Vote-Buying Behavior in the Security Council: Theory and Evidence from U.S.

Foreign Aid
Fumiko Tamura Brown University Takuma Kunieda Brown University

October 6, 2005

Abstract Motivated by a question about the determination of foreign aid ows, we examine U.S.vote-buying behavior in the U.N. Security Council (SC). We propose a model that takes into account both (1) U.S. optimal costand-benet considerations of foreign aid, and (2) veto powers of the permanent members. In the empirical analysis, we rst estimate a probit model that links the likelihood of the U.S. casting armative votes to the characteristics and importance of the agenda items voted upon. Using the inverse of Mills ratio derived from the probit estimation, we compute the level of benets that the U.S. expects to obtain, which then serves as an explanatory variable in the OLS estimation accounting for U.S. foreign aid distribution. Using time-series data for the period 1960-2001, we nd empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the U.S. trades foreign aid for rotating members votes on vital issues. Our nding suggests that SC seat rotation is a useful, reasonably exogenous, predictor of U.S. foreign aid distribution. Keywords: Foreign aid, Voting behavior, Probit estimation JEL Classication: F35, D72, C13, C25

Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912. E-mail: Fumiko_Tamura@Brown.edu Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912. E-mail: Takuma_Kunieda@Brown.edu. We thank Brian Knight for his introduction to this topic, and George Borts for his valuable comments. We are also grateful to Sarah Madsen and Kate Lorch for their assistance. The remaining errors are ours.

Introduction
What determines the U.S. foreign aid pattern? Alesina and Weder (2002) nd

that the U.S. does not reward recipient countries that have good institutions. Rather, it allocates more aid to more corrupt governments. This result is a bit surprising as the U.S. government, apparently, has no intention of encouraging corruption. This nding may be explained by the consideration that the U.S. distributes aid out of other motives, and in doing so, ends up allocating more aid to more corrupt governments. What else then dictates U.S. aid ows? Many researchers have tried to identify determinants of foreign aid ows in general. These determinants are viewed from the following three dimensions: (1) historical and cultural ties, (2) recipients needs and performances, and (3) donors political and strategic considerations.1 In the case of the U.S., its political and strategic considerations seem to dominate. It has long been said that the U.S. government uses foreign aid as a tool to induce certain political outcomes. Figure 1 shows U.S. economic and military assistance to non-permanent Security-Council (SC) members and Non Security-Council (Non-SC) members from 1946 through 2001.2 The SC members referred to here are rotating (i.e., non-permanent) SC members that are classied as developing countries. For instance, in 2004, eight developing countries served on the SC: Algeria, Benin, Angola, the Philippines, Pakistan, Brazil, Chile and Romania along with Spain and Germany.3 Compared to the assistance to Non-SC members, the assistance
1 Examples of historical and cultural ties are: colonial background (notably Frances aid to former French colonies), and cultural anity (such as language and religion.) Recipients needs include: recipients income level, emergency calls due to natural disaster, e.g., Tsunami relief for Indonesia, and post-conict reconstruction eorts. Recipients performances include both political and economic: the government quality (the degree of being free of corruption), political openness such as civil liberties and democracy, economic openness, and commitments to sound economic policies. Although in the literature what constitutes donors political and strategic considerations varies from study to study, there is a general agreement that donors interests matter for their aid-giving patterns. 2 Numbers represent an average of each member country. 3 In addition to ten rotating members, ve permanent members (the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia, and China) serve on the SC, and therefore 15 members in total represent the SC. NonSC members referred to here are developing countries that hold U.N. memberships but do not serve on the SC in a given year.

to SC members (both economic and military) exhibits quite large uctuations over time, which are represented by bold lines in Figure 1.4 This pattern suggests that, in providing assistance, the U.S. dierentiates between these two groups, namely SC members and Non-SC members. Moreover, there must be factors generating these uctuations, which might reect: the size or importance of countries who serve on the SC, U.S. political behavior such as vote-buying, or other factors.5 The answer is not immediately known from this simple plot, and thus it is worth exploring.

in millions of 1995 US $ 600

500

400

300

200

100

0
19 48 19 50 19 52 19 54 19 56 19 58 19 60 19 62 19 64 19 66 19 68 19 70 19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02
Economic Aid to SC Members Economic Aid to Non-SC Members Military Aid to SC Members Military Aid to Non-SC Members

year

Notes: Numbers represent an average of each member. SC Members referred to here are developing countries that serve on the Security Council as a rotating member. Source: The authors' calculation. Greenbook , USAID (2005)

Figure 1. US Economic and Military Aid to SC and non-SC Members

4 Here are the statistics. Over the sample period 1946-2001, an average of economic aid to the representative SC member and that to the representative Non-SC member are 117 million dollars and 61 million dollars, respectively. Corresponding standard deviations are 122 million dollars and 33 million dollars. An average of military aid to the representative SC member and that to the representative Non-SC member are 49 million dollars and 24 million dollars, respectively. Corresponding standard deviations are 82 million dollars and 10 million dollars. In that period, more economic aid was allocated to the representative SC member than the representative Non-SC member in 70% of the times, while more military aid was allocated to the representative SC member in 30% of the times. All nancial gures are in 1995 U.S. dollars. 5 In general, the following are considered key events in international diplomacy: Korean War (1950), 1956 (Suez Crisis), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Israeli-Arab Wars (1967 and 1973), Falklands War (1982), Gulf War I (1991) and Kosovo (1999).

As a matter of fact, the U.S. has special interests in the Middle East, into which it pours much of its foreign aid in order to bring about favorable political outcomes.6 The U.S. has been giving approximately one-third of its total economic aid to Middle Eastern countries since 1975 in response to the Middle East conict of 1973, the oil embargo of 1973-74, and Camp David Accord in 1978.7 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, Afghanistan became a major recipient of US aid; its receipt of Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) from the US has risen by 40-folds.8 Let us take a step further. On the premise that the U.S. pursues its national interests in a particular region, providing aid directly to that region is not the only way to do so. Bringing a dispute to the Security Council, which is the body of the United Nations in charge of maintaining world peace and security, is another way. Once the Security Council adopts a resolution, the Council is able to enforce it, to call upon U.N. members to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions, and even to take military action against an aggressor.9 The Security Council, represented by ve permanent members and ten rotating members, is a powerful body; one could imagine how high the stakes on its resolutions are. No wonder the U.S. pays cash to other Council members and secures votes on resolutions in its favor. If this conjecture turns out to be true, i.e., U.S. votebuying behavior exists, then seat rotation on the Security Council is a useful, if not a primary, predictor of U.S. foreign aid distribution. These issues U.S. foreign aid and seats at the Security Council have been gaining attention in recent years. The Bush administration has tripled its
6 A number of issues in the Middle East are identied as important issues" by the U.S. government. Important issues" are dened as issues which directly aected the United States interest and on which the United States lobbied extensively"(U.S. Department of State, various years). In the past ve years (2000-2004), 22 out of 64 issues deemed important are directly related to the Middle East, and a similar pattern is observed in the previous period as well. Alesina and Dollar (2000) document that the United States aid ow is largely inuenced by its interest in the Middle East. 7 When it comes to U.S. military aid, as much as 80% of its total military aid is distributed to Egypt and Israel since the late 1970s (U.S. Agency for International Development, various years). 8 Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005). 9 Charter of United Nations, Chapter V, VI, and VII.

aid to Africa since 2000, and is ready to disburse more.10 In the meantime, a reform of the United Nations is under way, where an enlargement of the Security Council is considered. Most proposals suggest adding several seats to the Security Council, two of which are from Africa.11 Despite the growing attention and the mounting interests, there is little literature that focuses on a link between foreign aid and politics in the Security Council.12 ONeill (1996) measures voting power of SC members in the absence of possible side-payment (e.g., foreign aid).13 He nds that, in such a setting, voting powers accruing to the permanent members are enormous due to their right to veto, whereas rotating members hold little voting power. ONeills nding implies that the value of seats for rotating members lies not in voting power per se, but in other prestige. Kuziemko and Werker (2004) have discovered that foreign aid receipt from the U.S. as well as from the U.N. increases during a rotating members tenure on the SC, especially during years when key diplomatic events occur. Their result is consistent with U.S. vote-buying in the SC. Several other studies (Wittkopf, 1973; Rai, 1980; Kegley and Hook, 1991; and Wang, 1999) explore a link between foreign aid and the voting pattern in the General Assembly (GA), instead of the Security Council (SC). These studies yield mixed results regarding the existence of such a link. The SC is a subset of the GA. In order to proceed, let us examine the structure of the GA and the SC (see Table 1). While the GA is represented by all 191 member states, the SC consists of 15 members: ve permanent members and ten rotating members, also known as P-5 and Elected-10, respectively. The ve permanent members are the U.S., France, the U.K., Russia and China. The remaining ten seats of the two-year term rotate among the rest of U.N. members. Every year ve countries that have served the two-year term retire,
York Times, June 10, 2005. (2005). 1 2 On the other hand, an analogue of such a link is examined extensively in the context of the U.S. federal system, namely a link between federal grants-in-aid and committee representation. See Knight (2002). 1 3 According to ONeill (1996), voting power is the probability that ones vote would make a dierence.
1 1 Anan 1 0 New

to be replaced with ve new countries. While SC decisions require nine afrmative votes, decisions in the GA are usually reached by a simple majority vote except for the important ones, which require a two-thirds majority to pass. Since 1946 voting coincidence in the GA with U.S. positions has varied among members from year to year, from subject to subject. This voting pattern of the GA contrasts that of the SC, where many of the resolutions are adopted unanimously. Table 1: The General Assembly and the Security Council (2004)
General Assembly All 191 members [simple majority votes]* Security Council 15 SC members [nine armative votes]

5 permanent members with veto powers (P-5) 10 non-permanent (rotating) members without veto powers** (Elected-10)

US France China Algeria Benin Angola the Philippines Pakistan

UK Russia Brazil Chile Romania Spain Germany

* With the exception of a two-thirds majority required for important decisions.

One might think that it would be more comprehensive if an analysis encompassed all U.N. votes; however, we intentionally limit our focus to the SC after considering two problems dealing with votes in the GA. First of all, not all votes in the GA are important enough for the U.S. to buy. Resolutions in the GA have no power of enforcement, and in addition, the subject matters of votes range broadly from conicts to values. In general, voting in the GA is a place for expressing opinions and taking positions, rather than a place for exercising political powers. In this respect, excluding votes in the GA from an analysis does not harm, but makes more sense for examining U.S. vote-buying behavior. Second, more importantly, an endogeneity problem arises in dealing with votes in the GA, which is a voting body consisting of all members. Is there

causality from U.S. foreign aid to the recipients voting pattern, or is there an omitted variable, such as friendliness," aecting the two?14 The latter type of causality, an omitted variable bias, is eliminated by conning an analysis to the SC, a subset of the whole body. Treating rotating SC members as a single group enables us to avoid the endogeneity problem, since the SC seats rotate almost randomly.15 The results of this paper, derived by regression analyses and conrmed by bootstrap tests, support the hypothesis that the U.S. trades foreign aid for rotating members votes on vital issues. The methodology employed in this paper is unique among the existing literature, in the sense that we try to nd a link between voting and aid-giving, indirectly. More specically, we take two steps as follows: (1) Using the probit model and computing the inverse of Mills ratio, we rst estimate the levels of an unobservable variable, the U.S. expected benets brought by a given SC resolution, and (2) this variable then serves as an explanatory variable in the OLS regression that accounts for U.S. foreign-aid giving, which is the cost incurred to the U.S. Applying this methodology to time-series data, we nd the following relationship: the higher the stakes for the U.S. on a given resolution, the more foreign aid the U.S. distributes in order to secure votes, unless the secured votes are negated by veto powers that other permanent members might exercise. Contributions of this paper to the existing literature are summarized in four points. (1) We start with a theoretical foundation by proposing a model, which not only considers U.S. optimal behavior, but also incorporates veto powers to which the ve permanent members are entitled. (2) By treating SC rotating
1 4 This question is addressed in the literature for years. For example, see Alesina and Dollar (2000). Friendliness" refers to an inherent distance between two countries in terms of historical background and cultural similarity. Two countries close" to one another have more nancial ows between them than with others, at the same time they happen to vote similarly since they share the common value. In such a case, vote-buying does not take place even though a positive correlation is observed between their voting coincidence and foreign aid ow. 1 5 Rotation of seats is not purely random because candidates lobby for their seats on the SC in advance. Nonetheless, the rotation is legitimately random in our context after introducing exogenous variables that represent resolutions characteristic and importance. This point is further discussed in Section 2 of this paper.

members as a single group, we avoid the endogeneity problem surrounding foreign aid and U.N. voting. (3) Using the probit model, we successfully extract from the relatively invariant voting pattern certain valuable information on the U.S. expected benets. (4) Our nding, derived from time-series data over the years of 1960-2001, adds to the determinants of U.S. foreign aid ows: seat rotation on the Security Council can be a useful predictor of U.S. foreign aid distribution. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop a theoretical model that takes into account U.S. optimal behavior and the ve permanent members veto powers, and display econometric specications and testable implications. In Section 3, we describe the data and explain the way we construct variables used for the empirical analysis. In Section 4, we report the results of both the probit and the OLS estimations. In Section 5, we check robustness of the results obtained in the previous section by applying the same analyses to Non-SC members, by using another dataset of foreign aid, and by conducting bootstrap tests. In Section 6, we draw our conclusion.

2
2.1

Theory
The Model

As mentioned in the previous section, there are several studies that focus on the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and U.N. voting patterns. Some of them exhibit statistical analyses using raw data of U.S. foreign aid and U.N. voting patterns, while others execute OLS estimations with ad hoc specications using such data. There are, however, no studies that construct an underlying model which takes into account a partys optimal behavior. Our main contribution to the literature of this area is that we construct a model which takes into account both the optimal cost-and-benet considerations of foreign aid on the side of the U.S. government and the existence of veto powers that the ve permanent members are entitled to.

Consider a country among the permanent members of the Security Council. When an agenda item arises, the country casts a vote for the agenda item or rejects it using its veto power.16 Each of the permanent members has a preference for each agenda item, which reects both the characteristics and the
p importance of the agenda item. Let yt be the benets from agenda item t.

The benets are determined by x0 , which includes some exogenous variables t reecting both the characteristics and the importance of the agenda item. Then we have
p yt = x0 + t , t

(1)

p where t is a preference shock and is a set of parameters. Even though yt is

unobservable, we can observe the voting behavior of the country. Each of the
p p permanent members accepts the agenda item if yt > 0, and rejects it if yt 6 0.17

Let us consider the vote-buying behavior of the U.S. government. We assume that the U.S. government gives foreign aid to rotating members in order to maximize its expected utility. There are a large number of agenda items that the U.S. government votes on. The U.S. government could receive positive or negative benets from each agenda item if it passed. We further assume that the benets from an agenda item are aected by the preference shock, and that the U.S. cannot observe its preference shock as it gives foreign aid to rotating members. Since the preference shock arises from the prevalent domestic issues in the United States, the foreign aid given to rotating members by the U.S. government does not aect the preference shock t . When the U.S. government does not prefer the agenda item, it simply exercises its veto power. Owing to its veto power, the U.S. can prevent any
1 6 We use the term agenda item" throughout this section, though we loosely call it resolution" in the previous section. Strictly speaking, agenda items become resolutions once passed in the SC. 1 7 An abstention, a third option available for all SC members, is implicitly embodied in our theoretical framework. Conventionally, in the SC, an abstention is not counted towards an armative vote, and at the same time it never constitutes a veto either. Nine armative votes are required in order for an agenda item to pass. The function P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ), introduced t later, is the probability that rotating members cast armative votes on the agenda item. The i function P i (zt = 1|x0 ), also introduced later, is the probability that the other permanent t members do not veto the agenda item, either by casting armative votes or by abstaining.

agenda items that brings negative benets from passing. Thus, negative benets do not realize as a result of U.S. optimal behavior. Therefore, the U.S. government takes into account the expected benets over the preference shock given the condition that the U.S. government decides to accept the agenda item:
p Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ], where zt is the U.S. governments voting behavior. (zt = 1 t

denotes the U.S. governments acceptance of an item, whereas zt = 0 denotes its rejection.) The U.S. government obtains its utility Ut from the expected benets over the preference shock as follows:18
p Ut = exp(Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ]), t

(2)

where > 0 is a constant. While the expected benets of the U.S. government over its preference shock
p are Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ], the U.S. government cannot gain these benets if other t

permanent members veto the agenda item, or if the Security Council itself rejects it by majority voting. Therefore, the U.S. government gives rotating members foreign aid in order to maximize its expected utility (over the uncertainty of majority voting and the possibility of other permanent members veto-exercising)
i minus the amount of foreign aid distributed. Let P i (zt = 1|x0 ) be the probat

bility that a permanent member other than the United States does not exercise the power of veto for an agenda item.19 Then, the expected utility (given x0 ) t becomes as follows:
i P(vt = 1|wt , x0 )4 P i (zt = 1|x0 )Ut t i=1 t

(3)

where P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) is the probability that an agenda item will achieve a twot thirds majority vote in the SC. (vt = 1 implies that an agenda item reaches a two-thirds majority vote in the SC, whereas vt = 0 implies that it does not.) wt
1 8 The assumption that the U.S. government obtains its utility from the expected benets over the preference shock, rather than the true benets, might seem unusual; however, such an assumption is plausible, provided that the U.S. government never knows the true value of each agenda item because of the organizational distortions of the country (such as its representative system), but it knows the distribution of the preference shocks. The U.S. government also knows the characteristics and importance of each agenda item when it gives foreign aid to rotating members. 1 9 Therefore i stands for the U.K., France, the U.S.S.R., or China.

10

is the total foreign aid given to rotating members by the U.S. This probability is an increasing function of the amount of foreign aid wt . We have assumed that if the U.S. government exercises its veto power, its utility, which is initially expected to be negative, becomes zero. Does P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) depend on x0 ? The answer is Yes." However, this t t is only because of xt s indirect eect on P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) through wt , which is t determined by the maximization problem considered below. The direct eect of x0 on P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) can be ignored. To see this, let us consider a Stacklebergt t game situation: the leader is the U.S. government and the followers are rotating members. Given an exogenous variable x0 , P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) is computed from t t the best responses of rotating members to the U.S. governments vote-buying behavior.20 Here, the exogenous variable x0 is irrelevant to this game. The t reason is as follows. In order to pass an agenda item, the U.S. government collects only four votes of rotating members out of ten members (two votes out of ve members until 1965), provided that the other four permanent members are expected to accept the agenda item.21 The U.S. government does not have to give foreign aid to rotating members that are not likely to accept an agenda item. As a result, P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) becomes independent of x0 . Of course, the t t eect of x0 on P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) might still remain; our emphasis is placed on the t t indirect eects of x0 on P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ). t t The above discussion allows us to rewrite P(vt = 1|wt , x0 ) as P(vt = 1|wt ). t The U.S. government solves the following maximization problem:
i max P(vt = 1|wt )4 P i (zt = 1|x0 )Ut wt , i=1 t wt

(4)

2 0 The construction of a more sophisticated game is left for future research. Since our objective in the current paper is to derive the relationship between the U.S. governments utility and the foreign aid given by the U.S. government, it would be enough for us to consider a reduced form of the best responses. 2 1 We should note that ve permanent members acceptance of an agenda item in the Security Council is a separate process from their opportunity to exercise veto power. This is because the power of veto is exercised after voting in the Security Council, rather than at the beginning, or during voting.

11

Substituting (2) into (4), (4) can be rewritten as:

p i max P(vt = 1|wt )4 P i (zt = 1|x0 )exp(Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ]) wt , i=1 t t wt

(5)

For tractability, we assume P(wt ) = 1 ewt . The rst-order condition of the maximization problem is as follows:
p i 4 P i (zt = 1|x0 )exp(wt + Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ]) = 1 i=1 t t

(6)

or equivalently, log() 1 X p i wt = log(P i (zt = 1|x0 )) + Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ]. + t t i=1

4

(7)

In other words, equation (7) illustrates that the amount of U.S. foreign aid given to rotating members is aected by two factors: (a) the expected benets that the U.S. receives from its favored agenda item, and (b) the probability that the other four permanent members also favor that agenda item, given the items characteristics and importance. Equation (7) is estimable once we construct the
p i data on Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] and P i (zt = 1|x0 ). t t

In the course of the decision-making process, the U.S. government cannot

p learn the absolute value of Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ]. In practice, however, the U.S. t

government is able to make a decision based on the relative value of the benets. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. government compares the current-year benets with the previous-year benets, thereby determining an increment of aid-giving to rotating members. Hence, we take the rst dierence of (7) to obtain another estimable equation: wt = 1X p i log(P i (zt = 1|x0 )) + Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ], t t i=1
4

(8)

where denotes the rst dierence.

2.2
2.2.1

Empirical Specications
The First Step (Probit Estimation)

First, we estimate in equation (1) for each of the ve permanent members, separately. Let us begin with the U.S. equation. Since we cannot observe the 12

p U.S. benets, yt , but can observe its voting behavior, we use the probit model. p Applying a straightforward calculation, we obtain: Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] = x0 + t t (x0 ) t (x0 ) , t

where

(x0 ) t (x0 ) t

is well-known as the inverse of Mills ratio. Although we

p made available from the probit estimation. Substituting into Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ], t

p cannot observe the true value of Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ], consistent estimates can be t

we have

0 p (xt ) . Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] = x0 + t t (x0 ) t

i Likewise, for each of the other four permanent members, the estimate of P i (zt =

i 1|x0 ) is calculated by substituting : P i (zt = 1|x0 ) = (x0 ).22 t t For the independent variables, x0 , we use the characteristics and importance t of each agenda item. Since the importance of each agenda item cannot be measured in a systematic way, we use as a proxy the degree of the importance of the Security Council itself in each year (see Section 2 for details). As will be explained in Section 2, we construct dummy variables by breaking down the contents of agenda items into multiple categories. Basically, we use an Admission" dummy, an Africa Conict" dummy, and a Middle East Conict" dummy as independent variables that represent the characteristics of each agenda item.23 For China, then, the probit estimation predicts Chinas acceptance rate perfectly when the Africa Conict and the Middle East Conict dummies are included, which means the coecients of those variables approach innity. The perfect prediction of the acceptance rate is implausible, because the past data do not necessarily predict the future voting behavior. Thus, we eliminate the Africa Conict and the Middle East Conict dummies from Chinas probit estimation. For the same reason, we eliminate the Admission dummy from Frances and the U.K.s probit estimations. The basic specication for the
2 2 Since we estimate ve equations, we have a dierent for each equations,. The subscript i is, however, omitted for the sake of simplication. 2 3 We do not use an Admission " dummy and a Conict " dummy at once because of their near multi-collinearity. For details on a selection of dummy variables, see Section 2.

13

probit estimation is as follows:

p yt

= + 1 Admision + 2 Af rica_Conf lict + 3 M iddleEast_Conf lict + 4 Importance + t . (9)

In the empirical analysis, we estimate the above probit model that links a likelihood of the U.S. casting armative votes to characteristics and importance of agenda items voted upon. We will compute the level of the U.S. expected benets by using the inverse of Mills ratio derived from this probit estimation. The constructed variable representing thre level of the U.S. expected benets will then serve as an explanatory variable in the OLS estimation accounting for U.S. foreign aid distribution. 2.2.2 The Second Step (OLS Estimation)

Although we give this sub-section the title of The Second Step, it is neither an instrumental variable regression, nor Heckmans two-stage regression.
p p Equation (7) contains Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] in its right-hand side, not just yt . Our t

estimation philosophy is found in what follows. The U.S. government can never
p p observe the true value of yt ; however, it obtains an expected value of yt over the

preference shock. In addition, the U.S. government has veto power over agenda items, which serves as an option with which the U.S. government is able to save foreign aid dollars which would have been spent had the U.S. government no such power. Accordingly, the U.S. government plans for its aid-giving by taking
p p p into account Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ], as opposed to Et [yt |x0 ] or yt . It also takes into t t

consideration the probability that the other members do not exercise a veto,
i that is, their voting for the agenda item: P i (zt = 1|x0 ). t

Due to the structure of our data, the independent variables in Equation (7),
p i Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] and P i (zt = 1|x0 ) did not match the corresponding depent t

dent variable, wt or wt . The data on foreign aid, wt , are yearly, while each observation in these independent variables pertains to the agenda item voted upon, ungrouped by year. Thus, in order to obtain the representative bene14

ts and the acceptance probabilities by year, we take the respective average of

p i Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] and P i (zt = 1|x0 ) over each year, thereby constructing yearly t t

independent variables.24 As to how to choose wt , we have two main choices, for each of which we have two sub-choices: the two main choices are the total economic or military aid dollars distributed by the U.S. government, and the two sub-choices are their current years values or one-period-lagged values.25 We use these four variables for our estimations. We do not take lags of more than one-period for dependent variables because the tenure of rotating members lasts for two years. Giving foreign aid more than two years ahead of voting is contradictory to the U.S. governments optimal behavior, and therefore we need not look further than the one-period for the analysis of vote-buying.26 We include other variables in the estimations in order to control for their eects on U.S. foreign aid. These control variables are: (1)the growth rate of the GDP of the United States: GGDP ; (2) U.S. government expenditure: DGX;27 (3) the ination rate of the United States: IN F LAT ION ; and (4) the years importance:28 DIM P ORT AN CE or IM P ORT AN CE.29 In addition to these four control variables, we have another control variable: the one-period-lagged value of foreign aid, wt1 , in order to control for the persistency eect of the dependent variable.30
2 4 Roughly speaking, a chunk of foreign aid given to rotating members is good for a year, no matter how many agenda items are considered. 2 5 We use a total" value, rather than average" of each recipient, because testable implications are derived from the viewpoint of the aid donor, the U.S., which acts as if it had a single resource pool for vote-buying. For further discussion, see Section 2. 2 6 This claim might be too much, because a country that has nished its tenure could become a rotating member again in the future. If we take this fact into account, we should consider a game-theoretic situation. In the current paper, we ignore such a situation and we leave it for future research. 2 7 The U.S. government expenditure referred to here, DGX, is the dierence between the current years U.S. government expenditure and the previous one. We do not use the level value of U.S. government expenditure because it does not pass the unit root test. See Table 3. 2 8 The years importance represents the media coverage of the Security Council" in a given year. See Section 2 for the denition of this variable. 2 9 DIMP ORT ANCE is the dierence between the current value and the previous one. We p do not use IMP ORT ANCE and Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] at once, because of their near multit collinearity. 3 0 Plotting the data, it seems that w follows a mean-reverting process. t

15

The basic specications for the second-step OLS are as follows: wt = constant + 1X p i log(P i (zt = 1|x0 )) + Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] t t i=1 (10)
4

+ 1 GGDPt + 2 DGXt + 3 IN F LAT IONt + 4 DIM P ORT AN CEt + 5 wt1 + t , and wt = constant +

+ 1 GGDPt + 2 DGXt + 3 IN F LAT IONt + 4 IM P ORT AN CEt + 5 wt1 + t ,

1X p i log(P i (zt = 1|x0 )) + Et [yt |zt = 1, x0 ] t t i=1 (11)

where t is an error term. The testable implication drawn here is that there exists vote-buying behavior of the US government in the Security Council if and only if

> 0. Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses are H0 : = 0,

and H1 : respectively. > 0,

3
3.1

Data
DataSet

To prepare a sample population of developing countries that are eligible for a two-year-term SC seat, the following two processes are taken. First, we select developing countries (based on 2003 GNI per capita) that hold U.N. memberships.31 Then, for each of these countries selected, we create the database beginning with the year they joined the U.N., to the present. After this process,
3 1 Countries with GNI per capita below 9,386 U.S. dollars in 2003 are categorized as developing countries, according to World Banks income classication (World Development Indicators database ).

16

150 countries remain, and as many as 5,943 data points could be made available in the period 1945-2004.32 Our main analysis begins with the year 1960 based on historical considerations. A number of African nations gained independence and joined the U.N. in the 1960s. Moreover, an amendment of the U.N. Charter was made in 1965, increasing the number of rotating SC seats from six to ten. The current structure of the Security Council, which continues to the present day, seems to have been shaped in the 1960s.33 Starting analysis from 1960 is also supported by the country composition of the SC, as seen in Appendix B. At least ve developing countries have served on the SC since 1960, in contrast to the prior period when the number of developing countries serving on the SC drops to as low as three. Based on a two-thirds majority rule observed by the SC, the U.S. needs to collect at least four armative votes from among developing countries serving on the SC.34

3.2

Data Sources

For U.S. foreign aid, two distinct data sources are available. U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID) provides annual data on U.S. economic and military assistance, separately, and according to the recipients, from the scal year 1946 to the present. Economic Assistance and Military Assistance cover grants and loans, excluding non-concessionary loans. On the other hand, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publishes Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) ows, listing donors according to recipient, from the calendar year 1960 to the present. ODA is dened as foreign grants
3 2 Israel, a major recipient of U.S. aid, is classied as a high-income country based on its 2003 GNI per capita. Thus, it is not included in our sample set. A list of the sample countries along with their code, regional classication, and years when U.N. memberships were granted is attached in Appendix A. 3 3 For the probit estimation, we use voting records in the SC from 1950 onwards in order to gather as much information as possible for estimating the unobservable variables. The period immediately after the Second World War, 1945-1949, is excluded due to its special circumstances and a lack of data reliability. 3 4 Under the U.N. Charter prior to the amendment in 1965, the U.S. had to collect only two votes from among the developing countries. To take this change into account, each year from 1960-1965 is indicated in the dataset by appropriate dummy variables.

17

and concessionary portions of loans that are provided for economic development purposes, and therefore it does not include military aid. Due to dierences in denition, economic assistance in USAID data and ODA in OECD data are not the same; however, the correlation between these two variables is 0.81.35 U.N. voting records on all adopted agenda items are retrieved from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET). Agenda items that were considered but blocked by veto-exercising appear in a U.N. publication (e.g., UN, 2004) along with each of these items subject and voting summary.36 Data source of the Importance" variable is ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times, which oers full-page-article images from the rst issue through December 31, 2001. The other control variables used in our analysis (U.S. GDP growth rate, government expenditure, and ination rate) are calculated based on the data by International Finance Statistics 2004 (International Monetary Fund, 2004). A minor inconsistency among price indices should be noted. While ination adjustment for foreign aid, GDP growth and government expenditure is done with a GDP deator, the ination rate used as a control variable represents a change in CPI.

3.3

Construction of Variables

For probit estimation, we need to look at two exogenous aspects of each agenda item voted on: characteristics and importance. Agenda items are characterized as either conicts, admission of new members, or general international issues, according to the subject matter on which voting is carried out. Agenda items that are obviously categorized as procedural are discarded from the dataset. Furthermore, to indicate concerned regions and countries, conicts and admission of new members are sub-categorized into the following eight regions: North America, South America, Central/South Asia, East Asia,
3 5 Since these two data sources rely on dierent accounting periods, we convert USAID data, originally in a scal year, into a calendar-year equivalent, through proration. 3 6 To the best of our knowledge, there is no agenda item that was rejected by the Councils majority voting.

18

Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and Western Europe. In total, 17 dummy variables capturing characteristics of agenda items are constructed (seeTable 2). Table 2: Classication of Agenda Items
Classication Conict NAMC (North America) SAMC (South America) CASIC (Central/South Asia) EASI (East Asia) ARAC (Middle East) AFRC (Africa) EEURC (Eastern Europe) WEURC (Western Europe) Admission ADNAME (North America) ADSAME (South America) ADCASI (Central/South Asia) ADEASI (East Asia) ADARA (Middle East) ADAFR (Africa) ADEERU (Eastern Europe) ADWEUR (Western Europe) International Number of Items Considered 1224 18 68 42 56 305 400 166 169 170 0 16 18 36 17 45 15 23 158 of which Items Rejected 155 10 14 6 10 53 30 11 21 42 0 0 5 15 5 2 0 15 7

We lump together all admission variables across the regions under one new variable, Admission, for econometric reasons.37 As specied in the previous section, we use the Admission variable, and top two conict variables in terms of the number of items: Africa Conict and Middle East. As for importance, it would be ideal if we could measure each agenda items importance in a systematic way. However, there is no such measure that is suciently objective. Thus, following Kuziemko and Werker (2004), we use as a proxy the Importance variable, which represents media coverage of the SC, i.e., the number of New York Times articles that cite United Nations and Security Council in a given year.
3 7 For admission of new members, the observations of each region are too few to sensor voting behavior.

19

These two aspects, characteristics and importance, are assumed to be exogenous in respect to the behavior not only of the permanent members, but also of all of the other U.N. members.38 Given the characteristics and importance, each of the ve permanent members makes its own decision on voting, and in addition, the U.S. decides how much money to spend on securing votes. Meanwhile, in the course of lobbying for seats, rotating member candidates cannot predict the type and importance of agenda items that will be voted on during their tenure.39 Thus, for rotating members, there is an element of the lottery" involved in the amount of aid received from the U.S. in exchange for their votes. This element renders SC seat rotation exogenous, eliminating possible biases.40 For OLS estimation, we aggregate annual U.S. foreign aid data into the following four groups:(1) economic aid to the SC members, (2) military aid to the SC members, (3) economic aid to the Non-SC members, and (4) military aid to the Non-SC members. Since seats on the SC rotate every year, the country composition of the SC varies from year to year (see Appendix B). By bundling SC members into one group, we avoid the possible endogeneity problem between U.S. preferences and its aid-giving pattern. We treat U.S. aid-giving as if the U.S. had a single resource pool for vote-buying in the SC, no matter how many recipients in the SC there are, and no matter what demand or preferences each of the recipients has. This argument holds because the U.S. always needs to secure at least four armative votes among developing countries, regardless of a change in the total number of these countries serving on the SC across years. Hence, we pay attention to the total aid dollars given by the U.S. to the SC members as a group, rather than taking an average. Table 3 provides summary statistics.
3 8 Another measure of importance, used in some literature, is based on the US governments recognition of important issues." We avoid using this measure since it is evidently endogenous in respect to the U.S. government behavior. For these important issues," see footnote 5. 3 9 Technically speaking, any country, even a non-U.N. member, can bring a dispute to the SC, and thus candidates can time themselves by bringing disputes to the SC on their own during their tenure. However, this possibility must be trivial considering the total size of the U.N. 4 0 In fact, it seems that some countries tend to serve on the SC more often than others. This bias is, however, mitigated suciently by introducing the above exogenous variables.

20

Table 3. Summary Statistics 42 observations, 1960-2001

Variable Economic aid to SC members Military aid to SC members Economic aid to NSC members Military aid to NSC members ODA to SC members ODA to NSC members US expected benefit level Russia's acceptance rate China's acceptance rate France's acceptance rate UK's acceptance rate Year's importance US GDP growth rate US government expenditure growth US inflation rate Code ECON_SC MIL_SC ECON_NSC MIL_NSC ODA_SC ODA_NSC US RUSlog CHNlog FRAlog UKlog IMPORTANCE GGDP DGX INFLATION Definition Total US economic aid to developing countries that serve on the SC, in billions, adjusted to calendar year Total US military aid to developing countries that serve on the SC, in billions, adjusted to calendar year Total US economic aid to developing countries that do not serve on the SC, in billions, adjusted to calendar year Total US military aid to developing countries that do not serve on the SC, in billions, adjusted to calendar year Total ODA from US to developing countries that serve on the SC, in billions, calendar year Total ODA from US to developing countries that do not serve on the SC, in billions, calendar year Imputed value that represents US expected benefits received from agenda items Logarithm of likelihood that Russia to vote yes or to abstain Logarithm of likelihood that China to vote yes or to abstain Logarithm of likelihood that France to vote yes or to abstain Logarithm of likelihood that UK to vote yes or to abstain The number of New York Times articles that cite "United Nations" and "Security Council," in 1/100th US real GDP growth rate, adjusted by GDP deflator US real government expenditure growth, adjusted by GDP deflator US inflation rate based on CPI Average [S.D.] 0.771 [0.877] 0.249 [0.495] 5.907 [1.972] 2.330 [0.707] 0.771 [1.082] 5.693 [2.531] 2.802 [0.566] -0.034 [0.030] -0.003 [0.002] -0.014 [0.001] -0.011 [0.008] 3.875 [1.938] 0.034 [0.021] 0.272 [0.208] 0.044 [0.030] Source USAID USAID USAID USAID OECD OECD * * * * * ProQuest IMF IMF IMF

Notes: All financial values are in 1995 US dollars, adjusted by a GDP deflator. All variables listed above pass unit root tests. * Constructed by the authors.

4
4.1

Results
The First Step Probit Estimation

Along with an independent variable capturing the importance of agenda items, we use three independent variables relating to agenda items characteristics, which are selected out of ten according to the number of items voted upon (see Equation (9)).41 These three variables are Africa Conict, Middle East Conict, and Admission. The dependent variable in the probit estimation is each permanent members voting behavior. (One is assigned to an armative vote, whereas zero is assigned to veto exercised.) The results of the probit estimation are reported in Table 4, where four of the ve equations exhibit highly signicant coecients.42 Table 4. Probit Estimation
Voting Yes=1, Voting No=0 USA RUS CHI -0.645 -0.337 -0.624 [0.252]*** [0.180]* [0.448] -0.432 0.569 [0.177]** [0.219]*** -1.031 0.012 [0.171]*** [0.174] 0.278 -0.125 0.140 [0.049]*** [0.030]*** [0.128] 1.178 2.355 2.444 [0.199]*** [0.186]*** [0.459]*** 1386 1386 1386 0 0 0.2389 0.164 0.091 0.067 FRA UK

Admission Africa Conict Middle East Conict Importance Constant Obs. Prob > chi2 Pseudo R2

-1.183 [0.366]*** -0.879 [0.390]** 0.194 [0.079]** 2.424 [0.418]*** 1386 0 0.167

-1.215 [0.263]*** -0.562 [0.310]* 0.208 [0.064]*** 2.064 [0.313]*** 1386 0 0.195

First, as the signicantly negative coecients on the Admission" variable suggest (see the rst row of Table 4), the U.S. tends to oppose admissions of new members, and so too does Russia, formerly known as the U.S.S.R. This result reects the confrontation of these two nations during the Cold War era;
4 1 The ten dummy variables relating to the characteristics are: eight regional conict dummies, an admission dummy, and an international dummy. 4 2 Although the signicance of the coecients in Chinas equation is not as high as the other four equations, they are acceptable.

21

the U.S. tried to block admissions of communist countries, while the U.S.S.R. tried to block U.S. allies from joining the U.N. Second, as their signicantly negative coecients suggest (see the second and the third rows of Table 4), the U.S. tends to oppose agenda items classied as Africa Conict" and Middle East Conict." Similarly, France and the U.K. tend to oppose agenda items classied as Africa Conict." The latter result is consistent with the fact that these two nations have colonial ties to Africa and are still involved in issues in that region, regardless of the independence of their former colonies. Third, the coecients on the Importance" variable are all signicant, except for Chinas equation (see the fourth row of Table 4). While the coecients for the U.S., France, and the U.K. equations are signicantly positive, the coecient for Russia is signicantly negative. In other words, the more intensive the media coverage of the Security Council in a given year, the higher the stakes held by the U.S. in its favored agenda items. The same argument applies to France and the U.K. as well. Russia has the opposite sign on the Importance" coecient to the U.S., possibly reecting dis-favor on the part of the U.S.S.R. towards those items during the Cold War era. More importantly, the coecient on the Importance variable in the U.S. equation is informative. Had there been no veto power entitled to the U.S., the U.S. media would have taken up all agenda items, both those favored and those dis-favored by the U.S., with equal weight. In such a case, the probit estimation would not have dierentiated these two types of agenda items, and therefore it would have yielded an insignicant coecient on the Importance variable. Contrary to the hypothetical argument above, in reality, the U.S. reserves its veto power over agenda items, which allows for the rejection of its dis-favored items without complicated negotiation, and perhaps the U.S. media does not cover those issues that are dis-favored by the U.S. intensively. The reason the media frequently takes up certain agenda items is that related negotiations are held (possibly prolonged), and the results of voting on those items 22

are unforeseeable. That is, the Importance variable is associated with only the items favored by the U.S. In this respect, the eect of the Importance variable on agenda items is asymmetric between those favored and those disfavored by the U.S. This asymmetry makes our probit estimation considerably meaningful, as demonstrated by their coecients. In summary, the probit estimation carried out here successfully incorporates veto powers in the analysis, while simultaneously capturing the two aspects of agenda items: characteristics and importance.

2.5

1.5

0.5

US Expected Benefits

Figure 2: US Expected Benets and Years Importance As shown in Figure 2, we plot the Importance and the level of U.S. expected benets, the latter of which is imputed from the above probit estimation.43 At many points, these two variables move in lockstep, however, they are not exactly the same. The Importance variable, though it is an incredibly innovative variable used by Kuziemko and Werker (2004), is a somewhat
4 3 For

comparison, both values are normalized.

19 60 19 62 19 64 19 66 19 68 19 70 19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00

years Year's Importance Note: Both variables are normalized for comparison.

23

crude measure to capture the nature of agenda items voted on.44 By adding the characteristics variables, our probit estimation supports Kuziemko and Werkers claim, as well as yielding more rened measurements of the U.S. expected benet level.

4.2

The Second Step OLS Estimation

In the OLS estimation, we use the ve variables constructed from the above probit estimation as independent variables. These ve variables are: U.S. expected benets from agenda items, Russias acceptance rate of agenda items, U.K.s acceptance rate of agenda items, Frances acceptance rate of agenda items, and Chinas acceptance rate of agenda items. Based on Equation (10), we rst run regressions of the current levels of foreign aid on those ve constructed variables. In both types of foreign aid (economic and military), the coecients on the US variable are negative, that is, insignicant for a one-sided test (see the rst row of Table 5). Among the control variables, only the one-period-lagged level of foreign aid (EconLag1 and MilLag1 ) exhibits a strong positive sign, implying that the persistency eect dominates in foreign aid distribution (see Columns (2) and (4) in Table 5). We obtain similar results when choosing the one-period-lagged level of foreign aid as a dependent variable.45 These results, derived from the level regressions as in Equation 10, are not signicant for a one-sided test. However, they do turn out to be consistent with our main results, which will be discussed later in this sub-section.
4 4 For instance, the Importance variable solely indicates less importance than we expect attached to the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11. By including the characteristic variables, which we have constructed, the levels of importance are elevated to align with a pre-established conventional wisdom on that event. 4 5 The estimation result is available from the authors upon request.

24

Table 5. OLS Regressions Dependent Variable: Current Year's Level of Foreign Aid
Dependent Variable US RUSlog CHIlog FRAlog UKlog GGDP DGX INFLATION dIMPORTANCE 1960-65 dummy Constant EconLag1 MilLag1 (1) ECON_SC (t) -2.054 [0.853] -19.858 [12.635] 176.355 [114.410]* 104.856 [80.937]* -75.279 [94.434] 8.522 [7.298] 1.039 [0.721] -2.204 [6.049] 0.005 [0.084] 0.465 [0.586] 6.439 [2.688]** (2) ECON_SC (t) -3.012 [0.754] -54.693 [14.556] 198.404 [91.873]** 192.328 [67.643]*** -206.456 [81.406] 8.056 [5.874] 0.755 [0.580] -3.704 [4.842] 0.038 [0.069] -0.334 [0.501] 7.817 [2.226]*** 0.447 [0.129]*** (3) MIL_SC (t) -0.446 [0.533] -5.003 [7.887] 46.625 [71.415] 34.879 [50.521] -40.817 [58.946] 5.045 [4.555] 0.673 [0.450] -0.894 [3.776] 0.008 [0.053] -0.020 [0.366] 1.188 [1.678] (4) MIL_SC (t) -0.954 [0.551] -18.107 [10.672] 88.775 [66.662]* 93.272 [50.568]** -112.999 [60.396]** 4.954 [4.162] 0.173 [0.444] 1.005 [3.522] -0.017 [0.050] -0.161 [0.341] 2.277 [1.608]

0.118 0.451 -0.078 adj. R2 Observations 42 41 42 F F(10, 31)=1.55 F(11, 29)=3.98 F(10, 31)= 0.70 Prob > F 0.170 0.001 0.715 DW D(11, 42)=1.35 D(11, 42)=1.163 Prob>chi2= 0.554 Prob>chi2= 0.020 Dubin's alternative test Notes: a) *** Denotes 1-percent significance, ** denotes 5-percent significance, and * denotes 10-percent significance for onesided tests of the following variables: "US ," "RUSlog ," "CHIlog ," "FRAlog ," and "UKlog ." For the rest of the variables, these symbols are associated with two-sided tests. b) For Dubin's alternative test, the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation between error terms. c) In the case of military aid, columns (4) indicates that a serial correlation exists between error terms. This correlation, however, disappears when MilLag2 is added to the equation as a regressor, and the result remains unchanged.

0.539 [0.190]*** 0.127 41 F(11, 29)=1.53 0.175

Next, we look at the rst-dierence of the equation as in Equation 11. This specication is more plausible than the previous one, because the U.S. cannot learn the absolute level of utility, but only compares the current level with the previous level in the course of its decision-making. Thus, what really matters is an increment of foreign aid dollars given by the U.S. to rotating members. Furthermore, we can safely assume here that foreign aid distribution precedes actual voting for the following two reasons. First, U.S. foreign aid is, in general, regarded as an inducement, as opposed to a reward, for recipients to coincide with U.S. positions in voting (Kegley and Hock, 1991). Second, negotiations, perhaps including an attempt to secure votes, take place prior to actual voting toward a consensus on issues brought up on the upcoming agenda (Fujita, 1998). In Table 6 and 7, we report the result of the OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the one-period-lagged rst-dierence of economic aid and military aid, respectively.46 For both economic and military aid, the coecients on the U.S. expected benet variable are signicantly positive (see the US coecients in Columns (1) of Table 6 and 7). The interpretation is the following: as the benet level received from agenda items is higher compared with the previous level, the U.S. gives a larger increment in aid to rotating members one period before voting on those items. Equally important, the coecients on the Russias acceptance rate and U.K.s acceptance rate variables are signicantly positive. That is, the aforesaid interpretation holds true as long as other permanent members having veto powers are likely to vote for those items as well. To put it another way, when any one of the other permanent members is expected to veto agenda items, the U.S. does not bother to distribute extra aid dollars to rotating members. For France, the sign of its coecient is negative, probably reecting that the U.S. and France do not agree on agenda items after all.
4 6 Without taking a one-period lag of foreign aid variables, we gain no signicant results. The estimation result is available from the authors upon request.

25

Table 6. OLS Regressions Dependent Variable: One-Period-Lagged First-Difference of Economic Aid

US RUSlog CHIlog FRAlog UKlog GGDP DGX INFLATION IMPORTANCE egy dummy (1) 1.720 [1.012]** 41.695 [21.149]* -35.041 [102.615] -111.106 [61.778] 137.356 [77.917]** 7.332 [7.036] 0.994 [0.721] 3.889 [5.701] 0.036 [0.111] (2) 1.807 [0.960]** 42.834 [20.542]** -38.144 [100.633] -113.134 [60.538] 141.495 [75.712]** 7.121 [6.901] 0.931 [0.684] 3.189 [5.198] (3) 1.349 [0.906]* 35.015 [19.298]** -11.211 [97.012] -105.322 [60.373] 132.918 [75.619]** (4) 1.383 [0.976]* 35.560 [20.278] -11.775 [98.648] -106.159 [61.821] 134.359 [78.013] (5) 1.369 [0.917]* 33.402 [19.602]** -18.262 [100.926] -107.794 [61.235] 134.300 [76.558]** 7.675 [6.983] (6) 1.460 [0.968]* 32.087 [21.343] -62.605 [99.885] -75.647 [64.287] 94.761 [80.363] 7.302 [6.760] 0.526 [0.722] 4.636 [5.180]

1774 [5.162] -0.011 [0.101]

0.689 [0.457] EconLag2 -0.555 -0.559 -0.573 -0.574 -0.561 -0.586 [0.151]*** [0.148]*** [0.147]*** [0.150]*** [0.150]*** [0.146]*** Constant -0.432 -0.239 0.420 0.460 0.069 -0.265 [0.784] [0.503] [0.170]** [0.413] [0.455] [0.492] 0.216 0.240 0.237 0.213 0.219 0.271 adj. R2 Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 F F(10, 29)=2.08 F(9, 30)=2.36 F(6, 33)=3.02 F(7, 32)=2.51 F(8, 31)=2.36 F(10, 29)=2.45 Prob > F 0.061 0.037 0.018 0.036 0.041 0.029 DW D(11, 40)=1.690 D(10, 40)=1.708 D(7, 40)=1.651 D(8, 40)=1.659 D(9, 40) =1.628 D(11, 40)=1.520 *** Denotes 1-percent significance, ** denotes 5-percent significance, and * denotes 10-percent significance for one-sided tests of the following variables: "US ," "RUSlog ," "CHIlog ," "FRAlog ," and "UKlog ." For the rest of the variables, these symbols are associated with two-sided tests.

Table 7. OLS Regressions Dependent Variable: One-Period-Lagged First-Difference of Military Aid

US RUSlog CHIlog FRAlog UKlog GGDP DGX INFLATION IMPORTANCE egy dummy (1) 1.129 [0.580]** 23.272 [11.948]** -38.875 [56.099] -78.155 [34.092] 102.534 [43.320]** 0.565 [3.808] 0.988 [0.427]** -3.012 [3.219] -0.069 [0.062] (2) 0.917 [0.550]* 20.241 [11.689]** -30.930 [55.894] -72.503 [33.866] 92.254 [42.527]** 1.034 [3.801] 1.053 [0.425]*** -1.489 [2.932] (3) 0.287 [0.525] 8.406 [11.211] 9.004 [56.733] -58.518 [35.531] 74.136 [44.648]* (4) 0.473 [0.565] 11.416 [11.721] 6.388 [56.959] -63.829 [36.105] 82.759 [45.766]** (5) 0.317 [0.534] 7.802 [11.400] -4.484 [59.245] -59.094 [36.099] 75.295 [45.323]* 1.898 [4.087] (6) 0.499 [0.319]* 5.108 [6.956] -82.668 [32.642]* -14.436 [20.720] 20.752 [25.956] 1.104 [2.175] 0.617 [0.249]*** 0.262 [1.692]

-1.954 [3.159] -0.054 [0.060]

1.206 [0.152]*** MilLag2 -0.863 -0.814 -0.579 -0.608 -0.621 -1.047 [0.173]*** [0.169]*** [0.151]*** [0.155]*** [0.162]*** [0.101]*** Constant 0.318 -0.054 0.142 0.347 0.182 -0.109 [0.434] [0.265] [0.084]* [0.241] [0.266] [0.152] adj. R2 0.310 0.304 0.212 0.208 0.189 0.772 Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 F F(10, 29)=2.75 F(9, 30)=2.89 F(6, 33)=2.75 F(7, 21)=2.46 F(8, 31)=2.13 F(10, 29)=14.22 Prob > F 0.016 0.0138 0.028 0.039 0.0625 0.0000 DW D(11, 40)=1.859 D(10, 40)=1.745 D(7, 40)=1.718 D(8, 40)=1.786 D(9, 40)=1.726 D(11, 40)=1.471 *** Denotes 1-percent significance, ** denotes 5-percent significance, and * denotes 10-percent significance for one-sided tests of the following variables: "US ," "RUSlog ," "CHIlog ," "FRAlog ," and "UKlog ." For the rest of the variables, these symbols are associated with two-sided tests.

In contrast to the baseline results shown in Column (1), the signicance of US coecients are weak in Columns (2) through (6) of Table 6 and 7. These estimations with weak coecients do not include a growth of U.S. government expenditure (DGX) as a control variable, thus implying that U.S. government expenditure plays a fundamental role in the determination of aid distribution, especially for military aid (compare Column (2) with Column (5) in Table 7). In other words, U.S. foreign aid is distributed according to vote-buying behavior given the size of each years budget. The eect of Egypt, which receives a tremendous portion of U.S. foreign aid, does not interfere with our main results that support the existence of U.S. vote-buying behavior (see Column (6) in Table 6 and 7, which includes Egypt dummy"). This nding concerning Egypt suggests that a large increment of economic aid to rotating SC members is not due to Egypt serving on the SC, even though it might appear so, based on casual observations.47 As far as military aid is concerned, the eect of Egypts presence on the SC accounts for an increased increment of military aid from the U.S. to the SC members. Nonetheless, we still nd evidence of vote-buying behavior even after controlling for the eect of Egypt. The coecients on the two-period-lagged level of the foreign aid (EconLag2 and MilLag2 ) show signicantly negative signs. That is, an increment of foreign aid is larger when the initial level of foreign aid is lower. This pattern, which seems to mitigate a uctuation in the total foreign aid given to rotating members, is consistent with an assumption made in the previous section: the U.S. acts as if it had a single resource pool for vote-buying in the SC.48 To reinforce the validity of this assumption, we run the baseline regressions excluding the period prior to 1966 when only six rotating members served on the SC. Throughout each year, during the period 1966-2001, ten rotating members
4 7 See Figure 1 of this paper. Egypt served on the SC in the years of 1946, 1949-1950, 1961-1962, 1984-1985, and 1996-1997. The gure shows spikes in these years. 4 8 This pattern is also consistent with a mean-reverting process, as mentioned in footnote 21.

26

serve on the SC; equivalently four armative votes are required from among developing countries. For that period, we obtain the same results with greater signicance of the US coecients (see Table 8). Lastly, our main results, summarized in Table 6 and 7, suggest that an increment of the U.S. benet level from period t 1 to period t is associated with an increment of the U.S. aid-giving from period t 2 to period t 1. If we look at the levels of both variables in the same period, the inverse relationship is expected. This inverse relationship, translated into a negative coecient on the US " variable, is found in the level regression analysis conducted at the beginning of this sub-section (see Table 5). Although that result was irrelevant for a one-sided test, the sign would have been signicantly negative for a twosided test, which would be consistent with our main results. All of the results found thus far are consistent with U.S. vote-buying behavior, rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative.

5
5.1

Robustness Check
Non-SC Members

We expect that the null hypothesis,

= 0, cannot be rejected when we choose

foreign aid given to Non-SC members as a dependent variable. In Table 9, we report the results of the OLS regressions using data on Non-SC members. In contrast to the results shown in Column (1) and (2) in Table 6 and 7, the US coecients in Table 9 are insignicant; we cannot reject

= 0. In

other words, an increment of U.S. foreign aid given to Non-SC members does not signicantly correspond with a relative increase in U.S. expected benets from agenda items voted on in the SC. This result serves as indirect evidence supporting U.S. vote-buying behavior in the SC.

27

Table 8. OLS for 1968-2001

(1) Dependent Variable ECON_SC (t-1) US 2.275 [1.308]** RUSlog 41.747 [31.805] CHIlog -67.250 [140.729] FRAlog -126.068 [71.129] UKlog 134.134 [89.804]* GGDP 7.291 [8.304] DGX 1.142 [0.806] INFLATION 4.939 [5.871] IMPORTANCE 0.020 [0.135] Constant -0.492 [0.931] EconLag2 -0.531 [0.173]*** MilLag2 (2) ECON_SC (t-1) 2.352 [1.176]** 42.937 [30.150]* -66.395 [137.717] -128.766 [67.363] 137.390 [85.305]* 6.921 [7.761] 1.100 [0.740] 4.614 [5.340] (3) MIL_SC (t-1) 1.700 [0.676]*** 33.553 [16.510]** 8.668 [73.029] -111.327 [36.886] 130.284 [47.401]*** -0.863 [4.140] 1.062 [0.471]** -3.521 [3.179] -0.100 [0.069] 0.504 [0.453] (4) MIL_SC (t-1) 1.330 [0.642]** 28.066 [16.458]* 3.800 [74.673] -98.529 [36.681] 114.092 [47.180]** 0.703 [4.093] 1.224 [0.469]*** 1.775 [3.017]

-0.379 [0.520] -0.537 [0.164]***

-0.038 [0.267]

-0.882 -0.846 [0.177]*** [0.179]*** 2 0.197 0.230 0.386 0.357 adj. R Observations 34 34 34 34 F F(10, 23)=1.81 F(9, 24)=2.09 F(10, 23)=3.07 F(9, 24)=3.03 Prob > F 0.116 0.072 0.013 0.014 DW D(11, 34)=1.071 D(10, 34)=1.065 D(11, 34)=1.847 D(10, 34)=1.792 *** Denotes 1-percent significance, ** denotes 5-percent significance, and * denotes 10-percent significance for one-sided tests of the following variables: "US ," "RUSlog ," "CHIlog ," "FRAlog ," and "UKlog ." For the rest of the variables, these symbols are associated with two-sided tests.

Table 9. OLS for Non-SC

(1) Dependent Variable ECON_NSC (t-1) US -1.895 [1.371] RUSlog -27.691 [28.468] CHIlog 294.691 [145.040] FRAlog 48.691 [83.102] UKlog -82.817 [105.318 GGDP -6.519 [9.989] DGX 0.545 [0.982] INFLATION -3.889 [7.683] IMPORTANCE -0.034 [0.156] Constant 1.326 [1.078] EconLag2 -0.223 [0.104]*** MilLag2 (2) ECON_NSC (t-1) -1.808 [1.289] -26.574 [27.550] 289.702 [140.912]** 46.858 [81.348] -79.094 [102.246] -6.867 [9.702] 0.485 [0.928] -4.476 [7.075] (3) MIL_NSC (t-1) -0.919 [0.844] -13.098 [17.654] 70.552 [88.230] 49.587 [51.872] -47.800 [65.759] -1.844 [5.967] 0.350 [0.619] 0.563 [4.801] 0.026 [0.094] 0.822 [0.765] (4) MIL_NSC (t-1) -0.858 [0.802] -12.354 [17.174] 68.104 [86.417] 48.283 [50.854] -44.972 [63.943] -1.973 [5.857] 0.303 [0.586] 0.073 [4.390]

1.471 [0.834]** -0.217 [0.098]**

0.966 [0.550]

-0.424 -0.427 [0.161]*** [0.158]*** 0.043 0.073 0.049 0.078 adj. R2 Observations 40 40 40 40 F F(10, 29)=1.17 F(9, 30)=1.34 F( 10, 29)=1.20 F(9, 30)=1.37 Prob > F 0.347 0.258 0.332 0.247 DW D(11, 40)=1.602 D( 10, 40)=1.596 D(11, 40)=1.827 D( 10, 40)=1.820 *** Denotes 1-percent significance, ** denotes 5-percent significance, and * denotes 10-percent significance for one-sided tests of the following variables: "US ," "RUSlog ," "CHIlog ," "FRAlog ," and "UKlog ." For the rest of the variables, these symbols are associated with two-sided tests.

Table 10. OLS using OECD Data

(1) (2) (3) (4) ODA_SC(t-1) ODA_SC(t-1) ODA_NSC(t-1) ODA_NSC(t-1) US 1.855 1.976 -3.715 -3.173 [1.265]* [1.199]* [1.994] [1.919] RUSlog 45.818 47.384 -67.805 -61.483 [26.434]** [25.665]** [41.675] [41.186] CHIlog -48.509 -52.721 319.706 293.119 [129.198] [126.735] [206.893]* [205.147]* FRAlog -121.493 -124.261 150.223 141.082 [77.353] [75.810] [122.443] [122.087] UKlog 147.674 153.202 -212.886 -191.781 [97.780]* [95.063]* [155.241] [153.776] GGDP 7.479 7.169 -1.868 -4.128 [8.881] [8.706] [14.382] [14.200] DGX 1.255 1.164 0.061 -.276 [0.918]* [0.867]* [1.445] [1.405] INFLATION 4.889 3.924 -7.806 -11.006 [7.196] [6.544] [11.501] [11.043] IMPORTANCE 0.049 0.237 [0.141] [0.238] Constant -0.650 -0.382 1.024 1.959 [1.000] [0.632] [1.561] [1.247]** EconLag2 -0.501 -0.509 -0.283 -0.238 [0.155]*** [0.151]*** [0.124]** [0.115]* 0.172 0.196 -0.001 -0.001 adj. R2 Observations 40 40 40 40 F F(10, 29)=1.81 F(9, 30)=2.05 F( 10, 29)=1.00 F(9, 30)=1.00 Prob > F 0.104 0.068 0.469 0.463 DW D(11, 40)=1.717 D(10, 40)=1.727 D(11, 40)=1.705 D(10, 40)=1.649 *** Denotes 1-percent significance, ** denotes 5-percent significance, and * denotes 10-percent significance for one-sided tests of the following variables: "US ," "RUSlog ," "CHIlog ," "FRAlog ," and "UKlog ." For the rest of the variables, these symbols are associated with two-sided tests.

5.2

ODA Data by OECD

We use the second dataset, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows, published by OECD, and treat net ODA as a dependent variable. The results derived from using the OECD data are similar to those obtained from the USAID data (see Table 10). The regressions using ODA to SC members as a dependent variable show the signicantly positive US coecient (Column (1) and (2)). Conversely, the regressions using ODA to Non-SC members do not show any signicance of the US coecients (Column (3) and (4)).

5.3

Bootstraps

We examine the signicance of

by semiparametric bootstraps. Our sample

size is small; there are only 40 observations of the OLS in the previous section, which make it dicult to convince us of approximate asymptotic distributions. Even bootstrap tests based on asymptotically pivotal test statistics are not exact; nevertheless, bootstrap tests generally work better than do tests which rely upon approximate asymptotic distributions.49 We construct simulated P values of the coecients on the US variable, which are reported in Table 11.50 We have parallel results with the previous regressions. Overall, the simulated P values are suciently low, implying the signicance of the coecients on the US variable. As Column (3), (4), and (5) demonstrate, the signicance of

is lowered if we eliminate U.S. government

expenditure (DGX) from the regressions. In particular, in the military-aidregression,

becomes insignicant. These results agree with the ones obtained

from the OLS estimations, reinforcing our main ndings. Table 11: P-Values for the US Variable by Bootstraps
Corresponding Columns Table 6 (Econ) Table 7 (Mil) (1) 0.0507 0.0310 (2) 0.0399 0.0584 (3) 0.0792 0.2862 (4) 0.0834 0.2109 (5) 0.0761 0.2815 (6) 0.0524 0.1024

4 9 See Davidson and MacKinnon (1999a, 1999b, 2002a, 2004), Beran (1988), Horowitz (1994), and Godfrey (1998). 5 0 For the construction of the simulated P values, see Davidson and MacKinnon (2004).

28

Conclusion
In search for determinants of U.S. foreign aid ows, we have found empiri-

cal evidence supporting the hypothesis that the U.S. distributes foreign aid in exchange for rotating members votes in the U.N. Security Council. Not only have we provided an underlying theoretical framework where an optimization problem is solved from the viewpoint of an aid donor (the U.S.), but we have also successfully utilized the probit estimation, thereby imputing U.S. benets received from its favored Security Council resolutions. By incorporating veto powers into the analysis, we have also found empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the U.S. does not bother to distribute extra aid dollars to rotating members under the following circumstances:(1) any one of the other permanent members is expected to veto a resolution, or (2) the U.S. dis-favors that resolution. In the latter case the U.S. simply exercises its veto power to prevent it from passing. Based on those results derived by the OLS regressions and then conrmed by the bootstrap tests, we conclude the following: as the level of expected benets received from a resolution is higher than the previous level, the US gives a larger increment in aid to rotating members one period ahead of the voting on that resolution, as long as other permanent members are likely to vote for that resolution as well. Our nding suggests that seat rotation in the Security Council is a useful explanatory factor of U.S. foreign aid distribution. The seat rotation, which in reality is not purely random, becomes a reasonably exogenous determinant with certain treatments of variables as demonstrated in this paper. The seat rotation as a determinant of U.S. foreign aid avoids the endogeneity problem surrounding foreign aid ows. One limitation of our analysis is, however, that although we have shown the existence of U.S. vote-buying behavior, such behavior does not necessarily result in loyalty and votes secured for the U.S. position. Our model, tailored to analyze vote-buying behavior in the Security Council,

29

can be readily applicable to various other settings where a party tries to secure votes in the presence of veto powers. Moreover, our methodology allows us to calculate, in monetary values, how much a veto is worth. In the current U.N. reform, which oers several possible scenarios, one could measure a value of a seat with a veto, using our methodology. Our paper oers wide applicability, from the determination of foreign aid ows to the valuation of veto powers; these topics are open to further research.

References
[1] Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth, 2000, 5(1), pp.33-63. [2] Alesina, Alberto and Weder, Beatrice. Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? American Economic Review, 2002, 92(4), pp.1126-1137. [3] Anan, Ko. In Larger Freedom: Toward Security, Development and Human Rights for All Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York: United Nations, 2005. [4] Beran, Rudolf. Prepivoting test statistics: A Bootstrap View of Asymptotic Renements, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1988, 83, pp.687-697. [5] Black, Lloyd D. The Strategy of Foreign Aid. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1968. [6] Christopher, Warren. The Foreign Aairs Budget: Our Foreign Policy Cannot Be Supported on the Cheap." U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 1995, 6, pp.285-291. [7] Davidson, Russell and MacKinnon, James G. Bootstrap Testing in Nonlinear Models," International Economic Review, 1999a, 40, pp.487-508.

30

[8] Davidson, Russell and MacKinnon, James G. The Size Distortion of Bootstrap Tests," Econometric Theory, 1999b, 15, pp.361-376. [9] Davidson, Russell and MacKinnon, James G. Bootstrap J Tests of Nonnested Linear Regression Models," Journal of Econometrics, 2002, 109, pp.167-193. [10] Davidson, Russell and MacKinnon, James G. Econometric Theory and Methods. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. [11] Eberstadt, Nicholas. Foreign Aid and American Purpose. Washington,DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1988. [12] Fujita, Hisaichi.Kokuren hou, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan kai, 1998. [13] Godfrey, L. G. Tests of Non-Nested Regression Models: Some Results on Small Sample Behaviour and the Bootstrap, Journal of Econometrics, 1998, 84, pp.59-74. [14] Horowitz, Joel L. Bootstrap-Based Critical Values for the Information Matrics Test, Journal of Econometrics, 1994, 61, pp.395-411 [15] International Monetary Fund (IMF). International Finance Statistics 2004. Washington,DC: IMF. CD-ROM, 2004. [16] Kegley, Charles W. and Hock, Steven W. U.S. Foreign Aid and U.N. Voting: Did Reagans Linkage Strategy Buy Deference or Deance? International Studies Quarterly, 1991, 35(3), pp.295-312. [17] Knight, Brian. Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending: Theory and Evidence form the Federal Highway Aid Program, American Economic Review, 2002, 92(1), pp.71-92. [18] Kuziemko, Ilyana and Werker, Eric. How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," October 2004, Harvard University, mimeo. 31

[19] New York Times. U.S. and Britain Agree on Relief for Poor Nations." June 10, 2005. [20] New York Times. Africa Tackles Graft, With Billions in Aid in Play." July 6, 2005. [21] OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. Paris: OECD. CD-ROM, various years. [22] ONeill, Barry. Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council, Journal of Conict Resolution, 1996, 40(2) pp.219-237. [23] Rai, Kul B. Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 19671976." Journal of Peach Research, 1980, 17(3), pp.269-277. [24] United Nations. Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, 2004. [25] USAID Overseas (U.S. Loans Agency and for International [Greenbook]. Development). Available on-line U.S. at

Grants

http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/home.html, various years. [26] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Aairs. Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations. Available on-line at http://www.state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprac/, 2000-2004. [27] Wang, T.Y. U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues. International Studies Quarterly, 1999, 43(1), pp.199-210. [28] Wittkopf, Eugene R. Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study. American Political Science Review, 1973, 67(3), pp.868-888. [29] World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington,DC: World Bank, database, 2004.

32

Appendix A. Country List

# Country Name Code Region Year of Admission Years serving as Years serving a UN member on the SC (1945-2004) (1946-2006) 1946 59 0 1976 29 2 1955 50 0 1945 60 16 1992 13 0 1981 24 0 1992 13 0 1962 43 2 1960 45 4 1960 45 2 1974 31 4 1955 50 6 1992 13 0 1945 60 2 1981 24 0 1945 60 4 1945 60 18 1966 39 0 1971 34 0 1966 39 2 1960 45 0 1945 60 8 1960 45 4 1960 45 4 1960 45 2 1945 60 12 1975 30 0 1975 30 2 1945 60 4 1945 60 6 1993 12 2 1977 28 2 1978 27 0 1945 60 0 1962 43 6 1945 60 6 1945 60 9 1993 12 0 1991 14 0 1945 60 4 1970 35 0 1991 14 0 1960 45 4 1992 13 0 1957 48 4 1958 47 4 1965 40 2 1974 31 2 1968 37 0 1974 31 0 1945 60 0 1966 39 4 1945 60 2 1992 13 0 1945 60 0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

Afghanistan Angola Albania Argentina Armenia Antigua and Barbuda Azerbaijan Burundi Benin Burkina Faso Bangladesh Bulgaria Bosnia and Herzegovina Belarus Belize Bolivia Brazil Barbados Bhutan Botswana Central African Republic Chile Cte d'Ivoire Cameroon Congo, Rep. Colombia Comoros Cape Verde Costa Rica Cuba Czech Republic Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Algeria Ecuador Egypt, Arab Rep. Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Gabon Georgia Ghana Guinea Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Croatia Haiti

AFG AGO ALB ARG ARM ATG AZE BDI BEN BFA BGD BGR BIH BLR BLZ BOL BRA BRB BTN BWA CAF CHL CIV CMR COG COL COM CPV CRI CUB CZE DJI DMA DOM DZA ECU EGY ERI EST ETH FJI FSM GAB GEO GHA GIN GMB GNB GNQ GRD GTM GUY HND HRV HTI

Central/South Asia Africa Eastern Europe South America Eastern Europe South America Eastern Europe Africa Africa Africa Central/South Asia Eastern Europe Eastern Europe Eastern Europe South America South America South America South America Central/South Asia Africa Africa South America Africa Africa Africa South America Africa Africa South America South America Eastern Europe Middle East South America South America Middle East South America Middle East Africa Eastern Europe Africa East Asia East Asia Africa Eastern Europe Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa South America South America South America South America Eastern Europe South America

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

Hungary Indonesia India Iran, Islamic Rep. Iraq Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyz Republic Cambodia Kiribati St. Kitts and Nevis Lao PDR Lebanon Liberia Libya St. Lucia Sri Lanka Lesotho Lithuania Latvia Morocco Moldova Madagascar Maldives Mexico Marshall Islands Macedonia, FYR Mali Myanmar Mongolia Mozambique Mauritania Mauritius Malawi Malaysia Namibia Niger Nigeria Nicaragua Nepal Nauru Oman Pakistan Panama Peru Philippines Palau Papua New Guinea Poland Korea, Dem. Rep. Paraguay Romania Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sudan Senegal Solomon Islands Sierra Leone El Salvador Somalia So Tom and Principe

HUN IDN IND IRN IRQ JAM JOR KAZ KEN KGZ KHM KIR KNA LAO LBN LBR LBY LCA LKA LSO LTU LVA MAR MDA MDG MDV MEX MHL MKD MLI MMR MNG MOZ MRT MUS MWI MYS NAM NER NGA NIC NPL NRU OMN PAK PAN PER PHL PLW PNG POL PRK PRY ROM RWA SAU SDN SEN SLB SLE SLV SOM STP

Eastern Europe East Asia Central/South Asia Middle East Middle East South America Middle East Central/South Asia Africa Central/South Asia East Asia East Asia South America East Asia Middle East Africa Middle East South America Central/South Asia Africa Eastern Europe Eastern Europe Middle East Eastern Europe Africa Central/South Asia South America East Asia Eastern Europe Africa East Asia East Asia Africa Africa Africa Africa East Asia Africa Africa Africa South America Central/South Asia East Asia Middle East Central/South Asia South America South America East Asia East Asia East Asia Eastern Europe East Asia South America Eastern Europe Africa Middle East Africa Africa East Asia Africa South America Africa Africa

1955 1950 1945 1945 1945 1962 1955 1992 1963 1992 1945 1999 1983 1955 1945 1945 1955 1979 1955 1966 1991 1991 1956 1992 1960 1965 1945 1991 1993 1960 1948 1961 1975 1961 1968 1964 1957 1990 1960 1960 1945 1955 1999 1971 1947 1945 1945 1945 1994 1975 1945 1991 1945 1955 1962 1945 1956 1960 1978 1961 1945 1960 1975

50 54 60 60 60 43 50 13 42 13 60 6 22 50 60 60 50 26 50 39 14 14 49 13 45 40 60 14 12 45 57 44 30 44 37 41 48 15 45 45 60 50 6 34 58 60 60 60 11 30 60 14 60 50 43 60 49 45 27 44 60 45 30

4 4 12

2 4
4

4
0 4 0 0 0 0 0

2
1

2
0 2 0 0 0

4
0 2 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 2 0 5 2 2 6 4 4 0

2
12 8 6 6 0 0 9 0 2 7 2 0 2 4 0 2 0 2 0

119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

Suriname Slovak Republic Swaziland Seychelles Syrian Arab Republic Chad Togo Thailand Tajikistan Turkmenistan Timor-Leste Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Tuvalu Tanzania Uganda Ukraine Uruguay Uzbekistan St. Vincent and the Grenadines Venezuela, RB Vietnam Vanuatu Samoa Yemen, Rep. Serbia and Montenegro South Africa Congo, Dem. Rep. Zambia Zimbabwe

SUR SVK SWZ SYC SYR TCD TGO THA TJK TKM TMP TON TTO TUN TUR TVL TZA UGA UKR URY UZB VCT VEN VNM VUT WSM YEM YUG ZAF ZAR ZMB ZWE

South America Eastern Europe Africa Africa Middle East Africa Africa East Asia Central/South Asia Central/South Asia East Asia East Asia South America Middle East Western Europe East Asia Africa Africa Eastern Europe South America Central/South Asia South America South America East Asia East Asia East Asia Middle East Eastern Europe Africa Africa Africa Africa

1975 1993 1968 1976 1945 1960 1960 1946 1992 1992 2002 1999 1962 1956 1945 2000 1961 1962 1945 1945 1992 1980 1945 1977 1981 1976 1947 2000 1945 1960 1964 1980

30 12 37 29 58 45 45 59 13 13 3 6 43 49 60 5 44 43 60 60 13 25 60 28 24 29 58 5 60 45 41 25

0 0 0 0

6
0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2

6
5 0 4 3 6 2 0 0 8 0 0 0

2
0 0 4 6 4

Sources: A/58/47 (United Nations, 2004) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004). Compiled by the author. Notes:

Democratic Republic of the Congo was formerly called Zaire until its name changed in 1997. To differentiate between the countries "Democratic Republic of the Congo," and "Republic of the Congo," we rely on the name of each country's capital. Kinshasa is the capital of "Democratic Republic of the Congo"; Brazzaville is the capital of "Republic of the Congo." Czech Republic and Slovakia are successor states of Czechoslovakia, which ceased to exist on December 31, 1992. Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958, and they shared a single membership until Syria separated from the union, resuming its status as an independent state in 1961. Egypt changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1971. Democratic People's Republic of Korea is conventionally referred to as North Korea. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) dissolved in 1990, and subsequently the following five states were established: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Myanmar is also known as Burma. Timor-Leste is also called East Timor. Byelorussia changed its name to Belarus in 1991. Yemen and Democratic Yemen were merged in 1990, and are represented as one country "Yemen." Malaya changed its name to Malaysia in 1963. Tanganyika and Zanzibar were members of the UN from 1961 and 1963, respectively. In 1964, they united to form a single state, the United Republic of Tanzania. In 1964, they united to form a single state, the United Republic of Tanzania. Indonesia withdrew from the UN in 1965 and it resumed its participation in 1966.

Appendix.B UN Security Council Members (1946-2006)

Permanent Members (P-5) China France Rotating Members (Elected-10) Year Africa/Asia 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 1949 1948 1947 1946 Tanzania Tanzania Angola Angola Mauritius Mauritius Namibia Namibia Kenya Kenya Botswana Botswana Djibouti Djibouti Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Ethiopia Ethiopia Zambia Zambia Madagascar Madagascar Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Uganda Uganda Zambia Zambia Mauritania Mauritania Tanzania Tanzania Kenya Kenya Somalia Somalia Zambia Zambia Ethiopia Ethiopia Uganda Jordan Philippines Egypt Egypt Japan Japan Japan Japan Pakistan Pakistan Singapore Singapore Malaysia Malaysia Japan Japan Indonesia Indonesia Pakistan Pakistan India India Malaysia Malaysia Japan Japan Thailand Thailand Pakistan Pakistan Japan Japan Bangladesh Bangladesh India India Japan Japan Indonesia Indonesia Japan Japan Nepal Nepal India India Jordan Russia UK US

Latin America Argentina Argentina Chile Chile Colombia Colombia Argentina Argentina Costa Rica Costa Rica Honduras Honduras Brazil Brazil Ecuador Ecuador Colombia Colombia Argentina Argentina Trinidad & Tobago Trinidad & Tobago Nicaragua Nicaragua Panama Panama Jamaica Jamaica Venezuela Venezuela Guyana Guyana Peru Peru Argentina Argentina Colombia Colombia Brazil Brazil Uruguay Uruguay Brazil Brazil Chile Chile Argentina Argentina Colombia Colombia Peru Peru Colombia Colombia Brazil Brazil Cuba Cuba Colombia Colombia Mexico

Eastern Europe

Western Europe and Other States Denmark Denmark Germany Germany Ireland Ireland Canada Canada Portugal Portugal Germany Germany New Zealand New Zealand Austria Austria Canada Canada Germany, FR Germany, FR Australia Australia Malta Malta Ireland Ireland Norway Norway Canada Canada Italy Italy Australia Australia Belgium Belgium Finland Finland Canada Canada Netherlands Netherlands Norway Norway Ireland Turkey Italy Italy Sweden Sweden Belgium Belgium Denmark Denmark Netherlands Netherlands Norway Norway Belgium Belgium Netherlands Greece Greece Spain Spain Norway Norway Netherlands Netherlands Sweden Sweden Italy Italy Spain Spain Belgium Belgium Finland Finland Italy Italy Denmark Denmark Netherlands Netherlands Spain Spain Portugal Portugal German, FR German, FR Sweden Sweden Austria Austria Italy Italy Spain Spain Denmark Denmark New Zealand

Elected-10 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 525

Algeria Algeria Cameroon Cameroon Mali Mali Gabon Gabon Egypt Egypt Nigeria Nigeria Cape Verde Cape Verde Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire Algeria Algeria Congo Congo Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Congo, DR Congo, DR Niger Niger Gabon Gabon Benin Benin Cameroon Cameroon Guinea Guinea Burundi Burundi Algeria Algeria Mali Mali Cote d'Ivoire Cote d'Ivoire Ghana Ghana Liberia Tunisia Tunisia Philippines Iran Iran Pakistan Pakistan Egypt Egypt Syria Syria Egypt

Benin Benin Guinea Guinea Tunisia Tunisia Gambia Gambia Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau Rwanda Rwanda Morocco Morocco Congo, DR Congo, DR Senegal Senegal Ghana Ghana Egypt Egypt Togo Togo Tunisia Tunisia Nigeria Nigeria Libya Libya Mauritania Mauritania Sudan Sudan Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Senegal Senegal Nigeria Nigeria Malaysia Morocco Morocco Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Iraq Iraq

Philippines Philippines Syria Syria Bangladesh Bangladesh Bahrain Bahrain Rep. Korea Rep. Korea Oman Oman Japan Japan Yemen Yemen Nepal Nepal UAE UAE India India Jordan Jordan Philippines Philippines Kuwait Kuwait Pakistan Pakistan Iraq Iraq India India Syria Syria Pakistan Pakistan Japan Japan

Lebanon Lebanon India India

Brazil Brazil Mexico Mexico Jamaica Jamaica Brazil Brazil Chile Chile Argentina Argentina Venezuela Venezuela Cuba Cuba Brazil Brazil Venezuela Venezuela Peru Peru Guyana Guyana Mexico Mexico Bolivia Bolivia Panama Panama Costa Rica Costa Rica Panama Panama Nicaragua Nicaragua Paraguay Paraguay Argentina Argentina Bolivia Bolivia Venezuela Venezuela Ecuador Ecuador Panama Panama Cuba Cuba Brazil Brazil Chile Chile Ecuador Ecuador Argentina Argentina Brazil Brazil

Romania Romania Bulgaria Bulgaria Ukraine Ukraine Slovenia Slovenia Poland Poland Czech Republic Czech Republic Hungary Hungary Romania Romania (Yugoslavia) (Yugoslavia) Bulgaria Bulgaria Ukraine Ukraine Poland Poland German, DR German, DR (Czechoslovakia) (Czechoslovakia) Romania Romania Belarus Belarus (Yugoslavia) (Yugoslavia) Poland Poland Hungary Hungary Bulgaria Bulgaria (Czechoslovakia) Romania Poland

(Yugoslavia)

Canada Canada Australia Australia New Zealand New Zealand Turkey Turkey Canada Canada Australia Australia

Turkey Turkey Greece Greece

(Yugoslavia) (Yugoslavia) Ukrain Ukrain Poland Poland

TOTAL
Sources: A/58/47 (United Nations, 2004) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004). Compiled by the authors.

of which are developing countries 2 7 8 8 7 7 8 6 5 6 7 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 7 6 7 8 8 8 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 7 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 7 7 5 5 5 5 6 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 380

Notes: Term starts on January 1st and ends on December 31st. Following the amendments to the Charter provisions (articles 23 and 27), 10 rotating members have been elected each year from 1965 onwards. Prior to 1966 the number of rotating members was six. Since 1966, geographical allocation has been considered according to the following pattern: five from Asia/Africa; two from Latin America; one from Eastern Europe; and two from Western Europe and other states. The remainder of the rotating members for 2006 are yet to be elected.