PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS BALUCANAG VS. FRANCISCO122 SCRA 344 FACTS: The petitioner bought a lot owned by Mrs.

Charvet which was then previously leased by the latter to one Richard Stohner. The said lease contract provided that the lessee may erect structures and improvements which shall remain as lessee's property and he may remove them at any time. It further provided that should the lessee fail to remove the same structures or improvements within two months after the expiration of the lease, the lessor may remove them or cause them to be removed at the expense of the lessee. Stohner made fillings on the land and constructed a house. When he failed to pay the rent, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Stohner a demand letter ordering him to vacate the lot. The lessee contended that he is a 'builder in good faith.' ISSUE: Is the lessee a builder in good faith? HELD: No, the lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under Art. 448 of the NCC (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only to the owner of the land who believes he is the rightful owner thereof, but not to a lessee who's interest in the land is derived only from a rental contract. Neither can Stohner be considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A possessor in good faith is a party who possesses property believing that he is its rightful owner but discovers later on a flaw in his title that could indicate that he might not be its legal owner. It cannot apply to a lessee because he knows right from the start that he is merely a lessee and not the owner of the premises. As a mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the property at his own risk such that he cannot recover from the owner there imbursements nor he has any right to retain the premises until reimbursements. What applies in this case is Art. 1678 (NCC) which provides that, " if the lessee, makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee 1/2 of the value of the improvements at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not. However, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary." MACASAET VS MACASAET ROSALES VS. CASTELLFORT FACTS: Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters, covered by TCT No. 36856[4] and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan LRCPsd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort).It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the

same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina) through her sonattorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased. Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with Villegas offering a larger lot near petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a replacement thereof. In the alternative, Villegas proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners lot with legal interest. Both proposals were, however, rejected by petitioners whose counsel, by letter of August 24, 1995, directed Castelltort to stop the construction of and demolish his house and any other structure he may have built thereon, and desist from entering the lot. Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1, 1995 a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary injunction against spousesrespondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No.2229-95-C. ISSUE: Under Art 448, who has the right of option? HELD: Under the foregoing provision (Art 448), the landowner can choose between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.[34] If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a justs olution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. LUMUNGO V. USMAN MUNICIPALITY OF OAS V. ROA7 PHIL. 20 FACTS: The Municipality brought the action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas, claiming that it was a part of the public square of said town, while Roa alleged that he was the owner of the property. The defendant admitted in writing that he knew that the land is owned by the Municipality and that Jose Castillo, whom he bought the property did not own the land. When Roa constructed a substantial building on the property in question after he acquired the property from Castillo, the Municipality did not oppose the construction. ISSUE:

Whether or not the municipality owns the land. HELD: Yes. The defendant was not a purchaser in good faith. The plaintiff, having permitted the erection by the defendant of a building on the land without objection, acted in bad faith. The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they both had acted in good faith. To the case are applicable thoseprovisions of the Civil Code which relate to theconstruction by one person of a building upon land belonging to another. Article 364 (now Art.453) of the Civil Code is as follows: "When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on another's land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. The Supreme declared that the Municipality is the owner of the land and that it has the option of buying the building thereon, which is the property of the defendant, or of selling to him the land on which it stands. GOVERNMENT V. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE FACTS: During the months of September to November every year, the waters of Laguna de Baycover a long strip of land along the eastern border of the two parcels of land in question. The claimant Colegio de San Jose contends that the parcels of land are a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging it, which has been in possession thereof since time immemorial by means of its tenants or lessees and farmers. In contrast, the Government contends that the said two parcels of land belong to the public domain, and its evidence tends to prove that they have always been known as the shores of Laguna de Bay. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Colegio de San Jose ordering the registration of the 2 parcels of land in accordance with law. Both admitted that the strip was formerly covered by water but since the Bay receded, it was now uncovered. The government tried to apply Art.458 which states the adjoin estate (the College) does not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters. ISSUES: Whether or not Art. 458 is applicable. Whether or not the property in question belongs to the public domain as a part of the bed of Laguna deBay. HELD: No. Article 367 (now Art.458) provides that the owners of estates bordering on ponds or lagoons, do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by them in extraordinary floods. The provision refers to ponds and lagoons, and has therefore no application to the present case, which refers to a lake, a lagoon being legally distinct in character from a lake. Instead, Art.77 of the Spanish Law of Waters should apply, which provides: Lands accidentally inundated by the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers or other streams shall continue to be the property of their respective owners. Therefore, they must belong to Colegio de San Jose as part of Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, which was originally owned by it. REPUBLIC v. CA 281 SCRA 199 CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY 384 SCRA 152

FACTS: President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding. Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA. Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties. ISSUE: W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution. HELD: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred. The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential

proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. RACHEL C. CELESTIAL VS JESSE CACHOPERO Gr. No. 142595. October 15, 2003 Facts: Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Miscellaneous Sales Application) with the Bureau of Lands. Petitioner filed a protest, claiming preferential right over the land. However, on an ocular inspection, the Bureau found that the subject land was outside the commerce of man and thus, denied the petitioners protest. Petitioner thereafter filed an ejectment case against the respondent. Subsequently, respondent filed another MSA which the petitioner once again protested against. The DENR Regional Executive Director declared that the land is suitable for residential purposes and in the light of the conflicting interest of the parties, ordered that the land be sold at public auction. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order but was denied by the OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner then moved for the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied respondents petition. The CA on the other hand, reversed and set aside the decision of the CA and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of the respondent. Petitioner contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the respondents petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari. Ruling: Yes. Petition for review of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency under rule 43 and petition for review under rule 65 is separate and distinct. The petition filed before the RTC clearly shows that it alleged the DENR acted with grave abuse of discretion and without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Orders through a special civil action for certiorari was within the jurisdiction of the RTC. IGLESIA NI CRISTO et.al. vs. HON. THELMA PONFERRADA et.al.G.R. No. 168943OCTOBER 27, 2006 Facts: In October 2001, Enrique Santos et.al filed a complaint for quieting of title and/or accion reinvidincatoria against Iglesia ni Cristo. They alleged that they are owner of a 936 sq.m. parcel of land in Tandang Sora, Quezon City which they inherited from Enrique Sr. Iglesia filed a motion to dismiss contending that the action has prescribed. It appears that it was able to obtain a TCT over the same parcel of land way back in 1984-the year when the title was issued in their favor. In support of its contention, Iglesia contended that the accion reinvidincatoria presupposes that the plaintiff is not in actual possession of the property he seeks to recover. Thus, this is true in this case because it (iglesia) was in possession of the property in 1984 when the title was issued to it. HELD:

Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and material possession of the property since 1961 up to the time they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001. Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An accion reinvidincatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such possession from defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvidincatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may file an accion reinvidincatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In this case, respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce their jus utendi andjus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from fencing the property. Limitations on the right of ownership: 1. Limitations imposed for the benefit of the State- police power [ e.g. SECTION. 16. ( Republic Act No. 7160)General Welfare. - eminent domain; and Taxation 2. Limitations imposed by the Law- legal easement of waters [Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.] (552) ]orlegal easement of right of way [Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity] 3. Limitations imposed by the owner- e.g. lease/pledge 4. Limitations imposed by the grantor- donor may prohibit partition [ e.g. Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs. ](1051a) ]