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Thayer Consultancy

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Briefing: Chinas New Aircraft Carrier Carlyle A. Thayer July 29, 2011

[clientnamedeleted] WereworkingonastoryaboutthelikelyregionalreactiontoChinasaircraftcarrier plans, off of which Beijing lifted a corner of its shroud of secrecy yesterday. The Chineseaircraftcarrierplanshavebeenknownforawhile,andnodoubteachofthe countriesintheregionareconsideringthedevelopmentandplanningintheirown way. Would be interested in your assessment of how a Chinese carrier changes things in the South China Sea and how countries here are reacting already, or are likelytoreact. ANSWER:China'snewcarrierismoreasymbolofitsgrowingnavalstrengththanthe realityofChinesepowerprojection.Chinahasannouncedthecarrierwillbeusedfor training pilots to take off and land while at sea. At present China cannot use the carrier to project force. While it might conceivably be used in future for certain contingencies it would not be able to maintain a permanent presence. Chinese militarystatethecarrierwillnotbeusedformilitaryoperations. Defenceplannersworkoutseveraldecades.Acarrierneedstobeprotectedfromair andsubmarineattack.Chinahaswoefulasw(antisubmarinewarfare)capacityand its carrier would be vulnerable in an enclosed sea such as the South China Sea to nationsthatpossessedmodernsubmarines,suchasVietnamwhenittakesdelivery of Kilo submarines. The carrier would also have to be accompanied by several air warfareships. The concern is that China will acquire several carriers and base them at Hainan Island. This could give China he ability to project power and exert sea control at muchgreaterdistances.ThiswouldaffectalllittoralstatesandevenIndiaasChinese carrierssailintotheIndianOcean. Theprimaryconcernsofregionalstatesrelatetothefuturebalanceofnavalpower andwhethertheUSwillremainengagedwiththeregiontopreventtheSouthChina SeafrombecomingaChineselake.

Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Briefing: Chinas Aircraft Carrier Undergoes Sea Trials Carlyle A. Thayer August 9, 2011

[clientnamedeleted] ThenewsisbeingflashedthatChina'sfirstaircraftcarrierwillbeginseatrialstoday. Request your assessment of whether this is a tipping point for US strategic naval dominanceintheregion,andwhatthiswillmeantoVietnamandthePhilippines. ANSWER:ThestartofseatrialsforChinasfirstaircraftcarriermarksanimportant evolutioninChinesenavalpower.But,contrarytothegrosslyexaggeratedassertions of some regional specialists, it does not constitute a game changer in the naval balance of power in the western Pacific. Chinas carrier represents a modest development.Itisintendedasatrainingshipanditwillnotbecapableofeffectively projecting power. The carrier is likely to spend more time in port than at sea. The carrier is mainly symbolic of potential Chinese naval ambitions. China will need at least three carriers to keep one on station on a permanent basis. A single carrier cannotbeeverywhereatthesametime.Thecarriergroupwillrequirenavalsupport elementstoprotectthecarrierfromairandsubsurfaceattack.Chinaisweakinanti submarinewarfare. Vietnam is projecting the development of an operational Kiloclass submarine squadron in six years. Vietnams sub force will present a credible deterrent to Chinascarrier,especiallyifoneofitsKilospenetratesthecarriersdefensivescreen. Chinas carrier will be politically but not militarily intimidating if it deploys to the SouthChinaSea.VietnamandthePhilippinesarelikelytocontinuepastpracticeof allowing U.S. carriers, such as the USS Carl Vinson, to sail through their Exclusive Economic Zones and host fly outs by government officials and senior military officers.

Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Briefing: Vietnam & China: Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy Carlyle A. Thayer August 13, 2011

[clientnamedeleted] AfterlastmonthsUSshipvisitinDanang,anotherU.S.aircraftcarrierisscheduled to pass through the South China Sea. This is the second time that Vietnamese officialswillfly outtoobservecarrier operations,butitalsocomesjust three days after China launched its first carrier. Could you provide an assessment of the following: Q1. Do you see the situation cooling a bit between China and Vietnam after the ASEANRegionalForummeetinginBaliandSinoVietnamesebilateraltalks?Theanti China protests have continued in Hanoi and Vietnams MOFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]firedoffafreshprotestthisweekoverBeijingsoilexplorationactivities.Do you think Vietnam wants to continue sending Beijing a message that its highly irritated?Orisittimetopullbackandplaynice? ANSWER:SinoVietnamesetensionshaveabatedsinceVietnamdispatchedaspecial envoy to Beijing and the adoption of guidelines on the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Both sides have convened the seventh round of bilateraldiscussionsonresolvingmaritimedisputes.Vietnameseleadersrealizethat there are limits as to how far they can press China on the South China Sea issue. Both sides will continue to protest any actions by the other side in relation to the South China Sea out of concern that the absence of a protest will signal acquiescence. The continuation of public protests in Vietnam is an indication that Vietnameseleadersaredividedabouthowtorespondtodomesticpressure.Public demonstrationsinHanoihavebeenmovedfromthevicinityoftheChineseEmbassy tothelake. Q2. What about the US role? The timing of the US Navy ship visit to Danang last monthangeredChinaandthisweekaUSaircraftcarrier(USSGeorgeWashington)is scheduledtoarriveoff Vietnamssoutherncoast. Doyou thinkVietnamis working hardertoshowcaseitsgrowingmilitarytieswiththeUS?Whatmessagearethese navalvisitsandjointexercisessendingtoChina? ANSWER: A distinction should be made between alignment with the United States and encouraging the U.S. to remain engaged in Southeast Asia. Vietnam is not aligning itself with the U.S. so much as underscoring that the U.S. has a legitimate

2 securityroleintheregion.ThereisaconvergenceofsecurityoutlooksinHanoiand Washington about the role of the U.S. in the region. The U.S. is engaged in high profilesignalingofitsresolve andVietnamissignalingthat itsupportssucharole. The message to China is clear: Chinese assertiveness will only result in a demonstrationofresolvebytheU.S.andVietnam. Q3.ThisUSaircraftcarriervisitalsocomesjustdaysafterChinasfirstcarriersetsail. HowcarefuldoesVietnamhaveto beintoutingthisgrowingrelationshipwiththe USNavy?Whatdoesitstandtogain,loseintheprocess?Andhowimportantisitfor theU.S.tomaintainaprominentroleintheSouthChinaSeaissue?IsChinascarrier a threat to the US? What about the smaller Asian countries like Vietnam and the Philippines? ANSWER: The launch of Chinas first carrier has been accompanied by an unprecedented deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers in the region. The USS Carl Vinson is visiting the Philippines, the USS Ronald Reagan is returning from deploymenttotheMiddleEast.AndtheUSSGeorgeWashingtonisduetosailpast Vietnam.ThisdisplayofU.S.navalmightdemonstratesthatChinahasalongwayto gobeforeitcanprojectnavalpower. VietnamhasbeenverycircumspectindevelopingdefensetieswiththeU.S.Flyouts to passingU.S. carriers are designed to convey a political message to China. So far Vietnam has refrained from conducting naval exercises with the U.S. that impart militaryskills. AnnualshipvisitsbytheU.S.Navyhavebeenongoingforeightyears.Itshouldbe noted that China and Vietnam also conduct naval ship visits but at a less intense level. A Chinese guided missile frigate visited the port at Da Nang in 2010 several monthsafterthemuchpublicizedvisitofthedestroyerUSSJohnMcCain. VietnamisengagedinadeftpoliticalgameofmaintainingrelationswithbothChina andtheU.S.Vietnamismaintainingitsindependence.ItissignalingtoChinathatit favoursacontinuedU.S.presenceintheregion.Chinaislefttodrawtheconclusion that continued assertiveness will only result in increased defence interaction betweenVietnamandtheU.S.Atthesametime,VietnamissignalingtotheU.S.that there are limits to the defence relationship. A congruence of security outlooks should not be confused with alignment. The risk to Hanoi is that if it overplays its handitmaynotbeabletoplaytheroleofpivotbetweenWashingtonandBeijing. Given Chinas economic rise and growing military power, it is vital that the United Statesdemonstratethatitiscommittedtomaintainingregionalsecurityandthatit remains the prime naval power. The U.S. will continue to engage in highlevel defencediplomacywithregularvisitsbyitswarships. ChinasfirstbutagedcarrierdoesnotrepresentanexistentialthreattotheU.S.or anyregionalstateatthismomentintime.ItrepresentsasymbolofChinasfuture naval aspirations. The message to the Philippines is clear: in the absence of an effectivenavalforceitmustrelyonitsalliancewiththeUnitedStatestodeterChina. VietnamlacksasecuritytreatywiththeU.S.andhasalreadydrawntheconclusion thatChinasnavalmodernizationcanonlybecounteredthroughselfhelpmeasures,

3 such as force modernization through the acquisition of Kiloclass submarines and Sukhoi30multirolejetfighters,andbyencouragingabalanceofnavalpower. Q4.Overtheyears,HanoiandBeijinghavehadmanybackandforthexchangesover incidentsintheSouthChinaSea.Butthiscasehasbecomemuchmoreheated,and Hanoi has responded with a new level of aggression i.e. the livefire drills and allowing the protests to go on for weeks. What do you think is driving this? Why now? Some say it may partially be due to Hanoi hoping to stoke nationalism to deflect attention away from the countrys economic woes. Others say China has pushedonetimetoofar.Whatareyourthoughts? ANSWER: In January 2007 the Vietnam Communist Partys Central Committee mandatedthataMaritimeStrategyto2020bedrawnupsothatVietnamscoastal regions could be integrated with development of Vietnams Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ).Chineseintelligenceacquiredacopyofthisconfidentialdocumentand Chinasetaboutputtingpoliticalpressureonforeignoilcompanieswhowerelikely partners in assisting Vietnam. The Obama Administration confronted China over pressureonU.S.oilcompaniesandChinabackedoff. ChineseassertivenessthisyearwasaimedatVietnamesevesselsengagedinlawful commercialexplorationforoilandgasinVietnamsEEZ.Hanoiconcludedthatithad to resist China or otherwise see its future economic development held hostage by Beijing.Vietnamslivefiringexercisewasaverycarefullymanageddemonstrationof its resolve. It was held far away from where the cablecutting incidents involving Chinese ships and Vietnamese exploration vessels took place. Vietnamese authoritiespermittedantiChinademonstrationsbecauseitservedtheirpurposeof demonstratingVietnamsoutrageoverChinasunprecedentedactsofassertiveness. Vietnams oneparty state bases its claim to legitimacy mainly on nationalism and successfuleconomicdevelopment.Vietnamsleadersfaceadilemmaonbothfronts. Theycannotallow domestic antiChinanationalismtodrivetheir actions.Andthey most assuredly cannot allow politically motivated activists, at home or abroad, to attack their handling of South China Sea issues with China. Vietnamese leaders dependonChinesetradefortheireconomicwellbeing.Whiletheycannothopeto redress the massive trade imbalance, they seek Chinese investment. The dilemma for Hanois leaders is not to allow economic relations to be adversely affected by SouthChinaSeaissues.Vietnamsleaderscannotresolveeitherdilemmabystoking antiChinanationalism. Vietnams new party Secretary General, Nguyen Phu Trong, is due to visit Beijing later this year. A great deal will be riding on this visit in terms of friendly bilateral relations.IncomingmonthsVietnamwillmovetodampenantiChinaactivitiesand letthependulumswingbackintheotherdirection.

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