Bayan Muna Vs.

Romulo Facts: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92. Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law. Held: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x. The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner s earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x . The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute. PHILIP MORRIS ET AL V CA Facts: Petitioners Philip Morris et al are US companies not doing business in the Philippines. As registered owners "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" petitioners asserted that private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should be precluded during the pendency of the case from performing the acts complained of via a preliminary injunction. Respondent admitted petitioner s registration subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Respondent further alleged that it has been authorized by the BIR to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark MARK and that it is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated. Issue: WON the treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention (of which the Philippines is a signatory and ratified by Senate) is sufficient basis for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Held: No. Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of

incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments. * Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market. NOTE: infringement issue not discussed extensively issue focused on lifting of writ-mere interlocutory order. RUBRICO V ARROYO Carpio-Morales separate opinion -Doctrine of Command Responsibility generally accepted in PIL, which warrants its incorporation into Philippine law via incorporation clause of the Constitution (Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution). The most authoritative enumeration of the sources of international law, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute),2 does not specifically include "generally accepted principles of international law." To be sure, it is not quite the same as the "general principles of law" recognized under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. Renowned publicist Ian Brownlie suggested, however, that "general principles of international law" may refer to rules of customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 38(1)(c), or to logical propositions resulting from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and municipal analogies.3 Indeed, judicial reasoning has been the bedrock of Philippine jurisprudence on the determination of generallyaccepted principles of international law and consequent application of the incorporation clause. - The Court thus subsumes within the rubric of "generally accepted principles of international law" both "international custom" and "general principles of law," two distinct sources of international law recognized by the ICJ Statute. - The first treaty codification of the doctrine of command responsibility was in the Hague Convention IV of 1907. A provision therein held belligerent nations responsible for the acts of their armed forces, prefiguring the modern precept of holding superiors accountable for the crimes of subordinates if they fail in their duties of control, which is anchored firmly in customary international law. -There is a long-standing adherence by the international community to the doctrine of command responsibility, which makes it a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations. As such, it should be incorporated into Philippine law as a generally accepted principle of international law. While the exact formulation of the doctrine of command responsibility varies in different international legal instruments, the variance is more apparent than real. The Court should take judicial notice of the core element that permeates these formulations a commander s negligence in preventing or repressing his subordinates commission of the crime, or in bringing them to justice thereafter. Such judicial notice is but a necessary consequence of the application of the incorporation clause vis--vis the rule on mandatory judicial notice of international law.