Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 7

EDGAR JARANTILLA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING (G.R. No.

80194 March 21, 1989) FACTS: REGALADO, J.: Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar Jarantilla in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" towards the direction of the provicional capitol resulting to serious physical injuries thru reckless inprudence. Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action. acquitted because of reasonable doubt. Jarantilla was eventually

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.

RUBEN MANIAGO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS HON. RUBEN C. AYSON 104392

G.R. No.

On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a complaint (civil case) against the Jarantilla in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in the dismissed criminal case. RTC wanted to enrich our jurisprudence. So RTC denies motion to dismiss, grants damages to Sing, proposed that the case be elevated to the SC by certiorari. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action (grounded on reasonable dobut) for physical injuries and who participated in the prosecution without reserving the civil action can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission. HELD: YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT. RATIO/DOCTRINES: Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. Where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist' Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused . . .

FACTS: MENDOZA, J.: Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. RTC: denied petitioner's motion for suspension of the civil case due to criminal action on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. CA: The civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case. CA dismissed because a civil action for damages is allowed to be filed independently of the criminal action even though no reservation to file the same has been made. ISSUE: Whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under QUASI DELICT and Employers subsidiary liability for civil aspect of criminal cases of their employees. HELD: No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except: (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule III, 1 and 3 are beyond the rule making power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. (Court discusses history of Rule 111. See case). But, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused.23

In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. By the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973 GERMAN C. GARCIA vs. JUDGE MARIANO M. FLORIDO (MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL) & MARCELINO INESIN et al. Appeal by certiorari from the decision dated October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte" FACTS: ANTONIO, J.: On August 4, 1971, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven by Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. Petitioners filed both civil action (contract of carriage/cupla aquiliana) for damages and criminal action for double serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence (gross negligence and reckless imprudence in gross violation of traffic rules). RTC ruled that the civil action was not based on quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana). ISSUE: Whether or not petioners have cause of action in the civil case provided that they already instituted a criminal action. HELD/DOCTRINE: Yes. Decision of RTC reversed and case remanded to RTC for trial of the civil case. The essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a)act or omission of the private respondents; b)presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d)existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e)the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP vs. ASIA DYNAMIC ELECTRIX CORP. and COURT OF APPEALS This is a petition for review of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed the order of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss filed by herein respondent, Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation. Facts: Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation (ADEC) purchased from Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation various electrical conduits and fittings amounting P1,622,467.14. ADEC issued several checks in favor of Hyatt as payment but the said checks were dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of insufficient funds/account closed. ADEC still failed to pay despite the demand. Hyatt filed before the RTC of Mandaluyong City a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation. It prayed that respondent be ordered to pay the amount of purchase, plus interest and attorney's fees. However, prior to the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before the said RTC, petitioner Hyatt had already filed separate criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of respondent corporation, Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat. They were both pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. These cases involve the same checks which are the subjects of Civil Case before the Mandaluyong RTC. ADEC moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the civil action was deemed included in the criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) previously filed by petitioner against the officers of respondent corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil action in B.P. 22 cases RTC denied the motion to dismiss ruling that since the act complained of arose from the alleged non-payment of the petitioner of its contractual debt, and not the issuance of checks with insufficient funds, the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal actions pursuant to Article 31 of the Civil Code. It said that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to the obligation in this case, it being ex-contractu and not ex-delicto. In a petition for certiorari, CA reversed the order of the trial court saying that the civil actions deemed instituted with the filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 and the Civil Case instituted are of the same nature (for sum of money between the same parties for the same transaction).

Respondent ADEC filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Respondent ADEC filed a petition in the SC contending that it did not violate Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when it filed the complaint in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. Issue: WON a separate civil action for violations of BP 22 is allowed Ruling: The petition is unmeritorious. SC upheld the ruling of the CA that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. Section 1(b) of Rule 111 specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. Ratio: TO PREVENT MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and timeconsuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar. ANTOLIN T. NAGUIAT vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, , TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION RATION AND MANUEL P. LAZATIN Petition to review on certiorari the decision IAC which set aside the Orders of the RTC of Angeles City Facts: Timog Silangan Development Corporation (TSDC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling subdivision lots in Timog Park located in Angeles City, with Manuel P. Lazatin as its President.Petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat purchased four (4) lots from TSDC on installment basis. Each lot consists of 300 square meters with a price of P60.00 per square meter. Petitioner made a down payment of P7,200.00, representing 10% of the alleged total price of P72,000.00 for the four (4) lots. Naguiat paid TSDC the amount of P 36,067.97, which was allegedly his full payment for the remaining three (3) Lots, namely, Lots Nos. 13, 14 and 15. Naguiat demanded from TSDC the issuance in his favor of the certificates of title for the three (3) lots, last paid for, but the private respondents (TSDC and Lazatin) refused on the ground that the petitioner had not fully paid for said three (3) lots. TSDC contends that Naguiat did not comply with the agreement therefore he was not entitled to the 10% rebate in price, and as a consequence, the previous payments made by petitioner did not amount to full payment as required for all the lots and which would have entitled petitioner to the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title to all the lots.

TSDC alleged that petitioner commenced the construction of a house on one lot but failed to finish it within the stipulated period of six (6) months. And as to the other lots, petitioner allegedly failed altogether to construct houses on them. The conditions for the sale of the lots were among others, "(i) 10% down payment with a commitment to commence construction therefrom (thereon) in one month's time; (ii) said construction to be finished within a period of six (6) months; and, (iii) the effective price was P 70 per square meter with a rebate of P 10.00 per square meter upon completion of the house in six (6) months." Naguiat filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City Before the civil action was filed, Naguiat also filed with the City Fiscal of Angeles City a criminal complaint against herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for violation of Sec 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 (REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISIONS LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS) which states that the owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. Thereafter, Naguiat filed a motion to consolidate the civil case and the criminal case pursuant to Rule 111, Section 3(a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Despite the objection and opposition of the private respondents, the RTC granted the motion and ordered consolidation of the two (2) cases. At the pre-trial hearing of both cases, Naguiat's counsel appeared as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and as private prosecutor in the Criminal Case. Private respondents objected, and filed their Motion and Opposition to Appearance of Plaintiff as Private Prosecutor with respect to the trial of the Criminal Case; the opposition was overruled by the RTC. Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the respondent appellate court which rendered a decision in their favour. CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. Petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of the respondent appellate court, and the reinstatement of the orders of the trial court, allowing the consolidation of the civil and criminal case before said trial court, and the intervention of the petitioners's counsel as private prosecutor in the criminal case. Issue: WON the criminal and civil actions filed by Naguiat can be consolidated Ruling: Petition is granted. GR: As a ground for the consolidation of the criminal and civil cases, petitioner invokes Rule 111, Sec. 3 (a), Rules of Court, which provides that the civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal action, is one for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto. In the case at bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title to the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell between the petitioner and the private respondent. Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner was for the enforcement of an obligation arising from a contract, or ex contractu and not one for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by the petitioner is inapplicable. EXPN: But, as held in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidation of a criminal action with a civil action arising not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the express authority of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which provides that When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost identical, i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he purchased from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise would virtually be the same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the purchase of the lots and, to

which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity, the official receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and other related documents. The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice. LAURA CORPUS et al., vs. FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. Facts: A passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided within the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons. An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court First Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The accused, Felardo Paje, was found guilty and convicted of the crime charged in the information. Said defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. While defendant's appeal was pending decision in the Court of Appeals, Clemente Marcia's heirs, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a separate civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., defendants, praying that said defendants be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amounts of damages claimed by the plaintiffs. Meanwhile, CA promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje reversing the appealed judgment and acquitting the appellant after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident. The defendants filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the Court of Appeals of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal action. The motion was denied. RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. Issue: WON reckless imprudence authorizes the institution of an independent criminal action pursuant to Art. 33 of the Civil Code Ruling: The petition is unmeritorious. SC held that the acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action. A verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil responsibility. Criminal negligence, or reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries. The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other persons.

As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a separate civil action). In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon the same act.

MARCOS BORDAS, vs. SENCENO CANA DALLA AND PRIMO TABAR

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Instance of Cebu which grants the defendants-appellees motion to dismiss the civil case filed by the plaintif-appellant on the ground that no reservaation was made by the plaintiff-appellant in the criminal action. Facts: Defendant-appellee Senceno Canadalla was driving a jeepney owned and registered by Primo Tabar who is also his employer when he allegedly sideswiped plaintiff-appelle Marcos Bordas. Thereafter, Canadalla was charged before the City Court of Cebu with the offense of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. While the criminal case filed against him was pending, plaintiff-appellant filed a separate civil action for damages based on culpa aquilana against Canadalla and his employer, Tabar. The defendant-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground that the complaint for damages was filed without proper resercation in the criminal action to institute a separate and independent civil action as provided by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the civil case filed by Bordas. He then appealed to the Court of First Instance who in turn affirmed in totoo the order appealed from. Hencce, this petition on a pure question of law. Ruling: Petition is granted. There is no need for the plaintiff-appellant to make a reservation of his right to file a separate civil action since the civil action contemplated is not derived from the criminall liability of the accused but one based on culpa aquiliana. The trial court was in error in considering the conviction of the accused as a prejudicial question to the civil liability of Canadalla and Tabar. Distinction should be made between the civil liability arising out of criminal negligence which is governed by the Penal Code and the responsibility for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the former. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff-applelantss action, being one for culpa aquliana (Article 2176), may not be classified as a civil action arising from the criminal offense of Canadalla.

As stated in Section 2, Rule 111 of Rules of Court (as amended on January 1, 1985), in the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Coded of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be broiught by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. Such civil action shall proceed independently of criminal prosecuion, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES, vs. HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY AND SPS. CRISTINA MALICSI AND DANILO MALICSI This is a direct appeal on a question of law from a resolution of RTC of Malabon Facts:

In a criminal case filed in the MTC of Navotas, Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In the said case, Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced by the court to a fine of P50.00. As a result, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused neither was she able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. A new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband was filed by Reyes in the RTC for damages arising from the defamatory uttered against her. At the pre-trial, Reyes admitted being represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case against Malicsi and that she did not reserve the right to file a separate action for damages. She further admitted that the presence of private prosecutor was for the purpose of proving damages against the accused. The issue in the RTC was WON plaintiff was barred from filing a separate civil action for damages against the accused on the ground that she was represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case and she failed to make a reservation in said case to file a separate action The Court a quo ruled in favor of the defendants relying on the case of Roa vs Dela Cruz and dismissed the case. Issue: WON intervention by a private prosecution and failure to make reservation bars the plaintiff from filing a separate civil action for damages against the accused. Ruling: Plaintiff is not barred. The Roa case is inapplicable in the present case ad precedent due to material differences betweet the facts. In the Roa case, a full-blown hearing occurred where a private prosector participated actively, thus, it clearly showed that the aggrieved party participated through the private prosecutor to indicate her inention to have her claim for damages. After the trial, the accused was found guilty of slight slander and sentenced her to pay a fine of P50.00 but there was no award of damages in favor of the aggrieved party. The reason for such decision is because of the failure of the aggrieved party to submit evidence to support her claim for damages. She failed file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the court and also an appeal therefrom. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner was represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case against respondent Malicsi for the purpose of proving damages. However, the undisputed plea of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of P50.00 prevented petioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to file a separate civil action. The court further held that the mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. The aggrieved party did not have the chance to present evidence to support her claim for damges and to enter a reservation because the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced.

Various intelligence units of the AFP known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance with said order, the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. During the said raids, certain members of TFM confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to the herein petitioners. Aside from that, plaintiffs were arrested without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. Plaintiffs further allege that among other violations of their rights and liberties, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.

Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver. Respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrtit of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents.

On November 8, 1983, Judge Fortun of RTC NCR granted the motion to dismiss the case. Thereafter, a motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by petitioners. Later on, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from the said case. On May 11, 1984, the trial court presided by Judge Lising, without acting on the motion to set aside the Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order against petitioners. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985, seeking to annul and set aside the respondent courts resolutions and order. Furthermore, seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function

Issues:

1. WON the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution;

2. WON a superior officer, under the notion of respondent superior, be answerable for damages jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.

Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damges a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary.

Ruling:

The court finds respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers. It is true that as members of AFP, respondents were merely responding to their order of duty but they cannot use it as an excuse to disregard the rights and liberties of individual citizen protected by the constitution. ROBERTO ABERCA, et. al, vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, et. al This is a petition for certiorari. Facts: Moreover, Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only

judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Held: The petition is devoid of merit. There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. According to a number of cases, a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. However, this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2(c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the CA found out that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanita Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With these findings, the CA exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist. Petition is hereby DENIED. EULOGIO OCCENA VS. HON. PEDRO ICAMINA Facts: Petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sibalom, San Remigio Belison, Province of Antique, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor. Private respondent, as accused, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court. Issues: (1) Whether or not the decision of the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability; and (2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory. Held:

As to the first issue, the court ruled in the negative. The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus does not destroy plaintiffs right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through th writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

As to the second issue, the doctrine of respondent superior invoked by the respondents is inapplicable to the case as it has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant relationship. Such relationship does not exist between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

Under Article 32, the law speaks of an officer or employee or person may directly or indirectly responsible for violation of the consituttional rights and liberties of another. Thus, the person indirectly responsible has to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. The complaint in this litigation alleges facts, which shows how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, etc. Article 32 clearly encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly as well as indirectly responsible for its violation. The military personnel directly involved and their superiors are jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintiffs.

BERNABE CASTILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA affirming the dismissal of the CFI (RTC) of the complaint for damages filed by petitioners against private respondents. Facts: Petitioners and private respondents were figured in a vehicular accident on May 2, 1965 at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons and damage to their respective vehicles. The parties have conflicting versions as to what actually transpired on that fateful day; each party pointing to the negligence of the other as the proximate cause of the accident. On June 30, 1965, a civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries sustained by petitioners and for the damage to their vehicle as a result of the collision, was instituted by the petitioners before the CFI of Manila. While the case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information against Juanito Rosario, private respondent herein, for double physical injuries, double less serious physical injuries, and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the CFI of Urdaneta. He (respondent) was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the criminal case. He appealed before the CA which rendered a decision acquitting him from the crime charged against him. As regards the civil case, the CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint of the petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the petitioner based on the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners. Petitioners then appealed before the CA however the latter only affirmed the decision of the CFI of Manila. Issue: Whether or not an action for damages based on quasi-delict is barred by a decision of the appellate court acquitting the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The petition is meritorious. (1) The decision of the MCTC as affirmed by the RTC cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final. (2) Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages. Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Thus, from the evidence presented, this court ruled that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Petition is hereby GRANTED.

When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. In the instant case, was dismissed on the ground proved beyond reasonable independent civil action for notwithstanding. the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence that the guilt of the accused (herein private respondent) was not doubt. Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an damages, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case

Private respondent's contention that the enforcement of the right to file an action for damages under Article 29, should be subject to the procedure outlined in Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure, i.e., that a reservation be made in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been ruled to be without merit. Article 29 of the Civil Code does not include any such reservation requirement. It allows an action for damages against the accused upon the latter's acquittal in the criminal case based upon reasonable doubt. Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective. Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate and independent actions.

FRANCISCO BONITE VS. HON. MARIANO ZOSA Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the CFI of Misamis Occidental filed by herein petitioners against private respondent, dismissing the complaint for damages, and the order dated 27 March 1971 2 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order. Facts: Florencio Bonite while working as "caminero" of the Bureau of Public Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta City, was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. Consequently, a criminal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs of the deceased (now petitioners) against the respondent Abamonga, with the City Court of Oroquieta City. After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court in the criminal case, acquitting the accused Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioners then filed an action for recovery of damages against the same accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the CFI of Misamis Occidental. However, the court dismissed the complaint for damages for failure of the plaintiffs to reserve the right to file an independent civil action and because of the further fact that the plaintiffs have been represented by a private prosecutor in the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review was filed before this court. Issue: Whether or not an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action. Held: