Mind, Language, and Epistemology: Toward a Language Socialization Paradigm for SLA Author(s): Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo Source:

The Modern Language Journal, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 331-350 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the National Federation of Modern Language Teachers Associations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3588782 . Accessed: 16/07/2011 20:13
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing and National Federation of Modern Language Teachers Associations are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Modern Language Journal.

http://www.jstor.org

Mind,

Language, and

Epistemology:
Socialization

a Language Toward Paradigm for SLA

KARENANN WATSON-GEGEO
School of Education University of California, Davis 81 Bonnie Lane Berkeley, CA 94708 Email: kawatsongegeo@ucdavis. edu

For some time now second language acquisition (SLA) research has been hampered by unhelpful debates between the "cognitivist" and "sociocultural" camps that have generated more acrimony than useful theory. Recent developments in second generation cognitive science, first language acquisition studies, cognitive anthropology, and human development research, however, have opened the way for a new synthesis. This synthesis involves a reconsideration of mind, language, and epistemology, and a recognition that cognition originates in social interaction and is shaped by cultural and sociopolitical processes: These processes are central rather than incidental to cognitive development. Here I lay out the issues and argue for a language socialization paradigm for SLA that is consistent with and embracive of the new research.

WEAREAT THE BEGINNING OF A PARADIGM shift in the human and social sciences that is revolutionizing the way we view mind, language, epistemology, and learning, and that is fundamentally transforming second language acquisition and educational theory and research. This (SLA)I paradigm shift is being stimulated by new research in the cognitive sciences (Churchland, 2002; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Levy, Bairaktaris, Gullinaria, & Cairns, 1995; Rumelhart, McClelland et al., 1986; Schwartz & Begley, 2002; Solso & Massaro, 1995; Spitzer, 1999; Varella, Thompson, & Rosch, 2000), human and child development (Burman, 1994; James & Prout, 1997; Jessor, Colby, & Shweder, 1996; Lewis &Watson-Gegeo, 2004; Mayall,2002; Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000; Wozniak & Fischer, 1993), first language acquisition and socialization (GibK. son, 11982; Nelson, 1996; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Seidenberg, 1997; Slobin, 1985; WatsonGegeo, 2001), cognitive anthropology (Chaiklin & Lave, 1996; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; HolThe Mlodern LanguageJournal,88, iii, (2004) 0026-7902/04/331-350 $1.50/0 ?2004 The ModernLanguageJournal

land & Quinn, 1987; Lave &Wenger, 1991; Shore, 1991; Strauss & Quinn, 1997; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1999a), cognitive linguistics (Ungerer & Schmid, 1996), and the critical social sciences, including cultural and cross-cultural psychology (M. Cole, 1996; L. M. W. Martin, Nelson, & Tobach, 1995; Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 1999; Sinha, 1997; Stigler, Sweder, & Herdt, 1990). The shift is also prompted by the flow of research from the periphery to the center of political power. Third wave feminist studies (Alcoff & Potter, 1993; Bhavnani, Foran, & Kurian, 2003; Weedon, 1997), and ethnic studies from colonial and postcolonial societies, including currently colonized indigenous and ethnic minority peoples within dominant societies, are consonant with the new findings in the human sciences. And in turn, the voices of these scholars and their claims for indigenous and other standpoint epistemologies (Collins, 2000; Gegeo, 1994; Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, 2003; Wautischer, 1998) are supported by the new research. The emergence of formerly silenced voices is part of the contemporary process of globalization in which peoples on the periphery within and out-

332 side dominant or center societies, rather than being passively affected by globalization, are actively reacting to and participating in it. They are speaking on their own behalf to the centers of knowledge construction and power, in order to promote their interests and the ongoing decolonization process. This remarkable and creative combination of sociopolitical events and trajectories in mainstream and non-mainstream research has already seriously eroded the universalist assumptions that have until now determined mainstream theory and method and that are anchored in Anglo-Euro-American cultural ontology and epistemology. The paradigm shift has begun to be felt in SLA scholarly social spaces through new cognitive science-based theories of language (see Doughty & Long, 2003; also Atkinson, 2002; Martinez, 2001), including emergentism theory (N. C. Ellis, 1998; MacWhinney, 1999), and criticalist sociocultural studies of second language learning and teaching (e.g., Canagarajah, 1999; Tollefson, 1995). The conventional paradigm for SLA research has come under increasing criticism since the late 1970s for (a) its exclusive reliance on Cartesian, positivistic assumptions about reality, (b) its experimental modes of inquiry that cannot incorporate cultural and sociopolitical context into its models, (c) its basis in structuralist or other problematic linguistic theories, and (d) its inability to produce implications for pedagogy that actually work for second language teaching, especially in the periphery (i.e., third- and fourth-world situations; Block, 1996; Crookes, 1997; Firth & Wagner, 1997; Jacobs & Schumann, 1992; Kramsch, 1995; Lantolf, 1996; Liddicoat, 1997; Pallotti, 1996; Pennycook, 1994; Rampton, 1997a, 1997b). However, recent developments have opened the way for a new synthesis involving a reconsideration of mind, language, epistemology, and learning, based on the recognition that cognition originates in social interaction and is shaped by cultural and sociopolitical processes. That is, cultural and sociopolitical processes are central, rather than incidental, to cognitive development. My purpose here is twofold. First, I overview in brief, outline fashion some of the diverse lines of research and thinking that converge on a set of general principles for cognitive development and social practice, which are still to be understood in full through further research. In being indicative rather than exhaustive, I highlight some of the subtleties in issues of social influences and experience in shaping mind and lan-

The ModernLanguageJournal 88 (2004) guage skills that are undertheorized in SLA, and I identify lines of work that have not yet entered SLA social spaces. Second, I argue for a language socialization paradigm for SLA. Such a paradigm would be embracive of and consistent with the new research. NEW UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT MIND AND LANGUAGE FROM THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES What do we now know about cognitive processes and the human brain? The shift from cognition to mindin much of the research discourse on cognitive development reflects current understandings about the brain and thinking. First, neuroscience research (Churchland, 1986, 2002; Dacey, 2001; Edelman, 1992; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Goldblum, 2001; Quartz & Sejnowski, 2002) has demonstrated that the bodymind dualism of Western philosophical and mainstream scientific thought, in which cognition rides in a detached fashion above the body and is in some sense distinct from it-an idea still implicit in much educational and SLA research and teaching-is fundamentally mistaken. What we humans understand about the world we understand because we have the kinds of bodies and potential for neural development that we have (Regier, 1995, 1996; Varela et al., 2000). Even our scientific instruments are an extension of our bodily capacities, and built on the assumptions we make about the nature of reality (ontology) and our way(s) of creating knowledge about reality (epistemology), and based on our body's ways of detecting and relating to the world. All cognitive processes are thus embodied. Second, most cognitive scientists estimate that more than 95% of all thought is unconsciouswhat Lakoff and Johnson (1999) called the "cognitive unconscious"-and it is this unconscious thought, lying outside our awareness, that "shapes and structures all conscious thought" (p. 13; see also Baumgartner & Payr, 1995; Jacoby, 1991; Naatanen, 1992; Schneider, Pimm-Smith, & Worden, 1994; Solso & Massaro, 1995). Included in the cognitive unconscious is all implicit knowledge that we have learned through socialization beginning in the prenatal months. Third, mind is a better term than cognitionbecause the latter tends to focus on only parts of the mind, typically what Vygotsky (1981) called the higher mental functions of voluntary memory, logical reasoning, language, metacognitive skills, and some forms of categorization. Most of our theoretical models of cognitive skills acquisition

KarenAnn Watson-Gegeo assume that these higher-order cognitive skills are independent of other mental processes. However, through research on patients who have lost emotional capacity via brain damage, cognitive scientists have shown that without emotional capacity, people cannot make rational judgments, including moral decisions. Emotions are essential to logical reasoning (Damasio, 1994). As developmentalist Kurt Fischer and his colleagues argued (Fischer, Wang, Kennedy, & Chang, 1998), emotions "have well-defined roles in human activity"and are "not opposed to cognition, as is assumed in Western culture; to the contrary, [emotion] links closely with cognition to shape action, thought, and long-term development" (pp. 22-23). Three neuroscientific models have been proposed and are being investigated to account for emotions and their role in human activity (network, Halgren & Marinkovic, 1995; polyvagal, Porges, 1995; and hemispheric asymmetry, Davidson, 1992, Fox 1991; see Byrnes, 2001, for a summary). Fourth, our earlier conception of cognition has been further expanded to incorporate many other components of a human mental life, including symbolic capacity, self, will, belief, and desire (e.g., Ingvar, 1999; E. K. Miller, 2000; Schwartz & Begley, 2002; Shweder, 1996; Silbersweig & Stern, 1998). Fifth, not only is language metaphorical, but because of the kind of neural networks we build in our brains, thought itself is metaphorical and made possible through categorization that is typically conceptualized as prototypes (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981; Taylor, 1989). Some categories and prototypes are inherent in the kind of body and mind we human beings have, and therefore may be said to be universal. A great many categories and prototypes, however, in fact probably the majority, are socioculturally constructed and therefore vary crossculturally. Sixth, until now we have conceptualized the brain metaphorically as a container of intelligence, knowledge, and cognitive skills, and the individual as a container for the brain and as possessing (or failing to possess) societally desired cognitive skills. Our metaphor has thus very much determined the way we look at human thinking and behavior, and certainly the way we measure and assess the cognitive abilities of students in schools and language classes. Some of the most interesting research in human development over the past several years has up-ended this conception of cognition. Research demonstrates that "both the content and process of

333 thinking ... are distributed as much among individuals as they are packed within them" (M. Cole & Engestrom, 1993, p. 1). The discovery of distributedcognitions-that people think in conjunction with others, that cognition is socially constructed through collaboration (Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991; Salomon, 1993)-links to the work that is going on in cognitive anthropology and by standpoint epistemologists on the nature of knowledge construction (see below). Even Vygotskian theory (1978, 1981; Rogoff, 1990) is subject to the critique of not being social enough, and as yet continuing to treat the mind as a container for the transfer of knowledge (Atkinson, 2002; Brandt, 2000; Watson-Gegeo, 1990). What have we discovered about language from cognitive science research? First, research has discovered no structure in the brain that corresponds to a Language Acquisition Device as argued by Chomsky and others. Language is not completely a human genetic innovation because its central aspects arise via evolutionary processes from neural systems that are present in so-called "lower animals" (Bates, Thal, & Marchman, 1991). There can be no pure syntax separate from meaning, emotion, action, and other dynamic aspects of the mind and communication. Linguistic concepts, like all other cognitive processes, arise from the embodied nature of human existence and through experience (Langacker, 1990, 1991). Language develops through the same general processes as other cognitive skills, and grammar is a matter of highly structured neural connections (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, & Plunkett, 1996; Plunket & Elman, 1997). Second, innateness is usually equated with language universals. However, if we are to be consistent with cognitive science, emergentism, connectionism, and cognitive linguistics, what we take to be universal typically involves universals of common human experience starting after birth. In other words, it is not just a matter of what we are born with, but the fact that we human beings occupy a set of environments with and within which our body-mind has co-evolved and that present us with common experiences. These experiences include, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999) phrased it, "the conceptual poles of grammatic constructions, universals of spatial relations, and universals of metaphor" (p. 508; see also Fauconnier, 1997; Koenig, 1998). The rest is culturally variable (see Chafe & Nichols, 1986); it is shaped by gender, ethnicity, social class, and sociohistorical, sociopolitical processes (Chaik-

334 lin & Lave, 1996; Segall et al., 1999; Stephens, 1995) in very powerful ways that affect perceptions, assumptions, language(s), and other understandings of the world. While some theorists continue to defend or reinvent Chomsky's theories, or both (e.g., Chomsky, 1995; Fodor, 1998; Pinker, 1994; White, 2003), biologists and neuroscientists have shown that a built-in Universal Grammar (UG) or language acquisition structure is unnecessary for explaining language universals. Chomskyian theory failed a major test when McWhorter (1997) devastatingly critiqued Bickerton's (1988, 1990) Chomsky-based "bioprogram" model of creole language formation, showing that, for instance, the grammatical structures that Bickerton claimed Surinam Creole speakers had supposedly created from UG turned out to be transferred from the African substrate. Evolutionary biologist/primatologist Terence Deacon (1997) convincingly demonstrated that languages have had to "adapt to children's spontaneous assumptions about communication, learning, social interaction, and even symbolic reference" (p. 109)-placing the social in the center of the linguistic:
The theory that there are innate rules for grammar commits the fallacy of collapsing the irreducible social evolutionary process [of language evolution and change] into a static formal structure.... The link from psychological universals to linguistic universals is exceedingly indirect at best .... The brain has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the adapting. (pp. 121-122) Chomskyian theory is but one account of lan-

TheModernLanguageJournal 88 (2004) cal nature of language learning and use is increasingly a focus of research in complex first language and second language situations, from a variety of critical perspectives (Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; Canagarajah, 1999; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Huebner & Davis, 1999; Kroskrity, 2000; Peirce, 1995a, 1995b; Pennycook, 1994; Phillipson, 1992; Tollefson, 1995; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1994,1995). The latter issues are at the heart of ontology, epistemology, and learning. To move into issues of ontology and epistemology, we first need to examine what we currently understand about how knowledge is organized by and in the embodied mind.

ONTOLOGY, CULTURAL MODELS, AND EPISTEMOLOGY:COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE VOICES OF THE OTHER Ontology refers to what there is, and epistemology to how we know. Work in cognitive anthropology over the past two decades has revisited the once discredited issue of linguistic relativity, and through empirical research, has demonstrated that differences in languages do have a significant impact on differences in thinking (Gumperz & Levinson, 1996). Levinson (1996), Lee (1996), and Silverstein (2000), in particular, have launched brilliant reconsiderations of Whorfs (1956) principle of linguistic relativity and the data at its basis, correcting the gross misrepresentations of the past. Lee's devastating critique of Pinker's (1994) carelessness in confusing data completely undermines his dismissal of Whorf's ideas, for instance. The new work on linguistic relativity is closely related to empirical research on cultural models for thinking and behaving by cognitive anthropologists using schema and prototype theory (D'Andrade & Strauss, 1992; Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998; Holland & Quinn, 1987; Shore, 1991). In turn, the work on cultural models is parallel to research by psycholinguist K. Nelson (1996) and her colleagues on children's language development, which also draws on schema and script theory. Nelson (1996) argued that "Human minds are equipped to construct complicated 'mental models' that represent . . . the complexities of the social and

guage in linguistic theory, yet Pinker's (1994) and Krashen's (1985) works have been read by a wider public, and language teachers at all levels often assume a Chomskyian perspective (perhaps unconsciously) on language that affects teaching moments with students, even if they are attempting to teach according to "best practice"
that incorporates language use and sociocultural issues (as modeled or argued in, e.g., Berns, 1990; Kramsch, 1995; Kern, 2000; McGroarty, 1998; or Larsen-Freeman, 2000). Third, language structure, language use, and language acquisition are inseparable because ex-

perience shapes all our neural networks. These processes are therefore also shaped by sociohistorical, sociocultural, and sociopolitical processes, because language change, use, and learning occur in social, cultural, and political contexts that constrain and shape linguistic forms in various ways, and mark their significance. The politi-

cultural world" (p. 12). She proposed the term Mental Event Representation (MER) for the basic flexible structures of children's cognitive development, in the form of schemas and scripts that

KarenAnn Watson-Gegeo become a mental context for future behavior in similar situations. Cognitive anthropologists argue that culturally shared knowledge is organized into cultural models,defined as "prototypical event sequences in simplified worlds" (Quinn & Holland, 1987, p. 24; Holland et al., 1998, expanded this idea into "figured worlds"). Cultural models frame and interpret experience and guide a variety of cognitive tasks, including setting goals, planning, directing action, making sense of action, and verbalization (Quinn & Holland, 1987). They operate below the surface level of behavior and the linguistic level of morphology and syntax, to shape perception, information processing, and the assignment of values (Gegeo & WatsonGegeo, 1999). Analytically, cultural models are compatible with a neural network model of the embodied mind. Typically in psycholinguistic research, the complex interrelationships among forms of cultural knowledge across domains are not addressed. In contrast, an important insight from cognitive anthropology is the relationship between cultural models and the systematic or thematic nature of cultural knowledge. Quinn and Holland (1987) argued that this "thematicity"is the result of "a small number of very general purpose cultural models that are repeatedly incorporated into other cultural models" (pp. 10-11) in hierarchical and other arrangements. General-purpose models or premises operating across several cultural domains give a culture its distinctiveness and reduce the total amount of cultural knowledge to be mastered by the learner. Knowledge encoded in cultural models is brought to bear on specific tasks in the form of metaphorical proposition-schemas and imageschenmas(Lakoff, 1984; Quinn & Holland, 1987). A proposition-schema specifies "concepts and the relations which hold among them" (Quinn & Holland, 1987, p. 25), such as (among Americans), ARGUMENT IS WAR (Lakoff &Johnson,
1980), versus, for instance, in Kwara'ae, Solomon

335 members are all one family, and thus the proposition-schema FAMILIES SHARE FOOD WITHOUT EXPECTATION OF RETURN applies to all of them. Cultural models-which are usually tacitly understood, and often unconscious-lie at the heart of cultural identity, ontology, and indigenous and local epistemology. Until very recently, ontology and epistemology were treated as what Western philosophy and science had invented, while everybody else had only a "world-view" and commonsense strategies for discovering knowledge needed to survive in the local environment. Today, scholars from third-world societies and from indigenous societies living under colonial conditions in first- and second-world societies are challenging the privileging of Western ontology and scientific epistemology. This challenging has come in the wake of the critique of mainstream epistemology by third wave feminist scholars against the Anglo-Euro-American patriarchal positioning of mainstream epistemology. Epistemology refers to both the theory of knowledge and theorizing knowledge (Goldman, 1986, 1999). Epistemology is concerned with who can be a knower, what can be known, what constitutes knowledge, sources of evidence for constructing knowledge, what constitutes truth, how truth is to be verified, how evidence becomes truth, how valid inferences are to be drawn, the role of belief in evidence, and related issues (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001; see also Williams & Muchena, 1991). Social epistemologists (e.g., Fuller, 1988) and feminist epistemologists (e.g., Code, 1991; Grosz, 1990; Haraway, 1988; L. H. Nelson, 1993) recognize with sociologists of knowledge (Bloor, 1991; Dant, 1991; Stehr, 1994) that "epistemological agents are communities rather than individuals. In other words, knowledge is constructed by communities-epistemological communities-rather than collections of independently knowing individuals" (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, p. 58), and "such communities are epistemologically prior to individuals who know" (L. H. Nelson, 1993, p. 124). Feminist epistemologists, parallel to neuroscientists, recognize the embodiment of knowledge. Grosz (1993) cogently argued that the current crisis of reason in Western culture and philosophy is a "consequence of the historical privileging of the purely conceptual or mental over the corporeal," and the "inabilityof Western knowledges to conceive their own processes of (material) production, processes that simultaneously rely on and disavow the role of the body" (p. 187). Both of these points are consistent with

Islands, ARGUMENTATION IS STRAIGHTENING OUT (Watson-Gegeo, 1995), or, to take another example from Kwara'ae, FAMILIES SHARE FOOD WITHOUT EXPECTATION OF is RETURN. An image-schema more gestalt-like and usually metaphorical, such as the American image-schema MARRIAGE IS A JOURNEY (Quinn, 1987, 1997), or the Kwara'ae imageschema EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBERS ARE ALL ONE HEARTH (or one basket/household/garden/cluster of baking stones). This latter image-schema means that extended family

336 the new findings of cognitive science and developmentalist research just reviewed. However, feminists add the additional and crucial insight that human bodies are not all the same. In particular, Western positivistic research typically assumes a male body and usually a White middleclass heterosexual male experience of and in the world. Moreover, the feminist and third-world challenge to Western rationality and normal science takes all these arguments a step further to challenge the taken-for-granted objectivity on which much of Western science depends for its claim that the knowledge it produces is necessarily universal and always superior to all other forms of knowledge. Particularly relevant to the present as discussion is standpoint epistemology developed by feminists, which recognizes that "Knowledge claims are always socially situated" (Harding, 1993, p. 54). That is, all knowledge is subjective, positioned (i.e., from a standpoint, not objective in a final sense), historically variable, and specific, even when what is constructed turns out to have universal implications. With the realization that all knowledge is situated comes the recognition of the importance of who gets to be the knowledge producers versus those who are only allowed or able to be knowledge consumers, and why there is so much power in the hands of those who control knowledge. Knowledge is political as well as cultural, and for this reason, researchers must ask, who gets to represent whom? Typically, it has been White Anglo-Euro-American researchers who study and represent mainly non-European "Others" who are not allowed voice to represent themselves as they wish to be or are positioned. As Yeatman (1994) put it, "Who must be silenced in order that these representations prevail?" (p. 31). However, the prevailing relations are in a very early stage of changing, through the new research by third-world scholars writing about their own cultures' ontologies, epistemologies, reand cultural models. Indigenous epistemology fers to an indigenous "cultural group's ways of thinking and of creating, reformulating, and theorizing about knowledge via traditional discourses and media of communication, anchoring the truth of the discourse in culture" (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, p. 58; see also Gegeo, 1994; Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2002). Localepistemologyrefers to processes of creating knowledge that are situated in local conditions and relationships and may be partially or wholly shared
across cultural groups. As concepts, indigenous

TheModernLanguageJournal 88 (2004) through which knowledge is constructed and validated by a cultural group and on the role of that process in shaping thinking and behavior. Underlying these concepts is the assumption that "all epistemological systems [are] socially constructed and (in)formed through sociopolitical, economic, and historical context and processes" (Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2001, p. 58). Together, ontology, epistemology, and cultural models constitute deep culture (Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 2004). Culture is not uniform and unchanging; it is variable, an ongoing conversation embodying conflict and change, shaped by the dialectic of structure and agency (Giddens, 1979), inherently ideological, and prone to manipulation and distortion by powerful interests (Foucault, 1980; Gramsci, 1978; Habermas, 1979). Bhaba (1994) argued that cultures and cultural forms are in a continuous process of hybridity, creating a "third space" (p. 38) for new cultural positionings to develop or be constructed, (re)creating current versions of cultures, and so on. That means, as Chaudhry (1995) pointed out, that hybrid individuals "exhibit hybrid identities as well as hybrid world-views deriving from different systems of meaning" (p. 49). Nevetheless, people usually have an internal sense of their cultural positioning(s). As Hall (1991) argued, cultural identity and knowledges involve two senses of the self: of "one shared culture, a sort of collective 'one true self,' hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed 'selves,' which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common"; and of identity and knowledges produced by "the ruptures and discontinuities" that result in "critical points of deep and (p. significant difference" 223). Although hybridity is associated now with diaspora(s), colonialism, postcolonial history, and globalization, the complexity it evokes (Canclini, 1995) is perhaps more easily grasped in multicultural/multilingual nations than in the United States (where mainstream interests try to suppress or downplay multilingualism and multiculturalism). Even with the reality that culture(s) is/are always moving and changing, people undertake their own critical reflection on culture, history, knowledge, politics, economics, and the sociopolitical contexts in which they are living their lives. They act on these reflections, and in all known societies, there exist formal contexts for direct teaching of cultural knowledge and values. Latour (1986) pointed out that to gain Western recognition as "useful" and meaningful, traditional and local knowledges typically must be

and local epistemology focus on the process

Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo translated into Western scientific discoursethat is, the parts that seem "relevant"to a Western science are extracted from the whole and reorganized into discourse that looks "scientific"to Westerners, transforming acceptable elements into "universal knowledge" (see also Vos, 2000). This treatment of the knowledge systems of cultural Others is an indication of the role of power and sociopolitical processes in knowledge construction and use, including language learning and discourse forms. As anthropologist Raffles (2002) argued: Explanatory powerresultsless from intrinsictruthfulnessthanfromthe successful collaboration poof actors.... In this aclitical,cultural,and biophysical count, scientific knowledge is as much a local knowledge[asanyother] ... all knowledges also are
intimate . . . [and] intimacies are necessarily rela-

337 ment and socialization is therefore also scientifically obsolete. Not only adults, but also children are "active participants" in their own development and help to shape their environment (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 24). Third, the idea that development is entirely and necessarily universal with regard to the specifics of stage and trajectory is now obsolete. "The effects of culture on child development are pervasive," the panel declared. "Culture influences every aspect of human development" and is "fundamental" to what happens (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 25; see also P.J. Miller & Goodnow, 1995). The determination that culture is formative entails recognizing the influence of the family and family organization. Today there is a turn towards seeing the family rather than the individual child as the unit of analysis. Some of the leading human development departments in U.S. universities are changing their names to reflect this new emphasis. For instance, the department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison recently changed its name from "Human Development" to "Human Development and Family Studies," and faculty have begun collaborative research projects, using qualitative and ethnographic methods. Fourth, "critical period" as a description or boundary for certain kinds of development is now a "dispreferred term," having been replaced in cutting-edge research by "sensitive period" (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 195). Research has found that "the developing brain is open to influential experiences across broad periods of development" (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 183; see also Barlow, Petrinovich, & Main, 1982). Drawing on activity theory, critical psychology, ecological psychology, and cognitive anthropology, Lave (1993) defined learning as "changing participation [and understanding] in the culturally designed settings of everyday life" (pp. 5-6). She pointed out that cognitivist theories of learning have heretofore claimed that "actors' relations with knowledge-in-activity are static," that is, "they do not change except when subject to special periods of 'learning' and 'development,"' and that "institutional arrangements for inculcating knowledge are the necessary, special circumstances for learning, separate from everyday life" (p. 12). The weight of evidence, however, is moving towards sociocultural theories that emphasize learning as "ubiquitous," as an aspect of all activity (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 38). In any situation, people will learn, even if what they learn is to fail, an all-too-common consequence of formal schooling.

tional. [Intimateknowledge]drawsattentionto the embeddedness of social practice in relations of power. (pp. 327-328) The recognition that all knowledge is positioned and situated in sociohistorical, sociopolitical contexts brings us to the questions, What do the new understandings about bodymind imply for context? And how do people learn? CONTEMPORARYUNDERSTANDINGS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT,SITUATED LEARNING,AND CONTEXT The new research has made older cognitivist theoretical assumptions about development and learning obsolete. One of the best accounts of how our understandings have changed is found in the National Academy of Sciences book, published in 2000, FromNeuronsto Neighborhoods: The Scienceof EarlyChildhood (Shonkoff & Development Phillips, 2000). First, by asserting that "human development is shaped by a dynamic and continuous interaction between biology and culture," the national panel stated that the nature versus nurture debate is thus "scientifically obsolete" (p. 3). As Spitzer (1999) pointed out: We have demonstrated that the connections betweenthe neuronsin a humanbraincannotpossibly be geneticallydetermined, because the entire humangenome is byfar too smallto containthe necessary information.Instead, humans learn through interactionswith the environmentthat change the connectionsin our biologicalbrains.(p. 38) Second, genetics and environment not only affect but are affected by a child's agency in development. The transmission model of develop-

338 Underlying the split between older cognitivist theories and contemporary sociocultural theories of learning is an epistemological gulf. Older cognitivist theories viewed knowledge as a collection of real entities, located in heads (the container metaphor), and learning as a process of internalizing these entities (what Freire, 1970, called the "banking model" of education in which "deposits" of prepackaged knowledge are made into the heads of students). Today some scholars in education and language teaching are attempting to apply aspects of neuroscience directly, ahead of the research and without regard to the complexities of cognitive scientific understandings (see Knudson, n.d., and Wolfe, 2001). In contrast, sociocultural theories, which are receiving support from the new research, regard knowing and learning as "engagement in changing processes of human activity" (Lave, 1993, p. 12). Even as cognitivist theories have not recognized the heterogeneity of knowledge, they also do not take into account situated activity and the fact that "conflict is a ubiquitous aspect of human existence" (Lave, 1993, p. 15). As we have seen, power issues cannot be detached from knowledge, and thus all learning is political in nature. Then what is meant by situatedcognitionand situated learning?Both terms have wide usage today in various pedagogical fields, where their meanings are often diluted. Situated cognitionrefers to the position that "every cognitive act must be viewed as a specific response to a specific set of circumstances" (Resnick, 1991, p. 4). This framing of cognition challenges experimental psychology and psycholinguistic assumptions that the research laboratory (or a test-taking situation) is a neutral environment in which valid findings about people's skills can be discovered, measured, or both. Research has shown, for instance, that children's conversational inexperience, rather than their cognitive incompetence, can produce inaccurate results about their abilities in an experimental situation (Siegal, 1991).

The ModernLanguageJournal 88 (2004) knowledge and learning," the "negotiated character of meaning," and "the concerned (engaged, dilemma-driven) nature" of the learning activity for people involved in it. Thus, "there is no activity that is not situated," the whole person is involved in learning, and "agent, activity, and the world mutually constitute each other," as Lave & Wenger (1991, p. 33) argued. A situated learning perspective rejects the notion that there can ever be decontextualized knowledge or a decontextualized activity. By definition, everything that happens in the human world is in a context with specifiable characteristics. Even so-called general can knowledge be learned only in specific contexts. And the usefulness of general knowledge is only in its applicability to (re)negotiating or (re) constructing meaning in specific circumstances (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Context is also a much more complex concept than is usually recognized in experimental SLA as research (for a review of the history of context a concept in linguistics, see Berns, 1990). From an activity theory point of view, context is "historically constituted between persons engaged in socioculturally constructed activity and the world with which they are engaged" (Lave, 1993, p. 17). Ongoing social structures shape but do not fully determine context, because context is also negotiated, and all interactions involve contradictions and political dimensions. Meaning is relational, that is, among individuals and activity systems or institutions. Context is open and is partially renegotiated in every interaction, but it is not completely so. It is the fluid, dynamic, complex, heterogenous nature of context that is usually reduced to a list of features or elements in SLA research, a mistaken notion of how context is constructed in interaction and across time and space. Even in communicative language teaching, much more attention is given to creating lessons that contain examples with specified typical contexts in which the language/discourse to be learned is realistic, than to the relational/ contextual, dialogic (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986) nature of the learning/teaching interaction within the complex context of the classroom. Teachers teach, but they co-create context with others (administrators, institutional culture, students, etc.), and they respond to and are constrained by context. The social construction of cognition and learning challenges our basic notions of cognition, even as second-generation cognitive science has challenged these notions. Social structures are often hidden and taken for granted, yet can influence our assumptions about cognition, assess-

Research has also shown that adults often attend to figuring out the social meaning of the experimental situation rather than the cognitive features of the task given them (Perret-Clermont, Perret, & Bell, 1991). In short, there is no decontextualized, neutral environment: Everything occurs in and is shaped by context. Situated learning refers to more than the idea that learning takes place somewhere and through doing, or that the meaning of activity depends on social context. Situated learning is a general theoretical perspective on the "relational character of

KarenAnn Watson-Gegeo ment of cognitive skills, and pedagogy. Lave (1988), for instance, pointed out that our society's organization around capitalist production and exchange of commodities creates a metaphor in which work can be divided into sets of separate activities and skills. As Resnick (1991) argued: Whatwe takeas knowledgein school and to a large extent in cognitiveresearchreflects [the] assumption that competencecan be decomposedinto constituentpartsand decontextualized purposesof for instructionand evaluation, withoutlosing anything essential.So our verydefinitionof the cognitive... is subtlycoloredby assumptions derivefromsothat cial and economic arrangements with long historical roots. . . . The social, then, invisibly pervades even situations that appear to consist of individuals

339 2000; Harklau, 1994; He, 1997; Hoyle & Adger, 1998; Kanagy, 1999; Li, 2000; Losey, 1995; Pallotti, 1996; Poole, 1992; Schecter & Bayley, 1997; Siegal, 1996; Watson-Gegeo, 1992, 2001; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1994, 1995, 1999a; Willet, 1995; for a review of some of the better LS studies in SLA, see Watson-Gegeo & Nielsen, 2003). The most exciting development in LS studies in SLA is the arrivalof Bayley and Schecter's (2003) excellent collection of research pieces, most from a critical, sociopolitical perspective, on second language socialization in more than 10 bilingual/multilingual sociocultural situations around the world, in home, school, and community contexts, across the life-span. This volume sets a new, higher standard for LS research in SLA and pushes the paradigm shift forward. Although individual authors in the Bayley and Schecter volume make important statements about the shifts going on in LS theory and research, an overarching theoretical statement does not emerge from the book. What I try to do here, therefore, is move us towards a LS paradigm for SLA by briefly laying out some of the key premises of LS theory. We need to recognize that a new paradigm will be socially constructed by an epistemological community, not individually announced, and that what we are seeking to build is an open, not a closed, paradigm. In other words, we are not seeking to construct a new grid or new walls, we are instead opening up spaces. The basic premise of LS is that "linguistic and cultural knowledge are constructed through each other," and that language-acquiring children and adults "areactive and selective agents in both processes" (Watson-Gegeo & Nielsen, 2003, p. 165, drawing on Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986). The learning of language, cultural meanings, and social behavior is experienced by the learner as a single, continuous (though neither linear nor necessarily unparadoxical) process (WatsonGegeo & Gegeo, 1995). Learners construct "aset of (linguistic and behavioral) practices that enable" them to communicate with and live among others (Schieffelin, 1990, p. 15) in the highly complex, fluid, and hybridized cultural settings in which they may find themselves and need to act. This premise coincides with our understandings that language and language varieties adapt to human circumstances and biology, that culture shapes development (including language learning), and that language, culture, and mind interactively shape each other through interactive practices and discourses. Language socialization research offers us an opportunity, as well, to

engaged in privatecognitiveactivity.(p. 7) How can we move SLA theory onto a firm grounding that takes into consideration the new research we have just reviewed and found to be converging across the social, human, and behavioral sciences and that creates a more realistic and useful basis for research and practice? A language socialization paradigm for SLA would resolve many of these issues and have significant application to language teaching. TOWARD A LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION PARADIGMFOR SLA As a theoretical and methodological perspective, language socialization (LS) began as a response to concerns with the narrowness of mainstream first language acquisition and child development research models of the 1960s and 1970s, and to the realization that language learning and enculturation are part of the same process (Watson-Gegeo, 1992). Since the early 1980s, a series of rigorous, detailed studies of children's first (sometimes involving aspects of second) language socialization have been undertaken in a variety of societies. Initial studies were carried out in the South Pacific (Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Hawai'i), Africa, Asia, Europe, and the diverse cultures of the United States (e.g., Boggs, 1985; Cook, 1999; Cook-Gumperz, Corsaro, & Streeck, 1986; Demuth, 1986; Heath, 1983; Kulick, 1992; Ochs, 1988,;Philips, 1983; Schieffelin, 1990; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986; Tudge, 1990; Watson, 1975; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1986a, 1986b). Language socialization studies of second language classroom learning, both oral and written language, have also begun appearing (e.g., Atkinson & Ramanathan, 1995; Duff, 1995; Eckert,

340 extend Whorfs (1956) principle of linguistic relativity by examining how, in the process of learning first, second, and additional languages, learners also learn multiple representations (ontologies and epistemologies) of the world. A second premise of LS theory is that all activities in which learners regularly interact with others in the family, community, workplace, or classroom are not only by definition socially organized and embedded in cultural meaning systems, but are inherently political. People learn language(s) in social, cultural, and political contexts that constrain the linguistic forms they hear and use and also mark the social significance of linguistic and cultural forms in various ways. These insights apply to second language learners as well as to first language learners because learning is ubiquitous, there is no context-free language learning, and all communicative contexts involve social, cultural, and political dimensions that affect which linguistic forms are available or taught and how they are represented. As Bourdieu (1985) argued, there is no disinterested social practice. In fact, the study of language socialization processes allows us to recover "how language forms correspond with the values, beliefs, and practices of a particular group and how novices can come to adopt them in interaction," because through language, "social structures and roles are made visible and available" (K. Cole & Zuengler, 2003, p. 99). Discourse organization then becomes central to understanding in classrooms, for example, the ways that language varieties and forms are used to create expectations, meanings, and judgments about learners, their knowledge(s) and indigenous/local/standpoint epistemologies, and so on, especially through interactional routines that invite while limiting agency (Sato & Watson-Gegeo, 1992; Ulichny & Watson-Gegeo, 1989; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1999b). A third premise of LS theory has to do with the complexities of context essential to analysis. Over the past decade, SLA research has demonstrated that social identities, roles, discourse patterns, and other aspects of context all affect the process of language learning, including motivation (Peirce, 1995a) and consciousness (Schmidt, 1990). Conventional SLA research has often treated aspects of context in ways that are reductionist and superficial. R. Ellis and Roberts' (1987) approach to context, for example, drew on Hymes' (1974) "SPEAKING"model, which Hymes intended as sensitization for researchers
to the multidimensionality of context, but in fact,

The ModernLanguageJournal 88 (2004) (1979) reductionist approach in limiting context to a few dimensions. Roberts and Simonot (1987) wanted to "deepen" context beyond such narrow uses, yet included only three levels in their analysis, omitting many historical and sociocultural dimensions that cannot be dismissed beforehand. These problems persist even in the criticalist work of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL; e.g., Halliday & Hasan, 1989; for excellent critiques of SFL, see Bronson, 2001; Hyon, 1996; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; J. R. Martin, 1997; Sullivan, 1995). The limitations placed by prior, and often contemporary, SLA research on what counts as contexttypically derives from the positivistic, experimental model of research that attempts to control variables rather than account for the complexities of people's real lived situations, and, in any case, reflects a felt need to reduce complexity in order to arrive at firm, codable categories. Berns (1990), Resnick (1991), Kramsch (1995), the authors in Bayley and Schecter's (2003) work, and especially Lave (1993) represent advances in encompassing the complexities of context. In LS research, "context refers to the whole set of relationships in which a phenomenon is situated" (Watson-Gegeo, 1992, p. 51), inof corporating macrolevels/macrodimensions and cultural asinstitutional, social, political, pects, and microlevels/microdimensions involving the immediate context of situation (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992; Malinowski, 1923). The history of macro- and microdimensions, including interactants' individual experiences and the history of relationships and interactions among them, are important to the analysis. In this respect, LS study aims to go beyond Geertz's (1973) notion of "thick description"-which he borrowed from the philosopher Gilbert Ryles (as cited by Geertz, 1973, p. 7)-to thickexplanation. Thick explanation "takes into account all relevant and theoretically salient micro- and macrocontextual influences that stand in a systematic relationship to the behavior or events" (Watson-Gegeo, 1992, p. 54) to be explained. "Systematic relationship" is the key for setting boundaries (Diesing, 1971, pp. 137-141), with attention to data collection to the point of theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This premise of LS theory is consistent with the new understandings about the ubiquitous and fundamental role of context in human experience. A fourth premise of LS theory, also supported by research, is that children and adults learn culture largely through participating in linguistically marked events, the structure, integrity, and

R. Ellis and Roberts followed Brown and Fraser's

KarenAnn Watson-Gegeo characteristics of which they come to understand through primarily verbal cues to such meanings. The construction and learning of syntax, semantics, and discourse practices is especially fundamental to learners' socialization in framing and structuring their development of both linguistic and cultural knowledge, including ontology and epistemology. Second language classrooms exhibit and teach-with varying degrees of explicitness--a set of cultural and epistemological assumptions that often differ from those of the second language learner's native culture(s). Certainly such differences have been well documented for linguistic and cultural minorities in a variety of national and international settings and have often been shown to be problematic for child and adult second language or second dialect learners. A fifth premise of LS theory incorporates the insights on cultural models and Mental Event Representations from cognitive anthropology and K. Nelson's (1996) work in human development. What this means is that cognition is built from experience and is situated in sociohistorical, sociopolitical contexts, as argued by Lave (1993). The construction of event representations and other cultural models is the building of new neural networks or links between networks, from the perspective of cognitive science. Because cognition is created in social interaction, contemporary LS theory is concerned with participation in communities of practice and learning, more specifically, the learning process which Lave and Wenger (1991) called legitimate peripheral participation.They emphasized the crucial importance of learners' access to participatory roles in expert performances of all knowledge skills, including language. The term legitimate refers peripheral participation to the incorporation of learners into the activities of communities of practice, beginning as a legitimated (recognized) participant on the edges (periphery) of the activity, and moving through a series of increasingly expert roles as learners' skills develop. Capacities and skills are therefore built by active participation in a variety of different roles associated with a given activity over a period of time, from peripheral to full participant. Lave and Wenger (1991) thus moved beyond the Vygotskian notion of "internalization" into a more fluid, realistic, and criticalist perspective on learning. Their theory of social practice is related to the work of Giddens (1979) and Bourdieu (1977) and is congruent with what cognitive anthropologist Hanks (1991) described as "the radical shift [in the human sci-

341 ences] from invariant structures to ones that are less rigid and more deeply adaptive," with structure "more the variable outcome of action than its invariant precondition" (p. 17). Lave and Wenger's (1991) formulation speaks to the "relational interdependency of agent and world, activity, meaning, cognition, learning, and knowing," and emphasizes the inherently socially "situated negotiation and renegotiation of meaning in the world" (pp. 50-51). This perspective is important to focusing our attention on how learners are brought into or excluded from various activities that shape language learning. The importance of studying access, negotiation, and the roles of second language learners' movement from beginner to advanced second language speaker status is foregrounded. These issues have critical importance for linguistic minorities and immigrants, who often face social and political hostility or exclusion and may react to that exclusion with resistance. Moreover, if we were to take Lave and Wenger's legitimate peripheral participation model seriously, we would need to rethink education from the ground up, including all the assumptions we have about classrooms as settings for learning. METHODOLOGICALISSUES FOR SECOND LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION A language socialization paradigm is eclectic with regard to research methods and design but emphasizes ethnographic and other forms of qualitative research as the key empirical methods. In the past few years, a number of discussions of qualitative and ethnographic methods in SLA and English as a second language research have appeared (Davis, 1995; Edge & Richards, 1998; Lazaraton, 1995; Peirce, 1995b; Ramanathan & Atkinson, 1999; Watson-Gegeo, 1990), but only two so far (Watson-Gegeo, 1992; Watson-Gegeo & Nielsen, 2003) flow from a LS perspective. Quality LS research requires a combination of ethnographic, sociolinguistic, and discourse analytic methods at a minimum, and often includes quantitative and sometimes experimental methods, as well. However, quantitative and experimental work must be ecologically valid (M. Cole, Hood, & McDermott, 1978) that is, incorporate all relevant macro- and microdimensions of context; and, going beyond the psychologist's notion of ecological validity, incorporate whole events and behavior rather than short strips of time with coding into preset categories (Watson-Gegeo, 1992). LS research is built on fine-grained longitudinal studies of lan-

342 guage and culture learning in community or classroom settings, or both, systematically documented through audiotape, videotape, and careful fieldnote records of interaction. Central to the analysis are tape-recorded naturally occurring interactions that are analyzed for linguistic and sociolinguistic features (including paralinguistic, kinesic, and suprasegmental features), participant structures, genres, presentation of self, indexicality, discourse organization, and other aspects of interaction. In-depth ethnographic interviews of learners are conducted, focused around their goals, inferences, and other understanding of interactions in which they or others participated; emergent patterns in data; and theoretical issues salient to the research questions that evolve, grounded-theory style, from accumulating data and continuous analysis. (For further discussion of methods in LS research, see Watson-Gegeo, 1992, and WatsonGegeo & Nielsen, 2003.) CONCLUSION A language socialization paradigm would transform SLA research, which is already moving towards becoming consistent with the new research in the human, social, and neurosciences, and make it more relevant to learners' actual experience (e.g., Kern, 2000). A language socialization paradigm would also transform the way we attempt to teach languages in classrooms. We would have to reexamine our pedagogical strategies, the assumptions we make about classroom organization, lesson structure, and effective materials, including current assumptions about sociocultural strategies. Our concern with multiculturalism would be radically changed, as well, from the rather superficial and anemic treatment of cultural variability to a serious and intensive consideration of how our perceptions of the world are shaped by the interaction between our embodied experience in the world and the culturally based ontology/ies and epistemology/ies into and through which we are all socialized in the course of learning our first language (s) and culture(s) (however hybridized they may be); and then (re)socialized or partially (re)socialized in the process of learning a second or third language and culture. Moreover, political issues in language, mind, culture, interaction, ontology, epistemology, and learning would be foregrounded rather than noted and then treated as peripheral or ignored altogether. With criticalist applied linguists and SLA researchers in sociopolitical perspectives, we

The ModernLanguageJournal 88 (2004) would all have to ask ourselves and our students, Why are we teaching/learning English (or another language)? What does this teaching/learning imply in our highly diverse but rampantly politically structured world? What are the political implications of our teaching, learning, and researching language learning and pedagogy? Whom does this work empower and whom does it disempower? Finally, I want to address briefly an aspect of human experience that is largely missing from the new neuroscience research, and which may make some readers uncomfortable. So let me begin from the periphery. In all known human societies, the "schism between transcendentality and appearances is recognized," as Wautischer (1998, p. 9) argued in the introduction to his edited volume, TribalEpistemologies: Essaysin thePhiIn the West, we typically losophyof Anthropology. divide spirituality from science; even those scientists who themselves experience or are open to the notion of spirituality tend to separate spiritual matters from their daily professional work. This is not an unimportant issue because, for most indigenous and ethnic minority peoples, spirituality and the sacred are at the core of their indigenous and local knowledge systems. Many third- and fourth-world peoples feel that when their languages and cultures are recorded and analyzed by Anglo-Euro-American researchers, they are desanctified in both the spiritual and the epistemological sense. When indigenous and ethnic minority peoples talk about their indigenous ontologies and epistemologies, much of what they say "falls outside any perspective consistent with our age of reason," as Wautischer (1998, p. 4) commented. He went on to say that mainstream researchers' own experiences with aspects of body-mind which we cannot explainsuch as intuition or intention-are "ubiquitous
... [and] show that our twentieth century sense

of science is incomplete: objectifying methodologies cannot account for qualitative experiences, while introspective methodologies collapse under the scrutiny of noetic [i.e., intellectual] intrusion" (p. 4). Nevertheless, spiritual traditions and formal religions are on the rise in first- and second- world societies everywhere. In Western science, with the exception of a few pioneers primarily in physics, we have closed off from reality-grounded science the recognition of the strong human seeking for transcendental and immanent meaning. The resulting dichotomy resembles the body-mind dualism that has been so physically and emotionally destructive to us since Descartes and which is now crumbling

Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo

343 the paradigm shift in the human and social sciences that revolutionizes the way we view mind, language, epistemology, and learning. It will affect how we think about learning languages and cultures and the values we hold in relation to local/indigenous languages and knowledges, moving us away from instrumentalism towards a genuine recognition and appreciation for differing ways of being, learning, teaching, and understanding in language teaching. And it will expand how we think about mind, cognition, and intelligence. A paradigm shift of the dimensions I have attempted to outline in this article is painful because such shifts shatter the old in the interest of making room for new growth and new visions. By definition, paradigm shifts question all that we hold dear, all that we have assumed, the theories close to our hearts, the methods we have believed in, the goals we have set for our careers. In this case, normal science which we have taken to be the hallmark of our very technologically oriented (and distorted) society is from here on challenged. It will be a new kind of science that emerges, far more holistic and open than in the past, integrating more of human experience and understanding than in the past. It will incorporate voices and knowings from the periphery of world power, from standpoints of indigeneity, hybridity, ethnicity, color, gender, and sexual orientation. As noted Nobel laureate (chemistry) Prigogine commented (as cited in Jantsch 1980; see Prigogine, 1980): The worldis far too rich to be expressedin a single language. Music does not exhaust itself in a sequence of styles. Equally, the essential aspects of our experience can never be condensed into a single description. We have to use many descriptions which are irreducible to each other .... Scientific work consists of selective exploration and not of discovery of a given reality. It consists of the choice of questions which have to be posed. (p. 303)

under the weight of evidence from a variety of methodological perspectives. Part of the postmodern realization is that knowledge is now going to move from the periphery of world power to the center, instead of always from the center to the periphery, as has been the case under colonialism whether internal or external, and in the divisions between the formally (especially higher) educated and the less schooled. Postmodernism is able to embrace the diversity of human experience. As Johnson (1999) argued: "Constructivist" versionsof postmodernism seek to
reunite dichotomies between subjective and objective, fact and imagination, secular and sacred ... immanent and transcendent .... The inclusion of a spiritual perspective may permit acceptance of the paradoxes inherent in these dichotomies. If our culture of separation arises partially from an overemphasis on the intellect and the ego, then the rebalancing of spirit and rationality are necessary to nurture life. (p. 157)

These issues are even more important in a time when the ecological sciences are beginning to make headway in changing the modernist paradigm. Physicists in the "new physics" have been developing a quantitative model of local and nonlocal energetic/information healing (Tiller, 2003b), demonstrating mathematically and through controlled experiments that spiritual experiences are real. Tiller (2003a) argued: Today,we once again have abundantexperimental evidenceconcerningnature'sexpressionthat is beunder the rug"by the scientificestablishing "swept
ment because it doesn't fit into the current prevailing paradigm. This concerns the issue of whether or not human qualities of spirit, mind, emotion, consciousness, intention, etc., can significantly influence the materials and processes of physical reality. The current physics paradigm would say "no"and indeed there is noplace in the mathematical formalism of the paradigm where any human qualities might enter. ]However, the database that supports an unqualified "yes"response is very substantial. (p. 1)

The new physics "posits both individual particles and wave-like patterns of probabilities of interconnectedness," reversing the "Cartesiannotion that the world is comprised of independent parts" (Johnson, 1999, p. 160). Physicist Capra (1983) argued that quantum and relativitytheories share ontology with mystics throughout history. The reconsideration of spirituality in light of the entrance of marginalized Others into the ongoing conversation about learning, knowledge, language, literacy, and sociopolitical processes, I believe, will become a significant dimension of

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This revised article was originally presented as an invited plenary talk at the Pacific Second Language Research Forum (PacSLRF), 5 October 2001, in Honolulu, via distance technology. I am indebted to Kandace Knudson, Matthew C. Bronson, and Sarah E. Nielsen for our many significant conversations on the issues and sources in cognitive science and SLA discussed here. I am also grateful to Michele FavreauHaight, Suzanne Romaine, Kathryn Davis, David Welchman Gegeo, Julia Menard-Warwick,Sally Sieloff Magnan, and three anonymous reviewers, for their

344 helpful comments on an earlier draft. I dedicate this paper to Charlie (Charlene) J. Sato, in memory of our conversations in 1991 when, while working on our "Discourse Processes in Hawai'i Creole English" project, I first began proposing the ideas developed here, catalyzed by our synergistic, free-ranging, and wonderfully electric discussions of mind, language, culture, and epistemology.

The Modern Language Journal 88 (2004) culling, relativism, accepted findings and soul of SLA. AppliedLinguistics, 17, 63-83. Bloor, D. (1991). Knowledgeand social imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Boggs, S. T. (with Watson-Gegeo, K., & McMillan, G.). (1985). Speaking,relating and learning: A study of Hawaiian childrenat homeand at school.Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theoryof practice.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1985). The genesis of the concepts of 2 habitus and field. Sociocriticism, (1), 1-24. Brandt, M. E. (1990). Getting social about critical thinking: Power and constraints of apprenticeships. Newsletter the Laboratory Comparative of of Quarterly Human Cognition,12 (2), 56-63. Bronson, M. C. (2001, December 5). Genreis a verb: Researchon academicwriting in critical perspective. from Retrieved http://www.enformy.com/ alford.htm#bronson Brown, P., & Fraser, C. (1979). Speech as a marker of situation. In K. Scherer & H. Giles (Eds.), Social markersin speech (pp. 33-62). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burman, E. (1994). Deconstructing psycholdevelopmental ogy. New York: Routledge. Byrnes,J. P. (2001). Minds, brains, and learning: Understanding the psychologicaland educational relevance New York: Guilford. research. of neuroscientific Caldas-Coulthard, C. R., & Coulthard, M. (Eds.). (1996). Textsand practices:Readings in critical discourseanalysis. London: Routledge. Canagarajah, A. S. (1999). Resisting linguistic imperialism in English teaching.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Canclini, N. G. (1995). Hybridcultures:Strategies enfor teringand leaving modernity(C. L. Chiappari & S. L. Lopez, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. Capra, F. (1983). The Tao of physics. Boulder, CO: Shambala Press. Chafe, W., & Nichols, J. (Eds.). (1986). Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Chaiklin, S., & Lave, J. (Eds.). (1993). Understanding practice: Perspectiveson activity and context. New York: Cambridge University Press. empowerChaudhry, L. N. (1995). Marginality,hybridity, ment:A criticalfeminist ethnography the resistance of of Pakistani Muslim immigrantwomenin community and educational contexts. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Davis. Chomsky, N. (1995). The minimalist program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chouliaraki, L., & Fairclough, N. (1999). Discoursein late modernity: Rethinkingcritical discourseanalysis. Scotland: University of Edinburgh Edinburgh, Press. Toward a Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: unified scienceof the mind/brain. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.

REFERENCES Alcoff, L., & Potter, E. (Eds.). (1993). Feminist episNew York: Routledge. temologies. Atkinson, D. (2002). Toward a sociocognitive approach to second language acquisition. Modern LanguageJournal, 86, 525-545. Atkinson, D., & Ramanathan, V. (1995). Cultures of writing: An ethnographic comparison of L1 and L2 university writing/language programs. TESOL 29, Quarterly, 539-568. Bakhtin, M. (1981). Thedialogicimagination:Four essays byM. M. Bakhtin. (M. Holoquist, Ed.; C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Bakhtin, M. (1986). Speech genresand otherlate essays.(V. W. McGee, C. Emerson, & M. Holoquist, Eds., Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Barlow, G. W., Petrinovich, L., & Main, M. B. (Eds.). The BielefeltInter(1982). Behavioral development: New York: Cambridge UniverdisciplinaryProject. sity Press. Bates, E., Thal, D.J., & Marchman, V. (1991). Symbols and syntax: A Darwinian approach to language development. In N. A. Krasnegor, D. M. Rumbaugh, R. L. Schiefelbusch, & M. Studdert-Kennedy (Eds.), Biological and behavioraldeterminants (pp. 29-66). Hillsdale, NJ: of language development Erlbaum. Baumgartner, P., & Payr, S. (1995). Speakingminds:Interviews with twenty eminent cognitive scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bayley, R., & Schecter, S. R. (2003). Language socialization in bilingual and multilingual societies.Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. Social and culBerns, M. (1990). Contextsof competence: in tural considerations communicative language teaching. New York: Plenum. Bhaba, H. K. (1994). The location of culture. London: Routledge. Bhavnani, K.-K.,Foran,J., & Kurian, P. (Eds.). (2003). Feminist futures: Re-imagining women, culture and London: Zed. development. Bickerton, D. (1988). Creole languages and the bioprogram. In F. J. Newmeyer (Ed.), Linguistic theory: Extensions and implications (pp. 268-282). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bickerton, D. (1990). Language and species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Block, D. (1996). Not so fast: Some thoughts on theory

Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo Churchland, P. S. (2002). Brain-wise:Studies in neuroCambridge, MA: MIT Press. philosophy. Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T.J. (1992). Thecomput'ationalbrain.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. and Code, L. (1991). Whatcan she know?Feministtheory the constructionof knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Cole, K., & Zuengler, J. (2003). Engaging in an authentic science project: Appropriating, resisting, and denying "scientific"identities. In R. Bayley & S. R. Schecter (Eds.), Language socialization in bilingual and multilingual societies (pp. 62-80). Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. A Cole, M. (1996). Culturalpsychology: onceandfuturediscipline.Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversity Press. Cole, M., & Engestrom, Y. (1993). A cultural-historical approach to distributed cognition. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributedcognitions: and Psychological educational considerations(pp. 1-46). New York: Cambridge University Press. Cole, M., Hood, L., & McDermott, R. P. (1978). Concepts of ecological validity: Their differing implications for comparative research. Quarterly Newsletter the Laboratory Comparative Human of for Cognition,2, 34-37. Collins, P. H. (2000). Blackfeminist thought:Knowledge, New consciousness,and thepolitics of empowerment. York: Routledge. Cook, H. M. (1999). Language socialization in Japanese elementary schools: Attentive listening and reaction turns.Journal ofPragmatics, 143-165. 31, Cook-Gumperz,J., Corsaro, W. A., & Streeck,J. (1986). Children'sworlds and children'slanguage. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Crookes, G. (1997). SLA and language pedagogy: A socioeducational perspective. Studies in Second LanguageAcquisition, 19, 93-116. Dacey, A. (2001). Metaphors, minds, and the fate of Western philosophy. FreeInquiry,21, 39-45. Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes'error: Emotion,reason,and the human brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam. D'Andrade, R., & Strauss, C. (Eds.). (1992). Human motivesand cultural models.New York: Cambridge University Press. A Danl:, T. (1991). Knowledge, ideologyand discourse: soNew York: Routledge. ciological perspective. Davidson, R.J. (1992). Emotion and affective style. PsychologicalScience,3, 39-43. Davis, K. (1995). Qualitative theory and methods in applied linguistics research. TESOL Quarterly,29, 427-454. Deacon, T. W. (1997). The symbolic species:The co-evolution of language and the brain. New York: W. W. Norton. Demruth, K. (1986). Prompting routines in the language socialization of Basotho children. In B. B. Schieffelin & E. Ochs (Eds.), Language socialization across cultures (pp. 80-96). New York: Cambridge University Press. Diesing, P. (1971). Patterns of discoveryin the social sciences.Chicago: Aldine.

345 Doughty, C., & Long, M. H. (Eds.). (2003). The handbookof second language acquisition. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Duff, P. A. (1995). An ethnography of communication in immersion classrooms in Hungary. TESOL 29, Quarterly, 505-538. Eckert, P. (2000). Linguistic variation as social practice: The linguistic construction identityat BeltenHigh. of Oxford: Blackwell. Edelman, G. (1992). Brightair, brilliant fire: On the matter of mind. New York: Basic Books. Edge,J., & Richards, K. (1998). May I see your warrant, please? Justifying outcomes in qualitative research. AppliedLinguistics, 19, 334-356. Ellis, N. C. (1998). Emergentism, connectionism and language learning. Language Learning, 48, 631664. Ellis, R., & Roberts, C. (1987). Two approaches for investigating second language acquisition. In R. Ellis (Ed.), Second language acquisition in context (pp. 3-29). London: Prentice-Hall. Elman, J. L., Bates, E. A., Johnson, M. H., KarmiloffSmith, A., Parisi, D., & Plunkett, K. (1996). Reon thinkinginnateness:A connectionist perspective development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fauconnier, G., & Turner, M. (2002). Theway we think: Conceptual blendingand the mind's hidden complexities. New York: Basic Books. Firth, A., & Wagner, J. (1997). On discourse, communication, and (some) fundamental concepts in SLA research. ModernLanguageJournal, 81, 285330. Fischer, K. W., Wang, L., Kennedy, B., & Chang, C.-L. (1998). Culture and biology in emotional development. In D. Sharma & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), New directions child development: Vol. 81. Sociofor emotionaldevelopment across cultures (pp. 21-43). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Fodor, J. A. (1998). In criticalcondition:Polemicalessays on cognitivescienceand thephilosophy mind. Camof bridge, MA: MIT Press. Selected Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: interviews and other writings1972-1977. New York:Pantheon Books. Fox, N. A. (1991). If it's not left, it's right: Electroencephalograph asymmetry and the development of emotion. AmericanPsychologist, 863-872. 46, New York: Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogyof the oppressed. Continuum. Fuller, S. (1988). Social epistemology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretationof cultures. New York: Basic Books. Gegeo, D. W. (1994). Kastomand bisnis:Towardintegratinto rural development the in ing cultural knowledge SolomonIslands. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Hawai'i. Gegeo, D. W., & Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (1999). Adult education, language change, and issues of identity and authenticity in Kwara'ae (Solomon Islands). &Education Quarterly, (1), 22-36. 30 Anthropology

346
Gegeo, D. W., & Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (2001). "How we know":Kwara'ae rural villagers doing indigenous Pacific, 13, 55-88. epistemology. The Contemporary Gegeo, D. W., & Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (2002). The critical villager: Transforming language and education in Solomon Islands. InJ. W. Tollefson (Ed.), Language policies in education: Critical issues (pp. 309-325). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Gegeo, D. W., & Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (2003). Whose knowledge? The collision of indigenous and introduced knowledge systems in Solomon Islands Pacommunity development. The Contemporary cific, 14, 377-409. essaysof Gibson,J.J. (1982). Reasonsfor realism:Selected JamesJ. Gibson (E. Reed & R. Jones, Eds.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Acin Giddens, A. (1979). Centralproblems social theory: tion, structure,and contradictionin social research. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). Thediscovery ofgrounded theory. Chicago: Aldine. Goldblum, N. (2001). The brain-shapedmind: What the brain can tell us about the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and Goldman, A. I. (1986). Epistemology cognition.CamMA: Harvard University Press. bridge, in Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge a social world.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goodwin, C., & Duranti, A. (1992). Rethinking context: An introduction. In A. Duranti & C. Goodwin (Eds.), Rethinking context:Language as an interactive phenomenon (pp. 1-42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gramsci, A. (1978). Selections from political writings 1921-1926. (Q. Hoare, Ed. & Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. Grosz, E. (1990). A note on essentialism and difference. In S. Gunew (Ed.), Feminist knowledge:Critique and construct(pp. 22-40). New York: Routledge. Grosz, E. (1993). Bodies and knowledges: Feminism and the crisis of reason. In L. Alcoff & E. Potter (Eds.), Feminist epistemologies (pp. 187-215). New York: Routledge. Gumperz, J. J., & Levinson, S. C. (Eds.). (1996). Rethinking linguistic relativity.New York: Cambridge University Press. and the evolutionof Habermas,J. (1979). Communication society.Boston: Beacon Press. Halgren, E., & Marinkovic, K. (1995). Neurophysiological networks integrating human emotions. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitiveneurosciences (pp. 137-151). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hall, S. (1991). Cultural identity and diaspora. In A. D. King (Ed.), Culture,globalizationand the worldsysconditionsfor the representation tem: Contemporary of identity (pp. 222-236). Binghamton, NY: State University of New York Press. Halliday, M. A. K., & Hasan, R. (1989). Language, context, and text:Aspectsof language in a social-semiotic Oxford: Oxford University Press. perspective.

The Modern Language Journal 88 (2004) Hanks, W. F. (1991). Foreword. InJ. Lave & E. Wenger par(Eds.), Situated cognition:Legitimate peripheral ticipation(pp. 13-24). New York:Cambridge University Press. Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism. Feminist Studies, 14, 575599. Harding, S. (1993). Rethinking standpoint epistemology: "Whatis strong objectivity?"In L. Alcoff & E. Potter (Eds.), Feminist epistemologies (pp. 49-82). New York: Routledge. Harklau, L. (1994). ESL versus mainstream classes: Contrasting L2 learning environments. TESOL 28, Quarterly, 241-272. He, A. W. (1997). Learning and being: Identity construction in the classroom. In L. Bouton (Ed.), Pragmatics and language learning (pp. 201-222). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Heath, S. B. (1983). Wayswith words:Language, life, and New York:Camand workin communities classrooms. bridge University Press. Holland, D., Lachicotte. W.,Jr., Skinner, D., & Cain, C. (1998). Identityand agencyin cultural worlds.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Holland, D., & Quinn, N. (Eds.). (1987). Culturalmodels in language and thought.New York: Cambridge University Press. Hoyle, S. M., & Adger, C. T. (1998). Kids talk: Strategic language use in later childhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huebner, T., & Davis, K. A. (Eds.). (1999). Sociopolitical on perspectives language policy and planning in the USA.Amsterdam: John Benjamins. PhilaHymes, D. (1974). Foundations in sociolinguistics. delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hyon, S. (1996). Genre in three traditions: Implications for ESL. TESOL,30(4), 693-722. Ingvar, D. H. (1999). On volition: A neurophysiologically oriented essay. In B. Libet, A. Freeman, & K. Sutherland (Eds.), The volitional brain: Towardsa neuroscienceof free will (pp. 1-10). Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic. Jacobs, B., & Schumann, J. (1992). Language acquisition and the neurosciences: Towards a more integrative perspective. AppliedLinguistics, 13, 282301. Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of and memory. Journal of Memory Language,22, 485508. and James, A., & Prout, A. (Eds.). (1997). Constructing reconstructingchildhood (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: Routledge/Falmer. universe:Scientific Jantsch, E. (1980). The self-organizing and human implicationsof emerging paradigmof evolution. New York: Pergamon. Jessor, R., Colby, A., & Shweder, R. A. (Eds.). (1996). Context and Ethnographyand human development: meaning in social inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo Johnson, A. N. (1999). Spirituality: Post-formal thinking, spiritual intelligence and the paradox of the developmental journey. In S. R. Steinberg, J. L. Kincheloe, & P. H. Hinchey (Eds.), Thepost-formal reader:Cognitionand education(pp. 146-173). New York:Falmer. Kanagy, R. (1999). Interactional routines as a mechanism for L2 acquisition and socialization in an immersion context. Journal of Pragmatics,31, 146711492. and language teaching.Oxford: Kern, R. (2000). Literacy Oxford University Press. the Knudson, K. (n.d.). Fad,fact, orfantasy?Demystifying in discourse "brain-based" education.Unpublished of manuscript. Koenig,J.-P. (1998). Discourseand cognition:Bridgingthe gap. Stanford, CA: CSLI/Cambridge. Kramsch, C. (Ed.). (1995). Redefiningthe boundariesof languagestudy.Boston: Heinle. Issuesand impliKrashen, S. (1985). Theinput hypothesis: cations.London: Longman. Kroskrity,P. V. (Ed.). (2000). Regimes language:Ideolof ogies,polities, and identities.Santa Fe, NM, and Oxford: School of American Research Press &James Currey. Kulick, D. (1992). Language shift and cultural reproduction: Socialization, self, and syncretismin a Papua New Guinean village. New York: Cambridge University Press. as Lakoff, G. (1984). Classifiers reflection mind:A cogniof tive approach prototype to theory (Berkeley Cognitive Science Report No. 19). Berkeley, CA: University of California Institute of Human Learning. we Lakoflf,G., &Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. in Lakoff, G., &Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy theflesh: The embodiedmind and its challenge to Western thought.New York: Basic Books. Langacker, R. W. (1990). Concept,image, and symbol: The cognitivebasis of grammar.Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, R. W. (1991 ). Foundationsof cognitivegrammar: Vol. 2. Descriptiveapplication.Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lantolf, J. P. (1996). SLA theory building: "Letting all the flowers bloom." Language Learning, 46, 713749. and Larsen-Freeman, D. (2000). Techniques principlesin language teaching(2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Latour, B. (1986). Sciencein action: How to follow scientists and engineersthroughsociety.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lave,J. (1988). Cognitionin practice:Mind, mathematics and culturein everyday Cambridge: Cambridge life. University Press. Lave,J. (1993). The practice of learning. In S. Chaiklin & J. Lave (Eds.), Understanding practice:Perspectives on activityand context(pp. 3-32). New York: Cambridge University Press. Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situatedcognition:Legiti-

347 mate peripheral participation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lazaraton, A. (1995). Qualitative research in applied linguistics: A progress report. TESOL Quarterly, 29, 473-504. A Lee, P. (1996). The Whorftheorycomplex: criticalreconsideration.Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Levinson, S. C. (1996). Relativity in spatial conception and description. InJ.J. Gumperz & S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Rethinking linguistic relativity (pp. 177202). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levy,J. P., Bairaktaris,D., Gullinaria,J. A., & Cairns, P. modelsof memory and (Eds.). (1995). Connectionist language.London: UCL Press. Lewis, J. A., & Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (in press). Fictions of childhood: Toward a sociohistorical approach to human development. Ethos. Li, D. (2000). The pragmatics of making requests in the L2 workplace: A case study of language socialization. CanadianModernLanguageReview,5 7, 58-87. Liddicoat, A. (1997). Interaction, social structure, and second language use: A response to Firth and Wagner. ModernLanguageJournal, 81, 313-317. Long, M. H., & Doughty, C.J. (2003). SLA and cognitive science. In C. Doughty & M. H. Long (Eds.), The handbookof second language acquisition (pp. 866-870). Oxford: Blackwell. Losey, K. M. (1995). Gender and ethnicity as factors in the development of verbal skills in bilingual Mexican American women. TESOLQuarterly, 63529, 661. MacWhinney, B. (Ed.). (1999). The emergence lanof guage. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Malinowski, B. (1923). The problem of meaning in primitive languages. In C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards (Eds.), The meaning of meaning (pp. 296336). New York: Harcourt. Martin, J. R. (1997). Analyzing genre: Functional parameters. In F. Christie & J. R. Martin (Eds.), Genreinstitutions: Social processesin the workplace and school(pp. 89--121). New York: Continuum. Martin, L. M. W., Nelson, K., & Tobach, E. (Eds.). and (1995). Sociocultural psychology: Theory practice of doing and knowing.New York: Cambridge University Press. Martinez, M. E. (2001). The process of knowing: A biocognitive epistemology. TheJournal of Mind and Behavior,22, 407-426. Mayall, B. (2002). Towards a sociologyfor childhood: Thinkingfrom children'slives. Philadelphia: Open University Press. McGroarty, M. (1998). Constructive and constructivist challenges for applied linguistics. Language Learning, 48, 591-622. McWhorter, J. H. (1997). Towardsa new modelof creole genesis.New York: Peter Lang. Miller, E. K. (2000). The prefrontal cortex and cognitive control. NatureReviews 1, Neuroscience, 59-65. Miller, P. J., & Goodnow, J J. (1995). Cultural practices: Towards an integration of culture and de-

348 velopment. In J. J. Goodnow, P. J. Miller, & F. Kessel (Eds.), Culturalpracticesas context develfor opment(pp. 5-16). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Naatanen, R. (1992). Attention and brain function. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Nelson, K. (1996). Language in cognitive development: Theemergence the mediatedmind. New York:Camof bridge University Press. Nelson, L. H. (1993). Epistemological communities. In L. Alcoff & E. Potter (Eds.), Feminist epistemologies (pp. 121-160). New York: Routledge. LanOchs, E. (1988). Cultureand language development: guage acquisitionand language socializationin a Samoan village. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pallotti, G. (1996). Towards an ecology of second language acquisition: SLA as a socialization process. In E. Kellerman, B. Weltens, & T. Bongaerts (Eds.), EuroSLA6: A Selectionof Papers. Toegepaste Taalwetenschapin Artikelen (pp. 121-143). Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij. Peirce, B. N. (1995a). Social identity, investment, and 29, language learning. TESOLQuarterly, 9-31. Peirce, B. N. (1995b). The theory of methodology in qualitative research. TESOL Quarterly,29, 569575. Pennycook, A. (1994). The culturalpolitics of English as an international language. London: Longman. Perret-Clermont, A.-N., Perret,J.-F., & Bell, N. (1991). The social construction of meaning and cognitive activity in elementary school children. In L. B. Resnick,J. M. Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), on Perspectives sociallysharedcognition(pp. 41-62). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Philips, S. U. (1983). The invisible culture: Communicaon and community the WarmSprings tion in classroom Indian Reservation.New York: Longman. Phillipson, R. (1992). Linguistic imperialism.Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct: The new science of language and mind. New York:William Morrow. Plunkett, K., & Elman,J. L. (1997). Exercisesin rethinking innateness.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Poole, D. (1992). Language socialization in the second language classroom. Language Learning, 42, 593616. Porges, S. W. (1995). Orienting in a defensive world: Mammalian modification of our evolutionary 32, heritage, a polyvagal theory. Psychophysiology, 301-318. Prigogine, I. (1980). From being to becoming.San Francisco: Freeman. Quartz, S. R., & Sejnowski, T.J. (2002). Liars, lovers,and Whatthenew brainsciencerevealsabouthowwe heroes: who become we are.New York:HarperCollins. Quinn, N. (1987). Convergent evidence for a cultural model of American marriage. In D. Holland & N. Quinn (Eds.), Cultural models in language and thought(pp. 173-194). New York:Cambridge University Press. Quinn, N. (1997). Research on shared task solutions.

The Modern Language Journal 88 (2004) In C. Strauss & N. Quinn (Eds.), A cognitivetheory of cultural meaning (pp. 137-188). New York: Cambridge University Press. Quinn, N., & Holland, D. (1987). Introduction. In D. Holland & N. Quinn (Eds.), Cultural models in language and thought(pp. 3-40). New York: Cambridge University Press. Raffles, H. (2002). Intimate knowledge. International Social Sciences Journal (UNESCO), 173, 325-335. Ramanathan, V., & Atkinson, D. (1999). Ethnographic approaches and methods in L2 writing research: A critical guide and review. Applied Linguistics, 14, 1-43. Rampton, B. (1997a). A sociolinguistic perspective on applied linguistics. In G. Kasper & E. Kellerman (Eds.), Communication strategies: Psycholinguistic and sociolinguisticperspectives(pp. 54-83). London: Longman. Rampton, B. (1997b). Second language research in late modernity: A response to Firth and Wagner. ModernLanguageJournal, 81, 329-333. Regier, T. (1995). A model of the human capacity for categorizing spatial relations. Cognitive Linguistics, 6, 63-88. Regier, T. (1996). The human semanticpotential: Spatial language and constrained connectionism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Resnick, L. B. (1991). Shared cognition: Thinking as social practice. In L. B. Resnick,J. M. Levine, & S. on D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives sociallysharedcognition (pp. 1-20). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Resnick, L. B., Levine, J. M., & Teasley, S. D. (Eds.). (1991). Perspectiveson socially shared cognition. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Roberts, C., & Simonot, M. (1987). "This is my life": How language acquisition is interactionally accomplished. In R. Ellis (Ed.), Second language acquisition in context (pp. 133-148). London: Prentice-Hall. in Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship thinking: Cognitive developmentin social context. New York: Oxford University Press. Rosch, E., & Lloyd, B. (1978). Cognitionand categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L., & PDP Research processGroup (Eds.). (1986). Parallel distributed of ing: Explorationsin the microstructure cognition: Vol. 2. Psychological and biological models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. cognitions: Salomon, G. (Ed.). (1993). Distributed Psychological and educational considerations.New York: Cambridge University Press. Sato, C.J., & Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (1992, January). InEnglish. Paper formation structurein Hawai'i Creole presented at the Society for Pidgin and Creole Linguistics meeting, Philadelphia. Schecter, S. R., & Bayley, R. (1997). Language socialization practices and cultural identity: Case studies of Mexican-descent families in California and Texas. TESOLQuarterly, 513-541. 31,

Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo Schieffelin, B. B. (1990). The give and take of everyday life: Language socializationof Kaluli children.New York: Cambridge University Press. Schieffelin, B. B., & Ochs, E. (Eds.). (1986). Language socializationacrosscultures.New York: Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, R. (1990). The role of consciousness in second language learning. Applied Linguistics, 11, 129-158. Schneider, W., Pimm-Smith, M., & Worden, M. (1994). The neurobiology of attention and automaticity. CurrentOpinion in Neurobiology, 177-182. 4, Schwartz, J. M., & Begley, S. (2002). The mind and the brain: Neuroplasticity and the power of mentalforce. New York: HarperCollins. Segall, M. H., Dasen, P. R., Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H. (1999). Human behavior globalperspective: in An introductionto cross-cultural psychology(2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Seidenberg, M. S. (1997). Language acquisition and language use: Learning and applying probabilistic constraints. Science,275, 1599-1603. Shonkoff, J. P., & Phillips, D. A. (Eds.). (2000). From neuronstoneighborhoods: science earlychildhood The of development. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Shore, B. (1991). Culturein mind: Meaning construction and cultural cognition.New York: Oxford University Press. Shweder, R. A. (1996). Quanta and qualia:What is the "object" of ethnographic method? In R. Jessor, A. Colby, & R. A. Shweder (Eds.), Ethnography and human development: Contextand meaningin social inquiry(pp. 175-182). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Siegal, M. (1991). A clash of conversational worlds: Interpreting cognitive development through communication. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine, & S. D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives sociallysharedcogon nition (pp. 23-40). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Siegal, M. (1996). The role of learner subjectivity in second language sociolinguistic competency: Western women learning Japanese. Applied Linguistics, 17, 356-382. Silbersweig, D. A., & Stern, E. (1998). Towards a functional neuroanatomy of conscious perception and its modulation by volition. Philosophical Transactionsof theRoyalSociety London,Series BiologiB: of cal Sciences, 353,1883-1888. Silverstein, M. (2000). Whorfianism and the linguistic imagination of nationality. In P. V. Kroskrity (Ed.), Regimesof language: Ideologies,polities, and identities (pp. 85-138). Santa Fe, NM, & Oxford: School of American Research &James Currey. Sinha, D. (1997). Indigenizing psychology. In J. W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, &J. Pandey (Eds.), Handbookof cross-cultural psychology:Vol. 1. Theoryand Method (2nd ed., pp. 131-169). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Slobin, D. (Ed.). (1985). A cross-linguistic study of lan-

349 guage acquisition (Vols. 1-2). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. and Smith, E .E., & Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories concepts.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Solso, R. L., & Massaro, D. W. (1995). Thescienceof the mind: 2001 and beyond. New York:Oxford University Press. Spitzer, M. (1999). The mind within the net: Models of learning, thinking, and acting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. societies. London: Sage. Stehr, N. (1994). Knowledge Stephens, S. (Ed.). (1995). Childrenand the politics of culture.Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press. Stigler,J. W., Shweder, R., & Herdt, G. (Eds.). (1990). Cultural psychology: Essays on comparativehuman development.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strauss, C., & Quinn, N. (1997). A cognitivetheory culof tural meaning.New York: Cambridge University. Sullivan, F. J. (1995). Critical theory and systemic linguistics: Textualizing the contact zone [electronic version].JAC, 15(3), 1-21. Taylor, J. R. (1989). Linguistic categorization: Prototypes in linguistic theory. Oxford, UK: Clarendon. Tiller, W. A. (2003a). Conscious acts of creation: The emergence of a new physics [electronic version]. of InternationalJournal Healing and Caring,Online, 3(1), 1-23. Tiller, W. A. (2003b). Towards a quantitative model of both local and non-local energetic/information healing [electronic version]. InternationalJournal of Healing and Caring, Online, 3(2), 1-40. Tollefson, J. W. (Ed.). (1995). Powerand inequalityin language education.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tudge,J. (1990). Vygotsky, the zone of proximal development, and peer collaboration: Implications for classroom practice. In L. C. Moll (Ed.), Vygotsky and education (pp. 155-172). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ulichny, P., & Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (1989). Interactions and authority: The dominant interpretive framework in writing conferences. DiscourseProcesses,12(3), 309-328. Ungerer, F., & Schmid, H.-J. (1996). An introductionto cognitivelinguistics.London: Longman. Varela, F.J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2000). Theembodiedmind: Cognitive scienceand human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Vos, T. (2000). Visions of the middle landscape: Organic farming and the politics of nature. Agricultureand Human Values, 17, 245-256. The Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: development of higher psychologicalprocesses. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1981). The genesis of higher mental functions. InJ. V. Wertsch (Ed.), Theconcept acof tivity in Sovietpsychology (pp. 144-188). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp. Watson, K. A. (1975). Transferable communicative routines: Strategies and group identity in two speech events. Language and Society,4, 53-70.

350 Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (1990). The social transfer of cogNewsletter the nitive skills in Kwara'ae. Quarterly of Laboratory Human Cognition,22, 575-592. of Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (1992). Thick explanation in the ethnographic study of child socialization and development: A longitudinal study of the problem of schooling for Kwara'ae (Solomon Islands) children. In W. A. Corsaro & P. J. Miller (Eds.), Vol. New directions child development: 58. Theprofor duction and reproduction children'sworlds:Interof for pretivemethodologies the study of childhoodsocialization (pp. 51-66). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (1995). Argument as transformation: A Pacific framing of conflict, community, on and learning. In D. Berrill (Ed.), Perspectives argument (pp. 189-204). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Watson-Gegeo, K. A. (2001). Fantasy and reality: The dialectic of work and play in Kwara'ae children's lives. Ethos, 29, 138-158. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Gegeo, D. W. (1986a). The social world of Kwara'ae children: Acquisition of language and values. In J. Cook-Gumperz, W. A. worldsand Corsaro, &J. Streeck (Eds.), Children's children's language (pp. 109-128). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Gegeo, D. W. (1986b). Calling-out and repeating routines in Kwara'ae children's language socialization. In B. B. Schieffelin & E. Ochs (Eds.), Language socializationacrosscultures (pp. 17-50). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Gegeo, D. W. (1994). Keeping culture out of the classroom in rural Solomon Islands schools: A critical analysis. Educational Foundations, 8, 27-55. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Gegeo, D. W. (1995). Understanding language and power in the Solomon Islands: Methodological lessons for educational intervention. In J. W. Tollefson (Ed.), Power and inequalityin language education (pp. 59-72). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Gegeo, D. W. (1999a). (Re)modeling culture in Kwara'ae: The role of discourse in children's cognitive development. DiscourseStudies, 1, 227-246.

The Modern Language Journal 88 (2004) Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Gegeo, D. W. (1999b). Culture, discourse, and indigenous epistemology: Transcending current models in language planning and policy. In T. Huebner & K. A. Davis on (Eds.), Sociopolitical perspectives language policy and planning in the USA (pp. 99-116). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Gegeo, D. W. (2004). Deep culture: The epistemological boundaries of multicultural education. In G. Goodman & K. Carey (Eds.), Critical multicultural instructions:A of guide to strategiesthat enhance theperformance all students (pp. 235-256). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton. Watson-Gegeo, K. A., & Nielsen, S. E. (2003). Language socialization in SLA. In C. Doughty & M. H. Long (Eds.), The handbookof second language acquisition (pp. 155-177). Malden, MA: Blackwell. EsWautischer, H. (Ed.). (1998). Tribal epistemologies: Aldershot, says in the philosophy of anthropology. England: Ashgate. Weedon, C. (1997). Feministpracticeand poststructuralist theory(2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. White, L. (2003). On the nature of interlanguage representation: Universal Grammar in the second language. In C. Doughty & M. H. Long (Eds.), Thehandbook secondlanguage acquistion(pp. 19of 42). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thoughtand reality.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Willet, J. (1995). Becoming first graders in an L2: An ethnographic study of L2 socialization. TESOL Quarterly,29, 473-504. Williams, D.J., & Muchena, O. N. (1991). Utilizing indigenous knowledge systems in agricultural education to promote sustainable agriculture. Journal of AgriculturalEducation, 39, 52-57. into Wolfe, P. (2001). Brain matters:Translatingresearch classroom practice.Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. Wozniak, R. H., & Fischer, K. W. (Eds.). (1993). DevelActing and thinking in specificenopmentin context: vironments.Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Yeatman, A. (1994). Postmodern revisioningsof thepolitical. New York: Routledge.