The Politics of Justification Author(s): Stephen Macedo Source: Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp.

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THE POLITICS OF JUSTIFICATION

STEPHENMACEDO HarvardUniversity

THE PRACTICEOF POLITICALJUSTIFICATIONis not just for philosophers,andit does not simplylie behind(as we may hope)ourpolitical arrangements. Commitments reasongiving andreasondemandinginform to some of our most valuable political practices.Judicial review, most obviously, helps ensure that legislative and executive acts are reasonable in constitutionalterms: In court it is not the fact of power but the display of reasonsand evidence thatcounts.Not only the courts,but also Congressand the executive branchsometimes(andquiteproperly)conscientiouslyjustify theiractionsin constitutional terms.Constitution aside,muchthattakesplace in and aroundlegislatures,elections, and otherpolitical fora can be understood as effortsto justify particular policies and programs.1 "Liberalsdemand,"as Jeremy Waldronputs it, "that the social order should in principle be capable of explaining itself at the tribunalof each person's understanding."2 Liberal, democratic politics is not only about individualrights and limited govemment, it is also aboutjustification,but not aboutany kind of justificationat all. Liberalpoliticaljustification,even in its ideal form,shouldbe understood politically- this articleconsiderswhy and how. Liberalcontractualists typicallyseekjustificationsthatarewidely acceptable to reasonablepeople with a broad range of moral, philosophical,and religiouscommitments.3 aim is reasonable The agreement: be bothreasonto able and agreeablein a widely pluralisticsociety.4The appropriate means is a processof reasoningthatis publiclyaccessible,butgenuinelyjustificatory.
AUTHOR'SNOTE: Thanks to WilliamGalston, Randy Krozsner,Charles Larmore,Percy Lehning,HarveyC. Mansfield,Jr.,John Rawls,JudithN. Shklar, MarkTushnet, Leif Wenar, and for comments on previous drafts. The article was improvedby discussions in the Harvard Government DepartmentPolitical TheoryColloquium,and at a symposium the Institutefor at HumaneStudies.A generousgrantfrom the SmithRichardsonFoundation providedthe time to workon thispiece. POLITICAL THEORY, 18 No.2, May1990 280-304 Vol. ? 1990 Sage Publications,Inc. 280

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The dangeris thatreasonswill be deployed thatease people into the liberal settlementby maskingthe truenatureof liberalismas a regime. In the quest for consensus amidst diversity,liberals have a tendency to minimize the broad and deep implicationsof liberal politics. Reticence in spelling out the controversialimplications of liberalism could lead to a conspiracyof silence and the embracement a liberalfalse consciousness. of Beginningfromthe desireto respectreasonablepersons,publicjustification could become liberalhoodwinking,and"political" liberalismcould come to rest on a noble fib. Liberalpublicjustificationcannotavoidcontroversy: engages andseeks It to shape our deepest and most personal values. Liberals, I argue, should acknowledge their partisanshipand the practical impossibility of perfect convergence on common principles of justice. A workable conception of publicjustificationmust acknowledgethe importanceof a principledmoderation as a core liberal virtue, one that allows us reasonablyto aspire to publicjustificationwhile acceptingthe infirmitiesof the humancondition.

LIBERAL PUBLICJUSTIFICATION The commitmentto publicjustificationreflects a desireto regardcertain kindsof reasonsas authoritative politics:moralreasonsthatcan be openly in presented to others, critically defended, and widely shared by reasonable people. The reasons must be moral: good reasons for others as well as for oneself, not self- or narrowlyinterested. They mustbe general reasons,ones we are preparedto extend to relevantlysimilarcases. The reasonsmust be public in the sense of being widely and openly accessible; appealsto inner convictionor faith,special insight,secretinformation, very difficultforms or of reasoningareruledout. Publicjustificationmust,finally,be critical in that objections have been sought out and reasonablealtemativesconfrontedor anticipated.5 At its most basic level, publicjustificationhas dual aims: It seeks reflective justification(good reasons),but it also seeks reasonsthatcan be widely seen to be good by persons such as they are. These dual aims are pursued togetherso that,politicallyspeakingat least,thereis no independent standard againstwhich a political theorycan be judged.6Participants at a system aim of principlesthatall can see to be reasonable(not one thatsome will regard as true). Public justification does not work down from a prior, purely philosophicalstandard: Political philosophy"mustbe concerned,as moral philosophy need not be, with practicalpoliticalpossibilities."7

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The dual aims of justificationare consonantwith the principledcommitments of a liberaldemocraticsociety: By pursuingboth together,we respect not only the goodness of good reasons,but also the freedomand equalityof citizens whose capacity for reason is limited and who espouse widely divergentcomprehensiveviews.8 Indeed,the goodness of good reasons,for a "political"theory,becomes entirely a function of their capacity to gain widespread agreement among reasonable people moved by a desire for reasonableagreement.9 ThomasNagel puts it, As
we should not impose arrangements, on institutions,or requirements other people on groundsthatthey could reasonably is reject(wherereasonableness not simply a function of the independent in rightnessor wrongnessof the arrangements question,butgenuinely dependson the point of view of the individualin questionto some extent).'0

Why publicjustification? acknowledge,firstof all, the permanent We fact of diversity: Reasonable people disagree not only about preferencesand interests,but also widely and deeply about moral,philosophical,religious, and otherviews. Second, while acknowledgingdiversity,we respectas free and equal moralbeings all those who pass certainthresholdtests of reasonableness:Werespectthosewhose disagreement with us does notimpugntheir reasonableness."We try to distinguish,finally, between intractablephilosophical and religious issues and otherproblemsthat are both more urgent (at least from a liberalperspective)andeasierto grapplewith.'2We urgently need agreementon certainpracticalproblems:securingbasic liberties and establishingfair principlesof distribution.'3 Thereare, says Rawls, "reasonable and generallyacceptableanswers"for only a few questionsof political justice; "politicalwisdom consists in identifyingthose few, and amongthem 14 the most urgent." Public justificationembodies a complex form of respect for persons:It respectsboth our capacityfor a sharedreasonableness, also what Rawls but calls "theburdensof reason."'5 People disagreefor a varietyof reasonsthat do not impugn their reasonablenessor underminetheir claim to respect. Public justification offers, therefore,a way of accepting the infirmitiesof reasonablecitizens and of respectingthem, blemishes and all. Moralarguments are, after all, complex and the relevantevidence is often difficult to assess and weigh appropriately. conceptsof political moralityare inherThe ently abstractand vague. Ourjudgments are inevitably somewhat subjective-shaped, thatis, by a totalityof personalexperiencesthat areboundto differ from one person to another.Moral values are diverse, and different ones often weigh in on both sides of moral issues. Particularpolitical institutions and policies cannot embody all values: We must make hard

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choices and be selective.16 Moral evaluation is a complex and difficult business, so convergence on common political principles is bound to be arduous;it is only reasonableto accept the fact of reasonabledisagreement. Publicjustificationplays a representative role: mediating,in effect, between philosophyand the citizenry(representing philosophyto citizens and citizens to philosophy)."7 public conception avoids excessively subtle The that andcomplexformsof reasoning,preferring arguments notonly aresound Publicjustification "butsuch that they can be publicly seen to be sound."'8 respects the "constraintsof simplicity and availability of information," moderatingthe aims of philosophyso as to ensurethe wide accessibilityof the relevant forms of reasoning and evidence: These should be not too difficult and (if possible) not too deeply at odds with firmly held and not unreasonable views."9With its significantlypublic standardof reasonableness, the political conceptionfosters trustand promotescooperation.20 And it expressesthe need to performcertainurgenttaskswithoutwaitingto settle deep and intractable disputes.2' Public justification embodies the philosophical impetus toward critical reflection in a qualifiedform. These qualificationsmay strike us at first as odd, and indeed as inconsistent with certain liberal institutions.Judicial reviewelevates the politicalauthority courts,authority flows fromthe of that capacity to recognize good reasons and make good arguments.And so, Michael Walzer charges that "Judicialreview is the crucial institutional device throughwhich the philosophicalconquestof politics takes effect."22 Takingseriouslythepublicnature liberaljustificationsoftensthe supposed of antidemocratictendency of judicial review, and allows us to see that the of authority judges is not automaticin a liberaldemocratic society:They gain authority disceming interpretations the fundamental whose reasonby of law ableness can be widely seen.23 This public conceptionof justificationconstruesthe ends and means of justificationin a way thataccordswith ourbroader commitment respecting to the freedom and equality of persons. Having done so, it honestly acknowledges the substantivequalificationsbuilt into the idea of a public moral justification(namely,thatit does not aim to identifywhataresimply the best reasons, where "best" is a function of only the quality of the reasons as reasonsleaving aside the constraints wide accessibility).24 of Given a polity with a widespread capacity for reasonablenessand a general commitment to liberal principles, it seems to me right to say that the best politicaljustificationswill be public in the mannerdescribed.25 And yet, the concessions that public justificationmakes to accessibility should not be confusedwith other,more political andproblematicconcessions that

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some liberals might be disposed to make in the face of disagreementand controversy.

POLITICIZING JUSTIFICATION? To smooththe way for a practicalpolitical settlement- a convergenceof reasonablepeople on commonprinciplesof justice- liberalstoo often minimize the broad and deep ramificationsof liberalism."The question is," Rawls says, "whatis the least thatmustbe asserted;andif it mustbe asserted, what is its least controversial form?"26 liberalreticence,I shall suggest, This grows out of a desirefor widespreadagreement, also flirtswith a kind of but liberal false consciousness. Liberalsshould, I shall argue,be candid about their partisanships,open in their arguments,and explicit on the need for principledmoderation. By avoiding"claimsto universaltruth, claimsaboutthe essentialnature or and identity of persons,"Rawls asserts, the political conception of liberal justificationextends the principleof tolerationto the ultimatequestionsof philosophy itself.27"Justiceas fairness deliberatelystays on the surface"; political justification seeks only "to identify the kernel of overlapping consensus" likely to be affirmedby each of the opposing comprehensive moraldoctrinesin a reasonably just society.28 The liberalismof overlappingconsensus avoids close links with "comprehensive" moralideals:idealsthatinclude"conceptions whatis of value of in human life, ideals of personal virtue and character,and the like, that are to informmuch of our nonpoliticalconduct(in the limit of our life as a whole)."29 CharlesLarmoreputs it, "we do betterto recognize that libAs eralismis not a philosophyof man,but a philosophyof politics."30 so, And
we adopt a conceptionof the personframedas partof, and restrictedto, an explicitly political conceptionof justice.... [Plersonscan accept this conceptionof themselves as citizens anduse it when discussingquestionsof politicaljusticewithoutbeingcommitted in otherpartsof theirlife to comprehensive moralidealsoften associatedwith liberalism, for example, the ideals of autonomyand individuality.31

It is trueenoughthat,given the differencesamongthe religiousandmoral perspectivesadoptedin a liberalsociety, citizens will have differentreasons for supporting liberalsettlement.And yet, while we seek reasonsthatare the widely accessible and acceptable,we mustacknowledgethe broadanddeep implicationsof basic liberal principlesand institutions.32 Liberalpolitical

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principles do not "stay on the surface,"and their consequences cannot be confined to a certain sphere of our lives. Let us examine how the various thrustsof the minimizationstrategyfail. TheBreadthand Weight LiberalPolitical Principles of The phrase "overlappingconsensus" might be taken to underdescribe whatliberalismstandsfor.Politics is the final recoursefor peoplewho cannot agree. People who disagree about religious beliefs or other commitments mustregardcommonpoliticalprinciplesas regulativeof all theirinteractions with others. Liberalismrequires,therefore,not merely an overlappingconsensus but a consensus thatpracticallyoverridesall competingvalues.33 The idea of an overlappingconsensus does correctlysuggest thatspecifically political values need not do all the work of supportingthe liberal settlementfor everyoneor even most people.34 comprehensive The moraland religious views of liberal citizens may provide a variety of values and intereststhat support,withoutforminga partof, the sharedpolitical framework:religiousconvictionsthatprize free andopen argument a pluralistic in environment,for example, or atheistic man-centereddoctrines that prize humanfulfillmentin this life. Sharedliberalvalues need not themselvesbe strongenoughto overrideall competingones so long as theweight, as it were, of liberal and supporting(or proliberal)values is enough to outweigh all competing (or antiliberal) values and interests.The success and stabilityof liberal politics depends, therefore,on people's privatebeliefs and commitmentsbecoming importantly liberalized becoming,thatis, congruentwith and supportiveof liberalpolitics. Liberalismprovideswide boundswithin which people are free to settle on their own religious beliefs, aesthetic values, and so on. And yet, basic liberalprinciples(of respectfor personsand theirrights,for example)wash across the whole of our lives, not determiningall our choices but limiting, and structuring, conditioningour lives as a whole. Illiberalforms of private associationare strictlyruledout, and manyotherinterestsandcommitments are bound to be discouragedby the free, open, pluralistic,progressive,and (arguably)commercialisticnatureof a liberalsociety. Liberals do not, moreover,just sit and hope that personal beliefs will become liberalized. In John Locke's "LetterConcerningToleration,"for example, the liberal flag was planted deep within the bounds of people's values. AlthoughLocke denies thatthe "careof men's souls" comprehensive is committedto civil authority emphasizesthe distinctionbetweenpublic and and privaterealms,he must appeal,nevertheless,to a certainkind of private

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to character: "all Men thathave Souls largeenoughto preferthe trueInterest of the Publickbefore thatof a Party." Considerthe repertoireof argumentsfor tolerationsupplied by Locke: Thatsalvationdependson an innerfaiththatcannotbe coerced,a distinction betweentheessentialandthenonessentialin Christian doctrine,the suspicion that intoleranceis a mere cloak for power, a social compact argumentfor political legitimacy, and the claim that oppressionnot libertyleads to violence andrebellion.Significantly,Lockecrosses the public/private boundary in arguingfor toleration, in thisway directlyengagesandshapesthe most and deeply personalconcerns.Althoughsuch a strategymay seem dangerous,it is unavoidable. People's privatecommitmentsin a liberalsociety do not become liberal accidentally.A liberalpolity takes care, in shapingeducationalinstitutions and in otherways (such as promotingcommerce),to encourageits citizens to adopta rangeof commitmentsthatsupportthe liberalpoliticalsettlement. Whatis distinctiveabouta liberalsociety is not thatit wholly lacks a tutelary but It apparatus, thatthis apparatus operatesgently andoften indirectly.35 is easy for us to take the success of liberalismfor granted,but only because liberalinstitutionshave been at work for so long. TheDepth of LiberalPrinciples The notion of an overlappingconsensus might also suggest thatpolitical normssomehow stay on the surface,giving rise to no deep claims aboutthe kind of personsliberalismtakes us to be. ConsiderRawls's remark:
We can, as it were, enter...[theoriginal] position any time simply by reasoning for principlesof justice in accordancewith the enumerated restrictions. When in this way we simulatebeing in this position,our reasoningno morecommitsus to a metaphysical doctrineaboutthe natureof the self thanour playinga game like monopolycommits us to thinkingthatwe are landlordsengaged in a desperaterivalry,winnertake all.36

Liberaljustice requiresus to be a certainsort of personall the time.37 do We not "play"at being just now and then, as we occasionallyplay Monopoly. No doubt, we can often distinguishthe public and private identities of liberalcitizens:Politicallyspeaking,Saulof Tarsussettingout for Damascus Likewise as citizens, we might supportthe is the Paul who arrivesthere.38 difference principle (accepting only those inequalities that work to the advantageof the least well-off) while eschewing it in our private affairs. Nevertheless, liberalism presupposesthe widespreadexistence of certain deep character traits.39

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Liberalismelevates impartialstandardsof respect for all persons and in doing so implies that people should be capable of reflectively distancing themselves from the whole range of their particularcommitments(friendships, family ties, business associations-although not on all of them all at once) for thesakeof interposing standards impersonal ofjustice andhonoring the equalrightsof others.It cannotbe rightto say, as Rawls does, thatliberal citizens may, "regard is simply unthinkable view themselvesapartfrom it to 40 certainreligious, philosophical,and moralconvictions." Of course, criticalself-reflectionis not requiredif our personalcommitments are alreadyliberal-but what guaranteesthat?The reflective capacities of liberalcitizens, alertto possible conflicts between personalcommitments and liberalrights, should be a centralmechanismfor preservingand advancingthe cause of justice in a well-orderedsociety. TheDynamicsof LiberalPrinciples Thereis yet a thirdway in which it sometimesseems thatliberalsminimize the reachof liberalvalues:by overemphasizing extentto which liberalism the settles basic moralissues once and for all. And so Rawls:
a liberalconception meets the urgentpolitical requirement fix, once and for all, the to contentof basic rightsandliberties,and to assign themspecial priority.Doing this takes those guaranteesoff the political agenda....41

The extent to which liberalvalues constituteus as personsbecomes clearer when we considerthe dynamicqualitiesof liberalpublicjustification. Manybasic liberalguaranteesnow seem prettyfirmly settled in America (the evil of slavery,women's suffrage,the rightto criticizethe govemment), and these might be takenas a hardcore of rightswhose fixity contributes to public trust and political stability.It cannot be claimed, however, that our Constitution(or any other)managedto "fix, once and for all, the contentof basic rights and liberties."The contours of every one of our most basic liberties remains a matterof lively disagreementand whole categories of rights(of homosexuals,for example) remainlargely unacknowledged.The Constitutiondid not so much settle as frame an ongoing debate about the boundsbetween individuallibertyand governmentpower. Public justificationshould be a never-endingcommitment.It would be sheerhubristo thinkthatwe have,or everwill have, thewhole politicaltruth. We are always learningandconfrontingnew circumstances; will always we have progress to make. Moreover, we could have no confidence in our

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reasonsfor committingourselvesto what we understand justice to be unless we keep debatingit and remainopen to new and betterinterpretations it. of We cannothonorour statusas reasonablebeings unless we remainopen to a criticaldialogue aboutthejustifiabilityof our deepestpolitical conceptions, whateverthey may be. Liberalismestablishes,for good reason,a processof public debateabout itself among otherthings. Liberalsneed dissentersfrom liberalismbecause, as Mill observed,"Hewho knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that."42 Not surprisingly,then, closing public debate on basic political issues is incompatiblewith our deepest ideals and our practiceof respecting even subversive speech (while drawing a sharp line between speech and action).43 I do not mean to say thatthe questionof slavery,for example, should be reopened.But the fact thatrace remainson our agendameansthatthe liberal of understanding this basic issue remainsvivid andhas a chanceto grow and deepen.And because publicjustificationis dynamicandopen, we can hope thatliberalvalueswill be tested,refined,andextendedever morepervasively throughoutsociety." All this means, as well, that while certain liberal guaranteesmay become stable, the overallpatternof rightsis likely to be in constantmotion. Publicjustificationis not a means only but also an end in itself: being a self-critical reasongiveris the best way of being a liberal and a good way (liberalsmustsuppose)of living a life. The reflective,self-criticalcapacities we associatewith publicjustificationmust,therefore,be regarded aspermanent and ever-developingcharacteristics liberalcitizens at theirbest. of TheMethodof Avoidance For the sake of facilitatingthe public acceptanceof basic liberalprinciples, liberals sometimes limit the reach and consequencesof liberalprinciples in the ways we have seen. I have argued, in effect, that liberalism constitutesa regime:Liberalprinciplesandgoals shapeourlives pervasively, deeply, and relentlessly. To a great extent, the modes of limitationthat we have examined so far are more apparent thanreal- instancesof reticencerather thana realrefusal to acknowledgethe full implicationsof liberalism.Rawls finally admitsthat liberalismshapesthe lives of liberalcitizens broadlyanddeeply,influencing "people'sdeepest aspirations."45 insists only thatliberalismis not "fully He comprehensive"(meaning that the regime does not prescribe everything about the lives of its citizens) and says that its broad influences simply

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Rawls defends the "cannotbe avoided on any view of politicaljustice."46 pervasive and nonneutral consequencesof liberaljustice by arguingthat its them), not to all aim is to be fair to moralpersons(as liberalismunderstands conceptionsof the good or all ways of life.47 of But deep at the heart of Rawls's understanding justification lies the "methodof avoidance,"a directstrategyto avoid assessingthe truthor falsity of deeply held personalviews, such as religious beliefs or other aspects of people's comprehensivemoralviews:
thanothervalues nor need we say thatpolitical values are intrinsicallymore important and that'swhy the othervalues are overridden.Indeed,saying that is the kind of thing we hope to avoid, and achievingan overlappingconsensusenables us to avoid it.48

Does it really? Can public justification avoid making ultimatejudgments aboutwhich religious beliefs, for example, arejustified? What does a liberal say about a range of religious beliefs that include and Protestantism, sects thatrequire ecumenicalCatholicism,fundamentalist holy war againstnonbelievers?There are, says Rawls, "no resourceswithin the political view to judge those conflicting conceptions.They are equally permissibleprovided they respect the limits imposed by the principles of political justice."49Underline "provided":All religions compatible with The liberalismwill be respected;those not compatiblewill be opposed.50 liberalmust in this way imply that religious convictions incompatiblewith liberalismare unsupportable. In makingthe personalchoice aboutwhetherto supportliberal politics, one would weigh liberaland proliberal values againstthe strongestcompeting package,as one sees it. (Is the freedomto debate,choose, and live one's own way reallymoreimportant thanstrugglingto establisha commonculture that supports piety and other-worldlinessand punishes blasphemers?Is thanthe ideal of Christian Unity?) peaceful pluralismreally more important To vindicate its overridingstatus, a liberal political moralitywill have to speak directlyto illiberalcomprehensivepersonalideals, arguingthatthese are false or less important thancompetingliberalvalues, or thatthey can be mendedand made compatiblewith liberalism. The reticent liberal may still try to avoid issues of truthand ultimate importance excludingfromthe politicalspace, as it were, the comparison by between the political conceptionand conflictingcomprehensiveviews:
Of course, citizens mustdecide for themselveswhether,in light of theircomprehensive views, and taking into account the great political values realized by the political

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conception,they can endorsethatconceptionwith its idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation.5'

But can political theory simply be silent at the crucial momentof deciding on the meritsof liberalism?52 Rawls's conception of justification employs a remarkabledivision of labor.The citizen "mustdecide for himself,"in light of his own comprehenThe sive schemeof values, whetherto acceptthe politicalconstruction. issue of acceptanceis not within the verge of "political" justificationfor Rawls, because acceptance raises questions of ultimate importance necessarily situated within the Apaceof comprehensiveviews, a space that remains personaland publicly opaqueeven afterpolitical theoryhas done its work. Liberalpoliticalvalues mustoccupy, as I have argued,much of the same space as personal comprehensiveideals, religious and otherwise. And so, unableto confine political values to an autonomoussphere,Rawls attempts to restrict the scope of political justification by dividing the process of in justificationin two. First,thereis the stageof construction, whichwe leave aside the controversialelementsof our comprehensivepersonalperspective because we recognizethatreasonablepeople with whom we wish to form a political associationreject them.53 The stage of constructionis a search for reasonableagreement.Only after constructionis complete do we enter a second stage in which the questionof acceptancecomes to the fore. At this second stage, our controversialreligiousand otherpersonalconvictions are reengaged:Can I, as a devout Catholic, really live with the kinds of questioning attitudesandbeliefs likely to be promotedby a liberalframework?54 The problemis thatsegmentingthe processof justificationonly gives the appearanceof avoiding a direct conflict between political and personal values. The conflict is not avoidedbut merelyshiftedoff thepoliticalagenda out (and, presumably, of political fora) by bracketingthe questionof theory acceptance,makingit private,and leaving it aside until the public construction is complete. The broaderand deeperimplicationsof liberalismremain, however, mattersof public concern that citizens are bound to raise. Public justificationshould have somethingto say abouthow the interfacebetween political and personalvalues is negotiated.Managingthat interfaceis, in a sense, the crucialpoliticalissue:an issue we cannothelp addressing public in fora,an issue that(in some of its aspectsat least)we shouldaddressin public fora. A more realistic model of justificationwould allow, in effect, that participants' personal moral convictions are engaged as each feature of the political view is constructed.Theory constructionproperlyinvolves not a rigid segmentationof public and private spaces of value, but a process of

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negotiationbetween sharedpublic values and each person'sset of comprehensive and personal values. None of us can entirely leave behind the baggage of our personalconvictionswhen thinkingaboutpolitical morality. At each stage of the argument, would seek principlesthatwe can live with we in our public and broaderpersonalcapacities, as beings at once public and private. And here again, despite his attemptto limit the space of political values, Rawls reluctantlyadmitsthata defenderof liberalismcannotavoid steering into the shoals of religious controversyand othermattersof deep disagreementandcannot,crucially,avoid engagingandpublicly relyinguponimportantfeaturesof a comprehensiveset of moralvalues:
in affirminga political conceptionof justice we may eventuallyhave to assert at least certainaspects of our own comprehensive(by no means necessarilyfully comprehensive) religious or philosophicaldoctrine.This happenswhenever someone insists, for example, that certain questions are so fundamentalthat to ensure their being rightly settledjustifies civil strife . . . [T]he salvationof a whole people, may be said to depend on it. At this pointwe have no alternative to deny this, andto assertthe kindof thing but we had hoped to avoid.55

The participants theoryconstruction in have recourseto theircomprehensive views as they go along. And so, for example, liberals must "deny that the concern for salvation requiresanythingincompatiblewith equal liberty of conscience."56 Publicjustificationis a process of constructivenegotiationin which the moves arepartlydetermined what we tegardas reasonableassertionsand by compromisesfrom within our comprehensiveview, and not only from a public perspective.We do not put off comparingthe political construction with our personalview until the constructionis complete. We do not really keep personal and public spaces of value separate.Each of us carriesour comprehensive moralviews with us in politics,drawingon theresourcesthey provide, and displaying these resourcesto others. Our deepest convictions and commitmentsare at risk in political controversies,and they are shaped by the confrontation with both political normsand the deep convictions of other people. Enough must be said to adjudicateat least the most serious conflicts betweensharedpoliticalprinciplesandwidely held comprehensive views. The political construction inevitablyoccupies much of the same space as people's personalcomprehensivevalues. Politicaltheorycannot,then,avoid advancingclaims sufficient to tame or overridethe illiberalcomponentsof comprehensivepersonalvalue schemes. The success of liberalpublicjusti-

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fication does not requirethe commonembraceof one comprehensivemoral of doctrine,but neitherdoes it allow the separation publicandprivatespaces of value.

JUSTIFICATION VERSUS LOYAL TY? There could be a substantiveand very political reason for wanting to segment the process of justificationin the way that Rawls, at times at least, suggests. The stability of a liberal regime requiresthat the personalmoral and religious views of many people will (when illiberal) be mended to support the liberal settlement. Ideally, this transitionwill take place via in candid,open public arguments. This is important partbecause the transitional stage does not breaksharplywith normalpractice:Publicjustification is, as I have argued,the way liberalsshould live. Publicjustificationis not the only meansof getting people to be liberals. Some people will become liberalwithout participating or being directly in influenced by anything like a public argument.Indeed, one might even suppose that some people are more likely to be liberalsif they are not provoked to reflectionby a publicmoralargument. Theremight,in otherwords, be a trade-offbetween candidpublic argument liberalsocialization. and Many people's comprehensivemoral views are, Rawls asserts, rather loosely formulatedandonly partiallythoughtthrough.57 Some who go along with liberalismonly as a modus vivendior who might oppose it altogether will often fail to be fully conscious of the relationbetween liberalpolitical principles and their broaderpersonal values. As a consequence, liberal principles
are more likely to win an initial allegiance that is independentof our comprehensive views and prior to conflict with them. Thus when conflicts do arise, the political conception has a better chance of sustainingitself and shapingthose views to accord with its requirements. do not say, of course, that the strongerthe initial allegiance We the better;but it is desirable,politically speaking,that it be strongenough to make an overlappingconsensusstable.58

People may go along without understanding eventuallydevelop liberal and convictionsout of habitrather thanfromanythinglike a reasonedargument:
many if not most citizens come to affirm their common political conception without seeing anyparticular connection,one way or theother,betweenit andtheirotherviews.59

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Unconscious socialization, the result of living in an open, pluralistic environment,can contributeto a liberal settlement(admittedly,a nonideal one settlement).' As a practicalmatter, mightpin one's hopeson unreflective acceptance,especially if one were disposedto see self-criticalreflectionand open justification as politically disruptiveand largely beside the point of liberalpolitics. And Rawls, in his reticentmoments,sometimesseems to be versionof liberalism,one thatsacrificesfull disclodeploying an "exoteric" sure to avoid confrontation contentionand smooth the way to a liberal and settlement.6' Widespread,unreflectivetheoryacceptancemight be jeopardizedby the open and candiddefense of liberalismas a regime.Sacrificingphilosophical candor and open argumentto smooth the transitionto liberal peace might well be justified- if therereally is a tensionbetween candorand allegiance, and the need for allegiance to liberalismreally is more urgentthanthe need for full disclosureand open publicjustification.Undersome circumstances, in otherwords, publicjustificationmay be a luxury,and promotingliberal false consciousness a moralimperative. Must liberals,to generateallegiance,exercise cautionin spelling out and defending the full implicationsof liberalism?Should philosophical types keep theirbig mouthsshut?

LIBERAL JUSTIFICATION: PUBLICAND CANDID on Compromising the full disclosureof what liberalismstandsfor entails high costs. First of all, while public justification is a form of respect for persons, failing to be candid is a form of disrespect.The search for widely accessible reasons is motivatedby a desire to respect the limits of reasonableness of common citizens. The embraceof liberalfalse consciousness is moved not by respectbut by fearof conflict anddespairat the incapacityfor reasonableness. Many practicalproblemscannotbe settled withoutconfrontingthe deep and divisive implicationsof a liberal public morality.Constitutional cases involving the FirstAmendment'sfree exercise of religionclause is (depending on how you look at it) a minefield or a gold mine of hardand deeply Even so, revealingquestionsat the tense interfaceof religionand politics.62 one could try to paperover and avoid problemsby paying lip service to the distinctionanda simplisticidea of liberalneutrality, ideasthat public/private have a certainamountof currencyandthatdo, even when sincerelydeployed, obfuscatewhat is at stake in practicalpolitical issues.63

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Thereareotherbenefitsof publicjustificationthata lack of candorwould threaten: Although a public conception of justification,by avoiding overly complex and esoteric argumentsfosters trust,any lack of candor,should it become publiclyknown,would undermine trust.And althoughavoiding that problems might seem justified as a temporarymeasure,critical reflection might be hardto revive, especially underconditionsof real popularconsensus, and afterphilosophicalandpopularculturehave diverged. Besides the costs of theoreticalreticence, there are positive benefits of stirringup a little conflict. My sense is that Mill was right in thinkingthat some intemaloppositionto a society's politicalmoralityis a good thing.(As Yogi Berraput it; "If the world were perfect, it wouldn't be.") Liberalsin particular apt to forgetwhat it is they standfor. Liberaltheoriststend to are systematicallyminimizewhatliberalismentails(as we have seen). One must be troubledby the slow and limp response of Westernintellectualsto the Ayatollah'scall for SalmanRushdie'sdeath.Confronting fanaticsand grappling with divisiveness remindsus of what we standfor as liberals,and that we live in a world in which liberal values are neitheruncontroversial nor foregone conclusions. Timidity and a too readywillingness to compromise can be as dangerous as intransigenceand dogmatism.It is not obvious to me that divisiveness is now a greaterdangerthan timidity.Drainingliberalismof its selfconsciousnessandpartisanship helps cultivatean allegiancethatis blindand bland. We should pick our fights carefully but preserve our ability to recognize and fight the good fight. As things stand, Americans are not especially reflective aboutwhat our regimestandsfor. A certainboldness in the defense of liberalismmay now be a public service. Of course, domestic peace and tranquility the many political goods and thathave nothingto do with being self-critical,reason-givingliberalcitizens all might counsel in favor of paperingover divisive questions.And let me addone additional in consideration favorof reticence:Liberalism anexport is commodityandnotonly a good for domesticconsumption.64 Thereareplaces in the worldwhere liberalvalues are decidedlyon the defensive. To encourage the exportof liberalism,we mightwantto keepthepricedownby playing along with those who would minimizewhat it standsfor. My own dispositionwould be to adoptthe publicconceptionof justification and to deploy it candidly.We shouldseek, in otherwords,justifications that are not only reasonablebut that can be widely seen to be reasonable. Once justification has gone public, a good deal has been conceded to pluralismand the burdensof reason.We shouldbe extremelyreluctant go to furtherand avoid articulatingwhat appearto be inescapablebut possibly

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To divisive implicationsof liberalism.65 do so would be to strikeat the heart of the liberal aspirationto public justificationby driving a wedge between critical reflectionand politicalpractice.

LIBERAL MODERATION FORA PRINCIPLED Lest my defense of "openjustificationsopenly arrivedat"should appear naive, let me introducea final consideration.Public justification accepts, even invites, open moraldisagreementon a wide range of political controversies. And yet we know thatbecause even the most conscientiousarguers often startfrom markedlydifferentpositions, consensus can be difficult to achieve. On certainespecially difficultissues, liberalpublicjustificationhas room for a kind of moderation. The aim of liberalpublicjustificationis to respectdiversitywhile forging a framework commonmoralprinciplesthatall can understand, of accept,and The demystifiedsocial openly affirmbeforeone another. aim is a transparent, of order,one capable,as Waldron puts it, "of explainingitself at the tribunal eachperson'sunderstanding." so, Rawls'spoliticalconceptionof justice And aims at "a publicly recognized point of view from which all citizens can examine before one anotherwhetheror not theirpolitical and social institutions arejust."66 allows us to express Achieving a commonmoralframework our common reasonablenesspublicly; it allows us, in effect, to mutually recognize one anotheras equally reasonablemoralbeings. The only way that we can achieve a public moral frameworkwhile accepting the deep and permanentfact of diversity is by putting aside not only the personalinterestsandreligiousbeliefs, but also the manyphilosophical andmoralconvictionsthatreasonablefellow citizens will disagreewith. Participants must sharean overridingdesireto affirmprinciplesthatare not simplyjustified (or true)in any sense, but ratherarecapableof being widely seen to be justified (or reasonable). The goal of a public moralframeworkis a noble one, butjust how adamantly should we pursueit? We do not, Rawls insists, strikebalancesamongthe differentcomprehensive moraldoctrines(religiousandphilosophical)thatexist in society:To do so would be to abandonthe hope of appearing beforeone anotheras free and We or fully autonomous,citizens.67 must abstractaway fromor leave equal, behindgroundsthatwe cannotsharewith reasonable fellow citizens.We seek a common ground of publicly reasonable consensus; we do not accept, moderate,and balance enduringand ineliminabledifferencesof belief and perspective.

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It is unrealistic to hope for perfect convergence on a common moral Thatwould requirea very strongand sustaineddesirefor public standpoint: moralagreement.Given the rangeof nonpoliticalintereststhatpeople quite properlyhave in a liberalsociety, it would be hardto imaginethatthe desire for publicmoralconsensuscould be sufficientlystrongor sustainedto make convergence a realistic possibility. The kind of common moral standpoint represented the veil of ignoranceand the originalposition may be ideals by to be aspiredfor,but,practicallyspeaking,we cannothope reallyto converge on a common understanding basic political principles.68 of People will be moved to peek, as it were, out frombehindthe veil of ignorancenot only by self-interestor impatience,but also by the varietyof moralbeliefs excluded by the drive for principlesthatall reasonablepeople can accept. Moderationis a virtue thatcomes to the fore when we acknowledgethat afterpublicreasonableness done its work(or as muchworkas reasonable has people areprepared allow it to do), ourperspectiveswill inevitablyremain to pluralanddivergent.Moderation allows us to acceptthe fact thata largeand diverse group of reasonablepeople can never really standwithin the same moral framework.69 Even the best possible liberal settlement will have somethingof the character a composite of irreducibly of dissimilarparts. It would be nice to think that all of us -rich and poor; libertarian and socialist; Catholic,Jew, Amish, andJehovah'sWitness- could standbefore one anothersimply in our moralcapacity.And, indeed, we should aspireto do so. But at the end of the political day we must simply accept the fact of reasonable disagreement a reasonable and divergenceof moralperspective.70 At thatpoint, the most reasonablething may well be to moderateour claims mutuallyin the face of the reasonableclaims of others,to balance,andsplit at least some of our differences. Respectis called for in the face of personswhomwe regardas reasonable. Even when we cannotreallyrespecta particular view (antisemitism,racism, and otherviews based on sheer prejudice),we may still tolerate its expression, partlybecause it is being expressedby a person:Wewish to respectthat personas a being capableof reasonandwe wish to respectspeech(thevehicle of reason) as such. And so we toleratethe antisemiteby allowing him to express his views, but we concede no groundto him, we do not compromise with him, we do not approachhim with moderation. Moderation goes beyondtoleration. Thereare,for example,manyreasonable argumentson both sides of the abortiondebate.The abortionquestion is so vexing, in a sense, precisely becausethereareweighty reasonson both sides, and it is easy to see how reasonablepeople can come down on either side. Onpolicy issues such as abortion, which seems, as thingsstand,to come

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the down to a fairly close call betweentwo well-reasonedsets of arguments, best thing for reasonablepeople to do mightbe to acknowledgethe difficulty of the argument the burdensof reason,to respecttheiropponentsand to and compromisewith them, to find some middlegroundthatgives somethingto The goes forward.7' rightkindof middleground each side while the argument on abortionwould acknowledgeboth the greatweight due to the judgment of of the motherandthefact thatthischoice concernsthecontinuance another life. It would, perhaps,honor a woman's choice up to a certainpoint in the pregnancyand also countenancea variety of measuresthat would not be permittedwere abortionsimply a matterof an individual'sright to choose: measuresto ensureat least thatthe choice is reflectiveand informed.72 Moderationis a liberal virtuejustified by the difficulty of occupying a commonmoralstandpoint, of exercisingourcommoncapacityfor reasonor ableness in the same way. Taking moderationseriously would lead us to qualifyDworkin'sinsistencethatthepartywith the strongestcase on balance (no matter how close a call) has a right to win. The best solution may in sometimesbe to give somethingto each side. Moderation the face of very strongcompetingcases offers a way of honoringnot simplythe best case but to also the case that is very strong.There is an argument be developed here for judicial prudenceand statesmanship,not (I hope) for pragmatismor a blanketdeferenceto legislatures.73 politicalorder To acceptmoderation to admitthata mutuallytransparent is is unrealistic.Explicitly embracingthe value of moderationmeans that we representcitizens in publicjustificationwith some measureof their differences and disagreements(some measureof partialityof perspective)intact. It is a way of coming directly to grips with the residualand realistically ineliminablemoraldiversitythat(on my analysis)leadsto Rawls'sreticence. I am not, I should emphasize, arguing that we should celebrate our inabilityto abstract away from some of our differences;we should acknowledge but not idealizeour incapacityto achieve a commonmoralperspective. We should, rather,accept this limitation as an infirmity of the human conditionand adoptan attitudethat allows us to deal with it constructively.

CONCLUSION Even where citizens share a desire to establish and support political institutions that can be commonly affirmed as reasonable, fully public justificationson controversialissues (ones thatall reasonablepeople really do accept)will oftenbe impossibleto come by - we mustreconcileourselves

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to that. Although it may fail to achieve a constructionthat all reasonable people can agree upon, public reflection can help us narrowthe gaps and negotiatethe tensions amongpublic and personalvalues.74 Because it respectsreasonablepersonsandthe limits of reasonas located in persons,publicjustificationis distinctlyliberaland democratic,substantive andpartisan. Whereliberalssee respectfor free andequalpersons,some religious people are going to see "secularhumanism" the hegemony of and a way of thinkingthat owes a lot to science and the enlightenmentbut that is deeply at odds with some forms of religion.75 This cannot be avoided. Liberalsoffer truebelievers, like everyoneelse, a sphereof privacyand the opportunityto continue arguing.The liberal must, in the end, defend his partisanship not evade it. If liberalismis justified, that must be, in part and at least, because of the superiorityof justificationsbased on widely acceptable reasonsandpublic arguments, because reasonablepeople reallyare and worthyof liberalrespect. The publicconceptionof justificationmay seem to embracethe concerns of those "postmodernist" who deny the availabilityof objective philosophers standards truth, of standards whosejustificationdoes not dependon thesocial practices of particularsocieties.76But while acknowledging the practical limits of reason, public justificationdoes not embraceconventionalismor localism. Reason establishesthe contoursandsubstanceof moderation: is It reasonableto want to live in accordancenot only with reasonableprinciples but also with principles that all can see to be reasonable.We have good reasons for temperingour expectationsaboutthe public efficacy of reason, not for abandoning aspiration governourselvesreasonably. our to Public justification is a core liberal goal, one that informs practical aspirations politicalinstitutions(like judicialreview) thatliberalscan be and proudof. But publicjustificationis not our only political goal. We want the freedomto live our own lives, and so a releasefrom political argument. We want peace, and more thanthat,we want comity or concord. Comity is a political good thatis not quite the same as moralconsensus, as RichardHofstadter describes:
Comityexists in society to the degreethatthose enlistedin its contendinginterestshave a basic minimal regardfor each other....The basic humanityof the opposition is not forgotten;civility is not abandoned; sense thata communitylife mustbe carriedon the afterthe acerbicissues of the momenthave been fought over andwon is seldom far out 77 of mind....

And in the firstFederalist, Publiusurgedmoderationas a means to comity even more forcefully:

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So numerousindeed and so powerfulare the causes which serve to give a false bias to judgment,thatwe, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the rightside of questionsof the first magnitudeto society. This circumstance,if duly attendedto, would furnisha lesson of moderationto those who are ever so much of persuaded theirbeing in the rightin any controversy.

Comity, or concord, requires a gift for conciliation and a willingness to compromise. There may, of course, be groundsfor variousforms of moderation (for a prudentmoderation, example,in the face of rancorous for disagreement and imminentviolence). We do well, however, to make room for a principled moderationat the most basic level, in our understanding publicjustificaof tion. To do so allows us to define and defend a form of moderationwhose justificationgrows out of the commitmentto reasonableness itself, and so to extend moderation groundsthathold out the promiseof drawingpeople on into theprocessof public reason.Principled moderation drawssupport,then, from the hope of an ever-more-reasonable political order.

NOTES
1. I will referto the United States as an exampleof a liberalsociety because it is familiar and in manyways liberal.I do not mean to identifyliberalismwith Americanpolitics, although certaininstitutions especially suitedto liberalreasongiving arewell developedin America.For a more extended treatmentof liberalismin general and as manifestedin American national institutions,see my Liberal Virtues(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1990). 2. JeremyWaldron, "Theoretical of Foundations Liberalism," PhilosophicalQuarterly, 37 (1987), 127-150. 3. Representatives liberalcontractualism of includeJohnRawls (see works cited below); T. M. Scanlon [see, especially, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism,"in Utilitarianismand Beyond,ed. by A. Sen andB. Williams(Cambridgc: Cambridge UniversityPress,1982)]Thomas Nagel [see "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,"Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (Summer1987):215-240]; and BruceA. Ackerman [seeSocialJustice in theLiberalState (New Haven, CT:Yale UniversityPress, 1980) and "WhyDialogue?" Journal of Philosophy,86, (1) (1989), 5-22]. Thereare, of course, important differencesamongthese writers. 4. This tension activates the search for a public conception of justification,not the embrace of a philosophicalpragmatism conventionalismas some have suggested;see Richard or Rorty,"The Contingencyof Community," Contingency, in Irony,and Solidarity(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989). 5. This accountis indebtedto discussions in JohnRawls,A Theoryof Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1971), 130-136; Dennis F. Thompson,"Representatives the in Welfare State," in Amy Gutmann,ed., Democracy and the WelfareState (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1988); and H. B. Acton, "PoliticalJustification," Civil Disobediin ence: Theoryand Practice, ed. by H. A. Bedau(New York:Pegasus, 1969), 220-239.

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6. As Rawls puts it: "The very contentof the first principlesof justice. . . is determined in in partby the practicaltaskof politicalphilosophy." "Kantian Constructivism MoralTheory," Journal of Philosophy,77 (1980), 515-572, 543; see also 524. 7. Rawls, "Overlapping," 24. 8. Rawls, "Overlapping," 4-5. 9. Persons, that is, with the two "moralpowers"("the capacity for an effective sense of justice" and "the capacity to form, revise, and rationallypursue a conception of the good") describedby Rawls in "Kantian 525. Constructivism," 10. Nagel, "MoralConflict,"221. 11. I have benefited from an excellent unpublishedpaperby Amy Gutmannand Dennis Thompson,"MoralConflict and PoliticalConsensus." 12. On the notion of urgency, I have benefited from T. M. Scanlon, "Preferenceand Urgency," Journal of Philosophy72, (6) (1975), 655-669. 13. Rawls, "Overlapping," 16-17. 14. Rawls, "Overlapping," 16. 15. John Rawls, "The Domain of the Political and OverlappingConsensus,"New York UniversityLaw Review,64 (May 1989), 233-255, 236. 16. This accountis drawnfrom Rawls, "Domain,"237. 17. Politicaljustificationdoes not apply a generalmoraltheorysuch as utilitarianism the to basic structureof society. For early suggestions along similar lines, see Theoryof Justice, sections 9 and 87. Rawls's moreexplicit emphasison political theory'sdual aims helps show that it would be wrong to charge Rawls, as did Allan Bloom, with making merely social or conventionalstandards absolute;see "Justice: JohnRawls vs. The Tradition PoliticalPhilosof ophy,"American Political ScienceReview(1975), 648-662,661-662. Rawls'scomplexstandard of justificationincorporates measureof criticalreasonableness. a Rawlsalso avoids committing himself to the kindof contentiousclaimsaboutthe natureof morality Richard that Rortybelieves he has found in his recent writings;see "Contingencyof Community," where Rortyendorses (and sees Rawls as endorsing)a pragmatism that"makesit impossibleto ask the question 'Is oursa moralsociety?"' (59). Rawlsdoes not ruleout thepossibilityof realorobjectivestandards of morality. " " 18. Rawls, "Overlapping, 21; and see "Constructivism, 537, 561. 19. Rawls, "Priority," 258; and also John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical," Philosophyand PublicAffairs(1985), 223-251, 225, 230. Rawls arguesthatthe political conceptionof justice needs a "companionagreementon guidelines of public inquiry and rules for assessing evidence. Given the fact of pluralism,these guidelinesandrulesmustbe specified by reference to the forms of reasoning available to common sense, and by the procedures conclusionsof science when not controversial" and ("Overlapping," andsee also 20, 16). And notice remarksin Theoryto the effect that the constructionof the original position relies only on generalfacts thatare widely acceptable;see section 26, especially 158-159. 20. Rawls "Overlapping," Complexarguments 21. shouldbe avoided,in part,becausethey generatesuspicion. 21. All of this helps to establishthe need for complexityin the way people are represented politically, and recalls Aristotle'sdiscussion in Book 3 of the Politics, where the principleof representation the basis of virtue is deemed politicallyinadequate: will fail to attractthe on It voluntaryallegianceof the manywhose claimto poweris basedon theirfreedomnot theirvirtue. RawlsandAristotleseek to respect,by to some degreerepresenting intact,thedeepestdifferences among classes and groupsof people in politicaljustification. 22. MichaelWalzer,"FlightFromPhilosophy," reviewof BenjaminBarber, Conquest a The of Politics, in the New York Reviewof Books (February 1989), 42-44, 43. 2,

Macedo/ POLIIlCS OF JUSTIFICATION 301 23. Which is not somethingthatRonaldDworkinputs muchemphasison. It also shouldbe clear that this paragraph helps answer Michael Walzer's concerns about the antidemocratic tendenciesof liberalpolitical theory;see his "PhilosophyandDemocracy," Political Theory,9, (3) (1981), 379-399. 24. See Rawls, "Independence," 14. 25. This is an important qualification.Publicjustificationmight yield unacceptable results in some circumstances.This may parallel Aristotle's claim that the practicallybest regime depends in parton particular circumstances,"Forby naturethere is a certain[people] apt for mastery, another apt for kingship, and another that is political, and this is both just and advantageous." Politics, trans. by Cames Lord, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 115, and see Book 3, chapters13 and 17 generally. 26. Rawls, "Overlapping Consensus,"8. 27. Rawls, "Not Metaphysical," and passim. 223 28. Rawls, "Not Metaphysical," 246. 29. Rawls, "Priority," 252; religiousandphilosophicalconceptionsof morality,as opposed to a politicalconception,tendto be comprehensive. Rawls wantsto distancehis limitedpolitical conceptionfromall comprehensive conceptions,whetherfriendlyto liberalism(Kantianautonomy, Millian individuality)or not so friendly(perfectionism,utilitarianism). 30. CharlesLarmore,Patterns of Moral Complexity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1987), 129. 31. Rawls, "Not Metaphysical," 245. And Larmore,"Liberalism... does not requirean individualisticimage of man;its individualism be strictlypolitical,"Patterns, 126. can 32. 1 have benefited from an unpublishedtalk by Michael Sandel:"PoliticalPhilosophy: How Political? How Philosophical?" discussion in what follows overlapssomewhatwith My WilliamA. Galston'sinsightful"Pluralism Social Unity,"Ethics 99 (July 1989), 711-726. and 33. Rawls allows that"the political conceptionof justice"expresses "valuesthatnormally outweighwhateverothervalues oppose them...." "Overlapping," 16. 34. "Deep and unresolvabledifferenceson mattersof fundamental significance is permanent,"Rawls, "Constructivism," 542. 35. The concem with virtueandcharacter a mutedbut not inaudibletheme in the history is of liberalism. Consider Adam Smith's recommendations education, militia training,and on religioussects in The Wealth Nations, or the moreelaborateschemes providedby Tocqueville of in Democracyin America and Mill in Representative Government. 36. Rawls, "Not Metaphysical," 238-239. 37. Here,Rawls may be respondingto Bernard Williams'sassertionthat"ground projects" giving our lives basic point and meaning are properlybeyond the reach of impersonalmoral criticism; see "Persons, Character,and Morality,"in Moral Luck (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1983), and his remarks moralintegrityin Utilitarianism: andAgainst, on For ed. by J. J. C. Smartand BernardWilliams (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1973), 108-118. Orhe may be acceptingMichaelSandel'sinsistenceon the value of commitmentsthat deeply constituteour identity;see Liberalismand the Limitsof Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1982). 38. As Rawls remarks,"Not Metaphysical," 242; and see Larmore, Patterns, 125. 39. As Amy Gutmannargues in her excellent "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," Philosophyand PublicAffairs, 14 (Summer1985), 308-321. 40. Rawls,"NotMetaphysical," 241, and"Constructivism," andsee Larmore's 545; critique of "themyth of wholeness,"Patterns, 114-130. 41. Rawls, "Overlapping," 19-20. 42. JohnStuartMill, On Liberty,D. Spitz, ed. (New York:Norton,1975), 36.

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43. See Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). But why protect the advocacy of violence? Because it is still advocacy.In dealing with the positions advocatedby Klansmen, however, we toleratebut do not respect or compromise;we allow them their say but do not budge. 44. It also seems to me thatthe basic politicalmoralityof a liberalsociety,whetherwe think of it in terms of Rawls's well-orderedsociety or the Constitution'scommitmentto ordered liberty,is, as Lincoln recognized,aspirational: includingnot only rules thatwe eitherobserve or do not, but also ideals thatwe can only strive for. Liberalprinciplesare dynamic,then, not only because of the controversythey generatebut also because of their inherent,aspirational quality;they are not easy to live up to. See TheLincoln-DouglasDebates, ed by R. Johannsen (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1978), 267-269, 304, and passim. establishedby 539. 45. Rawls,"Constructivism," Rawls, indeed,allows thatthe institutions liberaljustice "can have decisive long-termsocial effects and importantly shape the character and aims of the membersof society, the kindsof personsthey are and want to be," "Constructivism,"538. A political conceptionof justice specifies, he says, "theformof a social world- a backgroundframeworkwithin which the life of associations,groups, and individualcitizens proceeds.""Overlapping," and "Priority," 262-268. 21; 46. Rawls, "Priority," 265. 47. Rawls, "Fairnessto Goodness,"554. Rawls does not deny that liberalism is biased "If againstsome ways of life, only thatsuch biases as it containsare not arbitrary: a conception of thegood is unableto endureandgainadherents underinstitutions equalfreedomandmutual of toleration, one must question whether its passing is to be regretted.We might say that a well-orderedsociety sets up a situationin which Mill's choice-criterion the good can be fairly of applied.... " "Faimessto Goodness,"549. 48. Rawls, "Overlapping," and see "Priority" 17; 271: "Weneed not establishthe absolute importanceof political good, only that it is a significantgood within a political conceptionof justice." 49. Rawls, "Overlapping 9. Consensus," 50. Illiberal religions will be tolerated(so long as they go along with the regime) but preventedfromacting on their illiberalbeliefs. 51. Rawls, "Priority," 259; for similarremarks, "Domain," see 246, 250. 52. Considerwhat Rawls says in defendinghis list of "primary goods" againstthe charge these "arenot what, from within anyone'scomprehensivedoctrine,can be takenas ultimately important: they are not, in general, anyone's idea of the basic values of humanlife"; Rawls, 258. Rawls arguesthatthe primary "Priority," goods are not intendedas an accountof what is of ultimateor basic importance: Thatquestionhas no public answer- thatis, no answerwidely acceptableto reasonable people. It is preciselythe sortof questionthata "political" theoryseeks to avoid or to abstractaway from. Questions of ultimate importanceare filtered out by the requirement the theorybe publiclyaccessible andwidely agreeable.And so, from the point that of view of a "political"conception,thereexists no otherspace of values to which the index of primarygoods is to approximate, if therewere, this would make the view at least partially for comprehensiveand hence defeat the aim of achievingan overlappingconsensusgiven the fact of pluralism; "Priority," 259. 53. The idea of approximating truthhas, Rawls says, no role in "political" to justification; "Constructivism," 561. 54. One thinks,for example,of the resistanceof the Amish to publichigh school education, a conflict the SupremeCourtfaced in Wisconsin Yoder,406 U.S. 205 (1972). v. 55. Rawls, "Overlapping," 14. 56. Rawls, "Overlapping," 13.

Macedo/ POLITICSOF JUSTIFICATION 303 57. "Normallywe do not have anythinglike a fully comprehensivereligious,philosophical, or moralview, much less have we attemptedto study those thatdo exist, or to work out one for ourselves."Rawls, "Priority," 274. 58. Rawls, "Priority," 274-275. 59. Rawls, "Overlapping," 19. 60. Rawls is not alone here; Larmoreendorses the separationof "citoyen and homme" because it promotes"a sort of institutionalized myopia."Patterns, 125. 61. On the exoteric/esotericdistinction,see Leo Strauss,Persecutionand theArtof Writing (Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress, 1989). The motivationsof the Rawlsianand Straussian versions are importantly different.A Rawlsianversion might be called Disagreementand the Art of Writing. 62. See Edwards v. Aguillard (96 L.Ed. 2nd 510 [1987]), which concerned a state act for mandating balancedtreatment creationscience and the theoryof evolution. 63. A case in point would be Justice Brennan'sopinion in Edwards,which deployed the usual liberalarguments aboutkeeping religionout of the publicspherewithoutreallyacknowledging, as Justice Scalia points out in dissent, that this in effect promotesa scientific, mancenteredworld view that is a direct alternativeto other world views, such as those offered by religions. 64. I owe this point to Paul Rosenberg. 65. 1 offer this recommendation tentatively.More thoughtneeds to be given to the sorts of considerationsRawls points toward;the historicalrecordand the ideas of practicalmen must also be examined. See, for example, the Federalist No. 37's meditationon the "necessity of still our moderating further expectationsandhopes fromthe effortsof humansagacity."Indeed, the Federalist papers exhibit a decided disingenuousnesson certain divisive issues: See the treatment federalismin No. 45. One SupremeCourt of justice ridingthe circuitin the earlyyears of the republicpreachedthe need for"thatsalutary cautionwith which all public measuresought to be discussed";see RalphLerner,"TheSupremeCourtas RepublicanSchoolmaster," The in Thinking Revolutionary (Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress, 1987), 102. 66. Rawls, "Not Metaphysical,"229. The public role of political theory is to provide a "sharedpointof view among citizens with opposingreligious,philosophicaland moralconvic542. A well-orderedsociety is one in which everyone "acceptsand tions";"Constructivism," knows thatothersaccept"the same firstprinciplesof politicalmorality;"Constructivism," 521. 67. Rawls, "Priority," 275-276; and see "Constructivism," 527, 532. 522, 68. Indeed, Rawls's own accountof the burdensof reasonsuggests the same conclusion: "To some unknownextent, our total experience,our whole course of life up until now shapes the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values, and our total experiences surely differ."Rawls, "Domain,"237. 69. Thereareinklingsof all this in Rawls:He impliesa need formoderation compromise and by speakingnot of perfect but of "sufficient" convergence;"Constructivism," 562, 564. 561, 70. It may even be valuable that we cannot put all of our distinguishing features aside when enteringthe political realm.It is probablyno mistakethatso many of the greatSupreme Court cases have involved anarchists,Jehovah'sWitnesses, ChristianScientists, creationists, JapaneseAmericans,blackAmericans,andso on. 71. Importantsuggestions along these lines are being developed by Amy Gutmannand Dennis Thompsonin "MoralConflictand Political Consensus"(unpublished). 72. Specifying a properlymoderateabortionpolicy is beyond my ambitionsin this article. One mightbegin, however,by reconsidering kindsof requirements the struckdown by the Court inAkronv.AkronCenterforReproductiveHealth, U.S. 416 (1983), providingformandatory 462 informationandwaiting periodsafteran abortionis requested.

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73. See Stanley Brubaker,"ReconsideringDworkin's Case for Judicial Activism," The but Journal of Politics 46 (1984); Brubaker develops a powerfulargument leaps too hastily for deference. 74. Again, this seems to me to be the impetusfor Aristotle'sdefense of the mixed regime in Book 3 of the Politics. 75. See the debate over the status of creation science in public schools in Edwards.Is creationscience a science? Is a scientific worldview the functionalequivalentof a religion? 76. Rorty,for example, embracesand claims that Rawls embracesa form of pragmatism that"makesit impossibleto ask the question 'Is ours a moralsociety?' It makesit impossibleto thinkthatthereis somethingwhich standsto my communityas my communitystandsto me...." of "Contingency Community," Moraljudgments,forRorty,reduceto ways in whicha society 59. defines its identity and distinguishesitself from others;see "The Priorityof Democracyover Philosophy,"in The VirginiaStatute of Religious Freedom: TwoHundredYearsAfter, ed. by RobertVaughn(Madison:Universityof WisconsinPress, 1988). 77. Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979), 454.

StephenMacedo is Assistant Professor of Government HarvardUniversityand the at authoroftheforthcomingLiberalVirtues: Citizenship, Virtue,andCommunity Liberal in Constitutionalism.