Why did the Provisional IRA call a ceasefire on 31 August 1994?

Word count: 2,421 Enrique Requero

In trying to assess the factors which moved the leadership of the Provisional IRA to declare a full cessation of military operations at the end of August 1994, it is fair to start by making reference to what David McKittrick wisely points out: that the leaders of Sinn Fein and the PIRA made at the time the policy decision not to disclose the full inside story of the process which led to the ceasefire and its termination on February 1996.1 Therefore, what students of the topic can only do is to make different hypotheses which, although they may be more educated as time passes by and a clearer view of the issue is possible with the benefits of hindsight and the opening of archives; they are, at the end of the day, still guesses. Moreover, those interested in studying the events leading up to the 1994 ceasefire will also find that divergent ideological explanations are provided, mainly from the nationalist and the unionist points of view. The former portrays the ceasefire as the product of a unilateral Irish Peace Process which overcame the obstacles lain by British and unionist obstructiveness. On the other hand, unionists tend to see the ceasefire more as an opportunistic tactical move by the SF/PIRA leadership to win political support, and yet another chapter in the long history of the British surrender process, with continuous attempts to disengage from Northern Ireland since partition in 1921.2 This essay will look at the main differing explanations for the origins of the ceasefire which have been provided so far, and attempt to provide an evaluation by balancing the various elements of truth which each of them may contain. When the ceasefire was first called in 1994, some initially said that it had been the recent IRAs military weakening what had prompted it. Nevertheless, just with a quick glance at a chronology of the Provisionals actions3 one will soon realise that, although maybe the IRA was killing less people annually in the early 1990s,4 prior to the ceasefire its campaign was not just steady, but in fact, it looked likely to escalate and for the IRA to get more militarised.5 In the 1989 Sinn Fein ard fheis Gerry Adams lamented that the armed struggle was still a fact of life in the North,6 implying that given the conditions at the time, the republican leadership still saw the armed struggle as a way forward. Moreover, although in the IRA New Year messages for 1991, 1992 and 1993 the republicans progressively expressed a desire of peace and defiantly demanded of the British to create the conditions for
1 2

McKittrick (1996), p.314. Dixon (2001), pp.215-18. 3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronology_of_Provisional_Irish_Republican_Army_actions#1990s 4 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/crosstabs.html, crosstabulation of organisation summary by year. 5 McKittrick, p.298. 6 English (2003), p.266.

Why did the Provisional IRA call a ceasefire on 31 August 1994?

Enrique Requero

it, the general tone of these messages was of confidence in the campaign, and bombs continued blowing up.7 The ultimate proof that the IRA did not call the ceasefire because it was in the brink of a military defeat was the way armed struggle was resumed on 10 February 1996 with a massive bombing of Canary Wharf, causing damages of over 80m. Finally, it could also be argued that the IRA did not call the ceasefire out of structural weakness because of the fact that the security forces had long since concluded what Peter Brooke publicly expressed in November 1989: that it was difficult to envisage a military defeat of the IRA. 8 The IRA leadership knew that they could carry on with the campaign indefinitely, however, as Richard English points out, they also knew that the prospects of defeating the British militarily were also very difficult to envisage due to the improvement of British intelligence, penetrations into the movement and the increased capacity of the security forces to limit PIRA activity.9 Thus, both the IRA and the British were in a state of political and military stalemate and the ceasefire could have been a way of getting out of the deadlock rather than of preventing an imminent defeat.10 Along these lines, the unionist explanation sees the ceasefire just as a short-term tactical move in the context of a long-term armed struggle. Because of the stalemate with the British, for the IRA to call the ceasefire was the best way to profit from the specific situation at the time by furthering the struggle via increased political support. However, for the unionists, the ceasefire was never meant to be a complete cessation but rather a temporary change of strategy. This was demonstrated by the republicans negative reaction to the demands for the decommissioning of arms made by Patrick Mayhews Washington 3 sine qua non requirements for Sinn Fein to enter into all-party talks,11 and ultimately by the resumption of violence when more pressure for decommissioning was put on the republicans. Nevertheless, although it is quite probable that the republican leadership called the ceasefire out of political pragmatism also seeing that the post-hunger strikes boast of political support had lost its momentum , it is also possible that this was not the only underlying motivation and that maybe the leadership had concluded that the armed struggle was not the only way forward any more and there was a genuine desire for peace. The later development of the events in fact supports this view: the IRA leadership really wanted to get Sinn Fein into peaceful talks. However, they had to assure the grassroots that it was worth getting into the constitutional process and the refusal of decommissioning only sought to prevent disappointment for the movement, such as that of the 1975 ceasefire. They claimed that the

7 8

Ibid, pp.269-279. Quoted in Dixon, p.225. 9 English, p.308. 10 Dixon, p.225. 11 Ibid, p.255.

Why did the Provisional IRA call a ceasefire on 31 August 1994?

Enrique Requero

opportunity for peace created by the 1994 ceasefire had been spoiled by the intransigence of the British and the unionists, and that they were ready to resume the ceasefire if the British produced the conditions necessary to ensure that Sinn Fein would get into all-party talks.12 These conditions were indeed provided by the newly elected Labour government and an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire of August 1994 followed on 19 July 1997, together with Sinn Feins acceptance of the Mitchell principles in September, 13 which implied that the desires for permanent peace expressed with the 1994 ceasefire may well have been genuine. Some have argued that what really moved the IRA to call a ceasefire were the international developments that were taking place at the time, together with the influence of external factors such as that of Bill Clinton. The fall of the USSR could have prompted republican prisoners to move away from communism and start an ideological reassessment of republicanism. Developments in the Middle East and South Africa supposed a world reorientation which may have encouraged republicans to follow the trend. The end of the Cold War may have removed any strategic interest for Britain in the North and enabled the sympathetic Bill Clinton to support the republicans against the will of one of the most prominent Cold War allies for the USA. Finally, further integration with the EU presented prospects of facilitating the republican goal of Irish unity.14 Nonetheless, although all these were important in making the ceasefire possible, their prominence in prompting it has to be downplayed. Communist ideology was well spread out among republicans in prison but not outside, which is where the ceasefire originated. Reference to other world conflicts peacefully solved could provide ideological justifications, but could also be counterproductive if taken too far. It could have been argued at the time that the republicans were involved in a communal conflict of ethnic character, like that of Yugoslavia.15 Moreover, the USA was powerful enough in the Cold War to disagree with the UK in a relatively small matter. Also, Clinton was not the first American president to get involved with the politics of the Province (Reagan had played an important role in bringing about the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985), and may have done so to benefit his political trajectory and interests rather than out of genuine sympathy for the republican cause. Finally, despite the hopes raised by the involvement in the EU, issues over state boundaries and sovereignty remain to be solved. 16 In conclusion, although the international factors played an essential role in bringing about the ceasefire, their real importance should not be exaggerated. For what concerns the topic of this essay (why, ultimately, the IRA called the ceasefire), it could be argued that what these

12 13

English, p.290. English, pp.293-6. 14 Ibid, pp.304-6. 15 Dixon, p.227. 16 Idem English.

Why did the Provisional IRA call a ceasefire on 31 August 1994?

Enrique Requero

external elements did was to channel a series of movements towards a cessation of violence which had already been started within Northern Ireland, and that without the assistance of these external factors (mainly that of Clinton) the new movement towards peace would quite likely have failed to translate into a peace process and a ceasefire to start it. It is clear then that one has to pay attention first to the internal factors which started the movement towards the peace process. McKittrick once interviewed a senior republican who stated that the ceasefire didnt just drop out of the air. This process has been leadershipled and leadership-driven, but consultation took place. People were prepared for change: discussions and dialogues were taking place all the time.17 The new movement started by the republican leadership implied a series of ideological reassessments which eventually crystalised in the TUAS document of 1994. Regardless of what TUAS really stood for,18 what was clear in the document is that a major reorientation of the struggle was being carried out by the Sinn Fein leadership. In the document, the leadership acknowledged that republicans on their own do not have the strength to achieve the end goal.19 Thus, it was necessary to construct an Irish nationalist consensus with international support and, to this end, republicans would have to abandon the armed struggle in order to reach consensus with constitutional nationalist parties and create a pan-nationalist front. The leadership concluded that the situation at the time was appropiate and that there was enough agreement to proceed with the Tuas [sic.] option. Although the TUAS document had only been circulated by the leadership shortly before the ceasefire,20 it is clear that like the ceasefire itself it didnt just drop out of the air. This document was the product of a reorientation of the republican movement that had been started by Gerry Adams as far back as 1988 when talks between Hume and Adams were initiated, seeking to bridge the ideological gap which separated republicanism and the constitutional nationalism of the SDLP, and which eventually led to the Hume-Adams proposals of 1993.21 Also in 1988, Adams had already addressed the urgent need to build an all-Ireland movement which would be open to everyone committed to the principle and objective of Irish national self-determination.22 In 1991, he said that where you have the conditions for conflict, how you end the conflict is to change the conditions (as would later be reaffirmed by the TUAS document) and that we [the republican leadership] believe that peace can be achieved, we are prepared to take political risks, we are prepared to give and take, we are committed to establishing a peace process. 23
17 18

McKittrick, p.317. Totally UnArmed Strategy or Tactical Use of Armed Strategy. 19 Document reproduced in McKittrick, pp.381-4. 20 Ibid. 21 Dixon, p.222. 22 Quoted in English, p.265. 23 Ibid, pp.269-70.

Why did the Provisional IRA call a ceasefire on 31 August 1994?

Enrique Requero

Meanwhile, the IRA continued with the killings. Nevertheless, although the IRA campaign cannot be justified, it has already been noted how during these years, the paramilitaries progressively increased their demands for the British government to create the necessary conditions for peace. Moreover, the contradiction between Adamss rhetoric and the IRA killings lay in the fact that due to the structural nature of the IRA it supposed a slow and delicate process for the republican leadership to convince the more radicalised grassroots that time had come to continue the struggle in a non-violent way, without prompting a split in the movement.24 Although the first initiatives for change and which eventually led to the ceasefire were started by John Hume and Gerry Adams in 1988, the nationalist position that the ceasefire was solely the product of an emerging Irish Peace Process in not completely accurate. Despite republicans acussations of the British and unionist intransigence and obstructiveness, if the ceasefire was called in 1994, it was precisely because both British and unionists allowed for the conditions that the republicans sought to join the political process to happen. By stating that the British government did not have selfish interests in Northern Ireland, Brooke was implying that Britain was somehow welcoming developments.25 Furthermore, the back channelling between the republican leadership and the British government, which had been initiated by the former, also demonstrated that the British were interested in exploring the possibilities which the new tendencies started by Adams within the republican movement offered.26 This was finally materialised with the Downing Street Declaration of 13 December 1993, which had been inspired by the Hume-Adams proposals and which stated that the British government (and the Irish) would accept any constitutional change in the North and the South if brought about through consent and agreement.27 Despite the fact that the unionist leadership (mainly of the UUP under Trimble) also had difficulties to bring the grassroots to a common ground for discussion and concessions, there were real ideological developments within unionism wich enabled for the creation of a political context in which the republicans could come for talks and thus renounce violence.28 These changes were reflected in the post-Mayhew talks UUP proposals29 and statements made by unionist leaders such as Trimble and John Taylor.30

24 25

Sharrock and Devenport (1997), p.335. Dixon, p.225. 26 Ibid, p.236. 27 Ibid, pp.233,239. 28 Godson (2004). 29 Ibid, 230. 30 Bew (2002), pp.224-31.

Why did the Provisional IRA call a ceasefire on 31 August 1994?

Enrique Requero

The IRA called a ceasefire in 1994 because its leadership was recognising the potential of the current situation31 for the republican movement to abandon the armed struggle and enter into all-party constitutional talks. This event was the product of an initiative started by Gerry Adams in the late 1980s and which sought to convince the republican grassroots that if the conditions were appropriate, the most effective way and maybe the only one left to bring the struggle to its final goal (Irish Unity), was not the use of arms anymore but through involvement in the political process. Although this initiative was first started from withing the republican movement, the SDLP, the British government, the unionists (UUP) and international elements such as Bill Clinton, all played respectively essential roles in enabling this new initiative to succeed. Each of them had a double (although not necessarily contradictory) function of, on one hand, reassuring its own supporters that an accommodation was possible without giving all away; and, on the other hand, negotiating concessions in order to bridge the gaps separating each side. If the ceasefire of 1994 was called, it was because a new movement towards unarmed struggle had been started within the republican leadership, but also and as much, because nationalists, unionists and British made an effort not to let historical grievances and political differences suffocate new possibilities for peace in Northern Ireland.

Bibliography

-D. MCKITTRICK, The Fight for Peace (1996), The Nervous Peace (1996). -P. DIXON, Northern Ireland. Politics of War and Peace (2001). -R. ENGLISH, Armed Struggle (2003). -D. SHARROCK and M. DEVENPORT, Man of War, Man of Peace. The Unauthorised Biography of Gerry Adams (1997). -P. BEW, P. GIBBON and H. PATTERSON, Northern Ireland 1921/2001. Political Forces and Social Clashes (2002). -D. GODSON, Himself Alone. David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism (2004). -WWW.cain.ulst.ac.uk

31

IRA ceasefire statement 31 August 1994.