Prestige of Services and Bhutto's Administrative Reform in Pakistan, 1973-1984 Author(s): Charles H. Kennedy Source: Asian Affairs, Vol.

12, No. 3 (Fall, 1985), pp. 25-42 Published by: Heldref Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30171996 Accessed: 24/10/2010 12:47
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and Prestigeof Services Bhutto'sAdministrative Reformin Pakistan,1973-1984

CHARLESH. KENNEDY

has been over a decade since the late Prime Minister ZulfikarAli Bhutto pronouncedhis self-styled"revolutionary" administrativereforms. The avowed purpose of such reformswas to disestablish systemof "servicecadres"introducedby the British the in the eighteenthcentury and embracedin Pakistan, with certain modifications,subsequentto partition.One motive underlyingsuch redisestablishment, however,was the intentto weakenbureaucratic sistanceto Mr. Bhutto'sambitioussocial and economicpolicies and to specifically challengethe kernelof suchresistance-the CivilService of Pakistan(CSP). Severalpoliciesintroduced 1973(that were in crafted to lead to this latter end) included:(1) the abolition of the CSP Academy;(2) the adoptionof a uniformpay scale that reduced in CSP officers' comparative advantage salarystructure; the elim(3) of reservation posts for CSP officers; (4) the abolition of of ination the CSP as a group;and (5) the introductionof lateralrecruitment, designedin part to politicizethe bureaucracy.1 Much has happenedin Pakistansince Mr. Bhutto'sreformswere promulgated.Most notable from the perspectiveof the administrativereformswas the militarycoup of 1977, which installedGeneral MohammadZia ul-Haqas chief martiallaw administrator. One of the first things the new regimeattemptedwas legitimizingits as25

It

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its sumptionof power by means of discrediting predecessor's policies. The administrative reforms were victimizedby this process. in They werecharacterized the WhitePaper (1979)as politicallymotivatedand a blatantattemptat controlof the bureaucracy.2 Accordingly, the new governmentabolishedthe lateralrecruitment policy,3 severalCSP officerswho had been dismissedby Bhutto, reappointed dismissedmany officers (primarilythrough early retirement)who had been appointed during Bhutto's regime,4 and repositioned former CSP officers at criticalpoints within the bureaucracy.5 Inand deed, by 1978a seniorbureaucrat survivorof the tumultsof the 1970sremarked the "CSP was backin the saddle"and the "natthat uralcomityof interestsbetweencivilianand military had bureaucrats been reestablished." However,from the vantagepoint of 1984,we contendthat this observationneeds amendment.The postreformbureaucratic environment is far differentfrom the one that characterized bureaucratic the setting prior to Mr. Bhutto's purposefulmeddling.Though former CSP officersstilldominatekey positionswithinthe bureaucracy, their are dominanceas well as numbers dwindling; and, moreimportantly, has the service-cadre systemof bureaucratic organization undergone considerable transformation. This paperattemptsto justify these lattercontentionsby examinsystem ing the patterns of prestige within Pakistan's bureaucratic since 1970. It is dividedinto three sections. The first detailsthe distinctionsin careerpatternsand perquisites office associatedwith of that characterized prereform the encadremembership bureaucratic vironment.The second introducesthe conceptualand methodological foundation for the measurementof prestigewithin Pakistan's The bureaucracy. final sectionreportsthe findingsof the exercisedescribedin the second sectionand relatessuch findingsto the broader questionof administrative developmentin Pakistan. The PrereformEnvironment environmentthat Mr. Bhutto and his "reformThe bureaucratic minded colleagues" encounteredupon assumingpower was domitraditions.First, the bureaucracy was nated by two well-established subbureaudivided, to perhapsa uniquedegree,into multitudinous cracies,each with attendantand distinctcareerpatterns.Second,the was bureaucracy dominatedby the omnipresent realityof the CSP.

Bhutto Administrative Reform

27

The single most importantdeterminant an individualofficer's of was in careerpatternin the bureaucracy membership one of the nuor services.At the federallevel, there meroussemifunctional cadres, were two All-PakistanServices-the CSP and the Police Serviceof Pakistan-and eleven CentralServices.6Also, there existed several two technicalservicesand paradoxically serviceswhose membersbeto Furthermore, many of these longed permanently other services.7 cadresweredividedinto subcadres,variablydependentupon type of task performed,geographical type of reregionof suchperformance, cruitmentto original service, and/or relativestatus of occupation. mirrored patternwith this The structureof provincialbureaucracies attendantByzantinecomplexities.8 of are Two characteristics such cadre membership significantto of withinthe bureaucracy-namely, considerations statusand prestige the prospectsof individualofficers closely correlatedwith the prospects of fellow cadremembers.Thatis, the individual mobilityof ofwas ficerswithin the bureaucracy determined the generallevel of by mobilityof the cadreas a whole. Second, therewas very little interchangeof personnelbetweencadres.Oncean officer becamea memfor ber of a cadre, he was consignedto such membership life. When it was necessaryfor an officer to be assignedto a post that did not the fall withinthe ambitof his cadre'snormalresponsibilities, typical solutionwas to borrowsuch an officer for the durationof the assignment. Such officers were consideredto be "on deputation," or, in the case of officersborrowedby the CSP, to be "listedpost holders" or "ex-cadreofficers." In practice,such borrowingwas not limited to temporaryassignments.Indeed, many officers were listed post holdersor were on deputationfor the bulk of their careers. Complicatingthis patternof organizationwas the so-calledclass to designationof officersand the numerouspay schedulesapplicable differenttypes of employees. In prereformparlance,all officers in the bureaucracy into one of four classes-unimaginatively fell termed ClassI-ClassIV. Roughly ClassI officersweremanagementspeaking, level personnel;Class II were supervisory-level personnel;Class III were skilledworkers;and Class IV wereunskilledworkers.Interactand ing with such designations with the cadresystemof organization, and partiallya consequenceof such resultantcomplexity,were the numerouspay schedulesapplicableto public servants.Two factors interactedto determinean officer's level of pay: his cadre membership and his rankwithinthat cadre.An indicatorof the complexityof

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this arrangement the fact that in 1971therewereover six hundred is of distinctpay scalesin the publicbureaucracy Pakistan.9 in Inevitably, perhaps,membership certaincadresaffordedgreater benefitsthanmembership others.By far the most favoredcadrewas in the CSP. The basesof suchdominance werelocatedboth in the statuthat favoredthe CSP and in the more subtle,though tory provisions moreimportant, realmof the normsand practices arguably governing behavior withinthe bureaucracy. The most-celebrated officersof the CSP enjoyedwas the advantage of levels.In 1970, so-calledreservation posts at federaland provincial of two-thirds the positionscarrying rankequivalent joint secretary a to for or above in the federalsecretariat were reserved membersof the levelsor abovein CSP, and 70 percentof the posts at deputysecretary the provincial secretariats weresimilarly reserved.1i Also, CSP officers dominated districtand divisional due administration, in largemeasure to the customary of CSP probationers postsof assisat practice starting tant deputycommissioner. whenthe Economic Pool was Furthermore, formedin 1959(with the intentionof attracting and organizing economicand financial talentin the bureaucracy), percentof suchva60 cancieswereallottedto members the CSP." Indeed,so manyposts of werereserved the CSP that its actualcadrestrength for neverequaled the numberof posts reserved its members.In 1970,approximately for 570 suchpostswerereserved members the CSP, whilethe actual for of cadre strengthof the CSP, includingprobationers, was only 522.12 Thesereservations givende facto sanction were throughrelevant proviof consionsof the 1956,1962,andinterim1972Constitutions Pakistan cerningsafeguards againstdismissal,removal,reductionin rank, or retirement publicservants.13 of compulsory A second advantageenjoyed by membersof the CSP was associatedwith the trainingopportunities affordedits members.A newly to selectedprobationer the CSP was subjectedto a lengthyperiodof trainingat the Civil ServiceAcademy.'4Though other cadres had training programs for their probationers, none approached the at glamorof the academy.Some of the instructors the academywere the best mindsin Pakistan,and the academydrewupon foramong eign scholarsto buttressits status. Perhapsmoreimportantthan the informationconveyedduringtrainingsessions,however,was the implicit processof socialization-akin to one's initiationinto a guild or a fraternity-which the academyfostered.Manyof the practices,in-

Bhutto Administrative Reform

29

cluding horsebackriding, "games," mandatorymess nights (complete with formal attire), were importantcomponentsin the formation of a "we-feeling,"a sensethat the CSP was separateand better Attendance at the CSP than other sectors of the bureaucracy.'" Academyopenedthe door to a web of otheraffiliationsand provided A avenuesof informalinfluencewithin the bureaucracy. well-timed call to a well-placed"batch-mate"often curtailedresistanceto a given action and was more efficient than workingthroughthe cumbersome channels of authority. Finally, a CSP officer was much more likely to receiveadditionalmuch-sought-after foreign experience and trainingthan a non-CSPofficer.'6 The most immediateconsequence the confluenceof the reservaof tion of posts and the advantages that accruedfrom the trainingprocess was a remarkable degreeof positionaldominanceby the CSP. In 1971, twelve CSP officers were federalsecretaries,five others were additionalsecretaries; five chief secretaries the provinceswere all of CSP officers, as well as threeadditionalchief secretaries; eighteendivisional commissioners were membersof the CSP, thirty-eightwere five deputycommissioners; otherswere High Courtjustices;the administrationof the national traininginstitutionswas dominatedby twelve well-placedCSP officers; twelve others were chairmenand managingdirectorsof autonomousgovernmental corporations;and membersof the CSP were advisorsand privatesecretaries to eight major political actors." Comparedto other sectors of the bureaucIn racy, such dominancewas overwhelming. 1970, of the 497 membersof the CSP, 250 held posts with a monthlysalaryin excessof Rs 2,000. One hundredthirty-fiveof these held a post whose rank was Of equivalentto, or greaterthan, that of joint secretary. the remain19,500Class I officers servingin the bureaucracy ing approximately of Pakistan, only 175 drew salariesin excess of Rs 2,000; and only or twentyofficers held posts at the rank of joint secretary above.'8 A final consequence the dominanceof the CSP was the fact that of its officers were subject to much more rapid promotionthan other membersof the bureaucracy. Even when comparedwith officers of other elite cadres, the comparativeadvantageenjoyed by CSP offiin cers was awesome. In 1971,the averageincrement salaryfor CSP officers per year of seniorityin the public servicewas Rs 98.19 The next highestincrementamong all cadreswas found withinthe Pakistan ForeignService(PFS), with a rate of Rs 76. Comparable figures for the next four most-favoredserviceswere:PakistanRailwaysAc-

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count Service-Rs 65; PakistanAuditsandAccountsService-Rs 60; Police Serviceof Pakistan-Rs 58; and the Pakistan MilitaryAccounts Service-Rs 50. Another way to expressthis gap is to state that after ten years' servicean officer of the CSP could expectto be Rs drawinga salaryof approximately 1,500per month;an officer of the next most-favoredcadre (PFS), Rs 1,250; and an officer of the The PMAS, a salaryof Rs 1,000.20 expectedsalaryof all othermemwas bers of the bureaucracy still lower. In the lightof this description the bureaucratic of environment facfor ing Mr. Bhutto,his blueprint reformwas veryambitious.As mentioned above, his policies called for the disbanding the CSP, the of abolishment the cadresystemof organization, of elimination trainof heretoforeenjoyedby CSP officers,the establishment ing advantages of a unified pay scale, and the introductionof lateralrecruitment. from Combined,thesepoliciesconstituted verysignificant departures of the prereform system.The remainder this paperwill focus on the extent to which such policies actually were incorporated and have the system.The indicatoremployedto measpenetrated bureaucratic ure sucheffectswill be the most potentsymbolof the prereform environmentand the maintargetof the reform,the prestige eliteservice of the cadres, and particularly CSP. Simply, if the reforms worked towardtheirdesiredoutcomes,one would expectthat the prestigeof the CSP and otherelite cadreswouldweaken;if not, that it wouldrealso allows mainconstantor increase.The choiceof suchan indicator with the postreform environment. comparison longitudinal Towardan Indicatorof Prestige formaldefinitionof prestige not easilystated. is A fullysatisfactory of is Forthe purposes this study,however,prestige the esteem,respect, to thatis grantedby an individual a collectivity individor or approval uals or groups because of performance,qualities,or roles demonor stratedby such individuals groups.21 prestigecan be Analytically, eitheras positionalor personal;that is, prestigecan be acregarded eitheras a consequence the positionheldby of cordedto an individual of of that individualor as a consequence certainpersonalattributes that individual. In any case, prestige is manifestly a subjective phenomenon.22 To find out how much prestigeActor X has, one must find out how other relevantactors perceivehis role or position. This makes

Bhutto Administrative Reform

31

of the measurement prestigedifficult. Obviously,opinions concernthe relativeprestigeof individualsand/or groupsdiffer from ining dividualto individual.Therefore,an adequateindicatorof prestige must not only take into account the perceptionsof relevantactors concerningprestige, but must also make allowancesfor individual differencesin such perceptions.The indicatoremployedin this study meets both of these criteria. In orderto join the federalbureaucracy a directrecruit,candias dates must pass the CSS Examinationand then-subject to the regional quota restrictions23-must undergojoint trainingat the Civil ServicesAcademy.24 Eventualassignmentto occupationalgroups is determinedby the confluenceof three factors:merit (the respective on performance the CSS Examination); regionalquotas;and the individualprobationer's for In preference groupmembership.25 regard to the last factor, probationersrank groups in order of individual preferenceand submitthis preferenceorderon a specialform to the FederalPublic ServiceCommission. forms it is possibleto createa useful By analyzingsuch preference measure of prestige. Such an indicator is both "reliable" and It "valid.''26 is a reliablemeasurefor two reasons.First,probationers were uniformlyaskedto state their preferences an identicalform on designedfor the purposeduringeach of the nine yearsstudied. Second, in all cases probationersfilled out the foregoingforms before i.e., the effects they underwent trainingand beforetheirassignment, of bureaucratic socializationare minimized. The indicatoris valid for three reasons:(1) Probationersare in a position to know a greatdeal concerningdifferentialprospectsassociatedwithassignment particular to are cadres;(2) probationers vitally concernedwith their eventualassignment,and thereis no logical rationale to misrepresenttheir preferences;and (3) the measure of prestigehas at least "face validity"with our usage of the termprestige. Indeed, probationersplay a particularlysignificant, relevant role in the assessment prestige.Probationers of have a concretebasis for their orderingof cadres,the rationalefor such orderingsconstituting perceivedadvantagesand/or disadvantagesassociated with membershipin such cadres. All things being equal, through the mechanismof preference orderprobationers statethe cadrewith can which they would like to be associatedduringthe balance of their careers.Such perceptionsof advantages/disadvantages the stuff are of prestige.

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Accordingly, data were collected from the relevant preference forms for nine batchesof probationers from 1970-1981.In each case the top five preferences eachprobationer noted (e.g., for proof was bationer A-first preference = Group X; second preference = GroupY, etc.). The batcheschosen for inclusionin the sampleconstitute all of the direct recruitsto the federalbureaucracy over the relevanttime frame. The strategyof includingthe nine batchesalso enablesone to constructan informaltime seriesexperiment with two relevanttreatmenteffects-the administrative reform of 1973 and the assumptionof power and attemptedreversalof the reform by GeneralZia in 1977.That is, thereare nine observations prestige: of to the administrative two prior reforms,four duringthe periodof the to referto the reforms,and threesubsequent the reforms.(Subscripts year of examination,and "X" to the treatmenteffects.)
071, 072,

X,

074,

075,

076,

077,

X,

079,

080,

O81

Our designdoes not fit the time seriesparadigm precisely.A time series experimentassumes the same sample in each of the observations. Eachof our observations, rather,constitutesa separate population comprisedof all recruits for a given year. However, this with the time series anomalydoes not violatethe basisof comparison but design.And, in any case, therewas no alternative to use the data available;no controlgroupsexist. In fact, an alternative designthat tested one batch of recruitsat various stages of trainingwould be subjectto muchmore seriousmethodological problemsthan our design. For instance, how could one separatesocializationeffects of training from considerationsof intergroupprestige? particularistic Therewould also be the attendantproblemsassociatedwith maturation and instrumentation (priorto training,recruitshave a strongincentiveto be honest and carefulin their preferenceorderings). Findings The findingsof this exerciseare summarized Tables 1, 2, and 3. in In Table 1, we find that the patternsof prestigeaccordwith expectations impliedby the description the prereform of environment Secin tion I. The CSP dominates-82.9% of the probationers before the reformsexpressed first preference membership the CSP. The a for in next most prestigiousservicewas the PFS, with 14.8% of the first preferencesand 73.8% of the second preferences;the third most

t,

% Pref. 5th N

0.87.217.3 36.2 29.2 9.2 3

and Paki= PCES Telephone

26 62 105 33 33 130
Service; Service; preference no = Accounts Information and None Central Audits Service; = Pakistan Others = Cantonments Service; PAAS and

07 Pref. 4th N

0.34.1 19.0 9.85.1 47.7 14.1 1 15 70 176 52 36 19 23

1970-1971 0o Reform, Pref. before 3rdN

-

4.064.4 6.62.9. 2.9 0.5 18.7 15 71 25 11 2 11 13 244

Lands Accounts Pakistan; of Military Military Service Pakistan Police Pakistan = = Service; PSP PMAS Postal Service; Service; Pakistan Foreign Taxation Service; Pakistan = Pakistan PFS = Secretariat PTS Central Pakistan; of Service; Branch); Service Excise Civil and = (Railways

Table
070 Probationers Pref. of

13.9 7.71.01.30.71.30.3 73.8 1 3 54 287 4 5 3 5 30

190 = batch

2ndN Preference Service

1971 14.8 1.5 82.9 0.3 - 58 325 1 6

-

070

0.5 - 202, = 2 - batch 1970 392: =

Pref. 1st N

- - -

population Service PFS PAAS PMAS N CSP PSP PCES Others PTS None KEY: stan Telegraph

CSP Customs

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prestigious,the PSP; the fourth, the PAAS; with the PMAS, the PakistanCustomsand ExciseService(PCES),and the PakistanTaxation Service(PTS) vying for fifth place. The remainingfive services were clearlyless prestigious. It is verylikelythat this patternof prestigeis of long duration.The only otherexistingcompilationof prestigelevelsof serviceswas provided by the CentralPublic ServiceCommissionin its annualreport of 1963. In regardto first preferencesof probationers,this report stated that the CSP was rankedfirst by 78%o the probationers of in 1961and 80%in 1962;whilethe next most prestigious servicewasthe and 14%,respectively; followedby less than 3% per PFS, with 15%/ year for the PSP; and less than 2% for the PAAS. No other service receivedmorethan 1%of the firstpreferences eitheryear.27 in Therethe patternof prestigein 1970-1971is almost identicalto the fore, patternthat existeda decadeearlier.28 Given such a long-standing precedent,the changesin the prestige orderingssubsequentto the reform are dramatic.Table 2 demonstratesthat the functionalanalogueof the CSP-the DistrictManagementGroup (DMG)-commanded only 63% of the first preferences during the period of the reform's implementation.29 This is partiallyattributableto the prestigeaccordedthe newly change constitutedTribalAreas Group (TAG), which received6.8% of the firstpreferences, to an evengreaterextent,it is due to the relative but increaseaccordedto the Police and Customsgroups. Table3 demonstrates the effects of Bhutto'sadministrative that reform have persistedbeyond the lifetime of their architect.It reveals that the patternsof prestigefound in 1979-1981(Table3) closelyresemblethe patternsfound in 1974-1977(Table2), and that both differ markedlyfrom the prereformpattern(Table 1). Howeversuggestivethe informationfound in these tablesmay be, it does not lend itself to easy analysis.To simplifythe data and to allow direct longitudinalcomparison,it was decidedto constructa This indexprovidesan unbiasedmeasureof prestige prestigeindex.3" betweencadres,and betweenpopulations,with a directlycomparable of rangeof 0-1. The interpretation such scoresis straightforward-it is simplythat the higherthe prestigescore, the higherthe prestigeof the relevantcadre. Table 4 summarizes exercise.We find: the * The prestigeof the CSP (throughits linealdescendant,the DMG) has declinedsignificantly.Priorto the reform,the CSP dominated

35

%o Pref. 5th N

8.8 0.84.014.3 5.131.0 7.614.8 13.6 5

Tax CanIncome Group;

24 86 53 31 187 46 89 82

Group; Areas Management Tribal Office = Group; TAG

8.8 6.6 %7o 2.010.4 12.6 22.9 4.07.1 25.5 Pref. 4th N 12 63 76 40 154 53 138 24 43

Group; Information = Affairs Others Foreign = Group; FAG

1974-1977 o Reform, Pref. during 3rdN 22 165 80 52 58 21 12 26 167 3.6 8.6 3.5 27.4 13.3 9.6 2.04.3 27.7

Accounts Group; = Customs

Table %l Probationers Pref. of 2ndN Preference

1.3 30.5 15.6 3.6 21.7 12.4 11.1 2.80.8 108 5 8 184 131 75 94 67 22 17

(1977) = Accounts
Group; Customs

(1976); 112
Group; Group Commerce = Police Postal = (1975); and Police Commerce Group;

Service

070

6.85.116.4 0.50.20.80.3 6.8 63.0 167 41 380 31 99 41 3 1 5 2

Pref. 1st N

(1974); 216 603: =

Group; Group); Railways Taxes Management Group; (Direct

Tax

District Group = Tax Management DMG

population Income = Service Police TAG Commerce DMG FAG Income Others KEY:tonments Customs Accounts N

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the prestige rankingswith an index measureof .94; during the courseof the reforms,the DMG'sindexdroppedto .84; and, since 1978, the prestigerankinghas droppedstill furtherto .78. These are importantfindingsfor threereasons.The CSP was a maintarreformsof 1973.3' declinein the presThe get of the administrative tige scoresof the servicemeansthat the reformshave been at least is partiallysuccessfulin meetingtheir ends, i.e., the bureaucracy more egalitarian the powerof the CSP/DMG has been weakand ened. The persistenceof the decline since 1978demonstrates that the consequencesof the reformshave taken root in the bureaucracy despitethe widelyheld perceptionthat the policiesof the Zia regimehave servedto bolsterthe status of the service. * Similarly,the prestigeof the heretoforesecond-mostprestigious cadre-the Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS)-has also suffered rapid decline, though the declinehas leveled off since 1978. This decline can also be attributedto the effects of the administrative reform. The ForeignAffairs Group (FAG) was the single largest recipientof lateral recruits; 146 officers were inducted into the One group duringthe course of the program.32 outcome of such massive induction was to block the avenues of promotion to would-beentrants,hence makingthe cadreless attractiveto join. * The prestigeof the accountscadreshas declinedeven moreprecipiindexof tously. The PAAS and the PMAShad a combinedprestige .44 priorto the reforms;duringand subsequent the reforms,the to prestigeof the newly formedAccountsGrouphad declinedto .05. was of This development clearlyan unintended consequence the administrative reforms.Indeed,Bhutto'sadministrative strategy singled officersof the PMAS, to out the accountsservices,and particularly Furthermore, replaceCSP officersin key administrative positions.33 of the encadrement the AccountsGroupwas an attemptto form a cadre that would challengethe predominance the CSP. Obof viously,this attemptfailed.34 * Also unforeseenby the framersof the reformhas been the ascendency of the financial cadres. Before the reforms, the Pakistan Customsand ExciseServiceand the PakistanTaxationServicehad a combinedprestigescore of .28; during 1974-1977,the Customs and Income Tax groups had a combinedscore of .69; and, since 1978, .77. In fact, duringthe past threeyears-due to the relatively small number of vacanciesin the Customs Group-competition

t,
=

5.9 %/o 1.410.6 15.8 6.29.43.7 24.9 22.0 Pref. 5th N 10 77 43 25 115 45 68 27 160 181

TAG Management Group; Tax Cantonments Income =

07o Pref. 4th N

1.5 9.8 5.9 21.3 13.5 8.5 3.113.1 23.3 11 72 62 156 99 171 43 23 96 18

Group; Tax

Income Management Group; Office Affairs

1979-1981 070 Pref. 3rdN Postreform, 3 Table Probationers 07 of Pref. 2ndN Preference 15.7 28.4 6.29.12.31.14.7 17.7 14.8 117 211 46 68 17 132 110 8 35 7 33 16 15 161 85 31 30 45 225 110 4.530.6 14.9 4.24.12.26.1 21.9 11.5

Group; Foreign = FAG Information = Group; Others Police = Group; Police Accounts = (1981)Group;

229

preference Customs Accounts = No =

Service

(1980); Group; 1.5 7.54.715.4 2.01.31.03.3 None 63.4 241 Customs 11 56 35 116 15 10 7 25 476 (1979); 281 751: = Tax
Group; Group; Commerce = Postal and Management Commerce Group; District = Group; Railways Areas DMG

Pref. 1st N

population Service Customs TAG AccountsN DMG FAG Commerce Police KEY: Income Others Tribal None Group;

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Table 4 Prestigeof Cadres,1970-1981 Before Reform 1970-1971 .94 .76 .45 .44 .15 .13 .10 DuringReform 1974-1977 .84 .44 .53 .05 .45 .24 .26 .10 .10

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Service CSP/DMG PFS/FAG PSP/Police PAAS + PMAS/ Accounts PCES/Customs PTS/IncomeTax TAG Commerce Others

Postreform 1979-1981 .79 .44 .45 .05 .50 .27 .16 .10 .18

NOTE: Computed by incorporating information found in Tables 1, 2, and 3 as follows: (5)p, + (4)p, + (3)p3 + (2)p, + (l)ps

(5)n
p = preference; subscripts refer to preferences 1-5, respectively.

for entryinto its rankshas beenmoreseverethan for entryinto the DMG.35 The prestigeof other cadres, constant during 1970-1977,has increasedrapidlysince 1978. that the ends of Bhutto'sadTogetherthese findingsdemonstrate ministrative reformshave been partiallymet. First, the bureaucracy in 1984 is more egalitarianthan it was in 1973. The prestigeof the most prestigiouscadres has declined, while the prestigeof the less cadreshas increased.Second,the prestigeof the CSP and prestigious its analoguethe DMGhas beenweakened.The DMGdoes not dominate the bureaucracy 1984to nearlythe extentthe CSP dominated in the bureaucracy 1973.Third,both of thesedevelopments in havepersisted and accelerated since Bhutto left power in 1977. However,the widerand more importantgoals of Bhutto'sadministrativereform-to createa classlessbureaucracy that is comprised of "one service";to make the bureaucracy more efficient; and to make the bureaucracy more technicallyproficient-are as far away from realizationin 1984as they werein 1973.Moreover,the limited successesof the administrative reformhave been paid for dearlyby the bureaucracy Pakistan. of

Bhutto Administrative Reform

39

A fundamental truthis that Bhutto'spoliciesservedto increasethe of the bureaucracy. Such politicization had several has politicization unhappyeffects. One has been the declinein moraleamong public servants.A universal in complaintof administrators Pakistanis that are uncertainof their future career prospectsin a system in they which they lack protectionagainstarbitrary dismissalor retirement. is Unfortunately,this uncertainty directlyrelatedto the rank of the publicservant.A secondconsequencehas been a persistent shunning of responsibility makingadministrative for decisions.In a politicized it environment is best to "lie low," to avoiddrawingundueattention contextof Pakistan,this often means to oneself. In the bureaucratic the avoidanceof decisions.Hence, the prevalent complaintby senior administratorsthat even the most mundane matters are "duly noted" all the way to theirdesks. Third,by weakening cadresysthe tem, Bhutto also weakened the informal channels of authority through which much of the business of governmentflowed. Zia's continuedban on the formationof cadreassociationshas continued this process. Fourth, the politicizationof the bureaucracyhas, in decisionmakingfar less independent.Nodturn, made bureaucratic ders are more prevalentin 1984than in 1973.36 the reforms Finally,and perhapsmost importantly, administrative have furthererodedthe perception that choosinga careerin administrationis a validcareer choice.No longerarethe "bestandbrightest" in Pakistanpreparing a careerin the CSP/DMG. Rather,theirattenfor tion is beingdrawnto the professions to business. or Indeed,the shiftin towardfinancial cadresmaybe partof this phenomenon. This prestige of is depletion the genepool of publicservants likelyto havea long-term in negativeeffect on all aspectsof administration Pakistan.

NOTES

Thispaper is a much revisedand expandedversionof a paperpresentedto the Ninth WisconsinConferenceon South Asia held on November6-9, 1980. I owe to and who manydebtsof gratitude individuals organizations assistedthisprojectat variousstages over thepast eightyears. ThePakistanFederalPublic ServiceCommissionextendedconsiderable and expertise various at help stagesof datagathering and analysis: AghaIftikharHusainandDavidM. Olseneachreadearlierversions of thepaper and providedusefulcomments;and Ann M. Sargentcoded much of the data. Financialassistancewasprovidedby theAmerican Instituteof PakistanStudies (1975-6), (1982)and the Fulbright Program(1984).

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1. The policy pronouncements concerningthe scope of the contemplatedrein the to formswereannounced severalplaces,including "Broadcast the NationAnof Reforms,on August20, 1973," found in Government nouncingAdministrative Pakistan,Speechesand Statements Zulfikar Bhutto, PrimeMinisterof Pakiof Ali of stan, August 14-December31, 1973 (Karachi: Manager,PrintingCorporation PakistanPress, 1975),pp. 13-14. Muchgreaterdetailis found in CharlesH. KenThe Reformsin the Administranedy, "Policy Implementation: Case of Structural tive Systemof Pakistan,"Journalof SouthAsian andMiddleEasternStudies,IV:3 (Spring1981),pp. 78-100. of 2. Government Pakistan, White Paperon the Performance theBhuttoReof MPCPP, 1979). gime, 4 vols. (Islamabad: 3. For details, see CharlesH. Kennedy,"Analysisof the LateralRecruitment to of Programme the FederalBureaucracy Pakistan,"Journalof SouthAsian and MiddleEasternStudies,III:4(Summer1980),pp. 42-65. who 4. UnlikeBhuttoand Ayub (his predecessors, publiclypurgedthe bureaucZia of racywhentheycameto power),General usedthe moresubtleexpedient early and retirement normalretirement aftertwentyyearsof government serv(retirement ice) to reshapethe bureaucracy. 5. Forinstance,formerCSP officersreplaced non-CSPofficersas secretary, EsCabinetDivision;and principal, tablishment PakistanAdminisDivision;secretary, trativeStaff College. were:PakistanForeignService,Pakistan 6. In 1971,the elevenCentralServices Audits and AccountsService,PakistanMilitaryAccountsService,PakistanRailways Accounts Service,PakistanCustomsand Excise Service,PakistanTaxation Serviceof Pakistan,PakistanPosService,TradeServiceof Pakistan,Information tal Service,CentralSecretariat Service,and the PakistanMilitaryLandsand CantonmentsService. 7. The EconomicPool and the GeneralAdministrative Reserve. 8. The total numberof suchcadresis difficultto estimate.Someidea, however, can be inferredfrom the fact that over five hundredpetitionsrepresenting cadres, or weresubmitted the Services to Committee subcadres, departments Reorganization in 1969. HassanMeerfound in Dawn, August22, 1973. 9. Pressstatementof Khurshid Thisis an oft-repeated of figurein literature dealingwiththe establishment a unified the pay scale. It probablyunderestimates numberof pay scales actuallyexisting, however.Nearlyone hundreddifferentpay scaleswereapplicable federalClassI to officersalone. See Government Pakistan,CivilList of OfficersHoldingPosts of of Grade17andAbove ServingUnderGovernment Pakistan1stJuly1971(Karachi: of MPCPP, 1975). to 10. CSP Association,Rawalpindi, "Memorandum the Services Reorganization Committee,"(1969). of (Establishment Division), 11. Government Pakistan, President'sSecretariat Committee Government of Reportof the Administrative Reorganization (Karachi: PakistanPress, 1963),pp. 323-326. 12. Computedby author from data providedin CSP Association,Rawalpindi, to "Memorandum the ServicesReorganization Committee,"(1969),AnnexureI. 13. These safeguardswere modifiedin the 1973Constitution.See Muhammed Munir,Constitution the IslamicRepublicof Pakistan(Lahore:Law Publishing of Company,1975),pp. 519-521. 14. Officersof the PakistanForeignServicealso periodically underwent sepaa rate trainingprogramat the Civil ServiceAcademy. 15. Thereare a numberof excellentaccountsof the style of trainingat the Civil

Bhutto Administrative Reform

41

ServiceAcademy.Among the best are RalphBraibanti, Researchon the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham, North Carolina:Duke UniversityPress, 1969) and Nazim [HassanHabib],Babus,Brahmins,and Bureaucrats: Critiqueof the AdA ministrative Systemof Pakistan(Lahore:People's Publishing House, 1973). 16. In 1971,twenty-oneCSP officerswere on deputationabroad. 17. Compiledby authorfrom CivilList, 1971. 18. "ClassI OfficersMemorandum," the Services to Committee Reorganization (1969). 19. Computedby the authorby derivingmean lengthof serviceand mean total pay for the populationof the CSP, n = 494;PFS, n = 180;PSP, n = 125;PAAS, n = 142;PMAS, n = 71; and PRAS, n = 46. The rawdataweregathered from Civil as List, 1971and transformed under: "Increment year, serviceseniority" = per (X total pay - minimumpay of officer [i.e., Rs 500]) X yearsof service 20. Computedby using "increments" explainedin note 19. as 21. This definitionaccordswith WilliamGoode'susageof the term. See William Goode, The Celebration Heroes:Prestigeas a Social ControlSystem(Berkeley: of of University CaliforniaPress, 1978),pp. 7-8; pp. 66-72. 22. See David V. J. Bell, Power, Influenceand Authority: Essay in Political An Linguistics (New York:OxfordUniversity Press, 1975),pp. 26-27. 23. CharlesH. Kennedy,"Policiesof EthnicPreference Pakistan,"AsianSurin vey (June 1984),pp. 688-703. 24. Prior to 1973, probationers underwent institutrainingat variouspreservice the tions, including CivilServiceAcademy,FinanceServiceAcademy,etc. Afterthe werecombinedinto a singleinstitutionfor joint training: reform,such institutions The Academyfor Administrative Training.Since 1978, the academyhas been renamedthe Civil ServiceAcademy. 25. For a detaileddescription the selectionprocess,see CharlesH. Kennedy, of The Context, Contentand Implementation Bhutto's Administrative of Reforms, 1973-1978(Durham:Duke University,1979),Ph.D., pp. 164-179. 26. See Donald T. Campbelland Julian C. Stanley,Experimental and QuasiExperimental Designsfor Research(Chicago:RandMcNally, 1963). 27. Cited in Ralph Braibanti,"The HigherBureaucracy Pakistan," in Braiof banti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic SystemsEmergent from the BritishImperialTradition (Durham:Duke University Press, 1966),pp. 289-290. 28. Braibanti surmises that a similarpatternof prestigeexistedeven earlierthan the 1960s.See note 27, p. 289. 29. Table4 is drawnso thatthe prereform service adjacent its functional is to analogue, the postreformgroup. For a detailedtreatment changesin cadrenomenof clature,see CharlesH. Kennedy,"Policy Implementation," note 1, pp. 93-94. 30. The "prestigeindex" =
(5)p, + (4)p2 +
(3)p3

+ (2)p, + (I)ps

(5)n refer p = preference; n subscripts to cadrepreferences respectively; is samplesize. 1-5, 31. For this argument Charles Kennedy,"PolicyFormulation Pakistan: see H. in to Antecedents Bhutto'sAdministrative Reforms,"Journalof Commonwealth and Politics, XX:1 (March1982),pp. 42-56. Comparative

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32. Kennedy,note 3. 33. PMAS officerswereappointedto the posts of secretary, Establishment DiviStaff College;secretary, CabinetDivision.The post sion; principal,Administrative of specialsecretary administrative for reformswas held by a formerPAAS officer. 34. Interviews with principals,1976. 35. Several haveactuallybeenpassedover for theirfirstpreference, probationers the CustomsGroup,and assignedto the DMG. 36. The term nodder(yes man) was inventedby P. G. Wodehouseand is used widelyin the bureaucracy.