
of bombll period of 2 hou,. .nd 8 min.
the dstern half of the
dlstrtet In the heart of the <:it). Ita primary
effect. howe"er, "'&8 to burn OIlt eompletely
on the lIOUlheastem ,ide of the cit)',
poorer Tftidenti.1 dilltrim. a large
llhlpbuildlng "'orks, and numerolill small rllb-
!ler.prooucu illdoriea, '
d. The raid of May II, 1946, was foculled
primllrilyon the larlre planl$ in the
diHtrict (Halldill) between Kobe and Osak.
.nd cOnJIlsted of expIOlli"e rather than inc:en.
di.n' bombll. Thl! effec:til on Kobe proper "'ere
great. one residenti.l and one factory .rea
In the extreme ea.stem end !xilll: hit and par.
tially burned. But futory di!ltricts ex.
tendi.nl! Pa:n"'ard tow.rd Osaka "'ere "ery
henil)' dam.ged. Air.raid-prottction meuuru
ar.insl explOlli\'e bombs were intensified ...
result of raid.
e. The raid of June 5. 1946 (3.079.1 tona of
homlll! O\'er a period of 1 hour and 25 minUlell)
waa more scattered but equally destrueth'e. It
burned out the "'elItern h.lf of the bU$ineas dill-
triet in the beart ot the city .nd R''eral large
area.s in the e&lltern aect.ion. including maehine-
tool plant!. slftl wuru. rolling mills, .nd a
large rubber faetor)', The numerous residenti.l
and shoppinr are.. lIIndwiched In between these
factories were alllO burned out. Another size-
able arell in the extreme western end of the cit)
(containing the rJlll"'ay reFlllir ahops Rnd a
cro,,'ded residential area) WM
f. Exhibit A I map indicatlng the .reaa
.rreeted the of Febru.n t. "".rch 17,
M.J II .nd June 5. 1945.
g. E,idenc:e on .ir_r.id.protection _Urell
in HJ'ego prefecture.nd in Kobe indieatel that
prior to [)ember 1944 it waa a.IlIUmed lhat
only. small number of raiding pl.na would be
IIble to pus through the army .nd n.,')" de-
fen_, Ihe army havIng "pedflc.llJ' ad,'llIed
,....
..,U
U .....
20,817
1000lS
210.921
12,881
3S,071

'....
iUN
37.717
'....
U:W
10,llSIl
1.621
663.993
'N
,..
""" ",.

9,203
." ,..
".

,n
..
" ...
,-
M
Zll,4.7
=

.....
1,319
'00
.,03&

,.
...
,..
'" ft,

'" 912
..
"....
..

,,"
ho.11

iIIo. 11
ilia,. II
Junel
lune 5
hne.
J"neU
J" %2
Ja :s
JIII1,..
Jill,..
,..,.

A .
A 10
Tote" ._
I
lo.- _ ..._,......., .......
....,...
,-
'-
-
......,
........... :'"
.."'"'...
I "
-
" ,,"
J .... If ,..

,

- 1,816 U
,

Jb,.J; 6&711 ...

"
,
ill.,.. II 2,1'1
,....
"
..
J"nel ,...,
n
"
..
June 5 - ......

"
June9
-----.
"..
1.170
,
June 1& ______
9.361
"

"
June:: 1.348
."
, ,
June 26_
-
..,
1.169
, ,
JuJ,.L _
- 10.730
'"

Jub" I .m.
'"

...
,.. , ,
Jub"24
j '.6
...
, ,
Au,
'"

"
Au... 10 ..

,
T.....b 1",2:81 .... ..
'"
Exhibit A.S C{lnlaina more detailed airraid data
on Hyogo prefecture.
c. In Kobe alone, the tot.l peraon! killed in
the raids numbered 7,05"1; those injured num
bered 15.302 ("seriously wounded" 6,994 and
".'!llghtly wounded" 8,308). wllile 466,781 were
rendered homelellll,
5, Egutl of /lUI primar, a;r raiM.-. Offi
ci.l American military recorda lhow two ma.M
ralda on Kobe proper (!I1.reh 17, and Jnne 5.
1945) which caused considerably more d.ma,.e
thlln .11 of the othl!r raids combined. Two eee-
ond.ry raids (FebMJ.ry 4, .nd M.y 11, 1945)
.re or signiflcanee in their effeets on .irraid
protection meuurea,
- I

-_..- _.
Ort.1.1_
I_I.!'!! _To_ S .-:J.-...
tat- _ this
<k1 i...m...... .r

JaIL I. 't.l1
,,,....
1.101.:011 lad...i ... of a.-.l
.-
Jon. I. 3.337.600 1,011,800 Induolft of am>!
/3.395.200
..
J.n. I. 19_3 023.200 lnolu,i....' ,,,,,od
..nl_.
Fob. 2!.19U 3.217.158 C.... u. labn (n
.lo..i .....' ........
.1'"Oi<ooo1
JIUL I, l&tl 3.l&t.7.&t
U.= Eot,...1H
..... of .-.1
......,.
Sopt.', '1oU
--
".,41. Eoti..taoI
t .-.1
.,......"
It 8hould be noted that the war and the Pn>lI-
peeth'e .ir .ttach had little effect on the total
population until after January l. 194(), Be
tween Febru.rJ 22, 1944. and January I. 1945.
the population declined bJ' 72.179. whereas. 00-
t,,'een J.nu....J I. 1945, and Seplember I. 1945.
It declined bJ' 471.437,
4. Elut. of lIir l"tIidli (I. H/fOfJO prrful.rtc
a.. K._ . The coutal plain, utending
!IOlI1e 31 from Kobe to Osltka, comprises
a number of important indulltri.1 cille. cont.in.
iag 1.Te factories. and i. knO"'n .a the "Han.
din diatrlct:' This Intenenlng area
la entirely wltllin Hyogu prefecture lind in
eludes Amag/l.Sllki. NishinomiJ'a. AshiJ'a, FukHe
.nd Miure, totaling sHrhtly over a half.million
people prior to the r.ids.. Economically, these
cities were an integral part or the whole Osaka.
... metropolitan .rea which ...... 10 dosel)'
built-op that one could not tell ...hl!a he left one
city .nd paased into the next.
b. The following tablea indicate casu.lties
and .property damal'! in Hyogo prefecture, in-
dudlnr the industri.lare. indic.ted above:
2,%'i'8..8OO In 1941. .nd 2,626.489 01'1
I, 19.&:5. .
3, Arflll ."d ranks w,th
K)'Oto, :\.IrOY. and Yokohama in populatlon.nd
are. Pnw.r Kobe ....8 l.l !Qu.re miJelI in are.
and h.d. populatlor. of 1.001.200 pel'8On!l- The
following table indiclltell in tile popu
lation of Kobe and of prefecture between
(ktober I. 1940, and September I. 194:>.
2
5
al'e8 lIDdet' Ita jttrisMltll L ft_....
for alr.del'enae orden "- tM
Home AWaira In Tolcye (01'
iniliat"Ci b)' tbe govemor) to be tn--fttld
IhrouCh the chief of poIke dJredIy 18 U. ...
pnizatiocts and illdhidllll.l ItouadIoJ4a __
cerned. The police oonrtituted the nonnaJ pre-
"'ar ehll-nrn;l for tran,mitlill8 inatnoetiem. and
ror enforcing them. The primar)' efl'ect of
the creation of civilian airraid.defenlle orranl.
Ultions was to auist and extend police adminis-
lratlon in thill 1'Cl!P/lC:t and to make the people
more reeephl'e to air-raid-defense instructions.
5. Seffti",'icia/. d" ririli,ui,-raUl-dejn.ae
l>rf1(llli:atio...._a. The lM!mi-otllc:ial and the
civilian air-raid-defenllC orga.nlUltions. under
the juriadiction and leadel"llhip of prefectural
officials. reprl'llellt a venuine addition to the
air-rllid-defense foTCft of H}'OCO prefecture.
The pr:mary of command:' (used for
the ,uj'lB'\iaion of air_raid drilll and fJf opera_
tiona during actual raids all well U for the en-
forcement of air-raid-defen!!e regulations) WlllI
as follows:
(I) The governor (as direc:tor of tJte air
defense general beadquarte....... or bo...... lI(>o
Ao..bN).
(2) The chiet of police (as chief of the
guard department headquarteTll. or bibi
lo",b_).
(3) The chief of the guard section (kei_
MAl'), operating through the police .tations
in the se"eral police diltrirtil of H}'ogo
fectllre.
(4) The allXilial')' and fire uni
(keib04_).
(5) The neighborhood JrTOUplI ('''''an
gami) .
(6) The general public.
b. The tleCOndal')' chain of command ""IIlIlised
for classroom trainilli' in air_raid prcl1.ion
II1'Id for the a:eneral di5aemination of informa_
lion on air-raid.defense meastlTl'I and regula_
tions through radio. pamphlets,
motion picturu. and exhibi_
tions. The cit) Jt'O"ernment al!lQ played an 1m
portanl role in the finandng. acquisition, and
distribt:tion of "arious t)"peIII of airraid-defenllC
ftl.uipment. Thi. seconda,,. chain of command
""U lllI foUo"'a:
(I) The t'(lvernor (Ill director Qf the air_
respon..ibility for ita execution on the pref.
tur:a
l
and allowed them
latItude In its IIppllcation.
b.. The governor of HJ'Oj(Q prefecture did not
hla own air-raid-<lefense ordera to be
In ab}' 'll'nllC Or e\""'l ordinances. AlthollCh
they had the of Ia.... they were co",idered
to merel)' "inltn.octiona for earr)'inr Ollt the
natIOnal law:' They were therefore handled
ortcn by a phone call rrom the gov_
erllor s uthce to the chief of police, and con.
primaril)' of (I) dCllignal-
109 dates on "'hich air-defense drilla were to
be (2) noting the particular I'ClIpects in
which cnfon:eme:nt of the national law ..."" to
be tightl'cned; and (3) indicating
on which Wl'cre to be made.
e. Kobe and smaller industrial eitlCll along
the coastal area on either lIide of it WUI' con-
aid('red prima.." tatrets beeauae of their ship.
building installations, their large ""lIr-produc_
tion plants and tMir relatile nearneu to Ameri.
elln liS rompared with Tokyo. Therefore
the governor's inatruetionll (reinrorced b)'
orders from the of lIome AtTaiTll) re-
pNtedty urged a tighteningup of enfon:emenL
d. .A1' pre\'i<HUJ}' indiclltl:'d, the police ..-ere
empo,\\'ered to deal dire:tly "ith ehWan air_
organizationa and e'"Cn with the inti_
mate detllils or household air.raid.protection
measureil. Throughout Japan the prefectural
IlOliee s)'stems were thus the primary instru_
ml'clltil of airraid.ddeulM! law enforcement.
H}'ego "'u no exception to that rule.
The police and the aUJ(i1ia..,' police and
lire unilll (hi!>o<fuN). in earning out the frO'-
ernor's inlltruclionl. focu!Wed on the detailed
inspection or the ('quipment. pl!rgonnel and
other arrangemenL! or Ihe localllir-raid.defen"",
organizations. Inllpeetionll ro"ered factories.
businea. concerllll. "arebousC!l and hou!leholds.
The pumpll. helmet11. gas masks. tmergenc).
water lupply. mlllJl lind fire beate....... lIS well
1II the other detailed airraid.defense IITrange-
ments which wcre supervised by the police. aTe
discussed ill del.llil in other sections of this re.
port.
e. The adminilllrath'e map (Exhil.oit A-3)
indicates tlK> H}'oro adminilltrati,'('
Each districl contained a central police statiQn,
and iLl force of police thoroughl}' ro'e.....l the
, TlVE STRUCI1JRE FOR AIR-RAIO DEFENSE IN KOBE AND
II. ADMINISTRA HVQGO PREFECI1JRE
emphllsized the fllct thlll no new olft-
dals were add('(l to the gonrnment for air-
ddl'nJ!(' purpose'land atated tluJt the air.defel\8e
genual hl'lldquarten Wall the other
of the !l.'\me lIheet of paper."
b. "llldaia thull occupied t"o
llO"ilionll simultaneoullly. For ordinary pur-
nn ollldal WM to himselF II pre_
officer in the normlll go\ernml'nt.al
$l.ructure. For air.defl'cnse purpo!lE'8 he wall to
ronsider himaelf a lIpl'C'ial1" appointed air_
(\@.fenMofficial in an air_raid_protecti<m organr_
zation made up of the IIlIme oft\eials with whom
he dealt on ordinary prefectural mattera.
e. Actual opllratio;>rIal procedul'es could not
be JIll neatl)' divided howeler. Il was difficult to
determine. for eX3mple. at whal point normal
melillUrel! ldl off and air_raid
mellllUI"U began. and officiala
"'ere occllllionally uncertain u to whith office
they should occUP)' for the purpollcs of a given
npllration.
d. uncertainties arose only in connec-
tion with preparatory meaaUrel!. ho"enr. It
WlllI clearl)' unde tood that the air-defel1lle gen-
eral headquarn Willi the designated organ
for desling with an)' .eeriQus emergenc,'. includ-
ing earthquakes. large fires and floodll.. all well
IU lIir raida. At such times a "state Qf emer_
wu declared b, the governor. which
full}' IIctivated the air-defense general head_
quarters all the rentral and ret!!ponaible author-
it). The gGveroor of H}'ego atated that a 'lItate
of emergency" e:<illted whenever the situation
became aufficiently l!l'rioull to endanger life, re-
quire organized first lIid, or necl'cllSitate l'cmer-
gene)' feeding, shelter and evacuation. Thus.
the crel;tion of the Hrogo prefecture air.defenile
general headquarters did l'$tablish a new !let of
official reJatiollllhip$ within the prefectural of-
fice, constituting the central orxan for !letting
up operation"l procedures against air rsids. u
indicllted in Exhibit A2. Its principai effect
WII!! to slrenKlhen and extend the authority of
the Il)'Ggo police department.
4. Preftehmll ill /I.rodefe...e lIlot
ters.-a. The lIQurce of prefectural authority
in air.defenlle matters was the national air-
raid-defense Illw which placed the primal')'
l. Th, prtjtelurr.-a. Prefectural
ment plllred a dominant role in the
tion of Jllpan On all below that of the
national Then' ,,ere. for
no cit) polic a.s the police 1I}stem helng
entirel)' within the juri61lictlon of the prefec-
ture. The 46 prefectural JtUI'ernmentll
dO!'Cl)" tied in wilh the national gOI'crnmellt (m
particular ,,'ith the )Iinistr)' of Home Affairs)
and di':' iI-cd their power from that fut.
b. Although the ". municipal oftlc.e pla)'ed
II mgnikant role in the air_raid_protection
organillltion. it no independent initia-
tive in that ",specl. but was meTl'cly 1\ ml"'han
ism for Cllrryinlr out the of the
prefectural office. In fact. in llrefecture,
the cbief of pnfectural poliCll! had decidedl)"
PO"'er tban the ma}'or of Kobe: a situa-
tion "'kich existed in all major Jllpanese eitiCll
...ilh the exception of ToIi:)1).
2. OrgllNi.:ati(>l101 structuu.-a. The organi.
ElItion chart (Exhibit A-I) indicates the normal
structure of prefecture.
The prominent JIOiIition Il"en to the poliCll! de-
partment should be noted. This department
perfonned man}' functiollll "'hith in the United
States would be left to other agencies.
b. In two re811l'rt1l tllis is important from
the point of I'ie"' of air-raid protection:
(I) The fire depllrtment WIIS entirl'I}' under
the jurisdiction of the chief of police.
(2) Policemen of all ranb were permitted
to inqll,ire into (and inlerfere with) the dllily
life of tile 1I,'erage citiun to a derree that
would be ronsidered intolerable in the United
Stati':s.
3. HI/OJIfl air-dcjellllle gelleral heodquarlen.
a. For an understanding of the functioning of
the prefectural fO"ernme:nt in air_raid-defel1lle
matteT!! it i. neo:essIIl)' to refer to the organiza-
tion ehart (Exhibit A-2 of Hyogo prefecture
"Air_Ikfenlle General Headquarten" (Baku.
Sohumbw). It would be entirely misleading,
however, 10 col1llider thia all a l!l'PIIrate or-
",niution ClIpl'C'iallr ataffed for air_raid pr!).
tectm operatio.... The air-defenae general
headquartera represented ani)' a regTGtlping of
the prt'!tctural officials fOr air-raid-protection
purpo1<l'i. The go"ernor or lIyogo prefecture
4
';
"
c
unlla to tile lIN ............
llpeCiallud "I1lIIda with lUItblct datill
Oaaka. the memben 01 tile PUd ........
held reroponalble for mucll tile _ _
their equivalenla pn10rmed in Oaka:
trallk control. removilll" peraonnelln:m
\IClnlty of unexploded bombs. oblIerYatioD of
and enemy piaIll'll. remo"ar ot the qed.
Inlirm and children to shelter!'. transmitting of
Prlna to the public. direetine and enforein,
Ilr.ht control. reIICUf: and !lOme measure of post..
raid cltaranee.
..' E'1l1ip"'....I._11le equipment ot the aux_
lilaI'}' J-O\ice and /In!: unita of Kobe "'aa more
adequate tha? tJ.1"t of Osaka. this "'u
the lndn'i<!ual unit of Kobe a
..rabl1 large:r area than did the Osaka
umt. In aome C&8l'll tbere "'nl! .. mao)' &l' eight
. pompa III a sintrle unit "'hile tbe
In Osaka tour. Furthermore.
tint-ald medical and rd equipment ....&15 mo
complet.. lban in Osaka, It is inteJ'el!tinc ::
note that. although the unitll orere organized
lIO!ice aa. a pn{etturaJ ......ice. tbooy
rcc'el\ed their eqUipment and operating ex-
penaea from the cit,..
l).. Gnlnal operatioou._At
the ome of an Incident ....hich had gone beyond
rontrol of the indh"idual anti
the Mighborhood croup air.oetellH leader
the equipment of tbe subunit ...... dis--
patched to the _ of the incident b, the sub-
unit IealWor, either .-oluntarlly or th"mutrh re-
queM of the nei,hborhood ,-roup air-detellH
leader. ""hen the illCident COl the eon_
or the .wbunit's equipment, request for as-
Blllance ",as either to the head_
quarters ....hich equipment from a
neirhborinl" subunit. or. in of ertreme
emerge:lIC). dill!l:tl)- to a nelehboring 8ubunit.
A' inddent.s became t'\'en more H'ere. the unit
leader called either upon the pelice and fire
.ser,iNb tor l.lIIIiatance. if tb_ l>ad not al",ad)'
been dispalthed to the incidenl, or upon a
neighborin]l" aUlCiliar)' police and fire unit.
b. Rcporliltg fJI Iltcide"t.-TIte neighbor_
hood group air-defense le.der "'&S
for rellQrting an incident.s CK'Curring in s",a
to the headquarten which. in turn. re-
IlOrted them to [\3 unit heAdlluAnen!. The unit
headqulIrtet$ thereupon teperted .uch incident
7
e, !,'merI/CQcl/ mediealontl (1<1/1<1/0 hlldall
-The unitatlon arlt1ll of the T ).
and fire units of Hyoro
ho<I " ......ure 0 ,inally
wo rna n dutiea: lint aid lid d
tamlnation. As the "'at eeIln_
the numbe r ' we'er.
r 0 personnel became few and th .
eompletely lost. sieht ot their anli_,.. 'fun ' e)
W"-", ," Iona.
ra lllg entIrely on first aid. In many
the leader of the aUlCiliary police and fire
unIt acted aa the leader of the medi.
arm. there W&15 also at leut one dllCtOr
In the On the wbole th . .
d I .. ' elr equlplllt'nt
an r:llmntr al the handlt of profellllional doe-
tora. :"'ere superior to tllOile of the eqll;"alenl
auxillal'}. pohce and fire IIl1it tintaid arllllt in
.. a romple!e description of the or_
and operations of Ihe emerlrtl>C)'
arm the awlilal')' police and lire
lInlt.s. _ IleCtlon ot this repon On "Elllt'l"lency
Medic,,1 Sen'ice:'
Scbuniu (Bundan)
3. Orgoaiul.tio... 01 tI", nbllait.-. Af"C\l..-
In Kobe each unit w.... di,ided into from three
to ti.'l! subunit.s whicb "'ere the actual operalinr
bodLell. Headquarters of th<'!lC' lIUbunit.s "'en!:
!oeated IlCCOrdintr to connnience. in IICbooI.
houses: police stations, and pri"ate n!ilidencft,
and. "'Ith the eJ[ception of the ernt'fi"etIC) medi_
eal arm and the leader aDd 19iatanl leaders ot
the un.it. an pel'llOnnel ",poned to their aaaigned
subumt headquarters On the soundin, of the
alen.
. b. Table 01 orJl'(l_i..:GtiO>ll.-EaclI subunit con-
SiSted of a leader. b'o asBiglant leaderB. and
from two ,to four each ot fin!: squads and ruard
"'Iuad-. The leader "..... IIelected b)' the leader of
the unit. and he. in tum. IIelectl'd his o"'n l.lIIIist.
ants. Each of the squadlt conlained a leader and
nine men. There w.... no separ_
ate hal!lOn arm, as there had been in Osaka. but
each aubunit set uide certain men OUI of iUl
gU:lrd &qUAd, to act as meuengen.
c. rirt! (S....obob.. ).-A. has been
stated before. there from two III four lire
1Iq1l1l.ds in each ot the subunits ot an aUlCitisr)'
police alld fire unit. Each squad was equipped
with s mOlorized ]lump or a llirge handpump
and Willi responsible only for tire fighting. ThC$e
pumps were IItored at lhe subunit headquarlerll.
d. GllGrd arm (Kaibi/m).-Althollll"h the
gU11t(1 arm was llivided into squad8 in the gub-
iliaI'}' fIOli and fire uniU were chollen on a
slrictlr honoraI'}' without special reprd
for technical abilit)'. and they lIen'ed without
pay.
b. TabU 01 Orgo.izaliQll.-There w.. no aet
table of &It far all number of memo
ben .."58 roneerned in the auxiliary police and
lire units of Kobe... there ..... in (),g.ka. U..
uall)" a lIingle unit eonlained approximatel)' 300
memben. "'hich number ....., diminished h)'
sickne<:'l and other rontinge:nciea. At the time
of a raid. a unit headquarters wJl.'!,i.ted of the
leader of the uoit. two U4istant leaden. and
tbe entire ernertrenc)' medical trJ'Oup. The other
members UMmbled at the hecadqual'ten of the
subunit..
c. Tile leader of the aUlCmar)'
poli and fi", unil waa chO!len by the diatrict
poli ehief. on the advice of prominent mem_
bers of the communit). for a 3-)'ear term. and
he recei,'ed no salary. duties included re-
ceil'ing and executing orden trom the police.
supe....'ising and eoordinatinr the operations of
his unit. and exereisintr ultimate rellponsihility
for training and tor the maintenan of the
unit's equipment.
d. TJoe aui./ont leoder.- The two a!lllisiant
leaders of the unit were chosen by the chief of
the district police in the Ilame manner .. the
leader of the unit. The)'. too, lIen'ed for a 3-
year period without salary. Their main duties
were the aMisting of the unit lesder: one AS the
coordinntor of all lire &quads in the unit; the
other as the coordinator ot all guard IIquads.
They succeeded to the llOsition of leader. usuall)'
according to seniority, when that ofllce became
vacant. .
(8) The general !lubllc.
The chains of cflmmand indicated are
cO"ered in E:-;hibil A-".
c. The Great Japan Air.Ddenlle AlJIIOCiation
(Doi Xi"pon BOkrl KlIokui). a lIefIli-offtcial Of-
pn with headquarten in Tok)o. worked dOlle\)'
,,'ith Ihe municipal office and with the
organiz.ation$ under it. in sponllOrinlr air-raid-
defenlle me&llures.
d. The ci\'i1ian air_raid-defenlle or,anizationB
noted above are dillCu$lled in detail in other &l!C'
tions :;If this report.
III. SPECIAL CIVIUAN-DEFE SE AGENCIES
defenlle seneul headquarter!. or boh oW
blOlbM).
(2) The chief of poliee (lIB chid of the
l'Uard department headqulIrterl. or keib;
....
(3) The municipal officu of the !IC"eral
citi"3 in the prefecture
(41 The cil)' wards (br).
(S) The federated block a_iaHoM
(re_go t ....ohi).
(6) The h!oek a_iatio", (eMhi).
en The nellrhborbood lrroUJlII (IOI.ori
gil_i).
6
A XJUARY POLlCE
AND FIRE UNITS (Kclbod.an)
I. /"trod.ttio".-In acxordanee "'ith the
lliniMI'}' of HllIJM' Atrain' ordinance of Jan_
ual'}' 1939. H)'op pn!:fecture iaaued its o"..n
onIinalll'f' (In llareh 6. 1939 in reprd 10 the
establWlment (If auxilial'}' police and fin!: units
"'ithin itil juriMic:tion. Sinee. in Japan, the
police and fin! H....iee:t an!: under the rontrol
of pn!:fec:tun! rather than the cit)". the or-
pniu.:ion and operation of the auxiliary police
aDd lin!: units: in the city of Kobe ean be ac-
cepted .., a f",ir nandard for the unit.s in other
paTtI of the prefec:tun!:. aJtbou,h it mun be
rffCl1lized that unit:t will ditrer accordintr to
the number and densit) of population. and the
ceotrT&phkal atructure ot their an!:as. In ,'iew
ot the fact that each unit embraced a rompara
t;"el)' lafi"e area. it was di,'ided into ubuniUl
called 611.,1011. in order to fadlitate wntrol and
elficienC)' of operation ot it.s emefi"enl:)' IIervic:a
The fi", and ruard arms were then broken into
smaller squads and placed at the of
each subunit. while the ntral headquartefl! of
the unit retained wntrol of tht: emefi"enc)' med
it.l arm. AJthoull"h the 16,200 members con-
atituted the 54 auxiliary police and lire unitll
in Kobe. the)' were. tor the ITIQllt part. aSlligned
to thereof. There are attached hereto
referenee itenu t'0II. I and 2. The former gh'es
a reneral idea of the area (Overed by one par_
ticular auxilial'}' police and firt: unit. The latter
dtQws the breakdown of this ]larticular unit
into the lI'eClll"rallhical ex-
tent of the BubunitB.
2. Orvani:olLl>I\ 01 Unit._a. Membel"o
.Ili/I._As in the members of the aux-
- ,
"".
9
........... _-
(.t!WOI
IN HYOGO PREFKTUll.f
(HART OF AIR RAID DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
tenee sinee approximately 1870 an orianlzation
ealled the !!/Initation group (ei"ti /nlmiai),
whOlll' ehief dutil'l! were the inSIM.'Ctlon ror ....ni_
tar" conditions of membera' hornell lind of
and other public pfOtlerty falling with_
ing thia association's $phere. In Kobe, in 1939,
the area of this IIII.nitation gr'Ottll was taken ..
the standard area for the block .MOCi.tion
(dloklli) which in turn wla broken down into
neighborhood group;! and .1M eombined on a
higher echelon into fooeraloo block associa-
lionll- A chart !howing- this a)'stem .nd ILII
JlOlIition in the municiJlllI and prefectu1'l\1 go,.
as well /Ill its li.illOn with the aux'
iliary police and fire units, will be found on the
following
Neighborhood Group (Tooari Gumi)
2. Orgalli:alioll.-In Kobe there were from
15 to 30 ho\l$l':holds in neighborhood iJ'Oup,
being o"",rated in the 8llme manner .nd for the
pmI' purpo_ IllI the (bah neighborhood
grouJl& Funher to confound the already com-
plicaled and detailed of thilJ paternal
eontrolleading from the emperor down to Ihe
indhidual through n'\3'riadlJ of steps and eheeu,
in Kabe there W/lll formed an organiution
calloo neighbors' mutual lIll8istance (riMpo) ,
This crganiution ...... a further breakdowon or
Ihe neighborhood group, and it wu eornpGlll'd
of the oecupanta of from 5 10 10 houSl'll, whoee
only function waa the further pel'llOnalization
of the rationing, ..... 'ingll and other normal func_
tionlJ of the neighborhood ./IlIOCiationll- It is to
be noted thaI thele neighbonl' mutual _Istane..
grottp! had no air-defense dutil'll.
3. The
lar le:lder of the neighborhood group in Kobe
WII! eho!len by vote of the houlleholds in the
area, o!:leh houaehold voting II! one unit. This
leader !lO'r\oo for a period of 2 )earll without
pay and his dutil'll conslated of m.nagement of
rationing and wartime 8ttvings. He had no air-
defense units.
b, Tlte leaderll-(UllndlO)o-AlI in
OJl.1.ka, a slleCial man wa!! chosen to 1Je N!lIpon-
lJible for air-defense operations of the neighbor
hood group. His duties werc the direction of
fire fighting, of air_defense tnlining, reportinr
incidents and maintaining over-all supervision
of houllchold prellaration for emergency alr-
raid service.
NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS (Tonari
Guml), BLOCK ASSOCIATIONS
(Chokai) AND FEDERATED
BLOCK ASSOCIATIONS
(Rengo Chokai)
I: ",trool<dioll._ln 1939, under the Kono)e
regIme. the neighborhoodgrC/up came
to he r;treAAed lI./I the ultimlte in the J/lJlllne!le
system of. hmil) lind super_family control and
appeared lnlocalilil'll of Japan in vadoua forms
In Kobe, for example, there had been in
8
10 Ihe lQl:al police stillion wilh which II WII8 in
eoMlanL
6. r,."'NiNg._Training wn mueh the AAme
;/,11 thaI lI"il"cn in ().,.aka. the gum llQu/lds being
Ir.ined by the polil'i'; ;\Quad! being trained
b). membeMl or the fire dl'llllrtllW:nt; .nd flm
aid peNOnnel being tr.ined b>' individual doe-

1. Pre""t ..,,,t,, ._The auxiliary police .nd
fire unite et H)oet! pffi/!('Iure.re now w.iting,
&!!.re ...Ua""h unitil In J.pan, for the ordinance
of the of Home Aff.irs which "'ill
eilher diMOl\'l' lhern or reonraniu them ror
poet ....r dUlles. Until thla ordin.nce i! recehed,
are In a gl!neral atate or 8ua""lI8ion. the
author;t, and pG@ilion of the leader still being
rfCOi"lli&ed, bul without 8n)' actual operatiOn!
of the ull.it bcill.g earried out.
s.. Co.... .-Although the .uxilian pnlice
and unit;< in' tipted at Ihi! targel showed
a .-anation in tho! table or organizalion from
thMe of Osaka. especlall,' in the adoplion of
lhe uOOnil, lhe .ims and operatitll.! of
lhe un,u ..en!! The de:nlralization
of into lhe IJllbunit the
.... o,u a Ifreater ana .nd pro,ided
vea'..r flexibility in dllpatehinlt the fon:es.
Again. /13 in OAka. the) met the de",ands of
ttpplflnental l!en'ice for whieh the) we", de-
but e,en the ucellent 838\em of liaison
and l'OIltrol or onll mo,menLII pro,ed of no
al..ll ...hen 8-2'9 raid$ th",w' all
ehi1ian-defenll' .genell'S Inlo confll!Ion, al-
though al no time "./13 there e"idenee of com-
p1tte disorpnlzation of the unlU. The) kept to
t.bf:ir jobll ttntil II WaJJ e,'ident that limited ef-
forb on their pan ,,ere lneapable of ehecking
the holoeaWlt and that further .eti,ity Willi

IV. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF JAPANESE CIVILIAN DEFENSE COl\'TROL CEi\TIRS
I. l..trod t. .-In tr&eing the l:peration
of the \"J'riou.. air-raid_protection in
Kobe...:ith. \ie" to l"!'tabliMing the
and operation of ronlrol ..,nte,.,.. a new .nd
intereating ,..rial ion from the s);rtem as de-
IK'ribed in the 0:!aIta report \\"&8 the e3i$tenee
of an opet'ational subunit (b.Itd..II) of the au,,_
ilial'" poIiee .nd fire unit (kribc>dall). The fol_
lowing di>ICus:<ion will Ihow that the headquar.
ten of unit operated. miniature I'Onlrol
cenler from which serlItel' a'ailable to il were
report includel',
a d""eu""iOIl of three ol>erating CQntrol ('('nters.
"al"yin!l" In cope of operadun 11",1 in number
of -er.. icCli a'aHable: the lowest in point of
So, 7 _tal... IIG.... ot........
inlt of tht> air-raid .....
b, UIJt/i"._RacUo .nn;)CII-'tl ., ......
"ere from the Central AJ1IIJ' .
In o...ka. Th_ .nnouneeDlenla a&.o
inrorrru.lion of th, kleation of the p!aDeoI. 41nc-
tilln, _ill:' and compo..o.itlon of tile ftight and other
de""ripti\'(' inf"rmation.
c. ()'Jotr 1lI,IAo,b._The u.;e of or
!eoP\end ligh". to a.upplement sirena to .n-
nounce air-raid ..arninp ..... Itbo:> Pl'l'llC:ribed
In Kobt, b<lt in actual operation the ""&II
relied on primanl). Kobe ol5ciab I'Onsidered
the anemge entirel}' adequate for the
.U<libk "arning of the entin:' cit). The AIllfi..
den<:)' d the iI ob\'iQus from .n e:<_
aminati 'n of the map sho....ina: in!n il1$\alla.
I iona nd the ran", (of conTagf! of each
(Exhibit B). "i_1 methods of announcement
of ....rninp. 1ftft. ho-or",,-er, uaed for .loerting
the dnf.nd ... aD auiliary DH!Itna In the eU!flt
of of the "'reD '!ptan..
ii. Co.......u.-The Ioo:ation of lllrens in
110 thai tneir ranee- of eo\'erage 01-erlap.-
peel. &:tured ..ide dia.oemination of .!ipab in
ea IIOtIIe "'ere dealroyed. IDdh;dual si..... f:Oll-
trol..,.<uret! o!ll'rati"n in the nent that the ..,n_
t ral conlrol illJll,a/lati n or power linea leading
from it ....ere deat.ro)'"ed. Here. all in Osaka. offi-
ciaL! and citiuM had great eonfident:e in the
operation of the ....rn.ill&" s}"lltem. lleehanieal
f.ilul'1!f; .nd bombing of power line:a during
raid;< ....t:re o'errome bJ' the auxili.ry me.ns or
'iren to,nlrol"'hicb '\!'re pro\ided..
local 'Irena were eontrolled, .nd .t the conlrol
tenter of Ih.. pollee of the pnfectural
1l"1I1'crnm"nt,. I'rum the lauer point, ordera 1(1
_<ound ...arnmll"!! "'ere circulated to the lic
headquarteu of tile other munidpalilil!ll
the prefecture. Sounding of "'arninp
upon arm)" orde... "'l1li expfell3ly
e\cn thuugh planCll were attually '
.:1. fir methods by which
"Iet'\'t'll bells ,"h"
,I 'ed ',"'"""ere em_
I 0) to announce the v.rious air-raid "'.rn_
,nK'! ("ltlert," 'alarm." "relea"", from .lann"_
or to and the -n=!ea&e from .lert"
----Or all.dearJ "ere all dl'llC:ribed .t length in
the o".ka field noport.
.l/d 01 etltll(l'lIlnltg 'ig....a.-. S,r"".
- ..... "",ntral. from ..-hich the 12 Kobe
munlelp.1 1I11elU and 5 industrial ltirena: "ere
llOunded, .... Ioolled in a scbool build.
lag .bout 4 l>locb from tbe prefectural head-
Thia room .... manned .t .11 hours
1(1 army direclwlU for the llOUndinc of
... Il!terrogation of one of the operatonl
of Ih'a room indicaled that under uid eondi-
tionll mall)' dlsruptiona of iren ope:ration
eurred. both from mec-hanical failurell of the
f'Gulpll1l'nt and from the ell'ect.;; of bumbinc on
lhe powu lines. Anticipating such rontingen_
ciell. thl' Jlin:'1UI "'ere ...ir-ed llQ all to pennit I'On.
trol at Ihe "'.rning central or indhiduall)' at
each location. If toc central.rontrol panel
(page 12) IIho"'ed dillruptio"" of I'Onllediollll to
an)' of the lIirens. telephone call "..._ made to
delignaled operalor ...ho then operated the
,.iren b)' me.n$ of a ....ikh Iornted at the
Under such I'Onditions tile operator at the ,iren
receil'ed his cue for the ....rning by
radio. oU'r which the aigna!._ weno
at the direction of the eQntrollJng ann,}" author.
ill' ill Osaka. The illuatrationg on t3 .ho....
a municipal "iren ere<'ted on lOP of one of the
school huildingd. The II municipal ...ere
idelltknl in type. E"hibit B ill a mltp of K'lbe
_howing locationl or girena al!d range of cover-
age of each. Ileference Iteml N03. 3 and 4
the electrical hook_up of the lIiren syslem. Ref_
enmce item No, 6 is II I<lt (If of
the mutlicilllll in Kobe. Reference item
No, {; i. II nHUll",1 gll'ing a gcner,,1 tlco'ril.1 ion
of the CUrC and usc of sirclld, item
Fedcrated Block Associ2tions (Rttngo
Chokai)
6. Orgarri;:aliorr nnd opcroUoIl6.-The Kobe
federated bloc'k oper.ted in man
ner identical 10 that of Osak.. There "'u a
total of 60 in the dt)'. eath one of the
leadeN of the lIe"eral block aMOCiationa which
weno included within ilB anoa, The leader waa
thollen by Ihia _mb\}' fm a term.
:s"eilher the Ie.der nor the group had ape-
dfie .ir-defense functions oth"r th.n .eting
a channel for equipment And informalion to the
Io....er echelola.
7. COlIIlIIl:rrt6.-ll.king e\'en' dtizen rl'1Ipon-
to hi.!! neighborhood group. while bolding
the neighborhood group accountable to tile block
usoeilltion and tbull to allCCffding higher eche-
10M. &lIi!!ured I'Omplete coope:ration of each indi-
vidual in the I'Ontrol of $maU incident!!. The
interest .nd high nHlrale or the;,e grotlpll ....ere
to be e3pected. for here the indh'idual "'u con-
eerned with "lIelf_protection"_the u\'ing of
his o....n home. AJI in O$aka. although lmall in-
cidenUl were handled b)' these group;!, the I.rger
829 raidll were I'Ompletel)' be)'ond the capadt)
of the neighborhood grouPII.
Kobe at the point where the direction to lIOund
aignala Wll.!l ntil'ed from Ihe arm)'. Informa-
tion regarding the di$!lemination of air_raid
warnings within lIyogo Ilrefeclure walllll'Cured
from the chief of tile planning seelion of the
air-defense headquartcrll (boku homI,") or the
Kobe municipal lrO\"ernmenl.
of air.defense tralnin, once. ye.r In outdoor
m.neu..er. at larp park In Kobe. In -
neighborhood l"J'Oup did not ta.a\'e pump of It.
own. il shared 11 pump with lu adjacent nllip.
borhood. croup. lhe oper.tion of aueh pump
being under the control of the leader of the
defense section or the block lUlIOCiation who wu
ref!ponsible for il-'l upkeep .nd m.intenanee.
Airlbid Signals
2. Authorily.-Aa indicated ab<)\'e, direc
tions sent bl' the Ccntral Army hClldqUllrlera in
Ogakll tOllOund signala within H)'ogo
wcre l'ccd\"ed llt the wllI'uing central at which
4. "'lIlIdio""_' Ordi""rl/,-The ordinar)'
of the war-time group
in Kobe, IhOlle of r.lioning, and bond
ul_ did not dill'er from those In Osaka,
b. Air_mid de/'"Ie,-Aa in all ,the
able-bodied ciliEen. who nol
for dUliell in olher were ealled
upon to adiflllhll air-defenlle leader in
in, .nd whale\'u other dutle8
required. The principal equIpment
of a I..'O-man hand-oper.ted water pump illl!ued
Ihrough municipal ehannel...
Block Associ:oIlion (Chokai)
5. OrIlON"""',ON lIIId OJH'TlI/iOfU'. - Aa in
the nonnal function of the block U8O-
ciation "'ai1 lhat of a collectin/[ .nd diaeminat_
ing echelon the higher mllnicipa.l chan-
neb .nd lhe neighborhood llTOup&. In Kobe. the
func:tiom of the block _ialion .ere di\'ided
into 'h'e -.:tioll8: u\inp. diatribution. defense.
health and tuatwlL The leader of lhe defenlle
;lft1,ioIl (llib.) "'ai1 chollen for a pe:riod of 2
)'"ean by the bIoc:k _ialiOli members. n:'pre-
sentint( the lIe\-eral neiChborhood croups in the
\ic'init)'". The principal fUnd.ion of thia defenae
Mdion ""all the AIlpe:f\'iaion .nd coordin.tion
of the indh'idual neichborhood group .ir-de-
feMe leadera and the aupplemenling of air-
defelbe equipment in ,,'here the indhidu.l
neighborhood l"J'Oup equipment pro\-ed inade-
quate. The leader of the defen!le aection chose
an Ulii.!!tant leader .nd the rest of the member-
Ihip ...... I'Ornpoosed enlinol)' of the air-defenlle
leaden or the lIe..eral nei,hborhood groupll. The
defeMe MCtion leader reeei\-ed. certain amount
AIRRAID WAR ING
I. hlNJduti01l. _ Directioll8 for lI(lunding
.ir-raid ...rninl"5 in Kobe and throughout
H)'ogo prefecture wen! receil'ed from the Cen-
tr.l Arm)' headqu.rterlJ in Oi!aka. The Olaka
field report eonlaina a dellCriplion of the means
b)' "'hith enemy tlighu were detected and the
channeb Ihrough .... hich that information
re.thed Ihe Centr.1 Army headquarters ""hich
....u the tole .uthority for directing the sound_
ing of airraid.warning lIignals, The rellort of
the air_raid "'arning lIYlItem in Kobe, tllerefore.
omilllthe methodl of detection of cnemy flighlll
but describu Ille .Ir.raid_wllrning aystem in
10
11
" I ... '00'''" ", 1 br ,,", Kobo ....;,;.,1 ,;"., ,.d ,;"., I .,."d ;n ;m....".' ;nd."".. ;. ..... wo<'
...:::;: "..1: "'.,,, wO', ,,,I..... br .o<.f. b." , ... :". (".,. d;,....,I.d "nd ".' .,:,"'" .;. ,h. p;.,,),
.', , J."., f ,h. h,l. , ..,,,hOI ,"'w. " 'h. lol, ,,",...( ,h. p,.,I, .....,01 ..... ,h ......
12
CI"",'np ,;.... ,.1 .'""><;1..1 ';..n, All ,;,,", 01. " ...... ,tl 'H". n.., ."' .. ,.. tho " d.. 1
"S",,;,I "SUQ 1")1'" 1'0,,' flOG. No. lSOl? lph.a,., !O .p.. 1I<j ,-<>I,,.. ''''PC'''''' .l.n ,.1"- , '0 m..."'....
""""I,,,,,,",,, f ",.'), 4, 19.1& ,\I .."f.... 0>_ 01 0>0"'_"
13
, ,n.' tMI of the ,ubunil of
d'RR onit: tnen came thoe
tile awuhan" pol1ce tilt .\lXili.n" poli<:'f "xl
main ne-dquarlu- ... tbe
lin' unit: and at tbe lOp kut" dit.. _lite...
lural c:ontrol l_
w ..r operalioM T
O.-...t'OIl _. 1I....fdiolf M(lII.I!'lIrU,- h'
- '-'- ,-' -hip of I e
, ... ,he o ration and re...llon:;; _
""""rl - . . "d orgamu,-
c:ootrol centeno ir the Kobe lilT_rat r
tion /I; deM:riplion of the normal seq,uend. '
. .' -'Alltial rome I.
air_raid operation, 14 b-
mea$UN'I! to combat the of enemY,bom
lUi: w,,"'" employed the hou.eholder. wIth the
h Ip of hi. neighbors IIml the leader of t,he
n:i.thborhood group (I,mad gllm;) ..Ever
y
Ill-
ddent of bombing. of lIS ronse-
quencl!$. was reported to the ,of
the appropriate subunit of the" JMlhee
and II.,-e unit. Anuming that the rombmed er.
foTU of the neilrhborhood lrTOUP then on. the
lIeene ..-ere insufficient, the leader of the ne'lrh.
borhood lrTOUP made a rtqll('j't for aid to the
luOOnit headquartel'll.
11. Cntno! entrr o! tile .IIbllllit (bIlJlUorl) o!
,lie ....ra....., pol;'u ."td jre ".'t.-The
atinlr penonllel of control C"nter con$.;rted
of a leader and two apiltant ..-ho were
'n of the poliN! and lire UUlU,
Incident.!! reported to this headqullr:el1l
..-ere plotted On an operations map and
were dispatched at the dlf'edlon
of the leader, The method of selectIon of
aonnel of this unil, their dutiea" ami a
tion of the police and fire ?valillble
are del!Cribed in another o! th,s
under the .ubject "Auxihar,' Pollee and fire
Unia"
c. Tile co"'r "",,"ler of tllr aui/iorl! poliu
..d ,re II.it (keibodfl.).-There on. duty
at !hu control a leader and t..-o aMlstant
In.den in .upe.....i8t)ry colltrol of the police and
lire amIL Reporn of each int:ident "'ere made
to thi!; control center from the .ubunit bead.
quarten.. The only control of the poliee and
tire anna exerci.5ed at this headquanenl con-
luted Ilf the ghiftinlr of forces from the area
of (lJ1e subunit to another. It could also reque!<t
relnforcemenll from a nearby au"iliar)' llOlice
and fir_ unit. There howel'er, one lItrl'iee
which wu at the aole di!l<:retion of
this control center_the mediCli1
I'
. h d' .....-,ed at length undH the lite_
m WhlC II " U. "
a,r . led "Auxiliary Police and f Ire DIU.
lion enllt '. IIlll -uipped with an
. trol " .. II - ..
c?n for the recording of ineidtn40
operallo
ns
m,a
p
. dicatine the and location
and a chart or 10 , 'f eel
of the fflrce:l or ,nl I .
d TA, t'OJllrol UII/tr uf til, tJir-df/trut
. f fA, poliCf lIiri.i/l1l of til, prt!tt/Kmt
tlflll 0 tilt (8flb."JI .,lIit&If}.-AlI rellOrtlI uf
f!Or.rnllll mllde to the auxiliary pollee /lnd fil'('
mc.,denl.$ r to Ihe police and fire
nllll were or" II" . ,
u. n from there relayed immedillte)'
a d h '-defense S\.'C!ion
h ontrol center of t e IIlr
of the
menl At the 1l0u[\(Hng (Of the alert S.,g.lIll :
of this rOOm IIs:\(!mblcd (Exhibit C ItstJ!
perllOnnel and of each). In.man)'
but on n larger the operation of thul con-
trol cenler re!lCmbled the operation of the COII-
trol center of the next It>w..r echelon, the IIUX-
mal'}' police and lire unit, !or here, too, no
initial of the poliee and fire artJ\ll
made, :\"0 fire was kept under
the control of Ihi$ headquarter!!. and fire opera.
tion Wll8 confined to the shifting of fire eqUIp-
ment (prefectural and auxilial)') from one !Iee-
tion of the area to another. Contral)' to the
usual operlltion or control centeN, IlO opera.
map of the whole llrea covered willi ullCt1.
The shifting of fire lind pollee sen'ices from
one district to another "'&8 indicated on a black.
oollrd. There were. howe"er, certain senoJceR
availllole for disJlatch b}'this helld(jul1ltcrs:
(I) C""rd /'I:SCI'C IUdt (keil>ilfli).-Thlll
unit was compo!lC(l of members of the llOllce
department gpecial!)' trained in re!ICue.
lind who were delignnted for operation .111
thill M:rvice during periods of air raid. EqUIp-
ment corulisted of hand tools (l!llWIl, UelI,
picks, maull, IIho\'els, rope) lind Iltretchers.
Personnel of this unit were tr:anllportl'Cl b)'
d"iJian truw c:QltIlCripted for the purpoooe.
as dt>!eribed belo,,'.
(2) Police relltn'e of IIb
o
ut
itO policemen ,,...g a8!embled upon the llOiJnd
ing of the alert at designated
out the area, This group W:lS used pnman,b
for traffic control llnd prevention of 11I1IC.
A part of lhill ",.lIen'c II'all IltatiOlled lit Iht
centraillolice hend'i1I:lI"tCI'1I for firc dillies anti
for the handlina: or inndiarl.,. In that vi
cinity.
(3) Tr"Qport"tio. ruerl'e.-<:ertal
n
"1'_
eJvillan trucb "ere d.,.ia:natecl to
report to the contra( eenter or to other speei.
fil plae.,. on the llOundina: of the alert. Theae
tn1C:b "'ere used for transportation of the
lfIl&rd reacue unit and other IM'T-
llOnnel. They "'ere used also for CUl1'inlr
medicines. emerl(ellcy loodltuffl, and clolhinlr
to raid euualties..
(4) the period of air
raid there wal assembled in each police dil-
trict u rCllCrve of doctors for immediate care
of casualties. Shiftinlr of these doctorl from
one district to another "'all accomplished
through this ellnlrol center.
(6) Mll/qal ald,_ln the e\'ent the lIemcea
a"ailable within Kobe ....ere insufficient to
cope "'ith the emergency. a reqllest for rein_
forcemenu from neighborinlr municipalities
"'as made by the leader of the control center,
....ho ..... the prefedural go\'el'Tlor. 'n pru_
tice, hO"'l!\'er, requesb for outaide aid "'ere
made b)' the head of the lrU&rd .section, ..'110
was actually the operatinlr leader of the <:on-
trol \"('nter. Requesll were alllO made to the
arm)' for aslirtance in emel/l'en(:J' repair,
poat-raid clearance, and lil1!t aid. Such re-
questll were made either to the head(luarten!
of the Army unit 81ationed in Kobe Or to the
Central Army Headquarterl in Ollka,
3. R,'prwtl,_Aa soon as practicable after a
"aid, rcportll of casualties alld property damalre
were a8llllmbled b)' the police Itationl and for_
warded to the m.in control lIere these
reports were eonllOlidated and copies lubmitted
to the head of the lIeetion of the
police dh'ilion. to the chief of the police dhi_
sion, to the leader of the lrU&rd section of tlHt
police di"ision, to the go,'ernor of the prefec
ture, to the headquartel1l of the Central Arm)'
in OAka, to the headquartertl of the Kobe anllJ'
dhision, to the Ouka na\'al guard district, to
the Miniltry of Home Affairtl in Tok)'O, 10 the
director of the Kinki region. to Ok&}'ama and
Tottori prefecture&, to the head of the fire __.
tion of the police di,'ision of the Ilrefeeillral
go'ernment. lind to a central ministeri.1 board
which lupervlllCd production in factories pro-
ducing arm)' and nllVY materiala. A cop)' of a
typkalCI H1..... ....-& .........
aa Exhibit D,
4. C....nu.-'I1le tWp I U __
tion of coalrol _ten Ul KGIla _
studied In Oaka UId an _bJeet to U. _
..,neral to ...........
proof and lItrueturee aDd ahena.ce
IoeatiCi.... Here. &pin, "'&11 l!\ideneed tJt,a ftld
that p1annlna of ttll. air_taid.)lf'Oteo::_
tion .system "'u .... to small. sporadic raid&..
Arter eompletinlr the interruption of officiala
and the inl'et\ilration of the main control room
the immediate question altllle; What would have
been the result If a high.explosive bomb Or a
few heavy incendiary bomb!! had bit bere? The
ans"'er is, obvioualy, the loaa of
control of the ci\'illan-defense forces,
INCIOEi\'T CONTROL
I. l.trodllctiOll._The basic principles of in_
ddent control as diseU8Rd III the OlIaka lIeId
report pre\'ailed ""nerally in Kobe prutiee.
The shlftiq of <:(>nlrol In sueeeoedina '-de11l of
tile &eni,""", ratbeT than remainina:
in a indiMdual...... &pin the buis
of tbe operation. The uae of the (hil-
da.. ) of the 5uxiliaIT polic:\! and fire unit
(keibod,,") and the defen"", section (boeibll)
of the block _ialion (dokn,) in the Hl'OlrQ
prefecture air.raid-defen1le I,.stem introduced
ne.., links in the chain of eommand which
require additional diseuSllion. (A complete
re.um' of the organi:uition and operation of
the subunit and of the defen"", seelion il to be
found in this report under the headinp, "Au:r-
iliaT)' Police and Fin! Uniu" and "Block A_
dationl," re!!peetivel]'.) In r-eadinlr the follo'l\'
iog paralrrapha, n!feren.. ... should be made to
the chart On page 9, aecompan,rinlr lhe section
Iln "K"ilrhborhood GI'OOIM" (,-ri p.i).
2. Qpt'flIti(llO,-To il1u5tralf' the p1aeea occu-
pied bl' the ne'" """menu in the sequenN! of
Operatiolll "'hieh pren.i1ed at the bombi"l' inci-
dent, the preMnee of the leader of the neithbor-
hood lr"OUP directing and eontrolH"I' the com--
bined clforta of the houllthokler, the assisting
neighbors.. and neighborhood.lr"OUp membel"ll,
is lil1lt auumed. If the incident to he
of luch malrnitude that the defenlle section
leader \lIlIumed pe\'llOnal supel"\'ision, he Ihen
CIlmmander at the scene of the incident..
15
UNEXPLODED BOMBS
17
f, rire 4,.,."..., ...............
rem ill ....
one-half of the aftIaP -'-',,.,...
wonman's pay 1M:aJe. bo1reYer. iac:nuIdI_
rapidly during Ihe .ar t.Iwl the fI._n', ao
that hill .salary became approximately
the laborer'., The inducements to become
fireman "'ere the pennantnc:y of the job, peD-
lion bnoefita. and the import.DeC pined i" tile
commUllil)' by being a F1"ernmental empJo1eoe.
The 1I10g0 prefecture salary plall ...u similar
to the Osaka pay lICllle. thlt it "'as 8Ome-
what lower (Reference Item r-o, 11),
lr p!aJl.-The fire and pen5ion
plan Willi the same in all prefectures u it
CIItabliA.hed by the Minigtry of Home Atrair...
A detaned aceoullt of thil plan is contained in
tbe Osaka field report.
h. .\Iedical aid-Firemen injured in line of
duty received frft medial and hoospita1-
ization.
i. AdraltUlllflll ill rootk.-f"iremen after 3
)'eaTlI of lIen'ice mill'ht ad,'aru:e to serll'eanta br
a written examination with a II'rade of
60 percenL Three-)'ear 'erll"C&nta ad,'anced to
in the IIlIme lIIaCMr. Office.... "'eN'
selected b}' the police atraira chief from aJ'IlOlIg
the 5-}'Ut suboftlo:era. Commanders wen abo
thooten by aelect.ion from theZ- to 5-year omeers.
j. Killed aM ;lIj.rnl. i. lill(' of "al,.-From
Feb..... al'} 4, to AUJ1l.<l 22. 1945. there-
were 32 firemen killed and \01 "'ounded &.II the
resull of air raids. The det:ths and injuries
WeN' the result of fire fill'hting except an ind_
dent on August 22, 1945. which killed one alld
"'ounded three fin!men "'hen they attempted
to remo\"e a nUllO from Kobe harbor (RdenDeC
Item:\o. 12),
k. l:z...p1;OIt fro. _ilit"T)' Hrrin. _ All
firemen except men in high po!!-itionll. mechani<:ll
and qualified fiN' fighters of long of aef\'-
ice "-ere 10 military dutr. and lit one
time 4(10 men weN' on militu)' lene from the
department. ThoI!e who had N'ported back had
been returned to their former J,lI.lISitions..
l Sick ,,"" ;IIjtltftl_-Duricg the year 19-1-1,
then! were 219 men at-nt from duty for a total
of 3,184 da}'$. During that )"ftor ODe man re-
ported bKk to duty afler % da)'lI lick leave
(RefereMe Item No, 13).
&.II ,an auth<rrity on An! t\chti.... His
prominence III baed upon the fact that he ..
aelected to protect the palace inllt
and becaullt! he published a book in 1937,
wlth..a fourth edition in 1943, elltitled "Study
on t Ire.Pre,'ention Tactlca" (RefeN'nce Item
No. 10) ..The chief admitted that much of the
material In the book ""u taken from a aimilar
book written by l-twill of Ne... York. Prior to
July 2;;. Kobe did not have a lire delMrt-
ment llCI>tion within its police ooreau; the fire
department ,,u joint function of the traM-
portation di"illion of the poliC'C! department.
b. Sllbu/;,," d"/llIrtm"nt._There
"'ere nine within llyogo prefecture "'jth
POIlUlations exceeding 30,000 each. Fh'e (If
these towna, NiIlhinomiya. Ama'lI!lItki. Itam;,
Akaahi and Himej! had fire department head.
,,'jth an a"erage of thrft !UbAtatiolUl
each, Th_ to"'M were ullder the prefeclural
police uureau and their fire departmelltll were
"'ithin the juriMliction ot the Kobe fire chief.
c. de-por/ment IlCr.on""I._ln
thm'l! were 414 fulltime firemen in Kobe. Thi$
number had increased to 650 in Jul)' acd
had further increased to 1.830 in December
1942, In llareh there wre 1.933 firemen.
but at the time of this !Un'ey there were 1.223.
It "'II.'! the illtent of the prefectural go'-erlllJlCllt
further to reduce this number.
d. rire dr-portmut of
firemtll in Kobe w... "ery much the same ... in
Osaka. The required !lChooling of 8 )'eaTll in
addition to minimum and mllXimum age le'elI!.
and thc minimum ph)'sical sl/lndards were al50
the IIlIme. except that the minimum weight of
117 pounda ..... the Kobe and HyOlO pN'fecture
atalldard. All these N'quiremenl3 "'ere sublltan-
lian,. lowered duril1ll" the ...r, and. C'OlI5e-
quent!)'. man)' of the prewnt-dl.} fiN'men "'ere
below par mentally and ph)sicaU). The chief
atated that he intended to weed out the undt'JIir-
able mcn and replace them with better qualified
perilOrltlel.
e. 1I'0r!'itlg lIehedak - Firemell worked a
two-platoon a}'stem, 24 houTll on dut)' and 24
houra otr dut)" Oft'-duty firemen were required
to report to lheir re:tlpl.i,-e ftN' atations UPO"
the of an air-raid warning. All ftremetl
were entitled to an anllual \"IIcalioll of 3 "'eeb
with pay.
"i".) of the .u;dliar'} police and tire unit
(ttibod"all) .nd Ihe membel'll of the police de-
partment weN' relipoMible only for the cordon_
inll" off of a Il&fe area around an unexploded
bomb. Repol'U! of the prellence of.
were made immediately to the .m.lItar
y
pollee
of the army division located In Kobe, from
which the bomb-dispoaal llquads
and Target informatIon llId.u:atell
low ratio of high-CXP\OIIh-e to .Incen-
diaries dropped on Kobe. It IS .nteTelltmg to
note that lox.l officials ClItimated that unex-
loded bombol found in the area N'presented 5
ro 6 percent of the number dropped. defccu
were di!>CO\'ered in the mcthad of dls]>Ollal of
the few bombs which the aer"ices here were
called upon to handle.
FIRE SERVICES
Fire protection
I. lIotroducliolt.-The fire IN!rvices in"esti-
gation in Kobe and PN'fectlll-e included
the stud}' ot fire-lighting apparatull. the number
and training of fire fire.pre,ention
methods, building construction, water supply
and distribution s}'!tem,
method! and related subjects. together with
their etfecth'eness in controlling fire! caused by
air raids,
2. HlJO(Jo prefecture
Orgalli:atioll.-The fiN' department .section of
HYOiO prefecture under the police bureau
M it was in O!lllka prefecture. All lire depart_
ment administrative affairs, including a!llign
inll' and transfer of penonneJ. budget, lox.tion
of fire equipment, fiN' PN','ention and other
related matten. were directed b)' the head of
the police bureau. (Reference ltellUl NOlI. 8 and
9). police officera withoul any fire de-
partment background or trail1ing were mo,-ed
into important positionll in the fire department
[n that connection, all the battalion (brigade)
chiefs in Kobe were policemen. Howe"er. Y.
Yajima ,,'as brought from the Tok)'o fire de-
partment on July 25. 1945 and named chief of
the fire department !lCCtion with the titlt of
region.l police lIupe.rinlendent, He had had 18
}t.TlI tJtpe.rienee in the Tokyo fire departn>CO
t
and at the time of his Kobe appointment ....15
lire chief of the batUtlion station located on the
palace lie is by prominent
Thf, ne:o:t highe!' e<'hekm ff'(lft\ ....hich hl':lp
obt.inable "'1.. the 5ubunit. U,,?n the .rm.
1
of aMislanet> from subunit, Ih.e. leader
th<lreof look o,'er the direction or act",.t). If,
howe,'er, al Ihal lime, or laler. the leader
the particular subunil arm which had been d'l-
patched should arrhe. he a.'lSumed control.o
f
the OlKration. Aa the inddent rem-
forcemellU came from neighboring subunlu but
the leader of the __f\;ce alread,. on the
continlk'd ill control, reprdlese of
rank of the leaders. At thia ,tage it rna)' be
that the llSi!istant unit leader in charge
of the "rm in sen'ice has arrived at the inddent.
That !Mder then became the directing author
it}. The arrival of reinforeing auxi.1ial'}
and fire uniu did not caUi!e the unIt leader m
command to be aupe.r.!ieded, But uplln the u-
ri'''1 of the municipal :lOn,ice. iuleader became
the rommander allCl remained 80. regardll':!lll of
the arri,'al of mutual aid from all oUbide com-
munity,
3, CltlllllU'III-ln short. it mal' be said that.
throughout the l!C<luence of OIIerations, com
mand shifted to succeedini higher authority
but WII.'! not changed b)' the arrh...1of help from
a ec:heloll. Amonx ditrerent IN!f\'icC$
(fl.re. rescoe. police) of the .same echelon. the
leader ..;th :!eniOT rank W&.II in command. While
eonstallt shirting of indh'idual command
at fil'llt, Kern producth'e of cocfusion. t'JIpecially
in "iew of the Japanese meticulous obser"ance
of rank, in"C$tiption indicated that the se_
quence of control at incidentll Willi orderly and
,a,-e ri.>e to no N'ported incident of clashing
pe.raonalities or of lack of cooperatioll amollg
ditrerent &rIIU or troUPI.
Inquiry of the /\.Mistant leader of the peace-
prescn'ation .section of the police di"ision of
H)'ogo prefecture (formerly the assistant
luder of the air..defenlMl llCCtion) showed that
itt Kobe the handling of unexploded
(Olhet than incendi.ry) "'u in lltrirt compli
ance with the national revalatiom which dele-
....led that TelIponsibilily to the atllly. The pe.r-
lIOnnel concerned. i.e.. the leader of the neigh-
borhood group U_ri guti). the members of
the uno<ploded-oomb !Quad (fultatslldall sltori-
halt) which was part of the guard arm (kei-
16
19
portable ......- .
ina- or eutUtlI' toola. ItOI' odIIr .....
anCQ ('O)mmonly found ID tIIlPDe ftlIIIP'ID-"
the United StateR. Ladder, _\'lIP. COI.I...
high-preuure fna. reKue, lip!, aDd maiDte-
nance eompanies were In thia fire
departDlent. lfoWI!\tr. Kobe did luIve one 60-
foot IIreboat, Oleeel-dri,flt, with of
about 1> knola. It "'lUI equipped with two 350
Itprn. pumPll dri"en by a Bukk eight and a
Ford V..a engine. The Ford engine "'all out
of .eniee as there ...ere no repair parta a,'ail_
able. In addition to eiaht aoc:tions (65.5 feet
each) of 2-....inc:h unlined linen hose .nd under-
.... noa.lea, there .ere IWo .unall
moniton ,,'ith;;; to 15-ino:h UJlll. No other equip-
ment, ueept 4.ino:h hard auetiofLII for drafting
O\U the aide and pumping O\It other boota. and
foor one-half pllen carbon telraehloride ex_
tlnguishen Call erupt)) .'ere on this tireb<.at.
A.terlront and ahipboard tire prottion,
the .... or little \-.Jue euept for tire
fighting .unall and for incipient
flrea on plen and doeb. Its pumping eapadtJ'
and Iin:ited numbl!'r and aize of hose !trI'amlI
e,'en with ita 1Ie,'en firemen and tinman
erew. 1f1!'re inferior to _ of many am.aI.I patrol
(ftre department .nd mast guard) boota fO\lnd
.in United StaIn (page 20).
d. .ppli4_. toola Orttl ..OIU._
The entire equipment a,..n.bIe for the 161
pumpen In the prefecture wu .. followlI:
(I) F"olditlg "'aler tanks 33
(2) r..dder.--l8- to 2O-foot uteIIlIion 60
lSI Hoae-2.'i-ino:h linen 2.S02 lIti(lna
(650-ino:h each)
(4) Pike pol_ill: .nd eight foot- 356
(5) Sho"elll 116
(6) ;4
(1) Wood hammen (mallets) 37
(8) Cotton O\'ereoata 240
(9)
(10) Glo\"I'lI 145
(Rderenee Item No.
6. TraiHiau o[ }inJICItIl.-Prior I ::ember
I. a polieetraining ..,hool maintloined a
tion for inBtructing firemen in the bRre funda
mentals of tire flghtiott and pump operations.
Their primary training conaiated of milita!')'
drills and dilOOrum. The lfChool WII! not main_
tained during the war and wu not eurrently
In eaehh of the Pl"@SentbattallondlBtrlclJllhere
are t ree substation..
b. .t"tiona "lid PUMper.
The FebruarJ . Mafl:h 17 Ma," d J
6 1945" " an une
: aIr ralda dl'lltro)'ed three battalion ata.
tlons and four aubstationJI in addition to 116
fire These IoueB neeelIAitated the
IoealLng of llOmeof the fire.tatioOll in temporary
quarttl"ll,and a of the remainina
fire.lIghtlng equ'pment. This ae:tion in turn en-
larged the battalion dilJtricta and redueed the
number from 4 to 3. (Exhibit E and Reference
ltema NOlI. 16 and 17). The reduetion from
117 to between July and Oc:tober
1946, lUI mdlC:ated in paragraph a abo"e ia at-
tributed to the return of
l)Rratus to other dtil'll in the prefecture. P-
, 5. MOlorized "pparallC5
.a Kob",-In Kobe at theterminauon of tile "'"at
there were in the fire battalion dinrieu of
Nad. Ikuta. Napta a total of ,,9 pumpen. 32
of ....hleh "'ere out of o:ommiMion. The
of trained mec:haniOi and the fact that envne
and pump replao:ement partll ...ere not .vailable
made it impossible to repair them. Thirteen of
the 59 pumpers ....ere rated at 500 g.p.rn.. and
rema.i"<.!er at 450 g.p.rn.. The Z7
In oommlMlOn ....ere in poor state of repair.
and were not depend.ble eVen to the point of
.rr;'ina at the acene of a fire (Exhibit E and
referenee item No. 14). Ali fire apparatua had
to be started by hand erank,
b. MOlo.. appa,.t.., i .. "djac",t r;iUallt5.
-The adj.eent "mages of Niahinomi)'a. Amat-
aaaki. !tami, Akallhi and Himeji.dthin the
prefture and under the ume fiR ehief all
Kobe had at the lermination of the war 102
Ilumpen, half or whieh ....ere oot of eommillllion.
Twent)'-aix of these pumpen were rated at 500
1t.II.m., 70 at 450 g.p.m., ;; at 350 g.p,m. and I
at 160 g.p.m. All fire apparatus in aervice in
the!\f! villages were in the IlIIme of repair
u those in Kobe, It is interesting to note that
of the remaining 16t pumpers in the entire
Ilrefecture. 64 were American-built automobiletl
(Ilerel"enee item No. 14).
c. TVPi' o[ fira The onl)' t)'1Ie
of motorized fire apparatus in Hyogo prefecture
waa trucks equipped with pump.'! and hose beds
(rloel cllrts). There Were nO ehemical tanh nor
wllter tank.. with lJooater pumps. portable ex_
-'

'"

..
"!
d. .4ffilillte8.-The thou!lllnds of men, wOOMn
and children in the neillbborhood rroupl! Wl!1'tI
given some rather indiff;::rent training by thI
auxiliary firemen,
e. Adiliolt rquip'Ntlll.-Neirhborhood lITOuJi'
....ere equipped ....ith small 30 to 50 g.p.m. nanod
pump.'!, one 18- to 20_foot ladder, a pike pole
and sho\'el. 20 buckeu and !!C\"eral fire beaten.
In addition. theR ....ere a'<aililble for their u_
several 7O-pllon conerete tanka, supplemen.
tary to the one o.... ned b)' eaeh famitr, and a 300.
to l.500-gal1on "'ater barrel. Thb equipment
.... paid for b)' each group. In addition to the
aoo"e equipmenl. 6 hand pumps ....ere diatrib-
uted throughoot each blocli. .uociation (cho-
koi) acd ....ere under the operational jurilldie_
tion of the air.defenae section (boeibu) of the
block lISSOciation. Theae pumpll ....ere distrib-
uted !lO that ther eould be roo\oed to fires an)',
....here In the district.
f. Prirole brig<ldu.-MOilt manufactur-
ing plana lI\IIintained a small unit
"'hieh recein!d Ihe lIame .21_hour fire depart.
ment training as wu gh'en to Olher auxilian'
units. Some of this training wu gi"en at the
battalion headquarten stations and the rest. at
the plana. The equipment at th_ plants eon
aisled of a 450 g.p.m. pumper or a 120 g.p.m.
hand-dra....n rootoriud pump. depending on the
gize of the plant. The planti al!lO had hand_
operated pumps of 30 to SO a.p.m, eapaeitr.
The men ....ere not gi"en extrll paJo' for this $en'-
ice but "'ere Ullignoo to fire duty b)' the com
pany. and held an oecuional drill on company
time. The plant fire brigadea ....ere not well
trained and the)' were not ver)' effecth'e except
at amall fire:!!. Larae fires eaused b}' air raids
o"erwhetmed them.
4. .Ialio....._. "'umbu 0/ 8toliCl1l5._
i{obe Wall di"ided into four battalion distrie:u
until arter the Jul)' I. 1945 raid when it ....as
redueed to Ihree distrieu because of the burned-
oul areall and 108& of fire The battalion
stations and aubstations were liS follow&;
'.'
..".,.... ,..
.to,..... .,.,.... P......
--
1941_
---
- -.-

"
..
" 1942

"
..
1943
- -

"
'" 1944
-
.-.
--

'"
,.0
1946 (July 1) ____
3

'"
,.
(o.,tober) ___
3

..
,
m art;t)lI,_Firemen who were
of crime were immediately
from the fire ser"il:e. Minor of the
rull!ll and might be
handled direc:tb' br the battalion chiefa. The
first offenH uaualb' called for a reprimand.
s.erond or chronic offenders might be fined up
to I of two months' pay by the chief of
Ihe department. The ehief had the power of
dismis;sal in serioua matters.
3. AIIZl'lia'l' poIi" orttl lIait. (Kribo-
aOll),_. OTualli:atiooo.-The poliee depart-
mellt exercilled o,'u-all supen'iaion of the .uxil-
i.r)" poliee .od fire unita. It tr.ined these units
for gu.rd dut) .nd in thnique.
10 actual operation. the poliee .nd fire !leCtiona
of the poIiee department eould call upon the5e
units for reinfordnc sen'iee, In 1943 there
were uniu with .bout 16.200 members. (See
$fttion of thi. report on H Auxilia!')' Poliee .nd
Fire
b. Tnlillill,.-In addition to other training.
lheM men rec:t'i.-ed total of 21 houn' in!ltruc:-
lion from the fire _ion .t the battalion head-
quarten atatioOL
e. EqlllplIleal.-There: 1f1!'re four t)-pell of
pumpa ulled br the allxili,ry ftremen all followa:
0) per minute (g.p.m.)
pumpo on Ford and Che\Tolet tl'1H'lu ...hieh
....M'l! t!CI.uipped the Arne all the felrUlar fire
department pumpen.
(2) FO\Irtten 120 C.p.m. pumps mounted
on am.1I DaleOn ean, ueh equipped ...ith 8
to 10 _iollll of 2-ill('h linen flrehOlle.
(3) Two hundred .nd lUt)'_two 120 g.p.m.
tuOIine-dri.-en pumps on hand-dr....n eam
"'hieh carried S1iona of 2);.in<h linen
h_.
(4) One hundred .nd 30 to 50 g.p.m.
hand-oper.ud pumpe. eaeh I'tluipped with 3
.wctiona of linen hose. Thelle ....ere the
type of pump uaed mOlltlr by the auxili.ry
firemen owing to the pllOline ahortage which
limiled the aupply ror motorized equipment,
(6) In addition 10 the above pumping ap-
paratua. e.ch unit waa equipped with 40 pike
poles, 16 pieks, 30 15 eoila of I_inch
rope, 65-inchell long, 10 wood un"!, 4 3
aledge hammen. 20 stretehen, 40 20.foot
100 lI"aI maak! and 20 fint-aid
e<juipment wu by the citr.
18

20
Th. .... ......".
in service. The fire chief aUlte<1 lllat within the
next 2 montha he expected to} roopen the fire
sectiO}n O}f the IlChwl and JH!rsO}nal1y train all
firemen alQng the same llCneral plan tllat W4ll
used in TQkYQ. lie was frank in staling that
firemcll in IIY
Q
i!Q prefecture were poorly
trained in fire-fighting tactiex and that their
knO}wledge Qf pumps. twls and appliances ,,'as
limited. Ill' was emllarrused in havini! his
deparbnent inspected and drills obaened. The
training and equipment of the departmenlll in_
vestigated indicated their lItandards to be far
inferior to thOMe of the llvorage volunteer flre_
lighting units in rural areaa of the United
States.
7, FiN! alarm 8Jistcm,-a. E'leetric alorms,_
A Japanese_built electric alarm System (MM
type) was first installed in Kobe in 193!. Prior
IQ :\Iarch 1945, Ihere were 30'2 fire alarm bcIxes
in service ,,'ithin the harbclr, industrial and
busineas districts. At the time o( this survey,
45 of these bcIxes were still in CQmmill8ion. Ther
wero located On spcdal standards along prin_
cipal streets fram 550 feet ta a mile apart. A
central fire alarm office was not maintained and
each oox was CQnnected IQ ill! noarest fire Sla_
tion. Auxiliary alarm bcIxos were nat connected
to any of these cireuilS. Hawever, a few of tho
large industrial planlS :!.nd three department
stores each maintaine<l One alarm oox connected
to Iheir nearest tire station. The fire chief
staled that fire alarm ooxes were not deJH!nd-
able and were seldom used. There WIl$ nO rec-
ord maintained in the tire department of the
frequency these ooxes were used in transmil-
ting tire alarms.
, b. Tclcph,.me alarms.-Telephones were used
more often in ff\KIrting fires than were firo
1Ilarm boxes, but no record was maintained in
the department of these alarms. A fire depart-
ment special telephone number w/ls used for
re\KIrting fires, A fire call phone wu dis-
patched b) the district telephone exchange to
the neatest battlliion station headquarters.
c. Watch - Each battalion statiQn
lind substlliion had /I sleel-frame w/ltch tower.
60 to 70 fect in height. A 24-hour fireman
watch was on duty in each tower with the
watch changing e,'er)' hour. The walch tower
was considered the mQst dependable meaas af
detecting fircs and dispatching fire-fighting
Unlla. The On thief eClmated u.t to"""
of all aJanna In nonnaI tJ-. .......
durini air raldJI. were dl.eovered IBDCI traDI-
mitted by tower watchmen. That IlIQ" be .t-
tributed to the fact that a fire in realdeDtla!
and email buainel<$ districtll almoet immediately
envelopOO a buHdinj: and wa.g llCCn by tower
watchmen before a telephone Or fire alarm box
could be found. Three battalion staliQns and
(our substation watch towel"l! wero destra)'ed
by firC.'l caulled by air raids. Before the war,
two steel watch tQwers were constructed and
maintained in the mountain erea b)' the Rok_
kOSlln Fire-Protection Auaci ..liQn (a group of
pri'at... citizens intereated in protecting their
pr0JH!rt) in brush and wooded areas). These
towers ,,ere not maintained during Ihe war
owing to manpower shortage lind they were not
in commission at the time of the survey.
S. Wuter S'Juru of ICtlter._The
Kobe municipal water department reech'ed it!!
main water supply from three re$!rvQirs which
were fed by streams, and from the Hanahin Aa-
sociated Water \\'arlu! (Reference Item 1\0. 52).
Thcre were fi'-e negligible supplies of water
picked up from small streams (Reference Item
1\0. 18),
(1) I\unobiki reaen'Qir supplied about (;
JH!rcent of the citr's water. It was located
in the mountains norlh of the built-up part
of the city and within the city limiLs. Water
WIIS brought from this rcscn'Oir to II purifi-
cation plant through two piJH! lines, 24 inches
and 12 inches in diameter, respectively_ The
capacit), of Nunabiki rosen-oil' was aoout
198,OlXl,OOO pllO}ns.
(2) Karasuwara reservoir furnished lip-
praximately 15 JH!tcenl of Ihe citl"S water
suppl)'_ It was also localed in the citr north
Q( Ihe built_up area. aboul 2 miles west of
Nunobiki l'CllCn-Qir. Waler was supplied 10 a
separate purification planl by /I 24_inch piJH!
line and 11 (; by 4-fool tunnel. This reservoir
had .. capacity of about 374.000.000 gallons.
(3) Sengsri reservoir was the largest of
the three. It furnishtd about 60 JH!tcenl of
all the w/lter broughl into Kobe, but it Wll8
at the greatest dislanCe in the mountains,
!x'ing about 25 miles northeast of the city.
It wu 2.4 miles long and had a of
about 3,064,000,000 gallons. OJH!n can/lland
21
eonduit ...ere u!led to bring tbis ,.-ster into tbe
purill....tion p!a.nt.
(4) The HaMhin AMOCiated Water Work'!
took water from the \"000 rh'er about one-
balf mlle belo... tbe Osaka intake. Tbere was
no dam. jUlt an intake. but th flow in tbis
",'er II'''' ronstant. It ..'IS lupplil'd br Lake
Bi...a. Japan'llaryest lake. approximatel)' 35
mile< northeast or OBaka. The lIanabin A!<IlO
eiath'lP $upplied water to three eltielland t ....o
small h !IOrmall)' $upplied .bout 20
percenl of Kobe'l .....ter througb. bonse;lhoe-
Iha]lo!d tunnel with a deptb of I> feet. 9
inche!!. and an equal 00".... bored through tbe
foothilll aoove the cit)'. On June 1>. 1941>. the
main. a 4S-iroth ......t_iron conduil. lupplying
this lUnnel.....u hit b,' high .bout
]00 yards Welt of the pumping
plant. The conduit coliaplOO and the back
pre&$Ure the manifold (rom the
putting the wbole plant out of aenice
and cutting off 20 percent of Kobe'l w.ter.
b. lnlliffi"iellt lupplll.-Under normal condi-
tio"" the entire ....as tued to supply
sufficient ....ter for ordin.ry Ulle and. during
the r.ids......ter pre:!lBure in the m.ins
dropped to 1ero IS l'ellidenUl opened faucet.il to
keep fire barrels and bucket.., filled. and lead-
pipe ...ter riseT!! in d""elling>! fu;;l'd III born.....
bumed...hich releaHd ...ter in the C'ODfl.&T.-
tion .rea.. The four main .....ter IUpplie!l ....ere
Oller.ted as lleparate s}"3temS. each luppl)'ing
1'-' own district of the elty. Cro.u
were not pro'ided. euept throu.gh the Im.ll
mains in the distribution s,stem. which ....ere
In.dequ.te.
c. Il'olcr III0inl.-There ...ere two 36inch.
one 33_inch. three U-inch .nd one cut-
Iron mai"" from the purifieation pl.ntll
to the distribution Iystem ...hich Ipread oot
through the city in a grid system of pipe 36
inches 10 4 inche!l In di.meter. with fe.... dead
end!i. bolatlon ,a!'eiI .......re placed .pproxi_
mately 110 )'.rd5 (Reference Item No.
19). W.ter Wall eupplied to these maine b)'
eravlt) from four lleparate purification plante.
II "'11I po!IlIible to bJ-pa.$!I the purification planta
in .n rmergelK:Y. There "'ere 25 pumps used
to mainl.in pl"l!:8llure in the northern part of
the city which wae built up the mountainside.
22
O! thelle pumps sCI'en were not working and
Ih'e ....ere destrnyed b)' fire (Reference Item 18).
d. lIydrlllltl.-There ....ere 3.soo. public
120 prh'ate "ushI)-pe hydrlmt!l In CIty.
Hydrants in industrial plants were privately
owned. All h)"dranta In the city were standard.
h.,.Ing sinlrle 2!>-inch outlet!l and being located
below the lide...alk .....ith. 2 b)' 3-fOO'- steel cover
lIush in the eidewalk. The) were equipped with
a snap-on IYIIe connection. The ri.l!ers of all
""ere 4 inch. Hydran\.ll were spaced
.pprnl'im.tel) 110 r.nl.l; .part throughout the
cih. antt had a normal .....ter pressure of 6 to 40
1I0unds (Reference Item No. 19). The fire de.
partment WIIS responsible for !lushing all hr-
drantll once each m<>nth. but thig wu not done
.nd map)' hydranta ....ere in poor repair.
e. Il"dl..._There wert! about 20.000 private
wells in the city. but onl)" thOlle o""ned by fac-
toriCll had pumps .nd tanks which \\'ould be of
uiM! in fire fighting. The remainder had Imall
pitcher pumpl!l or bucket and rope. The ....ater
department did not use any of these lI"ells in the
city wllter system.
f. Other _r"el 0/ >cater.-There were IIOme
canals ne.r the .....terfront here fire pumps
could draft ..... ter. A IlIney 1$ m.de bJ' the
fire department of 1I11 spot!l here a llUmpcr
could be ulled and this system was of IIOme
!lCn'ice durir.g the lIe"era! .ir r.ids. The cit)
constructed ;00 open .nd i)OO co,....red reser-
voir!!. each "'ith a capacity of 13.200 to 26.400
gallons. The cit) paid t ....o-thirds of the cost
of bui:ding the co'ered reservoint and citiz.ens
contributed one-third. Pri\'lte contr.ctont ere
hired to build them. The open reservoira ere
buill by atudenu. the city p8)'ing for the ma_
teri.1. Bolh t)pes of reservoint were filled from
fire h)'drants .nd were used for emergenc)' fire
fig-htine. Keighborbood and community groups
had wooden barrels that had capacities of from
300 to 1.50() gallons. and each family provided
itself ....ith sm.ll !!Qu.re eonerete tank of 70
pllonl eapacit). Small lirell ....ere fought from
these tanks with bueketll and the small hand
pumps. The ....lIter supply WlUl wholly Inad....
quale for fire fighting. and a thoroughly modern
fire department could not ha,-e coped with tile
confl.grations in Knbe. Kobe's fire department
did not hllve a chance.
eire Prevention
9. Orf/IJlli,:/ItiCllt._ _ __ ....
. .. h ........ nre pl'e1'en
lion ad.n interpretation in J. -
from that in the United SI ._ ditrerent
. a..,.,. 0 the J.p..
not ollly preventin, fll'elI but
a 110 e met"""nd tact' ........ .
ing fire<. The. lei ..-.. lD extlnlrUiah_
re "'ere no 0Tlnized fi .
tinn bllreaus with trained .",........ re-pTe'en
I
. ' __",rlJ as .re
common)' known lD fire denmrtmen" d'
a '. .... .n In
uranee lDspechon offices in the United Stata.
All maHeTli pert.ining to Prec.autio
fiflh
' nary me-
II ....... reo g ling reeulatio ...,,_ ._ "__
........ I"'lDg
TelItrlC'l.lonS. "'ere enforced after a faJIhion by
pollee. The fire department had no .uthor.
Ity to e"force corrective meuures or e"en to
make .C(lnstructi,e auggestioll$, There ...u no
orpmted fire--pren'lltion inlpection len-ice I
All fire wilb few exceptionl. i:
pollltloM ....ere tr.ined policemen
With. no tire department bad:ground ot fire-
fighting .kno...ledge .nd Ihl')', tberefon. ..de
.... fire The term "fire--prC\ ;.tion
mspect'lr" is a misnnmer.
10. Bui/ding CUMlntetiOIl. _.. LaIC. _ A
I.rge printed volume containing poliee 1....1
and regulations nf Hyogo prdec:turt! had inter.
spersed through it certain building regulations.
The lawa ....ere not specific. but ....ere "ery bTOId
in !!Cope. and the interpretation of Ihem .....s
aerordin, to the fire chie!. left to the
of the chief of pollee .ffai"". There ...u some
llemblanee of :lOning regulations u the cit) w.s
divided into industri.l. bUlinE!Olll. and residen_
tial sections. Building regulatlonl ....ere not
dearlJ defined u such. .'or example. require-
ments pertaining to certain ....ooden ItruetllN!l!
were 10und. UllOn in\"cstigltion. to be part of
the requiremenla for a ]lCrmit to oper.te
gei.ha hllUlIe (Reference Item No. 20). A
theater building regul.tion. .notber t)pieal
law. ga'-e Ihe re!!ponsible minister .uthorit) to
designate the loc.tion of such a structure. The
.Te<;juirementa were very sketchy e'en though
firellroof w.lIs. fire--resiltil'e roof.. seating c.-
pacity. distance from stl'ftll and other protec:.
li"e measul"l!ll were mentioned (Reference ltm
No. 21).
b. COllcre/a bltildillgl._1t wal evident that
the moderntype olllce .nd buAi_ buildinp
in Kobe ......re constructed not of build_
ing 1....1 and regul.tlonl. but bec.use of for_
elp inll_apna ,'''-''--I' ..
In number or i ...... 1UDfIIId IIIfDt (_
feet). reinforeed baIJcIbItp ....
on windo... fire doora, aDd Ire .....
....,thstood the ba..,....... of Incendlar7 bomba ....
e"en relIi.s\ed IlTe!1 on their l'J:poeed aide (.....
2.5).
c. n ..ildillg. rti"/oruG ag/li/lfi. air
After the Mareh 17. 1945 air r.id. it beame
.ppartnl the JapanCile that .ddition.1 build.
il!&"-proled.lon nteUuTe!lllhould be taken aplnllt
lire. It ....uordered on June:?O. 1945 Ihat.1l of
Kobe eJ< ,'" . . cep I extreme ....here conKel-
!lon wa.1 not great. must comp , with the ne....
regulaUOIl$, Large building to hlll"e
rein reed.nd roo" u vered ....ith
tbelr maxImum 1<.. d of concrete. -nere "'11I no
record of Ihe of t':elM! protective
measure!!. but the Shimi Physit.l .nd Chemical
Inltitute In 0sI1ca Iimited.
bei
lrht.
building. l'llCein'd 49 direct
Inc.'t'ndllry bomb hill in 4 air raida.
It dId not bum III iUl roof had been rotected
b) 8 inches of concrete. ReaidenC<!llP..ere to
h.'e.ll oUUlide openings under the ea"elI doeed
bJ' plaster. but little ...... made in that
program. Of 30 prominent buildinp completed
23 ....ere burned. 7 ...ere atill intact but 5 or
thCile ....ere in dilltricta not in,ol,"c.'d in fire. and
other 2 ....ere -.::hoo15 ..hich had the addi.
Uonal protection of fire barrien created by re-
mo\'ll of near-by ....ooden buildinp (Referell<:'e
lte':"l' NOll. 22 .nd 23). Of the 23 buildinp
""h,Ch burned. 15 had the .dditional protec:tion
of fire barrieTll.
d. Fire bIImen._HOlIIelI .ere detnoIW>l!d
to cre.to! fire barrie"" on sil' oocl.'lioll5 durin&"
the period from J.nuary 19-14 to July 1945. A
total of 21,379 ....11I cle.red from 446
ICM! (Referell<:'e hem 23). An.ttempt "'I.'l
made to important planll .nd building>!
by remOVIng ....ood-frame houses in the imrntdi.
ate I"icinil). !Wad.!! from 12 to 25 J'lrds wide
""ere CUt through highb' congested residenti.1
distritu. but the!le barrie..... C:lc.'t'pt in fe..
remote !JIOla. failed to stop the Bplft.ll of firell
e.used by .ir r.ids.
11. JlilII/llleOQ.-. A",,,.ll/ jire lou._
Kobe tire louea by .... use.s other than .ir raids
from 1940 through 1944. u taken from the fire
department records...-ere u fnllo.s:
23
were not prepand to .....
and pel'llOnnel In Iup
combat almultaneoua ftr-. ".. ....
diary b<;mb wu new to them ud tbI1' ........
tllat lbe firM wen lienal' ....
had be<en warned to Mut oft" thalr fgel
the air_rald_".min. alarm. In
order "'U nol complied ..Ith and .....
llips were broken and hou.llell caul(ht tire, 1M
II'U burned like a lOrcb, Call compan)' employeea
could not cover the large area/; in"oh'l"d to sbut
ell" the maina. Till:' .. presa:ure dropped to
o"'ing tG open and ..ater runnin.
from melted lead-pipe .aler rieer>' in burniq
buildin....
mealfuTU neo:eaaary to meet. the demallda cau.tld
by enemy air raids and the l'rIOr'mt>ulf
task ia ea.al1y neM of the
b. PrlrraJlIle4 Knill:' tire de..rl_
p!anned to utinguish amall incen.
d,arlea WIthIn a lI'i"en area .,d , ,
con Ill' Tell to
the area by .ttackin. ita perimeter. Ofl\d l.s
were of the opini01l that they had adeqU:te
lind peT1lOnnel, includin. the luxil_
fire and police, to cope witb .ny enemy
.ctl?n. It wu until Febru.ry 1945 thai
the} actually believed I bombinll' of tbeir dt
w.s polllIible. )'
Actual Ilpcrtltioll._The Februal'}' 4,
raId Wllll a llurprise and llhock to them. The}'
S1U.b " o-n. Itooloo
..od b.;!d", Ii.. b, " f _ _ ool u. _
.........001 .
Kobe amI the surroundinll' community wUIlOt
of th" magnitude experienced in the wes!.ena
part of United States.
13. IArg" firtH other /!I1l /hQHt clI,,_cd l>,
oir rllid,.-The J{.wIIMki Hea\')' Indulltry Com_
pany. Ltd. (shipbuilding plant) on 2,
1944 lost ahop$ and ,,.rehoullell "'Ith crlUtal
stock and mllchinery ,'alued at 2,848.085 Yell.
O\"er 100 firemen lind 30 policemen bllttled tM
fire for 2 houn. 12 pumpeU. 4 hand-
drawn gII$Oline pumpel'3 lind a fireboat. The
fire was believed to have been caulled by care-
lnsness in disposing of hOI .shl!$ in a wooden
ma<:hinl'-shop building. 11 Willi dliOCO,-"red and
reported b)' II firem.n on tOWer ",.teh. Before
the fire department arrhed. the fire h.d spread
to .djacent buildings (Referell(4' Item No. 25).
Two "'l'('ks following the ship}'ard fire. fur_
niture shop burned. dertro)'ing propertr nlued
at 198.700 Police, firemen and auxiliary
polj(,e and fire units totalling 247 men, lind
12 pumpers. 3 hand-drawn g&l'<Iline pumps and
;; hand-pumps. were suecelllful in confining the
fire to the one
14. ,'btlUli aid._Kobe .nd the 1I}'OCo pre-
feture ,ill.ge:;I worked in dOlle
one "ith the other, During the four big fires
b)' air raids in t945, mutualusi;rtance
....11$ given by depleting fire stations of all
equipment except one stand-by compan}'. Osaka
prefecture furniJl.hed 41 pumpel"il to H)'OlfO
pn!fecture durinll' the big fin! or M.rch t7.
t945 (Refen!nce Item No. 26). The principal
difficult}' encountered in dispatching fin! ap.-
paratus o"er long dilltances (10 to 20 miles)
was the frequent f.Hurt'll and break-
do....ns.
15. Co"ntmt. Illt oJKrlltio"lf IlIldtr (Iir_roid
eoltditi01llf.-a. Kobt dtll /irt probtemlf.-Kobt,
one of Japan's most important industrial cilit'll,
presented serioUll problema under normal peae
time c::mditions. An examination or the city
showed. large port cit)' with miles of docks.
e"tensi,'e industries, and a clOlll'ly-buill residen'
tial district in which 1,023,200 people were
crcm'ded around ateep, n.rrow atreeta. When
it is considered that all of thia wall ]lacked iptll
a narrow atrip 10 miles lopg between the harbor
and enclosing mountain., an nrcil of 44 il'jua
re
miles, the problems or fire protection and pre-
vention must he apparent, Add to tht
,.,
24
d \10 raid._This ralll cao!l\'d
. . rc 68 000 home!! were
havOC that more tnan .
deslrOl"f!d and 242.466 IItTllOnB
nu.de homelesa. An lire apparlltua In
the prerecturt. in addition 10 41 from
OAka prefecture. wen! or 00 ...lue In control-
lillK 1M of IlI'e!1 in an palU of
cit)'. Tilt' au:'Cmary firemen ilOOlI p,'e up the,r
polite to ghelter a...a)' from Ihe heal and
amoke. The lire chid 1M-I smoke was
f'\"e,...", here and wu SO) denlle it was
10 -. all pllmpLlI equipment wU {o""
nished ....ith onl}' .. 2_hour fue! suppl}' (15 pi-
10M). an ell"ort ....as made to move the apparatus
out of ranat of the tire. In many thia
c<>uld not lw done and til"!' trucb burned. An
effort 'AU madf, to refUf!'1 the pumlM'rI b)' haul.
inc ca:.oline druma to 1M tane of the fires. but
"'U inell"mual. No elfort ...as maM e\"en
fter lltro\l. uperience to Bupply fire
apparatu& "'jth more than the lI&ual15 plloM.
A 100ai of 116 fire pumpen burned in <I air

e. 5. IIU5 Clir N,d.-So
effort ...as made to cope ...ith these lirft.. The
au.riliariell. u .ell u the firemen. felt
utlerly help\e$& and took shelter at the drop-
piq of the fint hil'h up!oeilelI. TheM fire!.
like the oneil. e'ent ....n) them-
Oelvell out. The lire chief AUted thaI ,..hen thi"
raid occurred. dvmaM. soldiers. sailon. poli,
.nd l'i""men took to the hills for protf'rtion.
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
I. hrrod.tt""lI.-A I'roup of dO!lf'ly rel.ted
acti"itif'Ol is included under the above c.ption.
The three principal subdil'isiolUl.re emerger>C)'
medical !!en'ia!, Red CI'OIllI !ll!rvia! and mortu-
ary Hrvia!, The medical service is
further dil'ided into finwid un'iet'll, hOllpital
services. medical training and e\'llcuation of the
...ounded, Althoulj"h subdivi"ions are
dosel}' rel.ted (rom function.1 8tandpoint.
they were rather widely seiWIrated in the or
IClInizational plan set up by the Japane!lf! au-
thorities.
Emergency Medic:lJ Service
2, Orgoni:olioll.-In "yogo prefecture, of
which Kobe is the largellt dty, all air_raid.de_
fen!le mediul f1ervice was coordinated throulj"h
26
the pref\!Ctural !!eCHon In con-
i nction with the prefectural pohce. All doe
t:rs, nurse;!, dentis.tiI, pharmadAta and mid-
wil'e11 were organized and to f1rn--1d
sectionA (kwugobllNl<li), tint_aid 6lIuadll (k"-
or 10 the first-llid of
the auxiliary police and fire Unlt.ll (kl!lbod/lll),
AI;lO under direct supervision of Ihe prefectural
health section were firsl.-ll.id sUitionll. hoApital
ser.-iCeil. e"l\Cuation of CllAualtiea and medical
training (organiz.ation chart on Page 28).
3. PtT5<lllllel.-ln Kobe there were 1,503 doc:-
ton, 8.961 nur!!l!S, 630 dentisUi. 2,077 midwh'e&
and 1.629 pharmacist. In each of the police
dirtrictil of the dty there WIIil a firawid lIllCtion
which WlI5 headed b)' a ph}'aidan with. denti5t
and pharmaeiat ll.$ a ii!.tantlt, Under direct
conlrol of eacb fint-.id section there ....eN! from
7 to 12 lir$l.-IIid !lQuada (kWlllfoJtU), compolled
of from 2 to ;; doctor.!. 1 to 3 dentisUl, I phar-
mad..t, and IUl untipecilied number of stretcher
bearers. nUr!leB and midwi\eI. In e.eh of the
medical unitlt of the .uxilian' police and fire
unitlt ef Kobe (54 in number) there ",'ere from
I to 3 doctors, I dentist, I phannac:iat, 25
nu."e'S .ide'! (see "Younr Women'a Fil'llt-Aid
Unita..... Item No. 27) .nd.n uMped-
fied number of stretcher bearers. PefllOnnel in
the first-.id MStions ....ere usigned b)' the
health ;;ection. Each hOllpit.1 h.d it.ll own aUIr
of personnel but, if it ....ere found to be inade-
quate after air raids, addition.l personnel ""as
as!tigned b)' the prefectural health IItion.
4. Erot:IIfimt t)! ('ll.tJlo1til!l.-When an air_
raid .lert wlI5 $Ounded, all medic.l perlJOnnel
reported to their prea$8igned pOlIt of duty. Cas-
ualtie'!' ....ere pkked up by the first-aid 6lIuads,
medica! unili! of the auxili.ry police and fire
units and by volunteer ....orken in the neighbor-
hood lCroUpll (tOHori gllmi). Cll.'!.ualtietl were
remo\'ed to the first-aid staliou where ther
were either treated and dismi!llll!ll or sent di
rectlr to the h08pital for more defillite treat-
ment.
5. Trolls/lOrlatill.-Transfer-c:ornpan}' truck!
were mobilized for the tranRportation of the
wounded from the first-aid slations to the hOI-
pitals and were dispatched 10 the !!Cene throull
h
the central control room of the Hyogo prefec
tural police department. It WIIS discoveroo thai
after air raidA these trucks were inllde<luale for
the remo\',,1 of all Ihe woun
trucks bullf'!l nreetea ded, and Olher
had to'be util'ized At bearerll
Ihere were onl')O of the ".r
r .mbulaneea in Kobe d
mOllI of them ....ere dtlltroyed d . ' .n
0\14 air raids. urlngthe numer_
6. 1"ifat-aid aloli<ta._1l was _,_ ..
fi
,
'd .....nn to have
olle I'll -III atation for each 5000
and theae _lations we:""
III phyalcillns' olJicea. Afte, 'h. ,- I '
'd ., arce .lr
nil It wu dlllCO\'ered that theae lila!'
inadl!(juate to handle the """'., .. ""ere
I
. ...- num....r of CII$o
ua tiel, lind the fint-llid lila,,'. '
, ylUI '" ere moved
Into elemenUiry IloChools .. 'A r'-
b' . .... 0 ....
UJldlOlCll, deiWIrtment stOI"ell, railroad 6latiOIUl
and .Iarg.e There ""ere four flnt-aid
Kobe harbor area operated under
the Jurls(hellon of tbe speeial ....ter police force..
Throughout the entire HSogo pN!fecture Wre
,
":'ere I'Q permanentl)- fif$wid lila.

. a. Eq.llip lltnl.-All I!(juipmenl in the flnl-
aid 5latlOll!l ""all furnished by the prefectural
be.lth aeetion. the CO!It being defra}'ed by the
loc.l and national gO\-ernmentA. Medic.1
ment eoMisted mainly of cotton. g&uu band_
aces. diainfectantlt. splinUi. medicatiolUl for
treatment of burna. $Orne opiates, and heart and
respil1\toT)' slimulantlt. A \-ery small and in_
sufficient amount of anti-tetanWl MEUm 'Ull
.,'ail.ble for UM in the tif!ll-llid stations. Each
station had one portable surgiul instrument
.nd intra"enous injection set (P.ge 29). TheN!
n:> sterili,ung equipmenl and .U inlltru-
mentlt ....ere !!terililed in the hoapitalll .nd
brought to tbe firstaid st.tions. No beds "'ere
.vail.tole .nd lIe\'erely ....ounded patienUi were
plll'd on matlt (talolJli) On the floor. Equip-
ment for the IIdmini..tration of plll5m. or blood
""as likewi!!e lacking. Each !ta_
tion WI..!! I!(juipped ....ith II portable ""aler tank
in case the water main to the building was de-
atro)ed. but there Wall no separale and inde-
pendent lighting unit.
7. JlrnpUau._Before the air raid.., there
were 108 hO$piUlls in Kobe, with a total bed
rapacity of approximately 3,000. This number
included both large and small. public and pri-
vate The hospital staff" were em-
plo)'e<1 Oil 1\ full.lime bIt..i", bUI after air raids.
ir the hOllpitals were overcrowded. additionRI
medical penonnel WOIIld be ....
by the public healtb lie.
pita" could not aec:ommocIdI aD of tile .....
cuualtlell, school", oftIee balldlrtp &lid dlura..
"'ere conl"erted Into relICrve botJpltalll. ""-
relIef"" hoapita", poorly I!(julpped. were
uaed only .A .aiting IIlationa and the patieDta
were removed to the rej'Ular hospitals as IlOO1I
u.pace beeam" nail.ble. All. rellult of raida
..ithin thirea, 42 hospital.. "'ith a total bed
capacity of .pproximately 1.000. "'ere either
eompleuly de.trtl)ed or damaged to such.n ex_
tent that they could not be uecd.
.. E"'crlfnln/ I.,..,t .. nlr CIt /tOlpilo1s -The
hoapitala took up the treatment of
"'heN! the l'int-aid stations left eff. Permanent
re1id measure. ",'en ...biltituted for temporal}'
0_ SUlCe the flm-aid stations had no lOOod
plasma for the treatmeont of abock "'hich is one
of the priflCipai cau_ of death from injul"}'.
bk>ot:l tr.nsfusiollll ...ere gi'en. The MlCCeSll of
thia "'hich eould be carried out only
In ho8p,taIl1. depended upon the ....ilabi1ity of
blood donor ...ith the same blood type 1I5 that
of the r:e-eipient. t'lIIl&l1yeach penon had. pre-
determIned donor to flU"llish blood in of
Ilftd. In tbe confllrion reIlllting from major
air raids, thill ..,..Iem beeame highly ineffecti""
beeauw of the dJlfto:ulty in Iocatin.- the OOIlOrll
","ho, in many inlltancell. were tlwmseh'e:!! either
1r.i11ed or ..",erely injured.. The dispel'llll1 of pop-
ulation further added to this diftleoltj..
b. Air-nlid pt"Ofl!diotJ i. loapat(lI6._During
.ir_raid al.rms. all patienu in multi-.5toried
holIpita\a """N! e\'Ku.ted from the upper floors.
Ambulator}' iWItientlt took wiler in tlw ba.._
menu, if a.-ailable, or ..-ent to the flnt floor, but
IIOmc u.wd clolletll ...ithin their hospital rooms
or ....rdll lIbelteD. One large bollpital had
llpeciaUy constructed ouuide shelter ...hleh
rould aommodate approximatel)' 100 patientlt
and emplo}'ees, The constn>etion of this shelter
"'a8 "ery crude and ,,"ould offer ,-en' little if
an)'. protection apinat air I'llids. Th;re "'u' nO
co1tJltruclion at an)' of the hOl!pitals for protec-
tion alr.inst JlOlIIible poillOngu attacks,
8. Traillillg.-At the beginning of tlte war,
the p.....rectural he.lth llI!Ction llenl a delegation
of to attend a special rourse on
medical pl'O<'edure at the IIrmy medi-
cal IIChool in Tokyo. After returning from
27
ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY ME01CAl SElI.VICE
HYOGO PREFEaURE IKOBEI
HYOGO pUfKTUU
fHYOGO /UH)

(UISArSIl .11)
28
Fint Aid Uroit
(ICYIIGO.UHDAH)
Finl AKI
(ICYIlGO.1I11TAll
Finl AKI Squod.
(ICYUGOHAH)
GoaoPoI All-. Depl.
(HAISf/ .11)
(ElSE/OJ
could be bandW 0lIl& _ ...
individual tuDerak. III u.. nil ., n:
194&. Cor i_.about 2.lIOO..- ..
alone were kJlled, and iD tbe raid of ,,_ ..
1945 there were 3.000 tataUtieL Tbe taUI
number killed by aU the ..ldR In Kobe ....
tween 7.000 and 8.000, .nd the tolal in H)'OCU
prefecture "'u 10.200. It lhollid be noted at.o
tllal. generally .peaking. the J.panese people
hne .n a"eraion Cor an)' kind of <:'Ontaet with
bodin. P.... umably thill ....alI dill' to their
COl>Ct'pta. For that reaaon there w..
dll'llculty in recl'tlitin( penonnel to aMiat in the
collection and dillposal oC dead bodi"" and the
burden fell principally upon the undertakers
lht'mlieh't'lI .nd their emplo)'-'
16. Orf/Olllzl1.fiott (Chart on Page 32).-The
?"Ortullty llervice ...... organized under the crim_
mal and ,detection lleCtion oC the 1I)'ago prefec-
tural police. From there the .uthorit,. elrtenrled
to the police di.!!trieta. E\'ef)' police atation had
police-muter who ....,. respon$ible Cor pick_
mt up and di!polIilllr of deN! bodies. In order
to meet the hclealHlph aquads (.n.o
tl1.') formed at each police atation. each
aqulld bemg under the direction oC a leader and
t ..o UIIi!.tant leadera. all oC ..-horn 1ren! under.
takers. The nllmber of mf'mbers ill the Iqll.d
ranged from 20 to 50, .lId the we.re
further !ubdi,ided into 3 \.0 5 branchell ,"".).
each branch collllistiD&" or 5 to 10 men. The
leade.n! of lhese two ditrerent J'1"OUJIIII ....ere
knO"'n all 111.; cM and 11 clio.
17. TtlIi.illg. lluch L'!I it ll"i'"f!D by
membera of the ondel'ta.kera lI&!IOCiatiolL The
undertakers who directed th", activities of the
Iquads already p<IUeUed all netel<Sal)' teochnkal
trlinirtK. and the need for lIUCh training 0lI lhe
part of subordinate "'lU not gTeat.
Real difficulty. howe'er...... experienced 011
account of the 1ac'k oC di!!Cipline aDd teamwork.
10 the midst of the _lated
...ith the lIe"ere air raids. the "'orken became
and fnlurated In man.v illll!aneea
the llQuad ID(>mbera luft"ered Io!!:aeot
of hornell, relati,''''' and Criends and "'0Il1d not
report for dUll' und..r tholle or
thl')' "'ould ill llOlll@ dnert.. In either
e.-tnt lhe work of lhe llqua<!! "'U di nlPted..
This condition remained uncorrected and per.
sisted to the end. It "'u found. therefore. that
31
of the no.......re ...
.rm) and na,y. There duty with the
oC lay workers trained b lit Iarp Dumber
seo'ice u nune'l aida y t Red Croea tor
tuy unPl'id helpel'lJ. , ... ho lM'rved .. "olun_
13. jo';'UUlCU _
three tOUTCelI; a. deri'-ed Crom
nu.1 fee >vila three yen and the
P
JUl.-The an_
ben reached II peak of 400 of mem_
air Before the .... JUI! before the
$hip .....a 100 000 b , . Ir the member_
, u .t "'u stimulated b' ha
""ar to a Courlold inerealM' It.. ) I t
note thllt art"r the B,29
dropped to 300000 d membenh,p
"_ ( " ue to the eXOOll5 of mem_
uo:rs rom the target areaa,
b. Spcciol roNlriltullolll._Here .
o t' t ."'nother
c un rlea a ....ar. apecial dri\"t'lI "er.. made Cor
Red C/'OO!.S fund$ "'hich ....ere said to hne totaled
U>(I().OOO yen Crom the belfinnlng of the ....ar
e. cOUulcd from patlent.ll
prlllC1Pl'1 !IOUTCe of aUPllOrt for the hos-
pItal!, oC which the annual budget ....u
3.000.000 )'en. The data furnished indieated
the membe...hip feel! and !peti.l contribu_
u.ons fell Car ahort of that amoun\. and the
dlffe.rence i. aaid to ha\"e come Crom fees for
ser"lce to the patienu.
.14. Air-mid prcCttlllioll# 11./ Rlld Croltl 1106.
pIII1.1I.-0nl) one of the four Red Croq hOI!-
pitalll in H)'oJtO prefecture ....a. conatructed oC
There Willi no concrete-reinCordng of
rooC.. All hospit.la maintained .irraid
ters for ambulatoT)' Pl'tienlll. !lOme in the hue-
ments of the buildings and IIOme in underrround
ahelter... In multi-storied structurea the ambu.
latoT)' IlIltients were qu.. rtered on the upper
1100.... liS thty were able to "Ileate theae tIool'8
rUdil)" and reach shelte..... belo.... with relati"e
ease. Althollgh the Iwo Red CI'OlI.!I hOllpital1 in
Kobe were destro)ed. there ....ere no li,'es 1O!It.
either or pattentll or hospital emplo)eea.
MonuOlry $en'ice
Iii. normal times the
undertakers' _iation contracted "'ith the
polite' departm""nt to take care oC bodin not
dillJ>O$ed of by pri'...te Cuneralll. When the
severe air raida Cllmf'. ho,,e'er. 1IO great ""II!!
the emergency that the ondertakers could not
handle the problem in the uaual "a)". Spec:ial
methods had to be devised whereb)' the work
there ....ere the.!l three Red. CrOllll hospi.taJ.s III
the preCectllrt'. each oC whIch WU oUllllde the
city. It i8 rather !tr.nge that,
Red CTOM hollpi.la .....ere of a
n.ture. only one took .rmy and Ql.
other na\'y patient$ up to the lime the)'
destro)'ed. All of thellt' hospitals took civ.m...
patientll and the t ....o not ?)' the
fort" were nelllS;"el)' Cor Obnoualy.
the load of militar)' Pl'tienL1 WII$ not 110 great
aa might be apected in the mid!t of an all.-out.
"'ar. Dllring the war. the Red. Cl'OM hO!lPltal!
treated 300.000 patient! auffering from war in_
juri".
b. lI'd/lln.-ln peacetime particularl)'. con-
_ trary to inCormation recei"ed in Osaka. the .Red
CrCWI carried on a "ariely of welfare ser\"lcea.
In timell of disuter it furnihed. on an emer_
gency baais. food. clothing, "IIhelter. and medical
all3islance. There waa no record of rehabilita-
tion having been a part of the set-up. There
...ere. however. rest camps maintained Cor chil-
dren. where they could llecure supplement.1
nutrition and re<:uperatil'e attention.
c. Firllt-oid lItlltiOJU were maintained at the
hospitals. but there ....aa nOne speciall)' con_
structed or equipped outaide the hOllpitills.
Firllt-aid kil1l were furnillh.ed to the police sla_
tions Cor use in Clllt'll oC minor injllrie:!l.
d. Trflillillf/.-Three of the main-
tained training schools for nurses. No lirat aid
....&.! tauJtht 10 the public in organized clall3el!.
The Red CI"OlIlI docton did, howe"er, make
periodic vis.illl to halla and othbf places. of pUblic
usembl)' ....here lectures .nd demonstratiollll
....ere gi\'en lind printed pamphlet.ll on firs.t aid
were dilltribllted. Persona instructed in this way
were expected to carr)" the 8IIme line of instruc-
tion to their Camilies.nd neighbors. The IlIlmpb-
leu were not di!tributed Cree but ....ere 1I01d
principllll)' to the members. each person p.)'ing
for thl> al no fixed price bill in at-
cordance with his financiailltatua.
12. I'lIrlloll1lel. _ In the IIreCectural head
Qllarters of the Red Cl'OSlI, there was a staft" of
20 persons.- There were no doctor. on the lIt,Jl"
IIlI the office personnel was engaged onl)' in ad-
ministrative activitie8. Emplo)'ed b)' the pre-
fectuT:lI office of the Red Crosa were 356 doctors
and approximate!)' 600 nUTlld. all on a foll-
lime bRsis. Abolll tOO oC the doctonl and 200
Tokyo. thill ddeption pn' a
COllnoe of instruction to an doetoTl!. nuT8ell
midwi\"es in USogo prefecture.
pf:nonr...1 ....re tbl'n UIIigMd et.raln dl$lTlctll
in which th..y (a"" medical training \.0 the pllG-
pie. Training consi$ted of II $tudr of $hoek and
treatmf'nt. bl'morrhage. treatment of bUTM.
m..lhoo:b of resuscitation and fractures. 1'Tat'.
tical lraininll" in bandall"inll' of JlOrtions of the
bod,)' and In handling of Pl'tienlll on $trelcheTll
"'u gh'eD. The p..- an imporanl part
in the diQemination of medical inCormation to
the public. and each da)' Ihe leading newsJlllpf:rs
....ould run sped.1 columns on tint.aid treat-
ment. daMilieation and id.. nti!iu.tion of poilWln_
ous gasell. their effects and treatment. These
columllll were e.ither ....ritten b)' members of the
health or b, dlxtors in consultation
..-ith the he.lth section. on medical
$ubjectll were made o\"er the radio. not as a reg-
ular COUI'8e oC inslruction. bill primarilv III
stimulation Cor the people 10 be col18tantl) pre-
pared \.0 meet medical emergencil"l. In the fac_
toriel!. indunrial allrgeona Jta"e roUline lecture$
10 all ..-orken on emergenc)' tinst aid.
9. Jlcdlnll ppliu._AlI medical $upplies
....ere iMUed to hospitlila. firat-aid atationa. lind
medicalaMOCiation! on a pro-rata baai! throuJth
the heahh 8l'Ction. Supplies Cor civilian Ul!e
....ere "ery lIC.rce and <:'OnlleQue.ntl)' patie.nts
often receh'ed inade.qllilte trentme.nl.
10. Jntr(>{/uctiotl._The. Red CNU proJtrilm
in Japan follo..-ed the same ceneral lines all the
Red Crou in the United SI.tes. StreM ....ilI be
placed more upon the differencea than the $imi.
larities of the American and Japanese Red
Crou AIlWl. emphuill "'ill be placed
upon the char.cteristics oC the Red C1'OQ pro-
ltTam in Kobe. "'hith were different from thOlie
fotlnd in <bI:ka. The pl.n oC organization and
Jines of .uthority are the same. and. thereCore.
require no
II. Cl4uificotio" o/l1.diritiu.-a. 1/00pitoltJ.
The duty perlormed by the Red
CI'OIllI was the operation of Cour hOllpitals, two
in Kobe and t ..'o within the preCecture. bUI out-
lIiH the city. Both of the hoI!IpitaJ.s in Kobe were
destro)'ed during the air raidll. One of these
waa relocated In a Illace oul.llide the city 110 that
30
what looked workable on p.lIper did not hold up
in time (If actual di.a"ter.
18. Jd.-Ntititollion o/bol/in 0.,d "ol;!itoll iOl' of
identification tal wa. attached 10
e,'er)' piKf! of clothilllC, Scnp. of Itarments,
e>pe<'ially in the cai'f! of women, al!!O lIC....
ed
.....
important aids in identi!\cation. as friends or
mem'*1'lI of the "ictim's famil)' were often able
to ret(lj("nilf! the p.lIttern wo,'en into the cloth.
w..... not u"oo a. I of
identification. In In iMtanres when I bod)' was
identified tht" famil)' "'1.1I notified, and. if de-
aired. the b/Id}' ...'lL'I lIent to the home. In that
ta!lC. for dispoea1 wI! usumed
by the bmil!. or all}'one elIe ...ho would claim
the body.
19. Storag,. ...d ..4.".Ii di.p0801. - Definite
spe<'iftt:d. luch III n!!iious temples and
ahrinel.. deaipated ,,'ithin each police di!,.
trict ...ben! aU bodies "'ould he taken. At the$e
rollectic;n point<!. bodies ...ere held for 3 days
and. if DOt and claimed at the end of
that time....en! sent to a c",maton' The ashes
were <hen n!mo"ed and .--nt 10 the temple&.
When the crematories became onrloaded. the
unidentified and unclaimed bodies ...en! plated
io a common pit and burned.. after "'hich the
...hes we", nall$ferrl 10 the temples.
20. DNtl cfftiftltu "'ere iaaued b}' the
police If the bodies wen! identified.
When a death certificate ....1.8 i_ued. the name
of that perM;n Will atricken from the cerulUS
reroni, In peacetime, miMinlf penoll!! we", de-
clared dead after j }ears. but In wartime the
period ....1.8 reduced to 3 )'ears. AI an emer
ltf!nc" mel!u"" the police statiOn
,,;oold iMue certibte of dcath in the c.....e of
miSlling penona without an)' time limitation,
w
21. Trollsporlotioll of the tlead would lIor
mallr l.M: accompli.hed b)" funeral cars. but
were insufficient 10 nleet the reIlulhtll'
f the unprecedented delltructlOn of human

Consequently. had to be utilited

!''e!'. (h ' 'd
for this purpo;\C. As a part 0 t, e air-rio
defen=le- system certain pretietern:<llIed
were required to report to the polIce
ffice when the airraid signal wu 8Ounded,
were then alUliltned t:l
duties, among which was. the collection and
of dead bodle:!!.
Comments
22. r.",agellcli ",fdirol s,.rriua,-a, Jo'irat
oid olld Mapilob.-To mte:t the requirement.3
of such raids as had been anticipated. the or-
ganiution of the first-aid atationa and hOllpitala
for treating the wounded "'aa relati"el)' ade-
quate aa judged b)' Japanese IItandardB, though
far bekl.... Amerian. The.re waa at all times the
familiar shortalte of _ntial medical aupplieA
and equipment. and in Kobe there ..... u o!.>aerved
the worn JlO'5'Iible example of aqualor in a Iarlfe
hOllpital. The 10*1 of one-third of the total boo&-
pital beds in the dt) as a result of the bombing.
and the loA of a similar proportion of fir!lt-lid
lItatiOll!l rendered inaurmountable Ihe talk of
normal can! for the .....ounded in the midlll of
aaturation raids. The lIituation ....a.a aggra"ated
by the faet that not a few and nuTSe!l
ldt tM eity in pUnluit of penonal ufet)'. All a
nI!lIult. man)" air_raid ca'lulltietl died because of
the lack of prompt and eflkient medical
h. Rtd Crou.-1n vie.... of the fact that one
of the foremost functions of the Red CI"OSlI ...
the operation of hoapitala, of .... hich there ere
four in H)'ogo prefecture--two in Kobe and tWO
outside. the Red C1'OlUl service wall lICriousb'
crippled by the 101Ul of the t ....o hoapitalll in Kobe
and, therefore. was unable atll'ljuatel)' 10 care
for civilian air_raid casullities,
Morlunry urdce. - From an orlf
aniu

tional standpoint, the mortuar)' sen-ice in Kobe

was .....cll arranged, and functioned ac<:ordinlt to
plan in moderate raids. The large number! of
dead fOl'ced the use of mASIi bUl"lling lind mall8
burial, measures ordinarii)" ulllLcceptnble to jhe
Japantsc; and though they departed frtlm tile
idelll, the)" accomplished their objective.
RESCUE SERVICE
I. tlilrOOlictioll -The
I
. purpose of the report
s to present a slud)' of th
I'llniz.ationa and the e reacue-iler\'lce or
and u'lCd in act I rescue I'rocedure, taul'ht
phlll!is will be Particular em
, upon eacribinl' any va i
lIons from observations d' h ",
re rt The rna e In t e Osaka field
po. " ume plan of de"clollment of the
ll('T\ Ice took place in Kobe u in Osaka
excep. that the date of eIllablish ('
'''''ani "*'. ment 0 the
,,_. ...e Ulllt tkeibitoi) in Kobe "'u de-
lermmed to be May I. 1944.
Gu:ud Rescue Unit (Keibiui)
2. Orga"izatiOll alId oPffalio" -Th d'
r, ,_ . e lrec-
I,e on Orpnlut'on af unit permitted great
leewa}' to the prefectural in the
complement of the unita.
slmphfication in organiution and op-
eraUon waa JlO'$ible in Oaaka, as the cit)" and
the we", practically cotermillO...ll,
bUI K:lbe was onl)' one of a n...mber of cities in
Ib'om p",fecture, ...hich nfl<"eMitaWd etrtain
changell in orpniution and llelection of head
qu.atUl"!l. In Kobe the unit ,,'aa rompoeed of
thn:e battalions. with battalions NOlI. I and 3
three companies and battalion Na. 2
..mg. t,,o companies. Each eompa1\}' "'as di
",ded mto thTe@ platoons. ..-ith NCh platoon
compolled of three squ.ads.. The unit "'ll3 oper.
atl'll at all times from the pre(ecturallewl.. The
prefectu", "'1lI di\ided into three areas usinlt
police districts III the bI'lis. i.e.. each a';' com-
fi"e or siit police districu. The head-
quarten of batulion No. I Will placed at the
Chickusuimhi police in Kobe....ith
\'Ompan}' No.3 detached Rnd stationed at Arna
gaaki. which is about 16 miles east of Kobe. The
heldquarten of battalion No.2 wu located at
HyO(o poliet station in Kobe. The headquartera
of battalion No.3 was in Aka:!hi
which i" about 20 miletl west of Kobe, with com-
Ilan)' No, 3 detached and atationed at S... moto
On the IslAnd of Awaji which liC'! belween the
Izumi St<a and the Harima Sea. The reason for
these a<!pIlratl'l1 headquarten and detachments
\Va. to make the rescue ser"ice svailable to the
principal cities and areas of the prefecture.
3. was recruited in
/litactl)' the manner de'ICribed in lhe
O... nkn field relMlrt,
4. TobIe 0' lII'fGlliMtloL-"'" tabII .,
j(anlutlon wu the aunt .. pi I I ....
Osaka field Rport. except thait two of the
battalion. jn Kobe had three eom.-m- tut.d
of two companiel!, and each com.-ny bad three
platooll8 inatead of t..'O. which made the total
complement ill Kobe 1.240, u compared _iUt
469 In Oaaka (orpniz.atioll chart Page SA),
The bIIttaliolUl. ho,,e'u. newr ,,'ere recruited
to their f ... natrenl'lh due to the demands of the
military and the Ilf!f!d for war "'orkel"ll, III e,'i
denced by a chart. dated ,ful}' I. 1945.....hich
aho.. the total complement to be 646 IJW':n
(Page 35).
5, Tra;lIi,,",-Retlponsibilit! for training of
the ...nit apin nI!Ited ....ith the leader ,,'110 "'11I
tbe chief of police alfail"ll, 11' ... methoda
and proeedurea in traini,,&, III in the
Oaaka 6ekl n!port ...ere used in Kobe. Onc
additior.al procedure lIhould be noted ..-ith re-
pni to the tnininl' of the tKttalion. company
and platoon leadel"ll, in tbat they "'ere 6CfIt to
the atT1I)' enVncer lInit _tinned in Kobe for I
half-day on cia)'s to
specialW!d iMlruction in 1'ClICUe teehlliq<>e.
6. OP"J'OlIGl COlltr.'" all
of the battaliona. the men had a recular toor of
dut} of 8 hou1'll ..-ith about half of thia time
apent in trainllll' c\auea and practical demon-
!ltration ",,'Or!< relath'e to rewue M'....ice. Ho....-
aU traininlt ceued ill the of
194;> ....hen bath liCht and he:a'"y air raids c0m-
menced. u the 1IIlit ..-all compMled to spend full
time in the aetual perfOI"ll'llDte of air raid and
al,lXiliary dutiea. All ather proccdUI'eII and C<:tIl-
trois wc"' identical to tbol!e explained in the
Qaaka ficld report.
i. jf.tllOlllid,_ln'atiption di!lcloi!cd that
mutu.al "Id "'Il! carried OUt bc\.-een oY.ka and
\lynco prefectUre!! on fo...r or fi,c occasion&..
The proeed... re "'ll3 for the chief of the Qaak.
prefectural to req... aid from the chief
of tI}'Ol/O p",feet ...nl police. or ,ice VCn!&. In
addition, the battalions ....en! mo,'ed from area
to area ..... needed ... pon orden of the chief of
the ... nit.
Auxili:Hy Police and Fire Unit (Keibodan)
8. Or/1OlIl:lIt,OIl.-The aUitiiiu)' police and
fire unit wu originally dh'ided into the lfUard
srm, arnl. medical arm. And
liaison arlll. with thr function of rescue ser"ice
32

ORGANIZATION Of GUARD RESCUE UNIT (KEtBITAI)

..t.d ,.101'_1
1 GUARD RESCUE UNIT
"'/
I
FIRST SECOND
THIRD
BATTALION 8ATT"lION
BATTALION
Oai PoiN;
Oa; Slln
Doit"i
Doi/,,;
Dailo,
I I l
I
I
Fill! Second Third Fin! S.cond
Fi..t
Second
Third
Compo")' Compo"y Compony
Company Compony
Compony
Compony
Company
Doi Ichi
Do; Ni Do; Son Doi /chi
Do; Ni
Doi 'chi
PoiN;
0,,; San
Chloi
Out.., (h.I,,; Cltu/oj
Chl"i
0.10;
Cit. I,,;
I
Fi.d Second Third
Platoon Plotoon Ploloon
Doi IcM DoiNi Doi Son
Shoto;
Sh,,;gi Sh,,1,,;
Fint
Second
Third
Squod
Squad
Squod
Each Squocl_ l Lcoclc.
Do; 'clti
DoiHi
QQ; Son
10M."
Ho. H,.
H
''::.'':- _L _.r
'r"
10 Il
U ..
.. ..
"
..
...
..
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"
"
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" ,..
",

,.
.. ..
.. ..
.. ..
iii
... -""IlI
:1
,

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.,]
11- ,

,
"
I
......., .
. .. ......
-
......,..

".,... .......'
...".... .."...
.
_,.,
,.-.,
"'-'
..- ".' .
,
,

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,

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--- -
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,
ORGANIZATION m' GUAIUl 1l.:SCU.: IJNIT (#,-,:/1111"111)
,ACTUAl. "T... S<n'" II
1i.1l0Ilo" h""o.. I Cl,o,.", tlorl, llyOllo,
Ko, 1C01oo
r .... "h ...... I'y __ .,
rll,h Imp."y 2 Cho..... Omolk...ho, N...,o.lCo

11."0110. h...Iq........ I .0.101.."" .o.khl
lll .. h p."y
lIf'r.,h py
.. h'h Imp, ! K.ki;olc..hl, So""""
!lond b.tl.lio.
Thinl ... ' ... Ii....
1101""'" I -., I lM."_
Dot......,>T,,, 1I.0dquar. - 3 Chomo .o..otatho.
to.. _ Koo.
Flm. b.IloUon 1I01l011on ..
Flrn _pony
a-Old ...... p.ny
Thlrtl Imp.ny I . .o.m......kl

the ll1l>or lind of the

In power duro
m bUI lhe drain UJlOn mlln
gua Hili. of thl' ",aT wmpelled the
ing bIer .' lie and
bandonrnefl
t
of this Lilto sma r .
" . r.ed romp"nent.. With this change In
sJle"1Il , I f nnl'd e,"cn'
orglln'UIlion, .11 pl!rllOnnc per.1) . 1 d"
I}'PC or alr.raid_protection ,-crVlce. Inc u In!;
thaI of nose'''' ",,-,,-ire.
9. Prrnlurl.-Sellion aOO of
peNOonel "'"all the ,<arne all det!cnbed '0 lhfo
Out. llell! n>port.
10. of The table of O.T'
glllliution ;. 1\ l'uplient;on of tha' prclIented lr\
the O,<aka !it'ld report.
t!. T......'lIg.-Thl' leaders of the auxiliary
:ond uniu m:eind their .t
schoob c'Ond"",tf!d under the svperils,on of the
police. Cl..- ....ere uauall)' held at po'ire ""a-
tions but rnllny were conducted lit other loca-
tiona to alle"iate transportation problems. The
peri:xla of training, aubjeeL' I'T'I"lented, of
instrvction and of p..-ntation fol.
1o...1!d the UJ1'M' principle. u de.cribf!d in the
field
12. Oper/llionlli control oml jIr<)(c(l"rc.-ln
ordl'.r to achieve more and greater
speed in operation. the ar"", under the ;urisd!c.
lion of e&C'h of the au",ilial')" police and fire unlU
wu dhided into all1'lOOrt equal lIfe-
tionl. The number of tbeoe lIfetionl in each
area , .. ried aceonlini to tbe lile of the area.
A beadquarterl al in each one or
the sectionl at bicb wal located a
(bHlOda.) of tbe au",iliary poli<'ll! and fire unit
of j::ar1..i of the guard .nn. fire arm.
and ttoe liaison ..rm. Tile potire emergen(')'
medical arm Wall retained at the main head-
quarterl or tbe auxiliary police and fire unit.
Under this $Cbeme. an incident "'IIJI reported
to the headquarters of the lIub6eetion (bllllldall)
from ....hicb the reeue M'....ice ''''1 dilpatebed.
Ho.... tho. main headquarters .....a.s contin-
ually .dvised a.s to the dillpol!ition of .lIlle....icu
by the sub!l:tion headquarters. From this
point. the methods of operational control were
similar to tho!le presented in the Osaka field
report.
Features Common to 8ol:h Org:aniutions
13. 1,0ro/ioN of C(lINaltifJJ.- In''estigation
brought fortb no different methods or device!!
h O
ro rescue Ul'it and the aUlImary
use(lbyt egu . r
. I ,. , ,mit3 fOI" the locatIon 0 cllllua!.
police .1111 II" k ft Id
tie!! thollC depicted in thc 0111 _ e re-
RrlClle /lcltlliqlll.-In "obe, as in Osaka.
. d b' learanct! method Wall the onl,
tne e rlJH: . . ,
h
." "ht and u.sed for extncaung rap.-..
met uu au . . __..
.' . , Whcncver rescue mCldentl occur.""
'lCtIDl.. d f II om.
at helwil)' ll1gs. a en ':" .
and other weight) m.. were remo\ed b)
attaching rope:!! and pulled the
debris b)' truck.$. "'bell a"ailable: otherw,llC b)'
groU\J.'l Olf rcllCue pen:'nnel. .
It; },'lll,ip"lwt.-1he same crude of
listed in thc Osaka lield
wel'f! used in Kobe and again no ..en
equipment ,,'as a\ailable. At tbe beginning of
the "..ar. an aireement ,,'113 made witb truck-
ing lI>lllociatlon to pro\'ide transportallon for
equipment and per!lOnnel to bUl the
great destruction of trucks dunng tbe
raids forced thum to tra''el on foot, In\'elIl1ga-
tion pro"ed tlult tra\'ele<! five or
more milC:ll ou foot to reach the scene of oper.-

Comments
16. Planned and developed to handle situa-
tions arising from small the rCllCue llCt\"
icell wpre O\p......helmed b)' the raids of
tion proportioM.
17, RCllCue were constantly de.
layed becaullC of the of trucks for trans-
porting perllOnnel and equillment. The ear!y
raid.$ destro)'ed or those a'.II-
able, so that the uniu finally had to travel to
Inddenta on foot.
18. The complete lack of heavy and power-
drh'en f!(luipment suitable for rescue work cre
ated difficult problema whene"er the more hea,
ib' comrtructed buildings collapsed from high
eXpl08I\'e bomb bita
19. It should be noted that the guard re&(ue
unit (bibitai) did not operate in the barbor
area of Kobe, where all len'ices
carried out the lluxiliary police and fire unIts
(kriOOdoll) and the special protective grouP!!
formed in the indulltrie.a concentrated in tbr
harbor area. (For a detailed deecripli?,n
thelle uniu. refer to the "Harbor a.
"Factory Air-Raid Protection" !lCCtionJl of thi!
report.)
POSf,fL\1D CLEARANCE
1. Illlr()/lilflioll._ln no algnillcant I'\!lIpect
doell the account of llOlIt-rald , ..
._" ranee and Ito
_Ill",. dllfer in Kobe.nd H .
fecture from that of Osaka r'.......
"'-_L ' pre fCture and
....- cIty. The. fOllo";ng report ... ilI. there-
fon:. but to I.. and
O]H.'tatlo;>na IdentIcal In Kobe and Osaka. and will
elaborate only .on auch refinemen\J! nf detail dill.-
CO"ere<! .nd alight \'ariatloO& prsctlCfld In Kobe
2. YOIJd .
lion foY "'au aiy raida,
(I) Admilti$tro/ire oryall;zaliQll. _ The
prefectural and cit) public works depart-
mcnll for road clearance under.
went no actu.l change for w.r beyond reee!\'-
ing w.rtime name for their Iabore....nd
official recognition for their function in the
air-raid-dclen'IC tablC$ of orpniution. In
thc prefeclural table of organization. a labor
headquarlcl"lI wall set UP. the leader of which
wa_ the head of tbe ci\il engineering di\iaion
in the public "'orka department, The aeetiona
thereunder ....ere the same aeetiolll a.'I ....ere
normally operating under tb" prefectural pub-
lic ....orks department: ri"cl1l !\CCtion. roads
section, !lI\nd ICCtion, lumber section. and
tl'ansportation section: and tbe same Indi\id_
u.ls se....ed in bolh capacitiC:ll .. seclion
chiefs. The laborera were gi\'en a ne.... name.
emergency public ...:orb con!rtruetlon group
(okyu doboh klMlIki< dalt) and gh'en a
military organization Itatua by brigadCl5. bat
taliona and companiCll. The nl'1 result of the
administratil'e plannin,. ....... to establish a
eonnection ...itb tbe police ,,'00 could !.bua call
upon the public ..'Oriel fol'Cft in lase
of emergency. The city of Kobe appeara to
bllve been somewhat berorehanded in it:! prnJ)-
arationa, for. whcreaa the equil'alent prep-
arations made by Osaka ,,'ere oot
until M.rth 1944 under Home Minislt)' ordera
of IF-cember 1943. Kobe had taken lIUch
measunll in June on its o.....n
Conliderabl)' more freedom of action .nd re-
81)(ll1Sibillty w.., C"ident throughout the Kobe
/'lOllI-raid operations In respect to control
tbe pre.rectu..... Onls In lhe mailer of eJ1'M'r-
gene,. police .uthorit) did the lI'ar change lhe
relationship betw...,n the cit) and the
ture from thaI of advice and counilel on alT'ftt
maltera. Aa to otMr dUll ...
pref"'Cture. tbe pn:teeWN
through IS braaeh omc..
(2) Tltl' ",""rlU'J' ,,1IblU 1r'Gf'b ____
licn, (lYQ>lP (olrp dobo.h "-'- 0.-
There little to add to the Oub IIIor7 011
tbe ora-aniutlon .nd au.iped functiona of
this A table of ora-anization furnillhed
by the public: ....orlo< departmenl of Kobe fol.
10..., entitled "Organiution of Temporal)'
Reeono.lruction AxMIciation:' All noted
the baaic: orpnization ''''lI set up in Kobe
nine months before it .....as in Osaka. and fell'
CbangCll ....ern required b)' tbe Miniltr.v of
Home Alfalra' order of December 1943. The
prefecture orpniud brigadC:ll of lhe con-
atrudion VOOP in the larger cornmunitiC:ll of
itll territor)" and provided for ae....j(,e to
plaeea not 110 organized. ne'"
was .utborized or .dded to tbe regular con-
struction and repair fOrl:C:lI: and It "'''a .1_
leged that such .....ould ha\'e bllen impolllible
in aIlJ' case due to military conxription.
(3) Trai.i.g of the pre:m-
ise that the air raids lI'Quld produce 00 new
problem that of mobilizing fon:C:ll and
them quickl}" to the of action.
the onl)' train'ng givcn W&!I that o! "maneu_
\"CI'/;" to eWec:t thia deJiired retlult.
All records of the number and detaila of slK'h
m.DC\l\ers ...en! Nld to ha,-e been bumed
when the public 1I"0rl<.o offices of both the pre-
feo,oture and tnc ....en! destro)'ed in the nre
raida, Repo.-u were to the of
Home Attain. bUI the .utboritiell in Kobe
considered theae reporu to be of little ,aloe.
OrganiZ3tion of Ternpor.try ROnSUUCtion
As.socUlioo
"..'"
T..... Dt-pI" ",,,,..
""'-noc<_ "-- '" l'uWic " ......
'n.. &no _- .--. '" ....
-
l1w .-.."' ...
l,ndn, I'Ilw """puI1 ..........,.. 01 too...
n... I....d '" ",;I _t__.
.........,... ...... n... Iowth _ . .-..moo: '" ..."
...- --
n". '" too"
-
n". ....do _ .-...... '" ...
-
37
\ .......ti... '" \\.t", wool>
T_...."" _;l.... 01 I""
.- ,
"... ...... ... _ .... aI""
..........'UOb cI<-) ,..- ....-. '-'--
...- -1_'"T'" ,\..,L
T_ ... of """
.- - .
n..looooIoI T'ooo __ - ---- .....
:.::::::- I n:-= 01 "-
- (4) t,-q.ip"' ....t.-Hand l.OOls. pitk$, ahol"
and ....koe1l ","ere tbe only equipment on
hand as of [)eceml:M"r except for 4 trudell
o..-nN b}' tbe ci1r and 20 trucks owned by the
preffClure for u""" throughout tht entire a",.
Although the city claimed to hal'\! Iuod on
order M\"ual bulldone,." in the prellll of
manufactUrt by a compan)' in Itami. they
were never aetuall}' delivered.
(5) Mulual o.id.-A plan for Mlnding as-
siatance from onc communi!)' to another will
worked out by the prefecture. under arrange-
menLs Ihat were "erbal. The ]lrefec-
lure was divided int" an eastern hlll( lind /I
western half for purpost"l of administration
and for quick dispatch of fOTCelI. witb the
head of the road section in charre of the CM\.-
trn h.lf .nd the head of the riven lI@(:tion
in of the ....l'!rtern half. The pl.nning
called for mutual aid to be ronfined to opera-
tioM ...ithin these divisions ueept for dr-
cunutanees of great emeryenC). The city of
Kobe ...u .uthorized to call upon the prf>fee-
tural forees in aM of utreme need.
(6) Role of Ill.. l'olit:e.-The eenter of the
emef"l""lM:J" roaddearane<l! p1.M wu to be
foulld in tbe poIit:e. for they were over-
aU .uthority all to the of informa-
tion reprding needing clear.nce .nd
ail to iMuing orders to immedi.tely aun.ble
clean.nee ptrllOnnO!!.. Eaeh loeal poliee atation
Wall .uthoriled to ..lfeet a\ICh clearance all wu
urrently needed b)' orderin( out .,.ilable
help, aueh all the .Ul<i1i.ry poliee alld lire
unitll (kribod/lll) or the emergency rePllir or-
r.niution (killkM kotllh tail. If they were
un.ble to tope the aituation the policE!
atation could call eentral poliee headlluarteffl
and the laller could give orderll direetly to
appropriate unitll of the emergency public
work.. construction group. Additional infor-
38
mation to the naturc or emerreoey
repair org.niution obtamed from the
r
, ",lice llllCuon that eommanded
preeeu " dft '
both it and the auxiliar)' 110 Ice an re unlta
.nd the emergenq' unita. The re-
ceived oroerll in June 1943 .from the Mmlstl'T
of Home AIf.in to organIze the emerJf!lleJ
repair organiution. of Ihat.
year it had been l!eI. up In 2l) CIties .nd towftlI
in the prefedurf>. It Wall hardly IJ\Ore thu
a term gi"en to skilled
to the -labor lIerviee U!lO(:laUon (rO.1I
!lobh tail. Eaeh at.tion
to organize ita o....n repaIr Off&?IutlOn.....Ith
as manJ' carpenters. masons. brlCklayerll, and
other cra.fbmen u it might need. Laborers
could be borrowed from neirhboring
to lill complement.s. The head of the orgaDl-
ZIltion in each police distriel was one of the
laborers who took orders from the station
chief. In April the chief himself became
the head of the repair organization in each
district. If the laborers were called out to
make emergency to 3treets. bridge.s.
factories or homes. the police station paId
them from funda provided the prefecture.
which, in turn. was rcimbursl'<l b)' the factoI')'
owner or particular government activity for
which the work was done. The public works
department of the preJeeture claimed to be
unable to supply figutl'!ll as to how much road
clearance wu done by the repair organiu-
tion 8.'1 retleeted record.a of reimbursement
to the poliee. or 10 furnish information on
ho.... much clear.Me ,,'u done b)' members of
the .;.uxiliar) police and tire unita; nor rould
this inform.tion be obtained from the polke
secti..n corr.mandin&" the auxili.t) poliee alld
Ilrt units. for the loc:.1 poliee lltationll were
said to hllvc made no report of such opera-
tions.
b. The air r.ids on Kobe .nd
olher plaee:s in Hyoga prefecture produced no
lIerious road-clearanee problems since relatively
few high-e:<plosi,'c bombs were dropped. The
streets were relatively dear for Iraffic:, and 8uch
debris as fell into the IItreet.ll was either lett
where it was or WIIS reported to have heeD
pushed aside by neighborhood-group meml)e"
There was one serious rOlld block Oil the Qaaka
Kobe road, but the public works officilll claimed
to no knowledge as to the detalb of ita
remo. al. A request Wall made to hi
thill materl.l toeether and to I, ,...... to ret
c....., In. oom_
plete aero,unt the ,,:ork done by the variou.a unita
to thIS operation. The a'-nee of
reportl.nr and th:'" IOQ of neorda due to the
tire raId g...en as f1'a8Ons for bein&" un_
.ble to funuah atatistics On the aueaea of the
road-c!earanee plana. In .... cue ...ere unita f
the emeJ'l"ency public ....orks construction rro:
called from one city to another for .id. p
.3. f: ... er/l"'.q rCP/lir 01 nxuh. II.wgu ud
rm'r ""'Nh._a. ad_
miniurath'C authorities "'ere in c:harge ot re-
pairine- thl'!!e inatallations as thoee for road
cle.rance, and the llllme organization and per_
sonnel were used. Hence. IllOIlI of the prepan.
tor}' moves were the ume fnr repair as for
clearance. Howe'er. greater use of the emer_
gency repair organization was contemplated In
the plans. and less use of the auxmary police
and lire units because the latter were unskilled.
Grenter llifficulties were anticipated In the mat.
ter of reJlldra. and in the training therefor
IIlIghtly mOre effort WIl$ expended. The road
and bridge men were given a demonstration of
emergency repairll to a bridge. Thc shortage
of repair materials .uch as lumber and cement
was acute; but such materials as weN! at hand
were placed near stral.egic roads and bridges
thought to be po&ible targets. There WeN! not
enoullh trucks to move the materi.1s around.
.nd the fe... rollers posaea.sed by the public:
....orks departments of the prerecture .nd the
city were borro"'ed by the .rmJ' to build air-
fields.
b. Opet1ltioJl#.-The only emeraencY
N!pair gitualion th.t.tOR durin&, the raids ...u
one alfti", the banks or the Mukaga".. ri.""r
that lIo....ed bet....een an arm}' fuel_tank depot
and an .ircraft plant. This ...as im-
mediatel)' the emergency public ..'Orb con-
struction ,:tOllp in the area. The repair forees
"'f!re ..id to reached the spot alm(ll!t im-
mediatel}' after tll-e dam.ge Willi e.uJed and to
hne tompleted repairll "et)' quickI)". The re.-
son ror the urgenc). it wall said........ bee.use
or the dana-er of liODd. There wall no damage
to ImllOrtllnt bridges. and such bridre>ll8 were
alightly damaged could all be by-passed by the
re.routing or traffic. in the case of tOlld
e1earanee. DO _kI oWabIIlI
in.-the ...-d aJId bridp r .......
by the auxiliary po&e and II 1IJdD;.,..,. ..
emeTlJl!nc:y repair orp.niudon. Tlw'" f1/I
theae 1"'0 gTOIlPll ... /If all iDfonml,
spot nature and DO one _tel be foond wbo
<:o\lld (i"e deaeriptioD of .nul repain fIf_
feetM by tbem. The public ...orb oflkialll said
that tho< allXiliat)' poIi .nd liN! units tiI'f!ft
too bw,. fightin&" lirea to make any N!pain 10
lI1reet.l1 Or .nd that they ....ere not
trained to make repai... afte......rds. The emer-
rellQ" repair organization mernberll ...eN! llSid
to have disapJhred 10 places of ..fety.
4. f:,.ergaec, rqir 01 oller iutaUllt,QII.I.
a. PrePllratiolu.-The maintenance creW3.
laboren and technicians of the trallllportation
and ...ater "'orb companies in the city ot Kobe
and in the prefecture: "'ere induded In the table
of or&"anization of the emer(eney public works
construction group. and were pl.ced under the
same police authority aa the road and bridge
men. Had there been any iOvernment planning
for repairs to buildings. it would have been
done in the construction section of the .ir-de-
fenlll! bureau. The chief of thla section stated
that no repairs were contemplated beoeaulle of
the lack of materials. Actually, the 8eCtion ac_
complished a fe.. repairs to aome pn.'.te resi-
dences in tM eastern pan of the cit)' ...ith labor
furnished by the repair organiza-
tion. nle fuoction ofthis8tion ..... to fumiAh
the materia.h and to .rn.nge (through its p0-
lice .uthorit)) for the labor. A -.wi fuDdion
of the section ...as to make pl.ans., in June 1945.
at the order of the prefectural ...eU.re deJ-.rt-
ment. for the coll81rvetion of houa-
ing. These pia"" were made hut were pe,...r
earried into effect.. The e:MI or the houaing 'lIl"U
to been borne by the national ....t
(one-half) and the city (one-half).
b. no source was it pIIII-
sible to di..oro'er I'ft'Orda or <I,...n informal judg-
ments conceming the elfecth-enellll of plannin&"
for repain to public iMtallations. 'ThoH in
charge of the er.>ergency publk ...orb eonll1ruc-
tion group that the raids "'t're 110 de"!l5-
tating that then> "... nothin&" left to repair.
This a half-truth. bUI. judging
from the way recorrta were kept. and from the
type of thing that I'ft'Ords were kept about. it
_ "llIe IMI then' ... no
is qUIte JIO'I"'I made to allJ1.lUIt!r
iT' worth, of the name .
.... C " Ollkials stilted thalille
but willer m" ns. I . '
. __ h,_'r.. maIN ials were
1)on ...... l'O ..- ,","" "d h"
,
". r _ ;0 _tlend b)' the Tal II t
an. t lr - . . to
.. repa; had no urgenc)... \\hat reV-II's
buildings were and the)'
elfectM pri\"&leu' by the apeClal bUlldl it
guard!: the fon:e:J or the telephont.
nill"Olld and ether utilities did "'hat the>:
to restore transportlltion lind oomnlUnlCatlon
without any organized help from the cit)', or
prefecture.. The nopair orpnlu-
lion membel'>l just t(luld not found. Onl)'
30 wert known 10 be in Kobe on Augun 15.
1945. One ([metal admitted that th"y knew the)'
not pr1'psred for qukk rf!ro\"el")' from
m&M air raids but that ron.cription and the
insbilil)' to;> gel equipment or materials made it
jmpo$Sible to prepare Or to operate
:;. Dntoldimc. _ Tbfore "'111 no demolition
carried out b)' eitbfor the cit, or prefectural
authoritil'l!. It atated that $mal1""'ICale ru-
inl operationA mill' ha"e been performed by lin
allJ[ilial')' police and fire unit, but that the polk)'
wu to }foa\'e dat\i'Cr'OUJ walLo to tbe o..
and that the practice wa$, in the
caJJe of brkk for inatance, to let
them fall do,,'n u f.u decidoo.
6. SolnlUe.-A metal_luge lItion Wa.$
up in the prefectural in Allril
!!Ktion aupervi'iCd a metalil-eollect-
ine-eontrol company (killZoQ k..iflllt to,", kal-
,b). the main ol'IIce of "'hkh ..'u in Tokyo
with a branch offiCi! in each prefectural capital.
the wh(,]e rompan,' being under the Munitions
llini!!tl')'. The Kobe branch of the eompan,'
"'&.!I C$l.I.bli$bed in June of 1943. The lM.'ction
super...iMd the eolle<:tlon of lICrap metal and
llOught such noneuential items as radiatOr!!.
bl'U.! door handles, windO'l\' Iakhefl, and other
hard"'are, and the distribution of tho:te metala
to factorie!l whkh had neoed of them. The aC-
tual "'ork of collecting the lICrap waa done b)'
the empla,..!e. of the rompan)' ...ho:te laborera
were in group called the rollecting unit (kal-
8hu k(Mah tail. About one month after the
tir1lt. mMll raid on Kobe, Mareh 17. 1945. the
rompsn)' befan to roJJect IICrap metal from the
ruillll r-f burned hou.'lell. Large pl.nls which had
been bombed were considered unaafe to work
40
in bee.uae of danger of injury loo!<e frame.
.nd "'cakened ....Ib. of the
remains could take B,,'a}' an}'thnlg ;-'anted
for a period of one month. ufter whIch IIIe
compalll' could go ill lind rollnet the $Cr.p. It
...ilI be-owen that Kobe did 1I0t interpret ill.
"" the same ....y the July II, 19451&",
exa .. . .
pet:ting the one-monlh limIt gnen ...... o\\nen
and retain poBlle!l8ioll of nonrollected
!Illlngt'ab\@ materials, all did the Osaka pre-
fecturalJro\'ernmenl. There Wall no central col.
lecling depot. and l\Crap be<;llme the property
of Ihe rompan)', but the)' could do nothing with
it u the companies needing IlCrap metal would
not accepl an)' lICT'llp which had
being Ihrough inten!lC hellt. In Nlllhllloml)'a
and Allhi)"a the memberll of lhe neighborhood
grou\U ...err emplo)'ed in the I'Olledlng of
In Kobe and ether communitlC!'. llChool ehlldren
were also u$l!d for that purpope. There l\'all no
a\'ailable eatimale of how much llCrap had
piled up in Kobe. All proceb from the pop,..
aible $ll.le of IIny of this lICrllp were to go to
the Sufferers' Welfare A5!lOCiation (Sell311i
f:II!10 Kai). Prior to the elltabli$hment of the
ronlpan)' and the &:I1\'age $l!Ction in the pre-
fectuml pl'ernment, all collecting W&ll done by
tho$e pril'ate concerns which could U!<e the
lICrap. No recOrd5 were kept as to how much
the" collectf'd. Neither administratively nor
operationalll' did the !llIlI'age lM.'ction have an)'
connection with the air_rald-defen!le organiza_
HoI' of the prefecture.
7. COJIIJIIl'1lu.-Tbe use of lire bombs did
not create clearance problem. of the magnitude
that high-exploai\"ea would hale caused, and
more and more of the cit)' waa burned the tub
of the clearallCl' and repair for<:cs lessened.
On the olher hand. the small stof:k of repair
material5 and et[uipment alllO depleted by
the great raid., and the restoration lJerllOnnel
di$per5l'd. Particularl)' difficult for the restora-
tion officials W/lll Ihe exodull fl'Olll
the cit)' of aUlIiliary perllOnnel, especialll' memo
bers of Ihe emergency repair organization.
-"Iulual-aid plana for clearanee and restoratiOll
had been good. but there was no actunl Cll5C of
their operational U!lC. Auxiliary emergelll')'
clearance and repair unit.s kept no reeords of
"1>rk accomplished, and the reporting
Wall 80 inaccurate that prefnetural authOrililll
In charge of relItor.tion "'ere of .
formed u 10 d......!rf' eonditio th ten mlroin- IDOri' initiative ... , ....... tn.
'1' All I d" ... TOIIl"hout 1M .. I _"_... _
Cl ). n ICatl,ona, ho...e\'er, pointed control t n n........- d _
record of restorallon <!quail)' all to a ahNd (of the nalional ...........
058ka. No eVidence of ....i.., ""'hr. of 'd
d' ee ) tn" ann)' ral TCCOI'ery plallnine for II bad ., ap air-
was IlICO\'Cred. Decmolition of dan defena meal!urea 9 _11ul bd_ the _tIoul
"'aa the T'f>lllOn ibility of tL- , .
h
.." d Ihll a0ll"gel!tlOIlll or December 1943 had r- reo
Jeet waa nol t ,".
over-all alr-defen'le plan.. Th bl" 0.", cei\"ed, and had dispersed to Itrateaic poifttlo ita
depanment of the city acted of r:palr materia1.'l to make them
) qUick!) a'allable In cue of emerll'enc,' need
V. PROTECTION OF FACI'O .
BUI RIES, UTILITIES. INSTALLATIONS .... ND
WINGS DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE
FACfORY PROTECTION vollc)' for all induurial protection relIted ,,'jib
.1. IlUrpose of the indU8- the go\'ernor of the prefecture and the usi$1.-
trial In the Kobe area \\"811 to examine anta on the prefectural in charte of the
the plana Procedure adopted by the larger lleCtion. J\lard lIOCIion (po.
and more "'ar-production indUlltrie<l heel. alr-defenae aec1.ion and departmenl,
to deUrmllle Ihe efficiency and adequaey of at the Ioc.l cit" le\'el "'u \'ested
their 1I"stem for air-raid protection. The in the chief of police and the chief of the fire
reflecu the scolle and functions of the pretec. dell8r1ment. The broad polil:)' of requirementa
lural o;Gl'ernment in the control of factory air_ for go\'ernment-eontrolied factoriea "'u formu-
raid IJroteetiorl in pri,'atel)'-owned.and-oper_ the arm)', na\')'. Or :\Iunitioflll ),fin_
ated planta, as well lIll In privatel)'-o""ned bUI l!ltry.
gO\'ernmenkontrolled war-production indWl- a. lbl,nagemenl'a personal inteTe!l1 in the
trie!!: and the SCOpol and functiona lib"'illt of mauer of facwl')' air-raid protection "'u e,'j_
the arm)' and ony and of the -"Iinilllr)' of Muni_ by the fact that the chief of Ihe air_
lions in pri"atel)'-owned and go,ernment-o....ned raid-protection organization "'1J5 seneraU}' the
war industries, both of which were gtl\"ern- jll't'$ident of lhe C(lrporation. or ....neral man_
nwnt-controlled. Detailed anal}'sill and in5pec- all'er of factol')' ......llIted b)' M\'eral mem_
lion "'ere made of the Kawasaki Shipbuilding bera of hl.'l Ilaif wt:ich numbered, In the cue
Yardll. Kobe Steel WorkB and the Miuubishi of the planta under s1ud}', SO or more pef8Oll$.
IleaV}' Industriea. which were engaged in the depending on the size of tbe faetol').
production of heal")' equipment, the building of 3. Or/lllIli:atIOIt. - Follo.ing the general
and submarines and the manufacture of plan and outline for. t)'pical facton' alr_raid_
Diesel ellgines and lurbinea. The larger numu_ fom., u directed in PN'fecturai go\'_
faeturing planu of the area ...ere chosen for ernment in$trtlctioll$. the air-raid_protecticn
slud}" ..-ith the kno"'ledge that there exi!ted fol"Cell of the planlS studied ""eN' didded into
onl, in the larger planlS an plant_ the follo";n/!, dh'isiollll:
prctection force designed to cope with air_raid a. IIrodq...r1e.... I/fll._Thu. staft" rollbisted
damage. (ElIhibilS G. 11 no:! I gh"e dt>taHed of the chief of the air.raid-prottion gTOUp
reports On e:u:h plant,) Again, for the purpose (bogo-dflll). principal a!<ll.istanlS and llla-ocn_
of seeurin, a thorough cl'Oll!l_l!CCtion of infor- gers.
nlalion a5 to the tn>e and structure of air-raid- b. G....rd dirViolt (kdbo-blt)._This dh'i_
protection indu5tries repreaent- sion ron$i!ted of a "'arning llCCtion (ktiOO-IIl"').
ing a dherait) of procC8IJC:I and compoged of telephoni$U, ...aullen<. l'ocal-alarm
interests "'ere seleeled. light control""... and me&llf:ng"'lI., and a
2. Control IJrld rt"potI"ibi/il,_RCl!pon!ibil_ guard I!Iection (i..ibi-Iloll). made up of guides.
it} for adetluate meaSUrei! and emergent')' N'pair Cre"'5 and l!CCurit) J'IIard& for
fnr the in!t&lIation of air_raid-defenae facililies msintaining order.
I'e:!lted entirei)' .."ith the o,,'ner and operator. c, Firt'din:.iOll ("IlolxNJll)._A fire brigade
but of the preparation of phil\!! and :!<!Ction embracing the tire apparatua ere...!, the
dl
d axe-men'" ll<\ulld. lind
ho:>e-mllinlellll
nce
I!QlllI "setl this <l[\-i.
II hanll-extingui8her ilqulld comllrl
Ilion. _ b J _Thill di.
d. di,'i,,()11 :id streicher
\"ision COIIIl;8Ied of II re&Cue. -
u.ad and llQuad. ed in
"", Itc-ir diriMioll (lVlllh-bIl).-lndudd 1
. ..- . ir llQua e ec
Ihi division ",ere. . "
lrk.lnlllllformer lind '
buildi!l$.l't'pair $Qu.d and an engineering eec-
lion. dd .
-I. Dtltir'lutd qlltllilie<llio....-. G...r n"l-
aioll (kfibfHllI). .
(I) AI",... mtN'._Emplo)'eelI gTOuped In
lhi, "'ere required to p&SlI through
plant "'llh an air
raid alert 01" alarm. the alert
I(i\"en b}' the electric sirena or public addl"e$ll
53'lItem.
(2) 1I'1IIclt"n'.-At.be lII.und of thto lin'll
air-raid ....tchefll manned the obIIer....
lion posu Jocaud on top of lhe main factor)"
bIlildinp. and it ..... IMir dul}" to
the approach of .Ireran and report ,mmed,-
.teIJ' to the faewry con!rol the numlle.r
of plaDel. of night .nd e!!tl-
matl!d gperd,
(3) LigJII ....-:M08t Iarfe manu-
farturi!l&" pJanU "'en!! found to ha,'e o..pn
iud lI'luad under thil di\'ision ....holIe dutJ'
it "'1Il!. upon from the control
center. to conlrol .n lirhtinl" throul"oollt tile
pl.nt durin&" an .nd to Ihllt off
po_r trall.!miuion Ul m.chine-tool opera.
tiotl...
(4) Mtungtr. - Each &"lI.rd dh'ilion
number of meMenEerll dividl!d
equ.lIy .monl" the &"lI.rd postll ....ithin the
pl.nt .rea, "'bose dllty it WII Ul earn' meJI-
sal"es 10 .nd from the eontrol nter lind
other dh'isions of the .ir_r.id_protection
forcl!li in the event other me.nl of communi-
cation faill!d.
Members of the gu.rd division were cho.wn re-
ll'.rdle!lll of previous skill or tr.ining and were
requirl!d to underl'o common training and to
eonduct prsctice drills at lelll!t once each month,
b. Fire di"i$ioll (.Iwbo-bu).-The qUlllity of
faCUlry lire-brigade llerllOnnel lind equipment
WI8 far below usual American standard$, In
most ca6ts it WI8 entirely inadequate Ill! to size.
42
. d "antit, of apparatuS. a. well ..
an h
.' of r:lOllnel. to fill even t e conlem.
trlll1
ll1
g of large manufaelurlq
I ted peaCe.lm
,. p of the larger factories con.
c:oncern$. ro "" AAA' .,,'"
. _" r ,torized pumpera not exc."..mg ........
list"" 0 m . be or rt.
1I0ns_per_minute capacity, anum r .....
ga line-driven pumpll mounted on hand.
able g&.$O. and a number of h.nd pum..
drawn Some fe.... plant fire-brigade
and extmgul. . ." with protective cloth_
penonnel were equ ........
. h ......r boota helmeta, and asheltoli
mgluc tiru....... . d h d
. Th be\ter-organiud lire bTlga ClI a
clothm&". e d _
. fi-' .id uad separ.te an apa
Ihelr o....n ,-' . di
from the personnel of the re&Ular .
. . O"Anrntion in the$e planta TC\ealed
\'ISlon. """ . , '1 'I,
"'.' -'er .....ere not a\&1 a
that su.. "8' ,
.,,. lires and the managemenlll
to rope ....h... k
reliance was plaeed on the U!le of lallIe buc et-
brigades. oomposed of resen'e empIO)'ees of
plant. Ob,iously, such methodl ... totalb
inadequate to rontend wilh lm-
]lOlICd b)' IallIe. incendiary. air_raid attacks.
Automatic sprinkler proteetlon, generally rec-
otrII
iud
in modern Arne-rican u the
first line of protection, did not alst as a I"eneral
rule in 1.0)' Japanese factories. The
selected Iocationl of lire
along the aterior sides of frame bUlldmp
further hindered the efforta of the lire depart-
ment in atinauishmenl,
c. Saxit..,... diri.oio.. .P:"r-
IIOnnel of the lirst-aid $Cdion9 of
wen': afforded "er)' rudimentro.ry tramiDg and
gi\'en infrequent drills in the lechnique of band.
aging applJ'ing and the general
handling of litter c .-. EqUipment and IUP-
plies for thil $Cdion varied poor to aver-
age, In one particular factory It
to reo::ruit penonnel for thll seetlon
from retired Army peTliOnnel on the alllump-
tion that previous military training had qu.li
lied such penons for lirgt-aid work. MOllt large
Japllne$e indultriell had their own plant hos-
pitals which, without Cltception. were well
maintllined and adequately staffed with doctors
and nurses. Little attention was paid to IIT1II-
aid organization within the operating unitl of
the plant prOller on the expectation that ,II
easel, including minor injuriel, were to
e"acuatet! to the plant h08pital for more dellnt
treatment.
(I) Th ....e_ .. 1 _ 1
I
. 1 ' uP...... w ItI
\e c othlng, IIr6t.aid kltll d
d
. . an llretch_
era, econ mmatlon kitll .nd --1'
r
.. Ilipply
o rellCrve &"1llI nutslcs. but there ..... no evI_
of or re!uscilation equipment.
Noteworthy I' the .b$en<:e in the planta under
of hea"y rescue unitll fDr the extrica.
tlon of personnel trapped in burning build_
Inl'.I or under debri... that might require the
of hea,")' C<juipment or tunnelling teo::h.
DIQUe.
d. Repair diri6i(l r........ht-b.. )._Tbe com_
of the p@raonnel in thia diviaion nrieot
accordmg 10 the needl of the different manu.
facturing plant&. SectiOnl were llIuall)' set up
within each department of the plant under the
&"lIidance of the SJ,;:perintendenl or foreman
of the particular operation depending upon
"'hether the emergenq' caUed for repair and
n!plaeement of machine toob, repair of electric
geneT1lUlrs, moUlrs and wiring, or re.-ir to
building damagM in .n air raid, .nd lpecial
lIQuad" with their 0"'11 hand tooll "'ere dis.
patched Ul the IlCIme of the &onl.
in&" to their special $kil\s.
e. Reuf'ru.-Thoee who ..-ere DOt
l8IlilfTled to any particular of the air-
raid_protection organization within the factory,
IOmetilT.l!I ....ere organized inUl a re:w:n'e di,i_
lion "'hich in turn WIJI subdhidl!d into Rctions
for support of the guard. lire. sanitary and re-
pair in the e\'ent of extreme emer-
gency. The .uxilian penonnel were not I'i>-en
anJ' training or drilled in air_raidprotection
technique. but merelJ' represented a re:aen-e
pool of manual labor to II""ISI in all of
.ir.raid emergenC)'.
5, Air-raid-tca,."ilf/T - The usual
method of receipt of air_raid waminl'll in the
indultrial plants WIJI b)' meallll of the public
radio or by telephone from the ne.rest police
..Iation ha"ing jurisdiction in the area. The
alert or alarm ""al sounded throughout Ihe in-
terior of Ihe plant lind the plant from lhe
control center by mean.. of electric lirens, elec.
tric bell" and public addrC'lS IUIl"-
Dlenled by the alarm criers previDusly de-
scribed. The lirllt slarm usually consillted of a
warning over the 10udsllI!aker lIystem tD all em
ployCCll of the imminent danger Dr an air raid.
At thl: 8ame time the alert WM Munded On the
" .....l-I,.....
mechanical .Irena and beUa tor ..........
Durinll" thia period emploJ'_ -': tIMIr
llationll and won continued. The __....
which ....1 announced OVeT the pubUe a;dcIr.-
"Yltem and sounded o\'er the mecbank:al de-
"icea, indicated lhat raiderll were _r-by and
headed in the direction of the plant. Thia warn-
Ing conliated of Ii\'e ronlMlCuti\"e sirnals of 5
each on the airenl and bells, at ...hicl.
time.n emplO)'eea "'enl ordered 10 take lIbelter.
The wall clear" ..... not llOIInded on the mechani_
cal de\'kft, bUI merely annol'nced throughout
the entire plant .nd In the dtelterll o\'er the
public addreu system. The decillion of when
Ind ho... to _nd ak!rt or alann ,,.. left by
the police entirely to the di.cretion of the ehie!
of air_raid prot1.ion of each incli,idual plant.
6, Coxtrol Utltera.--Pl.ant man&l't'ment earlJ'
in the w.r recognized the \-.loe of, and __
sity for, rontrol center wiltlin the factory.
Uaualb' ba8ement room of rei...
folftd eonerete and capable of w:ithstanding the
bomb impact. of a near-hit or anything but a
direct hit...... aelected .nd utiliuc! as. control
eenler. It was C<juipped with telepbrmes, IUX_
iliary lighiinc tqUipmenl. blacl"lul de\iceI.
public addTl!:lll ayauma .nd maps and charta
.ho...in&" the phylical layout of the plaot, tbe
location of 1'Ulnerable
points. linl maiM lin!! hydrants. and oIher ill-
teUi8CfIU information properly pkKted. In lll!V-
eral planta it ..... noted thai manll"'ment had
made pro,ision for a I'ftoi'TVe or supplementary
control center ...hich rouJd take over the opera-
lion of the main nler in the of iu de-
sln>ctlon. The eontrol center. from which all
instructioll.l Ul the four principal dhigions of
the air_raid_protection organization "'ere
patched, ..... staffed by the chief of alrraid-
protection fo"",", .nd hil l8Ilistantll.
by the I"tneral mar.aEer production manager
and elll'ineerinll" &!!Sinanll of the headquarten
$latr of the facto!'}'. Telepooniltl trained l'lI-
peciall)' for emergency duts manne<l the switch-
boardll .nd lelephonea, Upon receipt Df the air_
raitt alert, obaer\'en "'ho had n!!ported to the
center Mont 10 the
look-out towen and JT\UIl!ngers stood by for
digpatch dutJ',
7. Sltelttr. -Alr-r.irl Ihelten capable of
housinl" the tot.l penonnel of aDJ' one working
,,11m, ,,-jthin the plant and
.t II di_tanee up to tllree_!iftha of a mIle (one
kilometer) on the out.ide of the plant.
'1lried from the type of
to tOO-penon to the tnle construe:
of II alillHow wooden frllme, protl'Cted b)' earth
co,'er. and capable of accommodating from 10
to 15 peNOM. Non( of the!e lIhelU'tI! rould bot
bomb-proof b)' aI\)' Itretch of
imagination. In additiOn to shelters, mOilt
plants ,,'ere equipped "'ith "mlllJ c)'lindriclll con-
...teh of one-man capadts of the
"pill bo"," tJ'pe ...hich had Imall .slits for limited
,'ision. TheaI' were di.peraed throughout tile
factory and ,,'ere nl.nned b)' membel"$ of the
"'atd! of the guard di,ision. "'ho re-
mained in them during the emergency .nd kept
the control center mformed bJ' telephone re-
prding the status of fire .nd air-raid damage
Although InOIlt of theso aheltetl! might be ton-
"idet@(j to be fire-resiatant, the)' were not prop-
erly protected with OX)'lfCn equipmenl Or "enti-
Iated to pre"ent aut!'oeation. if in,'ol..eel in a
iMIt lire. nor ...eN' the)' gu.proofed. In the
Miuubi.hi Hea\'y Industries, the eeiling of the
reinforeed.c<)RCTf!te .helters was approximateiy
19... incne. (50 ntimeters) in thic:knesa ...ith
walls rangina: in tllicknelS from 12 to inches
(30 to (j.(l eentimetel"$). These ,u.eltel"$ ...ere wen
dl':!!ie-ned and had blasl ....ll. in front of tile
doon and one or h'o rie-lIt..-na:1e turna in the
entranee stainoa). The aUee(lI8 of t'- par_
ticuiar .lIeiterscan be measund bJ' the fact that
one sut!'et@(j I. near-llit by I. 2,200-pound (1,000
kilo) HE bomb on Jull' 19-15. ,,'lIieh resulted
only in 4 being killed .nd 10 injured,
in apite of the fact that the bomb atruek 10 feet
from the entranee to the IIhelter.
8. Lig"l COIlttol. _ As requit@(j b)' regul._
tiona, manufacturing piant. were ordered to
install auch devices and effect auch
at would insure IOtal blackout. although in cue
of b1&l1t and open hearth furnacea, it ...s lit_
impossibie to construct or other
on"ios to preH'nt .k)-glo". Again, the short-
ap of material and Ha:ht-eontrol equipment pre_
"ented ali such instroction. from beina: com_
pietely consummated.
9. MldlUll aid. - Mutlllll..-id .rr.nlrements
,,'ere f.irly "'I'll planned within the plant de-
in advance of lIir raids, The pre-
44
fecturai lire de'l&rtment. 011 the ,reeeipt, of tbe
I rt ,,'ould often dispatch pumpmg eqUIpment
;lerSOllnel 10 the of the to rein.
the plllnt lire 1I0"e\er, when
air raids UlIumed p,"?portlona.
I
. re coneerned princIpally WIth IIl!'lf-protee.
pe"e I'd 'ta be-
tion snd. l\6 a resuit. mutua _Ill _alll!l.
ran to 10lIe ill! meaning. Oc<:ll$lonaHy It
found that public fire apparatu.!l was much 111-
ferior in qualit) lind capacit)' to plant ap..
I'Srll-IU5, to the .Sili5tance of tt
10, Opercllioll' l<IlIder llChal lIlr.rold eo-ttdl_
11011,.-:\100 of the air r.ids su,:ered by the
Kobe area were the incendiary raIds of Febru_
ary 4,1946. Marl'h 17, 1945, and 5,1
7
45,
"ith the raid of June 5, 1945 employlllg hIgh_
uplOll;"e wc-.pon. in which many plant em-
ployees were killed and injured. The
of the air_raid_proteetion personnel dUring IIlr
raida "'ithin the industries ex.mined .....
orderl)- and without panic or confUliion, and,
considcrina: the iimited preparation and train-
ing for the dUlles they were required to perform
and the inadequacy of the prowcth'e equip-
ment. their efforts did to a large degree pre"ent
a greater io.'lil of life, but did not to lIny
urable degree the ph)'aic.l damage
in any particular r.id.
11. - Air_raid_protedion units
"'ere in a:enerlli stronl"l)' org.nized wilh IIOme
factoril':!! assirnina: .. hia:h .. 20 percent of
their personnel to air-..id-protection duties.
Fire equipment. however, which included !lOme
motorized units augmented by numerous auxil-
iaries........ in general, inadequate in both qu.l.
it)' and quantit). The raid of M.rch 17. 1945,
which "'as II 1Ie"ere blow to piant!! in the area,
on1)' emph.uir.ed Ihe .hortage of fire pump. and
.....ter .uppiy, L.owes ....ere hI'a,'y and remedy
for the situation hopell'llS due to the
absence of additional mllins and firt
pumps, .. well as ,,:lter s)'iltem booster pumps.
The f:lctor)' pel'ilOnnel recognized the
futilil)' of fighting against such odds lind be-
iatedly turned to dispersal as the solution of
their problem, The program Wll!! begun so lak,
howe"er, that by the en(1 of Ihe war lillie had
been accomplialled in the way of di.persai and
what It.ad hfton dispersed ne\'l'r got into prodlle"
lion, Some pi.nts in the area were able to pro-
cure cement Mnd for con.truet
iOll
bUI "'ere inadetjllllte for .
near-mi_ of 5OO,pound hi.... allythlna: but
'"
...-eJ;pIOllI\,e hom....
ORe equIpment "'.Ill antiquated .....
teriorated to auch an nd had de,.
. ...,. to preclude un
mterrupt"" operations at nor I -
most dil!COncerting fact reia:;:: The
Wll. the tetldellcy of th.:l .." 0 aIr attsck
h I ers to <'Ome in
wa"ell, t us relltrictillg defenders to he
for several hours willie firell .... II lten
I I
rae-"". By and
Ilrlee, II ant penonnei were wllii ,
'-k II na: an eager
.... I' II preeautionll neeeqary 10 Proteet
I elr from air attuk. but ahortage of
fire.fighlmg equipment lefl their . II
. A" . . we -organ_
IZ"., unIts \\'11, ....ut the tooia with ...hich to oper_
ate. Althoua:.h many plantll were partialty de-
stro)-ed bJ' bomb!! and fi
curred the of ,h
" ' I' p.nt.
forel'!< were "er)' effecth'e in pre-
venling .pread of fina lind they immediately
addres.ed to the Uak of quirk
ration and repair of production Plants
o.. and air-raid-proteclion 80
dlllClllhned definitely tontribuled to the quick
naumption of production.
AIR-RAID PROTECfION OF PUBLIC
BUILDINGS
l. hf/rOOIle/io"._1t is the intent of thia re-
llOrt to briell)' the plana .nd procedure
establi.hed in the city of Kobe for public buik!_
inp auch as department storl'S. officf! buiidinp,
theate", hoteb. IChools. universities and .imi_
!ar el!tllblishments dewted to public &.'IllembJ),
m mattera of air_raid proteHion, and to de-
llCribe the .pplic.tion of IIII' buic !Iireeli"el!
eo"eritllf this .ubject i>lllued b)' the :\lini.tt), of
Home _4.ffaiTll. While the respotllibilitj' for .ir.
defen!!f! llians was .trictly that of IIII' Q"'ner
and operator of 1M establishment, te!luits of
bri!'f atudy of public buildinp indicate thai
great latitude wall allowed bJ' the prefectu..1
go"ernment which ,,'a. chara:ed ,,'ith imple-
mentinlf the Ilation.lla,, :lnd ...-ith carr)'ine- out
air-raid_proteetion measurell in theae elltabli.h_
menta, as evidenced in Ihe casel! of the Daimaru
department .tore. the Shura Kan motion pic_
ture thl'lIter and Ihe Kobe l!eeretarial ochool.
(Exhibit" J, K, L.)
2. Orgu"i.:o/i(lll. _ The air.raidproteclion
&er\'iee "'1$ org.nized under. leader ...-ho ...-1.8
logicallj' the principal in the case of a sc:hool,
the department store manAger in the ca.'It of.
department atore. and the jii 01' __
p:r in the eue of a tMatlll'. la .....
iiahments. the aid-rald-proteetloa a.der kad_
aaailJtlnt who "-as lhe exeeutl"e ....... 01
the Qrganiution. Under thi" 1ead1Pnb1p. the
organlutiQIl Will divided into the IISIIal four
departrnenta. n.mely, the a:uanf seoction. unl_
(tint aid and reseue), fire-light-
tn. l!et:tmn and liaiaon Qr headquarters lNlCtion.
a. Gqrd uetiOll.-The number of pel'llOns
in thl" lNlCtion "aried .reordina: to the aiu of
the filtabliahmenl. and their duties ,,'ere ap..
proximately that of a:uardine-. i"Uiding and
watchin. The guardill( phaae of the work
<'On!i"ted of fire w.tchina:, protection of exits,
pre"ention of lootine-; the lfUidin. duties
In,'oi\"l'd directin pel'llOnl to ahelter areas Or
exita: and their "1ltcllina: duties requit@(j them
10 aaeertain the point of impact of bomba in
their telIpecti\'e ateall.
b. Sonitllr)' or ,.t'--,-Penronnel
"'IJ! u.uall) ehOll<l'n from the funale ltat!' of the
eatablil'hment to render tlnrt aid and medical
care to the "OlInded. and. althougb they "'e",
gken '''IT iittle lnotruetion ill tlnrt aid techni_
que. Ihe)' "'ere, according 10 Japaneae infonn_
anti!. able u$efully- 10 employ their "natural
nursing inatinct." MemberaM this section lI'ere
equipped ...ith tlral...id kita. litter5, splints .nd
... muks.
(. F're-!ig"li.g udw.., reeei\'ed lI'hat t..in.
ina: "'u a"ailable to them from the prefectu..l
tire department personnel who made IOUI'l! of
the public buildings from time to time for pur_
of in.pection and il\lltrflCtion. The equip..
ment "'IJ! usuallJ' crude and tonslsted of amall
hand tin> pump', extinlfUiaher!l, bueketa. lI&IId.
hap.ho'"els. .t..... mata. liN' be.ters and
otller hand tool.. None of t"- public build_
ings "'as equipped "'i&, automatic: .prinkler
"Ylu"", a;s but in the eue of a department
store it did ha,'e a ""1lter-<urtain t)'pe" of S)....
tem on the ext("rior "'all of the building "'hich
"'u adjacent to a hia:h1)' Inflammable residen_
tial .rca. :\1.naiC"'mMIt of all institutions mani_
fested real intete!!t in fire protection and !lent
their people to the local tire departments for
instruction and itudJ'.
3. Opn-vtiou._. Air-mid J<lf,..I.g'.-The
initial "'arnina: "'&.II picked up from public
radio. city "iren, or from I member of the
45
borhood group (Iona.; gUlQi) who
local crier. In the eMe of a alert.
!'til look shelter at once on e Inl k h I
Theater personnel were evacuated to see 8 e-
leT wheuver tile)' could find il.
store personnel wne given the chOIce Qf p.ro-
reeding to their homes, local ahelters. or.
to the .-enter of the lu"'er 11.00r8 of the bUlldmg.
No formal shelters were provided by manage-
mellt at either the department store Qr theate.,
but at the !!Chool they were eollstructed at puhhc
expense. As !lOOn as Ihe planes had plIssed lind
the situation reverted to the alert slalUB. lhe
guard per9<lnnel in each caSt'l hastened to as-
:ertAin whether the establishment had been
damaged. Methods of communication between
air_raid_pr<lte<:tion leaders lind OCl.:UPllnts con-
slated of telephones, public adtlress systems,
ftag5. hand signals, messengers. Or whistles.
In the of a public school. the contr<ll center
or post of Ihe chief of air.raid protection was
located at the headquarters section. and in the
eaile of the department store it was located in
the bagement.
b. Protecti.e lighting including blackout
measureil was n'lt a particular problem in an)"
of the visited in that the depart.
ment stone and the school ceased 'lperations be-
fore darkne!li! and in the case of the theater, the
lights were controlled by one master switch.
Such measures as the installations of blackout
:UrlaiDS. low_voltage lamps and protective en
:!O/Iures for doorways and windows were car-
ried out in compliance with instructions issued
b)' the prefectural police who made frequent
inspections or these establishments \)efore the
advent of ex\:ens;,'e air raids to determine that
all requirements had been met and perllQnnel
instructed in proeedures. In the case of the
school system. police made frequent inspecti'lns
ob.'lerving air.raid drills on the part of teachen
snd students and reported to the Kobe school
auth'lrities ll.'l to the quality 'lf training and
efficiency of the measures taken. The city fire
department of Kobe. which was under police
carried on the educational and
instructional "'ork with the air_raid_protections
staffs of all public buildings in the city in mat-
ters 'lf fire-fighting technique and proper use of
small apparatus and hand tools.
4. Mutrml aid.-A prearranged plan between
46
managements of public edifices for IlllsistanCil
t'l each other in lime of emergency drawn
. connection wilh the cooperatIOn of tb,
up In . 'j dlh
, h'" h-d ."ops (lOllar, yU1Il1 an e
nelg uur vv . . 'b d
'I' ol,'ce and fire unll!l (kf.' 0 an). The
am(l lary P .
I P
""'ared to be well conceIved but proved
I'd'
to be unworkable during th.e arge tIleen
rllida of SIIturation proportIon on "hen
nearly IIIl buildings of anyone mutual-aId gr'lUP
",ere invnlved in the emergency. In.the case of
ocbool buildings. however.
given lIy the neighborhood groupS and the allxIl_
illn' police and fire unib hecllulle of th.e clo.\!
ties and the immature age of pup,ls whn
might be trapped in burning buildings.
Ii. Coot r>f o;r_raidprotedioll meo,mres.-
Because of the private of 'lwners
and Operlltors of public buildings. expense. of
nrganizing and equipping
personnel was a private matter. whereas. III the
C8$e of schools the of shelters and
the of protective equipment was
borne by the public through the Kobe sehool
administration.
6. Operal;tm Wider ai>"raid
Many vf the public buildings in Kobe in the
category described were totally destroyed or
partially damaged in the heavy incendillr)' air
IIttacks on the area. result.ing in partial
i'l the school building in question and vcry
minor damage to the theatl'r described. The
conduct of the air.raid-protection personnel re-
cruited from the employee staff of the buildings
and from the teMherll and students of the
gchools appeared to be quite excellent. and, con
sidering the meager equipment provided. the)'
did all that was physically possible or could he
e:<peeted of any protection in the casc of
eonnagrationa of such proportions.
7. Commenla.-Public-building management
appeared to be fully cOnllcious of the imminent
danger that existed from attacks with incen
diary bombs, high-explosive bombs and. as the)'
have often stated. gas weaponll. They accepted
the directivell and instructionll from the na
tional and prefectural level, but complied bJ'
creating the minimum type of organizatiOn
applicable tn their type of building and OC'
cupancy. and attempted t'l provide sueh protec-
tive equipment as WIIS available for purchase
without government priority in order that the
greatest dell'l"OO or lIelf.protecti .
be afforded their em,lo On 110slnbie would
. YCCll and publl
cupantl!. PartIcular weaknCMell e oc
abllenc\! of a full appreclatio fnoted were the
air_raid sheltera f'lr n "or the need of
.' . m ern tire.fight_
mil' equipment. sufficient water supplies for
fire attention was also Paid to
the training of staff personnel to ren-
der 8$8lstance to llerllOns suffering from 1lC"ere
burns or wounds, it being the that such
cases be care of by hospita!.g which
even In peacetIme were 'lvcTCrowded and in_
adequate to sen'e the public need. Full rcaliu_
tion of the WIIS not apparent until Kobe
had suffered l.ts first incendiary bomb raid:
then franlLc efforts of prefectural olfleials
and management t'lward the end of the
wllr to Improve their ilrotection mellSures were
entirely too late and futile.
RAILROAD AIR.RAID PROTECTION
1. air_raid pr'ltec.
tinn organiZ<:d under the lIIinistrr of TranI!-
portation was handled organiUltionally dnwn
thr'lugh eight railroad Osaka was
the he:ldquarters for one of the most important
of thesc divisions and its organiUltion is de-
scribed in the Osaka field report. Kobe. near to
and directly under the jurisdictinn of the Osaka
headqu<lrlers. had important railrnad installa
ti'lnS but a much less degree of centralized
control. The stati'lnmllster at the main rail-
road station had contr<ll only of his 'lwn station.
nearby repair shops. and a small gr<lup nf
buildings immediately adjacpnt.
2. _ Self_protection unita
(boyo_dllll) Were organized among the em-
ployees of each building and installation. Warn
ina"! "'ere received on dil'lll!i telepboM U-
from the Osaka railroad bureau eontl'ol ....
The installationa at the pienl In the harbor dfI,.
triet acted independently but coordinated with
the barbor-defenllC general headquarten and
the Osaka headquarlcT8. rather than with the
Kobe oltke. A large repair shop WJIII op-
erated directly under the Ouka management.
Hn,:,'ever. the roundhouse, eiectrical sheds. local
mamtenance office. generating slation and
power-transmisaion station were under control
of the Kobe office. The lighting relrUlations.
mO"ement of rolling Btock and trains were pre-
aeribed br the divisional office. General super-
,'ision of air-raid-defenae. matters of the amaH
independent rll.ilwa)s rested with the general
affairs llCCtinn 'lf the Osaka railroad bureau.
The wnstruction and maintenance IlCCtion at
Kobe empl'lycd about 120 during normal times
but increased to a wllrtime atrength of
over 300. Heavy damage was contr'liled b)' Ibe
Osaka bureau repair department because it
could coordinate and marshal the rellJlir peraon-
nel throughout the division. and could asaign
priorities. The bureau had the use of an army
railroad unit witb about 900 IlOldiera axailable
for emergency repair work in addition to civi-
}ian laborers. Reserve-material dumps and re-
pair trains loaded ",itb bea,') and tight tools
and material were in readinl'$ at Btrategic 10-
:atioll8 as described in the Osaka target report..
The railr<lad communications section main-
bined II large emergenc,' repair department
equipped with both motorized trucks and loaded
freight cars.
3. OperotiOItB.-The historiH of major bomb
damage both to mainline traelt!! and to railroad
communications. giving labor and repair time
data are sbown liS fnllows:
47

(koji lyon) ..
tenaIIee and N by lilt GlIb
lJuroeaa willa bnDdI. ......................
___' of aedritt tbroqboat tile .. '
ti_ d!atriet', _ prelenar.. TIle KGI*
maeh emplot'-l 600 perwDI, 80 pen:lBIIt fill
whc.m were teehnldana.
3. Co",,,,,,,,t. 011 opt'r'dtioll.-- In the _YJ'
incendiary raid of Ma..:h 17, the 1.....
diltance telephone buildinl' ..... delltrored and
on June 5. 1945 the main bIIildi ...
Wall deatl'O)'ed Jea,inll only one inllta1la.
tion, the main telephone bIIildi... lhat hou.d
the adminiatrat.h-e foroe, the locaI-
line uchanges and the digricf. Kobe
of the enl'i_ra departlllellL The "-es "ere
eomplete .nd lnclud<!d 86 Ionl'-dmance lfWil.l:h-
boanb, 20 district boards for ront.roI ..nd in-
fOl'TD.ltinn. 15.000 ffft of \A:'lepboDe cableo<. 9
electric po.....r tK.nh, aDd all of tIM! cmeraton.,
ItOrall' batterie. aDd electrica1 equipment in-
atalled io the teM;phoGe The \A:'IegnIph
buildinll kilt 'iI .endinl' ..Dd recehinll .. and
.11 .ppurte:nant equifllll'l'llL Ouuick. 1.100
milea or telephnne and teletnph were
entanlfled or to the extent
that complete rftClMtruc1.ioa .... nec.alllSII'T:
.nd there .... le'riotaa to 8.000 y.nts
of undef"l'lOund cable.
b. Work began .t Ollft to the
_ntLaU of olftcial rommunieationa. A lDl?-,_
mum of seniee furnW>ed to olIiciaI
alrtnelH: prefectural. poIiee. ...in_
and milita'T ir.Aallauooa. :So time
IICMduie "'aII ....ilable .s .n actual record. for
rull seniee Wall ne,-er ftStored the
w.r. It WII!! jll:lt that. a tinle .... accomphsMd
each dar. :Sot much eould 1M! dan... in the "II).
of marshalling aid from other district.!t becau.se
they were busy ,,'ith t .....ir O.'n simila,' problems
and aSliistilti' in I..... repair of \'ital railroad com-
muniCf<tions. About 600 tee:hniciall!! ....ere
broul'ht into Kobe from K,yolo and 1e!lS
d.maged pllC8, and in 1 mnDth (by April 15.
1945) \5 10ng-di$lanN linea boardA and.n tele-
graph unib ",ere set up and cro"'de<! moo the
rem.lninilielephone building. A$ of No\:ember
19, onl)' 20 pemlnt of Ihe
linN sen'icl'll and \0 pemlnt of lQCal faclhtle$
were rceonst.ructed and capable or use.
4. COIllIll(lIt".-a., and world..,
equipment lor fepairiDr air.rald d..........
thoroulfhl)' orpniled but material -.me ex-
tremel)' flCBl"I:e toward the end of the .If. With
more and betterplaced ttoell. nRrYts there ill
little qUelItlon that repair could have kept r-ee
,,ith the darnqe that wu lnftieted. Army rail-
road unita UIIillled in repair wort in tltia
burellu.
b. In this city, where heavy ralob
caused utreme panic and lIIUS the
railroad air-raid-protection orpnizatkm If'o.
erally maintained .-ehedules for important
Inllllportation. minimiud c&!Iualties. and, al.
though weak in pre'-eoting fire .....u
quitk to restore order and operatiol1&
NATIONA.l COMMUNlCAll0NS
AIRRAID PROTECIlON
I. '.,(rod"clum.-N"ational eommunicatiOllJl
of Japan were organized into !le'I"en communica.
tiona dilltrict.!!. eaeh of them eontrolli .... the
three prindpal means 01 eommunieation--tbe
telephone. telegraph and pollia! lIeniees. This
orpniution is more fully de:!oaibfd in the
Ouka report. Sinee the rommunieationa in
Kobe "'ere directlS supenised b)' the Osaka
districi offiee (lrid".. k"lh<), the in,-estip_
tions at this larga. .... limited to the dwkilll'
of organi:tation .nd rontrol infOl'TD.ltion
.I'.irurt that pthered in inteniev... at the
O$aka di!!trict
2. Orgolli:;otii/l. for air.";id defnlle in Kohe
"'u dirtb supenised by the
headqu.rte,., of the O$ak. communications dl5-
trict. wu deo:l!ntr.li:tation, except
that during period3 of organiution the Jo<oal
pG!Ital president. telephone pre:si.dent.nd tele-
gr.ph pre:sident allllisted the
chief from the district office in and
inspecting the training of the
tion units in the leveral b.ulld-
ings throughout the 'ndl\,d....l
building and installation orgalllled a self-pro-
tection unit (oog",II".) among it!l emplo)'eeII
following the genernl IlCheme laid dawn by the
district aftke. the JlOlItal president
wal mllde naponaible rar 1111 brllOCh JlOlIt offi<:el'h
the telegraph president for 1111 branch teleJl"rllPII
(lfllcea. lind the far
d
:"
branch telephone installatt(lna "Ithlll the ,:
but not throughout 11)'(1110 prefecture. n
I
,
i
I
j ,-
,
,

L1
--
48
51
fire department: (1'.) The piera: (f.)
The Kobe WaTeMu!\(! A$$OClatlOn: (g.) The
government-<J
wned
railway sY$tem; (h.) Ship-
building yards (and other waterfront manu
fatturing and private (i.) The artl\Y
and the na'").
3. Orgonization for air.reid . The
coordination of all of the agendCll, listed in the
paragraph immediately abo\'e. in matters of
air.raid defensc rested with Ibe lI)'ogo pre-
fectur.' go..-crnment (HII01IO 1't:Il). For that
purpose. harbor .ir-defe.nlle aection "'lIB estab-
lished with the senior eltecuti\'1!lI of the abo..-e
listed agendes formed into a planning board
and council. The m.ritime bureau
and the rail...a) S)stem opl!rated partl)' under
the YinistT)' of Transportation. the shipbuild
ing }'ards operated partl)' under tbe :'lfunitiollll
Ministl'}' .nd plIrtl)' under the um)' .nd n.")"'
whereas the rest operated under the :'llinill-
tl'}' of Home AII.irs. The a)'stem Willi,
thl'refare, coordinated under the ministT)'
of Home AII.in whkh pl'l!llCribed that the
.aupl!T\'ision of dvili.n .ir.raid-defen.....lIain
should be under the prefectuT$.1 governor. There
were a.dded to this harbor-ddense sedion, rep.
resentllti"l!lI from :he e<:onomk department.
the m.lors affice, and the .rmy .nd n")'. A
book. entitled ''General Opelation Outline of
Kobe Harbor Air Defense:' publi.ahcd b)'
H)'ago prefe<:ture in :-l"onmber 1943, ia liUb-
miued as refeTl!nee'item No. 28. A translated
eoP)' of the table of eontcnUl of the .bove book
i.a submitted .s exhibit O. A mimeorr.phed
book entitled "Det.iled Plana for the Sulxih'i
sion of Aid Defense:' i.'5$ued bJ' the Kobe harbor
air-defcnse he.dquarters in Februsry 1944. is
submitted as Reference Item No. 29. A aum
mary of the plans and org.ni ....tion for harbor
defense. abtained by conference ... ith the clliff
eseeutivl!ll of the above agencie!!.. and cheektd
bJ' summary tran.'llations of the .bove exhibits
and reference iterlUl. is gi\'en below.
b. Kobe hllrbor air-defcnse sllction.-This
organization. the ml'moors of which are listtd
in Illlragraph 2 above. supervil!l!d the o\,er..
U
palieies and operations or all agencies concern
td
with harbor defense. Its organization conaisted
of a headquarters control committee. nlade uP
of interelltl'd chief executi\'ea and a ]ial
JlOll
ollicer for maintaining and
HARBOR AIR. RAID PROTECTION
AND PORT SECURln'
I. port of "obi! one of
the mOlot ;mport.nt h.rOOril of Japan. General
$tati$tia are.$
. TI!fI modern roncTl!le .nd $t(ll!l p;erl ap.
prOl'imaleb' mile long, llI!..-en of
...hich aN KO,'ernmcnt piel'il .nd three, munid
Il"l p;eri!. plu. numerous pril'llleh'-<Jwned p;ef!!,
make a lot.l of 7lo mil... of dock
b. Three squ.re of .nchor.gil
"ithin the inner brNk...tI!r .nd 10 ..ure
milH of anchorage in thl! bay ouuide the
inner break,,ater.
c. ,...0 large pr;\"&le.)-
owned but for ronstrue
tioo of rnen:h.lnt .hlpping .nd na,..1 up
10 banlahip size. bc.th opl!nted for masa prod
uction of aubmarinl':!! and ..;th OM l.rge ...a)'
in .ircmft cameT$.
d. TbP; KO"ertllllenl pil!n .nd entire ....ter-
frollt arl!& h""T of
4-i!1ol'}' to lQ...Itory ....areMuM&.
e. ColJlll1erci., .hip tram.: in 1942 eonsisted
of 61,381.hipl of 14.478.015 voes lonnage.
f. Exportll in 1939 .mounUd to $479.%4.500:
imports, $343.26&:100.
iJ. Principal I!XpolU in 1939 eolUlisted of
6:1.22'9 tolUl of TIl" silk. c;;tton rarn.rtifici.1
iIIilk .nd papl!r produc:u: 1.017,294,000 square
)'.nb of .. tuWI!&; $<i.ooo.ooo ...orth of
knitted pod. and $15.000.000 ...orth of maehin
tT). The import!! of the "TIll! year totalled
1.107.512 taM, mainly of the folio...
inl". in order of total ..alue: eotton. paper pulp.
machinery. beans and pl!u. crude rubber. wool.
coal and oil Red.
h. The TIIid. that damartd the lIarbor ...ere
thOll! of M.rch Ii .nd June 5. The laUer.
b)' mine so,,in,. m.de thia port virtually in
operati"e althougll mOllt of tile ncetlent lI.rOOr
fadliti"" rem.lned Intad. Photogr.pllic vie....
of the harbor appear on the follo"'ing
(For det.lla of the harbor f.dliti ... _ exhibit
N.)
2. Deporfmtnt. mainly c:oncerned with
harbor alr.r.ld proleetion and part lleCurit)
were as follow$: (a.) The maritime bure.u
(b.) The prefectural police (ieneral) ; (c.)
prefeetural water police; (d.) The prefeetural
50

e f f ,loo , p , '.'''.<0 ,. h..bo I.h,

Go..-., 100 ,.... _ ..Ioo f ) .
53
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L-'--

0
t
0- '--
0,

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;
0
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l:l:=f
=,
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g'
r-=-
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l..'-
L-

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... ::;<
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I
8 trllnslated chart (Page 55). The renei'U
scheme. of prolection was dictated lurely b7
the geograllhicallayout of the port area and b7
the chain of authority in governmental orranl.
zation. It will be noted from a map of Kobe
that the city is elongated, o<'cupyinr the narrow
strip of land between the eoutline .the near.
b)' mountains. Pohce and lire dl.slnCttl wen:
organized in sections, each extending from the
shore to the mountain. A !lCpnrale poUee juris-
diction existed in Kobe under the waler police
chief who was Ii"en control of the waterfront
aN':a and the entire shoreline within the harbor
as well as the surface of the water within the
boundaries of the harbor. The mO\'ement and
protection of shiJ16 and the protection of the
piers and installations on them 1"&11 the respon.
sibility of the maritime bureau. The .upeni.
sion of the landward portion resled with the
waler police station. The function. of the
various operating branches are .ho....n on 1\
translated <";hart in the oppollite .:olumn,
<";. Kobe lI'ater Poliee._Thia head-
quarters and the distrid <";Ontrolled b}' it i.
to in Japanege phraaeo!ollY aa an
"independent" poliC<!! distrid, implyinr that
they weN': orranized from the other
poIiC<!! di3trirts. They fundioned in two pa.
cities: .... regular .:on'entional poli during
normal periods; and aa speo:ial air_raid.protec
tion polio:e (kribiI,,;) durinr period. of aid.raid
alerts:, and earl}' po!!t.raid periods. The
stN':ngth of this unit ran(Cd from 80 to 100.
During airraid perioda ther ....ere aurmented
bJ auxiliary messengers to a total of
135. AJI "air_raid_protection polke" they wen
orranized into two unitJI, one, the "on duty"
police fOl'<:e (teibi_ehl"O, and the other, the
"reger"e unit" (yobit"i). The IiMlt <";onllillted of
the regular police unit that WllJl on dulr at the
moment; the second. thOllC who were ofl"-dutJ'
but were required to report upon hearing the
air.raid alarm. The "on duty" force in turn
WM organized into two companies: one for
immediate dispersal to POlltJI of duly throughout
the area; and the second to be held at the poliee
station It.'! a mobile unit until the main
reserve:!! arri\et!. Thus, the lIolice were "organ'
ized in depth," that is, the chief had at
his disposal at headllulIrtera n unil of the rcg
Uillr, trained llOlice force. Further, during raid
0'"
Sa. a......

--<
s.,. 0111..'
..-, ....Iiorwd
ill Kobo.
FIll",",": " ..ptloft. III def.n..
"",til 1".. ....... y 11._, ....... Wll.k, .nd .dju'l",enl
of 1. NIIuired fo. ,h.", .,,1"<1 oul by ,..,..
,,,",,,1.. dl.I,lolIl.
Ctun Showing ,he "'lorking Order o.f the
Kobe H:arbor Air_Defense Operauon
Dep:lnnU.'1lt
On......./
lI.ut1l&l h._ aM ..... ,rol of oper_
aUaa: paru: , ,tuo<U. po....-
ala....._i wack '. pOpu_
lo__ k_ pat"'" aDd
_ tnIl<: ..n'" ft...
alMl _IoB: ,...alar
_.....uaa. _Irol _ ........
......-.
lOotf...tl....-.... ........ _ 01
.......ioI ncu..: 1Ml,."" aBO! ..,....
u..;...... tlw I"llWe<I opOlO: ,....;.u
pc>pQl,......,_ , ..i"I........
,.-.diet-
... ..,-1,,_ --..1;' .1 .......:
kJuo. ,....._ >hi,.:
_,........_ <II. ...,lOti<al -...
_... .1 _nioa"": ..triooI
_. oolf-dof_ ...,n of an P'"
n- ... lor " ... ll: .....tlJW
B........
_ to ..1'1._ of ..il.-...l_ip..
_I; prwpera , ....
..,""" of ..u "",i_" a'-
....... an ..t"' aboul ..il..-do
la 0..;. rtlalioa wit!o .Ir ddmH.
cam.. _....,.q re,Wn on
u in
... wre<kod. Dillin oki,.
"'II .jeeu !bftn Whell
_I"J"; "," dup. lirult:
ca.ria ""nd drod.in.
of _, In..i 1M _"n'1 IIf
_I ....
"".,. C",Il.U "',"'_ til tll< ..lid IIf 'lI< needy.nd
.I...,d 010111 : ..... rpM)' rep.in
.nd "'JU" IIU ""'do "" i ...U.U.
ti<> u I.. """Iro/: ""'-.1,. im
,""' n, on 11....11. ..111111.. 'yl"'m.
T.k.. .11 m.llIIn ..I." to Ih.
,rou'llon of .....1..
plans and ortltU t(llhe
. Th' ,""ration ,,",u\lll of.
..... . - . "Til
II) The Kobe water police station;, (-) e
maritime bureau; (3) The ()u.k. raIlroad bu-
reau; (4) The harbor construction department
of the Minl$tr)' of Tran.poTUt!on; (&) The
Kobe cil)' hall; (6) The
This ora-aniution i. !!hOwn 11'1 graphIC form on
"
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III
1lI
...
Jlll,Jllll
1 ill
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-

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.ble of the harbor area. Their aeta.I.
orgllniwtion wllll effected by the Kobe aultllt.ar,
police and fire (keibodall) headquarters. Thla
w.s a special deputment c!lliIel)' auperviaed b)'
the chief of the water police atation and ......
made up as follo
wa
:
(1) A special di"iaion consisting of th,.
It"1'Oups. Group No.1 of 360 men auiped to
the emergency protection of the larger rroup
of pius to the lIOutheMt,nrd of the ...ater
police station: It"roup No.2. consistinlt" of 180
men. was asaigned to the protec.
tion of the It"1'Oup of municipal pie" to the
lIOuthwest"'ard of the water pollee aUltion;
and group No.3. 29& $trong. for the land.
ward area in Ihe vidnity of the police sUltion
itself.
(2) A second division, consiatinlt" (If 315
men. WlI!l organized as .n l'mergener repair
and romrtruction unit.
(3) A di\ilion ....ith a strength of 99 for
re!!Cue, fim aid and e\.('.u.lion.
(4) A dhision attached 10 the ret!Cue dhi-
sion. col1liisting of t,,o aquads of 30 euh (fe-
male) for fim-aid duties..
(5) 150 school be)'" to be uM'd principally
as
The auxiliao' police and lire section for .....ter
area district No. I had as one of ita
a fleet of nine pri\'ately-owned tup (with
rre"'"3) equipped with motor pumpera. all or
ganized and trained as auxilisr}' fire. patrol and
rescue boats. Section 2 for the amaller and
more l"i!rnote pier district had. similar organi-
zation equipped with onl)' one auxiliary fire
tug. In addition. 20 prh'lltely-owned
equipped with pumpeTll were orlt"anized into I
reaen'e. The organiUltion described above wI.!
pl't!!!Cribed in the harbor llir-defenae regulatioll$
Items NOll. 28 lind 29). The ('.hart
or organization will be found on Page &7.
. h. Fa::tor, protectiol\.-Only two principal
mdWltrles of aizeable proportions were included
in the actual harbor area, both of whi('.h weI"!
large shipbuildinlt" concerns; the lIIiUubishi
shipyards and the Kawllsllki shipyllrds. Tilt
former specialized in the construction of mer'
chant Ihipping and subm/lrines lind the latter
in lubmarines, aircraft carriera lind bllttleships.
The protection of these industriell was aelf.co
n

tained and a detailed report of their lIir_raid

peri,xl$, the auxlliary police _nd lire unit (/a+
twdOIl) of the harbor al'lla clime under
the police chief'. command. .
d. Mllritilllt bNtfCIN.-The dden8l! funcll
on
of Ihil IJrCnt) w.. the eontrol and ;.,elf_protec
lion of shipping. Through the office of the
harbor muter, all ... -...dden!lf! measurell for
$hips enlerinv and Iea\'inlt" the harbor and at
anchor were transmilted and enforced. The!lC
. printed and i!ll!ued in April 1943.
.re induded in the booklet lIubTnitted herewith
... referellCl! item 28. A tranalation of thil
AeCtion from .nother llO\Il'C'l! (Tnll1lllation No.
44, CKO Op-16-fE) ia herewith as
uhibit P. The m.ritime bureau had the further
Ttiponaibilits of organiVnlt" and lupen'isinlt"
the 8elf_protert.ion of the pie... and il\.'!tallatioM
on them.. Thil Will dOIlf! b}' arganizing air-
defenK It"T'Oup6 (/ttlgodOIl) all)()ng the "'.re-
hoUilCeroployee8 and TheM bt>goaOIl
uniU ..eft lIimilar in organiDtion to thoM
formed as f&d.ory air_raid_protection units. and
roMilted brieft} oJ lire-fightinlt" aquadll. mt-
aid and rt!iIC'IIC Iquadl. lire ....tche.... It"Uards.
eJnef'lt"l!l'ICl' repair Iquada and relIeT\'t! uniU for
control of penonnel .nd for rep1.acemenU .nd
night_w.tcb duty. The bul't!llu Will further re-
quired to UlIiA in recl1litinlt" and orpniling
apial awdlial'}' police and fire uniU (/eri-
bodaa) ...hi('.b WIll be co.'t!red in a aub5equent
na\'}' exerciM'd c\olle super-
of ae:tin protectien .nd mO\'emenU of
..._1l; during actual raid conditiOf\!l.
e. Tle lcIrbor coulnldiOlll deparl"n1t con-
trolled polit_raid reptli... and TecOllltruction.and
coordinated and aUpt!n'iM'd emerlt""'nc)' repain
for the harbor installatlona.
f. Kobe cil, b'I.-The municipal govern-
ment ..-u reaJlOlllible for relief and e"aeuation
.nd for lIre-pre\'ention matte" Ilfeeling muni-
cipal control. The moM important item of the
latter ,,'U the rlllinlt" of buildinp adjacent to
the harbor al't!ll and the harbor induatriell to
('.re.te firebreaka.
g. A>lzilior, poliu ond fire wni/s (ktibodall)
were orpniud with membeTll aelected from
atevedorea and employeea of harbor installa-
tiona, aueh aa warehou8ell and factoriell. The
wu recruited with the aid of the
n:Arltlme bureau and aelected all mu('.h all poII-
SIble from workerll who lh'ed within a reaSOn-
56
.' "11 be (ourld in the
oT1l'amUll!OIl . of this
"fad:>'" AirRaid Prot"".lon .'
""
10 the plannm orgamJ.l.llon.
ActO Ina: the pre-
these were dependent upon
rtural fire dellllrtmenl for support. but were
not direelb' unller the supervision of the water
police .
i. Fire profut,,/a.-The l.nd....rd of
the wluerfront and hrbor am ..'ere not 1'lO-
l$led from the main part of the cit)' as '00''' the
case in OJ!l\ka and. therefore. the prefectural
llre-fightingorpniution was not from
the prefectural Wbo'.re&S the
()un harbor poliee nation had direct com-
mand of a revular fire-fighting unit. this wn
not the ca${! in Kobe. WIlter!ront arells were
under the nogular prefectural fire distriel$ for
protection. The flreboau ""f'rf! under the
tonlmand and juri..diction of !.he chief of the
water police.
4. Air.ruid at the harbor of Kobe
"'as reh'f'd from thl'ft point!
.ir-defellM' eneral headquarten .t the Qgk.
p"'-feeturaJ the nanl office.nd
the army he.dqu.rters for milit.!') trantsport8-
tion, These w.rninp originllted from the cen-
tral arm)' w.rning headqullrlen in QMkll.
From the H,OOltO p",-feetural headquarters. the
chief of the h.rbor-defeniie headquartel"$ imme-
di.tel' telephoned lhe .... rning to' the chief of
the water police and the chief of the maritime
bureau o\er. direo:t line. The reilllar city tele.
phone ..nice .......bo av.il.ble. At the $ame
time the harbor mulu'i1 oIfio:e .as rehinr
.... ming from the chief of military transport.-
tion and the navy office by direct-line telephone.
Tile harbordefenlll! M!Clion al the H,'oro pre-
feetural headqu.rtel"$ had staff for telephon_
ing till! ..minr to lhe harbor branches of the
rail..y bureau, commuoicatiorll bureau, the
h.rbor connruction bure.u. .nd the Kobe
municipal offid. All of these agencies imme-
diatel)' notified the aubordinate branches for
...hich tMy .en! rt!8ponsible. The nanllt.tion
.irelua operator transmitted the "''arning by
radio to "essels at Ilea and installationa in the
h.rbor that had radio receiving lleta. Leaderts
of the .uxili.ry police .nd fire unit! (hibodllll)
nre JlOtilifd 11)' police headquarten $bff
city telephone lines snd by llIe8IIengen, .nd pro-
effiled to mobilize their auxiliary units. Patrol
58
boalil were made read)' .nd manned. t"
first audible tsignal, the !lime tranamlaalo.n
lelephone and radio took In
flags for the .Iert ..... rnmg .ere holated
onr the harbor ol&e. the .....ter pollee
!Statidn and at lhe entrance to the harbor. (If
al night. this !Signal waa by mean" of
thret! red lighls arranged Patrol
boats were dillplltched to give ... to \'e.-
selts in the harbor b)' hand tsignal or dlrect com.-
munication in CllllC the signsl had n?t been.oth.
erwille received. If al night, the !SIgnal .hghtll
wel'f! at fint blinked on and off for 2
and then In January 194<>, Ih,s
....aII chanlrt'd and the lighlts .... not on
:lnd off bul were jUlit The
municlltion sVlltem for all harbor Ln1ltalllltLons
i1l sho....n in detail on a chart in reference item
No. 51.
5, harbor
district had four fil"llt_llid stations, one for each
of the twO main pier distrietll and two on the
land....ard lIide. Three of these atations had doc-
tora in attendance and. in c__ of emel'&'ency,
the ....s increued from the ....omen's
auxiliary first-aid unit and apedall)' trained
first_aid personnel from among the rescue unitll
of the auxiliary police and fire unit. One large
group of the latter unit, eon!isting of 99 men,
,,'a! etspeci..ll,. organized as a main re!lCue and
fll"lIt-aid unit. Also, each of the thl'f!C !lCCtiOl1J5
all8ign<! \(l the water diatrictll lind one land
ward district had their separate rescue and first_
aid units. Ho...e\er. the service dillplayed out
standinr weakn_: (a) Lack of rood erne,..
gency bo!Spitats In the harbor al"f!a: (b) Inade-
quale mwieallll"luipment; (c) Inadettullte ambu
lantel! or "ehiclell for e\'acuation of wounded to
cily .nd prefectural hOllpitals.
6. SAdten.-Sheltel1l for the pefllOnnel ill
the water police diatrict ....ere mOllt inadequate.
The iarge pierll and the space immediately ad
j..cent \(l the ....aterllide ....ere cro....ded with
.'arebou8es. Tbelle warehou_ in the maia
....el'f! con3tructed of steet, concrete and mason'"
and the lower f100n afforded fair ahelter duro
ing light raids or against incendiary types of
bombs. Regular basement sheltera could pOI
be COl1J5tructed because of the ......ter Je,-el
Baffle. ....el'f! constructed by the use of timbel'
rehining walls tilled with eurth llnd ll"'a'"fl.
Fire gaptl ....ere created by razi
denliul buildinllll in the ad,' __ng CfOY<ded nsi
, _... _dt Iltlghbor" '
These c ea."" areas ,,'ere dotted . ..,,'....
covered with limbt lid WIth tl'alch
the shcJtel"$ obaen'ed ....ou.;: earth. All of
,
h'
ne be.>n hi,hI
vu nera e .... concentrated hi h y
g -explOliil'e
7. Trai"ing.-Training ...U d
harbor.protection forees uc!ed .all
of the chief of the ...ater POli
practicCll of amall unitll ....cre
out 1943, bulu directi"e iUuA" hr?ugh.
r fH "") ,""c lefof
po lce 0 yDgo prefecture in March 1944
!lCribed dates on ....hich trai'
d . I ed 'd nlng a",,!'t>I
an !llmu at ...ould be condUCt!d. For
example, a practice Wl\.S ordered for the d.le of
25 for Kobe harber. This wu a atated
alert and ....as ordered to last from 9
a.m. unul 12 noon. In this practiOl' ,L .,.
. . ' ''''' al1:l1 llIlJ"
police and fire umlll. tint_aid and units
anti the M'lf-protection unilll of the enterprises
unller control of the martime office ....el'f! mobil_
ant.! took part in a series of aimulated bomb
the raid of March 17. separate
mtem!l\'e Iralmng of the leaden and of the
auxiliary units ""as conducted b)' auxiliary
police Imd fire hea(lquarten, but no complete
tr.ining alerlll were conducti!d that look em-
plo)'_ from lheir regular job$. The leaden
re.. liud that inadequacy of equipment ,uld"
not be immediately corrected. Hea,) emphasis
\\'S5 laid On propaganda and training alol1' lines
deaigned to inspire the confidence of indh'idual
membera of the auxiliar,' units and to in
more 8lltiaJactol')- mobilil.atlon in times of &c_
tual crisea.
8. O/icratio"._Prewar piannin" anticipated
the JXtiU'ibilit.\, of !lCsltered air raids on the har-
bor area. and planning in late 19-13 pro,'ided
for the Ilrobabilit)' of such raids.. In J.nu..ry
and February of 1945 several light raidi! 0c-
Curred. Il ""M $tllted b)' tbe chief of the .....ter
IlOlice and subatantiated b)' te51imony of lead-
ers of the harbor-defense aection that in the
raids of January 3 .nd Febnlar)' 4. 194;'. the
rerular police forees operated lIJl an air_raid_
dcfenllC unit (kcibi_thtai) and the auxilia!'}'
ulljt.s (l'eibodalf) cooperated in. highh' endit-
able manner. Upon reeejpt of the ...
police detachmenta ....1''''- ditsplltched to sJlfC:itied
llaJlembly pointa llCa!tered throughout the area.
".." "....
Ke) Pl'raonnel .... IIJerted ........
Promptly. Upon the -.diq of .......
.lann for the air-raid aJert. allldlluy.... II
to aaemble and Ieadtn I't!pl'ted to tile
of the water police for apedal IDiltrue.
tIona .. nd orders. An estimated 30 of
the designaled peraonnet ....as aMtmbled abortl,.
after the _nding of the air-raid alarm. lIlId
all eat.lll'.ated one-third addition.1 pertIOfInet ....
...mbled for ponraid duty. Self-protection
(bt'gO/t,n) unita of the pri..-te enterprillCll wen!
able to extinillixh most of the amall tlrea. Cu-
lI&!ties ...ere light; damq-e to harbor facilitiea
"'-as inaignilk::ant; and the organization "'II.'! not
!!e\'erely telIted.. The major raid of llan:h 17
cautsed.a complet.e breakdo""n of ..ll org..
lzed prOtect'on. The harbor facilities ....el'f! &e-
\'erely damaged and the congeat.ed areas adja-
cenl to the ..terfront area ...t!I'f! en,'eloped in
There .as great confnsion and nry
little control of the fOrcell a'ailable. Fe.' mem_
ben of the unita reported for duty
according 10 plan, All of the jM'nonne! em-
plo)'ed in tlw 'icjnit,- paid mon atlCatio!1 to (I)
their o..n safety and (2) 10 the Protection of
their o... n install.tiona. A large number of the
membera of the auxilia!'}' unita ....el'f! unable to
get through the henil}'-dam&i'ed HletioU.l to the
harbor ..rea bel:a.lIIe of the __of transpor_
tation and the barrier of fire cn:aU!d b)' the
incendian bombs. Follo.ing raid, emer_
gene,' I'\'pain and recon$truction ...-ent fo...ard
according to plan. il1$Of.r ... limiled materi..l
.... .. ,..ilable. The poli"Y and pIa.n. makers con-
sidered that t""ir plan ..s still _nd: that all
orould ....ork ...ell, jf such a raid should OttUr
again.nd that the onl)' improvement poaaible
...as the supply of mare fi!'&-fighting equipment..
Since that ...... ftOI a\-a.ilable. all conocemed !Iet_
tied back and boodwinbd themseh"t!/! into be-
lie\ing lhat ."",h a raid ...-wld not OC'l'ur again.
In xub!equent light raid all orpniution;;. in_
cluding the al1:lili.,., unit!. funetiollf'd ....ell and
according to plan. ),Iorale "ent up and O\"Cr-eon_
!ide""" lIpin pre...i\ed. Whe" the l'ftOnd hea\')"
raid On the harbor area came (JUIlt;'. 1945) the
aame confusion .nd complete bl'f!..kdown of
cj"man-defen!!e occurred. AI this time
the harbor.'&8 rendered u.aeless as .. se..port due
to the droppi"na of mines. The efforu of the har.
bor air.raid.proteetion orpnization from that
59
hnpro\,cmcnlil broultht forth ataternllZl\
., h II of Ihe war was de"oted to ,h.I" im,rO\",mlent eou.1d be without
time on unlL I e en . " wlldinlJll bUI no fI flaM eq I
the protection of thl' ext" HIS de 'In,-sri- the of more re- ma u po.
eon8lTucti\'c "ere ma : . menlo
ably the re"JIOUlIe to question' concermng poi<Bl- NO PRECAUTIONS
EF
ENSE INSTALLATIONS A
PASSIVE.D r hfng when all noneMenliallill'hle were
PROTECTIVE LIGHTING Btn:e
t
nttage WliB reduced drulicali)'
extUlgulS , t be tbe
I. fIItrod.rtillll.-The lilhting and prole<: in othel'l!. lind the 50-walt lamp WllII, 0
...Iia:hlinll' illtuation in Kobe ":&8 aimOliI a maximum used .indoors. In 1943. all
dllplielte or tile eonditioUI (ollnd III OUka and pte lights (th WM the onb type of atreet
reponed in Illat licit! report. Aa in thert! lights in most residenti_! areas) were be
...u"" memt'lrle<l of blacko...t extingui$hed and in April there "as.
sored b)' lilt military and Iltld at urnell, drh'e to ha,'e all Indoor ...g tixturell
pl"Obabl)' once llr I";ce a year, d...nlli early ped with shields to prevenl I1ghl from
l!l3O'll. The blackout msisled of out the windows and spilling outdoorll. Smce the
the lirllu for a fe'" minuteil at some dellgnated latter was a measure requiring the UM of
lime ll"i''e'1l In tilt new5P&pl'rI .nd paMed around materials, It W8$ e,'ident that thill w": the
b!' .-oro of mo...th. time th.at the probabl1it) of rllds recewed SUI-
2. _lUI SolioMl.- 011$ col1!liderati!ln. (Blackout curtaiM ",ere in_
Licht-eontrol were b)' .the stalled in 1938 and 1939, but then was no
oftic'l! of the :\I.inbtrt of Home Apnl4. problem of IIt8rcity of m.alert.ls..) Br
19 under the authorit)' of the .lr-dd"en$f! 1943 all of tbe::>e rneatlUrel! combined to produce
lur n...", :So. 47) paMed in April of 1937. an effed. "e6' similar to the dimout e;;tablished
TheM formal ,..ere ,.upplemented on tbe eastern .&eaboard of the Uniled Statu.
by pamphteu .nd bulletint elaborating In February of 19-15. of the aerioullnes.s
subjeet and .....geo!Iioc of of lhe air raids. the alert .nd raid_period Iight-
the deitired elJettA. (Reference Item :';0. 30 ing rJlell ....ere made applicable e\"ery. nia
h
\...
rl'l'ft an uample), Dimout appliM from sunset untIl 2200
b. LoeoL_Loo:al "'ere ."11Ollt. hours. alert-period rules applied from 2200
dirt repriat of the national la,n .nd regula- houl'!l to midnight. lind alarm-period rules ap-
riOM (Reference Items :Soa. 31 and 32). As plied from midnight until sunri!le. Alert or
,..u found in Osaka. Illtre .alI little chance in .Iarm rules. of COU!'8e. were to go into e!feet
the blUie reculationl. but all the ,,.r immediately should .n .l.rm be llOunded. Since
.Irict<!r tnfortemtnt became the rule. U$u.I1!' mOllt of the f.ctories were working on 24.
upon tbe promptinC of the Ministry of lIome hour basis and had two 12_ho... r lIhifts which
Afflirs. changed .t 0700 lind J900 hours, the drastill
3. t-./....ce... r.I.-The Iicht-<ontrol regul.- red...ction in light at 2200 hours and at mid
tiOOI p... bll!hed on April 4, 1938 were to be night was not important.
effeetive !!t.rtinr from April 10. 1938.nd were 4. P01l;tr rillllltioN.-The electric compall1
to be p... t into llperation onl)' in case of an air- the Kobe (trea, the Kan!lei Electric
raid .len or .I.rm. HO"'e\'er, .round 1940, Power DiJltributing Corporation (K.n!lei Hai
under lnstructionll iulled from Tok)'o, all neon den Kabushiki Kaillha) Wall. all the name im
lIignll, ad\"ertilling signll, billboard lights and plied. a power-diJItributing company, It hid
the U$f! of electridty for advertising purpolll'll two small steam-generator pll1n\.ll which were
were to be discontin...ed. Thill meal! ... re Wall ap- stand-h)' plants to be ulltd in case of transm
i
8-
parentl)'adopted,plrtlyu.C{)nservationmea!l- Ilion line failures In 1942 all of Japan WI!
ure and part I}' for its psychological effect, lIll divided Into nine areas for
there apPE'ued to be little fear or expectation ]lOwer distribution and all of the indcpend
en1
of air raidll at that time. Shortl)' after Pearl' ]lOwer companies within each IIrell were merged
Hubor. carly in 1942, there WII! a drafltic re_ into one large power eompany. The mllil\ 1ft"'
duction of outdoor iIlumiMtlo", particularlr in erating facilities lI'el'e IlIrge hydroelectric !tl"
60
Iionl! located back In the IllOuntallll .nd
Itatlons and syalems "ere connected IUlt"-e
,'ollage tranllmluion lines. The hYd':oe hlc,tt
cener"ting 1I1.lions .nd
lines wcre owned b)' NiPPOn H8IIlIOdin (W
llaion
Power-Generating Company), Power Ippon
crated lind distributed al 60 cycles _
T
..ce... lll.
region near ok)'o where 50 C)'eles were sed
Ind rotary con\"erters were to lie tilt'" . '
temll together. Local distribution of
Kobe was 100 \"oltll for lighting ...se. 220 \'oltll
for power .use, both alterntting current, and
600 volts current for street railw.y and
1,600 voltll d.rect eUrTent for railroads..
5. '.igltl-ro"trol prodlln._The reaulatiollll
...sed in Kobe ....ere found to be d... p1ieate of
the rules .nd regul.tions i"O"erning light<oll_
lrol in Osaka and described In full ill that re-
port, except that the Kobe ru!e:l! included 1 _.
tion on lIhip and harbor lighting. (This .......
probably in effeet in Osaka. bot publl!hed lIep-
from the regulation lIeCtlred and triOS-
lated.)
6. Strut liglt ti"/1._..\llIi. afru/f.._All
IIlreet lighting in Kobe "'u electric.. 10 prn...r
da}'11 the main stree\.$ of Kobe .... illuminated
b)' upright globe uni15, 8-ineh-di.meter dilJ....
ing glaM e)linde",. appro"imalel)' 12 inches
high in a decorati"e frame ork. lamped 100
.... per unit (since 1....0 ere u$Cd for each
pole the ,,.tlage .....! 200 ,,.tlll per pc.1e).
mounted .bout 12 feet high on pc.1e:s en curb-
line oppollile eaeb other.nd spaced approri-
m.tely sa apan. Recommended practK!e
for this claM of lItreet "'ll'I;; lux and the one or
t ....o main .'l'tre@l.g in Kobe illuminated in thill
manner probably met the recommendatioM.
Some of Ihese lumin.ril'.'l' "'ere extinguished in
1942 and wattage in the remainder wu re-
duced. In the spring of 1943, all of these unita
were extinguished and a temporary unitn in-
\"erted COM, oonfining the lighU to a cone not
Uceeding 140 degrel'" in diameter,l.mped willi
a 5-watt light. wall uiled at the principal inter.
lleClionll.
b. Betler 8trtel,,_Other main streeU were
lighted with metal. radial or dome
The prewar idea was to secure an a,'erav of 3
lux on these streets and al..o on the more im-
portant residential and this
standard W1\6 achie\"ed. By 1943. thelle li,lhU
prac:tleally all __'11+ I ..
reftector unit. that the pDIieI did ...
eq... lpped "lib a &-.att lamp ud ..
conIIne the U....t within a
_.
e. f/'lidelllilllllrrll.-The J'elIidenUalarea iD
Ilre"'.r d.YI ""as itluminlted b!' each bouJIo.
hc.lder inml1ine amall lightlne IInlt outside
hi, Pte .nd borning approximately. 4o.tt
lamp. Thia type of liehtio,: ""M diACOUrapd in
1942.od eliminated in early 1943.
d. I..igltlillfl ullt .u made of
\"o1tall.' reduction. eilher by pla.c:ing lampa in
lltries, by uaing. Innsfonner. or b)' reducing
,-o]tages at to redllOl) the brightness of
the lItnet lighta. Brichtae. reduction ..... by
a III ",'.lIare, but. fO!" the _ pan,
street lJ..clttine ..... by ita .'-nee.
Thai ,.... partic'lllarir true in the re:sideDtiai
.rea .here then ..,... onl)' pte lichta.
t. T,...6ie The of tbe lamP'S
uted In traftic: lIicnals .-.. reduced drastieaIly
In 1943.nd lhe ...nits wve booded .t that time..
Tralllc Hcnu ,...,... ex:tinpiAbfd. durinl' the
a1ann and raid periods.
7. &1IooI ..d oli I,,,lt,,,-The pru-.r
Ideal 1O"U to pre,;de 100-200 Ius: anilicial il-
hunination in.cbools.nd clllcu.. Thill!lt.aDdard
.-as rlrely reached .nd of illumination
one-q....rter and oue-tenth tbtr'eof wen! more
common. Fi:rturell .en!! \l.lIU&J.ly either opal-
elaaa clobes O!" the !!at-type opal-ella
ooe O\Itlet per 200 to 400 !ICluaf1' feet..
The 19-12 decreoe limiti1ltt .... to ;;0 ....m
muimum f ...nher redueed lichting levels.. It
dil1icult 10 11ft ho...ny df:tT'ee of eI1icieney could
be maint.lned in oIlices required to reI}' on .rti_
l\c:i.1 m...mination. for the 1I1lIU.llation of shades
and ahlekb in the early pan of 19-13 funher
decreased the amount of UMful light
in" room.
8. l"t,\icle._. Although the formal regu-
lItien! rtad as if nonnaJ head1ighting ""u in
order \;.ntil the time ('f lhe aclu.l raid, aucll ""IS
not the cue. In the 1943 dri,-e to redllCe ligllt-
inlt" 1e... the brightneM of he.dlighlll wl
rt"duced either b)' Ulle of a sm"lIer
lleadlight l.mp or br use of relIistance in
lIl'rie.< with the reg lar l.mp. Onl" those cars
thllt had to mO"e d ring ulds or shortly before
or after were equiplled with and these
61
...ere blllCk e10th h()()l1a that tied on over
uill1ing he.dlights. A ",mple of one of
hoodi. muked ..ith the police afmbol ..... In-
eluded as Reference Item 19 in
field report. The brightne!l8 of the tall lights
"'u.lso reduced in 19.13 b)' the SlIme meana.
b. 'fred roil .....$._lIt.d]ighlll .on
.130 the inten:;itiel< of their interKlr
lights....ere rmuced in 19-12 .nd in earl}' 19-13.
Streete.1'l! in Kobe were permitted to run dur-
ing the al...rt period to allow the motorman to
mo"e hia ar and passengen< to reason.bly
safe \oaItioll.. C.n ,,'ere IIOt to run durin(the
alarm or raid period.
9. Railrood8.-a. and elec:
tric could proceed e"en during the alarm
PE'riod .nd through the .ctu.1 raid ilMlf.
tboee n':l!pllnlloible for the train 110 elect.
the .... lltarted I"lKlIIt traiM pulled into
the fil'l!t atation .fter tile alert w&llllOunded and
di!!<:harged their paMengerll. The e"CttPtlon to
thia "'U thClSl! trainll out in the country which
ll8U&l1y pl"lXftded at a alo..' pao:e.
b. Itallroad ril1....!I.-The polic)' ..u to U:M!
the railroad syatem 1.8 much all po$liible even
during raida 1IO as to have tbe minimum inter-
ruplion to .... r production. unit. were'
IloooMd to pre"mt their being seen from abo\'e
and the ,"Oltq\' &CI'OM the lamps ...u rmuced
from 20 to 50 perant (producing a brightness
reduction of 60 10 90 percent).
10. llarOOr. ,lIiplIOrth aNd ship
Onb" a fe... marker light:s ..-ere u!led in tile
Kobe inner harbor, \oaI1l'd at the entrances to
the breakwater. and they were all electric and
conlrolled from one control point. They were
extin/l"uillhet! .t the fil'l!t audible al.rm, the
alert. TileIIf unita "'ere ahielded in 19-13 to
ronline lllOIlI of the lighl belo..' the bori1'ont.1
and the upward 8piU light "'as not aUo"'l'd to
exceed an angle (If 20 degrees abo\'e the hori
u.mtal. A aet of lIC<:urit)'-li/l"hting re/l"ulationa
including that fO\"eming harbor lighting ill .t_
tae'hed u exhibil R. in eeneral, an harbor or
ahip lighta "'ere to be atinpiahed except thooae
absolutely nec:eMllry to of ahips
dillpenung bK.uae of the impending attack.
11. f'crdoriu.-Factoriea "'ere to ...ork up
to the la.5t minute "'hene"er plIQiblt. Earl)'
extinetiOll of outaide lighta stopptd outdoor
work promptly after the alert was lJOunded.
62
Theoretically, the of blsckoul eurtaina 01'
screens on factor)' windoWS allowed them to
work e\'en durlllg the raid. after the
r.id on the factorr area of 19, Ittl,
factoT')' workel"ll I.id down theIr toob .nd .-
out as quickI)' liS po!l8ible once the .lert al,l'ltI
w88 !IOunded. After that date factory flrea
,,'ere bsnked &lI much as poll8.ible upon the
l!OIlnding of the .lert.
12. Rt&;dtNtt...-Due to police mt:loIt
residences were e(luipped with blackout. cur
tains by 1939 and had their shIelded
by April of 1943, B)' the time the big raids hit
in the late winter and of 19441946.
most people ...ere not worf)'ing .bout
hlackout: they aimply turned out what hghta
they "'ere using and headed for the hillside or
to !lOme shelter they considered aafe. No black_
out shields for flxturell weN! rommerd.U)' a\"il.
able; each hou$l!holder W&II to shield the direo:t
light from the windows using lIaper, cardboard,
black cloth or an)' other means lit hill eommand
10 aehie"e the dt$ired re!luh.
13. ClIlor of 'ighl...--Color of lights had no
sieniticance as protec:th'e lighting.
14. GCllcr,,1 tomme'lls.-The minimum Ulle of
quantitath'e and qualitath'e figures in the para_
gr.phs abo\'e ill indieati"e of conditions in
Japan BI.ckout li,.hting "'&11 not under the
jurisdiction of engineefll or those qualified to
judge whether the public was pro\'ided with
some seeing illumination, with the fixture. ade-
quateU.- deigned to pro,'ide requisite safet).
Ughting \\'1.8 under the .rbitrarr rontrol of
the local policeman 3nd he, as well all the people
abo"e him, ...orked on the principle of elimina
tion of light. Admitting that the Japanese in
their homeland are reallOn.bl) Iawabidina and
lhat crime might not h&\"e increa.-,ed under the
cloak of darkneas. mill this palic)' could not
ha"e done other than hamper production.
Street.kccident rates did not go lip dlle pos.
sibl)" to decri'Alle in atreet traffic because of
the abunce of night life and the !!C.reil)' of
motor fuel, but factor)' productiOn rould pol
ha"\! been at ita maximum rate, e\'en if fllI.'
terials were available, on the basla of this pol'
icy. Following the first m&Sll r.id of Mareh 11,
1945. since the military' defenllell had f.iled lG
gh'e protectiOn. the public !IOught safet) in I
more rigid blackout: this, plus the
of power UnCll, pracHc_IIy I'll .
remainina liabl", further tt.m::nna\td the few
tid. Simil_r to the exPerietlCe of n.. _U &CUri.
found th.ltnt blackctlt lIttffly Kobe
ilOlight-for adet), 1.8 "enemy pi to 1"1"1' the
gelll at will:' 1ltlI fOUnd Iar_
SHELTERS
l. lntrodudilm._The pull106e of thO
to abo... bow the national PfOlni II repon
....." carried out. to ""., ,cn lhelter
',' f', n OUt any
"aru' Ion" rom I , and to portra th
t)pes of provided for e ','Ui?Us
" , K I.A """Ion Urlllg
.ir no""" the instructiollll f
llinistry of Home Atraifll follo"'ed the
, I ' .. ..... &arne
( anne b. . the same provbionl. and
.... In the UrnI' manner all des-
(rJbed III the Oi'&ka reporL In\"C!!trption
forth tllB.t a dlrecth'e carne do"'n from
the MInIstry' of Home Atr.illl in 1942 requiring
!he of trench Iheltel'$;
In the ....aa changed to provide for
the constructIOn of CO\'ere<! trench shehe"' and
in another amendment called for lhe' con_
slruction of aufficient shelter spsct for all in_
IlB.bitant:s. Thill last ch.ng!! directed that shel_
ters ahoutd be constructed according to planl
and set forth in the pamphlets
iaaued by the Ministr)' of Home Atrairs. but e\i-
dence pro\"ed th.1 lot.l oftlc:ialll had to m.ke
adjustment" to fit their o"'n "illiationa. The
principal factOr!! which nec:eSSilated adjus!_
menta were scarcity of critical materialll and
shortage of manpower,
2, DerdopJflul._a. The de"elopment of the
shelter program in Kobe wu earril'd ou! and
enforced in the same general manner all des-
cribed in the Oaaka field rellOrt.
b. Olflcids cl.imed th.t shelter apace, ex-
chai\'e or family $helter!!.....&$ pn)\idl'd ror 5(1
to 60 percent of the total popul.tion. or 80 per
cent or the children and aaed peraons. It ....as
again e&tablishcd that the sheltera. excepl thog(';
ron$lructed in the slope!! of the mountains. af-
forded practic.J1)" no protection apinat diN'et
hilJl of incendiary' bombs and hits or near
misses of high-explosh'e bombs. The general
POOr qualit)' of the ahelters ....as due to scarcity
of \'ital materials. lllI'k of manpower and late-
neu in rtarting the building prcgram.
c. The et!tablished plan to prolide for
the eOnatruction program wAS for Kobe to build
the lheltel'll and ttwo tJIe Il8doMI au. C
1l'II1I1d contribute 2Cl per-.: fII .. aIIIII" ...
to date. tile dl7 ..., I' ......
of the COIItl. No blIc (llada tram .., _
"'ere appropri.ted for the l:OII&truetioa of ..
at factories. buaineaa concema and for
pm'ate homes.
3. af '/tell",.-&. Pnrot",_ln the
earl)' lItalfCll of the "'.r the public "'Ill in.
Itrutted to pro\"ide ahelter space b)' dinine a
hole aboul 11 feel deep benealh Iheir hornell
luffidentl) large 10 aecornmcdate eaeh famil)':
Same of t'- ltad lidl!1ralll br&ffi!"'ilh timber
o.ften no bruine of any t)'pe "'1.8 wtd.
Under raid eonditiona, thtle sheltel'll became
death_traps both ell! rantel "'ere inaide the
houae, and thl')' cauSf'd the deatlu of tholl&l.nda
of peraollll (Page 64.), At a later period, fami.
hes eoMtnlCtl'd shelte ben tlrebrub had
been l'l'tablillhed and here larae areas ..ere
burntd out. Theae were col1lltruded as aemi-
lbout 6 feet .sqllare. generally
reInforced and braced ...ilb timber Or aah..ged
m&uri..lJ, ...ith a roof ro\-eril!e of from 2 to 3
feet of Imall slones and dirt, and llS1l&1I)' ..-ith
only one entrance (P.ge 65). Some indi\"idual
f.milies Iot.ted on the alopes of the moontain
ronatnICted b)' diaging into the moun_
lain. Se\"eral of thQ!!le obee.... ...el1 eon.
!truc:ud with brick braeillg of the side....ns.
but witb no lhorine 10 pre'"tDt of the
ceiling. Ne"erthelesa, the}' ...ere the bef;t t)"PI!
of family ahelters found in Kobe (Page 66).
b. Snli-1"'blU d..u...... -In Kobe. u in
Osaka. the ba!emenl! of. the IDOr't bea\ilr ron-
structed buildinp "'ere u..ed for 8helterioe both
emplo)'eea and the reneral publk_ Theae base-
menta ..-eN! open during day and night raida
and. e'"tD though the public had to go through
aome !!eCtiOllll of the building to gain tralX't.
nO miM:'Ondutl Or looting of article!! e\-er
reported. None of the C"ilinv of theae baae-
menU! wa, NIored.
c.
(I) COr'ffH fma<>l._Thi8 t)')lt of wiler
.... fOlllltructl'd in similar places "'ith ap-
the same .nd 1M
!la..... t)'pe of br.dltg'll u described in the
o..aka field report 67),
(2) COOlrrdf'-blod: ..rfau.-Thest
tel'l! ...ere rol1lltruct.ed of roncrele buildine_
63
s...lt.. bM,h MU" , ... 4.....,. /Io,h ,.,,,.,.. i.,idh. h.... (11..... ).
U.d..d... , ...10...h _ ... b.d ....... h.oood. n.o. ~ "' f _.f .... "............100...........-.. boob .......
POd _ .
65
67
("po) r_1J ,.h.. 1ooiJ, ..
..... 01_ t ; . . . , b . ~
........ " .,11 ., "'" ,..........
' d"" .....- ......
e- . - . ~ ~
.f... 'n.
66
--
69
lighting fl\cilitiell but none provldcd wilh
seating arrallgemcllb or slInitary faciHtieM.
One of the better-l:oMtructed onCII Wall dUll"
into the side of the mountain from Inalde a
road tunnl'l with Ileal'Y timber reinforcinlj:
the and ceiling lind with 1\ number of
at the othl'.r side of the hill (Pllgetl 70.
11). These of ahclten afforded excel.
lent proteetioll as they had 500 or mOTe feel
of the mountain above them. Beeauae 01
their excellent protection. the public filll'.d
them to eapacit) during each raid.
(6) Gldlcr.-1n manl' of the atreetll o(
Kobe there were guttera 2 to 3 feet deep,
...hich had. covering made of ",tonl'l' appro:c:i
matell' 3 feet by 3 feet b)' 6 inchl'.il. laid dr}'.
and mao." peraons simpl}' lifted one of theae
bkleks, cT'lIwll'.d into the gutter and used the
other blocb as protection. Statl'menU ob-
tained frem se\'I'r&1 penlOlliI indicated that
theN': ...ere \'eT}' pepular with the public, par
ticularl)' along the atreWlluding to.... rd the
mOlintain alopes (Page 72),
(7) Silbaco)' ,JultUl.- ThI' subwa)' in
Kobe extended ani)' 2 to S milea. At the be-
ginning of tile war. the Ministry of Home Af-
fain dire<"ted that subway atationa would not
be u!!ed as eheltl'TS because of the danger of
O\-ercro..'ding and the relIulting auffocation
therefrom in case of all.)' Incidl'nL The Kobe
officia'" did not strictly follOW !hi.. directin.
but. after the lint raid. during ....hlch a laree
number of amall machine shop.a were
or dl'lltro)ed. machine ahopll were set up
in the J!IIb"'''y atopplng all tr.n..portation
aervice and ita use a.'l a ahelter for the public.
4. COIII",",t,.-a. The program to pro\'ide
adequate ahelter for the public was ..tarted toO
late and ...as abo hampered by the lack of rein
forcinr ateel and cement. The availability of
Rokko mountain, ho...ever, emtbled Kobe to pro-
vide adequate protection for appro:dmatel>' 5
percent of IL' population by the construction of
tunnl'l-type sheltel'l!. These tunnel ahelters.
with timber braclngs, afforded elCcelll'.nt pro-
tection the types of bomba uaed in the
rllids On Kobe.
b. The family ahelters lind the public trench
aheltl'T! proved to be In the first
heav)' incendiary raids, ruulting in thc 1083 of
many livcs. The public, during succeeding
bloch with a inner ,,"11 IIll
d
II
block_veneer outer ,.-1111. laid "ith 3 (eet
o( dirt between the two The eeiling
had 4 bl" 4.inch with I.inch 011
top of the beams. COIl'.rtd b)' 110 to 2 feel o(
dirt. on tOP of ....hich hal(inch layer of
cement. The oUl3ide ....ere ap.
prOlcimatl'.h' U; bl 25 feet. There wl're tWO
bUI no liihll!. no lOl'.alinr arrllnll'-
menu no 8&nitarl' (aeilitieo<. This had
a capaeiQ' o( (Paget! 67 and 69).
(s) Cowrr(f( p>p'.- ahelter was con
ttru<"lI'd of 1....0 4(oot eo.>etions of coneNie
pip!'. :; (eel In diameter. laid on the llIirfaee
of the "'ith one end cC)lnpletl'l)'
b)' a ....U maell' of eontrtte bloc:b. It had
roof.nd ro\'erinl o( 2 to 2.\i (eet o( dirt.
The braeed 10 a heirht of aboilt 2
feet br the use of eonerete b\ol':ka .nd atones,
and the ouUide diml'naiona ....ere appro:c:i
matelr 10 b)' 12 feet, Two of thelle ehelten
p\&eed 110 that the Opl'..n enda fad each
other at about a 3-f(l(J( intl'",'al. A fe'" of
tbesfo 5belter& had one-half ineh of rontNie
abon the dirt roof (P.re 69).
(4) T..ul.-A number of these aheltl'n
were eonatnKted in the banks of park .rNII
wbkh ....ere .boUt Hi (eet abo\-e the aurfaee
of the atTftt. The tunnel ...... dq from the
level of the pa\'ement to a depth of aboUt 20
(eet witb a:; derTft aklpe. The aide"'alla and
ilinl" ..-ere reinfon-ed with timber, and
itOM:ll "'ere piled alonar the aide of thl' en
Dirt whieh had been exca\'ated 11'11.$
placed on top to ri\'e additional roof conr.
Z"o batlIe ...II.! ",-ere constructed in (ront of
tile The capaeltJ' of these
\l'&Il .ppro:c:imate1r 25 to 30 p!'nlOns (Page
70.
(5) eliTe or 11I,,"el.-Earl) in 194" fren.
zied effol"tll wen! made to tunnel
ahl'ltera in the of Rokko mountain. Offi-
eiat. estimated that the)' had conatructed
.bout 21 milea of tunnel. whiCh ....ould ateom
mod.te between 25.000 and 30.000 per!lOna.
Pl.na called for children and .ged persona to
have linn atCe8lI to these ahelten. The tunnl'ls
were well constructed. well braced with huYy
tim1ier. entrance.t were protected b)' heavy
baffle and the tUllllela were about 8
fl!f!t wide lind 7 fl!f!t high. Some of them had
68
T-..l ~ _ _ .._. _ ( ~ O < . ) .
70
T .............. .\001 d . ~ .... _ .... f....... of n" .__ ...... .... II..... __ ~ ) .
71
(buntai), eaeh in I!IIIIIbenIdp '--II
to 90. Th_ lJe(!lUIUl Wen! fllJtber aubdl1'icMd
:::e
to
local unit.c (,\(111). con.aiRilll' or 6 to 10
48 eaeh. A for eaeh or the
. WlLIl maintained at Ol>e of the .a
dlstnct pollee statiofUl. The local un,' "'.
el'e .... L__ ....
""':" ,'C"""I buildinl'l', storqe plaeel and
e bUlldlnp fur their rendenoull.
en;' total number of "'orien
I oiled In the lj:l..l-driense lIen'iee Will aoout
d,400, all of "hom. from the technical &lII!islant
t:::
n
. pharmaciw "-lIh the exa>plion of
llectJon (l>NIlIGi) Jeaden ""00 "ere doetotll.
The number of in tbe IocaJ units or
"'U not lilted .t any but
aned from 5 to 10, lK-pendinl' upon localllel!Cb
IlDd dtalm!ltallCel.
AqN,,,,,,nd.-. The aquade "ere furni!bed
'ltlth a tither impnai,'e lilt of items ..hid!
each .. u aupJl(llled to ha\'e, the coort beinlj: de-
f'-')'ed by the memben tbemaeh"llL 5inee the
tontrihation of funda ...... l!!ltirdy ....wmary.
the a/DOllnta an.ilab&e "''ere uDOUtain.. IlO that
fe--, if any, of the aquads had au1Iic:ieDt funds
to Illftt the need for 14). 1I0lit
of tbe Iquada actually acquired IlOme of the
itelllll. but none the full CIDIllpieromt
of equipmenl.
b. Of all the itemll of equipment. the most
important ..u lhe PI maY. T...
"ere uaed; one ..ith .lUI 18-iDd1 tlexib&e tube
ronnectil\& tbe detollifyiq ftlu:r and the fa
muk, and the other 1IIilh a n.;d lube direct1r
connectinlj: IholIl! paN of the apPlltltUII. )IOflt
of lbe maW \\w-e mado: to lit adu . but there
-.rere, accordinl' to the administratil'e officer
of tbe prtfeelural pollee department. a fe..
made in (hiJdren'a aius. Upon requeM for
samples, none eould be located. The need for
IIUl:!klI to lit children \I'U minimiud .....me..hat
b)' the fact that children ..-ert tel
poinl& /if ".fely ouuide the The (OIlt to
indil'iduals for tIlDe muU \"aritd from 5 to
20 reno ThooM! lilrl'rl!II, ho..-e\"IIr. do not rtpre--
llent the tot.1 (OIlt of the produtt &II the &'O\"ern-
ment absorbed part of the (OIl1 of produ(tion.
No wert distributtd freoe. III e\'et)'one
"'&11 prt!lumed to hal" aulllcient mone)' l(l buy
one for hllllM'lf. Euh famib' &\'craged. one to
thN'll m&llles, and it Wll.ll l'8timattd th.1 20 to
30 pl!rc:ent of the population had ma!lks. The
73
r.lds, rUlIhed to the tunnel shelter. or took .
"
OM 011 the upper sloPl!ll of the m .
I . OUntauuI
c. Thc COl1cretc-plpe and concrete-bloe .
teTll lome apinstk'::1.
fragmcntatlon, but not agains, aull'oo: l' b
a Ion duro
ing
d. Mi!i\1lry inlltallatiulllI in Kllbe did not
IS col1crete sheltel'll similar to those_':""
b t . . .... ed
in ()sakll; u pro\'ed that durin
bUI')' raIds, mlhtal"}' perllOnnel used th bra:
tunnel shelters in th( mountain. e pu Ie
to For a dl':llCriptioll of shelte" eo",
by hospItals. factories, harbor alUl
and railroad., refer to those sections of thO
port. and large, it c:an be llIid that ;b:
authoTltles faIled to prol1de IlIlisflctory tunnti-
type shelters for all the publi<- hetaUlle did
nol come 10 a full realizatiull of the intensity
of the nids until it was too late to MaIre enti_
cal materiaband neceM&I"}'labor, in llpite of the
rol-ernment'll offer to defrar of the
(OIlt of lIuch llhelters.
GAS-PROTECfION SERVICE
I. .-PlalU5 for protertion of the
pIlblk apinst p.!l ...ere dewloped u earb' u
1939 when drHIlI wen! initiated, but it ill diffi.
eult to understand ....h)" 110 much stn!!ll5 1tIS
pW:ed upon gas defense at the time ...hen
Japan', onl)' enem:. "'1Ui China 'lthkb had 110
air futcel!. Interest in p.!l defetl!le, bo1Tf:\W.
had p.llsaerl its peak before the atlad< on Pearl
Harbor, and ....s ne'oer rompleul)' mind be-
(ause the Japanese !leE'med to han been COlI-
I'inced earl)' in the War that the Vnittd States
had no intention of using polron plI. That lut
aewunted for the diffi(ult> the)' had In holding
their orlj:auizalion together. The prtnilina:
roneeption was that time and ell'ort del"Oted to
the gas program were futile. and in the oatu",
of shadow boxing.
2, Ot-gani..-atitt.-Thc g-u-defcn!ll!
...as a joint functiOn of the prefedural police
(a;uard section) and the health depart';1e.nt
(OrganiUttion Chart, Page 74). The admlnlS-
Irative director was a police officcr l(l
the health department. Under him there a
technical assistant who was largel)" responSIble
tor the organization training, and direction of
the subordinate and units. Dire;;-Il'
under the prefectural office were 48
Go, _ .. 0I0oI e-. .-..01 -. _ f ; ....
72
copy ot the local law QId repIa
II Rcoferen ltetn No. &L Tbe U- .....
Will not lntonned J'8MftI PIIb6e
eipll'll III it wu no:-=uftep or tt. PriJI-
or materl.l t:>l:e:tpl on UlOllt to .. tIIer'D'
thOlt lacea. h.. aDd at
rll'e ':me d It '<I'U felt camouftap would
'h
CfTCt of proteetion
e f(l'e'nor of the . <:ao y,
lI'hat .houl prefecture would desipate
of the . d c:amoul\aged; actuall), the head
,, poll d,II.lon (Ira....tn /llIdo) ..
t...., Wlldl !oea . "'"
miJita .. 0:. lloll.l (ueept distinctly
f) Innallat>ona or factori"" under direct
of the .mllitary) on his o'll'n initiati'-e or
PromptlD. of. the military. o.1lfrlI '<I"tre
be rmed by the poilu that camoullagina- should
. unden,uen.nd the polielt furnisbed tecll_
:::1 and help. The buic law allow-ed
. pollee to "fleet the buildinp, bmc:e IlO addi_
lIonal local law wu _I)' to flOnJpeI en-
fOtftIlltDt of their fle,eision. Owners bon lbe
t:I:IIN of the eamouJlaie. e:uoepl in the eue of
fllCtory i.onall.tiooa wbfte
.rnnrellltllla '<I'llllid be made to belp defray
lInlllUal_ fl'Oll:l a special :loIi.oUt.ry of H_
Atr.i.... fund. Otbft- thut fanorieB. the
PlI'rm:lta,re of buildillp were pul>
lie buildiap WIth the coat met out of locaJ
.......
S. TJIU 01 types of
camoul!qe were found: one. paint to
whiu_ and to break up plalM! I'lIrf&Ol!ll;
two, netI or bamboo to bide objeclJ! and
their shado.... ; and. three. trftl. ahrubll. and
!Od to acbie,-e natural camolIllal"- Smoke
&eree1U were not emplored iD Kobe. but there
wll limited u!t of tSPll' of eamoullage iD
Shikoma.... industrial tOWll about :;0 milell
from Kobe. wbert the smoke wu IlMd to pre-
I'tDt ,ital tarret:s in the town from beina- pin-
pointed. 1\0 U6t was made or f\-en contemplated
of .rtificial fop. locationll. decoy
liehu or glal"ll-COnfu.lon sean:hlli'ht&.
4. TopolTGpI!lI lfReI tlI ... is a
loDe and narroll' cit.' I)inr bd"wn the moun-
t.in r.nge .nd the ba)'. The industri.1 .rea
borde.. tbe ba). the ruldenti.l 're. nestltll up
do."e to the the ahopping and bu"i-
ness lies belween the IWO .nd the ilum
Area the fattories. The mountains are
d.rk and aomber in tone. Ther.re co,'tred with
d.rk "erdant growth. largel)' 1Tee!. but with
75
CAMOUFL"'GE
1. 1I,troductiolt.-The air..ddeD!!e law (Law
47) paMtd in 1937 included calDO\lll.1ll' U
one of the chilian-defense mea.'lures. ReIUlon
of the I..... in 1942 (La..... No. 91) further PIIl-
phui1ed it!! use and strengthened the mtaltll of
By these laW!! the Ministry of
HolIIt Affalfll ....It!! made responsible for the
diuemination of information on eamouftqe
and the enfolUment of camoull.ge meuurea.
along with other ej,'ili.n-defenlle meuures. The
ministT)' discharged this responsibility b)' pre-
paring regulation" governing eamoullage. by
listing the types of buildillgl! to be camoullaged.
and b) publishing bookle\;l on the prindples of
camoultage (RefeN!nce hem No. 34). The!t
publie.tion" were forwarded to the prefectural
governments which weN! made responsible for
the enforcement of the regul.tioM. Further
hell> and "uggestion to the prefectural go,'ern,
ments were given in bulletins and pamphleti!.
p.ut out b)' the great Japan Air,,l)@fense ,1.1110-
clation (Reference Hem" Nos. 35 and 36).
. 2, l.Qcal ".ilu(llion.-No loe:!l l'lI'l were pub-
hshCiI to ulter or modif)' .ny regulationg issued
rrOm the Ministry of Home Affairs. The loc.
l
law \\'us simply r: republighing of those porlioD$
of the Ilutionul IIIII' thal were pertinent. A
a..;,_"
b'thhDtlRe and hia elothilW "'0 Id
. boiled. In e&lIeS where this be w"heeI
loaull\cient to decontaminatE' the reatllltnt WII
riurTI (blE'&ehinr cal
.... t111f(i in addItion. Aa for _ would.
.... ntannnar
the gl-'l-affected urea. the plan" \I\'t 1011 of
indefinite. depending on the tnlt :fllOme....hat
re
rned
. In the callE' of phOll"." " d PlI eon.
''''. a ereOnta .
llllion wall necessary. but if th ml_
or mustard gas, the ar:.. I'''ere
,,'ould be sprinkled with calcium h,.
POe "'file.
8. COIl./lfr'lIellon of'(liJtllt "". -Th
,,_. ere ""ere
psprOOf "heltE'r8 or other guproof no
I:l f.r u could be ascertained. fltructurea
9. ClilNmelfu.-The thoroughn of
tion for pO" defenlle .in Kobe wu mu::.r:
ra
-
obllened In Osaka.
10150.....1lI well planned, and the
trallllDg of gas-defense pefllOr;nel w.s $E'riou I
out. The stn;ee. bowt\'tr, "'as
In and meaD!l for K3-' dettdion od f
deeontamination. a or
-: ]
--------1
-----_.. '_010.<0..
$Dnnel only. a sm.ll g.l-defenllC manual for the
people w.g digtributed all In Olllka, but It did
not have a large circul.tion In Kobe. Instruc.
tion was almoet entirely verbal. Drills WE're
held lporadieall)' until about the f.n of 19.....
when they were abandoned altogether.
6. Gag detee/ioll w.g effected b>' meth_
ods. Ga.s-detection kiU for produemg odorll to
COlDpare and identify the commoneU polllOn
gases (see "Gill protection service" in the
Osaka report) were at the di"IJOlIII of the gu.
d<.'fense but the)' pla)'ed little part in
their preparatioM for gill detection. Depend.
ence "'u placed primarily on the ameli of._
.lone and Iheir "i"u.l appearance. There WE're
no plan" for I.boratory E'X.min.tion of air
sampla
7. l}fco"ta",ilWtiOJt 01 flbjeda Gild pt:rllOlII,-
Upon the di5CO\'CT)' of a poi$On gaa the tint
pT'OC'l'dure contemplated wu to mark the loea-
tion and then rope off Ihe .rea, from whieh .U
unautboriU!d penoDS would be E'Xcluded. The
"tf@tchf,r bearen would then go In and rernD,'e
all ,ietilllll of the gil. Decontamination 'would
then preed, first of the ptfllOlUl .nd their
dothing. and nv<t of the plaee. The patient wu
to be Blrlpped of contamin.ted clothinnd
V'.en 1oea1 treatment of the "kin, if it weN!
gu caWling Ikin irrit.tion. He would next be
bathed in the neart!lt fint-aid Jtatlon or public
,
,
,
,

,
,
,
...
,
m

....
,
..-.
- ,
-,
-,
,
,
_ rU :
_ 1
-.
, -,,,
supply of au ma.aItt wu at all timea aufficient
to meet the 6emand of pun:huers. the
..ere not mueh conmed about the need
for All perllOnnel wbo were expected to
work in pa-inft:lted foci were pro\'ided with
protee:the rubber clothiq.
5. T'I".i"". - The ,-...defense profl'am
1It,'U pTOfl'eued beyond the tnining atare
Finrt of all. the .ttetion leaden who were doc-
tol'll were trained In gaa defeDllt by penonl
from the hulth department. The section lead-
en trained the 8I'Iuad luden. The onl)' training
the public .ec:e;"ed wal how to Ule the gal
masks and thlt was taught them by the emer
rency firat-aid uama (kVIIIIO halt) and galHle-
fenM squads (bodokl' The people were
al!l(l iDiltructed where to JJU in case of a gu
.ttack. Since information material of a tech.
nic.l n.ture wu Intended for ,.&odefense per-
.
I G m..... for ...h ..or\..
:: Gp....,! <loUll..... l""h.dinJ plp,...,f
..10_ ..... U-. IUIfl<i....t to .upp
1
r
....,b ..o",",,"
:l. O>:r.........p, ..to.
4. Guttct..... kh
i. Stru_' (oi.."..:J ft ... to ....... It...nJ'h
of ..."'"
6. WII.d ft.J'I (to I.......'. d,nrlion of

7. S... _ for _rk'.... dtelM .....
S. S,p - .....
.- 10. \1"......1.0.1',.... ('......n...... '

I:' PoeU< aubI,..h'
U.. B_.u
,........
II.. "oppMM
16. Ti.-b""""" for _ ........Ud dotlIIno:
17. Son,. of do<h (...rPeoJ d.-..o:l
Ii.. a earU
it. BiorJdo" \h ..rp earrio<'o

.-1_
..
a. PoousOl_
.to ea_i<'" 1__ ....Ido)
I.. SeIlI_ dIioAI,....
6.,....-;- ,........

_.....
. A1coIlooI
I'. R"-"'''

74
77
Att.m '0 ..",".A d 1 hb. ,,-,_'1 .b' I d .. , lKO.
The remaining sehoola were weath.
er_bealen 10 need no treatment.
c. Other l>Nilding.-1t!O)l!t of the prefectural
and other government buildinga were painted
or darkened III 80mi' n18m1l1r 10 decrt'alle their
whiteneall. The iIlustnltion on the followinl(
page showa camouflage on II building. former!)'
a llChOllI. no... used aa the ollice of the cit)' wllter
work"- II is Clltimated that or the 160 larger
buildinga in Kobe. approxin,atel}' 60 percent
were given lOme of camoullall(e lrell\-
ment. This relati"ely large percentage could be
for by the extensive u* of light-eol_
oN'd v;Jued ceramic tile as a facing material.
al80 the widCllpread use of stUCCO for building
finishell. both of which COnlr.st.ed stronl[l)'
with the dark mountain background. and needed
to be toned down. The o"er-all tone of the
camoul\.age painting WlUI not to that
of the hilly background, and. \'iewed frem thl!
ground. man)' or the buildinjp, particularl)'
those on the sides of the hill. were quite incon-
spicuous until one WI!! relatil'e!)' near. It is
intete!!tinl( to note that lOme of the highly eon
SpicUOllll buildings that could act lUI landmarks
were not One prominent example
"'"all the )l.yason lIotel. a large white structure
located aboUt 1.000 reet up on the mountain,
which contrasted strongl)' ....ith itil background.
and could as a landmark to Ioc:aw impor-
lant indu.nrial planu 2 miles to the lOutb,
i. l\alerlt'Orl."a.-The filtration and purifica
tion plant Wli! lnested ....ithin the city limil&
It h.d eight filtering pools. each pool approxi.
mately 100 feet !!qu/lre, /lnd all were arraneed
to form /I rectangular Dittern. Thill charac
teristic pattern WII hiddl'n by a ac:reeniDI
camouftagt> of fish nets and laced bRmboo mal!
which ....ert' laid acroM a network of rope!
stretched over thl! water srt'a. The local .--
\'Oir ....u located in the hiUlI immedilltely back
of the to....n. No attempt was made to eamOll'
Itage or hide the surface of this water but tlte
dim "'all painted black and shrubs planted
on illl rim. lt,wall not vcr)" effective all mll)' be
noled from the illUlllration on the followinl
page.
8. Army ill8!ullotions.-An army barrack
l
building located in downtown Kolle WII8 call1
ou
,
!laged by placing laced bllmhoo !leta it!
roof lind bambuo verticlllly nlong the out
of \lAre ground lIhowing
through. The color tone of the camounage paint
worked out to blend into this mnuntainoul
background, Colou applied tn bulldlng:\ were
lI011d. and where pattern elfeo"tIl wert:
u;led on the large.r oneil. they on a large
>!Cale and of !!Quart' rectangular IIhape. Thelf!
panernl wert: dl!iligned to blend i';to the block
roof paturn of lbe a,'er.ge sm.n dwelling
(black rQOf tile). Thert: wert' no ex.mples of
the irregular highl}-eont...;ning patterna found
in ();<aka.
5. f"lIe/Or, t'IlIIIOI/lOge,-Ten oul of approxi.
mateb' 60 factories had an or lIGme of Iheir
buildinp camounace:t. The camoufl.ging WIiI!
aoxompli,.Md by paintinl[ with. black. ffl;ldish.
..n or dark l[T1I$-creen n.t painl in either
lIGHd color or in larre geonwtrk pattern.
Thu pattern ...11 desiped to COP)' the tnoe of
pattern made b)' !.he nearb)' .sIum-aru roofs..
(For enmples.!Iee Refert:'- Item:S_ 3i and
38. ) :Slltl! that thill paintinl[ aunded o'-er the
sld@:j! and roof. No attempt ...... made to hide
or camouilail! distinetin induatrial features
IJUCb all ...n....d yanb. wipbuikliq ,.anla and
CrlDell or biallt furnaeoea. Col\.lidl!ntion WI!!I
ci"m to painting tbe larrer gl!! hoId1!n to
aehie"1! MlIM deer of camoullacinl[. bUl these
tanb "'ere Sll Iarre. and materialll "'ert' 50
llCIKe that nothilll( ....u done. Tbe police "'ere
informed that 1M l.t'IIl! I[I!! holdl!tlI had with-
stood the Tokyo railb. Mnef! tM,. ceasl!d worn'-
inl[ aboUt the Kobe tankit. Smalll!r plIOline
and oil tanu "'en hidden b)' the Ulll! of laced
bamboo Mts placed till! top and bamboo
pole. inclined Oil an anl(le alone thl! li<!el. Thia
lsuer Mlped to brt'ak up Ihado,,a.
6. eIlMo.f"'IJ" of "'rlltr b.ildilllll,_. 11M.
pilou.-TMte "'ert' approximatel}' 100 t\o$pi.
in Kobe Lut moat of them ...'ere re.lly nur$-
mg hOllies. Onl)' four ...ere of such size that
the)' clluld be conaidered real holIpit.b, and t ....o
or them .....ere camouflaged, One ....ss camou-
flal[l!tl With a flat bl.ck paint relie,'ed with a
block of neutral gray; the other ....ith blocks or
blue-gray and bla<:k,
D. OUI or approximatelv 50
schooll ..... ere carnouftall'ed. Thelll! Werl! Ihe'eon-
or structures and tlat blue_grav or
ack paUlt ....as used 10 hide their
76
8ide 10 hide the whitenelli' o( IllI ceramic Ille
/inish. Antiairu..ft pn emlllacemenlB, N:at-
terOO throughout the had nlliural c.amou-
lI..ge, that ia. l!Od and IICrub plantB &rowmg on
lhe dirt "mbankmenU and rover,
9. Oil ((l",oM/I/lgr.-l)c;lpile the fact
tlt.at ch'ilian-deJenlle authoritiCll were charged
"'ith Tbpornnbilily for the applic'"
lion of u.moufl,..e to hide _ntial buildingl!
and the lechniciana actuaU)' doing lhe
work were liven r>o opportunity of IIring ow.r
the cit) 10 eheck tJ.eir work. Pre:lIumab\'>' the
milital')' made !!'Orne cheek... bUI the onl)' criti.
cism filtering do,,'n to the technieians wall <:onli.
eism tlt.at the deMit) of the ne14 the filtN--
tion plant lIMuld be
10. Gnal'f'al authori_
ties to ha"e 110 conception of the tnJe
of C'a1Ilouttage for ..ir rfare. Time
"'u spent on meTJing buildin into back-
grounM. nit ""OllJd bft,n uee1lent eam-
OIIl'\aziog for .,.oond warfare but it is doubtful
..-betbf:r !hill of amouttage had an)' ,..Iue
u proteetion ft'om the air sillCl! on!}' lhe
objeeta _re hidden and no attempt wl.ll
made 10 hide or <:on<:eal "m' of the prominent
landmarlul and charuteristic indUJItrial fea-
tures.. ..UerDpta "'ere made to hide dock
anu. to alter pl'OlDinent coalItline featUre!!,
charaeterilllic atreet patterns. or to chanl"l': the
smooth geometric cun'e of the dam tried
to hide by p\.I.nling "hrullll on the <:oun'e il8elf.
COl\.'OUCT OF TIlE PUBLIC DURING
AN AIR RAID
1. htrodllCllolI.-Bec:aulle of 11.1 prol<imil)' to
Osaka. the of the ume warning s)slem.
and of the same to instruct leaden,
and the continually clolle 1i3illOn bet....een the
t..-o prefectural 1"O'ernmenta. there wall a
marked "imilarit) between Osaka and Kobe in
the approach to the eivilian-defenlle problem,
the trainin& of the ch'ilian-dcfenlle
tiOM. and the general (or lack of
it) of IIll: public for air attack. What differenCeil
uisted were minor and they "aried more with
the energy of the local lj"roup leader than with
any al1J'ration of basic poUC). In practice, how-
ever, there WI5 diJrerence in the behavior of
the public onee lll!rious raidinj(" actually lItarted,
And that difference W&.ll caulled by the
geographical location of Kobe, which has been
78
dl!$Cribt.d at length in olher 1,Ilria of t.hls
PIMmcd JlIll>l;C mtl!"ouc"ls durINg a. rnld.
_Upon the sounding of Ihe alert. all normal
acth'ities were to continue all far aK pol!IIlble.
If at night. the alert rull.'ll .....ere
to be applicable. Only children. Sick and aged
were to seck sheltefll, bUI Ihose ,,ho were not
ged were enCOuraged to go to lheir OWn
10 be there in ell"" a rtlid de,elopel!. All
IN-ffic w&.!I to conlinue. offices and llChoola Well!
to continUe all usual and hOllpitllls were to pre-
pare to patienjg. if ThOle
re5ponsible for elvilian-defen!<C aCt"'ltles were
to check to lt5!!Ure that 'H.ter and !lllnd bucketa
full and that their equipment waa in order.
(ho'nen; of sma,1 boaUt ..nchored in fleeUl. were
to go to their boaUt and be prepared to disperse
them. if a raid alarm ...as lIOunded. The raid
alarm "'Ill!' to be lIOunded al least 20 minutell
abead of the arrh..l of the planef! and that
inten-al wall lIUPIlO$ed to pro"ide ample time to
permi: all to to a shelter. After the aound-
ing of the raid alarm, traffic wu ITaduall)' to
stop as people mclted their destination or a
r.helter; stores. offices. and school.. were to flIOllt
and Ottupantll ...ere to seek shelters; and IlO5o
pitab were to mo,'e patienta.. Blackout-lighting
rule:s were applicable. Factories, hO"'e,'er, "'ere
to eontinue 10 work until the 11IlIt minute. When
the planes were aetual1}' the popula-
tion was warned b)- watehen aounding gonp,
blowing .....hilltleit, )elling. and warning lhe pub-
lic b)' whale,'er audible means were at Iheir
command. Upon receiving the warning, fac-
torll:l! were to eelllle work. all tralfic:: Willi tn
"top (acept trainll under certain circum.
stances) and aU, including eivilian-defense
workers. fire fighterll and policemen were to
!leek Ihe eo"er of the near_by sheltefll. Firmen.
policemen, medical men and olherll elIllential
for c;'ilian defenlle wel"f! to emerge from the
shelterll and proceed with their duties IllI !lOOn
&lIlJO'lSible after the All in Osak.,
there was no la" wmpelling lIerilOns to use
ahelters.
3. Guidill9 the public to Bhellos._Guiding
of people to shelters was tlte dutr of civilisn
organizations. tlte ncighoorltood groups (t<m
llrf
!I,m!i), and the aUl<iliary police !lnd fire units
(keibodan). as well flS the II01ice department. It
appears, howevcr, t1lat, except for the aged, in.
firm and children, little guiding of the general
blic done, but, since pllO I
PU
urared
to remain at work or were ell
:'.n Mmes, it was usual for them to t1l@jr
f miliar shelter, ao that the lack f . near a
I:e llCarcitJ' of signs were not im 0 UId
backs. public Shelter:'were
t
draw_
marked 1n some manner ._ . d' ftDer_
Ill. <OJ 'n IUIe tha
the,\' ",ere shelters and their ca'ti t
JI"en, but lIuch Willi not the
Th08'! thal were marked had I)Q u,', h""
,
" I ornllty III
to size 0 lIlgna or 0 wording or of legibT
)lost lIignll were a piece of raw "'ood 6 lily.
inehell b) 18 incheS. lettered bJ' hand "h 8
" ].. w, Ulack
paint. ,.0 umlnOUll SIgns or ni,h, _. "
d Lot . .._rImp
...ere foun . alionll of storm se"-era suitable
for tI!lC 1IlI lIhelterli were not marked. Loa
police or residenu ullual!}' directed lit I
10 suitable IIheltera rallten
4. Polin"!J 01 8IteUen.-There ..u no poIk_
iDg of cheltera and regulations
L:OndlK'l of the population within. In a few f
the better hillllide tunnel lIbelters,
brought blankea and prepal't'd to lIpend the
nitht. but. Cor the most part, tlte lIhe1ten 1fCI'\!
lmall Co:dtolt'll and wel"f! u!llllllllllluch; that ill,
they ...ere 1IO unpleasant that people mnailled
in them 1IlI short a time all )lOSltible.
$.. Actual - Theoretically, the
pubhc WlUl to prepare for and meet lhe air raid
as outlined abo,'e, but the actual I"1!!ponee
pro'"ed to be aomev.'bal diffel'\'nt. A 1Ima11 raid
on the 19th of January pin-pointed a factory
area in Akuhi and u.u!lllll a number of deaths
among the factory \\"Orken lind in the near-b)'
slutnll. This N-id taught the public that it W&iI
tlOt ufe to remain on their jot/$, and thai their
Joeal slit-trench tnle of lIhelter wl.ll not life.
AR)' doubtefll were eon,;nced b)" tht! raidi
of J.ebruar). 4, and. from then on, there"'u a
stoPPage of factory work shortl)' after the
sounding of the alert alarm and a general mo"Co
II1Cnt of people to the safetJ' of the hillllide.
On!) a 5mall percentage of the populalion could
be aceommodated in caves lind tunnels on the
hillside, but the)' I\OOn learned that bombinr
being conllned largel)' to the factor)' and
Indulltrial areaB bordering the bAy. and !!&"e for
In accidentally dropped bomb, the)' were resso
n
-
ably !lafe e,'en on the open hillside. The onlr
time workers, even ellSentill.l ones, did relll.
ln
on the job up to the last minutell was when lOme
highly Placed dviliaD4d
ciall wt'll! sw-nt aDd tha': 01' JIIlbtar1 ..
III military uaua\b' Dot. ........
onto the hllllllde," The ditt'.e:: dl1Uu1 ap
in Kobe and the
&1\ nol due to a ditrerenee in potli...,- ....
the] --
he peop I'll of the 1"'0 Iocalitiea but.
nt. r a eaae of the", being no .!Iafer _, __ '._
to In Ou.ka tlla - ...-."' ..... ..,
f . n t..", silt trench adjacent to the
SLllce the from the factory to
aafety "aTied from I 10 3 mill'll and since
t:me of arr;"al of the planea ""I.l! unkno"n.
endencr ...... for the "'orken to le:a'"e
shortly after the alert alarm. Moo: facto .
"'ere dolled b _ nell
). the tIme the air raid ......
Small raida III well aa larger ODell
peop1e into lIftkiog IIfely on the
lides of the lIlOlInWlII for they Ile\'er kne..-
lhe planea '&'Wid drop their born! with
de'"Utating ellena. From the abon it abould
DOl. be infur1!d that aD the people left tmrn..
)lany, particularly the PfOpie and the
collJdentioua one&, remained -.. their prop-
my or at tMir dlltiea, prepared to protect
property aDd reDder aid in aeeordaoee with the
pllllllled program. Shelter ........... modatioM
within the eity for 0lI]y about SO pereetlt of the
populati<rn further eneouraged mo-..t to the
hillside..
&. C" between the
behavior of the public in Kobe aDd ill Osaka
under similar raid eonditiooa caa be attn"buted
solely to the poo!II!ibilily of findiq a safe hanD
on the hillside Kobe. Since it toOIi: time to
mo,"" from the factory areaa into the life hills
(the faetoriH..-en' farthest from the hil\JJ1. tht:
action of the worken in Iea.,;.... their jobs
shortly after the lIO\lndi .... of the alert quite
understandable. Sinee the Kobe area had about
80 a1eru in 1945. which developed into 60 raids,
Industrial production 1\ltt'er1!d drastiu.Uy from
inttrl'\lptiona alone. Remedial actton .......ld
han bftn to pro,;de ufe sheluMI ..ithin a few
minute.< dilrtance from lhe factoril!:8. lIufficiently
Ill"\{\! to llC'COmmodale all "'orken who should
ha"e continued On prvdllCtion and all eMential
(or dd1ian defense. Pl'OlTfoms Illould Ita"e been
.... orked out to mO"e othen to the hillside in an
orranlled manner. Colllltrudion of adequate
8helten ,,(thln the industrial area would
retl
uired
the upendilure of considerable con-
79
so
8l
.nd the extremc need for b'anIIportaUoa to....
munitiollll,
.5, Trll",portlltloll of ";t'CICuu.-. No pred.
"IOn, were made to provide apedal or atn
trllnaPOnaUoll for either voluntal')' evacuee. or
wlIo .ere lIir-nid \i.:tim&. Certain prlor_
l\ie. and l"I'ductiona in ratell were pennitted
IIowever. The e\.euee became ju,t .nother
IIeIlll'er .nd aelected hill own time for mo\"ement.
Early In the ....r there WII& no limitation on
batll'age, but. hO'l\'ever. after the raid of Man:h
each C\'llCuee "'&II limite:t to lh'e pietell of
baiPgt, e.ch PLeo:e not to n.eeed I I 3 cubic
Yllrda (one cubic meter).
b. Cmi_a.te 't>r cbagillg all
permittinl'. chanceof district
1wI t.) be -."red befwe tnmponatlon would
be holl(}nd on the railroad&. Questionnaires
"ere ftlled out in the CUll of the m1un!arT
C\"&CIIt* .nd they "ere lICreened to make &un!
that IlO pereonnel_tial to the ...r eIl"ort Willi
lDO\'iDt out of the territory. Check 1fIIlI made by
the nrd le-den under direc:tioa of the prefec_
tural police. Effortll ...-ere InIde to Ion..... the
.!lame procedure for the air-raid lufferer, but.
Iftllr the hea\.,. raid! of M.n:lt and June 19.15,
"'hicb fllr exreeded aIlJ'thiDt they expected, it
became: impoMible 10 IeClIre certificltel fTOm
e\"Crrbodr.
c. E:;rpn!.U ..4 apel1R in.
,'oI\"ed in lDO\inr to .DOther district 1fIIlI borne
by fACb e''llCuee. A &llbaidr. boweTer, ....nging
from 200 to lIOO yen per flJDily paid
througb the ""lin! leader to help defray of
tbe upeMe.. Fuw for thill "-ere pro-
,ided by the nIItional l'O"emme:nL
6. St"liI't,a._. t.rlllC1llu.-lt ..,u reported
bv tM Kobeolfdlls that during the period from
311. until the cnd of lhe ....r.
AUjfU.t 14, 19-15, there "'ere penom.
of wc:hool childN'o....ho left the cily.
They "'ere claMilled III foIlO'll"5:

\'o/wIWl ... ..uh <'fttJb<> r.
...rI<t> !tfIjIS.!
\.oNnlon ..............._ """"""" '150,000
,.-WeI ,_.. ,,., 'fl'-" 1SJ.9S8
"".,.;d ' ...."'n ....._ 'flJbn 'IS.ooo


The po\lUlation tlgul"ell. N'p(lrted U 918,032
Februsr)' 2'!, decMl!IeC1 to 374,416
re made to enccurage \'OIUlllaT)' evlC
", .Mlter with friend" and reJativ Ut!ell to
'" . 'h . es or at
poeir IIncestra In various P&rta f
poe empire. There. were. hOwe"er, eertain lI'e:ft
.'n as evscuallon arelll! and destin_I
. '... 10nft of
t''llCueeti were to be outlnde of such IIrellll. The
e>'llCuation areas were Kobe and Amagasaki in

.--. prefecture, the Tok)'o area. and the ',.

'00- . \' , h CI les
of Kawa8llkl. 0 0 ama, Osaka, Moji, Kokura,
Tobata, Hachiman. Thefollow_
inll cities, III addition, were to be avoided u
ddlination areas, K)oto. Tachika.. Raw..
JllChi, Yokosuka. Sakai, Fuse, Nishinomiya
)likage and ShimonoseJr.L '
II. ArelJlI 'W' air-raid .,'t/'ereTl.-When II per_
WDI'I became an air-raid sufferer, he &IIUpeeted
10 !!helter in outh'ing areu ith N'lItiveII
and friend!!, the lilInte as the preeautionary
eflCuee. Tholle who had no pJaoe to 11"0 re-
lI1IIined in the area renting I"OOII\ll ""hell .\ail_
able, or colllltructing their o.n individLllll8hac:k
or ahelter. The cit), made no pTO\'mOD lor lIucb
shelter; it .....u a cue of e,'e'"!'one making hUI
0trfI arrangemenu. One exeeption to that. ho...-
er. was a amall agricultural project where a
fnr air-raid sufferers ....ho had no plaee to &,0
were !Wnt to fartrul in the neighborillJ
hires of Tottori and Oka)llma.. It W&llel!tilllllted
that not O\'er 1,000 lIuch penlOlI.!l "..ere sent to
-'tattered locatiollll. It ....u reported that there
W'IlI II lfI'Oup of 300 to 400 !lent lIS tenanu to
Dnf big firm in Okayama to impr<l"e a reclaml-
lion project. The)' were !!'ent out lifter the June
19-1;, r.id and m<lIIIt of them were .!ltill there.
That ....a11 the on!)' attempt in Kobe tei CIIIT)' out
lhe air_raid lIufferer$' plan referred to in para.
fl'IIph I a,
c. Tlte JlQkkaido plall._Following the big
"ids on Tokyo. N:tgo)'a, Osaki and Kobe in
)[arch 19-15, the officials of Kobe reported that
there was a large-acale plan to U.ie the Island
of Hokkaido a reception center for e"KUee!
from the industrial centers of the main island;l.
The plan Willi to include the grouP;! lliready men
tioned. The Kobe ot1iciais heard the announe:
m
..,,n" officIal
ent of the Illan but dul not recel\ , .
,IOCumun\ll from Tokyo putting thIs grllndLOi!t
Program into effeel. In their opinion, the rea!lOl1
ror not making the plan effective wu the. bre.
ak
.
d. .,.. t thiS time
wn or trlLnsportation fac] ,hes a
(1) Primal'" schools. second year and
below.
(2) Unwellned children and the i I'
motheu,
(3) Pregnant women,
(4) Old perllOns.
(v) l1(!i!dinK IlUendllnts. I
4. Reception nl"IW.-II. A,'C(lII.-11l Ilenera,
except for the school group.ull
. II r(lbabilily of dev....lating air
d tiler materlDlg, CoMtructloll of fall of the Mariana.. , and by then
an (I I r.ellille>! on the hilbide should ?"3' II, late The 1944 drive \.(I dig adequate
adequate tunlle " II wall 00 . , f t ,. ,
t diffieulL That no ae Ion I bo ed d(lwn from lac <) 00, ma e_
not hal"C """,n 00 I 19.\4 were tunne s gg 1 Ie lind man
taken on the former lind that on 'I the hill- rials to shore up the tunne s. conere -
real drLI"ea pul on tn dig tunnels Tee: power.
aide. ""lIS e\'ldenee that the aul - \'(IELFARE
VII. EVACUATiON ANr:> h.'" (Paragraph 2b, Exhibit T).
to whIch I e)'" . I
The poUt,- was not to make cvacuau.on CO,?"pu
I _ . The tutu.lion pro- "Or')' but 10 tun"1! encuees lI'O in
. br lied JlUIUIl'!' 21. 194.1 (I,"er the far lIll and not violate the faml y "",ley
gram. pu ... .tiu:ns
"iln'lIlure lind addresMd to tn'" e: of Ihe r,lltlon. red
of Kobe (Exhibit T lind Reference \tern No, 39) f;!'lIcl<cOlIl.-The plan promulgllted ur,
W'IIJI fundamenlllll!' the SlIme u that promu!- the' "olunLB,"!' e\"1lCu"tion of the followlnll'
pled the IILr-defenM generlll lflOups.
:Mini$t'"!' of Home AlTIII,.., lit TolQ"O. Thl$ plan II. Ca:>e$ ""here the heads of
....as primaril)' for the pUrpo:l$e of: , in lhe e\'lICu"tion areliS but hlld their work In
(1) Redudnr uceg popullitlOn. 1l'O\'ernment banks lind bu"inesll Iirl1lll
(2) Remo....l of tr.>useII to de\'elop open located elsewhere, or were cemmuting to lIuch
. work. h. ,
(3) Dispenal of important illlllllilatlon!l. b. Cues where a penon had 1000t l.II oeeup -
It rflnIIined in effect until the end of the ""ar tion f<>r the time being, beeIIUlIe of rearrange..
in 1945. In April, 194-1. J:l)-og(l prefec- ment of busineM. . ,
ture publi!bed. upon ad\ices rectl\'ed from Co CII!le!I where one was li\'ing on.llnnuLtLeII.
Mill.illlry of Home AlTain. a -Milln penslons. income from reIIl eollate Or Intere:tlt.
Poinu for CllnTinl' OUI Evaculltlon of Ref- d. l1looJe !i\'ing on aUo"'lIntel1.
(Exbibit V and Refereneeltem No. e. with nO fixed employment. .
10 carry (lut refulflll! meuura f(lr ttM:- remaln- f. Those reliding in the area to further theLr
Ins- ill. the dt)' and ....ho might become lIulTeren children's educllliun.
because (If air raid5. Thill plan. it .'1IlI renaled. g. Those .'bo. because of retirement or rent
11'1I3 De\'er put into efftet becIIUH it .u .too marriage.ere mllintaining two households.
elaborate. the trallllportati(ln and food requI.re- h Families of pel'!Klns Ii>'ing abroad or lit a
menU ...ere lacJr.in&". lind the indicated ho.mng di&tance, and who were living on
in the reception .reo bad been utiliJ.ed b)' the .lk>wance.
voIuntarr e\"llclIeeII lind lIChool children. Xo i. Those who&( Ottuplltion did not necessitate
attempt WIIS made to utilize it. e\'en .fter the their living in the area.
heavy n.id of 17, but it Willi ne>'er j In accordance with a H)'ogo prefecture
l'ftcillded. publication, dated 13, 1944 (Exhibit
b, The Kobe field !un'eY was dh'ided, for 1'.), from the chief of police to the ma}'or of
con\'enience. into three Hdion!, i.e. Kobe and Amaga!lllki. the following groupl!
(I) Voluntary encuation of ci\i1iarul. were to be evacuated starting November 15,
(2) E"lIcuation of lIChooi grouJlll. 19-14:
(3) POilt-raid emerlrency ""elfliN',
Volunt1u}' Evacuation of Civilians
2. Policl/.-The e,'a.euation of perllOns for
purpoee:s of reduction of UCei!a population was
not to be. II temporlr)' measure as an e:!lCape
from a tan,et area, but mol'1! III a measure of
turning important citiea into lIir-defense cities
and hIVing the e'.CUeeII therefrom devote them-
sel\et! to the Will' effort in the plllcell
Thi. tOlal of 175,814 \'oluntarr eVAlUCeR as
of the end or April 1945, increued to
by Ihe cnd of Mal' 1946. and to 279,952 br the
end of the war,
POle or htterntlnaia the Koba
school l)'Item of Mild It papOI trttIt ..
p.lete 1t.lllIfe. of a Kobe - a cue 01
lion carried OUI _ lI('boo{ to a Dew Joc:a.
IIChool authoriti to plan. TIle Kobe
lIOund' e. d,d report that

Inrofanair_r.ld.l.rm ,"_ the

"" 10 bamboo ' ."" t hurc
and of tbe IIChool build-
.... ' ,.....a: I""re "-ere
ral in thi. torn' no actWlI .ir
alarnto duc to the mU?lty, lhere "'ere man)'
3 milea' proJ;lmlty of an ai..-MJd .bout
....y, Th_.la .
1945 "'ere ao f rma I? the lI;pr;n&, of
llrutly hampem:l re:::
nt
umruction "'u
continued, .t llrneJ; diR-
I T:rll"llC' _lid .. u
hitl lI(!looli .... ,,',,_ d- _ af
... .. 1\ ...... ..,th the t' -_.
at"'eTllment IlIlpplyiq 8() H na >0,...
fectun; 15 peFt:!enl nd Kobe )'OgtI pre-
lOla/ toM.. The _ (; pelftlll of the
SlamPi and the rO:;;had the'r aOl'1l ratioa
, . ,Inlllry aUowed tbe re-
cemna: community an additiona1 a1l<.lt..mm
food 10 pFO\ide for lhem It 1I'U I of
sibilit). of the e"\'aaJaU'. , the reJ;poD-
c:ommUll1t)' to tIet\l
the fund. from theRe _ ""
, n:e a to par the
entire COSI or athoolilll fOf' iu 0YlI puplla ill
the area. It YU reU.ted that the food
.t lhe )liki neeptioq area YU ample. and. ia
-'ltIJlY -. bette:< than "-0II1d h.ne beert
pro\'ided al home; De\'ertbeIesa. the pupilJ; all
upresRed 1M desire to retUTllIO their homea.
I,I. Pre-raid \"Oluntary e\'IoC_
ostlOlllG Kobe folJo..-ed .boul tbe same panern
as four.d in Osaka in tbat appr-onmate1r 15
percenl or the populatillll \"OlUlltaril:r e\'IoCWlted
ill of .i. raids. After the cit) had
upertel'lted ita heary raids in lhe Iprina: of
the number of \'Ollintarr ""1lC\lft:I per
month increaaed to !i\'e times its pre\ioull;
a\'er&(e.
b, Conlrol of -=,till penonnel throut"h the
u.mination of lhe queotiannaire required for
moving from cme diltriel to another ..-as aer_
dsed 10 make sure lhat none _ntial to lhe
"... etrort ,,u mo\';n&, OUI under the guise. of
In Thill; "'U until the number
of .pplk.nti followinll' lhe heavy raidl of
Mll'l'h Ind June fir utftded the .bHit) of the
oflId.LJ 10 procel-l them. with the resull that
this item or tontrol was dilpenled with afler
.. major raid .nd were illlued 10
.!llir_raid J;ulferertl without qUl'lltlon,
:11,111
1M31
....,
il.!!ll
Total
1000.NS
The reported number of pupils e\'lI(uated
65 pcn:ent of the athool "'U
!ion In the first to alrth gnd popula_
IUmtDllrized a! follow!: ca, and may be
8f poup.
W;th familiea
c' Rftllailling pUl'il"._Reporq t
",ho remaint"<l behind as of Pup!!s
(hiler figures were not available Plelllber
';rtt and Ht'Ond lrud",,_ ) show;
Third to liJtlh gra""" 28,48:1
"'"
Total
10 .ddition to them thcre wcre 13
_tclfOry who wcre in gradctl ,--' In this
a"""e the -_'-
The lIChool population as of th RIA"',
1'--14 "-lUI given lUI e end of July
!'trtt and .....nd o:radft
Third 10 lixth
, Total :lI_
_ 10. II clfart._. Pupils ....ho "'ere \DOI'ed out
In a:roup!! were a_ecompanied b)' the teac:hen
and of their respecth'e t1Choola.. hl$ofal
lIS JlOlIl!lole, <I teachers and helpers .nd about
Scooka for 100 pupils would ronstit\lle a
UJlO? ,arri\-al at destinllticlIlI the pupils
be dmded sm.ller groUPli of about 20 10 30
Neh, and aSlllgned dormiton' spllCl! in tbe illll!!.
or othcr public buildings selected for
billets,
b, ,Aft il1$p<!ctioll of a receptioto artG.-A re-
ception area was inspected al llliki Iotaled in
mount.ins about 25 miles northwest or
where 445 pupils, all from a sina:le!lChooi
10 Kobe. had been mo\'ed in Seplember 19-14,
and were eontin\ling their instruction under the
teachers as in Kobe, Pupils "'ereu,df
ned
In units 10 'tn e:ocistinll' group of
b}' inns and tempi"" aolllC...
dispersed in the Miki rommunity. Euh
un,lt HI'ed. Illayed, worked. worRhipped Ind re-
!lChool instructions all in the same build-
nil to which it wall. assigned, In this particul.
r
group each u!!it had pupils rangina: from
first to sixth grades and it ""&II reporl
ed
that th' ' h
, IS wnll. the only caff in thc empire Yo' ere
thiS method of instruction was followed, There
was Amplc llChool housing available in this tom-
munity and it \\'11$ not net:eS!IlI-rr to supe,im-
,.
nlri ... 1"1..,
.,,,.......
- ......

AUlkS.PI_
__
27,73S !I,G1B
31.3
11
S.pL_Jlor, 1915
-
.
13'1
1

",--
'10--.-...1 .... 2' ..
-,.. _.......
- ".
..... ,......
'-'
,....

,.,....
......-
-.-

---_.
"....
1,()II%
" Ouya
ma
__
--_.. - ..... 1.491
."
TOI.lt>ri
- ---
20467
".
3.1,
17.119 ,
"..'
E":lcualion of School Children
7, for the evacua.
tion of school children in Kobe were publlAhed
hI' the prefectural office lind rollowed exactly
the reeeh'ed from the office or the
Minister of Education in Tokyo, E/lrly InUrue-
tiollll co\'cred pupils inlhe third to sixth Il'rlldea,
or IhOile approximately 9 to 12 >'earll old, In
No\'cmber 1944 (Exhibil VI. Ihese inatrucliOIllI
were modified to include the IIrst and Reeond
but it Wa.1 not until April aftu
the Maf(h raid, lhat theM pupilll were e\'acu_
Ated, The first group mo\-ement of sehool
started in Augusl 1944 upon orderll from the
Kobe prefec:tunl school aulhoritiell and was
pradically rompleted during September 1944,
8. RueptiQft art<l!,-There ..-aa an ad\'isory
rommitlee to Ihe gl>\'<!mor ronsiating of the
of the sehoola who made
inl'wipliollll and reromlllendations, and. in
the placell in .reaR ronsidered
to be distant from military to which
were 51'!nl. The rommittee ronlinued its
super-'ison' inspectiollll of all lIehool reception
centeff!.. The fadliti"" used were public meet-
ing pw-ea. inll!l. temples, trainin&, b\lildinp
ulled for the youth mO\'ement, and, in some in-
stanee"!. pri...te eat.t"".
9. SI./Jlidiu.-a.. GroliP plllll,-The prefee-
t\lre!! sdetled u reception are'" and the num-
ber of children e\'lltuated ftom Kobe in the
group plan to llreu selected b)' the ad\'illCrr
tommittee ..-ere:
b. et'aCllatiOl't with. their tamilir',
-Reportll of pupils who moved away from Kobe
with thcir familieR to the homes of rel/lti\'\!$ and
friends of their own selection "'ere:
-
'M'"
UM'
...,.
...
un
y,
,y
2,716
"
"
" 11&.1114
-_....... ...... ,.."I
HJ"ll" 1"'14 29.1_ ,
(haka 41.!H IUoS1
To"'" _ 4,111 1.711 ,,___ M2 *
Jl.ithi 1,14(1 'o:l
HtrMhltu 1Q 118
F.k...u 481 118
Kl"'""_ URI 1,3"
23
SqUllkl 18
s"il&/ll.O 31
12'1,", 41,91>6
, -
r, --.. .r w
mated) a_ of :n, or II diffcrelll'i!
of perllOnR,
b, Rrptlrl bll prriods,_For the 11 months re-
mainillg in 1944 after the puloHcalioll of the
instructions, there were 14,651 hou$eholdR or
58,60-1 perROM who left Kobe as \'olunlllr)'
e...tu_, For the ftff!1 4 months of 1945, which
Ihe month artH the big Maf(h
raid, there were 29,302 boui!4'bolds or 117,210
penons .ddilion.l. making. toul of 43,953
households. or 175,814 llert!Ons up to April 30,
1945. For lhe monlh of April 1945 alonc,
H.9s.:; penon. e...tuated Ihe cit)'. for
monlhll were nel ....n.ble.
e. Pr'frtl,,",J dnfilllltioll.-Although there
II'''re no Pfe\iOull)..rranpcl or Ipedfied .reM
desilrll
ilted
to the \'olunury "'uu_. il
..'U reporUd thai d\lrina: the period from J.n.
uary SO. 19U to M.f(h SI, (14 months).
127.i59 \"Oluntan' ",'ReUI'M reloated
ill It pre!edUrft distributed ... indiea.ted belo"'.
Barina: in mind that the lim heR\')' raid Oil
Kobe OOXIlrred on Maf(h 17. 1945. the erred of
that raid upon \-o!unulT e\.lu.tion il rel\eeted
in the dau reported for the month of April
i.e,. an itM:re&H from. monthl}' a\'eragt!
of 1>,32'7 penollll for 11 months of 1944 to
tnOllthly of U,628 for the lint 3 months
of 19015, and lhen a further inernae to th" re-
ported llrure of 47,900 penona for April, im-
mediately follo"'ing the March raid, For de.
ui""'- IUtiatica. lee the followina::
82
,
Tolm......rllry shelter for air_raid..
. r' h h8U"C",",T"""
....as not planned ene. with
expected to _k ,h"lIer in oulll'll1l ar 'd
relath'e;I and ....ml! u the
,"O]untal')' C\'acUeo!.
d \'er)' little effort hall been made t:l put 11I10
an)' plan for the e,"acUlIlion of
In...mueh u the official! felt lila! the propou II
from tbe llinistr;r of IlClml! Affain and prt!-
(Mural ofl'ocft ....ton! 100 el.borate; that
plans "'ould not be netded: that tr&TL!!portAtlon
nd food ... in!ments were Iac!ung: and that
:he uailable hotiainx n'Cl.uired for aueh pra-
JlOl!&ilI bad been utilllA!<! by \"Oluntan' e"acueelI
and III"booI children.
e. Group !!'...cuation of bool children in
ad....nce of air raid. ""loll cmiMnti}'
and the in:irpeetlon of one aueh UOIt fou?d
the children lh'iq, playing,
PUlz and recri,inr inAl'\ICClion w,th no ill f'lfects
from their of locale.
POST-RAID ,\IERGEt'\JCY WELFARE
1. P.apn..-.bwif,._lnstruetioM
ml!UUI'ft ...-itb the lohnlatl"}'
of Home Alfaln in Tok}'G .nd ,,'en i5llued .to
the Kction of the prdl'Ctural pollee
in Kobe "'hich, in tum, publillh@d tbf:m .bout
July 1943 pn.c:tically "erbati"! fot llse of
whoH dutie!l included welf.re ...ork.
2.. CUll _/fa" .tat,OM.-. Ell"IergenC)' ,,:el-
fare at.tioM, operated by the w.rd! in the c,t)".
...ere eortablished by the city .uthoritie!l in about
200 ill Kobe City where .ir_r.id aulferen
were tmt'l'Vncy lint .id. food.nd ahelter.
AfUr ahort period the patient.! ....ere turned
to the peace welf.re lltion of the prefec-
tur.1 polke depntment e,tn tholll"h m.ny titnell
il ...... only a paper tran&&etion. The.e stationa
were Joeated in pllblk IChoola, ahrint!!. public
bllildinp, hoapilala, and, In man)' inat.neetI, in
docton' home., particlliarly if they operatel!
aman hOllpitalll or un.toria in connl'Cti(ln with
their reKUlar practice. After the r.ide of M.rch
1945,110 many of the do<:ton ran .w.) from the
re. th.t It beeamt' ntsury to Pl'JII! atringent
I'l'KUI.tiona 10 keep them on their jobll.
b. rt:ndercd._InMmllch all th_ sta_
tiona were for emergency welfare pllrpoeeB,
Ihey llerved principally a. a_mbly point.! for
airrald vktima hut ,Ught Injuries were alI\Q
h
"hl'ere CIISe>< WHe evacuated
trcnllMl 1 erc. h h h
'hle 10 the hospitala, of W Ie t el"t!
800n a8 poBl'l .., th d'
. nl\' 3 out of 10 remlltnlRll" 11 e en 0
"ere 0 A air_raid victim could reeeh'e
the ,,ar. n ._"
. d , nl""rllr)' shclter for a IlCrt"" (If
rations lin e Y"" h" , dod
. t , .. 5 da"s whIch mIlt t "'" ex en
IIPllrQxlmll e, > ,., th
., 'h' ,-idim waa mla... e In at
tJl5davs.1 ., L
. fi d location for hImself. A ter t,,,,
pertod to n a .'_.1 ,
. d. ,.ne 1945 thlg perl ....... "1111 re-
hcsI")" aIr ral I ' h
maximum of 5 d.)'11 because t elIt
to me too crowded and ll&nitary condl.
beca . "-d Although the cit)' pr<wided
\Ions were vel"} "" . t
this e",ergenc)' houlling lind food at no . to
lhe it di'l not make lin)' Ilro\'ISIOn
. d vi(tima from the
either to e'acu.te the alr_ral
. .. p-,.,d. an" other public for
(It' or .... 'v, . 'd
The plan for evacuating these
$ulferel"!l- referred 10 in paragraph I of E,ac
uation Section:' wu not used.nd each person
had to seek out hill own arr.ngemenll for both
food and sheller. Ne\ertheleJIII. lhere was .n
in ''Gluntar)' eVllcuation after the
. . t th
M.rch raid. After the June raid, .0wI,n
g
0 e
lack of transportalion and (Om.munlcatton, there
001 the same A(Celerahon a.a .fter tbe
raid. .pproximately 200,000
pel'llOlI5 recei"ed help .t these emergellC)' lIla-
tions. about half of this number after the March
.nd half after the June raids.
(. prefutllml poliu ICtl/are .Ialiortt.-
The welfare department of the prefectural
poli(e !"tlkari) had approxim.tel)' 40
welf.re statioM, ....hich were reduced to 35 after
the June raid, set up in the prim.ry IChoola
and temple;! for the purpolSe of: aid in the distri-
bution of bedding, clothing and food: care of
orphan children and of old people left horneleN:
.nd assilltance and .id in locating work for
tho.!e "'ho had become jobleu because of air
raids. Thig welfare llervice WU II peacetime
organiuotion which hlld been adapted to meet
wartime wntingeneiCII. Its CIItimate of tbe
number (If War Bulferel1! wall 767.776. Food f(lr
thig group was set:ured with funds from the
national treasur)' and WIIR supplied for period!
of 1 week to II month depending upon how soon
arrangements could be made to send the beneft
eiarit!ll to relativcs. Those with no relalivfI
were lIent in grouJlll to Tlljima anti Tambll In
Hyogo prefecture, u well all to placea III ToHor
l
and OkaYllma prefecturcs. 1n all, about 4()O
I'lI<lnll were Cllred for In thill rn.nn
".re depllrtment W.lI unable to , et"..
.. h' unetlon at
time (If t 18 report becaulle of illl i ..
tile "",'ide ahelter and bedding and .._. nabl!lt},
.p.- h , h """aUllellnly
".t one-fift ate normal food..-. .
."" .....ulTemenl.a
..,. .\'Iln.ble.
3. 1'000 cont,"(I/.-Ag wall the ease in Osaka
faod depotll, about 30 in number u d '
the direction of the Agricuiture and
Ministr)' at Tokyo, were establighed throughoo
the cit)'. After the raids of MIIr'Ch and
19-15. they were uaed al,,? as food "lief stations.
Air-raid sufferers, haVing II certificate from
their ...ard leader lhat they were such auffeTt
.-ere illllued food from these Slatiol1ll
ration rouponll. Kobe officials rtported tllat
tbf're had been plent" of food 10 IIll'et the de-
but on Augugl 11, 194t> .11 food ratk>11lI
were cut 10 percenl throughout the six big
of the empire and because thea atorage
JlIPplil'll aince that time had been used 10 meet
ration demandll, lhere ..-ere no food
stocks in rl'!!ene.
4. Ho",eleu pcrso.... - Thert "l'rt lID:
periods starting in March 1944.nd c:ontin\ling
antil July 1945, during which housl'lI wtrt torn
down under orders from the gun"rOOr to cre:ate
fir'fbreaks. Those persong whose holllle8 1rff'f
cIelIignated for destruction Wert gi'oen 10 to
da}'a .dnnce notice and told to seek _'
quarten inaamueh as neilher the city nor the
prtfectun had made an}' prolision f(lr them.
Payment or compensation for the 10IIlI (If a
home under guch dteumstancel!' was determined
by. rornpen...tion wmmittee roR!-isting of rep-
I'!:Stntati,'l'lI from the prefectural ol'li.nd the
city.... hoge dutil'll were to lIS!Il'-JIlI the extent of
tbe loss lIugtllined .nd recommend the amount
of dllmage elaim to be paid. The claim
Plid to the owner W&ll t>OO fen per t,Moo !36
lIquart feet) lind the rentor. if IUI)', ree.eiltd an
.\'l'rage of 3 to 6 months' free renl. In tbe
event of a 101lll by tire the pal'ment.8 a.-erag('(! 80
yen Pllr family, 50 being paid b)' the d\}' and
30 by the prefecture. The owner WlIs prelumed
III !"('Ceil'e also whatever he rna)' h"'e
on the propert)", but no insurance
Paid in the calle of losg of a building due to the
creation of a firebrenk.
, ....OC) weI
. C(lmml'ntR_n Post-raid emer.. .
r ". d rdiMU(ln,
are lacked complete planmng an CQO
.1I;d w.... hantPered by abMlee of .-..Deli
pita. tranaportatlOll (-elllu.. lIbn1' UId ...
BlruCllon materi.la. '!'here niated
.ntipalhy lH!I"'een Ute city fO\WIllMllt.1ICI tbe
prefectur.1 ol'llcell ",hich relIulted in faflare to
Pprol'\: plane and brou,ht forth the ...__,
Ihat", _.-
PlIper p ana "'ere nUlIM'roua and not man)'
of them were carried out.'"
b. Ewn thoIIgh the "elf." 81en'iccs in K(lbe
wel"t! ....ndicapped !;oy poor plannint and lack
of equipment and facilitil'll, all indicated .bo'l"e
the wdfal'l! .id staticnl prtl\idfd _ IIOrt of
relief to 750.000 aulfel'l!n durinl"
the period of the "ar. Due to lack of al!1..nce
planmDI" for the Prtl\Uitln of l'flCt!1Ilion .reaa
for sulfereno, it becalllol! _rr to sa!to':r
.-ictilllll within the .na u.... altack..
\'(1AR.DA..\IAGE CLAIMS
I, {'lTrodll(lt&a._a. Lraf".. Dpnfi'" of
Ih falf'.-So dill"ermce "orthy of IIlf'IItion
coold be aKt!rt.ailled bet,,-<'l!'II Kobe and Claka
ill the adminilltratMtll aDd of either
lhe ....artime "-'-of-life and p<'nOrJaI-injurie!l
Ia.... (1tlIH .ltibG ,It.,..i Iton u) (lr the wu
riak-ill!unnce eml!'ryency law (_ ....
ri.1ii lOC..i Ito). For PQI'JlOI!ft of breril.T these
lawa ,,m be referred to .. the ...r_
casua/".s la... and the bw. Oaly in
the matter of the .ttitude of the Kobe people
t01l"ud ..ar insunnce eaJI artY d'istinpillbing
I:OP1JIlIl:ntll IN' IlIalk
b. Additi<l>tal i.f_att&a.-T'he rtmainder
of the report i! either to elaboratiDg
on poinu already pltitnttd in the Osata re-
port or nn the pl'l!!ll'ntalion of inf(lrmalion lit!-
l'Ured in Kobe for the 11m time but equan,
applicable to an other parts of J.pan.
2. 1I11' tI"""'fI< cl'lIi.....-a. of
th prog......._AI explained the w.r..:as-
ually la'" .nd law 1rUt! identical
In Kobe and in DAka "ith reIIP'!"1 10 the pro'i_
of the Ia.... dates of promulgation, adminis-
trating uenriC!!. method (If of
and of rollecti(ln of Clallllll, appeal opportu.mtll'll
and aupen'ilion of the progTam by lhe.
nee-rontrol aMOClatlonl .nd nnance mlnllllr)'.
. , .
Otl'lti.ll felt th.t there may hef:n eu lil-
t resl in the ...ar..:uualt)' I.... in Kobe due to
fact thll IQlll of life from the earl}' r.ld.
". . ,
w romparRth'el}' ll/t'ht. Under the urging {I
85
the of Finance and tbe contrulallllOC
ill
'
tion, life insurance cornpllnies m..de to
thl! advllntagell of wlIr-e:asu.lt) maur-
nee lind to promote the sale of policiea. These
compllnies were .uthoriled to gt.'1! $pedal corn-
to their can\"lSSl!ril for obtaining neW
clients. !lO IhM their comnlilll'iOna ",ere gre.ter
than thoM! for ",...lBnl' ",.r-d.mage
inSUrlll:ce. A to increa,... of intel'e$l
raids beran, the fin' raid on the
craft pl.nt on J.nua!")' 19. 1945 had no apprecl_
.ble elfert on the number of new ",ar-e:asualty
or applieanU- After the t'ebruan'
4 1943 raid !hen> ,,-as a colI.\!-iderabl<!' increaM! in
for ...r-damap polidl':ll but not for
......r-e:.uualt\.. Subo>equently. th<!'r1! wue lIl!,-eral
,imall-Jlle "raids. I"l!ported to ha'-e be<!'n o{ OM
to thre<!' aircraft. and Mid to ha'e had the ef-
(ed of frightening the people lILK:h that a r..irly
bia:b r3te of ne. .-as maintained.
The ),larch 17. 1945 incendiar)' raid that de-
l;U'0).<!'d 40 pel"C<!'nt of the cit) in. lIood
of ..ar-damap .pplicatioll5: the Kobe office of
one rompan)' alone wued 400 ne. in
one d.1).
b. Plllt.....t oj dGiou.-Compand to OYb.
the pIIJ-ment of claims ,,u AttOttIpliahed ,en
amoothl)", The raids on Kobe ",ere made o,u
coMiderable period of and it ....as pos-
lible to nrai"hten out pa)'ll"Illnt problellll in a
manner for Oaalta .'here the raids
C1IIll! 1II rapid IIUceeuiOl1.
c. _4PP'I.-The practice for adiudiation be..
t"'l!<!'n claimant and the iuuiq compan) for
....r-dam.J:l! clalmJI u laid do,.n by the control
.-btion aIled for the company to preso:-nt
the cue to the nearut branch office of the con-
trol_i.tion.blch in this cue "'u in Osaka.
With the idea of pltinl' quicker action for p0s-
sible Ctiell of thialOrt.nd of providina: kind
of durinlr hOUMi for local information, the
Kobe compani<!'a Mit up a lrr{\llP of members
cal1<!'d ..n "in"estil'atinr e<lmmittee." The com-
mittee h.d nO real.uthority. but it wu tbourht
tb.t ea&elI of dilla:reement between a policr-
holder and. company lubmitted to this com-
mittee for a judrment would have tbe effecl of
lIItiafyinr all parti<!'a concerned, No lueh CMeS
bad been lubmitted u of NO"ember I. 1945.
d, oj toelll w:tioN._Tbe police sta_
tions In tbe communitiel of Am.g.llkl and
Akashi took out for th4t
oolice officer" in Iheir in the amoul1t
'f 1 000 yen for l)11trolmen, _,000 yen for lIl!r,
, '" ,,000 }en for the chier. the funda
gean"" an ' ' .
be' supplied through IlUbllc contrlbut'on.
policies were \liken oul wilh tbe I,arg
eat
compan)' ser\"ing the Kobe area .nd It Will
thought that there were other such of
Ioeal initiat"e througbout the country.
e. Ter",illalwll oj Ille la ...-The war-damaa:e
la", wu .bolished on No\"ember 1. 1946. and
companies were ordered to no poli_
cies. Tbe reason gi"en (or the of
the law 2), montll:!l 3rter the ce6illllIon of
tilitie< was that fighting mil'ht ha\"e been re-
ne....ed .nd th.t the go,ernment ",ished to
tect its nationals apinst from unprel!ll:t-
.bIP beba,ior of American occupational trooPll.
There ....ere se,eral such policil!ll iuued in Kobe
during the month of September 1945,
3. CII_pt:utJtiox .,.dn- tile If"brwb pro-
gra" --L AUU3"IRelll.-When .. gi,'en area of
the cit... had been designated for dur..nce of
and other buildinllll, the land IM!Ction
of the prefedural public worka department llCnt
out a rommittee of to inapect th<!'
propert). and to submit .n t:lItimate of \".lua,
tion, Botb the size .nd quality of the premi$t:ll
...en> used iii a bui" for aMelSment. A table of
change"! in ..-alue b}' }'e:&n was applied to de-
termine depreci.tion (ReferellCl! Item No. 41),
Such tbinl'S as fenl'1!ll. ptell .nd other n>flne-
menu ....ere t.....m into consideration in fixilllI
the .mvunt to be paid the owner. Upon reach-
ing a decision I"l!g..rdina: .. valuation. tbe land
section iilllued to the owner which
be could present to the prefectural fin.nce office
for payment.
b, Ki"dtlllj wlllpeIl-tIllliOll,
(1) B"ildillg. and lond.-Indemnity to dill-
posessed ownen included oot only payment
for their buildings, but al:lO for their land,
which ....all eitber bought Or rented by the citl'
under instructions from the prefecture. Tbe
latter bought the houses and handled tbe
funds in connection witb them: the cit)"
handled the financial operationll relating to
purehase or rental of the land. If an indi-
vidual a tenant bad made repairs to the
house he was occupying, the prefecture com
pena.ated him fol' tbose repairs. A dispoll-
individual could colleet up to 3
'lII",ediately ullOn being moved out. yen
I .. imlJOunded in tbe form of a bl 'k e I'eIl.
...
'" _it drawing" interejjt at 38 ,,01: I'd bank
.-- . . l'Cenl and
p""abla In .. yearll.
,"J TralU/pQrl(lliOll. - Com""."
_ , _Ion",..
l.A provlllcd by Ihe prefecture f, ,
a"", , r "" mo,'
illi' or the efl'ecl.!l, Ibe IImOUnt to
determined by dIstance of mOI'emen, '
b' h . eqUIP.
IIItnt t e o"'ner to efftet Ib
lind tbe of gtJoda to u:
IDOIed. A flat "'118 for. mO'o'erntnt
to an)' place w'lh'n the CIt}', a flat aum al$o
....,' place in the prefecture ,,' '
.... ' '''n''1III
amounta for mOI'ernent to plaees outaide the
prefedure, based upon railroad mileage.
(3) Lou oj or -proJiL_A third
t)'pI! of compensation indemnified the 0'Irnft
af. $lore or shop for IosII of bllSinesa. It ....s
based upon the earning abilil}' of the incH_
lidual. the finaneial needs of the indi'idual
and the )'early profit of hi!! bllllilll':lll.
alROllllt wu detennined b)' the .-e1f.n __
tion of the prefecture under the authority
.nd direction of the ;\linistr} of Horne M_
fail'.
c. Gounlmellt rellpolltlibility.-For building,
IIOling and 10!lll of busirte!lll compensation, the
national put up 90 pel'a'Dt of the
fUJtda ..nd the prefecture the remainilllI 10 Jl'I"l'-
mit. In the Clllle of land, the go,'erDmeot i ...
Mrvcted the city to bur one-half of the land
.nd 10 n>nt the other half from the OWllU, .n
arrangement that prevailed for the first t_
progr.. ms, After that. the J:O'''rD-
Illent instructed the cily to I"l!nt .U 1I11Ch I.nd
IIllI<!'M Inere ....all II llpecial reason for purcba>e
by the cit}. For the citr-purchl3ed land the
ritl" aupplied 45 per<:ent of the p&lment to the
OWner, Ihe national government 56 percent; in
the case of city-rented land the city furnillhed
5 percent, the national government 95 perce
nL
Ho"'ever, in the special case of buildinP de-
molished near a factor)' \0 protect tbe pbnt.
the land rental wn divided between tbe dtl'
the owner of the plant, 40 percent b)' the
tltl' and 60 percent by tbe owner.
d, Ol/eroliollal deilliltl.-The IIrsl firebreak
began FebruarJ 26. 1945, but aU of
the owners entitled to their initial parment up
"30 . ReI' by
, 00 yen had not received their mo .
November I, 19-16, for ftlIIOD tbIt.t.-
for It. The prefectu - .....
In lhe newSjla I'll had alhwtW
lhel pel'S \0 induce 1tIt:h ........ 1o.-
r money, bUI many auch iDdhiduala
thourht to bl\'e bee k'Ued ....
There . ' n I Or to have lett town.
ere ILX OJl<!'rationa .I,..-.L_ ..
pl'tftllre' . ....."....r a the
NOI'em "'1.1 IIaYlnr on the lint four .. of
Ii:: I, With pa)'menta on the fifth
,
I
Operallona llCltedUIed for the --
!Ca )'ear,
P
4. Alr-d'kut .'Tcic("-<lUO.....1IU hut' _.
"'lm'e--on Dea- . -
.' mber 20. 19H, bl' imperi.1
1'tIll:1'Ipt, promull'ated throua:h the Minist . f
HGIn<!' AlI"airs. at . h' ,n,
, ra,g compelUallon pro,i
by the national 1'Il'ernllll'llt for death 0;
InJlIl')' due to IIir raids trru IlI.adf' ..,..iI.bIe to
the public., Thill La...... knowa u the air.(!e..
fen!ll! JIl'T\1c.-a1\0.1flC!e Ia", lbob ..i.t40 I
jorti). 1"1 ,..
b.. Clitld,f,IlQ.-11>e La,,' indetnDiflfd flW
of hfe or iajury. flW Inl!dieal expellll!ll. 11""-
IllInent daaabU,ty and flW fllneral e:ltp<!'1151e5 of
aU P<!'r-'01lI enppd in the eoantry
from attack by air raids. SpeciAo:aIIy mentiODed
In the Ia.. "ere .ir-"'.tehmea (boob
.ltXiliary police and ftl't perIOIIlIl!l. Ikti6olla.):
doctors. nUrMS. and aU 0- eapaed i.. lin!
defell8e employf!l!:& of the I'Ilvern-
m<!'nL The only I'I':IItrirtiOIl!l placed upon com-
pematfun forCUllaltiea in air-raid defenae ..en
that pa}-meat .'\)\lld not be made in IJI
indilidll&l .,.n kiYtd or injllred "'bile he ....
fither runplnl' a....,' or merely gandillS' by and
not actually fil'htiplt" fires. or if be 1rt'n killed
or injund due to h.i8 pn tIIupidity. A n'\'iaion
of the Ia.. on J.nuary 9, 1944 iDduded
for injuril!ll or death Incurred dllriq air_raid
traininl'. In CUI':II in,'Oh'inl' air_....tehmetl. au.x-
m.ry police and ti'" ptl'lOllnel, IW uoorpnized
1'Olunleers. the pmectun handled the compen-
sation money. Factory lrOrkers' compensation
fllnds wen! h.ndl<!'d by the fllctori<!'a ..nd thoM
for dcctofll .nd nUr8l!ll .-en! handled bJ the
mayor of the city. A IIChtdllle of clauitication
of indilidu.1a and amounU to be paid for dif_
leri'nt dell"rHI of disabiHt), including docton'
....s prol'ided in tilt I."" (Exhibit JI').
C. f"IM"ci4I rt'pIINtli/lilit" - The national
J:Onrnment bon! the full cost of compen8lltion
for aU killed or illJured except in the
of factor)' ,,orkers. In thOlle in!tlneu the
87
VIii, TRAINING OF ClVILIAN,DEFENSE PERSQi\'l\rEL AND THE PUBLIC
en whn had been seloeted tn aneod for 1
week Ihe air-defense in Tokyo under
!upen'iaion of the air-defense headquarte...,
where they liad been gi''<!11 instruetions in
general air_raid precautions, tellCUC sen'ic:e,
gas "roleo:tinn, some first-aid ill!!truetion and
a considerable alllOunt of train
ing, Additional ;lIstructon. such u doctol1l
and engineen, becau>!e of their
training, were employed withoul the benefit
of training al Ihe air-defelUie :sehool. The
arlll}'. al:lO, upon request. supplied personnel
In gi.e lectures on I'ell<'UC work, gB.'! protec_
tion and idenlification of ellemJ' planes.
(2) TnriU,.-The ...election of personnel
for attendance at this gchool ,"'IS carried out
in the same Dlanner as described in the Osaka
field report.
{Sl C.rrinJNlOl.-Apin, as in 110
documenlal'}' e,'idell('e could be obtaIned 10
h "" that a formal curriculum had evcr been
The subjects ill which training
ing eX!Jl'nllC/l \(I
IIr to cr. a " Pal' laltel<. \(Illettle. baak ....
in the judred to be
7, COlnm'nlc Th '
, ,- e War,lnaUrance Ill"'. W_
ramed lllI to -
application f permIt no variation ill their
I
' rom prefecture \(I prefecture .......
ear Y raIds on K be ' III"
caused more increMe in
ing r;t to protcettog property than in Protect-
, Ie, aa ehown bl' figul'Cll in "'ar-dama.....
tosurance and . , ..
t' , "ar-caaualt)' lU$urance applica_
:,:e, respectl\'cly, The BaIDl. effect nn Kobe
by the great Manh 17, 194a raid
on neIghboring Oeak.ll, The ennl, .,.-,. 'd
on th ' "'" ral a
k e enabled the insurance COmpanies to
cilium paymenta up to date. Air-dcfense
worken entitled to lIOmpensa.tion under the
a,llowance I.... made fe.... applic.a_
In the city for payment thereunder, The
lag, In pa}'men18 under the firebre.akll compen_
satlnn program wu explained u being 0111)'
partly a matter of admini51rali"e difficulties'
the other part being financial $11'\'811 on the pn:
fectural l'<!:llUlting in the deo:woo 10 pro-
vide funde for the lut two of the firebreak
programa in the budget of the next l\scal )'ear,
Civilian-Defense Personnel
L lJllrQlluclion,-This report will describe
the training program of civilian-defensc per
sonnel and the general puhlic as prescribed from
the ministerial level. It will emphasize anI'
\'Iriations from this policy and will shnw the
training procedures used and Ihe results of
these procedures,
2_ Training 8chools,-a, Air.deferue school
(boku gakko),_This school wss organized snd
OPerated almost identically like the air-defen8e
school de!lCribed in the Osaka field report. Onc
difference to be noted was thal while Osaka was
the nnl)' city in Osaka prefecture, Kobe was one
of five fairly large cities in Hl'ago prefecture,
and it served as a training center for the rest
of the prefecture, The school waa operated by
the prefecture with funds and materials fur-
n,i!hed by the Great Japnn ,\ir_D<!fense Asso-
tlltion (Doi NiTJPQ7l 801m Kyokoi ),
(1) InstructoTs, _ The faculty was
of those police and organi:r.ationallea .
ShOUld a company bring a case or I'

over property damsge \(I ,'"

' _ , a ocat
.....
oft.be I'mance MIDIstry the tapA
, ,.' ",r Would
..., out. cornmltt.ee of surveyors," and
__ fOT rec
ourfle
, to the civil the
of the committee would have been '
... I S' h consld_
..-" ftns . no suc ca!lell were brought
.,. aJI'! company m, or Kobe even all far
,.tII
e
control aSllocllltlOn, those legal Coneidera.
dOIIlI appear to ,be aom"what academic. One
additional func,tLon of a local branch office
JIloUld be mentIoned, The plsn of payment to
pl'Opl'rty owners whoae homes well! destTO 'cd
br lire raida atated, that 5.000 yen ShOUld) be
paid at once to a clalm,ant upon prClientation of
\be proper papers, whIle the balance waa \(I be
deposited in the blInk for payment in S }-tan,
The branch office had authority to release part
or all of the blocked deposit. A finance commit-
tee (:timu kl/ogikai) compOlled of branch mem_
and certain other public officials auch as
lhe officer in charge 0,1 military supplies. thc
customs official and the chief of tbe railroad
bureau, decided each case on its individual
merits. The bMis of decision was tbat of the
need of the individu:ll for the mone)" to pay Ii,"
ded The national war-dllman
e%d
U
l
w'publWted in 1940. Waa adltllb i,
ance bv the Flnanee Mlnilltf')'
at with the indlvldu,al insuranee1lIt.
rec, which illllued and Paid "" ....
paUles. th "N L' ,
in October 1942, e, on Ife
, . "will! changed In name snd i.....
SoclCty ),--,,,---
d
'
henceforth ca ..... the
snwa ')" le,,-
.,lce Control A!l!Iocla lon' (S01IUcti H
,", F' MI ' ....
Toscihri), The turned
, wers of admmlstratton to the n
Its po "ClrJr.
constituted insurance asSOCtatiOn,
(2) flmdiQllS of the branch oDicel,_A/.
though the Tokyo office the reSptlnSibilitr
of determining rates ofY,rlvllte_fire and other
property_insurance poheles, as well as
ccdures on c1aimsll
nd
l?e licensing of
the branch offices CO?siderable lllc&l
authority in the admlDistratlon of the !II,
lional wsr-damage insurance law, The), .....CI!
charged with promoting the purchase of Wlr.
damage policies and with seeing that. in their
Meas, a maximum response was
It was alw their function to see that the ren-
eral limits set forth by the law on amOUIIt!
for which insurance could be issued \fert
observed by the companies (E%hibit X),1IJIIi
they were empowered to settle differell(\'ll
bcl\ncn a client :lnd an insurance company,
not onlv on the amount for which a pnliq
coulrl issued (in case of disagreement m
evaluation) but also on the differencC:l It-
garding amount to be paid in case nf I..
The 1&'01' provided that all c1l<ims of \,1)00,001
yen or over should be sent through the IoaI
branch of thc control a,';.'lOciation for tfS/L<
mission to the Ministry of Finance in ToiJe
before payment would be made, but, in"
cases up to that amount, a disagreement b!'
tween clnimant and the company could
brought by the latter to the branch-offiCe
h
JlIi.
for a judgmcnt, His decision was not fi brr
however, for the claimant could n18ke furt()lII!
appeal to the Finance Ministry, and, be)'
it, to the civil courts, till
6, The Ministry uf Fimwce !>m
IlCA

o
tid
flUictiOllS,_The amclUnt of authority delePtit
to the control as!lOCiation WllS such
Ministry of Finance snu its P '
, ' the adrl'll
on y a remote supervisory pllrt In .It!'
t
"
- r-ca,u
ra Ion of the war-damsge llnd "II
d the factOT)' plIid
gn,'crnmenl paid oue-
II

lf
an ,ded for a fac-
'
he other half but the tntal I,ro," ,n aUJ<iliaT)'
II nlhal or . d'
tor\, worker I a h ,rhoate ,n ,-
. . bl!rort e .
police or fiT\! umt JerW
n
" in war ]n-
vidual, on the pr<lrm!!l! that: II 1"<'fore did not
dustrr made high waJC"'llIl'I( I C
need the llmllUnl.or.heIP. /I RdotioR$hip
1>. The control 08_,1111&11$.- .
to Iror.fflSIUlJlj/ ;1I$uruNtt. nnfore the
,
I
r<>Illrol.-(>'<
(I) Dnrlolllll
C11
" . were as*
',. ance cmnpante;! h
war the h e maUf .' n known as t e
date-I under an . Hol'(1i KyO-
Life IMurance hed in the
kni) with branch offices e:o;ta ,"? Ihis
. . \n Apr!
principal CItIes of Japan. bl' h'. as tWO
, I d reesta IS ....'
society W8!! dlMO \'"" an I ".""iatinn
',' S' a contre /I........
!leparale as:lOCll IOn . "al;on (8/\1('
(INeikoj) and II fralernal aSSOCI blished in
._,'.') The war-eaSualtr law, pu, ,
..... U , h prO"I'
Maffh of 1943, marked the sueranee in
sion for go,'ernment msu ,
Japan and Ihe control at that
sumnwned the insurance compames 10
Ihe law and urge. them to promote
ance of policies, but the M,Jnlstr
y
dealt directl)' with the as to IssuIng
instructions. receiving reperlll of
made and claims paid, and rendenng decl.
siems when necessary, In April 1945, the con-
trol 8!l8OCialion was displaced by a "Central
A$lS()('iation" (Clluokoi) and at that time the
Finance Ministry delegated full responsibil-
ity for the administration of the war-euualty
program to it and illl branchea in the major
cities,
(2) fnndiolU of tile 'Troaclt. office8,_Offi_
cially the branch offices were charged with
the of encouraging the public
to !lllVe money and of acting as an ad,'isory
Ben'ice for applican18 and for claimants, They
had 110 real power, for the reportl! of the
individual companies were made directly to
the home office of the "Central Association"
in Tokyo,
b, RtlatiD>UlIip to ",ordamage incarnate,
(1) Decelopment of eQIIlrol,-lkfore the
war the property-damage insurance com.
panies organized under a "NonLife Insur_
ance (Son!""i Hnkul Kynkai) in the
membenhlp of whIch were included fA '
, bu' vrelgn
compamell, t In early 1941 the were
",hleh the
""as given e:tIrr\,>!ponded to thod'! .
leaders had a' the particu.
.,.;:haol. It ....1ll! noted. howe,-tr,', in Ille
I.r wail placed upon train:,
of it>C.:II(hnr)' b;lnl
J
"
r,
b. Prof/UIIiNI p(ll'tr liN lice
SdlOOIl lor training minu. te-deMl of the
and Ii", departnll'ntll we", Mid at the:le .
L .>" f ... as
....Iin' stat;OI\l!. !IC' ........u'" 0
f dance was
...err no record 0 .Utll.. wll!l
t
... and no formaliztd roUI'l!<l! of \rallll!lt
... , fr ere
de... Officials .uted that e - .
made to WlphUiu practical demoMt,..UOll".
but due 10 the drain upon manJlO,nr. II\QlIt ?f
the lraini.,. a' theee ..U el.imiaated In
1M lattn part of 19H
Co AIU"il ....... ..,WoloI.-h. Kobe ail in Oo!&ta.
...rtilM 1I'Orltilll eonditionl'l .Dd lack of Irall3-
portauon fac:ilitil!ll ITfttlJ affected attendance
at ICboob. e"\"D thoarh "terDpU ... flll.de to
tbat coaditioo br e!ltabliJhilll' schools
ill as 1D&n. ... a"'" loB possible.. PArticular atten-
tioO..-all! (ivm to up!ICbool5 in the hJ,r-
boT .lUI. but dearlr indicf,ted
that .-err liltk 'Q$ aetOIPpliihed in
olMr IIt'CUoll!! of the city IlIId lhe prefertur!!. &5
tM lIdlrdulinc c;f claues.u Iargtly depeodtnt
upop. the all1bitic>M and tnel"flel of the kadel'S
of the ;auxiliary and fir!! unita (uilHldoaj
and tM ntichborhood crouP'! (toIIari gi).
)lany of tM peopk 1I'ho Ii\"e(! on lhe aides of
11M! mountaia .hkh in Kobe beliend
that tIMor frtf! ffOlll aU.ae1r. u tilt indus-
trial art&ll..-.:re Ioxattd mainly aIonl the harbor
ffl:!nt and for that reuon they not I\'Utl)'
in air.raid praulioM.
Training of the Public
3. 1"IF"'ldu(;OIl.-Tbt purpo$e of thia 1tC
tion the rtport II to deecribt the mealll for
tducatlng the public in the
of air_raid.protection and to d\!llCribe the
general resulta of auch training.
4. diunt;tUIti", ia!<mllalioft._
All ar the media rar edue,linV the pub..
00
lie aUCh" tbe uailI1DI Pl'OaI'amll ot the
,rou1lS (COM" 911Mfl. radio. IltlQ.
" movie&. uUa. pa.mphleta abll-""
described ip the o.aJr.a f1tk1
..1'", out to the ..me aa4
me IMnner in Kobe and Hyoao pm ...
7n addition, the plannlll&" Md.lon of .::---
defens<' burt'au of Kobe condueted ab.
,.. riou!! parU of the dty for the publle
,,'ere plIrtic:ularly devoted to methods 0;
inc:endian: and. the
tion of sMlterl!. prac:tl(e drilla
alYl held at irregul:u mtervaill. in
tlin areas the entire city Wi!tt
part:icipa.te. The:!ll! drilla were planned to
all the air.raid.protection lIef\'icea, but 0
to gon:rnment propaganda that enemy
would not be able pierce the defenlltll of
homeland. the pubhc wa.s "ery apathetit ...
p.l'e such little that trainin, c&
c:i.abi stated that the dnllll ne'er were wort!l_
elforU expended in planning them.
Comments
5. In Kobe, lIiI in {}$aka, many trainill' pr-.
gr&1l1!l were prepared. but the fallll! llI'IIIt ..
5l!('urity "'hich had been de"eloped militatetl
against the full execution of the plana.
6. The training progralllll of both chili&.
personnel and the public plad parne.
lar emphasis upon the principlea of fire uti..
guishment. el\pecially of small incendiarict.
Lack of information precluded any trainilll it.
methol1ll for comb2ting the hell"ier illCflldi.
arica, such as the jl'llied_ga.'lOline t)"l)l!.
7. 11I"el\tigation pro"ed that the trainiJI
program was never geared to operate -
raids of mass proportionll, exemplified br lit
raid of :\Iarch 17, 1945. which overwhelmed lit
civilian-defense forcea. Later raids found IIIIIl1
who ahirked eivilian-defenlll!
biHties fur the IIllfety of the mountain PoP"
8. Attached as Reference Ul:ma NOlI. 42 toll-
inclusive, is a group of training pamphlets. ..na
titleJI, available to both eivill.
n
#
ense pl:rsonnel and the generlll public.
,.

..

".
u.
,. ... ......... 0I1a"" 6.... '" )(obo. oIor
l1uon ._ <ago! br .lr id..
Or\ai ..l J.pO_ do<u1M1l' ....
......l.11on.
91

.. 1-=-,,"_
liIbId - ..,.....
..wr--t to u. etu... .,
I .....". 17, 1Mf, ( .....
to. 1."- MIIIi -1Iabo ata t.
I.... Out a.-u.. of --.
pabl....... .". 8J'ICO
INf 1_...uIIt U). ...
tl. TabIe"fbldWlac __u.... ....
f"r _h ,.... .,. .........
yal_ ..
tnt, uatn.aaIa\lllll
"n alMNt_ IItualloao,
ltU. DifICribaud fNe.
.,. Japa..- tut. lUltraulalOod.
pertaini"*" to 1,*_
.nd I ...;nill&" of H,..... PNl'eoI...
drlenlJ"; publilhed IN3. nuu-:

U. Japa_ tut, unt...ll.llaU<l !II....
.... Air Publlol>t4 loJ c...
era! He.dquarterl.J_
.ry Distribuled f.....
4$. Ja,...- tut. u"t...ulatool 'l'oMlJ
rep:>rt ... !t8- A;r dcf_
"'iwe halm; di.......1on of
.ttack pl." .nd f,m,", air ....,
dari,,*" con>t-t Ipi";t; '- '" ..
ohelte... ; -..";Iy and ai,,"" _
m>I; """'" 1<> recocni1e Iipa! "' ..
Ihelte>"; inunediate i"",,"" ., ....
dDCtion Ind .irdel",oe; __"
Yieti.... ; ...ealurea l"r ...tioDa. ,.
Hlhed by Inf"......t;.... Bu.... J_
ary Ill, lN5. Dill";buted ,_
JapaD_ tesl. untrorWa\Olll. If"
rqoort ... 261. "". U> oqaIi&
lir.....f.noe p...,paral"''''' ......
f_ IroininjC; ker to perfe<t ...
fetlK ia I national Ipi";l; t\ObII-
de> bet"... def.... t...lnin.. ; olIo/lOI'!'
... defenoe; .neultion.
by Informati"n Bu...au. (ktolIor
INI. Price 5 oen.
47. J_pln_ text, unlr_nll_to<!..'::;:
lant mati.... '''l{_roinll" al ....
id
Ie. CODllructi"n. Di.trlb.ted r....
J.p.n..., tut, untrlnllued. A:i:
for perfect lir defenoe; aIr' l'f'
and banle adylce; "mu1l"11<1
m"u.... at time of air .....
for relCue and IIr.t .id. Itt'
by Info.mulon Uu....., J"ly .
Price 10 ..n. ,.off
Japanese Len and "' .....
11)'011"0 pref.elure 11. ......
No. 912. Subject' Shelte'" .
ber 20, 10H. Diotrib"t"" 'rt"'.
".
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95
- .O"'''llfll,u'... r
'_TIlICTt
o 'Ollt1: CWFler.s
LOCATIONS OF PoLICE OFF'CIS
"YOGO '""['ECTOR!
Exhibir A3
I __I
I 1I"1WtA
...0 ....
........
.-
J _ ....
., IZI,I'101
W"OIl ..
..,..,. ..
10 ,,, ,
11 111"'"0
,t ..
" lA o
IlA.,UIOlt,
r. AIlO
.. "'0'
" "'faUIIO
I' lu..
II
10 ""111,
II us .
U lilt .
II T " ..,UO
.. II U<oo....
r, Mono
II '1'.... 10'.0
IT ''''''04
r. U .... II .... U..,
If Il'.'
30 .....'.10'
., 11'1'0110
3l SlI ..
U "", , ..
.... Iton $UIJOYO
n
'1 "AO'"
Sf .IIUTA
'1 "'Il.. n
U Ifllll,,,o... ,,,
40 ,uH".
., ".AU"'.,
4Z IU'"
IS 'W"Y...
SUIIU
AI 'UIl"' ....
., 5UNoro
---,
jl !
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97
CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR AIR DEFENSE IN HYOGO PREFECTURE
AIR DEFENSE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
(BOKU HOMBU) OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
GUARD DEPT. HOQ. (KEISI HOMBU)
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE
__ eHAIN CQ.... uO
- HGOf!OA'lY CH.,N or co_.,.o
I
I
I
DEPT.
I KOBE MUNICIPAL) ,
AREAS OUTSIDE OF KOBE IN I
lSJiO_B_O_S1t.Q EISATSUSHO) OFFICE (KOBE SHI) HYOGO PREFECTURE
I:UXILLIARY AN0I
ICITY WARDS I
IOTHER CITIES
RURAL CONMUNIT
FIRE UNITS ( 18 A)
,.,,1
AND TOWNS A5S'NB
(BURAI<UKAI)
IALLIED COMMUNITY ASS'NS I
COMMUNITY
(BENGO CHOKAII ASS'NS

ICOMMUNITY ASSOCI AllON$ I
(CHOKAIl
I
NEIGHBORHOOO ASSOCIATIONS
(TOHARI GUMI)
I GENERAL PUBLIC I

S'
,.
>
..
Iii

I:xhibil A-S
Air It.i</o_ /frOg<)
..",. bT t II,... "",.".,., 0..... 1
n .
-----1: ''':61 "
J,3$6
'.7:t3
"
."
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-.
_.....'
l.t 13
!U.'68

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H
4: I
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1.110
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1.816
../
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274
611.711
,
..llIn. ,hlp ""nk,
"""'" ..Il'n...
9,361 I

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w, ...

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I.....
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At .If"...
"
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3,428
A , ... f. 26,000
b'hlne-,
18
A'.....
:',000 .....
':; I".. / "I I
......
al 11.2'6 'll 300

TO
... re..
1101 1IIl2
IOO,tlOO
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Kobo
KoIM Cit,burt..
Kobe. Nl.hl"""'l, A"'...... kl. oidn_
It,.
.. '.'.1 ot Kobo
Kobo Cit,,"II" .h M ",......
K..1.oI n.,hlol.
Kobo Cll" .....
Kobo CII,. II,
K Cu,. 8.",., 011" Y
011" _ 0' K...... ",1 AJI
lIu,.1 "0" i" Mlh" llu" ."01 8
K""" CII,; Nau,. uol Su",.
K......, N...., Mlk..... A.hl,
NI.hl""",I",.,
Kol>o Cl.,. N'l.
K_ Cit,. II,......
Kobo, N.d., Ik"I., T.k.'.'"k 8."01.
"". ," .....
/I 3".16 Kobe Port "jor 1.';:-1
11 11/130& Over NarulO Str_il
1/111 1311 Akuhl ClIr.kin;!)'
.....,.....
U Kobe ......., Su.... n.fuhlol.
U ./0'l02 Olr K...... 1'0"
V ttlUll K..... H1OI>, hlol.
U 6101611 Kobo 8,,,tIO,,,lf AI<>Ibhl
2/8
/
0612 Kobe I'nkl..;
V 0206 Kobe M)'<Hlul
21 Oil' Koh.
2/26/1600 "<>boo ."d 01d,,1t7


3/11
n,

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412l!/OM6
4/12/1237
"M
Mr
61 4.0006
" 6 IlOOJ
II 6/JUI
6/11/0446
6111/0046

5117106:10
121/lt:U
Ju.,
61 I 0021 A"'......kl, 1'.",1. 1...,.
SI 1/0'n0 E." P.rt .., Kobe, NI,hln,,,,,I,., 1",,,1
SI TIIO'6 IItU,.kl. Ito 0101,,1\,
SI Akhi "'" K.....
I/UOI:\t A"' kl. h.,"I, Aab,
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un
l!xb'L" ......-lof.M_.... _ .... C
....,It""'"_
of HlIog
o
prefecture-GeDeral ......
7. Hta4 of tlf ,:::;-
f tM guard headflllQTtera (teibu tera eoneetl1jllf: lJll.,.... aeeu...-.
.",. (} er than during air the :. 'lid ....
police divilJion.) g' of 'llf'eIlIltrt.
, of the control rOOm and .,. 'h' eeret POIiee
.....e OUiht" Ie ""<[WI!
jBSUinJl' .orden.. ing: f.der dUtinr l1li14) ("po(jtieaJ
tor f the (Hrde!e'll1t 8edI01I.-Mattera E
j,,4 :. s of tilt ...., '.
: -defenfl(! operation. . ptllnubition of the PeIl r SPJrlt
'!lie Ill' rationS of the air-defenst control of the Iphil
'" ope }" 81r railil. I On of
d d
" d. Control of d
obiliZll
tion
an lspatch of neces- trol ,'. anntoua thou......
... h' t , ..... 5"U1,11IJl1Or
rsonne1. ae 00, pa rlOlle SOcieties 9 H COIl-
.. ",oku1ai), and air-defenSI! aUxiliary of the IrOI\.r/lQrt 1Uti6ll
mlng: .-ltatterJ
J. ," a. PI"(,te<:tio
n
of
'vilian olJservn IOn corp.'!, b 111 ,.,' . 8ea and lalld traJl8......... ,_
fbe Cl . 0 llUltlon and . r_'_
RubOr air defense, . POrt patriotic onila OiIeratlOll of Ihr trau.
eollection of IIlr-defense datil lind c Em '
The ergency tran.'lportatio
estimateS. . . d. lhffic COntroL D.
The
d
other
, 111 Ie penu pr",ntW"", fffl'
!fader (emergency suPpJy leader dori _"'"
Matters concerning; Df rUUl.
and O/leratiollll of .'"-
OOllS. o.ao: sopply
b, Emergeocr supply of food. dothiDf IIld
other necC!l8aI')' f,n raid '1mms. rtf....
gees and alr-defense /lersormef.
JI. Crimilllli offoirt Ita" CJeadtrot
"crime!! section" doring
cerning:
a. Disposition of eriminals
b. Imestigatmg of COrJlSl!8.
12. EmergclIq lIledirol
(I;yugo shombIlJ.-Mattetl!
a. First"sid tMtmen\.
b. Protection of air-raid ca._ll.Iltieil.
c, Punerals.
13. Food hrodq-IOIlrl"",,-Yallel"'(lIlI-
cerning fOO<! SUl'pIJ',
14..I!n/critl hrodq-lIOrffnl:-lIatlm
ing materiel Ill! dothing. Curnnll
and material used in rfp&lrs.
lIl
15. Public -"
nc" rt'J:&lr n->o
concerning the enlErgt> . I'k
water liues, canals, harllors. '''''Ilrl>(lfl OIl'
16 Uoislllr offirn' .... .1l'lI'"
. " 'teN
dIlJllrirs.-' II
o( tile Police affail's seetioll.-Mat-
rOl ng :
communication installations,
e PlgCOn corps.
3UPplring of members of the nir-de
eral h
eadquarters.
The handling oi raid 8ulfcrers (homeless).
Hood of the guard section.-Matters con_

The mobilization and operation of the
ollieialg, the auxiliary police and fire units
fibodaal and the emergenq' repair unLts
kMll.-utaij,
,. Lisison the military organizations.
The operations of the llamage-estimate
(jigai ChOS(ltlli),
l The guard information_liaison office.
EmergenCJ' el'acuation.
Rescue.
!mposilion of corpses.
Handling of lInexplodcll bombs.
Sandling of damaged locations.
Hrad 01 the scctiOll (emergencr
leader during raLds).
conCerning medical serl'-

"
o
a. Produetion or wartime produets.
b. Estimate of damaif" and emergenc)' I't!-
pairll to faetories and l'itAI installations.
Exhibit D
...._ .f fo.. of ... .. " "po'" ,,,
....... of _,_ f ..I.f _ .
of , .... pol",, ....... of H,... P..f
H}'ogo prefecture report No. 322. daMilied
police report No, 70. dated Mal' ll. ad-
dte$$ed from the gol'ernor of 11)"0(0 prefecture
b)" the head of the police dil'illion to the \'arioua
poliee offieiala. C'lhl,\terll concerning air_raid
damage and conditiona thereof).
The mume of the damage and the condition
of repair of the raid of 11th of this month in
"obe- and neighboring communities is u fol_
lows: (Pie.. PMlI thi!!' report On to the fire-
!M!Ction
1. Conditioru of the raid: Approximate!}' 16
8_29" whieh eongrep.ted and circled o\'er the
Kii Channel for approximatel}' 1 hour from
0830, new O\'er Osaka Bay from approximatel}'
0945 t? 09..16 and ad.'anced to the air O\'er Kobe
and. after bombing "obe. its environs and
Killhinomi}-a, headed towarda the paM-
ing aoutheast of K)'oto and towarda Nata.
2. The rftuml! of the aletta and alart1\.!.; In
H)'ego prefecture the alert 1\'U ,,\'eo at 0840;
the alarm al 0908; renrted to alert at IQ?..5 and
"all elear" at 1031. In the neighboring area tl'Ie
alert g1\'en III 0840. the alarm at 0910. re-
verted to the alert at 1026 and Mall dear" at
1031.
3. Wealher wndiliona divided into times. the
first time, 0920; the .second, 1010. The wind ar
both times W.II blo....ing from the northea.tt. at
0910 al a n.,IO('il)" cf Ii metel'll per lIeCOnd, at
1010.2 mete,. per !M!COnd. The density of the
doud!!' W8ll 10 at both time" The altitude of
the douds wu 1.000 metl!1'll al 0920 and 2,000
meters at 1010, The \'iaibility was 1,000 meteM!
III 0920 .lind 8.000 metel'll at 1010. The weather
eondition was doud)' at all timea.
4. The t)"pe and numbers of bombs dropped-
approximately 480 600- 250- and 1000kiiogram
HE bomba; se"eral aman type incendiary, ap_
proximately 60 mines.
5. The altitude from which they were drop-
ped; approximately 6,000 metera,
6. An elltim(lte o! thll dalMglI.-a. General
damage.
102
(l) CaaualUes: dead, 642; lMlrlotaly
jured. 537; Iirhtly Injured, 874;
hornele!l8,20,145.
(2) Damage to bulldinp: totally
2.853; partially demolilhed, 2.218: IotaIJr
burned. 149; partially burned, 33.
The above may be chanpd .Ihl"htly in liter
Iindings.
b. Damagr to fadori.
(I) The Kawanishi Aircraft Plant.
(a) Casualties: killed, 8; II('rloulllv Ill.
jured, 43; lightly injured, 54. .
(b) Material damage; atructures totallr
demoHahed. 8; partiall)' dernoliahed, 8;
totalh' burned. 23; partiaJl)" burned. 4.
(2) Nippon Airplane Factory.
(a) ClllIualtiea; killed. I: injured. 10;
lotal!}' demolished. 6 atrudure!l; totaJl)'
burll@((, I structure.
(Besides tl'Iese tl'Iere "'ere 22 small factoriell
either entirel)' burned cr entirely demolished.
with se"era\ euuAltiea.)
c. Dtllftage 10 oilier jMl'O'taNt iMtallatio...._
The Nada ward office wu entirety demolished
and The Kobe aeclion of the transport
di\;sion of the Munitiollll Ministry Wail parti.lIy
burned. The East Nada station of the go\un.
ment rail.....y was totally demolished. The Nada
poliee Ration was partially demolished: the
Shiba)'a station of the gol'ernmenl railway "'I!
totally burned; the Kawanishi Higher Girla
School was pattiall)' burned; the Shinto Higher
Maritime School parli.lIy burned; the
Fukuku (1) Gramm., School was parti.lly
burned; the Daijin (7) Grammar School was
partiall)' demolished; the gasoline II10rage plant
of the Munitiollll Ministry was entirel)' demol-
ished.
d. Val/Ullle to elutrieal j"dallatio....-The
Fukuku (1) transforming plant WI! entirely
burned.
e. Damage to communication i"Mall(lti(fNJI,-
The polke telephonea and the Communkat.ion
Ministr\' telephones were rendered unservlce
able bf<tween O!!aka and Kobe.
(I) All of the underground cable in front
of the Yamao Temple in Motoyama village
"'as delltroyed. Fifteen meteu of cable In
front of the Kawanishi Honan plant wall cut.
f. Damage 10 waler toorh.
(I) The water line in Nada ward 4 Ch
.a. broken in two s u 36' h
I h
, lnCeaand3ll
ne ell, 8$ rellllit or bomh$
(2) Some dam.ge to th . '.
Shltllugu"'a. e water piPeline in
,. Da.mage to eeutll.
(I) In Kobe harbor the "Y ''''' "
Mun,' of 70' 0' I )I"
tonll. WIth 200 peraonnel
"': mine. sank. Seriously 10:
Iightl) lDJUl'ed. 19; miMing, 3.
.(2) One tugboat and 2: Iight.era atruck
mines and sank.pproximately 1.000 metera
Offlloore.
h. of the hOllltleu._For pur.
JIOlII"II (,f supply, the homeleae h.'"e been pth_
ereel in homeless peraoM' wnc@ntratiCln point.ll
located in gramm&r lIChoob. At noon they 1\'ere
fed Ii,SOO slic:es of dried bread. For dinner
the)" ""ere fed 28,000 l!er'linp of rice. After-
....rd thl')" "'ere ,J"en 1.000 candle:.! .nd (;()
and ...en! equipped with 4.000 blan-
k...
i. Jltdirnl Ir"-ll.t ...""t Qltd jtrtt aid._Those
lJe\'erel)' injured were removed to the 10 fifilt.
aid posu .nd 11 emergene}' medical holIpitala.
Foft).eiRht emergency first-aid lIQuaWs 1\"en!
mobiliud al damaged ptac:es and 24 llQuaWs "'e",
put inlo operation at p]lICe!! other than thO&l!
damaged. It is expected that these have filled
the entire neoed for medical senice and fim aid.
j. CONditio... of re-pair.-(I) l>t tltri(:it,l.
(a) Atthough the Fukuku I?) trallllrorm-
ing plant. which "'/Ill totall}' burned. had bl'en
suppl)"ing eleetridty to the K.aw.nishi Air_
craft CompanJ' ;" its Konon plant and to
neighboring ractories. at present this damage
i. being repaired. The personnel of tM Kan_
""i Electrieal Oilision'. colllltruction uniu
al'(! now auppl)"ing emergeney electricit)" to
the Ka"'anishi Aircraft Company'a Konan
plant. The other plants are waiting for tM
speed}' repair of the tran$rorming plant be-
fore reauming operations.
(b) Althouah tho! Kan.i pow.-
COmpleted .upplyln, '""'- "':'''
buildinp which were IlO\ ...
hlll'h ttnllon wiffll Tunnilll' betwee.. .-
.nd Kobe are being repaired aJId
thi. there i, na electrkal !X>"o.tr he or
aahi (?) Machi '1lllI. In I GrG-
(2) lacitdiu._The 1'O'"erfI.
ment rail...) f'fturned Ope...tiollll with ItA "ar;.
OUR e.... l'utpt e\e.ctrical an at 1736
'ltnshin.lI.nkyu electrical rail...,. aad
..."....,. win lit
repaIred the fhortftt poaaible ti-. Abo
tM
.Hanahln elertrieal ...ilway. Alao repaiq;
are In Prorrna an the Hamhin railw'r be.
t"'ern Shinzailla (?) and San""mi,.a bmrer:a
"xl. Aahio I !). On the hilt,
paIn 're ,n IlI'OIt'elIa between
.
(3) C__iOlltlO. taciW.ia. _ T'Iw P<>lieo
telepbonea ,Dd the lliaiItry
uJepbones '"' both belne repa.;ra1
(4) CoIIenmne the ""Ie'rwvrb, nptira";
the break ill the ..,.ter tint in nrd 1rilt
be in prorr- until the 14th.
7. Th fled 011 procItIetlOll..-. SiIIce
"'all eompa...t;\"ely little daInaae Oooe in the
Kenan plant of the Karram.m; Airaaft e-.
pan)' all f.r all maclunery ill tlwft
baa been no I'Ut ItOppqe at" prod...tioa. AI"
pro:rimately 30 peftetlt or the of tht
Aircraft Companr bAlI ben
bIlt by noon tomarrow it ill uped(d tl>o.t pm
of thill wiU be restored. Appro:rimltdy
cent of the prodlXUOll of tbe 2! ......n pleu
"'hieh ".l'tf! hit bas heeD. cIestroye:l, but. tllroItch
emergeney .IIupply. :1 ill thoucbt tl>o.t lhi! ....iIt
not hal"e to1I i'ftt ,n tIJt an prodlldiaL
8. Tu datu 01 tJlf fOIIdlt>o. _f
Althouch there "'u apprtilell!ioll aboIn .....
inC flUt .ir raid!! in IM.re:u WI nrt dam-
aae<l .n thrtlllJl"h 1M prefeclure tho! JfIleral
public kept their .pirits up aad there n.I no
IIp<<ial .prtad or IooIJe talk.
103
........,.....-... ----.......... ' ......
-.....
1. Gfteral ill!lWIlS4tiell._1'h!JJ PlaDt, prj_
...... 0WDed. aovenm.eat -auPervUed 1thJp-
bafldJlII' nrd. lulllOine COlItract8 (OT the 1l.I\')',
oocapled Iarp ... in the toulJl ....,m por_
tIou of Kobe harbor. JtIs tacilitiel included 6:;
II.rp bu11din.,. alld ahipbuild.in, .'a)'a,
IIK'Jodill' one capable or battlelJhip COliltruetiOll
aDd _hi. (or the eonstruction of lubmari-. The
Iarp ., u UIIed (or tht con&truttion of the
battleship ..............- in 1914, but dUrin, the
..ar period wu uaed for buildi car.
rien of the "Slllik4kw" The aubmaMIl8I
were of 2,000 toJl$. The factory buildinp ."ere
u$!d for the manufacture of Dil!lld
turbines, Ihip maebiner}', el.ectrical fqlliPmetlt,
and for fabricating ship', Mctiona which 1rtn;
in outlying planla and _hipped to
thil plant for assembly.
2. Orgalti.z<lI;OII of o;r....fIid-profuti",.
Thill plant emplo)-ed 20,000 P\'TIOIl.I of
..born 3.000 "'en seleeted and orpniud into
an air.noid_protection unit by the
gent,.! manager of the plant and hb stair of
&SlILstanlll as the oftil,i.l ileadI; of the Orplliu-
lion. The orpniution ot the ",tire PJanI "'&II
dh'ided into aubdi\i$ioll!l for control P?r_
pGl!I!S, e.ch being ""'POIll!ib!e for the
of a group of building:s. Each of thea di\1slOna
W&lI di\ided into 10 operating lIniu known u
cllilnl_toi. coll!i!lting of 5 leaden 95 ,IMn.
each comprising the following servia! lltionI:
a, Fire lighting !l'ction (S/lIwo-H... ). 30
men.
b. Guard (Kribi_HIIIl), 30. men.,
c, Reseue. tint-aid and rescue (N,.-
go-Han). 15 .
d. Communications .'lI'<:tion (T....\o:,-l1l1l1).
telephonists and melI5I'llgen, 10 men. ,
1'. Lighting and blackout-ronlrol
(Tokokall$ejHIIII),10 men. .
Each of the 3 main divi.$iona of the plant
Ii department WIt
tained illl own lleparate re 8 to 14
piece of fire apparatu!...:'nd h.,d.
,
. mount"" on
POrtable gaso me ated by
drnwn carriages, all of which were oper
30 full_time profC8!!ionalliremen.. ,h,
- . rca _OwIng to
3. f i,'e_/lnvellt,OIl IOMSN . ded by a highb'
fact that this plant was !urroun
5

,
;
;
aplntlt hi..h-expIO/!Ilve bomb hitll becauiM! mOllt
buildinp wel'1! of multiple-lItor)' conlltruction
(four or live above ground levell. tIIch
ha\'ing an 8_inch conCrilte deck. In addition to
these Fhelters, man)' tar:h IIhelters of the cov-
ered_trench t),1le were constructed in the imme-
diate area surrounding the factor}', thull afford_
ing lIufficientllhelter capadt), for all empioytell
on an}' one work II.hifl. Evacuation to these
ters did not occur with the sounding of the
electrk electric bellll within the plant
area. but onl}' on order of the air-raidprotec-
tion k'ader by meanll of the public addrt:!l!l 11)'11-
tern. "'hen in hiJi judgment the factor}' would be
the tat'Jrtt for a direct auack.
8. O;.cratio.... d..ri"fI gi .. raid"._This ship.
}.rd operated on the buill of one 12-hour day-
lightllhift. the plant requiring only the gen'ieetl
during lhe olf-hours of thoile emplo)'_ needed
for continuoulI-proctlloS operations and mainte-
nanee work. :\'ight alert duty ....u arranged b}'
roster for membenl of the air-raid_protl!C'ticn
force!! required to man the control guard
po:5t11. obi!u\'nion p()Ilta and fire-watch cubicle$.
A total of 60 peraoll! wa.s required on the night
,....tch and operation llet\;ce....ith 500 addi_
tional of the air-raid-protection
fOll:e!l Mulled in dormitoril'll scat_
tert'd throughout the plant.
9. a. The Ma\")' ineendiar)'_bomb raid of
lIan:h 17. 19-15 caused exten.i\e damllge to the
IIhipbuilding )'ard and factories. it being e$ti_
mated that .pproximate!} SO percent of the
buildings were deatro}'ed_ Despite the fact that
buildinp for the mOllt part were of masonry
constructbn with wood roofll. lire-bomb$; would
cr&lIh through the roofs and set lire to the en-
tire building. caulling great havoc and deslruc_
tion to the machine tool., The factory lire de-
partment augmented b}' auxiliary police and
fire unita of the city (I.eibodllll) were able w
confine the'le IIrea to indh'idual huildings .nd
a general conllagration throughout
the pl::r.nt area. Inllllmuch lIlI thi. raid occurred
at night, the effect of the organixed air_raid_
protection unil.ll recruited from the employeell
waa not thorough!}' tellted. However. the night-
alert unita on duty were found to be entirel)'
inadequate, which was largely due to the poor
quality and of fire-fighting equip-
ment rather than to imllroper organlzation and
106
tndniq. AWIItanee from the PAleeturai ftrt
bripde.8 W&II not obtained &II th.,. w.... ctlJD.
pletely oet:upied In the 'P"-d 01
the fire in the flambt...ldeDtJaj Nctlona Of
the city. The loe:a of life &lid the number Of
wounded were very U..ht within the plant d\lt
to the hour of the raid and tlte of work.
ers from the plant.
b. Immediately follo1riq thia raid. plent
DlIIuagement held colUlultation to detel"lll.lne
what could be done to improve the plant-protee,
tion organization already formed, &lid &rriYfd
at the roncllLiion th.t little additional could be
accomplished without the addition of t ...o illl-
portant items, first. incre&lled water IIl1ppl)' for
fire-fighting purposes ...hich would require the
bring of additional water mainll and the intro-
duction of booster pumplll to lIuppl)' a
quantin' of water under high pretl$ure; .
ond!)', more mobile fire-fighting equipment or
modem design and greater c.pacit) Willi neeckd.
Inasmuch aa the pipell Mi!Quired for .... Ier mains,
pumping equipment needed for high presaure
fiN! Strt'alllll and the additional lire
were unobtainable e"en with high go\'ernment
priorit). it wa.s deemed useless to augment the
protect;'-e fOll:e!l unlell!l the plant were afforded.
tt-e additional fadlities.
Exhibit H
I, GutrCll ill/O.....otioll.-Qffieialll intet\;ewed
October 31. 1945 at the Kobe Steel Works were
Mr. Kimura. assilltant manager, and lilr. Yama_
"'aki. assistant chid of a &'liard unit in the
plant'$ air-defense corpll Guns.
torpedo tube$, tank. and other itemll produced
in the plant were purchased b)' the arm)' and
navy, being made by the central
ernment. Per!lOnnel employed in the beginninr
of 1945 totaled 11.200: plantarca Willi 7,600,000
!!quare feet. A na"Y captain, hia a!llliatant.,. and
an army colonel and hia IlUiff were the military
represenUitivea aUitioned in the plallt, who
lIupervised and inspected production mcllSures,
but made no air-defense auglrCltions.
2. O..gllllization._. Air-da!aIU6 I6ctioll
(8oeika).-Thill bod)' with itll chief, live lllIIli!t
anta and two or three female elerkll con!tltuted
thOlle permanently emplo)'ed for air,derellllll
_rlt: however, when alert "'u .
Mdion did not fnlll'tion IIlI . fllCe"'ed, thi,
qWlrlel"ll. an alr-defen.lle head_
b. TIlt C0"Pli It d
danAo",ltlt), consillted of a quarter. (ltoei_
and 12 directing th er, 2, llIJl!lnanlll,
pMral alfaitll (10m..) e operatlolll of tile
(10) re""ir ( . reacue-fitllt-aid (lr/lM.
...
. rt and ration ,,",,., )
pa menta. /Ill
c. There were the lIe..en d' t' ,
(ltMlldaN) wit:: :t
h

hl'o &Sl!istant chiefa. Within
n, ',eadquartefl were o.....niUd t"-
alfail'll -' , . '.
. . _a,,,. re PI'l!\-entlOn and
paIr Unltll. .
d. ":he chief dut} of tile qnteral "'aira IINit
wall alteraft IIpotting. obeen'era lakina: their
POIItII at the initial alert. Ordinarily. tllere ..-ere
15 men to a unit but the number could be .
crelllled to 20. In_
e. The qllQm '''tit peraonnel maintailWd Or_
der, ...ere.on w.tch for !pies, and patrolled tbe
O!:'tslde of the plant durina: raids. In the
be(inmng of the w.r. training "'-" ronducted
tW.ite month!}', but "'hen later the number of
ralda to incrtlll!e, training ...... abandoned

f. The function of tbe '''''-,"",altioit
Willi fire lighting for which there "'ere 10 men
regularl)' employed and 60 men employed dur,
ing air raid!. Equipment ronsiat.ed of the fol_
lowing: 2 motor pumpera, 12 hand-operated
ga.,.;Iline pumpel'll. 2() band-<;perat.ed pumpll.
2.200 hand fire extil!&'Ui!hers. and 4.000 ....ur
pail!. These figures are groM and incluah-e of
a\l uniLs of the plant.
t The ptr!lOnnel from the maintenance
partment were into the repair IInil.
Theile men made emetgl':lII'l' repairs to ma-
chinCll. clet'trical equipment and buildings.
Ordinarii)' during alert, there were 5 men, and
thia number was to 40 during air
ra,ds.
h. No organized resen'e fOllnd II! !uch:
however, the per!lOnnel other than incor,
POrated in the mentioned units were plllCed in
air-da!CJI'6 team! (bokugun). each being com-
\lO$ed or aoout 15 to 20 persona, Their prime
tunclion waa 10 tight tiril after the "all clear"
!ignul "'allgilen.
107
,
!

,
;

8. Finance.-Ro!l.rdin.. financing of .ir-de-

ft'nIM! the upen8ell were borne IIOlely
by the corpor.tlon. A rough eetim.te of the
sum expended is 500.000 to 700,000 yen.
Exhibit I
WoITSU.ISIU IlIlAVY INDUsT.lllS
(KOllE SHlPY"'''O AND (NGIN...oau)
1. Gt'lltrflt ittfOrllllltioll._The Kobe Ship)'lIrd
.nd Engillt' Works or the Mit.I!Ubishi hell\')' in-
ill loc.ted on the waterfront of Kobe
Harbor. This corpor.tion manuf.cture!! for
both tbe na")' .nd ch'ili,n consumer interesu
",ith .pproxim.ttol)' 50 to each. They
n> buildeTll of shipll, produce..., of land boiler$,
locomoth_. Di_1 enginee, lIubm.rine!!, ship
turbine!!, t'Jeetrie turbinee. pumps, .nd .Iso op-
er.te n>pair }'.nl. This corporation em-
pIo)'ed .pproximatel)' 23,000 peraoTlB during
w.nime .nd co"ered .n .rt'lI of 120,000 1.1100
(.pproximatel\ 100 ures) ....ith. plant ,..lue
of .pproximatt'i} 200.000.000 }en. Thill organi-
:u.tion built 20 6,OOO-ton ahips .nd had
month!)' production of 8 locomotives. 4 Diesel
ellginu of 400 bortepowt'r .nd .pproximatel)'
10 or 15 Diesel t'nrine!! of the 100 to 150 horv-
po\llo'er ,.riel)'. The interview rela,i"e to air-
raid protection of this pl.nt \IIo'U conducted ...ith
the lIuperintendent of the production-
enlineerin&, :!tion. cener.1 manager of the
"'orkll police ofl\c:e,.nd the lIretary of the per-
sonnel oftiee.
2. Orjl'llltl.:C1tiOll c! plottt C1ir-ruid-protcctiOlt
!orea.-Tht' basie orpnb"ion Wall di"ided ac-
cordin.. to the requin>ments of the six m.jor
departments of the pl.nt (Annex 1_1). The
titul.r ht'&d of the was the
of the corpor.tion aMillted b}' a re-
tired n....1captain, gradu.te of the J.panese
N....l Ac.dem), t'lIpeci.lI)' emplo}'ed all chief of
their air-r.id-protection or&,aniz.ation. It may
be in pauing th.t the .ir-raid-protection
organi<lation reflected the effect of this wise
choice. The chief of .lr-r.id protection had an
.dminilltrative headqu.rteTll IItaff of 20 .Millt-
llnL! who directed the operations of the 5 major
departmentll of tht: air.raid_prol.ection unit,
namely. the air defenl!e committee, general
affalu department, the air-defense corp$,
works department lind IIIJeeial air_defenlle
depllrtment. Between the chief of air-raid pro-
lOS
tection and the butt .ubdlvlalOlUl Illto
which this orpnluUon .u divided -aa
aMiatant chief for air-raid proteeUon, n:
basie lIubdivisiona (_Annu: /.1), COIUl!ated of
the ll"l'neral .train, Bblpbulldll!l'. enatne. taIt..
ing, IIpecial lfUlIrd, Wad4 divi.ion, aubJnarl
and outside "'orka diviaiona. Each d1vialon-:
divided into four IleCtiona: pard aectlob
fire-fighting section, first-aid and a
gu.rd The lfII.rd lII!ction acted .. Pa-
lice, .ircraft apotten.. fire .pottere and Uailted
the fire department as well as rruided Pl!TIOtlJIeI
to the shelteT!l. Then> wu little or no fOTlllll
training for the lfUlIrdll, "on-th_pot" illlllruc_
tion being the order of the d.y. The fin> aectioll
conducted drills twice. week .nd firemen from
the prefectural fin department came in fT'lllll
time to time to gi"e inlltruction.
Sa. Colltrol was exercised from the chief of
.ir_raid_protection di\'illion throucb hill lI!llIiat_
.nt chief to the superintendent in ehal'&'l! of
each d;,'ision. who was .Lso in ch.TI'll of .ir.
raid protection in his department. The .uperln.
tendent had no specific trainin&, other than that
whieb came from a knowledge of hill depan_
ment, but was guided in emercenciee. however.
by suggestiol1.'!l (rom the cbief of .ir_raid pro-
tection ....ho reported to the incident to t.ke
o'"er direction of personnel. Ofttimes it beeame
netl:'$$.Bry to bring one divillion in support of
another. The chief of .ir-raid protection \IIo'ould
decide who Wall to direct the divi.ioTlB in the
.1"f'lI U incident officer.
b. The air_raid_protection orpniUltion "'u
llubdh'ided further, all .n example. in the CUI!
of the division. where the chief en-
gineer alw acted All he.d of the air_raid_protec_
tion foret'8 of his divillion .Misted by a IItaff of
10 messengers. The guard !lOCtion in this divi-
Ilion. for e:o:ample, cons.iorted of a leader but no
staff. and wu comprised of 20 peTllOM divided
equally all guides and watcherll: the fire !lCCtion
l'Ol1llist;ng of a leader (no staff) and 20
divided equally into mOlor_pump squad and
the hand_pump l!Cluad: the first-aid seetion eon
sisting of a leader and 20 perMnS, although
they were sUPllOrted by 1\ speeilll firsl-aid lIl!C'"
tion at the divisional level which of
I doctor, 3 nur8ell and GO per&Qns t:lIpecially well
qualified in first-aid technique. The hitter or
ll"anization manned the first-llid 1I0sts UlI'(/ujfh-
J
out the pl.nt .nd administered
UJltU lueh time they could be th.e Wounded
rnon! definite treatment. and th oapt':-Uted for
Int' IM!Ction of this di . '. e IIJ1tCIII guard_
leader .nd 10 men \'llIlOn Will eomPOlll:d of a
4. OpcrotiolU durillg IJi .
IOOTJliltg 'y'/elll._Due r To'....:_ A,r-t<lid.
tance of thia w .the "z.(' .nd impor_
ar pl., . .
.....rnings ....en> . .' n, .Irrald
reamed dIrect f the
....rning central and b rom army
Authority u to \I'h" radio.
a,... ' ....\1. to IOUDd the
.lert or alarm ....811 Idt b' ,.
thoritiCll to the d' ).go ernment au
agement. E lllCrt'tion of plant man_
. mplo)'tCl! of the plant \I'ere
to continue work .t their PDlIa of duty .nd
could take .helter under all}' conditioTlB un_
!eM ave:c1lical1y ordered by the chief of 'ir-raid
protection.t the control center o"er the public
1I}llte'": It \1"811 reliably n>ported that
th.e ehief of IIr_TlIid proter:tion "'811
....Ith the relIpollllibili!)' of cueaain. "'hetber the
.pproaching ain:raft \\"Guld drop iDcendiary_
type bombe or high-explol!li"e bombL If the
for..:neT "'en> the CMe. emplo}eelI.ta}ed .t their
dutlee throughout the raid. but if be dedded
...alI !mminent danger of 'n .ttack by
hlgh-exploe"'e bombl. be would immediately
.11 emplo)"eee to take sbelter.
b. Tlte COlltnH ec"ter._Thi. particular plant
had established t....o controll'l:'nteTll one located
in a subturanean b:!sement of pb.nt buildin&,
.nd the other relllO>el)' rlistant on tbe roof of
one of the plants.. the latter station being pro-
tected by he..-y, reinfon'ed-concrete \110.1111 and
roof ....hieh alllO acc:ommod.ted li&,ht .ntI me-
dium anti.ircraft weapon. On the perimeter
of thil! CJnen>te control station, concrete pill
boxes with sm.1I ob5en'lItion slits ....ere eTftted
to watch station. Then> man)'
other pill boXClI of the &arne t}ope dillpe..-l
throughout the entire plant area and connected
b}' telephone to the main control center as well
'11 the auxiliarr control center atop the plant
oof. Watcher personnel manned thege (:Oncrete
pill boxell throughout the raid and, dellpite thl!
heat of fire, were required to n>main .t their
POSt of dut). It is beliel'ed that the concrete
control center a. conlltructed, as well all the
smllller pill boxes. would not withstand the
direet hit of a 500-pound bomb. but would mO!!t
likely be nmpl<J protection against fugmenl:ll
from. bomb btut 30 or
COntrol centl!rJ! ... ..40 feet ...,. 8011I
telephone .equlpPed wItIrt
tern ''', PU"nc
.. . -:
tlon. ...l!1l u rna ment radIO con_
.n hll..rdoUll PR. char1ll .nd Ioc.tion, or
....ithin thl! .nd POinu
c. TIle gllflrtJ f'CI'O"._The ruard secti .
tach dh'iaiob ...'q headed .... on ,n
, V3 IIQ ex...rmy m.n
o fXP\!MI'1lce. The dutie. of ....
t u,l' penonnet ....Cf'e
o act q 1oot-ouu. ftre ....lchen to Protect the
plant from Iootinfter raida' lid to
.he!ter guideL ACt ..
d. urliotl .--Tbe dotiCli of the per.
IOflnoel of ot theae sections hili been de.
. under the ftItitled
'OrpnJUt!oa of the Plant Air_Raid FOreeL
1lle mechanical eqWp!l)ent oper_
.ted by tbes:'" .miooa ...... of the .IIDI.11. 154).
pllon-pn--MlQlIte. PdiDe-dri\"ell and haDd-
dra........riety II,. two mator-
dra1ll"ll pampen of the maill plant fin do.l'Vt-
malt. III Iddltioa to thia eqaipment. sdI see-
tion had small band-dno.... enilll"isber of
the ma..a.xt-.....ter type. H,so.. Fire boR.
_hieh had the plant po."... throocb
many ro:an of peacetime pmluctiola. b8III DOt
been replaced and _ .. onabll. to withstaDd u.-
Illr:lill of I'OIItinual pu.mpm. durinl!arp fin!II.
e. U,1Il. ..or._At tile 00IUft of the "'ar,
tach dl>iaion of the plant ..... eqaipped with
blackout 'hatten and CUrtailU and lilbWontrol
de\'iceiI ...hich permitted redao:ed .... or a
total dilconnectioll. Howe'-er, due to the frail-
il)' of !lOme of the bIKkoot equipment. it 1a5ted
only 1 )'ear .nd ..... nenr n>p'-I.. TI1is in<
dustT)'. like .11 otIwr lIIIlIufa.cturina: plant!! of
like kind...... llll.ble to pl'O\"ido. any de\ice to
the akJ"-slo'" from open-hNnh funlaC'ell
.nd blast furnaces. the only ell"on beilll made
in thiJ direction to...rd the .nd of the ......
beilll to provide blaekout !!Cl"l!el\ll of black piper
on bamboo framea. ...hich ""en! delltroyed .nd
rendered .!ler tbe IIrst 1Iea.-y ....in.
f. .<:/tttUn.-8ei1!J" high priori!)' indu!tfJ"
in the J.panl!N! .....r_production thi!
plant .ble III $eCun> su!ficil!nt of
hljlhl)' eritit.1 m.teriala !uch u eement.nd re-
InfoTClIIlf ateel with which thl')' "'ere .ble to
over 300 c ncrete shelters or rairll'
109
If(Nld construction. In addition to these
pined great hudway by reuon of the
Annex
sheltenl, 200 of the common Japanese wood-
that raidins: aircraft were arrivlns: over the tar.
,- 1
,
frame and ellrth-eover variety were erected.
get in aUl:CeIllIlve wava.
AII!.DEFENSE ORGANIZATION CHART
I
b. As:ain on February 4, 1946, 50 or more
a li-inch steel boiler plate OVl!r the roof.
aircraft bombed the area, with 5 HE batnba FOR KOBE SHIPYARD AND ENGINE WORKS
The lop deck of the reinforced-eoncrete shellers
. MITSUBISHI
HEAvY INDUSTRIES
and 150 fragmentation flllliris: Within the
,
Waslillproximately 50 centimeters in thickne!l!!.
,
with walls of 30 and had the capa-
plant lIrea. Ten persons were killed and fire.
...IR.DEFENSE HE...DQU.... RTERS
" raged for se\-eral houra unchecked. DUrin, thb
,
citv to house approximateh' 20 men each. They
H.....q"",I." L.od..
were eN'Cted so liS lO provide two right_angle particular raid mOllt of the were
.... ""t"., H.odq""" ... L.......
,
turns ill the entrance stairways Sll well as a
caught out!!ide of their shelters and could not
CI''''9' "I .... " Dol....
,
,
blast wall in front of the exit doors.
The sta- get back to them bec-ause of the llrlllt. Then
......"11, r"pp,.",,,.t.IYI
"
bilitv of the concrete shelters WM tested at this again on July 24, 1945. at 0830. one pilUle,
on July 24 when a 500pound high-<lxplo- evidently a Pathfinder, dropped one 1.00Q.kil(l
sive bomb exploded within 10 feet of the shelter.
bomll on the plant, demolillhing 4 lIuildings, kilt_
A/R-DEfENSE
GENERAL AffAIRS
.... IRDEFENSE
WORKS DEP.... RT.
SP'Kl.........IR. mo"ing the entire structure several feet. killing ing 4 and injuring 10 llerllOns.
DEIARTMENT
COMMJrTEE
LA80R AFF.... IRS CORPS
MENT
DEI'fNSE oEn
4 people and injuring 10. Peculiarly enough,
6. /WI/lectio'IIt.-This plant wall inspeeterl
C",,,,Out!
WORK REP.... IR
GENERAt ..FF"IRS
INST.... LLATIONS
inquiry as to the strength of these drew once or twice a month by both naval and Pll!.
M....TERI.... L
......;,1".' C","I
RAW .........TERI.... L
LABOR ""fAIRS
the response that plant personnel conSidered fectural fire personnel and reports coneerning
ADM, SECTIONS
....
"
PlANNING
SECTIONS
this !J'pe of shelter to be strong enough to with- the adequacJ' of air-raid-protection measurllll
SE<T1ONS
EXPERIMENT PLA<.
stand ans t"pe of bomb Ihat the American
and efficiency of personnl!l were sent to the
forces mighl deliver, the attitude of the Japa-
i\Iinilltry of Home Affairs twice each .'ear and GEN. AFf.... IRS / SHIPBUilDING I
ENGIN. II
CASTING
SUBM.... RJN. OUTSID. II'ORJ(
ne'll! management appearing to be if they used
to the Navy Ministry four to six times per year.
DIVISION
DIVISION
DIVISION
DIVISION OIVISION DIVISION
the be$1 materials they had at hand and con_
Inquiry concerning these inspections br(lught
structed their lIhelters in the best manner that
forth the information that during each inspec.
4TH .... OS - I
5TH ADS
9TH .... DS
10TH .... DS T I 11TH ADS .
their engineering knowledge
,,'
experience
tion suggestions were made by the prefecture
1ST .... DS
WITH .... DT WITH lAOT
II'lTH ADT
WITH 6 ....DT. WITH ......DT II'ITH .....OT
dictate<i, they then were justified in beliel'ing
and navy people all to the nel!<! for better light
6TH .... DS
12TH ....DS
that nollling more could be done and they were
control and improvement of sheltl!r construe_
lD .... DS
WITH I AD1
SPECIAL GU.... RD UNIT
WITH I .... DT
....VERAGE ...IR.
WITH 2 ....0T preparPd to attept the reSUlt. even though all
tion.
DEI'fNSE SECT.
7TH .... DS
,
of the occupantll of such shelters might be
h,d
"""
lD .... OS
II'ITH J ....OT
Y... o..l ,
In other words. the)' offered no apology
7. Mlltunl aid. - Arrangements
WITH 2 ....OT .......t""t
,
killed.
made b, this industry with <h, Mitsubishi
GUARD
for not having constructed heavier types of ITH .... DS
Electric Company, a nellr_by plant. to all8ist one <""'iX"'y SI"" FIRE.FIGHTING
WITH I "'OT
WADA DIVISION underground shelteu in an industry that ob-
another in case of fire, as well as a separate
H",p;I,,1 R..cuo---$';"t....,d 1ST (QMPANY (1 ... 2J.ldPIaI...... 1
vioullly would be a potential military target in
arrangement with the City of Kobl! 10 place the
PI"., s.<I;,,", Spec",1 G...,. U.,I
20 (QMPANY (I". Zd, 3d l'Iclt-.ol
11TH ....OS
"artime. 2001.100 M
WITH I AOT plant equipml!nt at the disposal of Citl' authori
lO COMPANY (llI.2dPlo!"""'1
5 a. Throughout
<h'
War there were nine
ties if the emergency dem,.nded. On a reciprocal
14TH ADS
raids on this particular industry, not all of
ballis. the city stationed Ilt alt times within the
WITH 1 ADT
15TH ....05
them. however, infllcting damage. On March
confines of the plant, 3 gasoline motor pumps
WITH 1 ADT
17. 1945. between 0330 and 0400, 60 aircraft
and 15 firemen. Harmony did not exist between
ALSO UNDER THE .... IR.lEFENSE <OYS
I
bombed the g('neral plant area. dropping 5 frag-
the city firemen stationed at the plant and the
mentation bombs which destroyed 15 percent
plant's own firemen. as it was Ihe the opinion
of the buildings through the resulting fire. Fif_
of the latter that the forces would not slay
HE....DQU....R GENER....l AF OH'NSE ENGINEERING RESCttE-flRST-
FOOD SECTION teen thousand persoIl!l were at work in this
at their llOlIt!I of duty if there was any imme-
HRS SECTION F...IR; SECTION SE(TION SKTION AID 5ECTKl
particular section (If the plant at the time lIut
diate danger to their lives. the attitude of :he
;; or 6 were hurt and none killed. Great plant workers being motivated by the feelw
difficulty was encounll!red b} the firefighting
that the plaut belonged to them, even though
Du';.. "" c".""I,
"I"C''''.
F-d ..... s...
"'0<1.... ""_.
forces of the plant in putting the fire under con_ they did nol share joint ownership with Out;.. "" CO"" G"",d, r.t< r.sht-
" ....... b,.;ld"'!l.
-,-
9"'1<"""
corporation. but by reason of the fact that It
,.",.;11".<0, .
",".;."1,,,. and
"'5.5'" .01.... ""...........
trol due to the fact that the bombs landed in
"I.qu'p. s".1
,hoM<..,
"'arehOU8e!l and employees' dining rooms. Th, represented their means of livelihood.

plant fire department complained Ihat they had 8. /);sper8al.-At the direction of the NavY SPECI.... L RESCUE
f-jR5T.....ID SKIION
had a very late start on the.llC firea because they Department. diapersal WKlI planned by the
'No'" ADS ;, ...".001" SI",.: ....oT;, ...;,0.1.... T."",
were kept in their shelter!! until the fires had ministrative section of the plant and the lima
TU8'_'
III
110
J.
r.,. 9{ E....-.

K'" LJoo_... Dr,.rlowal S'-
(.ppnoz.) it
\a 1 11
(.pp l __ II

.- .
- .
"
"
dor of the department store htdlcUlII" .... DOC
protected with automatic .prlnkJera but tile
exterior walla and ..indo... aPeTlinp were
equimll'd with au!Omatic prottion of the
.....atl!r Curtain" tnll'. Which opened delup
val"ell and protected one .ide of a building duro
ing an incendiary air raid When adjaaml
proPl'.rtiell were ablue.
e. Adequate meana far /If/lit wlltrul "'ere
taken by managemenl "00 had af-. inatalled
blackll\lt curtain. and other Protecti\"e de\icea
O\'er ..indo.... and around dOll...a). to inaure
total blac:kaut of the premi-..
4. JhtlUll ...d.--The management of this
establishment had joinfd nei(bborin. bUlIineu
hou8etI in a prearr.npd plan for mutual-aid
to each other in the e\"l'nl of air-raid
.ttaclt. However, the es-perience in Kcbedurillg
the lirfeIlt incendiary-bomb raida "'alI that lire
broke oUllimulta-..valy O'er ...ide anAI"'tueb
made tIM! plan of mutual ...atance unfMlllble
aa I'lICh buai_ "'alI engaged in iLH 0'"' protec.
tion.
6. C__nu.-Aa in all otheT _. the
tlnalXial burdl'n of air-raid _rea in this
ltore " ... barne by the mana"'lDO:'Ilt '8"hich c0m-
mented lhal if it had an <opportunity to repWo
ita: type of orpniz.atioa. it would have paid leu
attl'ntioD 10 gu defense and CODCftltratl'd more
ell"ort on the ahellI'r prote<:tioD a( C\l5tOml'.n and
better equipment for combating inel'Ddiary
hom...
Exhibil K
TlIEATU ..1.11... ,0 P.OTlCTIOS
I IMtrotlNClioll.-The Shura Ka.n .
Theiler and AmuSl"menl 111
. 'ted and inapected to dell'.nmne to
Will "lal . Urell for the
"tent air_raid_prot1.10n mea.a.
of the public during ha.d
Th - ,Leater co'enn. /In are
effeclM. la"
.om
"'......
F,.-e IooMll..o (,-...)
S,", htl-.
,......
S<nw ( .....;... 1
Fi... balen (l.,.,.,l
Go, ..ob
........._ 1-,--'"
.... -. _ 0-0.""'..:.-...:.- ---.
_."' " - ...:- -.....
1 _ 1_.
........ _.
B. nllder air-roid a.
rM air-mid warning._Both the alert and the
alarm waa picked up from the near(:8l city alren,
tile public radio or throuih a member of the
neIa'hborhood group of this particular area.
b. S1Ielter8._There were no exteriar public
,helten pro,ided by the manaf('ment af this
.tore for the customer public:. When the al.rm
sounded throughout the bUilding by means of
I'lectric bells. announcement ""alI made o'er the
public addrelllI system that the cU!ltOll1e1'$ were
privileged 10 O('(up)" the hasemf'nt and the coenter
portionll of the lil'lit and $l'COnd lIoora of the
eighWlnrJ' bUilding, thl!!le areas Ill'.ing con_
aidered the llllfl'.:l!t wnl'.:l! for from
bomb blallt and aplinters. Ho"e'er.
were prhill'.l'ed to lea\'e thl'. 8tOre and _k
Ilafet,. in the nearl'.:l!1 public lIhl'.lter or a"ail
thell1lleh of the aforl"ll1entioned safety anaa
all the)" dl'.:l!ired.
c. The penlOnne! of the g u ide lll'.dion en-
dl'.a'ored to LWl'.mblf' CWltomeMl In VOU.. of 20
each in the ufet)'" areu of the 8tOre whl'.re the).
were atronted additional prolection behind
merchandise and stock <:a.lIe!l.
d. f,qlfip..ut._Eac:h of 11M! tire-lighting 1IeC.
tionll c:onsi8ll'.d of a;;mali team of seven penlOM
who "ere equipped "ith the UlIual amall toolil
conai.sting of buckets, sand bap and abo,-ela.
IItrs,,' mats and tire beaters, along "ith
her of CO. hand tire ertinguiahers. The Int&-
oa: NlZATION
f(lI. c u W ....T..EP<T two persons to each lJ(IJoitatiOlllltdioll and
duties were to give tin.t aid to
cuatomers i.n =n t ...ined
equipped with gll!l rna 1I ao 'd They re-
in deconuminatlon all well as al tra,.el.
coei\"ed their training from a reglllte ent
ing doctor who viaited the depflrt.m udi(HI.
from time to time. ThfO firt-fightlng raled
comprising lilt
under instruct,onll from Pb Nlfectural
lIel:tion and had been trallled y p that pur-
personnel who came to the .for
s
the stolt
pose On two or thrl'.i! other (M:caHlon tment to
viHited the city fir.e h VI/ide
Htud)' principles of t -:; guirling
ec/ion which wall aSBljfned the II Y .'."d in a
. ill be deaerl""
personnel to safe areas, .... . Under Air'
later paragraph under "OperationS
Itnld Conrlitiona,'
".
,
,00
,-
"
"
Exhibit J
...,._UID nOTCTIOS OF ... DlP....TIU... ,. STO.l
I. IlltrodlldiOIl.-)lr. M.8llAO Obata. ch.ier of
- -d p-..... ion ileetion of the Dalm.ru
the .Ir...' - ......O<OC. f
De rtlr.enl Store or Kolll'.. :l modern 0
. pa and t ....o buemen!4. ""&.11 inten,e....l'.d
:::tive to the .ir_nid.proteetion ser\'Ice of
that I':i!ublbhment.
2 Or{HJIlUatiQII.--Operatinr under thl'. lIllme
pre;e<:tural 1.....1I u other public the
balIic orianiutian of the of
th dep:artment "tore ""as dIVided LIlto eight
one for each Hoor. Each unit broken
do.... n Into a guard aec:tion, Slinitilry aec:tlOn. lire-
tlghting aec:tion and guide section. There
!!e'en guard. in (:ltCh gaard aec:tioo and theIr
duties "'ere to the I'O(If aod open areas
where bomhll might fall. There were
Wow- (I.....)

Fin ""_
Fi... Plap.
Industrial eatabll.hment. The tolltfol
. h department Japanese ther with their equlptnent PI'Q"d
machine-tool In eac bII f Kobe rooma toPlI&tl.factory In operation. While It
were actuall)' dillpersed to .ubu,r :r build. to be Vfl'Y. construction would not
where they were inslalled In anY.I).pe Allhe is the,.r they were d8iped very mlll:h-..
- 1 - 1 d ,!!Chool buddini'll. direct hi II' ....
ina: aVIIllab e. mc II III 1 t' small a. the po ey (I II r Protee.
nd or the war 40 of the II II conll,or they could wttbllland the b'-t of.
100111, alonr with 16 large .Irhammers lion In. of. bomb of 260- to 600-kllo Ibt.
were rnol'ed to other loeatiOM. t near.m1S:S 'd .helters while not the -..
9 ._AII of the plan'hno Their d,,ra:
tely
to prot.eet the plant fllIplon.
. t pry or anot er !ler,:ed a h"'t,-...r bomb!n. attach that speciflc.Il)' Illllii
ned
10 onl! c. e d" ,oded in- t e ian The"
M the air-raid-protection force ....I'.re undl'.r ii. dl'.lh.l'.red on thia p t. Ir fl.....
to groupll of 20 or 30 and orgam ral actua J. methods ....ere aound and inclUded
leader 10 be ILWd ..'here'u nl!eded as. .. f lire huarda adj.cent to the IIIaDt
of rnanu.llabor. .. 0 rotection ....u entirely inadequate
I it c.n be alat aite. but in"elItment in JIIaM 10 SIIIN"'llf/f.-ln genera. . h- proU'l:t tn"
. . niutlon at t III .....
that the air_...id_protechon orga . . of this importance.
plant ""all far abo"e that _
- Annex 1-2
T.W../ E,.;,.....'
/., . . H 1"""''';8
11- .h JW.....A, ......
K'" SA,,....-d." E.,;_ .. .
9 (Dd"_ Sect..... ) . W.... DiYi.ion, I f&dI t.
(1 ill EIIl:iM DiflOioll, ! '"
the other dirili'o'\O) n: ZO-C".......l AlI""n It
O.PUide Won ....
WadJ, 01..... .....nd Is.cuunlf)
(Outside Work
i
:
,
,
,
112
113
.
= ;
,
21.3500 l!<Iuare fed (600 1""00) t..,d _tiflA'
capacity of 2.067. ilJl houni beiflA' from
12 o'clock nOOn until 7 p,m. each dar of the
"..tell_
2. Shibala. of
the thealer. stattd that little had been acromp-
in the ......,. of an air_raid_
protection organiVition f.,r the !.hN.ler bUt that
he had crealed a small ,,18tf of 35 men and
....omen. under the leadenohip of his businellll
11fIrtner....ho al!.Sumed the title of aid..
tection leader. This group Wag dl\'lded Ill'
to Iwo par1s. l\aml'ly. the Fir!lt.Joioor Guard.
compolle<l of 17 allemlanll<. and Ihe Second
Floor Guard, compGlle(1 of 18 altendantll. Their
prineipl\1 dut) WAS 10 inform Ihe patrons of Ihe
theatH of Ihe air-raid alert or alarm as the case
might be and to !ICC that the audience was co.n.
duded to the exitll withoul confusion or panle.
Some of the per.lOnnel ....ere trained in rudi
mentaTV fir.n-aid mellllure:tl and 0 I her sin.
lItTUCted in the handling of the lire extinguishers
and methods of fighting incendia., bombs.
usin&" such small hand tools as IIRnd bucllell! and
abo"els as "-ere anilable.
3. OpvatiOM. - The management of the
thester recei ... the air.raid .....ming either
from the public radio or from a mes.senger di..
paUhed from the nearat post of the neighbor-
hood group (10M"; Jl'"llIi). airraid shelters
were pro"ided auch by the management for
the Jl,8fct) of the patrona of the thealer. Ho....
ever. during the period of the alarm the base-
ment or the theater ....as u!le(1 as a shelter for
employees.
4. Being a place of public a$llembly. frequent
inspections to determine the eflkiellc)' and ade-
quae)' of the air.raid.protO'Ction me&.llUn'll of the
theater ....ere made by the chief of the Kobe
poliee. The poli ue C'Oneerned lllI to whether
the per.lOnnel that ould he required to main_
tain onlfl" "'ere well selected. that tM)' ...ere
properly instructed in handling fiT1!-eXtinguisb-
in&" equ;pment and thoroughly familiar ...ith the
_hani3Dl of the $Afety doors at the theater
entraIlCl':ll and exill!.
s. This building .... 81ruck June 5.
during an ineendia"'-bomb raid. at ....hich time
four luch mi lies pt.lnelrated the roof, landing
on the concrete deck of the Ihird Iloor of the
building which Will the ice rink of the amUl!e
114
ment when tIM1 bunuod tbezn.el.,. 0Ilt
and taped UttJe or no cIamap. The theattr
...... empty .t the dma of the Bid and t"-e
fiNll ....re v:dDPIMed by the ....rd -uoa
_dUd br tJw 10eallln delJutmenl, -Ideh
plor
ed
....ur.nd aand In their
6. As in the of factorillS. II.IId
other n'pe!! of pub:!k the bule
fe<'lural1a.... co,enn .......
ure;< applied to tbeaten W1tb the .additional
quiren>ent imposed by local Cit} ordinallCt
CO"ering the matter of adequate
and m,anl of egreM for the through
entrances and emergency fire eXIII!. This tbe.
nler was con.slrueled in accordllllce .... ith lhe
building code lind local fire nnd police reo
quirement!!.
0/ lor hUM n ... r
tubA 21l $tret<:ben
Sand bags 200 Eninguilben !t
Gu masb 10 Fire 1>o>o>b 0";"'1 II
ShoYeb 10 " Fire ulil\J{lll.ben
Aus 5 (...u.rr )
25 F",, bul (Ii'._
.,.....id till 2 t""'il II
W.ur eon...;......
(000 liun -=Ill It
Fire hydnnll I
'c:_ of _. '_-.,.....-
Exhibit L
Allll_lIIAlO rlllOTf;CTIOS IN SCHOOU
1. Illtrooudion. _ !IIr. Karru, Prefectural
Superintendent of Schools. Mr, Narau. in-
structor in Englillh in II Kobe high school. and
the principal of the First Kobe middle llCltool,
were interviewed relative to air_raid.protection
procedures in the school system. As in the case
of factorie.s. thealeu and stores. the basic pre-
fectural laws prevailed. However. there were.
in addition to these. certain instructions whi(h
had been i"ued by the Education !IIini!lt11
....hich ....ere not a,ailable. dut! to the fact t,,!,t
the)' had been burned. The largest sc:hoot.
ID
Kobe ....as the Fiut Kobe middle lICbool, .hidI
C'Onslsted or approximately 1,200 pupils and-tO
in$l.ructoT$. . tiooIl
2. Orgollti.:aliQIt. - The basic organll\ll rse
waa approximatl!cly the l!81T>e as in other latI
building!!. hs,'ing headquarters.
and rescue lind first-nid di"isions. D"'181
....ere d;,'ided into sections; ta
lf
a. The hcadql<arlrril sectill1J acted as A8
1
g.
under the chief of nir_rAid protection whO 0
AIR-DEFENSE ORGANIZATION CHART
FOR KOBE SHURA KAN THEATER
I
AIR.DEFENSE CORPS LEADER
I
INTELLIGENCE
I
SECTION
AIR-DEFENSE CORPS ASST. LEADER
I
I
I I
RESCUE-FIRST- 20 FlOOR GUARD 1ST FlOOR GUARD
AID SECTION
SECTION
UAlSON SECTION
SECTION
I
I
I
I I I I I
FIRE
GUIDE REPAIR
FIRE.PRE
GUIDE REPAIR
PREVENTION
SECTION SECTION
VENTION
SECTION SECTION
SECTION SECTION
116
Exhibit M
ntCI.. I. coal'S ORGANIZ..TION
SCHoot SPEClAt AIR DEFENSE CORPS ORGANIZATlON
r
COUIi UADU I

I
AJIt.tIlflN$l COUIi AUT. UADU I
.........
HlAOOUAJlTEU

fllll DII'f, Usct.l(....fllt5TAlll
-

-

'--

..-

,,-
..- ..- ..-
.-
-- --

AlltoOISQY,,-

'--

.-

0_

ftSTAtLU1OI'fS

'--


.-
0_
.-


.-
--
I'IC-
lUll.! GU.uD
---

'--

..- '-- '-- '--
,,-
..-
lNTERIOIl ."To>
lO;()Ot GAll

-..oasuY,,_

.... TOI TlAM

'--

'_IWo .....0..,
'-- .-
.. -
0_
--

."
Fire boob 10
8_l1 I_
lluch... 1M
),ira be..,...
Str..w "'..... I!II
M..-.. phoneo !II
Air-w..tnin, ....hi.U. -&0
StMI helme... I"
e... m...k. M
S'retchers 10
Spli... (.....) 60
Tcianrull'
eloth.
lIandllf"
Medicin..
on the tcboOJ premt- to accommodate all PQ.
pils. aupplemmted by the tlM of conel'ettl tun.
nels In the ....hool ba8emeIlt ItnletUl'e. ElI;terior
shelters were of the ,haJklw Wooden.frame
variet)' with 4 feet of ea.rt.h and atone COverina
the entrancell whicJt 'll'ere lIKtttly Protected b1
thin wooden baftlell. There were no direct or
near_hits rep?rted on any IChool shelte... In
Kobe but ob\'lOullly their inferior comltruct!o
,,'Ould not h.ale 1I1J.1tained any, n
". t;rocUOIWIl ,micro - A dlsperaal policy
Wll.$ outlined b)' Kobe llChool authorities in Slop..
u'mber of 19.,\4 and was divided into fOur cate-
goriea according to the four typell of IIChoola.
Primar,. lIl'hool students (1st to 6th rrade.)
were ortlered evacuated to the countr)' dUrinr
September. 1944. and the middle grade 1111-
dents (7th 10 10th grades) were placed on I
voluntar}' baSiB at the $lime time. Hirh lJehool
atudenll (11th w 13th grades) could not be
eneuated because of the lack of hirh school
facilities in the countn'. universities btinr In
the same eat.egon.
6. OperotiOll .",du lIir-rllid conditio....._Tbe
Third "nbe middle school wu in"olved in a
night ineendiar)' raid on March 17. 194" when
one s.mall unit of the school wu
dCllttO}-ed. despite the ,'aliant efforts of some
10 teachers and 30 students on tbe nirbt-pro-
tection shift. who were aWlted by otber 4tu-
dents wbo re!!ponded for dul}' from their holl'lCll
on the Ioir-raid alarm.
T"'" af E,.i"",coof f .... KMc TAi.... S<hH
Fire ptup (.......ide
J ..d) 2
Fire pitlIP' (in.i....
J"I'd)
H"dnln... eonntcd
10 wlter m..in_
w..ter tank. 30
Rae""in (10 ki) 18
Pumpo 3
EninjtUi.hen 42
Sheltetl (,ok........ )
(110 men tol.al) 11
.:ICIPO 'rench.. (a10
men 1<>111)_ 21
IndiYidu.. l.hel",.. Ir.o
Sand pil.. 25
Cover lC.... n. r.o
Lldde.. 6
""poC lintern. _ _ 8
EmeTlj"encJ pIck hllj"'
(hi jom.c-Aido. hih,
h ... ) 3
lcally the prindpal, lind ...s compoMld of
6 teacherll and 12 boy-, and Wall totally super-
\-i$OT)' in function.
b. (If UNUM tliri.rriolt .."&II com'
of 6 tcacherll and 90 8ludcnts, &Ubdivided
into a guard Ill!Ction. guard for Em-
peror's picturell l'e<:tion. Bnl! an air_raid oil-
lleTw:r'lI section. The prindp'-l dUliell of theee
!leCtinnll wcre the protection of halls and exits
10 pn!vent crowding lind panic among pupilll
and air ob$en'ation of airl:l"lIft and Caning
bombs from the mob of the buildillJ{ll.
c. TAe 'ire diri.rloN COn.,illted of 6 teachers
and 147 lltudl!nt8 dh'ided into <I lIen'ice sections.
pump !leCtinn. outdoor fiN-plug lIection, in-
door lireplug l!ection. and bucket_brigade !!eC-
lions.. Their dUliell wen! to rnan t/wo thr('@hand
water pumpllat the 80und of the alert. Bland by
the fire el<tin,guillMn read)' for Wion and un
noel fire hOIIe read,- for indoor and outdoor
connectiolUl ..ilh which tiM! buildinp
ftluipped, The bucket bripde of 2 leader.! and
65 pupiw stood b)' "'ilh 150 fire buckets to rela)
w..ter from tiM! "atic water rese....oin.
d. rt_t din.m mnsi.ting of two M:'C-
tiOIlll. :he raK'ue and fi ....t-aid and the pi-
dcfclIM uniLit. 4 teachen and 44 Itu-
dents whoic dut)' it "''alI to bandage the in-
jured. url)' the stretther o:asea and conduct the
training or teaeh the simple rudi-
ments of fU protc<:tion in ,ie... of the few gU
..ilable (50 in number).
3. OJH'",tiou. _Air_raid INn'ltiltg. - When
the initial air_raid warning ""&II sounded from
the n9re:i!t cit)' lIiren. children were
man:hed to lhelte.... in an ortlerl) fuhien.
ruided br membel'$ of the guartl divillion who
remained on duty until the air_raid alarm
AOIInded, then haltened to .helten which were
built near their station, When the "all clear"
"'as lIOunded. the auards eame out first and at-
tempted to dillCO,er where the bomblJ had been
dropped, followed by the Uudentl when condi-
tions were considered safe.
b. A l'Ontrol ulller was set up in the base-
ment of the school buildinfll and manned b)' the
headquartelll dhbion of the air-raid-protection
service from "'hich inatructiona to teachen and
leaden were iuued by meana of mellJlCngers
and from which air_raid signals were trana_
mitted.
4. Shtlters.-SuHicient .helters were built
!
,

,
116
117
Chapter n. Shipping Entering and
Leaving the Harbor
ARTICl. 7. BerON' enterina- the harbor, all
ships ",m, with n>pnl to air defell.'lell (indud_
ing defell.!lf!ll against fin!. "'ater and gas, ali "'I'll
I..lI aheltt"n1) complete tht.ir preparations as the)'
ha\'e each pn!\'iously decld4!d.
AIlTlCLE &. During an air.raid ""-.rning, &II
a matier of general practice, tntering, !ea\;ng
or t;hanging the mooring or \'_Is ill not per-
mitted. In lIuch a ease, \'_Is should pa)' atten_
tion to the pennanu and beacona on top of the
harbor master'lI office, on the lIignal IItation at
Number 5 jetty and at the Kawallllki Hana look_
out Illation.
the harbor area .nd Mi)lll wfWD ..
the promulption of the order for ;;'0;...1
ot llir-rlcfen.se measlll'ell.
ARTICLE 2. Thill outline appU. to aD .....
mo,-ing in or near the arbor JlmltL De....-a.
on the variou8 t)'pel! of ",hips it _ill be applied
aecordingly.
AIlTJCLE 3. Aside from the items stipulated
in Ihis outline, the t'nforc('ment of it makes DO
change in the open P.:lrt or the n!WU-
IaliolU for earn'jDg them out. nor in the air-
defense plalUl of 11)'011'0 preffeture, the air--de-
lenllE' planll of the Kobe waler police depart.
IIl<I!nt, :md other lu('h rtJrUl.tion8 of the harbor
master or chief or the water poliee department.
AmCLE 4. Thill cutline applies to nand ,-es-
IIels, to milian' "eMel" emw.rking na\"llilluper_
"i,ing officers. to army and to \'e!llIeb
of government and municipal officl!ll eoneerned
with policing and protection of the harbor.
ARTtCl. 5. Shipll' ownerll all well u their
agents (handling agendea) and representath'es
shall give full ssilltanee lind cooperlltion in con_
nection with the of the provisions
of this by their shil'8.
ARTIeLl: 6. When carr}'inll out the prO\'isionll
of this outline, the harbor muter ill to be in
communication, all regardll e!llIential matten.
with the Kobe Resident' Naval Officer, the chief
of the Kobe branch of the Maritime TralUport
Headqu"rtenl. the chief of the Kobe ....ater p0.-
lice department. the chief of the harbor repair
IleCtion of the ch'il cn(ineering brant;h office of
the Interior Department and the chief of the
harbor ....ork.ll section of the City of Kobe port
.ffi<.
Exhibit 0
f .... c:. GOHTINTS Of 100.. ENTITLED "GENUJlL
....."TJONAL OOTLISt OF &011 HAIl_
.tlll
(lbIpter 1. and lICOpe of the planl!
for Kobe harbor air defense.
CbapUr 2. General operational outline of the
Kobe harbor air defense.
5ertlon I. Gene",,1 rules.
Section 2. Ol.osenation report.
Section :l. Red and blue alert.
Section 4. Moat efficient measUrell in light
control.
Section 6. Dillperaal of lIhipa in harbor in
time of blue and red aleru.
Section 6. Sumnu:r,' on harbor IIbe1ter in
time of red alert.
Section 7. Prevention and extinguillhing of
're.
Section 8. Rescue and fint aid.
Section 9. Repairing of damagl!ll of vllrloua
harbor instal1ationll.
Section 10. Camouflaging of harbor in$ta1l11_
tiona.
Section II. Air-defense security system.
Section 12. MiacellanC(lull.
Chapter 3. Air-defense reguiations illllued by
the Kobe Air-Defense Headllullr_
ters.
Chapter 4. MillCellaneous.
A. Ship-protection rf!'lponllibilitil!ll of Osaka
and Kobe navalauthoritil!ll (anchorflland
docked) in coordinating and enfol'CE'ment.
B. Ship.dillperlllli regulationll of the Kobe
hnrbor.
C. Summar,' on dillpersal of ahip;t 1000ded with
dangeroua materiala (expIOlli\'elI).
D. Ship-protecting atation regulations (in
general).
Exhibit P
..o,-RAII)..D(FI!;",s.: .(GULAnONS FOIl COl'o'T.OL Of'
StltI'PING IN II:OU HAUOA
",..;I
OUTliNt Of' CONTI.Ol, "ND .o."''''GOl.EN'T Of' SH".
PING IN II:OU H....ao. fOLLOWING THIt ,.0000UI..-
c ..nON 01' THE OI.D(. FO. ENFOI.<::Ult"''T Of' "'11..
DEFENSE Mf...SUI.I:S.
Chal)ter l. General Provillions
ARTICLE l. This outline pN'scribes the gen.
tral control nece!lllar)' to preserve the lIIlfet) or
;
f
,
f
I
I
f
f
f
1,:'
----":.'. :'
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'" ')'
"'. i
,
I
I
I
I
1/
II
'/
!
I
I
;
I
I
f
i
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"
"
'I'
I
JAPAN
/
-.--
Exhibit N


... _ !"
KOBE.
-_._._._-.-.. ........--- ---------_.-._-
: r
L;
"

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!
,

118
119
Durin. an air-raid ....
the da,-time... red and ...hite penant appT01I-
malelv 6 in lenrth will be t\o...n at each of
the .i"",,mentioned plac<'l'; at nighl. the .....
ina: signal at the lop of the harbor mal!IU 8
office .lId at the ......&8IIkl Halla look-oul ata
tion (3 red lampa hoisted o,ne the
"I intervals of 3 wIll be ullnked for -
minutes. ttum extinguished and kept Ollt.
ARTICU: 9. When II captain i8 about to
his ship. he should dellignate a n:mal.n
aboard and carrT out the captain's dut,esln hut
plae@.nd the full name of this penon should
imrnediateQ' be ",ported to the harbor m&l'ter.
.....hen at the breakwater mooring: or w the
harbor offidal in the oftl\'e of No. 4 jell}' (Q)
who is in charge of the mooring placell. on the
8,ot. k <h
ARTIct.E 9 (2). In cajjl! of a ",Tee or 0 er
auch near the mouth ,of chann,els
1 to 3, Or No.6. at WadaSllkl
St:l.tbn and lit the 5 pier. signsl stau?n flags
,<>ill b> hoisted as spE'C:ified in the follo.wlnr se<.
lion; and pneral of \'essel! will be pro-
hibited.
Dow/i,.e._lnternational Signal Flap H, R
and numeral palunl 1 (in case of an obstruc-
tion ncar the mouth of No.1 channel). Inter
nlltional Signal Flags 11, R and numeral pen_
nant 2 (in case of lin obstruction near the mouth
of No.2 channel). International Signal Flags
H. R :lnd numeral pennant 3 (in Cllse of an
obstruction near No.3 channel).
International Signal Flap H, R and numeral
pennant 6 (in ca'!'e of an obstrudion near the
mouth of No.6 ehar.nel).
If nflC'f'BU,ry:on identiealaignal "'ill be hoisted
on an Iook-out beat to be stationed at the mouth
of the P'orticular channel.
Xil1ltl/iMP.-Three lirhl$ (blue_whlte-blue)
"'iIl be run UP one abo..e the other on the look-
out boat and the boot will be stationed at the
mouth of the particular channel.
Chapter III. OrdeT$ Vencls at Anchor
AaTlCU: 10. Shipe qualilied for hand 8ag sig.
nallina: (hoist the beacon special!)' dHignated
for a tl:ip at anchor and .....hich indicate! that
the ship carries pcrwnnel ""'110 ha\'e qualilied
in the pl'ftl:ribed hand lIag signalling eumin.
tion), "nd vessels moored at buoya equipped
with are charged with taking all ne<:
120
fDIIIll&U"' repnliq: ......ry dilJpa\dtea
..
. .-lIIIkadoDI tor ..-la i. the
a ,n""nv _
\'ieillit)' .
AI'TtQ.ll: 1I. W1lea abi.. are tied up at the
moorina: pier, iMOtar" condiU_ pennit.!.be,
to be moored with the bo_ taclq the
:n of leaving the harbor 110 u to facilitate
rapid movinr away from shore,
AItTICLE II (2). VelllIelswill.tantimeRh.ve
their engines re.dy to be .ble to .nchor,
a:e quick!)' under their own power. Ho...evtr,
.nchorfli in areas NOll. 3 to 5, if pennil-
sion is obtained in not keep tlleir
tna:ines in a of readmelll.
AUlct.E 12. Ships whiCh h.ve the PBrUi of
their engine!! ne<:essal1' for gettina: under..-ar
dillmantled for repairs or refitting must report
Ihis immediate\} to the harbor master.
ARTICLE 13. All ships mUlll keep on board the
minimum personnel needed for moving the ahill
a IIhort diatance and for the various derenM!
me.sures.
AIlTICW: 14. Ships alwa}'! hal'e slronC
tow linH al the bow and stern.
AItTICL 15. All waterpTOJf dool"B and hatches
within the ship are to be firmly llII!'eured iMOfu
all thill doell not hinder acti"ities. All rer
ards
thOllt which remain open for a time, ,rrance-
ment!! lire to be malle so that the)' may be
immedilltely. .
ARTICLE 16. Ships in the procclllI of loodml(
and unloading will take appropriate mellllures
beforehand reg,rding the hatch COI'el1l and
hatch Learns for the ship'lI hokb 80 that
an air.raid warninl: 8Ounds, the)' e.n ql,nckly
d_ the hatchell. . red at
ARTlCU: 17, In order lIhlpll moo
the pier do not obstrllct the paMllg.e of ot:
llhip!l b}' rolling O\'er awa}' from the pIer beca
of damage making water, etc.. the hullll art
he left inclined liS mueh Ilol!llible towardll t e
pier side. ed that
ARTICU: 18. Ships mUllt 80 , aidt
it ill p(l&!ible llpeedih' to clear at the shIp II
. d L_ 80 that t..",
illlelf, DUoy chams an ,...wllen,. of fire
can ehange their moorage quickly In case ....
laces where t,_,
or other such danpr near t,,,, P L_\.t
F h
... the\' must ,.-
are anchored. or t III re n . k!)' til
ready the necessary toolll to be able qUIC ]u.in
ll
CUI the anchor away or cut the anchor c
and mooring wira.
Anta.B 19, Shlp!lloaded with oil, r.... cotton
", odIer combulJtiblt, infl.mmable or eltplollh'e
mllllt have rud}' sul\'leient of hoo5e
.. of ll&nd thoroughly .dequate for
P"'"ntine conll....tionll.
AaTJT1.E 20. Whenel'er the h.rbor muter
thlnka it neceMary, he will h.I'e llhipll which are
l<*led with dangeroull cargo change their an
chorages to proVloullly atablillhed llafet} areall
UlIOOn lUI the wllrning aignalllOundll.
AaTlCLE 20. Whene\'er the harbor muter
teetll an enemy pl.ne, in ofller immediatel}' to
inform the aignal IIt.tion, the .nti...irer.ft ob-
sen,.tion station on land, and IIhips in the har-
bor, toc ship ""'iIl. in the d.ytime immediatel}'
hoist mtern.tional Jlign.1 8.p (numeral pen
nant showing the number of planet! and B) one
above the other at the [oremallt }'ardarm.
AllTlCU: 21. From the "alert"' until the "all
clear:' ships will control the firCli in their boll
en 110 to prCI'ent as much 1111 p(l&!ible the
issuance of smoke from :heir funnels,
AItTlr:u: 22. Vessels, no matter what the "it-
uation,.re not to make an}' IIOUnd auch as might
be confused ,,'ith the pl'e!lCribcd air.raid w.rn
ing. Howe\'Cr, the pre\'iousl}' pl'ftl:ribed aound
for the prt\'ention of collillion .re not in
thla limitation.
ARTICLE 23. In order that vessels at anchor
or moored to buoys be able to put their bollIa
into immediate use, they mUlIt hal'e the boat's
fitting!! bent on to the boat d.vitll.
Chapter IV. MOI'ementof V_I! Within
the Harbor
AItTlr:u: 24. During an airraid warning the
harbo" m&'lter ""ill ha\'e a launch lItationed near
the aouthern tip of the No.5 jt'Uy for communi_
eation witli the airnal station there.
ARTICLE 25. During an air.raid warning, re-
gardleu of whether it ia day or night. all shipa
will stop mOl'inll' and will tie up at prescribed
mooring placCli.
Howe\er. \'eNCla whieh .ro jullt then in the
miliat of le'\ing the harbor will immedi.te\)'
Pl'OCffd oUtllide the bre.kw.ter, and other \'elI-
Itb underway or ill the proeetlll of changinr
their moorinp, as well .s tugboatll engaged in
IIlOOring or c1earinJ .cti.ities, will "land cle.r
of n&l'lgation channels ant! other ahipa and moor
at Pl'C<lcribed anehorages nearb}'.
,,'rom the t1-ul .....
clear ..,Ima: In areaa I IUld 2: at _
hibited. - '""
ARTICLE 27. DuriliC all airraid wal'lll8a
Ilel! wU: cease loadina .nd unlo.dirll
it be day or night. .
ARTICLE 28. During an alert, \ellllel. navi_
gating in areas I to 2 within the harbor will
strictly adhere to the minimum lpeed necesaary
for lllI.fe control of the ship. but are to keep be-
low 6 knot!!. However, damaged 1'_111 takinC
emergency "helter outllide breakwater in
accordance ...ith the ttipulaliOI\ll of Article 3t.
do not come within !hill limitation. In such a
ease, the aforementioned ahips will n}, Interna.
tion.1 Signal Flag T from the maathtad during
the day, and at night will hoi.st II. blue light (an
oil lamp ill not viaible from the air) at the fore-
mast Jardarm.
ARTlCU: 29. All ships will navill'ate so as to
stand clear of waTllhipa and military I'esselll
then at harbor.
AnlCL 30. Regarding tht' internal protet-
th'e meaJlUtel! for ""pair ships other than thoI!e
actuall) moored .t the adjacent abore in the
\'arious when they are to
report 10 the chief of the w.ter polic@and will
reee;"e neeessary aid and cooperation at the
proper time. Regarding the intern.l protectil'e
measurell for ships under structural repair at
the aforementioned adj.eent shore moorings,
this will come under the cognizance of the plant
defenlle corp!! which .re organiud in the ri.
ous dOlCkJ'ardll, and. when neceual')', they ill
re<:ei\"oi! the .id and cooperation of the ter
police dr-fense COI'lll!.
AnlCLE 31. Ships that ha\e reason to fear
the}' might sink bec.use of h:l\'ing been bombed
should do lheir utmOlit to st.nd cle.r of plaees
necessary to the nal'igation and anehoring of
vessels auch as channela, ehannel entrances, jet-
ties, the neill'hborhood of piers. the entrances to
aneoor;lge and docks. etc.
HO"""C\'er, as for thl'lle aforementioned ships
which .re moored at buoys or at the break.
water, the}' are not to change their of
moorina: reckle:ss\J.
ARTICLE 31 (2). If nece!lN.1'}', the h.rbor
master will hal'e the ahiPll ....hich .re moored
to buo,.a disperse beyond the break"'Rter. For
121
!

:
;
,
this PUrpoM. hI' .,i11 hoist International Si.-J
F1.qs (F'.D.E.). ()'ou anl 10 !Km the
Inp of the harbor the 1'0. 5 jett)"
and the Ka,u'I.llki Hana
and lit tt\@ arne time he will transmit
the llami' .signal br the harbor offlce
radio. In this caiM'. will ret;",
the breakwater, /lQi"i' b)' way of the lJrfllCrilJ<.>d
passag.'s indicated in the following rlllll!litlCII-
lion. From there on, shops shnll mo'-e lit II suit-
able $pt.ed. in acrordanc@ with the opinions of
their cllutaiM. 110 a;s to e,'.de AIUld< from enemy
planes.
In the .bo,e C&;le. "hips will 110 all
to steer clear of the roul"$Ol':ll of other ahip>l which
have enteN'd the p8;:sage before them.
I. I passage ('"eMeI8 moored at buor
s
NOlI. 9. 10. 12. 13. 15. 16. lind 18, in the No.2
area).
2. 1'0 2 p8ggj1ge (,"I'$!!ela moored al \)110)'8
11. 14. and 17, ll.$ ""ell all Kawauki C. and
Yitsubi"hi A to D buoys in the !\o. 2 arl!fl).
a. No.3 puiiage ("eueLs moond at buoys
1.2. 4. 7. 8, and Kawasaki A and B
buo!'s in the I area).
"-. 6 pa;;ilage (,_Is moored at buoYs
3. 6. 19 to 23 in the No. I area).
Upon the hoi!lting of International Signal
Flags (M.M.O.) (return) at the various 8ignal
stations (Wada!lllki Quarantine Station. No, 5
jetty signal IItlllion. KawlWIki Hana look-out
station) the variouJI \"_ls co"end by the pre-
viOUll will return to their former
aDChoragfti. in order, beginninr with the "_ls
nearest the pusall'!; or e.... they will a,'oid the
puiiagfti and. in .u=rdarKe "'ith the follo"'ing
.-ragraph, are temporarily 1.0 ride at .ndKlr
outside the proper breakwater.
l. Vel!lleb th.t went by the No. I pa.s!lllre of
the pr<!vious paragrnph,to the eaBt of the No. 2
breakwater.
2. V_Is thaI went b>' Ihe No. 2 pa!l3llge. to
the lIOuth of the No. I paMage.
3. V_b that ..-ent by the No.3 pa.M&ge,
to the IIOUth of the No.3 bruk,,ater.
4. V_la that Wellt 1))' the No.6 pau&", to
IIOUtheat.t of the No.4 break,,ater.
AJtTICLE 32. In order to indicate the direction
and poeltion of shipll within the harbor that
might by chance have 8unk. and in order to pro-
122
.ide for .ah'aP: operatioDl.. ..... tor tile Wet,
of ship' l'llf'OUte .,--..-u have JIf'Oo
,-lMd on the ...nouadecks of the bow UMI ....
marker of autkteat. buo)'aDq
""inted buoyl'-o for the bow lUMI red pablW.
onl'!'. for the litem), aad theM are to be len
seeurely fixed to the hull by 20 meten of buoy
cable.
AIITICI.E 33. The harbor muter will
Na\"y techniciana Immediately undertake, under
his $u;Jer\"isi:lII, for the removal of the
debri1 from hulls or lIunken v_la.
AaTleu: 34. Unlell-' led b}' prellCribed ruide
ahip, "essels are nol to sail throU&"h a de1ell$l!
area (where nets, minell, etc
are laid). In thia cue, the guide ship "ill II;
at the mllBthead the international lIag (flnt
8ubllWute (repeater) flag). DelICnding on con_
ditions, instead of II guide ship. II pilot may be
and put aboard a veesel.
Chapter V. Pilots and Tugboll.ts
ART1C1.F. 35. During an air_raid alarm, in
addition to stationing a harbor office tugboat
at tbe southern end of the No.1 jett}' and an
Otbel one at the aouthern end of the No.5 jetty,
whene"er necl!$llllry a look-out IIhip will be 8ta
tioned during the caytime at the entranee to
each channel.
ARTICLE 36. During an air-raid alarm, the
pilob ailBOCiatiol1ll will dispatch one pilot from
each aMOCiation to be stationed at the harbor
maater's cffice (depending on conditiollll) in the
room on top of number 4 jetty which ia the
offIee controlling mooring IocIltiollll on the apoL
AaTl<.:U; 37. In order to engage in pilotinr
duties, pilots must without fail firat ret in touch
with the harbor mallter'a office.
ARTIC1.F. 38. When the harbor mll$ter thinkll
it neceiWIry, he will hoist International Signal
Flagll (Y.A.) (we need :l tug bollt) from the
top of the harbor master's office. the No. I) jetty
8ignal office, and the Kaw&Ulki HlIna look-llut
station, and at the same time he will ha,'e the
harbor department's patrol boata hoist the same
air
nal
and cl'\liJll! around the harbor with their
whistles blowing. In this cue, the tUgbo&U
!pec.ially designated from amonr the ones o....ned
by the .--rious operlltorll will .11 gather
ill' at the llOuthern end of No, I jetty and In
accordance with the directions of the hlIrbo
r
..-.r ..ill ""pair to their ... rious atatlonll.
)Iowef'r, 1m- f'np.g\'d in operation. of
trfJl:f up, c....inC off and ch*nginll" anchonr.ge
wID pther immediatel)' aftfor oompleting IUIld
operation!,
Chapter VI. Taking Jl,leallurCll in ltegard to
Aid and Call Altacks
ARTlf'l.F 39. As collision mut cables, veltllela
will alwa}'s have provided various suitable atee!
cabll'll and heml) rOlIC8 on the fore and after
decks, u well aa dip ropes on the deckll amid-
ahipll,
AaTlCU 40. A \"_1 which hall suJltained a
gu atWk, will, if neceMar}', ha"e its place of
anchor:lge changed in accordance with direc-
tions of the harbor master. The ship'lI captain
will immediatel)' plan lldequale measuretl (or
irll8 lleutrali7.lltion, 8uch measurell to be endorsed
by the official. At the same time,
he will report to lhe harbor w/lter police de-
partment master'a office whal he intends to do.
ARTICU 41. When a 'e!l.'ll'1 hu sustained a
plI atUu:k. it shall not lea"e port unleM it ha.a
gas neutralization measUrell en-
dof1ll!d by the p8-defense official.
Chapter VII. Ship-Shore Traffic Ill! weUall
Shelters. Etc.
.42. During an air_raid 1Iiarm, IIhip
captallljj Will prohibit their crews going ashore
except for lIpecial reasollS. '
AllTllU: E
there i.o an)' r&.r" II
to poi""n IlU i' 11......
lnadine Or unJo.din 'f t ....n - o:on4w:t ...,
traft\c ylth other : p.:rat,olll; <or ......... t1l
official in';: IPB la"d. until the po..
ulutl'tl It may
ART1CU: 41. Whe h . ..
the ship'lI ;,.,', alr,raid alarm,
mhe It a ""r
tact the Ifuide for the 1 I ,-v ICy to con_
hll'e the IIhip's m. sn< IIhelten and 'Jdll
llCribed IIhellers. r,,,JulCe in pre_
"
.. ' 'ea...e s beyond the
.'IoCa I anu pier mooral will take measu
a.s directed by the chief of the "'ater police ::.
partmcllt.
.son:. Thia outline WQ dra"'n up in I
Iation with the of t"- ....... -
K
. ,. '''' .--.... and
,oue na,:a atattont<, the chief of the Kobe
"ater IlOhce department, the chief of the Kobe
brllnch office of the marine flection of the OBak
bureau, the chief or the
engllleermg branch office of the Interior De-
partment and the chief of the ch'i! engineering
flection of the Cit}" of Kobe.
Printt.'!J, April 10, 1943; Illllucd. ,,),,pril 13,
19.t3; Kobe Cil}", Kobe Ku; Coalltal Communi-
cation No. 5 Shippin&" Bill); Kobe
BUBinelll :'Ilen'a (Kobe Jitaumusha
Kai); Publisher. Kawakami Rikuju; Telephone
Kumber. Sannomiya 454; Kobe City, Kobe Ku.
ShimO)'llmatedori 2 Chome; Printers, Kaiun
Keizaiaha.

the P'-cea to ..hich lhey P. the wtda IlIItIa
thus taking ....1illle PIllIQ.
e. At it is not the policy to make
eVllCuation complilaory, nOr for prelectlin, dtJ"
or Ward offke" to enter hom...s one by one and
adl'ille eVII<::JStion; but it is hoped that ttK.e
c!aMlfled in parsgraph one will, of their own
aoecord, lollow the national poliey and eooperate
in '''''''ution .. lar aa poa/lible.
d. It ill neoeaa.ry for e\'llC1MlI!lI to CO In lamily
unita 110 far .. JMMaible, and not ,ialate the
lamil)' policy of oor nation.
e. Delitinations must be oUllJide the eVlI<:ua_
tion sreu (Kobe and Amagauki in this prefec_
ture, and in addition the Tokyo area and the
cities of Ka. ..asaki, Yokohlm.s, Osaka, l\Ioji,
Kokura, Tobata, Wakem.atllu, Hac:himan). Also.
the (011o",in.. citiell are 10 be a"Gided: K)"Oto.
Tac:hiUwa. Ka...apchi. Yoao-uka, Sakai, FU8e,
Kiahinomiya, }Iiuge, Shimonoaeki.
f. In cases of t!"ac:lIation or penoQ.II, ...Ith the
pUrpolle of providing llOme help in moving ex-
])('nses, money will be given far encouraging
removai to the following classes at the rate of
200 )'en for a famil)' of four or le!\ll, and SOt)
J'en for a family of fi"e or more.
(I) Tbolle wha paJ' city Wl'lI under 2 J'en
or "'ho pay none at aU.
(2) Far.lilie of M'n'ice men call! to
....
(3) Familiell of roD.i<:ripted men.
(4) Other calleS where the need is recog_
niZed.
Note: ThO$e who mOI'e to the pIsces men-
tioned in p:tragrlph 2. e. ""ill not rec:eh'e this
grant.
g. Other:s than HoOSe in\-ol\'ed in bouM' or
inrtallation ""-at1.lation are reqllt!Qed 10
b)' February 10, 1944, and all others befare
the end of March.
3. Hone ertrcllaliOll._I. In order to make
0p('1l spaC('/l where lraD.!ll)Qrtation is
around important factoriea and installations or
where fire or other air-defenlle acth'i-
ties are difficult due to densit)' of bou_. or in
places where il is important to confine damqe.
the go"emor "'i11 determine the areas from
whkh hou5es are to be remo,'ed and gh-e the
orders.. Thi.$. differing from e"acuation of per-
sons, is mandatory based on the air-ddense
law.
Exhibit T
IDICT10HS fOIl tNc:OVUGIHG CITT EVACUATION
-'OGO PUncTul.l
,....... ,Jt. .1181""'. .....J
.... JQQ""'v r1.
I. TIr, [Clr cifV
Ina- from all of prl!8ent air raids
aft inevitaiJle. Further, judging from lhe
methods of fhe enemies' air bornbill*" or 1I.1Il_
bu.ra' and Berlin, it ill a'-oluteJy necess.ry to
make Japan'a important citit!ll strong in air
der':>n:;e in all hutI'. To that end "'e must cury
out (I) reduction of e>:Cf':!llli\'e population, (2)
e"acuation of houflell to gel open apaCell and
(3) Qf important all of
which ....1' refer to all "city evacuation," In Ihill
I'Nl(eclure, {','un_tion has tH:-en decided on for
Kobe and Amagagkl citie.s.
2. f:'"Q('IlGtioll Of perw...._ . P"'rlIOn& 10 be
e\"lu:uated are, in addition til thoee in\'Olved in
hou8e nd installation e\-Uculltion. persona (or
whom ther" is little need to l1!side in the arl'all
to be evacuated. FCir example:
(I) Ca2es where the heads o( houllehOlda
live in the eVllcuation ar...as but have their
work in gO\'ernment officels, banks and bllSi_
nl'all firms located elaoewhere or are rommut_
ine- to sl>Ch work.
(2) Cues where in rearrane-ement of busi-
neu ...nterprises one has Iot!t his
(or the lime being.
I;':) Cases where one is living on annuities,
])('n810n8, income from real ('/Itate or interest.
(4) Tho$(' living on allowances.
(5) Those with no ti>;ed emploJ'ment.
(6) Tho.se residing in the arell.'J (or their
childrt'n's eduelilicn.
(1) Tholle who bec:a.u$e o( retirement or
recent marriage are maintaining two house-
hold2,
(5) Families of people living abroad or al
a distance and who are living on
allowances.
(9) ThOlle whOlle occupation does not
sitate their Ii-'ing in the art'a,
b. EI':Icualion of persuns i8 oot like tempor_
ary taking of refur bJ' women and llDlall chil_
dren 8lieh Il.) is pl'lIcticed in other c:ountria It
lIIeans turning the importanl citil"S into air
defense cit;ell, and having the e\'IICUet'll g;\'e
thtmselvu to increasing the war p<Jtelllial in
"

,
.,
,

1
E...;
.-

.
.,
i!. 0
,
"
,.

..
o
.

..

124
125
....1 .....
b. All. fundamental polic)', condemned
will bought in and n'mowd b)' the
1re{ectul"e. Any materilll$ l!t'Cured from this
....iII be controlled by the preCectUI"e and
J!IOO in !!Orne dcpart.nlent ....here nel:'ded.
e. The prefecture will either buy the land or
rent it. u the o"'ner Ilf'('{erll.
d. :\Ioving will.be paid to
Ind compen$8tion to In ae<:O.
lnee with arrangemcnu cf the enterpnJOe.
of mor,"g.-a. Evacuees will
file an application for mo\'ing with the
evacuation-guidance offiee of the ward:
b
A certificate for moving will be
(Th Will
the applicant from the ward o"... ,Ill
entitle the beaT1'r to \"arinus kinds of aulstanee
listed below.) .
e. When application is made. if applicant
is nlO\'ing beeauee of house e\'llcuatLon, the nee-
_ry in\"estigation will be made for pa)'menl
of ,'uiol,lll kindll of compelWltion. and, on the
ba;!is of this. c:ompenytian .....ilI be p.ld
the prefecture, In addition, if the e\'acuee III
qu.lified to receh'e the money. grant f?r
couraging of e\'8C\I1l.tion. he Will be paId lm-
medi.teh from the ....rd oft\ce.
S. Sp'ciol /ullldli.g of noCllet,.-a. Ha.d-
li.g of tnllU"portotlon.. .
(t) Consulting arenta Will
atatiolll of rO\'ernment and prl\'ale .rall":
line>! truckinr and upreu a.
the)" ....iIl plan traraportation ,,'.ith
rirhta in all t)'pe:!! of tralll!portabon.. .
(2) Truckinr and e"prellll Will
gi\'e a 20 percent reduction, and radwaya a
auitable I"llte.
(3) Sleeper and tid:eu can be se-
ellnd ...;th priorit)' rimU.
(4) Each per!lOn il requested t? use auch
packing rnateria15 all he haa. but, In c.a!ltS of
neceaaity. apecial can be made on
application to the prefecture through the
block _iation leader.
b. RtgldaU"g /IlMtittlrc .lIiplIltllt.-:ln \i.ew
of the present condition of trt;nllponallon dlffi-
eultiea, it ill neeesllllfJI to reatrict IIhipmenU of
houMchold goode to minimum. In reference
to Ihu, in each police precinct a apecial
zation for pur.:hue hili lJe.en set up wltb the
.seeond-hand dealen U1IOCiation aa ila nucleUII,
and thty will purch.se at fair price!.
126
c Hllp j" fff'"rlttg ......,.
. (t) 1I0nllDJ at the ..unadon ahou1d be
"ith relatiY8ll 10 far II ,..tble. For thole
with no re,*tiY8ll bous1JlC expediter ..
lJe.en appointed in _b pollee pndnct.
(' dl!lliroua of help In -=urlna ttou.-
i;g bhould fill out an application blank "'hleh
can be secured at the of.
flee of the ward. Dnd prestnt It..
(3) For (IIardin.. t.he. d.elbnp of evac
Uee:!, a stringent reatrlcbon hued. oa
I
. will be Nl.rried out both "'lthID and With.
... II . t
out the e\acua.tion area ane eMIDlt a ones
own discretion ill nol Further.
. prtl\"i$ion for grantlD'l:
:011C)' for turning into d....tlling&.
d. Di"triblltioll of "tuor", .
(I) On the of the certifi_
cate the distribution of neceSill\rJ' for
li\'ing will be expedited at the recel\"mg area.
(2) In the case of !!Orne arlidl!il (such IS
;soap dried f\.ih, etc.) pro\i.'!ion ia made for
10 be secured 110 far as pu..... qible in the
preltlnt location.
e. llelp in auurillg tmployment.
(1) In the emplorment-guidance office
officer for conllulting about employment, w,1I
be and priorit)' treatment ....111 be
accol'ded.
(2) Care will be taken that do not
fall below U\O!Ie pl"eviou$ly reeell'ed.
(3) In respect to limitation on e.mploy-
ment. apecial eonaideration ",ill be gl\tn to
employing e"&cuees,
(4/ Special handling of thoae who need.
help for li\'ing ia planned in the ease of thOlll!
who cannot immediatel)- secure
(5) Thoae desiroull of securing emplOy-
. f ,hoy' will fill
ment can receh'e .alllstantt I .
. . pro\'lded
out tile employment quelltiomllli
re
d
. d n 0 of the war
at the e\"acuation-gul arlee 0 Ie h
and present it to the one in charge of I e
e,'acuation employment office.
f. lIa"dJillg af IIII)IIC CGrrtfi"g all IlInr oK'll
. ellll will
(I) Th08C in tile distributing bualll n
. b IM__1 out by reallO
not ha\"e their uainellll c .....,.... I ,
f d mental po It ,
of ev.cualion, but, as a un a !!O far
ahall be mo\'ed to auitable areall. and, .ed to
as 10000l condition.ll permit.....ill be allo"
continue tMir bUllines.'l,
(2) Oth,era ea.1T)'ln.. on their own busineu
will have It chanred or dOlled out by rea.llOn
of evacuation, and will not be able to carn-
it 011. However, lholle concerned "'ith IflCrua-
I.... producUon, auch II Irarusportation and
Iabor..upply qenciell, 3.re not aubject to this
restriction,
(3) ThO.lle conducting rel!taurarll3, drink_
I.... places, cafes, 00.... placea of _imation
and places of aml.UltDlent will. II a funda.
mental policy, not be able to carry on. H01I'-
tnr, large reatauranlll are not aubject to thia
limit,
(4) Barber ahoPll, baths .nd kitchena op-
erated e.:tlu.aively for important faetoritll and
buain_ ...iIl be riven eonsidtratiOfJ for
calTJ'ing On their buainesa.
... Special consideration will be given to the
handling of NOlI. 4 /lnd 5 abol'e in Ihe case of
families of thoae called to the colorll and thoole
eonllCripted.
h. HgJtdlillf/ of traJU/t:r to oUler aelloola.
(1) Those from youth and priman' lithonia,
on application to the principal of Ihe IIChoal
in the receiving area, rna}' be entered in the
lIChool no matler ...hat the fixed enrollment
be.
(2) Middle aehool studenUl, as a funda-
mental principle. may be transferred 10 the
I18me of sehonl and the same aubjeclll.
This is the cue no matter ...hat the fixed en-
rollment may be. If it is difficult to carn' out
the above pro\';siona. studenlll in llChool ....ho
have completed the elementary eoUI'lle of the
primary scilool will be allowed to enter llChool
in Ihe receiving area' irrespective of type of
school. eou rill!, Or term.
6. Rilla for 1lI0ri"g into t:MCllatioll
a. Movement into the evacuation areaa ia to
be refrained from, ao far all pollllible, but in
unal'oidable eases a eertificate or permit will
be needed,
b. Xcv.' imtallation or mo\ing of place of
buaineaa will not, aa a fundamental polit). be
rewgnized.
7, IJulallatian el'Ol'Uatl'QN. Installation e\'ac-
Ultion meana tile conllOlidatinr or mo\ing to
the ('Quntn' of !Choola, public bodie!!. all kindll
uaistanee organi7.lltiolll!, control organi7.ll
tions, companl>=s, factories, etc, Thill is to be
n"l. "_II
carried out COnlll!tulh'ely by the orpnlpKeee
concerned.
8. Rnpo...wlt CI1'l1<I"UatiOlla for ,i.e ___
of tnIfiiC1tilloll.
a. lteadquarUrs for the carryin.. out of city
evacuation are in the prdtcture and
are entrusted with thla work.
b. In the ...rd OmeN there are the t''IC\I1-
tion......let.ann- oftIcea. entrnsl.ed .jth gl!Deral
eonsultation on t'"aClIatiol1.. In the poIic-e officea
concerned tbere are tbotle in ebarge of t','aeua-
tion arld the)' alJlO are entrusted with consulta_
tion and evacuation in connection ""ith the e\'ac-
uation-(IIidance office..
Exhibit U
MAIN I'OII'oTS fOa C/lKavING our [,'ACUATlOS
foa aHUGEFS-K08J! (50 R,I"""", 10,.. No. "")
l'n.pIold ,..bl"'A..r April. b, ,w./I
.uI _ til. A_ ., I" P , ..._. PoJi. o.,.n-
..."'" G_ , ..u 1 _-..
i" ..... ,...1 .,.."'" I_.u __"" _ f. _.... I_
b_ .f ",rou, ,_."" ""'''''" ""'-
PRlU,MBJ.E; Colll!idering present circum_
it may be anticipated that there will be
large-acale and repeated air attach 'on cities.
and for that reason it u necalll8l)' to cufJ' out
escape measures for mull"!" in the cue of
large-llCale injun'. Therefore, on the baaia of a
note JUSt received from the Baku Sa/lQllIlH.
(Air_Defen..oe General Headquarterll), it has
been decided m carn' out refuge meaaurell for
suffering in aec:ordanee ,,'ilb the attached
pamphlet, "Main Points for Carn'inr Out
EI'acua.lion for Refugee.s:' To thia end a.ll of
you will maintain dO$e cooperalion and pAl'
attention to the following and !il!e to the
tompletion of planned preparationa for speedy
operation bued on the abo\"e. Note: Police
chiefa outside of areas for carn'ing oul the
refuge measures and of the reception area.'! will
lP\'e notice to the to.n .nd chiefs eon-
eemed and see to it that there ia nothing left
unattended to in p,*nL
1. This outline has detennined the main
poinlll in carrying out t"('fuge measures whicil
can be applied to large.ll(ale and repeated air
attacks on Kobe. Amagaukl and Ni.$hinomra.
and "'!'len the refugl! rneaaura .re on a amall
.!!Cale you will see to il that thill outline il COD-
formed to, and in other cities, towna and vil-
127
biIreI. _Ul'ell are to be carried out in actOrd-
altCe with the determined poUe}"
.. The main inlent of thelle meuurell is that
III'ho hue kIM of homes
0' the air raids and ,,"ho for public dut}" 01'
bl$ine13 reallOns do not need to in the
dlmared area shoukl lake oull'iide .of
t\e lrea" but who
lUted below. no matter how $e,'ere Ihe attackl
raa}' be. are to remain at their poilUl;
a. Go,'ernment officiall. ,
b. Watchers. aUl<iliar}' fir<' and pohC<!. res-
cue. construclion workers, (after
raid). !!Chool patriotic organiutlons,
e. Workers in munition faclones and of
f1eell, harbor_transporllition and supply om-
elab.
d. In addition. othenJ del!.ignated by the
1'O,ernor. fire and police chitta and the ma)'or.
3. The ot tholle menlioned in Ihe
paragraph are to be trealed as refu-
..... ""
4. In matters pertaini.,. to Ihe a
,rotection of thee de$irnated officiall and
l1boren "..ho are to remain at their pc:l<rta.
lhey are lutrerel'll, are to
k a:1"en ahead of time to thOlll! In c!'&nre an,d
I) th()!ll! lubject to them and a defimte plan II
I) be prepared.
5. Preparations before takina: refuge are
bsed upon the air-defense Jaw and help for
lufferen is based on the
leCtlon law and the proper a1>phcatlon of both
jaIn expected, At the !!lime time mutua,l,co-
lpet1ltion between police and heads of clt,e.,
:owns and \'ilIagl!!l is of course taken tor
(Tanted. as ..-ell as cooperation between offi-
dab and bodies concerned and complete pre,:
uation of plans and cal'T)'ina: out of plans IS
nd '1
6. The police chiefs and cit)', a ""-
laie healh of the temporary recepuon areas
for refui_ and desirnated (thOlll!
..ho have no relativft to 1'0 to). wben It cornell
to and protection of autrerers. are to
guide Or IeRd the people in those !lO that
In the epirit of positi"e cooperation ,and
tection they may do e''I''l')thinl' that f1tbng,
7, Because there will be refugeel! wIth rela-
1I,"ea coming in from other prefecturo:a
lhi$ one and their reception and protectIon wlll
128
ulr.,> attention in an pan. of UIilI Pftfer:tu.h,
police chiefa aDd the bMU of towna Uld
villagell will, of counte, be a:pected to live COB-
tructh-e attentiOD to thl! ,..tvial of ref....
:nd ....i!! see to it that DOthI... Ia left uadcnM! to
thill purpollC.
So The p1acts (aIoq the
roulell) are liai!lOn betwftIl the
evacuating pl&Cl':!l and the Tt'CePti".l1 and,
u Ihe}' are extremel}' III lil.1lJOn be-
tho.'le left in the dlllUter area and the
tween .t ., e,,"""'ted lhat they will do every_
refugees. I I ...
thing po!lSible in applying the planned prepara.
tions. ,
fl. Councils are to he establia
d
'''',' In th,,\' c&ll,e
of Kobe cily. between the war . or.po Ice o.
f1ell) and the respective authontles In the re-
ceiving are&\! (or police olficl!1l), they are
to see to it that houaing protection are car
out in a thoroughgoing manner.
10. When it cornell to takinl', refuge. al a
tundamenUlI principle, Will go foot;
in the "&lie of old, )'oung or Sick
the' are to be liei'll by streetcar and. In
110M, ) I t -rto
addition. plans are to be made or rans.... -
lion by truck.
II. As it mas be v;peeted that there will be
a rush of visitors to the refuge areas and the
receh.jng areas. police chiefa are planl
ahead of time for limiting or prohlbltllll' lucb
visitll, ,
I? Kobe chart of the location of relatl\'e!
(if ;here are any) is attachcd.
for relatives in other prefectures also IS ap
d
,, 'Note' chlll'ts not tranala,ted.
- . 40)
F "al see lleference Item No, '
or OrLglll . , based n thia
13. The planned preparation 0 " be
outline makes the a!llurnption ",ll of
approll:iTlUltely 20 percent of the ed
Kobe and Amapsaki and Nishinomya, in"O" ,
in di$uter. and it ....ill be OIIt on thil
.......
844.045
Censua population ._.563.635
Thole with relativell 0
1 t
280,51
withOllt re a 1,'e11 -_.
,. th mber of
Then follow!! a chart glvlIlg I'. IlU f II: be
reaidenta with relativea in each ward 0
I
t' 'n 1I)'ogo pw
dty and the dtiea ant coun lea I 'd ]lUI
fecturl! in which the relativea of these ]'(lSI e
are located. (Note: This chart not tranalalOO.
For orilinal, _ Reference Item No. 40.)
A _nd .. hart ahoWl! the DUmber of relIidenla
with relath'l"ll in other preff!Ctu,"-thi, Is not
broileD down b}' warda of Kobe cit}'. (Note:
For original, _ Rifer_
Anal)..ia of the first chart &hows that 232,b61
of Kobe had retativea in I/}'ogo pre-
fecture.
The r.eeond chart showa Ihe remaininlt' 330.
974 lICatteroo in other prerecturl'll of Japan
proper lind Saghalien, Forrnolla and Korea.
Similar are I'h'en for Amllgasakl and
Nishinlomya,
Main Points For Carryinl' Out
EVllcuation For Refugeea
1. priltciplea._a. On the occlllion of
(lir rai<ls. the entire populace of the prefecture
in every place or work and in e,'Cl')' home will
mainuin the apiril of the battlefield and in the
work of air defenlle. fire fighting and relief, etc.,
.nil work to pre"ent the spreadinl' of tholle dis-
asteu with all their might, and. when disuten
of creal TlUIiJlitude arise, "ill u,rry out the
ell'Rpe of refureea aceordinl' to theae main
principles.
b. in accordance with this main
outline. are people who ha\'e 1000t their homes
or damage because of air raids, and
from air-defenae workers, offlcera and
laborers in fllctorie/land places of businelll!, will
be classificd I\S sufferers in general.
c. The gOI"ernor will have entire charge of
the e"acuation or sufferers.
d, Police chiefs will be in charge of the carry_
inl out of the evaCliation of sufferen,
e, CiIJ', town and "mage chiefs will be in
thargt of reception centers and other erner_
1\'1lC)' nlief for autre-ren.
2. roclllltiofl area'.-Kobe. ATlUIgasaki and

3. RCuiriJlfl arru lor '1l/fl'rl'r8,-a. Sutrer_
all' to chOO8e their own places for refuge
relativell (hereafter called thoee Who take
with relath'es) as a fundamental prin_
ClIlIe. While tholle who cannot choose for them-
:,:"e$ des.ignated refugees) will
e provIsIon made for them by the mayors
fOncerned,
b. Refureea will make UIN! of _pty bd4-
inp, inns, eating places, temple,a, publk: ......
inl' haifa and ac:hooIs. etc.. in the area PIlbIIatled
in lhe appended chart No. 1 "For temporary
receiving areu for retugl!l'll." (Note: Chart
not tranalated. For original. _ Reference
Item No. 40,)
c. Reception placet which are to be prepared
for "deairnated refuceea" in the three citiell
will be lIIl!t up in aceordance with the pre,ioua
paragraph In areal published in the appended
chart No.2" For receiving areal for de/lignated
reful'eell." (Nole: Chan not tlllnslated, For
original. _ Reference Item No. 40,)
d. The gal'ernOr and mayOn! concerned will
make proviaion for the reception of those who,
while I.>eing aufferers, still ha\"e to remain in the
evacuation areaa for realIOns of public duty Or
buainClill.
e. In order to accommodate tboee ""bg have
to) lila}' in the diaaner areaa according to the
preceding paragnph, in cue01 need, temporary
d.....ellinp may be erected.
4, Prepa",-tioll of plo.....-&. The maynr of
the evacuation arca ill conference with the po-
liee chief and toW'll and 'illage heads concerned
will make plana for the protection of refui@l'll
in refen!nce to the following poinu;
(I) Teltlporar llccommodlltiou fqr nfrv
g"U,-(a) Reception placet alld reception
abilit}',
(b) A!lIlignmenl. of reception places (ill
Kobe accordilli to wards).
(c) Control of reception placea.
(d) Suppl)' of food. clothing, ele.. for
refugees.
(e) Measure. for mediu,1 relief and agairu;t
eoidemiCll.
(I) AI1}'1hioi else that _ry.
(2) l)uil1Mletl n!fll{/u.-(a) Same :I!l
for
(3) Refll{/f:u Id:o /tare ill re-toill._(a)
Same aa for refugees.
b. The ehiefs tOlll"l1 and
heads of the areaa for refui@l'll and d imated
refugees will coopt'rate wilh the pre'l'iou$ly
mentioned plana of the ma)"ort of evacuation
areu. and for the accommodation of refugees
will make nece!lllarJ' preparations for repair of
building;... di/llribution of food. clothing and
129
oller and also for medical care and prf!-
of epidemics.
c. The police chieh of the evacuation "reas
in accordance with the prepllrations the may_
ors in paragraph 4a will confer with the police
chids of the reception areas conccrned and will
make preparations for the following points
amcerning refugees;
(1) Transportation facilitiea lUld routes
lind alternate roules to the reception nreaS.
(2) Rull!'! for the guidance.
and r"Ception of refugees.
(3) ,\l1otment of poliCf! officials or mem-
of the auxiliary fIre and police a$$OCia-
tiOll necesMry for the guidllnce and reeeption
of refugees and the number of necessary per-
sonnel.
(4) Anrthing else that is necessary.
d. In order to carry out evacuation to rela
tive$ or to;> designated evaculltio;>n destinations
iftu conditions ha\'e been restored to normal,
refugees who have been accommodated in
temporar}' receh'ing centers, the police chiefs
in the temporary reception areas and with town
and village heads will make arrangements in
reneral as follows:
(1) Refugen with rekltives.-(a) Rela_
ti"es within the prefecture are to be classified
according to citie& and relatives outside of
the prefecture ara to be classified according
to prefectures.
(b) Guidance to the place where transpor-
tation i$ to be secured. the transportation it-
self and the roads to be used.
(c) The allotment of police officials Or
members of the auxiliary police and fire asso-
ciation necessary to handle the above and the
number of necessary personnel.
(d) Anything else that is nece!lSary.
(2) De6ignoted refuget$.-(a) CIMsifica-
tion according to county or city of the
designated reeeption areas.
(b) Transportation to the designated
evacuation area and the roads to be used.
(c) Same as "c" above.
(d) Same as "d" above.
e. When it com('ll to carrying out evacuation
in with the previous paragraph, the
police chiefs will provide refugee certificates
according to form No.3 appended. (Note: not
translated; for original, see Heference Item No.
130
40) and will Jay plans for (ivllll" (Onervte In.
in the Item" neeell8l.ry for tranlPOrta-
tion flcHities to the reception areas, roads, ete.
l. The roads to be used IIlI refuge roadll and
auxiliary roads between the evacuation area;
and telnporary reception and dellignated ref_
ugees reception areas are according to the
refuge road pian in chart No.4, appended,
(Note; Chart not lranlliated. For original, lee
Reference Item No;>, 40.)
g, The police chiefs in charge of the refuge
roads ::ccording to the above paragraph. aad
town and village ahiefs. will cooperate and
establish protection areas for refugees along
the roads and make plans for equipment
lor housing. feeding and medical attentiOn for
refuge<'s. Temples, public meeting places and
schools are to be used for housing and feeding,
and dispensaries and ho;>spitala are to;> be used
for medical treatment.
h. Police chiefs in charge of escape roads in
accordance with prepnrations mentio;>ned in the
preceding paragraph for guidance and protec-
tion of the escape roads for the refugees will
make plans ahead of time for police officials
and lor auxiliary police and fire association per_
sonnel under their diredioll to be assigned to
these tasks.
1. The governor, with reference to the use of
trains and street railwaYlI for the transporta-
tion of refugees to distant parts, will co;>nfer
with the railroad bureau chiefs concerned and
wHi no;>tify the police chiefs of the dates and
places for boarding trains.
j. Police chiefs in charge of the departure
and arrival places of rnilways, street railways
and steamers. and the city, town and "mage
chiefs. will cooperate and make plans for equip-
ment for housing, feeding and medical care for
refugees in aeccordance with paragraph "g"
above.
k. The town llnd village chiefs of the areRS
for temporary reception of refugees and recap-
tion of designated rdugcell will confer with
the police chiefs aoncerned and lay plans to
have them open comfort statio;>ns along the wlI}'
for rf!fugeea and provide liaison in matters of
medical care. ratio;>ning of supplies and COll1-
munications for the refugees.
I. Comfort ,ta!ions for
ol'll'l.nized wllh person I refuget's are to be
...1I1a6e officials. up of tOWrt and
tion personnel. tire aSllOeia.
pel"lKInnel doctors palrJl)tlc a!;SOCiation
m. The 'elt,. 'A nur'ea ,and matrons.
, , .....Wnandl'lll h' r
bon areaa for thoU'h age c Ie 8 of recep_
tive8 are to exert th " 0 take refuge with rela_
paragraph "k" f In aCoor<lanee with
of refugeell. or t e housing and protection
,
.5.. C,arr/linQ out af eMCll.alion._a E,.,...
Ion IS 0 be . .
b . cllrrled out o;>n the gOl'erno;>r',
. Police chiefs, when they have re<:(l zed
that damage hall been extremely heav}.
the re.scue of sufferers is diflieult, in IIpite ::
the fact that they have taken speedy refu .
parka, athletic fields, graBlly placell and g:h'n
empty spots. "'ill immediately notify th 0 er
nOr of this effect. e gaver_
c. The governor, when he has reae d
port from the police ahief in , ... "ve a re_
th ,-_ anae with
. e. a.....,ve paragrallh, Or when he aonsidera tha
It IS neceSSllrJ' will give '
. v, ers to the pol"
chief to start evacuation in a d lee
general plan. ceor ance with this
d. The police when the or' r
h bee .' er Or evacuation
as n given, will cause refugees to be led
accommodated in the te .. to
,
. mporary recelVl11""
cen ers accordlllg to the pian outlined "
e. \Vhen it comes to conducting refu
temporary reception places in
"'llh the above paragraph the bl k ..
I d h ,OC -aSOOClallon
ea er .or III deuptr is to be entrusted with this
operatIOn. When the refu""ees h .
od' I . "al'e..,."n acco;>m
m a e{ 111 the tem'lOrar,'. .. -
,ecelvlllg place the
of the evacuation area will coo t
"lih the police chiefs concerned and poe'"p'"
roll of refug . are a
f . ees, lIeparntlng thooe who will take
uge With reiativell and the designated ref-
gees, and see that thereafte. h .
tecto ouslng and pro-
lan are fully carried out.
.. return to normal. the
and \\111 give or.ders to .the police chiefs,
ty have evacuation carried out bJ the two
PeS of .
i" 111 accordance with the plan
Paragraph 4 d.
g. When til r .
e po Ice chiefs have evacuation
' ..... out th "1
0.' I ' ey WI have tbe refugees p','
"'CUaratte ,. ,
(I) II Ion 0 the follOWing provisions'
thnoAThey will carry oul the Instructions of
_0 Who "" .
"ll'e gUIdance, such as police offi-
city. town lI.nd vill .
lary police and fire auxfl.
steamllhip authorities and 'hon. r.allway and
orderly manner and 'ive . ey '."Ill act la an
and aClions lj(I as not b .attentlon to Words
people. rmg trouble to other
(2) They will tak th
enough food and th.e?, blankets.
paper, toothbrush a d
Y
ece8l!ltles suah as
the lceeptio n soap to last them to
\.aluable1l. n area, and a lImaJr amount of
h. The POlice officials d
lage chiefa of th . cIty. town and vil_
structions to the e areas will give in_

. IOn 0 e sufferers
I. The official and public bod .
tion areas an' th . les (If the evacua_
i a e receptIon areas for d
/rIlsted refugees will establish a . es-
strengtbening the Haiso f counc.Il for
refugees. n or the protectIOn of
j. FacilitiC!l for chan in .

rccei\.e . .qUlC Y to the refugees who
protecbon In accordance with 'h'
eral plan. IS gen
6 f.' t

l.....here conditions arise which it
, ",t to out the planned evacuation in
aecor ance With these mllin in
anticipate that there is ""'i: whe,n
.. k "V ...... "'" COn USIOn
re rna e plans for managin th .'
of evacuation in the face of
. . Erpenses.-a. Emergenc)" rf!lief is to be
gIven "? according to this general plan
oasIS of the Wartime-Disaster_lnsurance
b.. bodies of the e\'aauation area are
to gIve aSSIstance in the ex""nses
. necessarv for
preparations 10 be made b, Ihe to... '."1
h f nn an \'1 age
Ie s of the temporary reception and des.
sufferers reception areas, or else to
dIstribute supplies.
c. Tile government will plI}' expenses nece1l_
carrying out this general plan, includ_
Ing aSSistance for the expenses assumed
bJ' pUb.lic bodies. (Note; There (o;>lIow four
appendIces not translated. For original see
Reference Item No. 40.)
131
Exhibit V
SUWWAaT OF TIlANS..ATION 0' INn'IUCTIONS P\Ja.
Ll$IIW IT .... TOGO ,aEfECTU"I. " NOVI\)I.UI " ....
TO ALL I'OLICII. CAPTAIN!. .. AYOIlS 01' Itcal AND
AMAGASAItI. "EGAIDING THE IVACUATION 0' OLD
AND YOUNC
I. Matter of evacuation of old and young
pe,>pIe and prelfTlant women. l)eeided in cabinet
meeting. June 7. and announced b}' deputy
ch,ef of Air-Oefen!le General Headquarten the
sa:ne day.
To be begun NO'"ember. Hi, 19'/''/'.
J. Plaee!l: Kobe and Amaguaki.
t.
a. Cit}_Encuation.Execlltion Headquar_
tel'll (Toalli Solioi Jiklio flo.blli.
b. All police
Co. The dty.
ii. of procedure: Thl'l)llgh-
a. Council of neighborhood-(T"Oup and
bklek.UIlOCiltion heldg,
b. Coundl of ndghborhood (T"Oups.
c_ U8e of pamphleu..
d. of ne"'lIpapenL
6. Those to be e,'ICUlted:
I. Primary !!Chool children. 6nt 100 wmnd
.......
b. t:nweaned ehildren.
e. PN!j'lI&nt women.
d. Old people.
e. People needing attendlnta.
Note: Encultion to be ,ohantary.
7. Work for the police:
I. Form !lervice jtroupll to help v.-jth trlns-
portltion.
b. Pro"ide packinr matnials for tho!le who
<:IInnot Ct it otherwilit.
e. Provide (T"Ollp houaing for thOlle left in
citro
d. Pro,'ide bonulIe!I for families of thOlle
who stay behind (ka.:oh tMle). up to five
yen per individual.
8. Police at the reception areas;
a. Cooperat.e in helping the e"lcUeell.
b. Kind treatment of the evacuee.
c. provision of food and necl!lllities.
d. Help against cold In plaCell where
"eather ia &evere.
Note: The city will aSllume expensell.
132
ExhibitW
Ala.DUINIle SUlYK:& Au.owUfCI LAW" IUYISao
EDITION). " 1..1. __IAL
NO. l.U1 fTaANSl..ATION)
AaTI(.'1.E 1. According to the provuliona In
article 12 of the air-de1mse law. the pa)'11ltnt
of compenll&tion is prescribed II follo...s:
ARTICLE 2. Peraons to receive corn.
pen!llltion (excludinr public ofllo.:lll" under the
pension la'" and peraons who participate in air
defense and training in air_raid_protection lIer,_
i<WI in the performance of their profellllional
dulies) :
I. Membel'll of the Ch'ilian Obaerntion
Corp!! (Boh Kalllllt; Tlli).
2. Members of the Aultiliarr Police and Fire
Unili (KeibodaJt).
3. Peraons participating in actual air defense
or training in air_raId_protection IIen'io:es under
order:s of the gonrnor (in the _ of ToIio To.
thOR under the Superintendcnt-General of the
Metropolitan Police) on tlie pro,i!lions of
article 6. sections I and 2 of the air-defense law
(including eases which come under articH! to.
'Oe<:tion t of the same la"').
4. Peraol1$ participating in actual air defellM
under the pro,isiona of article 9. section I of
the air-defense 1a.... (TN: doctor:s Ind nUrlle!l).
5. PCrllOns. other than the abo,e-mentioned.
enraged in air defense or training under the
direction of the local gln'crnment or the local
m&}'or lind as dellignated by the Minister of
Home Affairs..
6. Peraona participating and cooperating in
emera:cnc)' fire fighting and training of lllIme
according to the provisiona of article 8. section
7 of the air-defense law (includinjt eases ,,hich
corne under article 10. lleCtiOn 2 of the SlIme
law).
7. Thll!!e per!lODS who Illanned lIir_raidPr()o
lection service plans according to the pro\'isions
of article 3. section I of th(' air-defenae laW
lind who took part in lIir defense or training
based on those plana.
ARTICLE 3. Persons authorized to disburse
thia compensation are liS follows:
I. In the case of compenslltion pnid to per-
sons who comc under the of lIrticle
2. sectiona I and 2. the local govcrnor who es-
g!)llaJIed the civilian Db.. '"
_._. ....Tva Ion
.......11...,. police and nl"f! un.l!! corp, and the
I. In the <:ll1Ie of com I.
ho
Pens"tion "6d
_... come the ro .......
1
to per_
I. MctJon 3 Ind who took P or article
air deftllH under the ".d PBrt In training of
v. ere of th
or tlte head of a town or1i e gO\erllOr
.110 iaaued the order to the go...ernor
"r penona who took ,a- . In the Cll!le
In trami
air-defense meaaurel) made by th ng Or actull
aiJ'-defUW! plana according t t e plannertl of
01 article 8, I of the provaions
pIa!lllU of the alr-de(enae'_ ense 11... , the
I
.L p",na.
3. n u,e ease or perllOnJl dt!!i . .
2 aection& 4 and 5 tL_ ..,. gJ!a!ed In artIcle
, ,,,,,, erllOr who h . .
dktloll over the area in whi h h III JurIa-
part in air defense or pel'llOn IIkel)
4. In tlie case o( article 2 _"
6 the
fecturtl f\l'('rnor who has jurilld' .' Pre-
of the building which is, ..'..<:llon o\er the
"" ,. . ro"""ted by .-.,'.
parttclpa 109 In emergency fire n h. ....v .'"
trainin&". g tlOg or Its
. 5. In the ea.se o( article 2 secti
Il'r of air-defense plans.' on 7, the plln_
ArTICLE 4. The kinds or compe t
follows: nsa Ion are III
1. Modical-treatment eltpense shall be .
time "'-00 are wounded or who L__ _ .(Iald to
-. ire __... , .. lJ"COme SIck and
... 0. "",,,1<:11 attentIOn, and thOlle who d
:'Ie medical treatment paid for b)" othe;0:
2. Compensation to be iv
from .ickn....6 g en after
or lOJUl')' and (or rm
or dillllbilil). of the bod)". pe anent lICIT
3. In Clse In in,'u"-' '1'
I or I ness is not cured .
l'rar. (Ia)"ment will be In
001)' (I )'ear) and r made for that period
be paid to ter:ninate
a
that a sum will
Co e compensation
. mpensation will be . .
lot bmil)'. gIven to the auni\"_
.s. Funerllt ex .. .
I"lIing famil)' \I III be paId to the sur_
family to t'k' n case there ia no suni"in.
. eCllreofth f ,
IIho
n
will be. c uner. the compen_
it. (Note. I pllld to the person who performs
Ifctio
n
3 ia n the lump aum mentioned in
'oeJll,id.) )lIII, no other compen.'lation will
II
ln
case the PerllOn bee .
s rL'llU!t of in . omes SIck or is injured
caution, the pllyment
II depend on t in sections 2 lind 4
he Judgment of the officillls.
. ARTie!.!: 5. hi
hons in article ]2fU:tordance with the _L
law h Iection I , "-
t e amount of 0 the alr-elef
mined as foHo..... comPl'
n
8llion"'lll
I. ........r
tn tile calle of
ural
. nC_ofPa ""umn]
in article 2 to the persons
II mdiClted In tolum . 2WC1.lon 6. the amollnt
2. In the c_ of pe.n of the tlble.
ner of the air-defe Y1TIent mlde by the plan_
regutationa in plln &ceording to the
d..fenae 11...., the e, Mc.'lon I of the air_
....ithin the scope PI:n:;: wl1l pay an amount
column I of .L. , c:.. amount inditated in
f u.., I",e and With tL_
o the prefectllral ..,. '''' permia8ion
3 I rnor.
n ICcordlnee ....ith
article 12. lIection 2 of the t?e-d reg",latioDS in
amount of compensation law, the
follO\\.a: "'I determined III
a. In case of pa)'ment by
go\ernor. the amount' . . the Preferturl1
of the table. Bllt in in c:oIllrrm 2
pel'llOll$ mentiOned In arti;-se., of 10
amount o( compensation ia .. 6. the
3 of the table. luulCated lD c:oIwnn
. b. In CU@ of payment b). the
Ilr-defcnse plan -0' planner of the
._ lCCO.ulDg the -.lan
IrtIC", 3. Iltction I of the. ODS.
planner will ...... ... Ia..... the
f
.-.. "amount With h
o the Imount indiclUd . In t e scope
table. with the penn.. III column 2 or the
go\.ernor. IUlon of the prefectural
Note The co .
: mpellsat:lon mentioned in a .
4, sections 2 and 3. w1t be . . rticle
scope - the I made WUhan the
,
. 01 amount indiclted in the "00\.
Ions I and 2. and with due . . e sec
d('gree of . . COllSld('rahon to the
InjUry or sickness and Iso
seriOusness of the disabllil}",' a the
. ARTICLE G. If. aft('r of the com
tlon mentioned in article 4. section" th penllll_.
a.hould within 3 "ellrt af,. , -d' e person
""", .. r,..,ateofthe
mjul') or illnCQ again becom
lOush ill or disabled, due 00 the !11me more se
h
,"
pasme 1II f e cause. t e
n 0 compensation for di!lllbilit} ".ill
be rencwed. lind the difference between the first
and seconrl parments will be paid.
ARTICLE 7. In this law. "sur\,i\'ing famil)'''
shall be defined IL'!: spouse, chilrl. grandchild.
parents. brothcr or siater. who
lire lit the time of rlealh regi!tered in the aame
133
I. It..,ical at...ntiooo
n_
:. CMa_tiooo
t.... :
.. 1'10..........,
"... "... "..
dUalHllt,.,
b. 1-.ot
'...
... ...
_u
"
1_.......
,. ....... ,..
...
bodil,. Inj".,.
._""
fariai _ ...
,.
T....inal I""" ,...
'....
,..
w_
.. BelIei .,. ,... ,.. ...
com,..n..tion.
.. Fun...aiu,......... ,..
" "
tion, fall. into any of the tollowlq
the next penon In order ah_J1..-1.. It:
I. Death.
2. MiMing,
3. Going to another family, aeepUnc tbe
cue of the divided family,
ARTICLE 10, A penon _ho. entitled to re-
eei"e rompenllAlion, does not make a d_Im with-
in 2 years willlOlle the right to reeeive It...
ARTICLE 11. If a person other com_
pellllAtion for the lIllDle T'l':Ulln under the dvU
1.11,,', the amount ahall be dedueted.
ARTICLE 12. In Calle eompenllAtion i. due for
the tame rl'll!lOn under .imilar lawlI, no eompen_
lI&tion "'ill be made under thia law, unle. the
SUm due under the other laWlI ill leu, in which
Calle ecmpensation will bt! made ueording to
thi. Law. n'-ote: Such other 1.11 .... gTanting
.aimilar eompensation will be determined by the
Minister of Home Affailll.. Thia Law lIhall go
into effect Deeember 20, 1941, the date on
which La,,' No. 91, 1941, beeomea effecthe.)
...w. ......., ....., or
2. IIflli$ehold "
Y600 rqect.,_T'he allowable II.....
per taubo Col'
by alii/win Y3' erage may be
In case t:e Per member 01 the famil,.,
h ec"eralfe from the8e
rna odll of caJculali . d'ff toro
amount "'ill be III I erent, the Larpr
by3. Ma.:hiNel)l.-(;oI'l'rage to be determined
base prJce, salYll! to c:onfonn to
a lona .. .IIet f. h ....
Minilltry, ort UJ' the lIunitioM
If the purc:-haae prjee il not known eith
the ot!kial price lMued by the Com '. ,er
try ,,'ill be ueed men:e }finlll-
bed Or a eonfe"",DCe prioe will be
;;.: b allTftment of a committee of q .....li .
ualneurnen "'M ahall eoMider
manufacture and diatribution. _t of
of the atJ:oI'e, the market \-.Jue beto"",
of tbe SlIw..Japan_ .... r fDl.ltipljed
by 2.5 P!UlI 15 peTa!nt ahall be u-t
4. ,\Ja.:II"lIr ICJOi#.-The lII.--
r
...., PfO\isiOll$
app y Or maehi\lffY.
. ,

'-'
--
..,......
,--
"-
a. W<>oclnI hou.. orohop ""'11 ,--
b. \Ii'oodeb boll. Or ollo'
..
...
pr....,. _....... p, O<n>_
...
..
'" .....w....... (_...,
.-
,- Ill 7$ hl"bo Or llullt ot
Yo.IaaWt, "TIdar val.
.... <edar.

..-
(lI..."",""" w._
,*-, adjojbi.....
....
.....
.. Pabli< boU.........
--
,-
r.w.......
'... .,........,
......
...
boopltal, doTlll.itory. ...
C. Thn._
h. K.l"'ol<.'Od_retoo
...
' ...
.... ,....
L S<eett..- W1I"""""-, roo1..,
...
...
-.itll ..... ho Or lr&!.."iaod 1.-.
j. Ordibrr w-s.., f_.,._
...
...
k. Hfet>_ritd '"OIIdft:I t.........,._
...
...
l or brid:
.-
....
t_rr .nd w.......
'""-
". I '"
--
-- --
'" ::::::r
cemua reJistl:'r, (Note: Tn case a person comea
hlto the same eensus rt'1f'I.IIter of the 'amll)'
after the death of the benelldar}' and eomplll'l!l
wit. the anides of L.ilw No, 4, 194Q (the law
eollferning the notiflcation of the een.IIU& reria-
ter b)' mail Or IIOme authorized person) within
2 )'tar", arter the death of the benefldar)', thai
penon shall be considered u beinll' in the same
(amil)' een.llUlI regilJter,
Aftl:'r the death of the beneflciar)'. a member
of the family who lI'oelI O\'er to the
dhi:led part of the aun'i\'inll' famib' shall be
eon.idered to be in the same family .. that of
the beneliciaTJ' ,,-ith reapect to the application
of the aoo\'e-mentioned lItipulationll.
A who married the benelkiaTJ' but
who did not notif}' the eeMUlI regillter lIhall be
eoruidered u the lIpouse in the same famil)'
win respect to lhe application of the .stipulation
u in the abcwe IleCtion.
An unborn ehild at the time of the death of
the benefici....,. lIhall be eoMidered af'U:r binh
to be :l. ehild or in the same famils,
...-itl respeet 10 the application of the lItipuLa_
lion! u mentioned in the ..bo"l:' IleCtk!n.
AnIC1. 8. The order of the aurvivinll' (amil)'
in NCei"ing the compensation lIha1l be .. men
in artidl:' ,.
In the a$e of !le\'eral ehildren or ra-nd-
chiNnn, the order .hall be determined b)- the
oroO' of the rii"ht of lIUl'S1ion to the family
esta:e of the benellciar).
III the eue of parenti or lI'randparenta: one'.
in-...... lIhall take precedence o"er blood parentll
and lI'randparenu,
In the eue of brothel'1l and .illten, eompen_
lUIti.n ia limited 10 a minor or a deformed or
dilllnied brother or .i.ter with no meanll of

AlTlCt. 9. In ease a member of the aurviv.
ini" ramib' who, in order to receive compen.sa_
134
135