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A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE GROUND
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
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~es~n
4 June 1993
A Plan for the Reduction of U.S. in Europe
6. AUTHOR(S)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
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GROUND
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Army
B.A.,
1979
Kansas
release;
distribution
is
unlimited.
Name of Candidate:
Henry M. St-Pierre
Thesis Title: A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Approved By*
X.William M. Connor,-M.A.
B.A.
, Member, Consulting Faculty
T. James E. Swartz,
Ph.D.
A"O
_,
Director,
Graduate Degree
Phip
Brookes,
Ph.D.
Programs
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ii
ABSTRACT
A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND AND AIR FORCES EUROPE by MAJ Henry M. St-Pierre, USA, 99 pages.
IN
For the past forty years, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies on our national security had forced the U.S. to take a direct role in the defense of Europe. This commitment required the U.S. to permanently station large numbers of ground and air forces in Europe to deter against the threat of a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. Since 1989, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has changed the security paradigm which governed our military posture since 1949. American focus has now turned inward to devote time and resources to the domestic agenda foreseen by the Clinton Administration. This turning inward has forced military planners to relook the need to station a large number of forces overseas. A major point of this look is our need to station a large number of forces in Europe. This thesis will study the feasibility of reducing our ground forces from one full up Corps to one Corps headquarters with selected CS and CSS assets intact, one division and one air assault brigade. In addition, Air Force strength would be reduced to two composite air wings. The total number of combat forces stationed in Europe would be between 70,000 and 75,000 personnel. Accesion For NTIS CRA&I DTIC lAB Unanrtounced Justification
El
By ................ ............ ..................... Dit. ib !tio; I Availabiiity Codes Dist Avail av dlor Special
ED' I
iiiC
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis would not have been possible without the help of John W. Douglass, Brig Gen, USAF (Ret), former Deputy United States Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee who, during many long discussions, planted the seed for this thesis in my head. Equally responsible are Mr. William Connor, LTC Ken Osmond, and LTC James Swartz without whose help, time and forebearance, this thesis would never have gone beyond the idea stage.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE APPROVAL PAGE ......................................... ABSTRACT ............................................. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................... CHAPTER 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. INTRODUCTION .................................. REVIEW OF LITERATURE .......................... RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................... ANALYSIS ................ ..................... 1 8 34 39 68 85 91 93 99 ii iii iv
ENDNOTES ............................................. FIGURES .............................................. BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The rise of the Soviet Union as a superpower and as our chief post-war rivals sparked, up to 1991, perhaps what has been,
one of the greatest and most divisive military The question was, who
would be responsible for striking the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in Force with its the event of war? Would it be the Air
large fleet
This argument pitted the competition for limited winners' expensive the
compromise that gave us our deterrence strategy. Since then, complete withdrawal by 1995, Treaty, events such as the promise of the of the Soviet forces to its own borders Europe
Forces in
immediate war between the two blocs has regressed ever more to unlikeliness.
once again,
anchored the crucible of debates within the defense establishment. At stake are the dollars that will be used
to build the military structure which will safeguard our national interest into the 21st century. ultimate
question of how to build up the military to face the growing Soviet threat, this debate centers on how to reduce meet our national security in a world which has no large
the military structure and still objectives and treaty commitments clear-cut
military establishment. Like all debates, hand, the Chairman, this one has two sides. On one
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former in spite of all the the
maintain a large military presence overseas and a worldwide strategic deployment capability. These forces,
represented by the four services on permanent or temporary overseas deployment, would serve to reassure our friends of to support of those enemies
friendly governments and convince our potential that the U.S. contend. is still
These large deployments also would insure our thereby continuing to support our 2
influence overseas,
Further,
provide for forces close to potential trouble spots. the event of trouble,
be moved quickly to enter nations which require our help--recent examples are Somalia and Saudi Arabia. These
capabilities are seen by the Chairman as key to safeguard the nation's national security requirements The threat as it existed before 1989, in the future. and the need
to protect Western European democracies from the Eastern threat, was the basis by which the U.S. It designed its force Now the
structure.
Western
leaders and NATO strategists have admitted that the Soviet Union, and its successor state, the Confederation of no longer poses a threat to the
survival of a free and viable Western Europe. The counterpoint team in this debate, logic of the reduced threat, is using the
view of the decline of the worldwide threat and the small residual risks, we should now reduce our overseas presence or even all, of our overseas
by the reduction in defense spending could be used to finance the domestic programs envisioned by the new administration and, of course, of the deficit. 3 contribute to the reduction
In
withdrawal
of
the size of
point of view.
can probably be done quickly and without adverse effect on readiness. however? This lack of threat brings up the third point in debate--the affairs. issue of U.S. is: involvement in the What would be the U.S. risk by such a move,
The question
preventing a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe has been fulfilled and its its forty year mission has been complete, usefulness? Do the present domestic of all or part of the forward has
the withdrawal
deployed force? Directly tied with the preceding question the reason for stationing U.S. essentially disappeared, is why, if
a forward deployed corps and separate air force permanently stationed in central Europe? The next question, is: in this case the
restructured, should it
be capable of doing?
Nowhere else this does debate affect in our relationship Because resolution dealing in
in
of it
our overseas
with our NATO allies. no definitive lies, arena, is, like in in answer, the
there is
discovery this
compromise
study. that
the main
question
into the next century, areas security vis-a-vis fend for introduced earlier. interests Europe?
They are:
of the United States for the near term That is, should we let our NATO allies security needs
or should we stay
issues which face them today and what is and threats forces in in it that Europe? still for us if we do?
Second,
viable
those tasks,
suited to meet future needs? already announced U.S. contribution to station force
continue
need to project force without taking NATO into consideration, or should it tailor its force representation
to a force better suited to deal with a new NATO with an evolving mission based on a new strategic concept? Central to this study is America contributes to NATO, overseas bases, the controversy of how much
of closing domestic military bases while maintaining a large number of overseas bases. a way in still This study, then, may show
plan would have three purposes: will to remain engaged in European allies; presence in it
maintain a headquarters that could support a rapid expansion should the need occur. In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis then, be to be is
based on the following concerns: our national NATO; (3) interest in Europe;
(1) the need to secure (2) the risks which face and (4)
the future missions NATO might take up; remain in the U.S.
force structure
chapters of this
thesis
will
investigating
these concerns.
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW The purpose of this chapter is and determine what the literature questions outlined in include official documents, to survey literature
government documents,
semi-official
interviews, articles.
security documents published by the administration and 1993, military strategy documents,
testimony taken as evidence to support the feasibility reducing the defense budget in against our national facing our NATO allies.
part of the Senate confirmation hearings for Secretary Aspin will also be surveyed to help determine the new administration's direction on national issues. security and defense
Following semi-official
products and interviews of subject matter experts. products include Ph.D. dissertations and monographs
issues.
strategic force planning which could affect the outcome of this paper. All the written products from the experts involved
when dealing with issues which involve our European Allies. The last major source used to do research was These articles, are helpful much like in
the written products discussed above, providing background recently written, information.
information as to the specific problems of force reduction and ally concern with those potential The first U.S. reductions. in
into isolationism
much the same way we withdrew after the two previous excursions into European affairs must the U.S. during this century or building the
the national
security goals of the Reagan and Bush administrations had been to continue deterrence and rontainment against an overwhelming Soviet threat worldwide. a strong and active U.S. participation This policy mandated in European affairs. in Central and
were clear indications that new policies dealing with C&EE nations would be needed. In part President Bush's National 1993 recognized this change security
strategy would be the support of growing democracies, maintaining free markets, partners, competition with our economic
survival was based on the need to contain communist our new focus would be to safeguard our economy
aggression,
by insuring the safety of our markets and the acquisition of potential new ones in the emerging C&EE democracies.
These goals clearly indicate the need to remain engaged in European affairs. This view was the basis for
recommendation of a
10
however,
to encourage democracies
home and abroad."2 President Clinton's views on the importance of the domestic economy were echoed by Secretary of Defense Aspin during his confirmation hearings when he stated, new era, our first foreign priority and our first
.. . "3
"In
this
domestic
These statements
indicate that the focus of the Clinton like its predecessor's economy. later goals, would
administration,
the method to be used to achieve the goal. Whereas the Bush administration would have focused
to in.1uence foreign markets through direct the Clinton philosophy will rely in less on
direct participation
include infusion of funds on the domestic scenes and sanctions and duties on imports. 11
The question,
then,
is
development of overseas democracies and maintain our influence over our overseas markets? On this question, to NATO, David Abshire, former Ambassador
states that the way to insure the growth of "to ensure cooperation and cohesion among the
4
democracy is
In his opinion,
Asia. Ambassador Abshire is not the only one who in Europe. Institute
a tendency to want to disengage from direct participation in European affairs in the future. Huisbourg believes this
national
which might occur tied with our need to maintain to influence western European economic affairs, liberalism
in
engaged in
Huisbourg also points out that the ability to crisis situation is Europe.
to react
not the only reason to maintain The rise of the European community as and monetary system makes it
influence in
the development of European affairs.$ should the U.S. Alliance, served. withdraw its
the interest of the nation would not be well He cautions, however, that such a presence should
be smaller and tailored for a different mission than what the force, even in a smaller form we have today, Europe. is
7
of the
a NATO body
responsible for the formulation of policy dealing with reserve officer augmentation to the NATO and SHAPE staff, states in National an article of the Reserve Officers Association "the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
American security role Johann Holst, Rand Corporation, NATO to keep itself
states that not only does the U.S. in the European arena;
as long as there
9
to remain engaged. 13
The urge to remain involved in is the only way to keep the U.S.
engaged
Obviously, presence in
the argument for maintaining a strong military NATO is neither unanimous nor should it be our
only vehicle for contacting and influencing our European allies. Many suggest that greater participation in such One
(CSCE).
discuss security issues involving European specific security issues. The problem with this it is forum is that,
neither formal authority nor power to enforce any of its decisions. Clearly, all of the above sources realize the presence in Europe. is What the
however,
root issue for our need to maintain influence in Europe--stable and growing markets for our goods. As stated in fall Pact, the introduction to this paper, the
and the subsequent transformation of the all-powerful have forever changed the In designing a new force, the
Confederation
potential
to
reemerge as a threat against the Alliance. must also examine other sources of risk The first risk to be examined is in
the CIS.
the better descriptions of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union was presented by Zbigniew Brezenski, National Security Advisor to President Carter. former
He described
the Soviet Union as having suffered a complete collapse of not only its system. political it is system but also of its a nation economic
As such,
what of the threat of the former Soviet troops remaining in Germany? What is the possibility of CIS senior military or Also,
between the Urals and western Russian borders? In answer, NATO intelligence planners see ro chance planned withdrawal
that the CIS or Russia will stop its from German territory. leadership's ability Steinbrunner,
Director,
"For
aggression."1" 15
Finally,
the Russian western border and the Urals, of Defense Cheney stated in Congressional
the remaining force will be cut from 115 divisions to 60 divisions. The reduction of these forces by almost half impossible for them to launch any offensive
would make it
moves against the West without mobilization of their reserves. Such reinforcements would then provide warning own efforts.1 2 He
surprise attack against the West have clearly changed. explained that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,
coupled
with the signing of the CFE treaty has removed the option of the CIS changing their its plans by stopping withdrawal of
The CIS would now have to deal with nations, the Czech and Slovak Republics, would be neutral
This neutrality would make covert movement of troops westward impossible. Indeed, NATO planners no longer judge attack
This relationship has been changed by the withdrawal Soviet Union and the turning
own problems.
This withdrawal
has left
a vacuum in
security assurances to those nations that were once covered by the Soviet umbrella and its security would be guaranteed. guarantee that their That is now gone. NATO heads
of state and governments declared during the Rome Conference stability in 1991 that NATO would help provide needed new
security partners.1
in
from becoming threats as described earliEr.1 6 As already mentioned, might face are the residual control of nuclear weapcris, nations accepted others, and, the future risks the Alliance Russian military force, loss of
into the Alliance while not accepting the divergent cultural and social
finally,
past forty years and have now come to the surface. example is the instability in the former Yugoslavia.
An
17
The risks described above and the promise of stability offered by the Alliance with its Trans-Atlantic
link are why the former Pact look at NATO for help.'' To take the point further then, how will the The
Alliance set the minds of the Z&EE nations at ease? future European security picture, still reflects some concerns. although
looking better,
Western planners that the possibility of military attack on NATO territory revolution in is small. The possibility of military not, however, beyond the realm of Deputy and
Russia is
possibility.
On this subject,
Sergei Rogov,
stated that the future of the CIS lies in The first is that the armed
forces of the CIS will be under control of a central authority. This would be similar to a strong federal power over a unified
terms of control
the military would be under no central as the number one military power in 18
the region,
leading voice in
this situation with the relationship of the U.S. NATO allies. The last,
He gave this plan a 30% chance of success and least desirable situation, has a 60% chance
of occurring.
a total disintegration of any central total loss of control of the military.' As time and events have shown, predictions
Rogov's pessimistic
that the former Soviet Union would completely military would be under no control
have not materialized and are not likely to. Does the inability of the CIS to launch an unwarned attack on the West mean that NATO planners should not worry? The answer is an emphatic no. NATO must still look
eastward with a wary eye because the break-up of the Soviet Union has now caused the controls it to disappear. placed on its allies
fragmentation of not only the Soviet Republics but also artificially created eastern European nations such as These breakups have caused the case of Yugoslavia,
repercussions have included military incursion into neutral aoid Alliance nations and refugee influx into much richer
20
testimony before the House Armed Services Stephen Biddel stated that the transformation of Eastern
Europe to market economies might also be a catalyst for civil war. This is especially true in view of these times
on the Alliance's
southern flanks have not been missed by NATO's military planners. Indeed, this year's REFORGER exercise calls for corps from the central region to
The preceding evidence has concentrated mostly on the dangers of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. and its allies
These are not the only dangers the U.S. face. tier There is
nations that a major south-to-north immigration flow littoral in states. Indeed, this
flow has already started happening France, in turn, Germany, and Belgium.
nations such as
nations.22 In his confirmation statement to the Senate Armed Secretary of Defense Les Aspin pointed 20
Services Committee,
out that,
in
the
the Russian and Ukrainian Another risk to the well nuclear blackmail made
possible by the loss of control of weapons of mass destruction owned by Russia and the Ukraine.2" This portion of the survey indicates that the threat posed by the former Soviet Union has clearly and some say, forever disappeared. That disappearance has, however,
The next area worthy of examination in new U.S. force structure for NATO is
designing a
a massive land based attack which NATO members armed forces to counter, has gone away. if This has
not controlled,
becomes how can NATO best handle the risks described above? Before this can be answered, it is useful to
is,
of course,
The
security
security problems in
the Conference on Security and Confidence and the role it can play in solving
Europe (CSCE)
regional
security risks.
The third is
Community (EC).
The help these emerging groups could provide has also been noticed and commented on by former Secretary of State James Baker when, in November 1991, he inferred that of which
only a network of European security institutions, NATO was but one, "whole and free."
would be capable of supporting a Europe The EC and the CSCE would also have integrating the East into the
4 would
This statement clearly indicated that the U.S. look at other organizations to help gain and maintain stability trends, in Europe. In
22
crisis
peacekeeping,
traditional
Aspin stated, at it
This indicates a willingness on the part of the new administration to let NATO, under if it its own authority or with to accomplish
so chooses,
structure needed to accomplish such a task is functioning under one body. without precedent in Indeed,
recent history.
Russia during the winter of 1991 was managed by NATO even though the Alliance was not the proponent agency. The
alliance provided the in-country expertise and much of the infrastructure to support the operation, charge. Crisis management is NATO. not the only viable mission for with their in peacekeeping, civil unrest, but it was not in
individual
non-combatant
support of national
authorities who
23
This mission,
given to NATO to handle as the executive agent. NATO? According to Ambassador James Goodly,
former
negotiator on CFE and START and Ambassador to Finland, because NATO is the only organization in existence which
has the military force and infrastructure capable of carrying out the various missions from peacekeeping to war. Four types of peacekeeping missions the Alliance could be trained to accomplish are: I. Humanitarian missions. These missions would
include organizing and shipping foodstuff and medicines under hazardous condition. 2. or conflict 3. Border patrols or patrols of buffer and zones Observers in situations that contain some risks
demilitarized 4. harm in
Again none -ifthese missions are without precedent for NATO forces. As already discussed, NATO infrastructure missions during
provided support to the Russian food relief the winter of 1991-1992. Presently, 24
Force Mediterranean,
under UN request,
is
patrolling off
the Yugoslavian coast to enforce the UN sanctions against the region. The problem with the above stated new missions and priorities its is simply that NATO is neither organized nor are Indeed, NATO is it to
Ambassador Goodly and others emphasize that if survive and develop beyond its "metamorphose"
present structure,
must
into an organization
troops for such peacekeeping missions as quickly as possible. 2' There can be little literature doubt that much of the
available on the subject of NATO's future Alliance develop the does not role and
strongly supports the idea that the force for these future missions. emphasize is its
What it
concerns between the West and C&EE nations. this literature organize itself also does not discuss is
25
U.S.
domestic political
effect on the
future U.S.
Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev began unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, political that the
leaders and think tank specialists have advocated Alliance in general and the U.S. in
by reducing equal
forces from the Alliance arsenals. coupled with new treaties, domestic agenda, on defense. Since early 1991,
reduced tensions,
Services Committees have been looking at ways to reduce defense spending in view of the new posture in Europe. In
an opening statement before the House Budget Committee, Committee Chairman Leon Penetta stated that the spending plan agreed to by the Bush Administration would not achieve the promised reduction in spending promised by both the
Executive and Legislative branches during the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. He stated that, in order to military
Chairman Penetta,
in
that same
also set the stage for further defense spending "We cannot afford to waste our
26
In
the October 1992 edition of the Reserve National Security Report, President
Association Journal
budget by 60 billion dollars from the proposed Bush budget by 1994.32 He also stated that in the future, the U.S.
would have to fight as part of coalition and to do that "We must also be able to fight effectively on our own," necessitating basing a larger part of our forces in U.S.3" 1993, Kohl, in This belief was confirmed when he, a joint thus the
on 27 March
100,000 troops
administration's policy force a return of forces from Europe, it but may well cause the floors agreed to by the This
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 to become ceilings. would reduce the defense budget even more.35 This
expected change and the new administration's attitude on basing more forces in the continental U.S. will obviously
Europe.
from 350,000 to the present number of 150,000, the size of the forces overseas be?
To do that, we need to
27
examine what JCS Chairman Colin Powell suggests the total future force should look like. The force envisioned by General "Base Force." First, it This force is Powell is called the
must be able to deter aggression mounted both interests and those of our allies with whom we
against U.S.
have treaty obligations. the deterrence affect U.S. allies. presence. Second, Third,
This study will concentrate on forces would have for our NATO
the force must be able to project forward it must be able to respond to world-wide in Europe. Lastly it must
crisis--again,
Contingency forces,
and finally,
maintenance of the nuclear force. Concentrating specifically on Europe, those forces, First, that is, the Atlantic forces, Powell, what would be able to do?
according to General in
deterrence
Europe is
still
present in
Europe.
3 7
36
large numbers,
deterrence is
large amount of
stationed forces but by the idea that the commitment to return in In the event of problems is there and believed. John Steinbrunner is to
states that,
wait for a major invasion mounted by some unforeseen threat, that force need only be small.
38
Others,
such as
Stephen Flanagan,
former Deputy Director of Foreign Policy insist that the less visible
identified more with the old status quo than the new realities. He states that large forces represent because they lead to quick reaction which, is dangerous for crisis heads" and time to
destabilization
which "cool
defuse the potentially dangerous situation must be the primary considerations. earlier, In their article mentioned
Patrick Garrity and Sharon Weiner specifically is not dependent on the presence of a particular theater
to be effective.
force would be used to support a policy effective as having a force present in precedent for such a thought is The entire theory behind U.S. on the idea that if against the U.S. kind. The fact that the U.S. respond to an attack in made it present
theater.4 in
nuclear deterrence
or its
kind is
of nuclear weapons since the capability to use the force is there. The same can be said for our own use of such the Korean War. The thought
weapons against North Korea in that Russia would retaliate certainly played a part in
we used them
prevent the perceived threat of Chinese intervention into the Indo-Chinese theater in 1954.41 Whether or not the
threat actually prevented Chinese intervention can only be surmised. The point is that the threat of American we had the capability to employ
The same situation can be said about Europe or anywhere else the U.S. has commitments. As long as we back our
30
promises with the possibility of action, deterrence. The second point General
then we have
mission for the forward deployed base force is presence. For the past forty years,
overseas force and the maintenance of a large number of war stocks (POMCUS) in Europe. Again, Garrity and Weidner They
state that forward presence can be achieved by offsetting a smaller permanent representation forward with greater temporary participation U.S. in military exercises in which the
invest in done in in
and participate
indeed,
there is
attack or any serious threat against U.S. then should the U.S. so what should it suggestion, of the U.S. maintain any force in
be able to do?
As a partial
answer and
Johann Holst suggests that the future mission military in Europe should be to participate
31
within the NATO framework to work missions: 1. substantial 2. undeniably 3. Provide a cadre presence in
to do the following
for reconstitution
of a attack to be
for US forces
the remaining
he estimates that
43
a force of
be needed.
that in
The continued
development and emerging power of the Economic Community makes it critical in that we maintain some form of visible presence that participation in the
presence
Europe--a
CSCE or the UN cannot provide us. This chapter has also showed that which we built our defense structure, that the threat is for a
to contain
no notice attack by Soviet Union and Soviet supported Central and Eastern European nations, This threat has, is no longer credible been replaced war, that, if
instead,
include possibilities
of civil problems
ethnic unrest and ultra-nationalism--all left unchecked, could spillover Such a spillover
into otherwise unaffected could then Qause the unsuited for missions
of NATO forces--forces
32
-ired--that
is
peacekeeping,
humanitarian
management. internal
politics have mandated the restructuring of forces to be more in line with the changing economic realities, have made it Europe, as well
albeit in
needed to cope with any problems which may occur. this chapter has demonstrated how the four
Finally,
supporting questions should go into making up a new force structure for the United States fo- participation within the NATO alliance. The questions are: what is what are our threat that
the changing
faces NATO; and what are the possible future missions for the U.S. military within NATO and the domestic politics
33
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCG METHODOLOGY The purpose of this chapter is to map out the
methodology of how the primary and secondary questions will be answered. The assumptions, definitions, be established. limitations and In addition, be
This type of study does not lend itself quantitative method of research. It does,
to a allow
however,
for a qualitative model with a subjective analysis of the material included in the literature and interviews.
The withdrawal
of Eastern and
Central European countries will continue unabated. (3) Central and Eastern European nations will
34
(4)
will not change. The above mentioned assumptions are based on fact and current trends. Initial research has discovered no those assumptions or indicates
Research has also provided some useful definitions. They are as follows:' (1) Forward Deployed forces: Forces deployed outside in peacekeeping,
their national
boundaries to participate
or alliance commitments. (2) Forward Presence: The influence one nation has power the former is willing to
use to maintain that influence. (3) nations in Collective Defense: The joining by several
defense of both nations should those nations come under direct attack (NATO). (4) nations in Collective Security: The joining of several
forum may or may not have an executive agent for discussion and conflict resolution (5) European Pillar: (UN or CSCE). Informal reference made to a
which as a
35
body,
uniquely European military structure. (6) Central and Eastern Europearn Nations (C&EE): The
nations include all former Warsaw Pact nations plus all republics which made up the former Soviet Union. Because this project deals with such a dynamic subject, research. certain delimitations have been placed on the Those limitations deal with the time frame from be drawn. Because this thesis deals
the recommended force and command structure which should be placed in Europe. Methodology Whatever the force and command structure selected, they must be able to meet four criteria. First, the force security the
and command structure must support the national goals and national interests of this nation.
Second,
36
U.S. its
has articulated
the U.S.'s force structure must be able to support the Alliance's new roles and missions. deployed force, then, The U.S. European to
operate independently
Fourth,
the new force and command structure must be capable of supporting U.S. unilateral military action while still size of the
meeting the needs for reduction of the overall U.S. active duty military strength. The proposed solution will
be arrived at by
subjective analysis of the primary and secondary source material already discussed in Chapter 2 and the analysis of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will
that material
to be presented in
describe the three options for recommended force structure and the two recommendations for the command structure. Chapter 5 will also make the recommendation as to which the U.S.
requirements for the near future based on the above mentioned criteria. In addition, Chapter 5 will also
outline some recommendation for future studies. This chapter also has discussed how I will research
information to answer the primary and secondary questions. It has also described the assumptions governing the This chapter has defined terms certain terms to be Limitations and 37
thesis.
delimitations governing the thesis research have also been outlined. Also described in be used in this chapter are the criteria to
38
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS Chapter 2 of this thesis concentrated on providing a survey of the literature on what has been written about the This
four questions used to support the primary question. chapter will analyze the information provided in answering the primary question, should the U.S. which is:
terms of
What forces
Evaluation of the former and present administration policies and statements on security and national makes it interests
Both administrations agree that the demise of the Soviet Union has changed our security interest focus from a single direction based on the need to contain Soviet expansionism to the need to counter a number of smaller problems caused by regional instabilities. is how to handle the change
and how to focus on their new security strategy-strengthening our economy. The Bush administration was in. European affairs by
influence
in
This
to our ability
partial disengagement
the more pressing domestic problems but it ability to influence the EC. The possible withdrawal in
of substantial
U.S.
presence
Europe begs the question'of why we saw a need to get in European affairs than we already
were immediately after World War II. The greatest concern of hostilities immediately after termination
could be demobilized and brought home. concern for the post war events in
and the USSR together as the great gatekeepers of European security. As events turned out, this situation of peaceful
coexistence did not last. Conditions in post war Europe were rife with the
advantage of these conditions and started supporting civil wars in Europe by bolstering communist inspired revolutions could exploit civil "Mr. 40 unrest. Not even on a State
wherever it
X telegram,"
Department memorandum outlining the steps that should be taken to deal with Soviet expansionist government concern itself Soviet aggression in declaration ideas, did the U.S.
with how to deal with growing It was not until the precipitated by recantation
Europe.'
Britain's abandonment of Greece and the later of its assumed responsibilities that the U.S.
Europe's freedom,
role as the guarantor of European security. Up to and including the Greece and Turkish civil wars, the U.S. role in helping the beleaguered governments in the role of advisor and money Plan That
provider--functions amply demonstrated by the Marshall and the deployment of advisors to Greece and Turkey. role was forced to change, first Berlin Crisis in however, as a result of the the passive
1948.
At that time,
a policy
which would evolve into containment, dealing with the Soviet threat.
to be the only useful method to hold back Soviet expansionism. With that, the Washington Treaty of 1949, defense a
treaty based on the already existing mutual Brussels Treaty signed by the UK, Netherlands,
was Article 4.
would be considered an attack on all. guaranteed that the U.S., involved in European affairs, with its
vast resources,
Altantic link.
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had started--the direct involvement of the U.S. in European affairs. Thus, the
American commitment to deterrence and containment has been, since 1949, its its one overriding defense concern and Europe
major focus. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Empire, the U.S.'s
national
security interests were directly challenged by the by the Soviet gone and the
likely to take a more "laid back" attitude in it must not give the impression that the on the well both the
European affairs,
government no longer believes our interest lies being of the continent. 3 As mentioned earlier,
Bush and the Clinton administration although the U.S. reduced threat in
indicated that,
fully realized the implication of a Europe and elsewhere, it was still in the
U.S.'s interest to support the development of new and emerging democracies in the C&EE nations. in
The reasons for support of those emerging nations their effort to achieve stability purely political fourth is reasons, are fourfold. Two are
the third is
prevent the rise of conflicting economic, political alliances which might pit against another.
defense,
as a repeat of the same situation which precipitated the continent into its In Surope, First World War.
4
view of the above stated need to integrate all of take the responsibility to The partial in
the second reason why we must remain engaged In our last three major involvement in
European
intra-European
disagreements.
a greater autonomy for our Western European partners. attitude has helped build a certain amount of credibility which gives the U.S. a neutralist appearance.
This neutral
The third reason why we need to stay in purely economic. Nations of Western Europe are, If
Europe is as a group,
43
then we could deal with them on a bilateral are not however. Western Europe has bound
basis. itself in
They a
community of nations which unites all of their individual economies into one economic power, organization NATO. make it in in which the U.S. the EC. It is an
The potential markets of the emerging nations also imperative that we maintain a significant presence
Europe is
the resurgent feeling of mistrust between the' This situation published in is best described in an
National
This article,
Corps may be reviving some age-old rivalries three major European powers--Germany, Britain. The article
France and Great reemergence Europe will This tends to apprehensive. among the
as the leading economic and military power in place it in position of dominance in Germany's principal the EC. rival,
allies at worse and dominance of the EC by one power at best. This situation would probably serve to make the EC a for either control of its markets of
44
If could
this is
permitted to continue, in
lead to instability
Western Europe.
disadvantageous
to the U.S.
as an economic block is
single most important reason why the U.S. engaged national stability in European affairs. In
needs to remain
interest was equated with the need to maintain in Europe since this stability was needed to
access to markets.
For this
Western European nations together as a This block makes Europe the single has. It is an
has little
influence except for the common participation and the EC by many EC members. If
Europe through the EC channel. It Europe.$ 45 is essential then, that we maintain a presence in
In
is
importance
to
must first
be understood
a nation based on a market economy which we must guarantee those as a nation depends which to conduct
Survival in
on a stable, business.
prospering environment
The future potential of markets is reason why we must maintain presence is to be believed, it is in
Europe.
instability
can throw the entire continent into turmoil. draw us into those same continental and Second World the U.S.
Wars serve to remind us of what can happen if removes itself affairs.$ from active participation in
European we then
By maintaining a presence in
Europe,
and influence can only be maintained'through an active support of NATO. The preceding sections have shown that participation in NATO is critical to support our national interest in
NATO was,
however,
an organization
born of necessity to provide for members against a lerge It has become more and more
to justify
support, an organization whose members see little ever being used for its original if purpose. there is
no threat,
why
with a capable military force that has an intention towards its is neighbor.'
0
unfriendly
definition it to NATO.
Europe is
Using Huisbourg's definition of threats is say that there are no risks, in Chapter 2, however.
not to
As already discussed
Europe abounds in
controlled if
the emerging C&EE nations are allowed to we (the United States) want
ultranationalism, persecution,
paragraphs are,
real concerns. 47
terms of stability
if
possibility of aggressive action on the part of Russian forces, forces still if present a certain risk of uncertainty, economic
Russia is
On this
subject,
means that as long as Russia maintains its world as a nuclear and conventional should never be discounted."' power, it
position to the in
As such,
benefit of the Europeans to keep the U.S. European affairs. Russian strength. This engagement will
engaged
serve to offset
The preceding paragraphs have discussed the fact that the situation requiring NATO's large standing military force, East, that is, the danger of imminent invasion from the The danger of general conventional
war has been replaced by dangers brought about by emerging nations who, frustration for the first time in forty years, can vent
means.
that is
has made it
possible for
right wing factions to gain popularity. Should these right wing groups be allowed to develop any type of power base, political the U.S. there exists a real danger that the is necessary for
governments which could become even more protectionist in their attitudes towards free markets.
12
The preceding portion of the chapter has focused on the need of the U.S. exists in Europe. to safeguard the liberalism which key for a growing
to national
security. then,
way to influence the rmajor economic powers in vehicle to do that is Because NATO is critical that the U.S. NATO.
it
is
General
answered that the Alliance's new mission was old one-that is, to provide for the "community of
13
To be sure,
remains the same and that the Alliance can continue its way of doing business without looking at the changes European security needs. Such a limited view of the to obsolescence in
Alliance's future will probably doom it since domestic politicians, elusive peace dividend, will
for a large military force whose effectiveness against the risks described earlier is suspect. simply put, still remains
the fact that the Alliance's way of doing Prior to the fall its of the Soviet
defended
military force poised at the border ready to defend against a conventional Now, invasion from the east.
14
The concept,
adopted in
November 1991,
is
of changing the structure and missions of NATO's forces from a static single, defense based on the need to defend against a mobile and forces.
multi-directional
Powell's assessment is
to guarantee Western Europe's freedom through mutual What is different is the way in which NATO must
defense.
guarantee that freedom. That guarantee, ways. The first some suggest, its will come from three role of The second management and
will be in
traditional
deterring any remote possibility of attack. will be by providing for.a forum for crisis the establishment of closer ties former adversaries. The last
NATO's forces for peacekeeping.'$ First, on the issue of deterrence, Johann Holst phenomena which
17
does not remain constant but changes over time. security environment in over time. In Europe is
The
order to deter,
has already been shown that NATO's planners no longer consider Russia or Ukraine capable of launching an unwarned attack against the west. If that is 51 the case, then, the
maintenance of a large standing force every member's resources. When the Soviet Union had a
is
a useless drain on
military force ready to defend against that force, bolstered, no doubt, by the large nuclear umbrella may have deterred the potential
does the same force provided the same The answer for NATO is that such a
amount of deterrence?
than an advantage.
large force provided deterrence attack, in that same force may This
perception evolves from the fact that NATO's forces although smaller in capability. number, still represents a deep strike
This perception could push former Pact nations intentions and might push those by
former C&EE nations into defense structures which could, their very existence, lead to renewed mistrust between
18
to become less
sought a way to reduce the threshold of war between the two alliances by adopting a doctrine which would render neither side capable of launching a sustainable attack onto the others territory.
19
dubious since it
Since the situation has now changed and the C&EE NOD
nations are looking for ways to reduce fear of attack, may be an idea whose time has come. The second mission NATO should be able to do in
the
future was suggest by then Secretary of State James Baker in 1990. Realizing that the status quo would need to he suggested a new security architecture for the He specifically
change,
called for giving NATO a structure that would be able to accomplish two missions. be in One, the Alliance would have to
division by being responsible for new programs such as arms control verification and responsibility for dealing with
53
regional conflicts.
Baker's recommendation to expand the Alliance's role to include verification would not be difficult. operations would require little Such
verification teams needed to support this mission could be placed in Brussels or SHAPE where the infrastructure is already present. Along with verification, an additional role
envisioned for NATO's future was articulated by the NATO Heads of State and Ministers in Rome in meeting, 1991. At that
the heads of state clearly outlined two paths for The first required the Alliance to
facilitate the liaison relationship between NATO and the C&EE nations by inviting them to participate meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). meetings, in expanded These
Council (NACC),
forum in which they can voice their concerns over issues which concern all of Europe. If Secretary Baker's verifications and peacekeeping the forces required
to do those missions are much different than what is available to them now. For the purpose of treaty and 54
not a combat force but teams made up of experts with an infrastructure capable of
deploying and supporting them. Acceptance of Baker's second suggestion, peacekeeping, however, If is more controversial. If it chooses to so,
for such missions. Although the new administration has not specifically addressed these new NATO roles and missions, Clinton's belief, as stated by both him in President
various speeches
his confirmation
indicates that he would support these new it would require more allied
deploy to Europe's
It
is critical then,
that
before NATO can get involved in peacekeeping mission in Europe, it must do so under CSCE or UN auspices. the
reluctance of some NATO countries to get involved in military operations outside of NATO territories. Indeed,
Germany's constitution forbids such a military operation. In order for the alliances out-of-area operations to be successful, all nations must agree to participate to their
2 capabilities. '
As for the peacekeeping force, there are several advantages to NATO playing a major role in such activities. First, again, the logistics infrastructure
needed to support such an operation is already in place. Second, the command and control requirements, is already in place. like the
infrastructure,
like its
action should the Alliance be requested to participate in peacekeeping. The force to be used would be the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).
The second result of the Rome Summit was the articulation of the New Strategic Concept and the creation of an ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. This multi-national force,
made up of units from various members of the Alliance, commanded by a British officer, 56 is to be NATO's
multi-national lethal.22
force,
designed to be flexible,
mobile,
and
The force is
made up of ten divisions plus other It is with this force that if the Alliance Such
or,
the Alliance's
interest to conduct peacekeeping operations. The ARRC came into being in October 1992. It is to
be NATO's force for rapid reaction and contingency missions within ACE area of responsibility. As such, it is to be
The significant difference between the old corps level organization which existed in NATO prior to the that, before,
individual members of the Alliance were responsible for providing the corps structures, personnel. equipment, C2, and
responsible for providing 60% of the corps structure versus 100%. The UK will provide
headquarters
all C2 assets down to divisions slated to make up the corps. their Member nations providing divisions will provide own logistics,
2
C2, 4
57
does not provide any peacetime forces divisions which make up the It has committed itself,
to providing one of the six divisions which would combat power during times of crisis. the
division would presumably come from the forward deployed V Corps. A key aspect not fully discussed for the corps is the question of its ARRC is however, air support. The air component for Lhe
a German responsibility. it
As of October 1992, in
organizing
problems,
issue of the force's capability. The future Rapid Reaction Force (AIR) to perform three functions in first is that it must be able The
superiority if area.
The second is
and battlefield
However,
present some significant problems for the force. problem is the force's ability Presently,
superiority.
equipped with third and fourth generation air suited for air
French do possess a very capable aircraft 2000 C. has, The problem with the French aircraft
so far,
Given the reluctance of the French to entangle itself NATO military operations, is questionable.
'of air-to-air
capability available to all NATO nations is Britain has the capability to deploy like the F-16, its it
neither the newest nor the best available aircraft superiority missions.
for
Germany does not presently have defense fighter capable of aircraft such as the MIG 29,
an airplane available to most former Warsaw Pact nations. Germany's own fleet of MIGs require logistic support from a be supporting the opposition
26
the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). is 59 that it has not yet been
flight
tested and presumably will not be ready for field built F-22 is
The second mission the Rapid Reaction Force (AIR) must be able to perform is battlefield in interdiction. The UK, close air support and In this area, the European are
better shape.
capable airframe in
other nations have F-16s capable of performing limited (daylight/clear weather) to fixed wing aircraft, would be used in BI and CAS missions. In addition
the deep strike and CAS missions. 2' forces have attack helicopters in
adverse weather and limited visibility. The third function the NATO air able to perform is theater-wide airlift. component must be Again, although their
many NATO nations have a limited lift C-160 and C-130 fleets, those aircraft
capability in
are limited in
number and are incapable of carrying oversize cargo. The last airpower addition, is their problem which the Europeans have vis-a-vis lack of stealth and EW capability. French and British AWACS, in the
Alliance has very limited airborne C3 capabilities. The Alliance's air component is ability to fight and sustain itself 60 in key to combat. the ARRC's Yet it has
several
The answer to NATO's problems lies in The first is that NATO nations
possible solutions.
spend a tremendous amount of resources to build the capability they need. every effort The second is engaged that NATO must make in Europe by taking can offer to the
The final consideration to be looked at in our contribution to NATO is force structure look like?
designing
what will the remaining U.S. The answer to this question can emphasis on
the demise of the Warsaw Pact have made the threat against the U.S. less likely, Congress has wanted to reduce the seen as useless in view
of the lack of a credible threat due of its non-deployability. The primary consideration of the size for the future military force is force. This is for a smaller, more readily-deployable
Senate Armed Services Committee when he stated that the military of the future should be "flexible enough to do a 61
large number of simultaneous smaller contingencies.'30 Earlier, while writing in Reserve Officer he stated that he did
Association National
Security Report,
not believe the American people were willing to spend $250 billion a year for a military which, was incapable of operation contingencies" meaning, war.
3
in
generally,
clear that future missions will depend of light forces which can rapidly Such
embarked
Marine Amphibious Brigades and the Army's 101st and 82d divisions. These suggestions are a clear indication that the active duty heavy forces will be reduced in strength and a the
greater emphasis will be placed on heavy forces in national guard and reserve for sustained combat
32
operation.
The question
is
by how much,
and what
effect will that have on the forces dedicated to Europe? Some experts suggest that the active force can safely be reduced to ten active divisions seven of which The
would be army units and three would be Marine Corps. total Air Force active strength could be as low as 10 62
33
it
can
along
with the Army's 82d Division and the 101st Division would be the nation's contingency force. These units would be
charged with rapid deployment and forced entry missions. These light, quickly deployed forces would then be the
augmented by the remaining heavy divisions based in U.S. The final likely to remain, structure? To recap then, vital Europe. question, then, is
interests for the future remains tied to a stable This stability is required for the U.S. In turn, to be able
European markets.
depends on
maintaining an atmosphere in
have demonstrated that work must be done to preserve that environment and that preservation of that atmosphere must be our number one priority. the EC is our chief rival, Such must be the case because a rival in which its members can
form an economic block against the U.S. block in which the U.S.
economic block--a
have no formal
representation
Chapter 4 has also demonstrated that the primary purpose for NATO, the threat of war caused by an As such, they
expansionist Soviet Union has disappeared. are no longer a threat against the Alliance.
The single
monolithic threat represented by the former Soviet Union has been replaced, not dealt with, however, by a number of risks, which if being
These new risks include the dangers of civil wars in the newly emerging nations caused by ethnic and religious unrest, traditional border disputes kept under control by
and wars caused by the sudden change These acts of violence and their root themselves, but they do not have
the chance of spreading to the richer more stable western nations. The danger represented by these wars is that mass
immigrate to those
movements could precipitate a movement away from the economic liberalism which has characterized the end of the Second World War.. 64 Europe since
it
needs
incapable of launching a surprise attack against the west at this time, still retains enough conventional and nuclear
forces to make them the largest European military power. These facts make it engaged in essential for the U.S. aid in to remain
European affairs--to
advantageous for the Europeans to keep the U.S. European affairs forces. The third factor in missions of U.S. forces in
engaged
determining the role and the NATO of the future will Again, that is be
the Alliance future roles and mission. showed that NATO's past raison d'etre,
of Western Europe against the massive invasion from the East, is gone. With the disappearance of that danger has the
Baker who outlined three main missions the Alliance should be in position to do are deterrence, management, treaty verification Obviously, the
and crisis
and peacekeeping.
force required to complete those above stated missions are far different then the force required to fight a 65 large
scale conventional
war.
The
fighting a large war to its new missions is articulated in its new strategic concept as outlined in the Rome Summit of 1991. Also identified earlier is the vehicle the Alliance is, the ARRC.
One of the key concept to the rapid reaction force must be its capability to rapidly deploy and fight once deployed. Finally, the last factor that was examined in
Chapter 4 which will have an impact on our contribution to NATO forces must be the availability of U.S. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the administration is forces. the atmosphere
combined with the lack of a viable threat will make it difficult to support a large force permanently stationed in Europe. This belief will cause a substantial downsizing of With the majority of those remaining versus forward deployed in
structure to support NATO be? In conclusion, it is evident that the national its capability to maintain It is also clear
is
tied to its
the new potentially great markets which exist in emerging democracies of the East make it
essential
we support NATO as it
a structure designed to deter aggression against its members or its that will C&EE neighbors. The vehicle in which to do
military structure
designed to defeat the Warsaw Pact but a new Multi-National Corps guided by the new Strategic Concept.
67
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this deployed U.S. chapter is to select a European Whatever the force and
outlined in
that will be discussed are primarily Army and Air forces. Navy and Marine forces afloat are excluded from the total count because those forces are not permanently assigned to U.S. forces stationed in Those criteria safeguarding U.S. for the national Europe. The force must be capable of interest and continue to provide the force must be a credible it must support the in Eastern
are: national
security;
and the force must be able to work within the At the same
framework of the NATO's new Strategic Concept. time, will it should provide the additional
The first
what is
Europe?
The answer
that the force needs to be large enough to allow the to make a contribution which is perceived as equal to or it must
U.S.
or greater then any single other of our allies be of sufficient capability to be seen as critical Europeans ability
to the
Since all evidence suggests that the military forces will undergo severe downsizing in the near future, the NATO
will not depend on the deployment of overwhelming U.S. forces but will depend on the U.S. ability to provide the
Alliance certain capabilities Which they are not able to provide themselves without substantial These capabilities unique to the U.S. financial costs.
the European nations overcome their critical and lack of capabilities described in As discussed in capability to deploy, Chapter 4, in
Chapter 4.
attack and observation helicopter capability which can be found in brigades. the U.S. divisional and corps level aviation
By deploying a corps level headquarters with its the U.S. would be able
to provide those attack and observation capabilities for the ARRC to be an effective force. Another asset critical
2
needed
to the ARRC's deep strike the ATACMS. The ARRC's could would
requirement for this system suggests that the U.S. either sell the missiles to the British which, require expenditure of resources on their part,
again,
or the U.S.
could make units equipped with MLRS available for use by the ARRC. In addition to army combat assets the U.S. could
alleviate other shortcomings such as EW and C31 systems in the European force structures. in the corps' MI brigades in These army assets are found
electronic collection and jamming systems. assets are normally found corps level. If the U.S. were to make these critical in
assets
This would insure that we could maintain our NATO therefor Europe. the forces
Europe must be able to perform four essential First, they must be able to deploy out of
theater to places such as the Middle East or any other out of area region to support the CJCS plans and contingencies. 70
also be able to support the theater CinC by providing the capability to conduct combat operations independent of other NATO forces, they must be large enough to maintain they must be able to protect the
military contacts program as envisioned by the London Conference. Finally, they must be able to receive in a time of crisis Again, if a
called for.
force suggests a corps size element since such an organization has all of the structure needed to be able to providing it is supported by the EAC
fight independently,
elements at some points. Since the need of a theater deployed corps has been identified, does this corps need to have its combat
Chapter 4 identified two The first reason why the corps that the risk of
not a threat of imminent attack against NATO. needs to maintain any decisive is because of our commitment to
because of the belief that such a full-up corps can be deemed as offensive in nature by the C&EE nations. is no requirement in Europe. the U.S.
for a full-up corps to be permanently deployed Because there is not reason for a full up corps,
should proceed to reduce that structure. According to U.S. planners in NATO Headquarters, The
there are three possible ways to reduce the force. first is by deactivating one division in
corps along with the CS and CSS assets which would support that division. division. The second is to reduce one brigade per
headquarters and leave separate brigades operating as separate units under a corps headquarters. However, answer,
3
advantages and disadvantages. The first advantages. The first advantage is in Europe. that the U.S. maintains a a recommended solution has four major
corps headquarters
credible presence in
Europe thus assuring us a "place at to influence events and in an indirect way, the EC.4 the
theater if occur.
The third advantage to this organization would be that essential that is, capabilities needed to support the ARRC, brigades, units
capable of participating
support either the theater CinC or the ARRC would be aviation assets from the corps's MI brigade which would be capable of providing electronic warfare. The fourth advantage to this structure would be the manpower savings. With this structure, corps strength
could be reduced by approximately 23,000 personnel. The major disadvantage would be that USAREUR would be unable to meet its German corps. commitment to provide a division to a
by earmarking a follow-on division from the U.S. to be part of that German Corps. The second solution,
from each division offers no major advantage over the previous solution except the ability to provide an anemic corps would
division to a German corps while the U.S. retain control of a division. Savings in division, manpower,
The first
force could be tailored to meet the situation as it at the time -that is,
relatively easily.
redeployment of these units could exercise our sea and airlift capabilities on a continuing basis. Some of the disadvantages that the U.S. the ARRC, to this organization are
that is
redeployment of forces from CONUS and train up time to reach the proper degree of proficiency for those divisions to be an effective fighting force. neither This solution would
the CinC's requirement to have an effective fighting force at his disposal. Another disadvantage to this concept would be the
organization for combat required for the separate brigades would not be present. That is, the combat support and
those maneuver brigades might not be the habitual organizations needed for effective combat operations. Command and needed This
control would also suffer since the span of control to command as many as six maneuver brigades, brigades, three artillery brigades,
three aviation
would probably be beyond the capability of the standard corps headquarters. The headquarters would require of course, drive up
augmentation.
component commnander should be dual hatted as both the Theater Army and Corps Commander for peacetime and operations short of war only. Under his command would be
the standard corps organization for combat with the following exceptions. replacement of the assault brigade. The first exception would be the regiment with an air of course, be
armored cavalry
The replacement of the cavalry regiment with a separate air assault brigade with all of its lift assets
would provide the corps commander with the ability to deploy the brigade separately as a peacekeeping force if 75
In
addition,
An alternative to this
would be to replace one of the division's heavy assault brigade. the air component
The next area to be discussed is of U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The U.S. air
component's mission in
that is,
the force must provide for air and strategic lift, and provide EW
superiority,
tactical
and airborne C3--all missions the ARRC's air component cannot do for itself. overseas, then, The U.S. air assets deployed
support plus have the capability to provide CAS and BI in support of the theater CinC. Fortunately, Air Force the recent reorganization by the U.S. is ideally suited
for the mission of supporting not only the ARRC but also the U.S. corps. The problem is that the mission require different
requirements for these two purposes airframes. As already discussed, ARRC's mission is
the wing should then be heavily oriented on air superiority and EW type aircraft. aircraft. These would be F-15/EF-111/F-16 type
Their purpose would be to provide an air umbrella who would perform the actual deep
CinC's mission would have to be more robust since it be required to be both air-to-ground and air-to-air missions. Such a wing would be heavily dependent on
multi-role capable aircraft This wing would also have its and C2 aircraft.
These two wings would be the major air power in personnel wing; i.e., Europe. in
force combat
them (depending on the orientation of the ground attack vs. air to air) the estimate Europe would be
strength of tactical air forces strength in approximately and personnel remembered 10,000. Admittedly,
seems small.
However,
that these forces are forward deployed to deal The rapid deploying nature of air that a large number of
less essential
The above described strengths for the Army and Air Force are for units at the tactical there is level and below. Since
forces in in
theater,
structure exists.
The first
is
three components commanders are also four star with the appropriate level staffs.
The second command structure which could be in place to support the reorganized forces would be based on the Korea model. In this scenario,
overall
would continue to be in
all assigned forces but planning responsibilities would be delegated to a sub-unified commander. Europe where the CINCEUR also fills Commander (MNC), national This is the responsibility In the case of
the role of Major NATO for planning for of the DCinC In the
Europe today.
the army/corps commander would become the He would also fiHl the role of
three star
office.
He would be in
wings described above. The navy component commander would be, present situation a four star billet. This is like the due to the
peculiar nature of the European theater in Because the naval component commander is Subordinate Commander (MSC), in
respect to NATO.
planning and command responsibilities are delegated to his subordinate, a three star office. equal. for command structure would be based a peacetime environment. In for This would, in effect,
planning and executing all missions in and Alliance missions. and Air Force units be applicable if in
the U.S.
were to be replaced in
position of SACEUR. Because of the unique nature of the dual structure which exists in Europe, that is command
and execution portion under command of the SACEUR who doubles as the CINCEUR, situation is the best command structure for the that is, a modified
79
and operational
forces Europe
would be approximately 70,000 personnel. In criteria conclusion, it is clear that in order to meet the the
command were reduced by the appropriate number of personnel required to support that deactivated division. In addition, the Corps's organic armored cavalry
regiment should be replaced by an air assault brigade with all of the organic lift capabilities normally asociated
the deployment of the 10th Mountain Division to Somalia. Corps combat support units should be kept at full strength so as to support the ARRC missions as well as other deployments requiring CS and CSS support versus combat troops. Echelons above Corps units should be
maintained at an appropriate level so as to support the in-theater forces and be able to support the arrival of new units if warranted. The Air Force should permanently station two composite wings in Europe. One wing should be primarily dedicated to air This wing juch a return of U.S. forces to Europe was
could be removed from theater once the EFA or a suitable replacement were deployed. The second wing would be equipped with F15E type aircraft. It would be dedicated to providing the theatar interdiction and deep
commander with adequate battlefield strike capabilities while still capabilities. Should it be required,
81
in
should be reduced from four to three star commanders. is certainly appropriate in view of the greatly reduced
force structure permanently stationed overseas. Reducing the force structure as described above and modifying the command structure would fulfill all of the Chapter
the force would help maintain our influence in by providing a force capable of rapidly in Europe. Maintaining a Corps
European affairs
deploying anywhere
would also alleviate the fear that nature. This would help maintain
and,
therefore,
NATO has no design on their territory. The recommended solution would also be ideal to help NATO in its new roles and missions by providing substantial C2, CS and air power to the ARRC. This same
capable of supporting the CinC with any mission he might be assigned to accomplish. 82
unilateral U.S.
still
of substantial in
size,
the message is
remaining engaged is
European affairs
the force is
scenario of having smaller active forces which must still contend with world wide instabilities capability to deploy world wide. Recommendations for Further Studies Recommendations for future studies could go into three different directions. The second is operation in The first is cost analysis. which require the
force structure estimates for a military operations other than war. Europe. on the the methodology money for The third would be
Because this study was based strictly military-political requirements outlined in the cost in terms in
section of Chapter 3,
maintaining a forward deployed force was not taken into consideration. Further research could center on which
force structure would be best using the additional criteria: "How many dollars would such a force cost?" The force structure recommended section of this chapter is primarily support the ARRC in the previous
for a force which would in conducting missions such as The recommended force
reinforcement from CONUS would be needed if to conduct such a mission on a unilateral present situation in model.
were
a result of such analysis. The third direction for future study is subject of this study itself. recommendations based in the
Should any of those goals and requirements for the specific force
the recommendations in
the new administration were to articulate fundamental in our position vis-a-vis our relations with
differences NATO.
84
ENDNOTES Chapter 2
1
the-U.S., p.1.
2
George Bush, The National Security Strategy of (Washington DC.:Government Printing Office, 1991)
Policy: p. 421.
3
William J. Clinton, "A strategy for Foreign Assistance to Russia," Vital Speeches, 1 May 1992,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Statement to the U.S. Senate Secreatry of Defense COnfirmation Hearings, (Washington DC: 19 January 1993), p. 13. David Abshire, "Strategic Challenge, Contingencies, Force Structure and Deterence," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 40. SFrancois Huisbourg, Washigton Quarterly, 'Ibid.,
7 lbid., 4
The
Spring 1992,
pp. p.
132-133. 135.
'Alexander Gerry, "NATO in Central and Eastern Europe," ROA National Security Report, November 1992, p. 49. 'Johann Holst, Exploring Europe's Future and Trends and Prospects Relating to Security, September 1990: Rand Corporation, p. vi. ' 0 Zbignew Brezenski, "Order, Disorder, and U.S. Leadership," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 9. "IU.S., Congress, House, The Committee on the Budget, The Long Term Defense Budget, 102st Cong., 2d sess., 1991, p. 3.
12 13
1bid.,
p. p.
5. 7. 85
I bid.,
p. p.
ZHuisbourg, p.
17Ibid,
''Sergei Rogov, "International Security and the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 5. Personnal Intervier, LTC Dan Skeldon, USA, Intelligence Planner, U.S. Delegation to the NATO MC. January 1993, Brussels Belgium.
20
13
2IU.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Budget, The Long Term Defense Budget, Ibid., p. 24.
22
Ibid.
23 24
james Baker, "U.S. Committment to Strengthening Euro-Atlantic Cooperation," U.S. Department of State Dispatches, 23 December 1991, p. 15.
2 5 Aspin,
p.
7.
2 6General David Maddox, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Europe, Statement to U.S. Army Command and General Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., March 1993. Staff Class of '93,
Goodly, "Peacemaking in the New Europe," Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 166. Washington The Daniel Nelson, " NATO-Means, But no Ends," January 1992, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 48:1, pp.10-11.
29 30 28
2 7 James
Goodly,
p.
170.
U.S., Congress. House, The Committee on the Budget, Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1991, p. 1.
31
Ibid.,
p.
2.
86
3 2
Security," p. 36.
ROA
National
1992,
"3Irbid.
Remarks by President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Press Availability, The White House, Washington DC, 26 March 1993, p. 2. 35Ibid.
3 4
"36U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Aooropriations for 1992 - part 8: The Base Force Concept, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1991, p. 32.
37Abshire,
3
p.
36.
Budget,
"39Stephen Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," Washington Quarterly Spring 1992, p. 95.
Patrick Garrity and Sharon Weidner, "U.S. Defense Strategy After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 97. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Defense in American Foreign Policy: Practice and Theory, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) pp. 250-251.
4 2 4 3 4 1 4 0
p.
64.
Chapter 3 'These definitions are the author's. They are based on his understanding of the terms used throughout research.
his
Chapter 4 'Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterence American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 22-23. in
87
Francois Huisbourg, "The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Wither NATO, Whether NATO?" Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 128.
3
Huisbourg,
p.
140.
4Personnal Interview with COL Jerome Watson, USA, Forces Planner, U.S. Delegation to NATO MC. Strategic 13 January 1993, Brussels Belgium. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and 'Stephen J. Eastern Europe From Liaison to Security Partnership," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 143. @"Esprit de Korps," November 1991, pp. 18-20.
7
National
Review,
43:21,
18
James Schlesinger, "The Trans-Atlantic Partnership: An American View," Brookings Review, 1992, p. 19. &Huisbourg, p. 'Ibid.,
1 0
Summer
138.
p.
"Esprit
" Huisbourg,
1 2
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 8- The Base Force Concept, 101st Cong., 2d 1992 - part 1991, p. 8. sess.,
1 3
Watson,
Ibid.
14Ibid. Challenge: 15David Abshire, "Strategic Contingencies, Force Structure and Deterence," Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 35. Johann Holst, Exploring Europe's and Prospects Relating to Security, (Rand September 1990), p. 30. 1 7 Colin McInnes, (London: Unwinn Hymann, lslbid., p. 165. The Changing Strategic 1990), p. 163.
16
Washington
Agendas,
88
1 9 Andrew
Current History,
2 0"Why
NATO?"
The Economist,
1992,
p.
2
16.
1Micheal Mechams, "Signing NATO's New Strategy May be the Easy Part," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 35:20, 4 November 1991, p. 27. Rupert Pengelley, "ARRC Arising," Defense Review, October 1992, p. 981. 23Ibid.,
2 4 Ibid., 22
International
p. p.
2 5Hans-Heini
Interview with John W. Douglass, BrigGen, USAF (RET), former Deputy United States Military Representative, NATO MC and presently senior Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 January 1993, Washington DC.
2 TPengelley,
p.
193. Ibid.
28Interview,
2 9Les
COL Watson,
Aspin, Statement to the Senate Armed Services Commitee, 19 January 1993, p. 14. Les Aspin, "With the Soviet and the Cold War Gone, What Future for U.S. Forces," ROA National Security Report, November 1992, p. 24. Correll, "The Right Mix Fight Heats Up," Air Force Magazine, January 1993, p. 68.
3 2 Ibid. 3 1 John 30
p.
69. Chapter 5
'Personnal Interview with COL Jerome Watson, Strategic Forces Planner, U.S. Delegation to NATO MC, January 1993, Brussels, Belgium. Pengelley, "ARRC Arising," Defense Review, October 1992, p. 63. 89
2 Rupert
15
International
1nterview,
COL Watson,
Ibid.
4Ibid. 5Ibid.
90
C2 Commang Structure
CinCEUR
DCi nCEUR
JFACC
V Corps
21st TAACOM
3 star command. Army component commander acts as Commander U.S. Army Forces, Europe. Air component commander acts as Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe.
*
Figure 1
91
5th Corps
ARRC
Iwing
Win
Sueirt
win
-,
On order:
OPCON
Figure 2
92
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