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The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude Author(s): George Dickie Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 56-65 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009119 . Accessed: 21/07/2011 14:52
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American Volume

Philosophical i, Number

Quarterly i, January 1964

V.

THE MYTH OF THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE

GEORGE DICKIE*
ever, the language of the two is different enough to of this justify separate discussions. My discussion second variety will for the most part make use of con? is a thorough, Jerome Stolnitz' book6 which
sistent, and large-scale version of the attitude

recent the articles1 have suggested unsatisfactoriness of the notion of the aesthetic SOME attitude and it is now time for a fresh look at that encrusted article of faith. This conception has been valuable to aesthetics and criticism in helping wean them from a sole concern with beauty and related I shall argue that the aesthetic notions.2 However, is a myth and while, as G. Ryle has said, attitude "Myths often do a lot of theoretical good while they
are still new,"3 this particular one is no longer

aesthetic theory. useful and in fact misleads is a range of theories which differ accord? There ing to how strongly the aesthetic attitude is charac? is reflected in the language terized. This variation is The the theories strongest variety employ. Edward Bullough's distance, theory of psychical recently defended by Sheila Dawson.4 The central technical term of this theory is "distance" used as a verb to denote an action which either constitutes or attitude. These is necessary for the aesthetic theorists use such sentences as "He distanced (or the play." The second variety is failed to distance) widely held but has been defended most vigorously in recent years by Jerome Stolnitz and Eliseo Vivas. is "dis? term of this variety The central technical
interested"5 used either as an adverb or as an

theory. The weakest version of the attitude theory can be found in Vincent statement Tomas' "If looking at a picture and attending closely to how it looks is not really to be in the aesthetic attitude, then what on earth is?"7 In the following I shall be concerned with the notion of aesthetic attitude and this notion may have little or no connection with
the ordinary notion of an attitude.

distance, Psychical process psychological puts some object (be dangerous fog at sea) tical interests of the that it is "the beauty
captures our life, practical view it on Later actors,

to Bullough, is a according virtue of which a person by a play, or a it a painting, "out of gear" with the prac? self. Miss Dawson maintains of the phenomenon, which
puts us, that an us if we out are of gear with to receptive, consciousness."8 persons and (critics, the like) un?

attention, and forces the level of

aesthetic some

she

maintains of

a special adjective. This weaker theory speaks not of kind of action (distancing) but of an ordinary kind done in a certain way of action (dis? (attending) These first two versions are perhaps interestedly).
not as different as my classification suggests. How

members

orchestra,

"distance
Bullough,

deliberately."9
discusses cases

Miss

Dawson,
people

following
are

in which

able

or are in? to bring off an act of distancing into a state of being of being induced capable

* I wish and made many who read earlier drafts of this paper and Jerome Stolnitz G. Beardsley to thank both Monroe comments. helpful 1 See Marshall vol. 56 (1959), p. 926; and Joseph and the Aesthetic Attitude," of Philosophy, Journal Cohen, "Appearance but "Aesthetic p. 211. Margolis 19 (i960), gives an argument, of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. Journal Perception," Margolis, as to be at best only suggestive. it is so compact 2 Aesthetic "Some Questions Research, vol. 22 (1961), Philosophy and Phenomenological Concerning Perception," Stolnitz, Jerome p. 69. 3The 1949), p. 23. Concept of Mind (London, 4" vol. 39 (1961), pp. 155-174. Australasian Journal as an Aesthetic of Philosophy, Principle," 'Distancing' 5 "Disinterested" uses "intransitive." term. Vivas is Stolnitz' 6 Aesthetics and i960), p. 510. (Boston, of Art Criticism Philosophy 7 "Aesthetic to distinguish between The Philosophical attempt Review, vol. 68 (1959), p. 63. I shall ignore Tomas' Vision," "Aesthetics and the Looks of and reality since it seems to confuse rather than clarify aesthetic theory. See F. Sibley, appearance and J. Stolnitz, "Some Questions M. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 915-926; of Philosophy, vol. 56 (1959), pp. 905-915; Things," Journal but his remarks discusses Aesthetic attitude, only visual art and the aesthetic op. cit., pp. 69-87. Tomas Perception," Concerning into a comprehensive could be generalized theory. 9 8 Ibid., pp. 159-160. Dawson, op. cit., p. 158.

56

THE

MYTH

OF

THE

AESTHETIC

ATTITUDE

57

of the Bullough's example husband at a perform? jealous ("under-distanced") ance of Othello who is unable to keep his attention on the play because he keeps thinking of his own if wife's suspicious behavior. On the other hand, "we are mainly concerned with the technical details of its [the play's] presentation, then we are said to distanced.
be over-distanced."10 There is, then, a species of

She

uses

necessary

for a work of art if it is to be enjoyed so leads her to draw a conclusion aesthetically) curious as to throw suspicion on the theory.
remembers the horrible loss of distance in Peter Pan

One ?the

moment when Peter "Do believe in says you fairies ? . . . If you believe, !" the moment clap your hands when most children would like to slink out of the theatre and not a few cry?not Tinkerbell because may die, but because feel is gone. What, after we should all, to leave Cordelia, come to the front of the stage and say, "All the grown-ups who think that she loves me, shout 'Yes'."11 like the magic if Lear were

action?distancing?which
done and which initiates a

may
state of

be

deliberately

consciousness?

being distanced. The question

"to distance" or

is: Are
states of

there actions
consciousness

denoted
denoted

by
by

the curtain goes up, When "being distanced"? when we walk up to a painting, or when we look at
a sunset are we ever induced into a state of being

the play. The children do not at that moment lose or snap out of a state of being distanced because they never had or were in any such thing to begin The distance-theorist ask, with. The comparison of Peter Pan's appeal to the may respect. perhaps are not to noises and "But oblivious one by Lear is pointless. Peter Pan is a you usually hypothetical sights other than those of the play or to the marks magical play in which almost anything can happen, on the wall around the painting?" The answer is of but King Lear is a play of a different kind. There if "to But distance" and course?"Yes." an actor "being are, by the way, many plays in which that one's attention is distanced" addresses the audience simply mean directly {Our Town, The focused, what is the point of introducing new tech? Marriage Broker, A Taste of Honey, for example) nical terms and speaking as if these terms refer to without Such causing the play to be less valuable. are unusual, but what is unusual is not neces? special kinds of acts and states of consciousness? plays The distance-theorist argue further, "But might sarily bad; there is no point in trying to lay down 'out of you put the play (painting, rules to which every play must conform indepen? sunset) surely interests?" This question gear' with your practical dently of the kind of play it is. seems to me to be a very odd way of asking (by It is perhaps worth noting that Susanne Langer
employing the technical metaphor how "out of gear")

distanced either by being struck by the beauty of the object or by pulling off an act of distancing ? I do not recall committing any such special actions or of being induced into any special state, and I have no reason to suspect that I am atypical in this

It is hard to believe that the responses of any as those Miss children could be as theory-bound Dawson In fact, Peter Pan's request for describes. applause is a dramatic high point to which children The playwright respond enthusiastically. gives the
children a momentary chance to become actors in

if I attended
my wife

to the play rather than thought

they managed

about

reports in Peter

the

reaction As

she she

had

as a child it, that all

to

this

scene Pan's

Pan.12

remembers

Peter

or wondered

to move

the scenery about. Why not ask me straight out if I says that paid attention ?Thus, when Miss Dawson under-distanced Othello and the jealous husband
that niques the of person with stagecraft consuming over-distanced a interest the play, in tech? these

appeal
misery.

shattered
However,

the illusion and caused her acute

she reports the other

children
selves.

clapped

and

laughed

and enjoyed

them?

are just technical and misleading ways of describing cases of inattention. In both cases two different to, but in neither case something is being attended is it the action of the play. To introduce the tech?
nical terms "distance," does acts "over-distance" after phantom Dawson's Miss "under-distance," us send but nothing states and of consciousness. to the and chasing of

II

commitment

theory

distance
10 Ibid., p. 13 Aesthetics

(as a kind of mental

159. and Philosophy n

The second way of conceiving of the aesthetic attitude?as the ordinary action of attending done in a certain way (disinterestedly)?is illustrated by the work of Jerome and Eliseo Vivas. Stolnitz as "dis? Stolnitz defines "aesthetic attitude" interested and sympathetic attention to and con? of any object of awareness whatever, templation
for 12 Feeling its own and Form sake alone."13 Stolnitz 1953), p. 318. defines the main (New York,

insulation

material
pp. 34-35.

Ibid., p. 168. of Art Criticism,

58

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

terms of his definition:

concern means appreciate for any ulterior the and "accept it";15

"disinterested"
object purpose" on

means

"no
to

;14 "sympathetic" terms its own means "per?

or interestedly ? An example painting disinterestedly of alleged interested viewing might be the case in which a painting reminds Jones of his grandfather
and Jones proceeds to muse about or to regale a

"contemplation"

ception
and ask the

directed

toward
is not it."16

the object
concerned

in its own right

to analyze it or

spectator about questions

companion with tales of his grandfather's pioneer exploits. Such incidents would be characterized by
attitude-theorists as a vehicle for as examples associations and a work of using of art so on, of i.e., cases

The
has

notion

of disinterestedness,
shown17 to be seminal

which

Stolnitz it is
dis?

elsewhere

for modern

aesthetic
necessary interested sense to

theory,
to be attention speak,

is the key
clear to for about the

term here. Thus,

the nature arts. of of

various

It can make listening dis?

example,

interestedly to music only if itmakes sense to speak of listening interestedly to music. It would make no sense to speak of walking fast unless walking could of "dis? Stolnitz' definition be done slowly. Using
interestedness," the two situations would have to be

as "listening with no ulterior purpose" an ulterior and "listening with (disinterestedly) that what Note initially (interestedly). purpose" in appears to be a perceptual distinction?listening or disinterestedly)? a certain way (interestedly described
turns out to be a motivational or an intentional

attention. But Jones is not looking at (attending to) the painting at all, although he may be facing it with his eyes open. Jones is now musing or attending to the story he is telling, although he had to look at the painting at first to notice that it resembled his grandfather. Jones is not now looking at the painting since he is not now interestedly, at (attending the painting. looking Jones's to) is thinking or telling a story about his grandfather no more a part of the painting than his speculating the artist's is and, hence, about his intentions interested
musing, telling, speculating, and so on cannot

to the painting properly be described as attending are calling What attitude-aestheticians interestedly.
attention to is the occurrence of irrelevant associa?

for or with a certain purpose. distinction?listening for the listens to a piece of music Suppose Jones of being able to analyze and describe it on purpose an examination the next day and Smith listens to
the same music with no such ulterior purpose.

tions which distract the viewer from the painting or But distraction whatever. is not a special kind of it is a kind of inattention. attention, Consider now disinterestedness and plays. I shall make use of some interesting examples offered by J. O. Urmson,18 but I am not claiming that Urmson
is an article attitude-theorist. of aesthetic In mentions Urmson attitude addition economic, to but never rather in his speaks of aesthetic satisfaction, personal, and

There
and

is certainly
intentions of

a difference
the two

between
men: Jones

the motives
has an

ulterior purpose and Smith does not, but this not mean Jones's listening differs from Smith's. men enjoy the music or that possible that both be bored. The attention of either or both may
and so on. It is important to note that a

does It is both flag

satisfaction. Urmson

aesthetic moral,

intellectual satisfactions. theorist would consider

satisfaction of interested as "ulterior attention.

I think the attitude these last four kinds of

cases hence, and, case the considers

person's

motive

is different from his action intention to the music, for example). There (Jones's listening is only one way to listen to (to attend to) music, the listening may be more or less atten? although inten? and there may be a variety of motives, tive and reasons for doing so and a variety of ways tions, of being distracted from the music. or
In order to avoid a common mistake of aestheti

purposes" Urmson

of a man in the audience of a play who is delighted.19 that his delight is solely the result of It is discovered man the fact that there is a full house?the is the of the production. is right in Urmson impresario calling this impresario's satisfaction economic rather than aesthetic, although there is a certain oddness about the example as it finds the impresario sitting
in the audience. However, my concern is not with

a conclusion about one kind of art cians?drawing and assuming it holds for all the arts?the question for attention must be considered of disinterested arts other than music. How would one look at a

Urmson's

the attitude examples as such but with an interested This is certainly theory. impresario party in the fullest sense of the word, but is his

16 15 14 p. 38. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., 35. Ibid., p. 17 "On the The Journal of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness'," of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Origins is "What Makes in Philosophy Looks at the Arts, Joseph Margolis a Situation Aesthetic?" (ed.), from Proceedings Society, Supplementary Volume 31 (1957), pp. 75-92. of the Aristotelian " Ibid., p. 15.

vol. 20 (1961), pp. 131-143. (New York, 1962). Reprinted

THE

MYTH

OF

THE

AESTHETIC

ATTITUDE

59

an instance of interested as behavior attention distinct from the supposed disinterested attention of the average citizen who sits beside him? In the situation as described by Urmson itwould not make to any sense to say that the impresario is attending
the play at all, since his sole concern at the moment

although
and

the two may

have quite different motives

intentions.

is the till. If he can be said to be attending to any? than just thinking about it) it is the thing (rather to suggest that an size of the house. I do not mean impresario could not attend to his play if he found himself taking up a seat in a full house ; I am chal? attention. As an lenging the sense of disinterested of personal satisfaction Urmson mentions example the spectator whose daughter is in the play. Intel? lectual satisfaction involves the solution of technical satisfaction the con? problems of plays and moral sideration of the effects of the play on the viewer's conduct. All three of these candidates which the
attitude-theorist would propose as cases of in?

the discussion of disinterested-interested of literature it is appropriate to turn to reading the arguments of Eliseo Vivas whose work is largely concerned with literature. Vivas remarks that "By a poem in a nonaesthetic mode itmay approaching function as history, as social criticism, as diagnostic For ' '20 definite number of other ways. Vivas further notes that according to Plato "the Greeks used Horneras an authority on war and almost anything under the
sun," erotic ence."21 and poetry The that or a certain account between poem "can of a mystical reading be read as as an experi? a poem as evidence of the author's neuroses, and in an in?

difference

history or whatever (reading it nonaesthetically) and reading it aesthetically depends on how we

approach or read it. A poem "does not come self

terested attention turn out to be just different ways of being distracted from the play and, hence, not cases of interested attention to the play. Of course, there is no reason to think that in any of these cases the distraction or inattention must be total, although it could be. In fact, such inattentions often occur but are so fleeting that nothing of the play, music, or whatever ismissed or lost. a re? The example of a playwright watching
hearsal or an out-of-town performance with a view

to rewriting the script has been suggested tome as a case in which a spectator is certainly attending to the play (unlike our impresario) and attending in an interested manner. This case is unlike those just discussed but is similar to the earlier case of Jones (not Smith) listening to a particular piece of music.
Our mined more, can playwright?like on the music?has the was who Jones, motives. ulterior an to be exa? Further?

is a poem only when it labelled,"22 but presumably it is an object of is read in a certain way?when aesthetic experience. For Vivas, being an aesthetic the object of the aesthetic object means being attitude. He defines the aesthetic experience as "an of rapt attention which involves the experience intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent and values in their full presentational meanings that his definition immediacy."23 Vivas maintains me understand better what I can and what "helps I cannot do when I read The Brothers [Karamazov]" and his definition "forces us to acknowledge that can hardly The Brothers Karamazov be read as
art. . . ,"24 This acknowledgment means that we

cannot probably intransitively apprehend Brothers because of its size and complexity.
"Intransitive" meaning best. must is be made the key clear. term A here and number

The
Vivas'

of passages

reveal his meaning

"Having once

but perhaps
seen a

the following
game in

is the
slow

unlike playwright, the after change script

spectator, ordinary or the performance

hockey

during a rehearsal. But how is our playwright's attention (as distinguished from his motives and from that of an ordinary different intentions) viewer? The playwright might enjoy or be bored
by the performance as any spectator might be.

I am prepared to testify that it was an motion, of pure intransitive experience object [attention]? for I was not interested in which team won the game and no external factors mingled with my interest in the beautiful rhythmic flow of the slow-moving
men."25 tion" has It appears that Vivas' same the meaning "intransitive as Stolnitz' atten? "dis?

The

even flag. In attention might playwright's short, the kinds of things which may happen to the attention are no different from those playwright's to an ordinary that may spectator, happen
20

interested
ulterior

attention,"
purpose."26

namely,
Thus, the

"attending
question

with
to ask

no
is

"How

does one attend

to (read)

a poem

or any

"Contextualism The Journal 18 (1959), pp. 224-225. Reconsidered," of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 21 22Loc. 23 24 25 cit. Ibid., p. 225. Ibid., p. 237. Ibid., p. 227. Ibid., p. 228. (Italics mine.) 26 remark about the improbability as art suggests that "intransitive of being able to read The Brothers Karamazov Vivas' attention" can be attended sometimes mean to at one time" or "that which can be held before the mind for him "that which at one may time." However, this second possible meaning is not one which is relevant here.

60

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY Or He Look'd like stout at Cortez at each upon other a peak when with with a wild

can certainly One literary work transitively?" attend to (read) a poem for a variety of different and because of a variety of different purposes
reasons, but can one attend to a poem "a of a transitively ?

star'd

the Pacific?and in Darien.

eyes eagle all his men surmise?

Silent,

I do not think so, but

Vivas uses for a offers. poem He or mentions parts

let us consider
of type as a poem relaxed free from

the examples
reader" who spring-board

"loose,

uncontrolled, rambles,

wool-gathering

day-dreaming, the contextual

Someone might read both of these raptly and not that they make know historical references (in? in one case)?might this be a case of accurately intransitive attention ?How would the above read?
ing differ?so far as attention is concerned?from

control" of the poem.27 But surely itwould be wrong is a case of transitively attending to say such musing to a poem, since it is clearly a case of not attending to a to a poem. Another supposed way of attending is by approaching it "as diag? poem transitively
nostic evidence of the author's neuroses." Vivas is

that there is no critical point in right if he means this since it does not throw light on the doing poem. But this is a case of using information gleaned
from a poem to make inferences about its author

to a poem. If anything can rather than attending to here it is the author's be said to be attended neuroses least they are being thought about). (at This kind of case is perhaps best thought of as a from a rather special way of getting distracted distractions Of course, such "biographical" poem. and momentary be insignificant enough so might as scarcely to distract attention from the poem (a about the poet). flash of insight or understanding On the other hand, such distractions may turn into
dissertations may lead a and whole to a of As a careers. concentrate poem) poem on and as Such his an interest attention "in? the sus? reader read

the case of a reader who recognized the historical content of the poetic lines ? The two readings do not differ as far as attention is concerned. History is a part of these sets of poetic lines and the two readings differ in that the first fails to take account of an aspect of the poetic lines (its historical con? tent) and the second does not fail to do so. Perhaps as history" Vivas means by "reading "reading does not simply as history." But even this meaning mark out a special kind of attention but rather means that only a single aspect of a poem is being
noticed and that its rhyme, meter, and so on are

a poem as social criticism can be ignored. Reading in a fashion similar to reading as history. analyzed
Some poems simply are or contain social criticism,

and a complete
fact.

reading must

not fail to notice

this

The above cases of alleged interested attending can be sorted out in the following way. Jones listen? the ing to the music and our playwright watching rehearsal are both attending with ulterior motives
to a work of art, but there is no reason to suppose reads

he (when formational" remaining

does

certain to ignore a such

that the attention

that of an ordinary On the

of either
spectator. other

is different
The reader

in kind from
who

aspects aspects.

deplorable

a poem
of a poem.

as history

tained

practice
to

may

be,
features

it is at best
of a poem

a case
and

is simply attending
hand, the

to an aspect
cases

of

remaining

attending ing others.

certain

ignor?

?Jones father,
"reading"

beside the painting telling of his grand? the gloating impresario, daydreaming while
a poem, and so on?are simply cases of

way that poetry may allegedly be read is by reading it as history. This case is transitively different from the two preceding ones since poetry statements often contains history (makes historical or at least references) but does not (usually) contain Another
statements nor free call does about it contain are the author's neuroses about (otherwise Reading what we and so on statements about a reader's would a poem not as

not attending In general,

"intransitiveness"

to the work of art. I conclude that "disinterestedness"

cannot properly clear Hence, be used to

or
refer

to a special kind of attention.

a has term which is used kinds to make certain of motives.

"Disinterestedness"
that we an action speak

is
of

associations them "free

associations").

history about)
poem?the

to (thinking suggests that we are attending to a events by way of attending historical

poem is a time-telescope. and ninety-two blue. the ocean Consider the

disinterested findings (of boards of inquiry), dis? interested verdicts (of judges and juries), and so on. to an object, of course, has its motives Attending itself is not interested or dis? but the attending
interested according to whether its motives are of

following

two sets of lines :

hundred sailed

In fourteen Columbus 27 Vivas, op.

interested or disinterested the kind which motivate action (as findings and verdicts might), although the
attending may be more or less close.

cit., p. 231.

THE

MYTH

OF

THE

AESTHETIC

ATTITUDE

6l

I have argued that the second way of conceiving the aesthetic attitude is also a myth, or at least that attention?is itsmain content?disinterested ;but I must now try to establish that the view misleads aesthetic theory. I shall argue that the attitude theorist is incorrect about (i) the way in which he wishes to set the limits of aesthetic relevance; (2) the relation of the critic to a work of art; and (3) the
relation of morality to aesthetic value.

Between

the

erect

and

solemn

trees

I will go down upon my knees; I shall not find this day

So meet a place to pray.

use of the treatment I shall make of Since aesthetic relevance in Jerome Stolnitz' book, let me the make clear that I am not necessarily denying relevance of the specific items he cites but dis? His with his criterion of relevance. agreeing criterion of relevance is derived from his definition of "aesthetic attitude" and is set forth at the very beginning of his book. This procedure leads Monroe in his review of the book to remark that Beardsley
Stolnitz' discussion is premature.28 Beardsley sug?

The image of a rugby forward running arose in the on reading the third mind of one student-reader verse of this poem. A cathedral was suggested to a second reader of the poem. The cathedral image of the "is congruous with both the verbal meaning it which and mood and the emotions poem It does not divert attention away from expresses. in? the poem."34 The rugby image is presumably
congruous interested and diverts attention from the poem.

It is a confusion
attention

to take compatibility
as a criterion of

with

dis?
If,

relevance.

as I have tried to show, disinterested confused notion, then it will not do as criterion. Also, when Stolnitz comes the cathedral image is, and the rugby
relevant, the criterion he actually uses

attention is a a satisfactory to show why image is not

is congruous

dis? gests "that relevance cannot be satisfactorily cussed until after a careful treatment of the several
arts, their dimensions and capacities."29

is meant by "aesthetic relevance"? First, what Stolnitz defines the problem by asking the question : to "Is it ever 'relevant' to the aesthetic experience have thoughts or images or bits of knowledge which are not present within the object itself?"30 Stolnitz begins by summarizing Bullough's experiment and
discussion associations of single absorb colors the and associations.31 attention Some and spectator's

is quite the meaning of the poem, which The of the notion of disinterestedness. independent is perhaps best described as the problem of problem
relevance of art, rather or more to a poem, generally, than aesthetic relevance. to a work

ness with

distract him from the color and "fuse" with the color. Associations
are aesthetic and the former are

some associations of the latter kind

not. Stolnitz draws

the following
If the aesthetic whether it is then whether interested

conclusion
experience an association

about

associations
have

:
it, on "dis? the

A second way in which the attitude theory mis? is its contention that a critic's leads aesthetics to a work of art is different in kind from relationship the relationship of other persons to the work. H. S. in an early statement of this view wrote Langfeld that we may "slip from the attitude of aesthetic enjoyment to the attitude of the critic." He charac? occu? terizes the critical attitude as "intellectually . . . merits" and the pied in coldly estimating
aesthetic attitude as responding "emotionally to"

is as we with the

described depends of

is aesthetic attitude association

compatible attention." If

the

re-enforces

of attention the object, with upon focusing by "fusing" the object and thereby it added "life and signific? giving it is genuinely aesthetic. it arrogates ance," If, however, to itself and away attention from the object, it under? mines the aesthetic attitude.32

a work of art.35 At the beginning of his book in the discussion of the aesthetic attitude, Stolnitz declares that if a percipient of a work of art "has the pur? of passing judgment upon it, his attitude is not pose
aesthetic."36 He develops this line at a later stage of

his book, arguing that appreciation (perceiving with the aesthetic attitude) and criticism (seeking for
reasons to support an evaluation of a work) are

clear how something could fuse with a single color, but "fusion" is one of those words in is rarely defined. aesthetics which then Stolnitz one from makes use of a more fruitful example, I. A. Richards' Practical Criticismo He cites the responses of students to the poem which begins : It is not
28The Journal of Philosophy, 32 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 36 Op. cit., p. 35. vol. 33 57 (i960), p. 624. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 37 Ibid., p. 377. 34 38 Ibid., Ibid.,

to (i) distinct and (2) "psychologically opposed each other."37 The critical attitude is questioning, analytical, probing for strengths and weakness, and so on. The aesthetic attitude is just the opposite: "It commits our allegiance to the object freely and ; "the spectator 'surrenders' him? unquestioningly" self to the work of art."38 "Just because the two
29Loc. cit. p. 56. pp. 377-378. 30 31 Op. cit., p. 53. 35The Aesthetic Attitude (New York, Ibid., 1920), p. p. 54. 79.

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attitudes it reduces course, appreciation. important to appreciate

are

inimical, aesthetic that

whenever interest."39 criticism

criticism Stolnitz is

obtrudes, does not,

percipient.
of appreciate

If many
so few works,

professional
it is not

critics
because

seem
they

to
are

argue and

for unimportant an He criticism maintains plays a person in preparing role necessary so on the nuances, and detail, form,

of works of art. We are quite read and listen perceptively

questions, measure "Does in terms this mean of

right, he says, thus to and acutely, but he

that we must etc., analyze, during the

value-criteria,

supposedly
"No" "prior and to the

aesthetic
he maintains aesthetic

experience?"40
that criticism encounter,"41

His
or

answer
occur inter?

is

must it will

fere with appreciation. How that criticism will does Stolnitz know His conclu? interfere with always appreciation? sion sounds like one based upon the observations of actual cases, but I do not think it is. I believe it is a of his definition of aesthetic logical consequence attitude in terms of disinterested attention (no to his view, to appre? ulterior purpose). According one has to perceive ciate an object aesthetically it with no ulterior purpose. But the critic has an
ulterior object functions he purpose?to perceives?hence, as a critic But here, analyze in he as cannot previously, and so far evaluate as a the person an as con?

of good critics, but perhaps because the percentage works of art is fairly small and they suffer from a kind of combat fatigue. I am unable to see any significant difference to a between "perceptively and acutely" attending work of art (which Stolnitz holds enhances appre? ciation) and searching for reasons, so far as the If I attend experience of a work of art is concerned. and acutely, I will have certain stan? perceptively dards and/or paradigms in mind (not necessarily aware of the and will be keenly consciously) elements and relations in the work and will evaluate them to some degree. Stolnitz writes as if criticism takes place and then is over and done with, but the search for and finding of reasons (noticing this fits in with that, and so on) is continuous in practiced tors. A practiced viewer does not even have appr?cia to be looking for a reason, he may just notice a line
or an area in a painting, for example, and the line

function Stolnitz

or area becomes a reason why he thinks the painting better or worse. A person may be a critic (not a good one) without meaning to be or necessarily even realizing it. without There is one final line worth pursuing. Stolnitz'
remarks suggest that one reason he thinks criticism

appreciator.

fuses a perceptual distinction with a motivational one. If it were possible to attend disinterestedly or then perhaps the critic (as percipient) interestedly, would differ from other percipients. But if my
earlier argument about attending is correct, the

is that they com? appreciation incompatible one another be with for time (this would pete bad in the cases of performed works). especially But seeking and finding reasons (criticism) does not and
time for compete means for a reason with appreciation. to be and ready First, able to seek to notice

critic differs from other percipients only in his motives and intentions and not in the way in which
he attends to a work of art.

just be a fact that the search of incompatible with the appreciation not think it is. Several years ago I in a series of panel discussions of films. participated the showing of each film we were to discuss, During I had to take note of various aspects of the film Of course, for reasons is art, but I do itmight
(actor's organization performance, of the dramatic screen-plane and development, screen-space

something and to be thus ready and able as one attends does not compete for time with the attend? ing. In fact, I should suppose that seeking for
reasons on would of tend art. to focus Second, attention finding more a reason the work securely is an

achievement, run a race but the following to "see" that

long does does it

a race. (It takes time to like winning not to win it.) Consider the finding of reasons. How much time does it take a note is off key (or on key) ? How
take to notice that an actor mispro?

at given moments, and so on) in order later to discuss the films. I believe that this practice not only helped educate me to appreciate subsequent films the appreciation but that it enhanced of the films
I was analyzing. I noticed and was able to appre?

nounces

a word

(or does it right) ?How much

that a character's action

time
does

it take

to realize

not fit his already established personality? (One is struck by it.) How does it take to apprehend long that a happy ending is out of place ? It does not take
time general. to find Finding any a of these reasons is like or coming reasons to under? in reason

things about the films 1 was watching which ordinarily out of laziness I would not have noticed. I see no reason why the same should not be the case with critic or any critical the professional ciate
39 Ibid., p. 379. 40 Ibid., p. 380. 41 Loe.

stand?it suggest
cit.

is done in a flash. I do not mean in finding that one cannot be mistaken

to a

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AESTHETIC

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63

reason. What may appear to be a fault or a merit of a performance (a found reason) in the middle (or during one look at a painting and so forth) may turn out to be just the opposite when seen from the of the whole perspective (or other performance looks at the painting). A third way in which the attitude theory mis? that aesthetic leads aesthetic theory is its contention value is always independent of morality. This view is perhaps not peculiar to the attitude theory, but it is a logical consequence of the attitude approach. will estab? Two quotations from attitude-theorists lish the drift of their view of morality and aesthetic
value. We are either some concerned other value with of the the of the object beauty as soon, same. Just for occur to our mind, it seems we do to conflict . . We . inter? to it. then not To lead

some films and plays do. I assume it is unnecessary to show how novels and so on have this moral so aspect. Pole notes the curious fact that while critics approach works of art in "overtly many common? moralistic terms," it is a "philosophical
place ... that the ethical and the aesthetic modes ...

or with

as ethical example, our attitude shifts.42 Any with have posed This say of us might our moral not read moral... disrupts that the

considerations

a novel because reject . . When . beliefs the

so

for we have book aesthetically, are alien of our own which responses cannot the aesthetic We attitude. is aesthetically to consider bad, it for we have

novel

permitted maintain of the

ourselves the object aesthetic and

we attitude, in concert respond

aesthetically. must follow the with it.43

This conception of the aesthetic attitude func? tions to hold the moral aspects and the aesthetic of the work of art firmly apart. Presumably, aspects it is difficult to see one's way clearly here, although
the moral aspects of a work of art cannot be an

I suspect that many form different categories."45 philosophers would simply say that these critics are confused about their roles. But Pole assumes that philosophical theory "should take notice of prac? tice"46 and surely he is right. In agreeing with Pole's I should like to reserve the right to assumption argue in specific cases that a critic may be mis? guided. This right is especially necessary in a field such as aesthetics because the language and prac? tice of critics is so often burdened with ancient criticism iswrong but theory. Perhaps all moralistic should not rule it out of order at the philosophers very beginning by use of a definition. Pole thinks that the moral vision presented by a particular work of art will be either true or false of true and false might occur). (perhaps a mixture If a work has a false moral vision, then something "is lacking within the work itself. But to say that is to say that the [work] is internally incoherent; some the aspect must particular jar with what?on claim a right to demand. strength of the rest?we And here the moral fault that we have found will
count as an aesthetic fault too."47 Pole is trying to

show that the assessment of the moral vision of a work of art is just a special case of coherence
or that incoherence, coherence and is since an everyone aesthetic would category, agree the

object attention
moral I suspect

of

aesthetic attention because is by definition disinterested

are there somehow are a practical number of

aesthetic and the

(interested). confusions

assessment
assessment.

of

the moral conclusion

of his

vision

is an

aesthetic but
I am

aspects that

I think of
but the exception

Pole's
to some

is correct
First,

take
un?

involved
aesthetic I shall of not

in the assumption
attention attempt and to make

of the incompatibility
aspects these of art, since clear, attention?is than in

arguments.

the moral

certain whether it is proper to speak of a moral vision being true or false, and would want to make
a more modest claim?that a moral vision can be

root a

the

confused

assumption?disinterested notion. Some way

other

terms

of the aesthetic attitude, then, is needed to discuss and aesthetic value. the relation of morality David Pole in a recent article44 has argued that the moral vision which a work of art may embody It should perhaps be re? is aesthetically significant. at this point that not all works of art marked embody a moral vision and perhaps some kinds of art (music, for example) cannot embody a moral
vision, but certainly some novels, some poems, and 42 H. S. Langfeld, 44 and "Morality 45 Ibid., p. 193. op. cit., p. 73. of Literature," the Assessment 46 Loc. cit.

judged to be acceptable or unacceptable. (I am not Pole is wrong and my claim is not in? claiming consistent with his.) Second, I do not see that a false (or unacceptable) moral vision makes a work incoherent. I should suppose that to say a work is coherent or incoherent is to speak about how its fit together and this involves no reference to parts something outside the work as the work's truth or falsity does. In any event, it seems to me that a faulty moral
193-207.

43 op. cit., p. 36. J. Stolnitz, vol. 37 (1962), pp. Philosophy, 47 Ibid., p. 206.

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can be shown to be an aesthetic fault in? of Pole's consideration of truth and dependently vision
coherence. As Pole's argument evaluative?about implies, a work's

If the foregoing arguments are correct, the second the aesthetic attitude misleads way of conceiving
aesthetic theory in at least three ways.

moral moral
statement

vision vision

is a part of the work. Thus,

or

any state?
the work's

ment?descriptive about

is a statement
a work

about
critical

the work ; and any

statement and,

Ill
In answer to a hypothetical question about what a portrait with is seen in viewing the aesthetic in part responds "If looking at a attitude, Tomas picture and attending closely to how it looks is not really to be in the aesthetic attitude, then what on earth is?"48 I shall take this sentence as formu? lating the weakest version of the aesthetic attitude. (I am ignoring Tomas' distinction between appear?
ance thus, and are not reality. a See critique footnote of Tomas' 7. My argument; remarks, I am

is a

the aesthetic domain. To judge hence, falls within a moral vision to be morally is to unacceptable it defective and this amounts to saying that judge the work of art has a defective part. (Of course, a of a moral vision may judgment of the acceptability
be wrong, as a judgment moral of an action sometimes is,

but
Thus,

this fallibility
a work's

does not make

vision may

any difference.)
be an aesthetic

merit merit moral

or defect just as a work's degree of unity is a or defect. But what justifies saying that a vision is a part of a work of art? Perhaps "part" is not quite the right word but it serves to the point clear enough. A novel's moral make vision is an essential part of the novel and if it were removed (I am not sure how such surgery could be carried out) the novel would be greatly changed. a novel's moral vision is not like its covers Anyway, someone might or binding. However, still argue that even though a work's moral vision is defective and the moral vision is part of the work, that this is "aesthetic" defect is not an aesthetic defect. How It is being used to segregate being used here?
certain formal work's separation selected teristics or aspects and stylistic vision. moral is only a name parts aspects But nominal. for of art. a of works from it seems of such art such as as a aspects to me that has of

simply using one of his sentences.) First, this sen? tence speaks only of "looking at a picture," but to a piece of music," and "listening "watching listening to a play," and so on could be added the sentence, easily enough. After thus expanding it can be contracted into the general form: "Being in the aesthetic attitude is attending closely to a work of art (or a natural object)." But the aesthetic of attitude ("the hallmark in this formulation is a great modern aesthetics")
letdown?it no longer seems to say anything

the been

this does seem to be all significant. Nevertheless, that is left after the aesthetic attitude has been purged of distancing and disinterestedness. The only the aesthetic attitude from prevents thing which is the qualification into simple attention collapsing
closely. One may, I suppose, attend to a work of art

"Aesthetic" certain sub-set cannot

as

charac? object the to

of works

I certainly vacuousness at this

such a stipulation,
is essay "aesthetic." to suggest My

since an underlying
the concern of point

aim of this
term to is simply

insist that a work's moral vision is a part of the work de? and that, therefore, a critic can legitimately it. I would call any defect or scribe and evaluate merit which a critic can legitimately point out an aesthetic defect or merit, but what we call it does
not matter.

or less closely, but this fact does not seem to "being in signify anything very important. When is equated with "attending the aesthetic attitude" the equation neither involves any (closely)," nor could it possibly mislead element mythical aesthetic theory. But if the definition has no vices, more
it seems to have no virtues either. When the

aesthetic attending
not be

attitude
"the the

turns out to be simply finally the final version should perhaps (closely),
weakest" but attitude. rather "the vacuous aesthetic

called of

version"

to judge a work It would, of course, be a mistake on the basis of itsmoral vision (it is only one solely part). The fact that some critics have judged works of art in this way is perhaps as much responsible as the theory of aesthetic attitude for the attempts to
separate morality from the aesthetic. In fact, such

correct that the Stolnitz is no doubt historically an has played attitude of the aesthetic notion role in the freeing of aesthetic theory important
from easy an to overweening see how the concern slogan, with "Anything It beauty. can become is

criticism is no doubt the rise of the notion

48 Tomas, op. cit., p. 63.

at least partly responsible of the aesthetic attitude.

for

an object of the aesthetic could help attitude," this liberation. It isworth noting, how? accomplish ever, that the same goal could have been (and

THE

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OF

THE

AESTHETIC

ATTITUDE

65

to some extent was) realized by simply perhaps that works of art are often ugly or contain noting or have features which are difficult to ugliness, include within beauty. No doubt, in more recent
times people have been encouraged to take an

aesthetic attitude toward a painting as a way Washington State University

of lowering

say, against abstract and non prejudices, art. So if the notion of aesthetic attitude objective value for has turned out to have no theoretical it has had practical value for the appre? aesthetics, ciation of art in a way similar to that of Clive Bell's suspect notion of significant form. their