PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales, Thomas H.

Van Sebille and Federico C. Lim, for [a] sum of money. After service of summons upon the defendants, they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period, hence they were declared in default. A decision was rendered in favor of PH Credit and against Pacific Lloyd Corporation, Thomas H. Van Sebille, Carlos M. Farrales, and Federico C. Lim. After the aforesaid decision has become final and executory, a Writ of Execution was issued and consequently implemented by the assigned Deputy Sheriff. Personal and real properties of defendant Carlos M. Farrales were levied and sold at public auction. Farrales filed for MR but the judge continued to issue the writ of possession. She claims that the actuations of respondent Judge was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Farrales claims that respondent Judge refused to consider as waived private respondent's objection that his obligation in the January 31, 1984 decision was merely joint and not solidary with the defendants therein. According to petitioner, private respondent assailed the levy on execution twice in 1984 and once in 1985 but not once did the latter even mention therein that his obligation was joint for failure of the dispositive portion of the decision to indicate that it was solidary. Thus, private respondent must be deemed to have waived that objection, petitioner concludes. RULING: A solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors. On the other hand, a joint obligation is one in which each debtors is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt, and the creditor is entitled to demand only a proportionate part of the credit from each debtor.19 The well-entrenched rule is that solidary obligations cannot be inferred lightly. They must be positively and clearly expressed.20 A liability is solidary "only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires. Decision of the trial court, the word solidary neither appears nor can it be inferred therefrom. Farrales further claims that the fallo was erroneous for not indicating. Petition is denied.

Jeanette alto vs SDIC 1216 Danilo A. Alto applied for a Regular (Local) Card with SDIC. He got as his surety his own sister-in-law Jeanette Molino Alto. One of the requirements for the issuance of either of these cards is that an applicant should have a surety. Surety is defined -who shall be jointly and severally liable with the cardholder to pay Security Diners all the obligations and charges incurred and credit extended on the basis of the card. Danilo upgraded his credit card from Local to Diamond. On October 1, 1988 Danilo had incurred credit charged plus appropriate interest and service charges in the aggregate amount of P166,408.31. He defaulted in the payment of this obligation. SDIC demanded of Danilo and Jeanette to pay said obligation but they did not pay. Defendant Danilo Alto failed to file an Answer, and during the pre-trial conference respondent moved to have the complaint dismissed against him, without prejudice to a subsequent re-filing. Petitioner was left as the lone defendant, sued in her capacity as surety of Danilo. In the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim that she filed with the RTC, petitioner claimed that her liability under the Surety Undertaking was limited to P10,000.00 and that she did not expressly and categorically agree to act as surety for Danilo in an amount higher than P10,000.00. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for failure of respondent to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court went on further to state that petitioner was not liable for any amount, not even for P10,000.00 which is the maximum credit limit for Regular Diners Club Cards, since at the time of the upgrading Danilo had no outstanding credit card debts. Dismissed by RTC, CA reversed and declared that the Surety Undertaking signed by petitioner when Danilo Alto first applied for a Regular Diners Club Card clearly applied to the unpaid purchases of Danilo Alto under the Diamond card. Ruling: The Surety Undertaking expressly provides that petitioner's liability is solidary. A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable.14 Although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor is direct, primary and absolute; he becomes liable for the debt and duty of another although he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he receive any benefit therefrom.15 There being no question that Danilo Alto incurred debts of P166,408.31 in credit card advances, an obligation shared solidarily by petitioner, respondent was certainly within its rights to proceed singly against petitioner, as surety and solidary debtor, without prejudice to any action it may later file against Danilo Alto, until the obligation is fully satisfied. Affirmed against petitioner.

De Castros were owners of four lots located in EDSA Cubao Quezon City. Artigo was authorized by appellants to act as real estate broker in the sale of these properties for the amount ofP23,000,000.00, five percent (5%) of which will be given to the agent as commission. Appellee received from appellants P48,893.76 as commission. Appellee apparently felt short changed because according to him, his total commission should be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%) of the agreed price of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to appellants for the two (2) lots, and that it was he who introduced the buyer to appellants and unceasingly facilitated the negotiation which ultimately led to the consummation of the sale. appellants completely traverse appellee's claims and essentially argue that appellee is selfishly asking for more than what he truly deserved as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were more instrumental in the consummation of the sale. RTC ruled in favor of Artigo and was affirmed by CA. Ruling: The De Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of agency. The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros' theory that the other coowners should be impleaded as indispensable parties. A noted commentator explained Article 1915 thus "The rule in this article applies even when the appointments were made by the principals in separate acts, provided that they are for the same transaction. The solidarity arises from the common interest of the principals, and not from the act of constituting the agency. By virtue of this solidarity, the agent can recover from any principal the whole compensation and indemnity owing to him by the others.The parties, however, may, by express agreement, negate this solidary responsibility. The solidarity does not disappear by the mere partition effected by the principals after the accomplishment of the agency. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation.12 The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in this case. Indeed, Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor may sue any of the solidary debtors. This article reads: Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected. solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously

Plaintiff Commando Security Service Agency, Inc., and defendant Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation entered into a Guard Service Contract. Plaintiff provided security guards in defendant's banana plantation. Wage orders were issued increasing the minimum wage of those in the security sector. Plaintiff demanded that its Guard Service Contract with defendant be upgraded in compliance with Wage Order. Defendant refused. Defendant opposed the Complaint by raising the that the rate adjustment is the obligation of the plaintiff as employer of the security guards.

Ruling: It will be seen from the above provisions that the principal (petitioner) and the contractor (respondent) are jointly and severally liable to the employees for their wages. Art 107. The principal, on the other hand, is made the indirect employer of the contractor's employees to secure payment of their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them.15 Even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship, the law itself establishes one between the principal and the employees of the agency for a limited purpose i.e. in order to ensure that the employees are paid the wages due them. It is clear also from the foregoing that it is only when contractor pays the increases mandated that it can claim an adjustment from the principal to cover the increases payable to the security guards. The conclusion that the right of the contractor (as principal debtor) to recover from the principal as solidary co-debtor) arises only if he has paid the amounts for which both of them are jointly and severally liable is in line with Article 1217 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept. He who made payment may claim from his codebtors only the share which corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded. . . . Pursuant to the above provision, the right of reimbursement from a co-debtor is recognized in favor of the one who paid. It will be seen that the liability of the petitioner to reimburse the respondent only arises if and

when respondent actually pays its employees the increases granted by Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6. Payment, which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation. Petition dismissed.