ARADAIS vs COMELEC and ABDUSALI ASMADUN

COMELEC En Banc gravely did not abuse its power and discretion when it delegated its constitutional

duty to "hear and decide" pre-proclamation cases to a mere ad hoc committee. The findings and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee are merely advisory in nature and do not bind the COMELEC, especially in light of petitioners failure to present any evidence that the COMELEC merely relied on said findings and recommendations and did not go over the records of the case to make its own assessment. Absent any evidence to the contrary then, the presumption of regular performance of an official duty stands.15 The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELECs discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as requiring the parties to present their side through position papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a settled rule that the COMELECs judgment cannot be overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Cipriano vs. COMELEC As an independent Constitutional Commission, COMELEC is clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; register political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer. The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was granted exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its broad administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. The court disagrees to such stating that: The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus: Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy.[14] The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.

Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false. It states: Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the petition shall be heard summarily after due notice. It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must be notified of the petition against him and he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. Due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal shows substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. In a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, since the proceedings are required to be summary, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits, and other documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. When there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants. Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. On the other hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks. In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that Resolution No. 5363 and Resolution No. 5781, canceling petitioners certificate of candidacy without proper proceedings, are tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore void.

DE GUZMAN VS. COMELEC

Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate
it. SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district.

On petitioners argument of violation of equal protection clause: The Court is not persuaded by petitioners arguments. The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class All these requirements for valid classification were satisfied by the said provision. In Lutz vs. Araneta, it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. Also, to require COMELEC to reassign all employees would entail a lot of administrative burden on its part. Security of Tenure: The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. Undermine the authority of COMELEC to appoint: Untenable is petitioners contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress. The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.

ESTRELLA v. COMELEC Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd. Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained.

Guerrero v. COMELEC The COMELEC did not commit GADLEJ in holding that the determination of the validity of the COC of Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

In the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction had ceased with the assumption of office by the Respondent While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions However, petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. Consequently, he claims that any issue which does not involve these constitutional qualifications is beyond the realm of the HRET The word "qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

Idulza vs. COMELEC The appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of the COMELEC when supported by substantial evidence are final and nonreviewable. An examination of the Tuason dissent reveals that it is predicated not on any broad question of law, but on the specific application of principles of election law vis--vis particular ballots. His disagreement with the majority is purely factual in basis, too detailed to the point of being pernickety. Petitioners are unable to point out why the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the contested ballots. Notwithstanding the dissenting opinion, the Second Divisions factual findings, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, are supported by substantial evidence and thus beyond the ken of review by the Court. Thus, the Court is bound by the findings of the COMELEC as to how many votes the parties had obtained in the city council election. Election protests are guided by an extra-ordinary rule of interpretation that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. For that reason, the Court sustains the allowance by the COMELEC of Bollozos Intervention. It would have been explicitly anomalous had Bollozos not been seated in the City Council, considering that her uncontested vote total had exceeded that of Asuncion, the ninth (9th) placer according to the Second Division. The people of Gingoog City had chosen Bollozos to serve as their councilor, and it was but proper for the COMELEC to recognize that electoral will and accordingly amend the Second Divisions Resolution. Besides, in allowing the Bollozos Intervention, the COMELEC did not stretch itself by applying an overarching equitable principle that would have disturbed the judicially sedate. Statutory prescription on the right to intervene in an election protest is provided only by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 8, Section 1. The aforementioned rule does state that the motion for intervention be filed before or during the trial of an action or proceeding.13 At the same time, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are to be construed liberally "in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding" before the COMELEC.14 The allowance of the motion for intervention was clearly geared towards fostering honest, credible elections and a just outcome centered around the proper proclamation of a candidate whom the voters have chosen to serve as their councilor.

PEDRAGOZA vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO SUMULONG, JR. The failure of Commissioners Sadain and Tuason to indicate their reasons for taking no part in the case does not annul the Resolution of 30 September 2005 Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a COMELEC member who takes no part in a decision or resolution must state the reason for his inhibition. Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution imposes an identical requirement on the members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts. While there is no extant record of the COMELEC's proceedings in adopting Section 1, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules, the parallel deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution on Section 13, Article VIII shed light on the purpose of the rule requiring a member of this Court and all lower collegiate courts to state his reason for taking no part in a case. Because of the exact identity of the rule in question as stated in Section 1, Rule 18 and Section 13, Article VIII, these deliberations apply here by analogy Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it appears that the purpose of the rule requiring a member of this Court and all lower collegiate courts to state his reason for taking no part in a case is to see to it that all justices participate in the promulgation of decisions. Being a devise to dissuade members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts (or in this case, the members of the COMELEC) from not taking part in the deliberation of cases, the requirement has nothing to do with the ruling involved but concerns the judge himself. Thus, non-compliance with the rule does not annul the ruling in which a judge takes no part but may be basis for holding him responsible for the omission.

RASUL vs. COMELEC and TERESA AQUINO-ORETA

Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code provide
that "(t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . . ." Since petitioner was assailing the Commission's resolution proclaiming the twelfth (12th) winning senatorial candidate, the proper recourse was to file a regular election protest which under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the proclamation of herein respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner.