G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R.

REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, Respondent. Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CAG.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission." The records shows the following undisputed facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1 On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. law library Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit: WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with

prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance. SO ORDERED. Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3 To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being coequal bodies. After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case, We rule in favor of the petitioner. The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission. library The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7 chanrobles virtual law library

What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit: In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion: The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10 Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held: ... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . . law library Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.) In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.

In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides: SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: library xxx xxx xxx (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The contention is devoid of merit. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasijudicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 14 This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. law library The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16 law library As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said: We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17 One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus: The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19 Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement: The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20 In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it. Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21 The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the

issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22 Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court: The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23 Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit: ... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological makeup for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. law library In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. library

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914 THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. ADRIANO PANLILIO, Defendant-Appellant. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga convicting the accused of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial. The information charges: "That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the abovenamed accused having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them."chanrobles virtual law library The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded not guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it appears that the defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the Director of Agriculture. law library It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the defendant fully understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them, from the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined. library The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof. library We are forced to agree with this contention. library The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify that section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial.

The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it shall be unlawful for any reason, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship, drive or otherwise take or transport from one island, province, municipality, township, or settlement to another any domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseased or to expose such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may come in contact with other domestic animals. Section 5 provides that whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island, province, municipality, township, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by shipping, driving or otherwise transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality, township, or settlement any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive or otherwise remove the kind of animals so specified from such locality except when accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the Director of Agriculture stating the number and the kind of animals to be shipped, driven, taken or transported, their destination, manner in which they are authorized to be shipped, driven, taken, or transported, and their brands and distinguishing marks. A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall within any of them. There is no question here of importation and there is no charge or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a dangerous communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said animals from one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It was alleged had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that they had been placed in a corral in quarantine on the premises of the accused and that he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the corral and worked them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highway nor moved from one municipality or settlement to another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined, and there worked by the servants of the accused. The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not applicable to the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of said Act is not applicable. This section provides: "Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in quarantine in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his agent, shall deliver it at the place designated for the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and attendance. Should the owner or his agent fail to comply with this requirement the Director of Agriculture may furnish supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such supplies and attendance shall be collectible from the owner or his agent." We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this section, as we are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so phrased as to warrant the conclusion that it was intended to be a penal section. The section provides the means by which the refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment, if we may call it punishment, which he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a penal provision or the form or substance of such provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be inflicted are so phrased as to make

the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment for any act declared unlawful by the law. The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar. Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information and proved upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760, it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. It provides: A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and censure shall be imposed upon: . . 2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issued with reference to any epedemic disease among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar plague. It alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine had been executed and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that the accused, in violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, duly promulgated, broke the quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his plantation. We consider these acts a plain violation of the article of the Penal Code as above quoted. The fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as follows: "The undersigned accuses Adriano Panlilio of a violation of Act No. 1760, committed as follows:" Then follows the body of the information already quoted in this opinion. We would not permit an accused to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the change from one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a different defense or surprised him in any other way. The allegations required under Act No. 1760 include those required under article 581. The accused could have defended himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of article 581. virtual law library In the case of United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. Rep., 740), the information stating the facts upon which the charge was founded terminated with his expression: "In violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission, in effect on the 6th of February, 1902."

In the resolution of this case the Supreme Court found that the facts set forth in the information and proved on the trial did not constitute a violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 as alleged in the information, but did constitute a violation of article 387 in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, and accordingly convicted the accused under those articles and sentenced him to the corresponding penalty. In that case the court said: "The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as defined in article 387, in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code." (U. S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil. Rep., 391; U. S. vs. Guzman, 25 Phil. Rep., 22.) The accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, and is sentenced to pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So ordered. G.R. No. 4349 September 24, 1908 THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. ANICETO BARRIAS, Defendant-Appellant. In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 1 After a demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power. Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows: For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court. In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power. library The Attorney-General does not seek to sustain the conviction but joins with the counsel for the defense in asking for the discharge of the prisoner on the first ground stated by the defense, that the rule of the Collector cited was unauthorized and illegal, expressly passing over the other question of the delegation of legislative power. By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows:

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed. library SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both. Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of Manila. This spot is near the mouth of the river, the docks whereof are used for the purpose of taking on and discharging freight, and we entertain no doubt that it was in right sense a part of the harbor, without having recourse to the definition of paragraph 8 of Customs Administrative Circular No. 136, which reads as follows: The limits of a harbor for the purpose of licensing vessels as herein prescribed (for the lighterage and harbor business) shall be considered to include its confluent navigable rivers and lakes, which are navigable during any season of the year. The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.) This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep.

402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533): The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. . . . In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and counsel the power to make pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon et al., 135 Mass. 175). In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues authorizing them to do so, the court saying: Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature. Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should pass on the questions discussed in the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not material, as we have frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial. library We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section Act No. 1136.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered. G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees. This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. library

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 841.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429). Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. library It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned. SECTION 1. - Definition. - Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follows: (a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.

(b) Electro Fishing. - Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or generatoroperated and from and available source of electric current. library (c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee. (d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products. SEC. 2. - Prohibition. - It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times. SEC. 3. - Penalty. - Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court. SEC. 4. - Repealing Provisions. - All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked. SEC. 5. - Effectivity. - This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its publication in the Office Gazette. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." chanrobles virtual law library That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22, We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the

Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein). And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596). It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67). library In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11. The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. library

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32). Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing. However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. That decree provides: SEC. 33. - Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ... The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704). The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing. Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84. library An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious

and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328). Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704. Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries." Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law."

Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8). library "Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion. library The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124). virtual law library In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132). It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527). In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under

which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law. Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code. virtual law library Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island. This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss. A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130). Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51). In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra). law library The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game. library

Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof." library Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., PetitionerAppellant, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellee. On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: . Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 21/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. library Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal. library

The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act." There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) . A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: . (f) Compensation - All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so. Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: (f) Compensation - All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month. It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed.

The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect. The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995 DIONISIO M. RABOR, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent. Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.

Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" 2 issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date "2/28/91." Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on this matter." library In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows: Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted: Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months. IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble. 3 Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991." 4 Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSROXI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President." 5 This request was denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March 1992.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part: In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement under P.D. 1146.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part: 1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year. Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given due course. 6 (Emphasis in the original) On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service Commission this time invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits, having been separated from the government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission. Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that, under Cena grant of the extension of service was discretionary on the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's letter, in relevant part, read: The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal opinion. Both the City Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission are one in these opinion that extending you an appointment in order that you may be able to complete the fifteen-year service requirement is discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor. Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we can no longer do so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be able to perform the duties attached to your position. Moreover, the position you had vacated was already filled up. We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your request. 8 (Emphases supplied) At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993. The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for instituting a special civil action of certiorari to review the assailed Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In turn, the Commission was required to comment on petitioner's Letter/Petition. 9 The Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993 relating to compliance with the mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk of Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10 The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment on 16 November 1993. The Court then resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.

In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 11 Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons. library While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must reexamine the doctrine of Cena and the theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. 12 We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena. Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixtyeight (68) years. virtual law library The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or not Cena's request could be granted considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he was entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to complete the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded: Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146. 13 (Emphases supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety: Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. - (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who (1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service; law library (2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and library (3) is separated from the service. (b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied) The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in respect of retirement statutes: Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a] retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. 14 (Citations omitted) While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age. The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which should be quoted in its entirety: TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS. library SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the Fifteen Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes. Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following policies and guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement purposes: 1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year. 2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted. 3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement of retirement shall be

filled not later than three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement. 4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with no further extension. This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases supplied) The second administrative issuance - Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 provides: xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/or retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended. WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months only. WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows: Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months. All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government including governmentowned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular. library This Circular shall take effect immediately. By authority of the President (Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR. Executive Secretary Manila, June 14, 1988. 15(Emphasis supplied) Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena. We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote: The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-

32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). . . . . The rule on limiting to one the year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied) It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the law prescribes. 18 (Emphasis supplied) In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which established passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines, said: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]) The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The Standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained in Calalang v. William is "safe transit upon the roads." We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied) In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general nature of the standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of compliance with the requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rule-making: This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," (Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]); "necessary in the interest

of law and order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); "public interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 17 Phil. 602 [1940]). 22(Emphasis supplied) Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn. virtual law library We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil Service law found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 - and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law. virtual law library Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in relevant part, as follows: Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. - The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx (2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws; (3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government; xxx xxx xxx (10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and retention of a qualified and competent work force in the public service; xxx xxx xxx (14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age; xxx xxx xxx (17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement; xxx xxx xxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied) It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the government." 23 It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement." law library In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]). We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena: Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied). Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government employees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission. 25 Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of

persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior approval of the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the government service so required and provided that the appointee possesses special qualifications not possessed by other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the Education and Information Division of the Commission on Elections when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had been obtained either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and the Commission found that the other conditions laid down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view of permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on. 26 When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen (l5) years of government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed such extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum

Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSROXI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 135945. March 7, 2001] THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., represented by its President RODRIGO S. MACARIO, SR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, represented by its Commissioner, RUFINO V. MIJARES; MARIO PADILAN, PONCIANO BASILAN, HIPOLITO ESLAVA, WILLIAM LUMPISA, PACITO MOISES, DIONISIO ANAS, NOLI DANGLA, NAPOLEON BALESTEROS, ELSIE MOISES, SEBIO LACWASAN, BEN FLORES, DOMINGO CANUTAB, MARCELINO GABRIANO, TINA TARNATE, ANDREW ABRAZADO, DANNY LEDDA, FERNANDO DAYAO, JONATHAN DE LA PENA, JERRY PASSION, PETER AGUINSOD, and LOLITA DURAN, Respondents. Before us is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief seeking the annulment of a status quo order [1 dated September 29, 1998 issued by the public respondent Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP, for brevity) in COSLAP Case No. 98-253. The facts are: The property being fought over by the parties is a 10.36hectare property in Baguio City called Dominican Hills, formerly registered in the name of Diplomat Hills, Inc. It appeared that the property was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) which eventually foreclosed the mortgage thereon and acquired the same as highest bidder. On April 11, 1983, it was donated to the Republic of the Philippines by UCPB through its President, Eduardo Cojuangco. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes of the Ministry of Human Settlements. On December 12, 1986, the then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 85 abolishing the Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the latters supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS). [2 On October 18, 1988, the PMS received an application from petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC. (UNITED, for brevity), a community housing association composed of non-real property owning residents of Baguio City, to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property.

On February 2, 1990, PMS Secretary Elfren Cruz referred the application to the HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC). HIGC consented to act as originator for UNITED. [3 Accordingly, on May 9, 1990, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED. The Memorandum of Agreement called for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills property to HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. The parties agreed on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter. Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992. Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. [4 Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action [5 for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 3316-R, in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied in an Order dated March 18, 1996. [6 While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES, for brevity), filed Civil Case No. 3382-R before Branch 61 of the same court. The complaint [7 prayed for damages, injunction and annulment of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC. Upon motion of UNITED, the trial court in an Order dated May 27, 1996 dismissed Civil Case No. 3382-R. [8 The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals. [9 Demolition Order No. 1-96 was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineers Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures. To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed on September 29, 1998 a petition [10 for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order, docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-253, in the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineers Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. The issues we are called upon to resolve are: 1 IS THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS [COSLAP] CREATED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 561 BY THE OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINES [sic] EMPOWERED TO HEAR AND TRY A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS WITH PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND THUS, ARROGATE UNTO ITSELF THE POWER TO ISSUE STATUS QUO ORDER AND CONDUCT A HEARING THEREOF [sic]?

2 ASSUMING THAT THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS [COSLAP] HAS JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER, IS IT EXEMPTED FROM OBSERVING A CLEAR CASE OF FORUM SHOPPING ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS? To the extent that the instant case is denominated as one for declaratory relief, we initially clarify that we do not possess original jurisdiction to entertain such petitions. [11 Such is vested in the Regional Trial Courts. [12 Accordingly, we shall limit our review to ascertaining if the proceedings before public respondent COSLAP are without or in excess of its jurisdiction. In this wise, a recounting of the history of the COSLAP may provide useful insights into the extent of its powers and functions. The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 561 dated September 21, 1979. Its forerunner was the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) founded on July 31, 1970 by virtue of Executive Order No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions. It was given the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum and to call upon any department, office, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations and local government units, for assistance in the performance of its functions. At the time, the PACLAP did not exercise quasijudicial functions. On March 19, 1971, Executive Order No. 305 was issued reconstituting the PACLAP. [13 The committee was given exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other lands of the public domain and accordingly was tasked: 1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative procedures, and in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain; 2. To coordinate and integrate the activities of all government agencies having to do with public lands or lands of the public domain; 3. To study and review present policies as embodied in land laws and administrative rules and regulations, in relation to the needs for land of the agro-industrial sector and small farmers, with the end in view to evolving and recommending new laws and policies and establishing priorities in the grant of public land, and the simplification of processing of land applications in order to relieve the small man from the complexities of existing laws, rules and regulations; 4. To evolve and implement a system for the speedy investigation and resolution of land disputes; 5. To receive all complaints of settlers and small farmers, involving public lands or other lands of the public domain; 6. To look into the conflicts between Christians and nonChristians, between corporations and small settlers and farmers; cause the speedy settlement of such conflicts in accordance with priorities or policies established by the Committee; and 7. To perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the President.

Thereafter, the PACLAP was reorganized pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 832 dated November 27, 1975. [14 Its jurisdiction was revised thus: xxx xxx xxx 2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, that when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon, shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction thereof; xxx xxx xxx Notably, the said Presidential Decree No. 832 did not contain any provision for judicial review of the resolutions, orders or decisions of the PACLAP. On September 21, 1979, the PACLAP was abolished and its functions transferred to the present Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems by virtue of Executive Order No. 561. This reorganization, effected in line with Presidential Decree No. 1416, brought the COSLAP directly under the Office of the President. [15 It was only at this time that a provision for judicial review was made from resolutions, orders or decisions of the said agency, as embodied in section 3(2) thereof, to wit: Powers and functions.The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: 1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes; 2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, that the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action: (a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; (b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; (c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants; (d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and (e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. The Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or

decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. xxx xxx xxx In the performance of its functions and discharge of its duties, the Commission is authorized, through the Commissioner, to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the appearance of witnesses and the production of records, books and documents before it. It may also call upon any ministry, office, agency or instrumentality of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and local governments for assistance. This authority is likewise, conferred upon the provincial offices as may be established pursuant to Section 5 of this Executive Order. In Baaga v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, [16 we characterized the COSLAPs jurisdiction as being general in nature, as follows: Petitioners also contend in their petition that the COSLAP itself has no jurisdiction to resolve the protest and counterprotest of the parties because its power to resolve land problems is confined to those cases which are critical and explosive in nature. This contention is devoid of merit. It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take cognizance of cases which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. However, the use of the word may does not mean that the COSLAPs jurisdiction is merely confined to the above mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive Order are clear that the COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the abolished PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it. The said Executive Order No. 561 containing said provision, being enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial Committee of Koronadal on September 29, 1978. Neither can it affect the decision of the COSLAP which merely affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction. Given the facts of the case, it is our view that the COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. As matters stand, it is not the judiciarys place to question the wisdom behind a law; [17 our task is to interpret the law. We feel compelled to observe, though, that by reason of the ambiguous terminology employed in Executive Order No. 561, the power to assume jurisdiction granted to the COSLAP provides an ideal breeding ground for forum shopping, as we shall explain subsequently. Suffice it to state at this stage that the COSLAP may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are already pending in the regular courts. The reason is simple. Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP as having the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision. The qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative character of the COSLAPs determinations, amplified by the statement that such resolutions, orders or decisions shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. An agency is defined by statute as any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-

owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. [18 A department, on the other hand, refers to an executive department created by law. [19 Whereas, a bureau is understood to refer to any principal subdivision of any department. [20 In turn, an office refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functional unit of a department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation. [21 An instrumentality is deemed to refer to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. [22 Applying the principle in statutory construction of ejusdem generis, i.e., where general words follow an enumeration or persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, [23 section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAPs dispositions are binding on administrative or executive agencies. The history of the COSLAP itself bolsters this view. Prior enactments enumerated its member agencies among which it was to exercise a coordinating function. The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions: Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[24 However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasijudicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. [25 The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [26 There is an equally persuasive reason to grant the petition. As an additional ground for the annulment of the assailed status quo order of COSLAP, UNITED accuses private respondents of engaging in forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court. [27 In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated February 8, 1994 provides: Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994, applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.

Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following requirements, in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and shall be subject to the sanctions provided hereunder. 1. The plaintiff, Petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceedings is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed. The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. 2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum shopping by any other party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for the summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the party. [italics supplied] xxx xxx xxx The said Administrative Circulars use of the auxiliary verb shall imports an imperative obligation xxx inconsistent with the idea of discretion. [28 Hence, compliance therewith is mandatory. [29 It bears stressing that there is a material distinction between the requirement of submission of the certification against forum shopping from the undertakings stated therein. Accordingly, xxx [f]ailure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that plaintiff is not guilty of forum shopping. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in concluding that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 did not apply to private respondents case merely because her complaint was not based on petitioners cause of action. The Circular applies to any complaint, petition, application, or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing a complaint or any other initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not committed nor will he commit forum shopping. Otherwise, we would have an absurd situation where the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a violation of said Circular, and compliance therewith would depend on their

belief that they might or might not have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would defeat the very purpose of Circular 04-94. Indeed, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance of forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a difference in the treatmentin terms of imposable sanctionsbetween failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping. The former is merely a cause for the dismissal, without prejudice, of the complaint or initiatory pleading, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt.[30 A scrutiny of the pleadings filed before the trial courts and the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private respondents propensity for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, and not by his counsel. [31 Hence, one can deduce that the certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. In the case at bar, private respondents litany of omissions range from failing to submit the required certification against forum shopping to filing a false certification, and then to forum shopping itself. First, the petition filed before the COSLAP conspicuously lacked a certification against forum shopping. Second, it does not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION informed Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City before which Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, that another action, Civil Case No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of the same court. Another group of homeless residents of Dominican Hill, the LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter case. The aforesaid plaintiff, however, does not hesitate to admit that it filed the second case in representation of private respondent, as one of its affiliates. In the same manner, the certification against forum shopping accompanying the complaint in Civil Case No. 3382-R does not mention the pendency of Civil Case No. 3316-R. In fact, the opposite assurance was given, that there was no action pending before any other tribunal. Another transgression is that both branches of the trial court do not appear to have been notified of the filing of the subject COSLAP Case No. 98-253. It is evident from the foregoing facts that private respondents, in filing multiple petitions, have mocked our attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby upset the orderly administration of justice. They sought recourse from three (3) different tribunals in order to obtain the writ of injunction they so desperately desired. The willful attempt by private respondents to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after it failed to acquire the same from the original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial process. [32 In this connection, we expounded on forum shopping in Viva Productions, Inc. v. Court of Appeals [33 that: Private respondents intention to engage in forum shopping becomes manifest with undoubted clarity upon the following considerations. Notably, if not only to ensure the issuance of an injunctive relief, the significance of the action for damages before the Makati court would be nil. What damages against private respondent would there be to speak about if the Paraaque court already enjoins the performance of the very same act complained of in the Makati court? Evidently, the action for damages is premature if not for the preliminary injunctive relief sought. Thus, we find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati court, being a mere co-equal of the Paraaque court, in not giving due deference to the latter before which the issue of the alleged violation of the sub-judice rule had already been raised and submitted. In such instance, the Makati court, if it was wary of dismissing the action outrightly under Administrative Circular No. 04-94, should have, at least, ordered the consolidation of its case with

that of the Paraaque court, which had first acquired jurisdiction over the related case xxx, or it should have suspended the proceedings until the Paraaque court may have ruled on the issue xxx. xxx xxx xxx Thus, while we might admit that the causes of action before the Makati court and the Paraaque court are distinct, and that private respondent cannot seek civil indemnity in the contempt proceedings, the same being in the nature of criminal contempt, we nonetheless cannot ignore private respondents intention of seeking exactly identical reliefs when it sought the preliminary relief of injunction in the Makati court. As earlier indicated, had private respondent been completely in good faith, there would have been no hindrance in filing the action for damages with the regional trial court of Paraaque and having it consolidated with the contempt proceedings before Branch 274, so that the same issue on the alleged violation of the sub judice rule will not have to be passed upon twice, and there would be no possibility of having two courts of concurrent jurisdiction making two conflicting resolutions. Yet from another angle, it may be said that when the Paraaque court acquired jurisdiction over the said issue, it excluded all other courts of concurrent jurisdiction from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. To hold otherwise would be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might have conflicting orders. This will create havoc and result in an extremely disordered administration of justice. Therefore, even on the assumption that the Makati court may acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action for damages, without prejudice to the application of Administrative Circular No. 04-94, it cannot nonetheless acquire jurisdiction over the issue of whether or not petitioner has violated the sub judice rule. At best, the Makati court may hear the case only with respect to the alleged injury suffered by private respondent after the Paraaque court shall have ruled favorably on the said issue. We also noted several indications of private respondents bad faith. The complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3316-R was prepared by the ASSOCIATIONs counsel, Atty. Conrado Villamor Catral, Jr. whereas the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3382-R was signed by a different lawyer, Atty. Thomas S. Tayengco. With regard to the petition filed with the COSLAP, the same was signed by private respondents individually. As to the latter case, we noted that the petition itself could not have been prepared by ordinary laymen, inasmuch as it exhibits familiarity with statutory provisions and legal concepts, and is written in a lawyerly style. In the same manner, the plaintiffs in the three (3) different cases were made to appear as dissimilar: in Civil Case No. 3316-R, the plaintiff was ASSOCIATION of which private respondent Mario Padilan was head, while the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3382-R was the BENEFICIARIES. Before the COSLAP, private respondents themselves were the petitioners, led again by Padilan. [34 Private respondents also attempted to vary their causes of action: in Civil Case No. 3382-R and COSLAP Case No. 98-253, they seek the annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and among UNITED, the PMS, and HIGC as well as the transfer certificates of title accordingly issued to petitioner. All three (3) cases sought to enjoin the demolition of private respondents houses. It has been held that forum shopping is evident where the elements of litis pendentia or res judicata are present. Private respondents subterfuge comes to naught, for the effects of res judicata or litis pendentia may not be avoided by varying the designation of the parties or changing the form of the action or adopting a different mode of presenting ones case. [35 In view of the foregoing, all that remains to be done is the imposition of the proper penalty. A partys willful and deliberate act of forum shopping is punishable by summary

dismissal of the actions filed. [36 The summary dismissal of both COSLAP Case No. 98-253 and Civil Case No. 3316-R is therefore warranted under the premises. We shall refrain from making any pronouncement on Civil Case No. 3382-R, the dismissal of which was elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals where it is still pending. WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED. The status quo order dated September 29, 1998 issued in COSLAP Case No. 98-253 by respondent Commission On The Settlement Of Land Problems (COSLAP) is hereby SETASIDE; and the petition filed in COSLAP Case No. 98-253 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 3316-R are hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and forum shopping. Costs against private Respondents. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 179830 : December 3, 2009 LINTANG BEDOL, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. Challenged in this petition for certiorari are the twin Resolutions issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in the case entitled "In the Matter of the Charge of Contempt of the Commission Against Election Supervisor Lintang Bedol." The first Resolution1 cralaw dated August 7, 2007, held petitioner guilty of contempt of the COMELEC and meted out to him the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00. The second Resolution2 cralaw dated August 31, 2007, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The facts as stated by the COMELEC follow: On May 14, 2007, the National and Local elections were held under the auspices of this Commission. As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC's performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province. At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao. Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007. On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain 'observations' on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area. He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge. On June 4, 2007, Celia B. Romero, Director II, ERSD & Concurrent Chief of the Records and Statistics Division of the COMELEC issued a certification that as of even date, the

canvassing documents for all municipalities of the province of Maguindanao in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections were not transmitted by the Provincial Election Supervisor of said province nor the respective Board of Canvassers. The Commission and not just the NBOC, in the exercise of its investigatory powers to determine existing controversies created the Task Force Maguindanao, headed by Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer, which was tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass from the city and municipalities in Maguindanao. Respondent [petitioner] appeared before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity and responded to the queries from the chair. It was during this hearing that respondent [petitioner] Bedol explained that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss. Respondent [petitioner] Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next scheduled investigative proceedings set for June 14, 2007 as the Task Force wanted to delve deeper into the alleged loss by propounding additional questions to Atty. Bedol during the next scheduled proceedings, such as why he still had in his possession said documents which should have already been turned over to the Commission, why he did not report to the COMELEC or to the police authorities the purported theft, and other pertinent questions. However, despite actual notice in open session, Atty. Bedol failed to appear, giving the impression that respondent [petitioner] Bedol does not give importance to this whole exercise and ignores the negative impact his attitude has on this Commission. Also respondent [petitioner] failed and refused to submit a written explanation of his absences which he undertook to submit on June 13, 2007, but was only received by this Commission belatedly on July 03, 2007. On June 26, 2007, [petitioner] came out on national newspapers, in an exclusive interview with the 'Inquirer' and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber pistol strapped to his side, and in clear defiance of the Commission posted the challenge by saying that 'those that are saying that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me tomorrow, the next day. They should file a case now and I will answer their accusations.'(Words in brackets ours) On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force Maguindanao head, Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, issued a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order3 cralaw against petitioner citing various violations of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, viz: You are hereby formally charged of contempt of this Commission for having committed during the period between May 14, 2007, and June 26, 2007, acts in violation of specific paragraphs of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as follows: 1. (a) Your (PES Bedol's) failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he (sic) is (sic) the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007; (b) your failure to attend the reset schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when you attended the previously scheduled but again reset canvassing of said PCOCs on May 25, 2007; (c) your failure to attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite notice to him in open session in the hearing held

on June 11, 2007, and personal service to you of a subpoena which you duly signed on the same date; and your failure/refusal to submit your written explanation of your said absences which you undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 ' all of these failures on your part are violations of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 2. Your unlawful assumption of custody in your office in Maguinadanao of the municipal certificates of canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election documents of all the municipalities of Maguinadanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main office in Intramuros, Manila, and your admission that said accountable documents were lost from your said custody ' these constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d), section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. 3. Your pronouncements in the media flaunting [disrespect to] the authority of the COMELEC over you, challenging the institution to file a case against you in court as it is only in court that you are ready to face your accuser are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. 4. Your regaling the media (interviews in national television channels, newspapers and radios) with your boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and side arms, displaying in public for all to see in your front-page colored portrait in a national broadsheet and during a television interview a shiny pistol tucked in a holster at your waist in a 'combative mode (sic)' ' these are clear violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. (Words in brackets ours) Through the foregoing June 27, 2007 Order, petitioner was directed to appear before the COMELEC En Banc on July 3, 2007 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning to personally explain why he should not be held in contempt for the abovementioned offenses. On July 2, 2007, petitioner was arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest4 cralaw issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao. During the July 3, 2007 hearing, petitioner questioned the COMELEC's legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Upon petitioner's motion, he was granted a period of ten (10) days within which to file the necessary pleading adducing his arguments and supporting authorities. The continuation of the hearing was set on July 17, 2007. On July 17, 2007, which was beyond the ten-day period he requested, petitioner submitted an Explanation Ad Cautelam with Urgent Manifestation, containing the following averments: 1. Respondent [petitioner] urgently manifests that he is making a special appearance as he assails the jurisdiction of the Honorable Commission and its capacity to prosecute the present case in an impartial and fair manner. 2. Respondent [petitioner] questions the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him. He can not be validly arrested or re-arrested as a witness who is being compelled to testify in a hearing before the Honorable Commission.

3. Respondent [petitioner] has not committed any contemptuous acts against the Commission. He has not committed those acts charged against him by the Commission motu proprio. (Words in brackets ours.) During the hearing on July 17, 2007, petitioner reiterated his objection to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the contempt charges due to the absence of a complaint lodged with the COMELEC by any private party. Petitioner's objection was treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied forthwith by the COMELEC. Petitioner was then required to present evidence which he refused to do. Various exhibits were then marked and presented to the COMELEC. However, the latter allowed petitioner to file a Memorandum within a period of ten (10) days and gave him the opportunity to attach thereto his documentary and other evidence. On July 31, 2007, petitioner again belatedly filed his Memorandum5 cralaw maintaining his objection to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on ground that the COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators, was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC, in that capacity, could not punish him for contempt. On August 7, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, respondent Atty. Lintang Bedol is hereby found guilty of Contempt of the Commission for the following acts and omissions: 1. (a) The failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007 (b) failure to attend the reset schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when Respondent Bedol attended the previously scheduled but again reset canvassing on May 25, 2007 (c) failure to attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite notice to Respondent in open session in the hearing held on June 11, 2007, and personal service to him of the subpoena which he duly signed on the same date; the failure/refusal to submit written explanation of respondent's absences which he undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 --- all of these failures are violations of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 2. The unlawful assumption of custody in the Respondent's office in Maguindanao of the Municipal Certificates of Canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election documents of all the municipalities of Maguindanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main office in Intramuros, Manila, and Respondent's plain admission that said accountable documents were lost from his said custody --- these constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. 3. The respondent's pronouncements in media flaunting disrespect to the authority of the COMELEC over him, challenging the institution to file a case against him in court as it is supposedly only in court that Respondent Bedol was ready to face his accuser are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.

4. Regaling the public through the media (interviews in national television channels, newspapers and radios) with boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and side arms, displaying in public, for all to see in his front-page colored portrait in a national broadsheet and during a television interview, a shiny pistol tucked in a holster at your waist in a 'combative mode' (sic) --- these are clear violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. chanroblesvirtualawlibary All the foregoing constitute an exhibition of contumacious acts showing disrespect for the institution, of which respondent is even a ranking official, which is clearly contemptuous of this Commission, for which Respondent Lintang Bedol is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). The Legal Department of the Comelec is hereby directed to investigate and determine whether or not any election offense or crime under the Revised Penal Code has been committed by respondent Lintang Bedol and to initiate the filing of the necessary charge/s therefor. SO ORDERED. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007. Hence, petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HAS JURISDICTION TO INITIATE OR PROSECUTE THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER. II WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSSION HAS ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS III WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ASSUMING IT HAS JURISDICTION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT, ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. We dismiss the petition. The main thrust of petitioner's argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions. The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or

omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. The above-quoted provision should be construed broadly to give effect to the COMELEC's constitutional mandate as enunciated in Loong v. Commission on Elections,6 cralaw which held: xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections. The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,8 cralaw described quasijudicial power in the following manner, viz: Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. [Emphasis ours.] The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud and irregularities attending the conduct of elections in the province of Maguindanao and the non-transmittal of the canvassing documents for all municipalities of said province. Task Force Maguindanao's fact-finding investigation ' to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly

been committed ' could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function. The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions. The effectiveness of the quasi'judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings. As enunciated in Arnault v. Nazareno9 cralaw ' Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a factfinding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC's investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers.10 cralaw When the results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions. In Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista,11 cralaw the Court held: xxx. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially. On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect contempt charges against petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code pertinently provides: Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.

xxx (e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therin. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt thereof. [Emphasis ours.] The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELEC's Rules of Procedure, Section 2 of which states: Rule 29 ' Contempt Sec. 1. xxx Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. ' After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission or Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or restraining order granted by it; (c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or proceedings of the Commission or any of its Divisions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rules; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice by the Commission or any of its Divisions; (e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served. SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt. ' If adjudged guilty, the accused may be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, at the discretion of the Commission or Division. The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC, viz: SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. ' Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the

contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed by a private party. We turn now to petitioner's claim that the COMELEC prejudged the case against him, and that its findings were not supported by evidence. His claim deserves scant consideration. The fact that the indirect contempt charges against petitioner were initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC did not by itself prove that it had already prejudged the case against him. As borne out by the records, the COMELEC gave petitioner several opportunities to explain his side and to present evidence to defend himself. All of petitioner's belatedly filed pleadings were admitted and taken into consideration before the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The COMELEC complied with the aforementioned Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and with the requirements set by Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, when it issued the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order against petitioner directing him to appear before it and explain why he should not be held in contempt. Petitioner claims that the challenged Resolution finding him guilty of indirect contempt was based merely on hearsay, surmises, speculations and conjectures, and not on competent and substantial evidence. He contends that there is no convincing evidence that he deliberately refused to heed the summonses of the COMELEC or that he was sufficiently notified of the investigative hearings. He further argues that the loss of the election documents should not even be automatically ascribed to him. We are not persuaded. Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds. First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled12 cralaw canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. It was his official responsibility to be present during the scheduled hearing to shed light on the allegedly stolen election documents but he failed to do so without offering any valid justification for his non-appearance. Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules. Petitioner admitted that the subject certificate of canvass and other election documents were lost while in his custody. Petitioner himself admitted during the hearing held on June 11, 2007 that the documents were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007. Apart from the said loss of the vital election documents, his liability stemmed from the fact that he illegally retained custody and possession of said documents more than two weeks after the elections. The COMELEC viewed such act as a contemptuous interference with its normal functions. Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC through the media (interviews on

national television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules. Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a photo of him with a firearm tucked to his side and his supposed exclusive interview. He claims that said newspaper clippings are mere hearsay, which are of no evidentiary value. True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay, when such articles are offered to prove their contents without any other competent and credible evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al.,13 cralaw the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time, exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on grounds of "relevance, trustworthiness and necessity."14 cralaw When certain facts are within judicial notice of the Court, newspaper accounts "only buttressed these facts as facts."15 cralaw cralaw Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner deliberately defied or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution of August 7, 2007, it was not the mere content of the articles that was in issue, but petitioner's conduct when he allowed himself to be interviewed in the manner and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC Resolution, on a pending controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While petitioner claimed that he was misquoted, he denied neither the said interview nor his picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm holstered at his side but simply relied on his objection to the hearsay nature of the newspaper clippings. It should be stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or respondent. He was under the administrative supervision of the COMELEC17 cralaw and it was incumbent upon him to demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had faithfully discharged his duties as dictated by law. His evasiveness and refusal to present his evidence as well as his reliance on technicalities to justify such refusal in the face of the allegations of fraud or anomalies and newspaper publication mentioned to the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order amounted to an implied admission of the charges leveled against him. chanroblesvirtualawlibary All told, petitioner brought this predicament upon himself when he opted to dispense with the presentation of his evidence during the scheduled hearings and to explain his non-appearance at the hearings of Task Force Maguindanao and the loss of the certificates of canvass and other election documents. chanroblesvirtualawlibary WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 177878 : April 7, 2010

SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR, Petitioner, vs. APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLE'S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB) Chairman, New Corella, Davao del Norte, Respondents. Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioner SPO1 Leonito Acuzar assailing the March 23, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77110. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the October 15, 2002 Decision2ca of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, Branch 31, which had annulled the Decision3ca of the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of the Municipality of New Corella, Davao del Norte, finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and ordering his dismissal from service. The facts are as follows: On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-014ca against petitioner before the PLEB charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondent's minor daughter. On May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of New Corella, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1712, for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act. On May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit5ca before the PLEB vehemently denying all the accusations leveled against him. In support thereof, petitioner attached the affidavit of complainant's daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person. On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit and a hearing of the case was conducted. The PLEB also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on August 9, 2000 for allegedly being dilatory. On August 17, 2000, after due proceedings, the PLEB issued a decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the respondent, SPO1 Leonito Acuzar, PNP New Corella, Davao del Norte Police Station GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse) which is punishable by DISMISSAL effective immediately. SO ORDERED.6 Immediately upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order7 with the RTC of Tagum City, Branch 31, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 384. Petitioner alleged that the subject decision was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard. He likewise averred that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. Petitioner pointed out that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the administrative case considering that the charge was actually for violation of law, although denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct. On September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the Philippine National Police (PNP) by the Chief Regional Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police Regional Office 11, effective September 7, 2000.

On October 15, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB. The trial court noted: xxxx But nothing in the record would show that the Board scheduled a hearing for the reception of the evidence of the petitioner. In a nutshell, the petitioner was not given his day in Court. The Board could have scheduled the hearing for the reception of petitioner's evidence and if he failed to appear, then the Board could have considered the nonappearance of the petitioner as a waiver to present his evidence. It was only then that the decision could have been rendered. xxxx The hearing at the People's Law Enforcement Board, although administrative in nature, has penal sanction of dismissal and for forfeiture of benefits of the petitioner. It is along this context that the petitioner should be afforded all the opportunities of hearing which principally includes the reception of his evidence consistent with our established rules. Due process of law embraces not only substantive due process, but also procedural due process. xxxx While this Court does not tolerate any form of misconduct committed by members of the Philippine National Police, yet it equally considers the right of the petitioner enshrined under the Bill of Rights and the deprivation of petitioner's gainful employment which is the economic life blood of the family, especially the innocent dependents.8 Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the CA. On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision reversing and setting aside the trial court's decision. The CA found merit in respondent's argument that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before the RTC was not the proper remedy because (1) appeal was available and (2) the issues raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact. According to the CA, the existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one (1) of the requirements for its availment is the absence of the remedy of appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. The CA ruled that petitioner should have appealed the decision of the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari before the court. The CA added that while it is true that there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, petitioner, however, failed to demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate resort to it. Thus, it held that the trial court erred in giving due course to the petition. Petitioner now assails the Decision of the CA in this recourse raising the following assigned errors: 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Certiorari was not a proper remedy [to assail] the Decision of the Respondent-People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), New Corella, Davao del Norte, because (1) appeal was available; and (2) the issue raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact. And that herein Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was accorded with due process before the Respondent-People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), New Corella, Davao del Norte, and was given his day in court for his defense.9

In essence, the issue is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner's resort to certiorari was not warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him. Petitioner contends that the petition he filed before the trial court was appropriate because the instant case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, the decision being patently illegal. Petitioner maintains that a conviction should have been first obtained in the criminal case filed against him for child abuse before the PLEB can acquire jurisdiction over his administrative case. He also maintains that the Board's decision was reached without giving him an opportunity to be heard and his right to due process was violated. The Board's decision having been rendered without jurisdiction, appeal was not an appropriate remedy. We affirm the appellate court's ruling. To reiterate, petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on the pretext that the PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted before the regular court. According to petitioner, although the case filed before the PLEB was captioned as "Grave Misconduct," the offense charged was actually for "Violation of Law," which requires prior conviction before a hearing on the administrative case can proceed. Thus, petitioner insists that the PLEB should have awaited the resolution of the criminal case before conducting a hearing on the administrative charge against him. The contention however is untenable. A careful perusal of respondent's affidavit-complaint against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent's minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.10ca It usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment.11ca On the other hand, "violation of law" presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance.12ca The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other.13ca In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.14ca The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975,15ca is explicit, thus: SEC. 43. People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). - x x x xxx (e) Decisions - The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided, That a decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision. It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari.16ca Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court. Moreover, for a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.17 For sure, petitioner's bare allegation that appeal from the judgment of the Board may not be adequate does not justify immediate resort to certiorari. Moreover, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.18ca Here, not only was an appeal available to petitioner as a remedy from the decision of the PLEB, petitioner also failed to sufficiently show any grave abuse of discretion of the Board which would justify his immediate resort to certiorari in lieu of an appeal. Contrary to petitioner's claim that he has not been afforded all the opportunity to present his side, our own review of the records of the proceedings before the PLEB reveals otherwise. The PLEB summarized its proceedings as follows: The Board issued a summon to SPO1 Leonito Acuzar on May 03, 2000 informing him of the case filed against him. On May 4, 2000, the respondent's wife Mrs. Arcella Acuzar made an informal letter addressed to the Chairman of the PLEB that the respondent cannot answer the summon because he was still in a critical condition in the hospital as alleged. After three days, May 9, 2000 the respondent through his legal counsel filed a motion for extension of time to submit counter affidavit. The Board received the sworn statement of the respondent on May 16, 2000. Subpoenas were sent to both parties informing them of the first hearing which was set on June 01, 2000; 8:00 a.m. at the SB session hall, New Corella, Davao del Norte. Then the Board set for a second hearing on June 15, 2000; 8:30 a.m. but the respondent's counsel moved for a postponement because he was slated to appear before the Regional Trial Court Branch 1, Tagum City of the same date and time; the third hearing on June 21, 2000; 8:30 a.m.; the fourth hearing on July 13, 2000, 8:30 a.m.; the fifth hearing on July 19, 2000, 9:00 a.m.; [and] the sixth hearing on July 26, 2000 [were] postponed because the respondent's counsel filed motions for postponement and to suspend proceedings pending resolution of criminal case before the regular court and the final hearing was set on August 03, 2000; 9:00 a.m. of the same place but the respondent walked out during the hearing because of the non-appearance of his legal counsel but the PLEB Members continued to hear the case without the respondent and legal counsel's presence based on sworn affidavit in the hands of the PLEB Members.19 In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence

submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.20ca In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had submitted his counteraffidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due process. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. Here, we note that petitioner had more than enough opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot claim that his right to due process has been violated. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77110 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 187752 : November 23, 2010 IRENE K. NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K. NACU, and NEJIE N. DE SAGUN, Petitioners, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, Respondents. Before the Court is a petition for review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated December 24, 2008 and Resolution[2] dated May 6, 2009. The assailed Decision held that Irene K. Nacu (Nacu), Enterprise Service Officer III at the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), assigned at the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ), was guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties. The case arose from facts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the following

PEZA officials (Administrator, Manager, Officer-in-Charge, Deputy Director Generals and the Director General) on any difficulties or problems they encounter, particularly those pertaining to lack of service-orientation or improper behavior of any PEZA officer and/or personnel.[3]cralaw Sometime in September 2001, Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation (EBCC) filed a complaint against Nacu for allegedly charging it overtime fees, despite Memorandum Order No. 99-003. Acting on the complaint, PEZA immediately conducted a preliminary investigation, during which Atty. Norma B. Cajulis, PEZAs lawyer, interviewed Rey Ligan (Ligan), a document processor at EBCC. Ligan attested, among others, that the overtime fees went to Nacus group, and that, during the time Nacu was confined in the hospital, she presigned documents and gave them to him. On November 21, 2001, Atty. Procolo Olaivar (Atty. Olaivar) of PEZA Legal Services Group requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to verify the genuineness of Nacus signatures appearing on the Statements of Overtime Services (SOS).cra[4] Original copies of 32 SOS and a specimen of Nacus signature were then sent to the NBI for comparison. On January 25, 2002, the NBI informed Atty. Olaivar that no definite opinion can be rendered on the matter since the standards/sample signatures of the subject submitted [we]re not sufficient and appropriate to serve as basis for a specific comparative examination. The NBI then requested that, should PEZA still want it to conduct further examination, it be furnished with additional standard/sample signatures, in the same style and pattern as that of the questioned document, appearing in official/legal documents on file, executed before, during, and after the date of the questioned document.[5]cralaw PEZA referred the 32 SOS, together with the same standard specimen of Nacus signatures/initials, to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory (PNP Crime Lab) for determination of the genuineness of Nacus signature appearing therein. In Questioned Document Report No. 052-02 dated May 3, 2002, Rosario C. Perez, Document Examiner II of the PNP Crime Lab, stated her findings, thus 1. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19, Q-20, Q-21, Q-23, Q-24, Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32 and the submitted standard initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked S-1 to S-19 inclusive reveal significant divergences in the matter of execution, line quality and stroke structure. 2. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q22, Q-26 and the submitted standard signatures/initials of Irene K. Nacu marked S-1 to S-19 inclusive reveal significant similarities in the manner of execution, line quality and stroke structure. x x x CONCLUSION 1. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19 to Q-21, Q-23 to Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32 appearing in the twenty-two (22) pieces [of] Statement of Overtime Services and the submitted standard initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked S-1 to S-19 inclusive WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON. 2. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q22, Q-26 appearing in the ten (10) pieces of

On December 17, 1999, PEZA issued Memorandum Order No. 99-003, prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees from PEZAregistered enterprises. The pertinent portions of the said regulation read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Effective immediately, PEZA shall provide processing/documentation services required by economic zone exportproducers for incoming and outgoing shipments x x x FREE OF OVERTIME FEES/CHARGES x x x. x x x Economic zone export producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders, truckers and other service providers and enterprises are strictly prohibited from offering financial and/or non-financial tokens, compensation, etc. to any PEZA official and/or personnel, in connection with PEZA overtime services rendered and/or other transactions. In addition, economic zone export-producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders, truckers and other service providers and enterprises are enjoined to notify ranking

Statement of Overtime Service and the submitted standard initials/signatures [of] Irene K. Nacu marked S-1 to S-19 inclusive WERE WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.[6]cralaw Finding a prima facie case against Nacu, PEZA Director General Lilia B. de Lima (Director General De Lima) filed a Formal Charge against her for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It was alleged that Nacu unlawfully charged P3,500.00 overtime fee from EBCC on ten occasions (covered by the ten SOS which the PNP Crime Lab found to have been written by Nacu), for a total amount of P35,000.00. Nacu denied that the signatures appearing on the ten overtime billing statements were hers. She averred that it was impossible for her to charge EBCC overtime fees as the latter was well aware that PEZA employees may no longer charge for overtime services; that she had no actual notice of Memorandum Order No. 99-003; and that she caused no damage and prejudice to PEZA and EBCC. During the hearing, PEZA presented the following witnesses: Rosario Perez, the document examiner who examined the SOS; Atty. Dante Quindoza, Zone Administrator of BEZ, who testified that Nacu was one of the officials authorized to sign the documents; Romy Zaragosa, Corporate Relations Manager of Covanta Energy, who attested that meetings were held on November 17, 2001 and January 25, 2002, wherein Ligan testified that he gave the payment for overtime fees to Nacu; Roberto Margallo (Margallo), Enterprise Service Officer III of PEZA, who testified that he knows Nacus signature and that he was certain that the signatures appearing on the SOS were hers; Omar Dana, EBCC plant chemist, who testified that EBCC paid, through Ligan, overtime fees to Nacu and some other persons; Elma Bugho, PEZA Records Officer, who testified on the issuance of PEZA Memorandum Order No. 99-003;[7] and Miguel Herrera, then Division Chief of PEZA at the BEZ, who testified that he was responsible for the implementation of PEZA rules and regulations and for assigning examiners upon the request of zone enterprises and brokers.[8]cralaw On February 8, 2005, the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation, and Discipline (CBIID), with the approval of Director General De Lima, found Nacu guilty of the acts charged, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline (CBIID) 1. resolves that Irene K. Nacu committed an act which constitutes a ground for disciplinary action and finds her guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct[, and conduct] prejudicial to the best interest of service pursuant to Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and hereby 2. recommends that respondent be dismissed from service pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV, Revised Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in Philippine Civil Service with accessory penalties of:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a)cancellation of eligibility; b)forfeiture benefits; and of retirement

On February 19, 2007, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 070327, affirming the CBIIDs resolution, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, the appeal of Irene K. Nacu, former Enterprise Service Officer III, Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 08, 2005 issued by Director General Lilia B. de Lima finding Nacu guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and disqualification from being re-employed in the government service is AFFIRMED.[10]cralaw Nacu filed a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 070327, but the motion was denied in Resolution No. 071489 dated August 1, 2007.[11]cralaw Nacu forthwith filed a petition for review with the CA, assailing the CSC resolutions. On September 17, 2007, while the case was pending resolution, Nacu died and was substituted by her heirs, Benjamin Nacu (husband), Nejie N. de Sagun (daughter), and Ervin K. Nacu (son), herein petitioners. The CA, in the assailed Decision dated December 24, 2008, affirmed the CSC resolutions. The CA could not believe Nacus claim that she was not aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003, considering that the order was issued almost two years earlier. According to the CA, as a PEZA employee, Nacu had the obligation to keep herself abreast of everything that transpires in her office and of developments that concern her position. It stressed that even if Nacu had not actually received a copy of the memorandum order, such circumstance will not foreclose the orders effectivity; and that it is merely an internal regulation which does not require publication for its effectivity.[12]cralaw The CA brushed aside Nacus objections to (a) Ligans written statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during the hearing; (b) the PNP Crime Labs findings for being unreliable in light of the NBIs own finding that the samples were not sufficient; and (c) Margallos testimony identifying Nacus signatures on the SOS, on the ground that he was not presented as an expert witness. The CA pointed out that proceedings in administrative cases are not strictly governed by technical rules of procedure and evidence, as they are required to be disposed of summarily. In particular, the CA found pointless Nacus criticism of the PNP Crime Labs findings based on the NBIs opinion on the samples given. To counter the same, the CA highlighted the fact that the NBIs opinion did not conclusively state that the signatures were not that of Nacu. It stressed that Nacu failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to contradict the PNP Crime Labs findings, relying merely on the NBIs opinion which, to the mind of the CA, did not actually absolve petitioner. According to the CA, Memorandum Order No. 99-003, the PNPs findings, and the witnesses testimonies, taken together, were sufficient to hold Nacu administratively liable for the acts complained of. Nacu was not denied due process, considering that she was given the opportunity to explain her side and present evidence, and that she had, in fact, participated in the hearing. The dispositive portion of the reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary assailed CA Decision

c)perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service.[9]cralaw Nacu moved for a reconsideration of the CBIIDs findings, but the motion was denied. By way of appeal, Nacu elevated the case to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). cra

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[13]cralaw A motion for reconsideration was filed by Petitioners, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution[14] dated May 6,

2009. They then elevated the case to this Court through this petition for review on Certiorari. Petitioners submit to this Court the issue of whether the finding that Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioners arguments focus largely on the weight given by the CA to the PNP Crime Labs report, which, they insist, should not be given credence as it is unreliable. Firstly, it was not shown that the questioned document examiner who examined the SOS was a handwriting expert. Secondly, the signature samples were, according to the NBI, insufficient references for a comparative examination. Thirdly, the sample signatures used were obtained in violation of Nacus right against self-incrimination. And lastly, the report merely states that there were similarities in the manner of execution, line quality, and stroke structures of the signatures, and that such conclusion does not translate to a finding that the signatures appearing on the SOS are genuine. Petitioners also object to the CAs reliance on the statements made by Ligan during the preliminary investigation, which were not given under oath. They contend that Nacu was denied due process when Ligan was not presented as witness during the trial, and that there were inconsistencies in Ligans statements. And finally, as an affirmative defense, they reiterate that Nacu was not aware of the issuance and implementation of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They point out that there was, in fact, no showing that the said order had been published in a newspaper, posted at the BEZ, or a copy thereof furnished to Nacu. We find no merit in this petition. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings, means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[15] The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.[16]cralaw Overall, the testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made by Ligan during the preliminary investigation, and the findings of the PNP Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS, amounted to substantial evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that Nacu was guilty of the acts complained of. Petitioners allegations of unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies of the evidence neither discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu. For one, petitioners cite the PNPs findings as unreliable in light of the NBIs opinion that the samples utilized by the PNP Crime Labthe same samples submitted to the NBI were not sufficient to make a comparative examination. We do not agree. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the findings of one are not binding or conclusive upon the other. Moreover, as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment, the NBIs finding referred only to the insufficiency of the samples given; the NBI did not actually make a determination of the genuineness of the signatures. While the NBI may have found the samples to be insufficient, such finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime Labs own findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of the signatures found on the overtime billings matched the sample signatures. The difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of the samples could only mean that the PNP Crime Lab observes a standard different from that used by the NBI in the examination of handwriting. Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Labs findings, Nacu should have channeled her efforts into providing her own proof that the signatures appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all, whoever alleges forgery has

the burden of proving the same by clear and convincing evidence.[17] Nacu could not simply depend on the alleged weakness of the complainants evidence without offering stronger evidence to contradict the former. In any case, the CA did not rely solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in concluding that the signatures appearing on the ten SOS were Nacus. Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu, also identified the latters signatures on the SOS. Such testimony deserves credence. It has been held that an ordinary witness may testify on a signature he is familiar with.[18] Anyone who is familiar with a persons writing from having seen him write, from carrying on a correspondence with him, or from having become familiar with his writing through handling documents and papers known to have been signed by him may give his opinion as to the genuineness of that persons purported signature when it becomes material in the case. [19]cralaw Petitioners also posit that Nacu was denied her right against self-incrimination when she was made to give samples of her signature. We do not agree. The right against selfincrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection does not come into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at the appropriate time, or else, it may be deemed waived.[20] In the present case, it does not appear that Nacu invoked her right against self-incrimination at the appropriate time, that is, at the time she was asked to provide samples of her signature. She is therefore deemed to have waived her right against self-incrimination. Next, petitioners assail the credibility of Ligans statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due process when she was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan. It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[21] In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the non-presentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity to crossexamine the said witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held that the contention was unavailing, stating that In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating that the petitioner therein could not argue that she had been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing Casimiro v. Tandog, 459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[22]cralaw The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies.[23]cralaw In addition, petitioners claim that there were inconsistencies in Ligans statement. While Ligan allegedly stated that Nacu gave him pre-signed documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that these pre-signed documents referred to the ten overtime billings referred to in the formal charge, the record does not show that Nacu was confined in the hospital on the dates indicated in the said billings. To set the record straight, Ligan did not specifically mention that the dates indicated in the pre-signed documents were also the days when Nacu was confined in the hospital. He merely said that Nacu pre-signed some documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that she gave these documents to him. Neither did he state that these

pre-signed SOS were the same ten SOS cited in the formal charge against Nacu. It was petitioners own assumption that led to this baseless conclusion. In Nacus defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of the existence of Memorandum Order No. 99003. They aver that there was no evidence showing that Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be said that the order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the BEZ. Petitioners claim that Nacu had, in fact, no actual knowledge of the said order as she was not furnished with a copy thereof. Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the said order. As correctly opined by the CA, it is difficult to believe that Nacu, one of the employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum order, was not in any way informedby posting or personal noticeof the implementation of the said order, considering that over a year had lapsed since it had been issued. From the testimonies of the other witnesses, who were employees of PEZA and PEZAregistered enterprises, it was evident that the prohibition against charging and collecting overtime fees was common knowledge to them. At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take effect. Memorandum Order No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that clearly falls within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from the publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing case of Taada v. Hon. Tuvera:[24]cralaw Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.[25]cralaw At the very least, Nacu should have been aware that collecting payments directly from PEZA-registered enterprises was strictly prohibited. Months before Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was promulgated, PEZA had already put a stop to the practice of collecting direct payments for overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises under Office Order No. 99-0002 dated March 8, 1999. The latter specifically provides that overtime shall be paid only through the regular payroll system, and that overtime claims shall be supported by the required documents.[26] This was followed by PEZA General Circular No. 99-0001 (Prescribing New Rates of Overtime Pay Payable by Zone Enterprises, Customs Brokers And Other Entities Concerned) dated August 10, 1999, providing that 4.5. All payments to be made by requesting parties shall be covered by official receipts. IN NO CASE SHALL PAYMENT BE MADE DIRECTLY TO ZONE/PCDU PERSONNEL. 4.6 No additional charges or fees shall be paid by requesting parties, nor shall they offer gifts, tips and other financial/material favors to PEZA employees rendering overtime services. 4.7 At the end of the month, all claims of personnel for payment of overtime services shall be supported by the following documents:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 4.7.1. Copies of written requests enterprises and other parties; 4.7.2. Certificate of service or DTR; 4.7.3. Authority services; and 4.7.4. Certificate [27]cralaw to of render overtime by

Petitioners desperately argue that Nacu could not have charged and collected overtime fees from EBCC as it was well aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. The contention is puerile. Petitioners are, in effect, saying that knowledge of the existence of a rule prohibiting a certain act would absolutely prevent one from doing the prohibited act. This premise is undeniably false, and, as a matter of fact, judicial institutions have been founded based on the reality that not everyone abides by the law. All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and penalized with dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties. The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. [28]cralaw Nacus length of service or the fact that this was her first offense has not been clearly established. We cannot reasonably take them into consideration in reviewing the case. At any rate, these circumstances cannot serve to mitigate the violation, considering the gravity of the offense and the fact that Nacus act irreparably tarnished the integrity of PEZA. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 24, 2008 and its Resolution dated May 6, 2009 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

accomplishment.