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Summary
High developed-country debt burdens can only be reduced via some combination of four approaches: austerity (preferably spending cuts rather than tax increases), economic growth, inflation (via devaluation), or default. We analyse which routes are most likely to be taken by the major problem countries (Table 1 below). The 21 July euro-area summit eased terms for Greece, but not enough to restore debt sustainability. The summits endorsement of a formal Greek default, at Germanys insistence, will keep investors nervous. A major concern is that there is barely enough money on the table to fully cover Spain, let alone Italy, if market contagion resurfaces. Germany is very unlikely to accept a full fiscal union, but the current muddling through approach may not be enough unless Spain and Italy can quickly reduce deficits and boost economic growth. A disorderly combination of defaults and euro (EUR) exits would be a major new shock to the world economy, although the results might not be as serious as in 2008-09. Asian countries are relatively well insulated. There are increasing hopes that US debt-ceiling theatrics might yield a significant fiscal agreement, though US politics are unpredictable. We are confident that, over time, the US will reverse the upward trend in its debt ratios, primarily through a combination of austerity (particularly spending cuts) and economic growth. We have similar confidence about the UK, where progress is already being made. Japans route to fiscal sustainability is hard to discern. It has a large budget deficit and anaemic growth and deflation, yet we view default as highly unlikely. We expect that a combination of austerity and inflation (via devaluation) will be the answer. Table 1: Likely importance of each route to debt reduction Countries will probably use more than one
Austerity Cut spending, raise taxes Medium High High Medium Medium High High Medium Growth Requires reform and investment Low High Low Low Low Medium High High Inflation Requires devaluation Very possible Possible Possible Likely Very possible Possible Limited Limited Default Easier if losses borne by foreigners Certain Very possible Possible Very unlikely Very possible Possible Very unlikely Very unlikely
John Calverley, +1 905 534 0763
John.Calverley@sc.com
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Germany France Italy Spain Netherlands Belgium Greece Ireland Portugal Euro area
2 498 1 948 1 548 1 051 586 352 232 157 171 9 172
75.9 86.8 120.2 69.7 66.6 100.5 150.2 107.0 88.8 86.5
-2.7 -6.3 -4.3 -6.4 -3.9 -4.6 -7.4 -10.3 -4.9 -4.6
-0.3 -3.5 0.2 -4.6 -2.2 -0.5 -0.9 -7.5 -1.6 n.a.
52.8 64.4 47.0 49.6 66.4 68.3 61.5 59.4 56.7 n.a.
63.9 69.5 56.5 90.2 130.4 54.5 62.1 124.9 107.5 66.0
2.5 1.8 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.8 -3.0 0.9 -1.0 2.0
4.6 -3.4 -2.7 -3.8 6.8 2.0 -8.0 1.5 -8.0 0.0
10.7 10.3 8.6 9.1 11.4 14.1 10.2 10.3 8.2 n.a.
Sources: Bloomberg, EU Commission, ECB, CEBS, BIS, IMF, Standard Chartered Research
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We still think Spains fiscal position is better than Italys and the market is coming around to our way of thinking
In another report, published last year, we argued that the long-term fiscal sustainability of Spain is better than Italys (On the Ground, 19 May 2010, Europe Spain, Italy default risks are low). Although Spain has a larger deficit and more problems in the private sector, with the collapse of the construction market, it also begins with a far lower debt ratio (70% at end-2011 versus 120% in Italy) and seems more capable of regenerating economic growth. The markets were not seeing it the same way then, with Spains spreads and CDS significantly higher than Italys. As recently as mid-June, Spain was paying 4.8% on 5Y government bonds, while Italy was paying only 4.0%, versus Germanys 2.2%. However, in the last week, Italian and Spanish yields converged above 5%, though yields have since fallen back to 4.75% and 4.95% respectively. They are still below the 6-7% level which would be unsustainable over the long term, but not comfortably so.
EFSF may be too small now to fully cover Spain; certainly not Italy
With more money agreed for Greece, and possibly more needed for Portugal and Ireland the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) now has enough funds to provide liquidity to Spain for only a year or so if market borrowing costs become too high. The additional flexibility for the EFSF agreed at the summit means that the available money could be used for financial support without a formal programme and also for debt purchases, a welcome change. But the EFSF urgently needs more funds. To have enough to cover all of Spain and Italys borrowing requirements until 2014 (new borrowing plus rollovers) would require the EFSF to double or even triple in size. However, since neither Italy nor Spain could contribute if contagion returns to Italy, the burden on France and Germany would be correspondingly higher.
Chart 2: Euro-area periphery stock markets sag Stock indices seen the October 2007 peak
150 S&P_US (Oct 5 '07=100) DAX_Germany (Oct 5 '07=100) IBEX_Spain (Oct 5 '07=100) MIB_Italy (Oct 5 '07=100) ASE_Greece (Oct 5 '07 =100)
100
50
0 Oct-07 Apr-08 Oct-08 Apr-09 Oct-09 Apr-10 Oct-10 Apr-11 Sources: Bloomberg, Standard Chartered Research
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There is still a possibility that contagion will not return. If Italy and Spain could inspire more confidence in policy and generate a real improvement in the coming months, markets might calm down. But it is hard to be optimistic given the scale of the problems and the difficulty of generating stronger economic growth, especially in a climate of uncertainty. Meanwhile, the risk of a backlash from taxpayers in Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and elsewhere remains. Is some form of global bail-out possible? The US and UK are both very concerned about the European crisis and it is a threat to China and the rest of the world too. So perhaps more funds to supplement the EFSF could be put up by the IMF, the US or even China, which might at least avoid Germanys difficult choice for now. One problem is that the IMF is always regarded as a preferred creditor even though it is not formally senior; the US and China might demand seniority too. This means that investors would continue to see lending as risky and the markets would likely not re-open until countries could substantially improve the debt outlook. The question remains: Can countries restore growth and reduce debt burdens, or will their lack of competitiveness together with political pressures as austerity fatigue mounts get in the way?
Chart 4: Government finances out of line Total government outlays and total receipts 2011
Total tax and non-tax receipts % 55 50 IT 45 40 35 30 30 35 40 45 Total outlays % 50 55 60 SW US SP JP GE IPA IR GR UK FR
UK
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In practice, the likely fast pace of the unfolding collapse, together with political differences and anger about who is to blame, may make this difficult to achieve. Departures from the EUR would create considerable market uncertainty, with worries about how many countries might leave and even whether the EUR might be abandoned altogether. The EUR would inevitably decline sharply against other currencies. Markets will also be concerned if the European single market, the centre-piece of the modern EU, is itself under threat. It would be important therefore that, despite what would undoubtedly be a tense, chaotic process, Germany and France held together in emphasizing that EUR exits are a step back for European integration, not the end of the process. We fully expect that the EUR would continue, even if it was reduced to a rump of countries centred around Germany and France.
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If Greece and others in the euro area are eventually forced to abandon the EUR, it will be very difficult for governments to service their debt in EUR; most likely it will simply be redenominated in the new currency (an effective default to the holder). But some financial institutions and commercial borrowers may find that they are locked into EUR-denominated debt and so will face distress. Eventually, devaluation paves the way for an economic recovery (provided it does not lead to an inflation/devaluation spiral), as Asia showed in 1998-09 and Argentina in 2003 onwards, but it takes time.
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Third, large banks benefit from an implicit sovereign guarantee, at least to some extent. The guarantee has been explicit in many countries since 2008, though in theory it is slowly being withdrawn. But if doubts emerge about the fiscal sustainability of the sovereign, then bank borrowing costs naturally rise. Bank stocks fall too, making new equity harder to raise. Stock markets in all the euro-area periphery countries have been falling in recent weeks, led down by banks, and are still well below their 2007 highs, in contrast to Germany and the US. As last weeks bank stress tests revealed, many banks in Europe (not just those that failed) are sparsely capitalised and not well-insulated from a major recession or upset, which is far more likely if the sovereign is in trouble. Fourth, difficulties for banks and doubts about sovereign backing reduce interbank funding. Banks in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and to some extent Spain have faced difficulty in obtaining overnight or other very short-term funding from international banks for some time. They have had to resort to borrowing from the ECB, making the ECB itself very uncomfortable. Italy may now face the same problem, so ECB lending there is likely to rise very quickly. The fifth problem, which faces euro-area banks only, is that if depositors begin to question the commitment to remaining in the single currency, they will move money out to banks in Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg or other havens. Most of it will stay in EUR, so there is no exchange-rate implication, in contrast to old-fashioned capital flight from emerging countries. But this outflow reduces the funding available to banks and forces them further into the arms of the ECB. Not surprisingly, most banks are likely to respond by reducing their balance sheets, which implies less credit and money in their economies. The euro area no longer publishes money supply on a country basis, on the argument that it is not meaningful in a single currency area. However, since country banking systems are still largely separate and, in any case, outside banks are unlikely to be actively lending into the periphery countries in the current environment, the drop in money and credit aggregates is a drag on the economy.
Austerity
Austerity means raising taxes and/or cutting spending. Research is clear that fiscal adjustments in the past have usually worked better when the balance is heavily towards cutting spending. However, this may partly reflect the fact that countries with fiscal crises in the past have usually already had a relatively high tax take from GDP. Both Japan and the US have long taken only about 30-33% of GDP in total tax revenues, much lower than in Europe or Canada, so a case could be made that there is more room for tax increases in those countries. However both theory and practice also suggest that higher taxes do slow a economy by reducing work incentives. This can be mitigated by focussing on taxes on spending (VAT and duties etc), and reducing income tax exemptions rather than raising rates. But this is often hard to do politically. In Britain, top tax rates were raised sharply by the outgoing Labour government and the coalition has felt unable to reduce them.
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Where there is less agreement is on the extent to which fiscal tightening slows economic growth in the short term via the Keynesian demand route. Keynesians, particularly prominent in the US, argue that, just as a fiscal stimulus can be expected to boost growth temporarily, fiscal contraction has the opposite effect. Others argue, that the so-called fiscal multiplier is small, or even negative in some countries. Moreover, since tighter fiscal policy improves private-sector confidence, it can therefore encourage economic growth, despite its direct effect on aggregate demand. This latter view is widely held in the US on the political Right, but among policy makers is more common in Europe. Easy monetary policy can offset tight fiscal policy In our view, the key is the balance of fiscal and monetary policy. There are plenty of examples historically in which fiscal contraction has not brought weak growth, but this always seems to be because monetary policy was loosened simultaneously (lower interest rates and a lower exchange rate). In the 1930s, for example, the UK government ignored Keynes and tightened fiscal policy aggressively. But Britain almost simultaneously left the gold standard, which enabled it to cut interest rates and devalue. The economy grew strongly in the following years and unemployment steadily fell. The UK repeated this pattern in both the early 1980s and the early 1990s, as did Canada in the mid-1990s. The key is that while fiscal policy was tightened sharply, interest rates were simultaneously lowered and currencies allowed to depreciate, helping to boost economic growth. However, with interest rates already very low, there is no room for further cuts. There is also uncertainty about the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy such as quantitative easing (QE). In this authors view, QE works and can be an effective offset to tightening fiscal policy. QE in Japan from 2001-05 was followed by Japans strongest burst of growth for more than a decade and deflation eased. QE seems also to have worked in the US and UK in 2009-11 in supporting recovery. In all these cases, the effects worked through higher asset prices and a weaker exchange rate, exactly as would be expected in the transmission of an easy monetary policy. But it is impossible to be sure of the importance of QE in generating these recoveries versus other factors such as a natural cyclical bounce or faster growth elsewhere. We have only limited experience and this assessment is controversial. A key problem for countries remaining in the euro area is that there is absolutely no possibility of independently easing monetary policy or devaluing. Indeed, as already noted, the outflow of funding for the banking system tends to reduce both monetary and credit aggregates and monetary policy is effectively tightened. Even low interest rates may not be low in real terms, if tight fiscal policy brings deflation, as is possible and may even be necessary if they are to regain lost competitiveness.
Growth
Strong growth makes countries both more able and more willing to service debt Economic growth works to lower debt ratios by increasing the denominator (i.e., GDP). Of course governments need to contain the numerator (debt) too by reducing the deficit. But growth indirectly works to alleviate debt crises by creating employment and income growth, which ensures that the population is content to keep servicing debt. It also makes markets believe that the debt is more likely to be fully serviced, creating a virtuous circle as interest spreads or premia come down, improving fiscal sustainability.
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The key to generating faster economic growth is a combination of reforms and investment. The most important reforms are usually tariff reduction, labour market reforms, measures to heighten product competition and privatisation. Reforms sometimes hit investment in the short term as businesses must realign to the new realities. More often though, over time, they generate new opportunities and new enthusiasm. Some economists also put considerable emphasis on Keynes idea of animal spirits, the need for business to feel optimistic and willing to take risks on new investments. Fiscal crises are an opportunity for reform since, in the midst of crisis, governments and people often accept the need for radical change. Business as usual just wont do. But exactly how it plays out in each country depends on political developments. A new government with a strong mandate can sometimes achieve major change. A weak government or one that is perceived as partly to blame for the crisis may face more difficulty. Sometimes too, measures to control the fiscal deficit may go against reform and investment for example, higher tax rates or reduced government infrastructure investment.
Inflation
Arranging for inflation to erode debt burdens is harder than sometimes supposed, though it would work for EUR members if they exited Under certain circumstances, inflation can help to improve debt ratios. But this depends on the country having a relatively long maturity of debt and then generating unexpected inflation. If the inflation is expected, it will already be priced into higher bond yields. The success of this strategy also depends on the response of the central bank. If the central bank reacts to higher inflation by quickly raising short rates, shortterm funding costs will rise, as will long-term bond yields. The government may be able to pay off its longer term debt over time in devalued money, but its funding for new debt will limit the gain. If the central bank is slow to raise rates, either because it judges that inflation will not persist or because it is not independent, then the debt ratio will come down faster. In our view, euro-area countries could relatively quickly improve their debt ratios by devaluing and inflating. This would come at the expense of debt holders both domestic and foreign. Since so much debt in euro-area countries is held by foreigners (50-70% in most of the problem countries) this option may appear attractive to voters. On the negative side, the hit to foreigners would naturally cause some ructions. Greece, for example, receives an estimated EUR 5bn annually in EU grants and subsidised loans which might be at risk. Moreover, as noted above, leaving the EUR is not likely to be the first choice for politicians because the costs are front-loaded. The extent of the improvement in debt depends on how much a country devalues and, indeed whether it can quickly regain control of money. The Argentine peso (ARS) devalued initially by about 75% in 2002, before recovering slightly to about a 67% decline. Indonesia saw a similar devaluation after the Asian crisis. If Greece followed the same trajectory, it could push its government debt down to 50% (from 150%) in a matter of months, though it might also need to inject more capital into the banking system. For the US, inflation is a much less sure route to improved debt ratios. Currently, interest rates are extremely low, with 10Y UST yields under 3% and bill rates at nearly zero. But the average maturity of debt is relatively short at about five years. So unless inflation rises rapidly and significantly, it is hard to make a dent in the
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debt ratio. An IMF study found that five years of inflation at 6% p.a. versus an expected 2% rate would cut the US debt to GDP ratio by only about 9ppt at the end of the period (IMF, February 2010 Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the PostCrisis World). In fact, creating a sudden burst of inflation of this magnitude would be quite difficult. It is much easier to imagine a degree of inflation creep; for example, inching up to 3% and then perhaps 4% over several years, rather than a sudden leap. But this would have only a small effect in reducing debt.
Default
Default is not an attractive option for countries that still have a net new borrowing requirement Default is usually not so much a strategy as a last resort. As already noted, if foreigners take much of the hit, the domestic political and economic costs are lower, though there may be other implications. One of the major problems with default is that it usually prevents new borrowing, at least for a while. For countries which still have a net borrowing requirement (like Greece now) this forces a rapid adjustment and may add to the pain. It is partly for this reason that we expected Greece to avoid any hint of default until 2013-14, by which time it should have reduced its borrowing requirement. Indeed, this seems to have been the strategy at least until recently, but Germany insisted on forcing a default. Fortunately for Greece, new finance is still being provided. The long-term results of default also depend very much on policy after this. If the country still follows poor policies, including undisciplined fiscal policy, lack of structural reform and poor monetary policy, then the economy may still struggle to do well and the international credit markets may stay closed. If, in contrast, the country follows a textbook adjustment programme it will likely quickly achieve strong economic growth and renewed access to the markets. Of course, since it is the failure to follow a sound adjustment policy in the first place that leads to default, such an outcome is unusual.
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Time is a critical factor for Ireland. If any further contagion to Mediterranean countries can be delayed to 2013 or later, Ireland may be able to move out of intensive care by then, avoiding both a chaotic default and EUR exit.
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significant role in reducing the debt burden. However, this is admittedly a somewhat speculative scenario; others might argue that the increasingly elderly population will strongly resist higher inflation. We struggle to see any other way out.
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an increase in taxation will also be required over the medium run, with the US tax share in GDP one of the lowest in the OECD area and, over recent years, 2-3ppt below 1990s levels. But Republicans are adamantly against tax increases and Democrats are anxious to defend spending. Last years mid-term congressional elections sent a strong message that people want the budget fixed, but the politics appear unusually polarised. We are hopeful of a large package being agreed over the next week or two. If not, the next chance for a full assault on the problem will likely come in 2013 after the presidential elections. Either Barack Obama will be re-elected and, as a second-term president, have an incentive to fix the problem to secure his place in the history books, or, a Republican will be elected and will likely pursue fiscal virtue forcefully (though the recent run of Republican presidents have not been particularly good at this). The US is very conscious of its declining relative status in the world and most Americans make a direct connection between the need to solve the budget problem and national strength and pride. We are optimistic that the adjustment in the US will also benefit from strong growth over time. Near-term, we still see the aftermath of the housing bubble as holding growth back, but this should dissipate over time. Then we expect the superior dynamism of the US economy to once again shine through, supported by relatively good demographic prospects from immigration (in comparison to Europe and Japan). As already noted, inflation is unlikely to play a significant role in controlling debt. The Feds five-year forward breakeven inflation rate (calculated from the TIPs yield curve) currently forecasts inflation of about 3% in five years time. This is higher than today and above the Feds informal 2% target, and could be about right. But it will not help much with reducing the debt burden.
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Disclosures Appendix
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