SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 1 - Tuesday, June 28, 2011

This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/

News,Views & Opinions

In which we said ..

Saturday, January 1, 2011 HAPPY NEW YEAR ! ( 2011) Hello Dear ! Wishing you a happy new year ! This 2011 A.D. will be hoped to be the very first year of making the political ideology of General Reformation instead of any kind of revolution to the Burmese Society though there has been still existed plenty of unsolved issues in almost all fields. The bigger issues might be named as democratic reform and internal peace to be concluded by means of cooperation, not subordination, between military organization

and political forces. We do strongly believe that there shall be no way of success without cooperation between military and civilians. No personality cult, no sectionalism, no vandalism and no vendetta would be favored by us to achieve Democracy, Peace and Prosperous Society for future Burma (Myanmar). This blog will be pushed toward "The True Reform for Burma by means of co-operation" in the coming new Hluttaw and the new government. Thank you so much for reading this. Saturday, January 01, 2011. Yangon Myanmar ( Burma )

And also stated that

Thursday, February 10, 2011 Memorandum (1/2011) Memorandum (1/2011) February 10,2011

This blog is intended to prepare the collections of reference resources for supporting academic study as well as policy analysis concerning U.S. foreign policy toward Asia or

the East. China, Japan and Asia-Pacific region, South-East Asian nations, the Indian Sub-continent and the Russian Federation are the targeted Geo-political parts of this study to understand the real meaning and the true purpose of the U.S. foreign policy toward Asia or the East. Under that title, such a policy toward Burma (Myanmar) is fundamentally and necessarily included for the sake of shaping future relationship, between the two countries, Burma and United States of America, which had been infertile since after the stepping down of General Ne Win. As reformers, we always propose to make a talk directly only between the two governments, U.S and Burma (Myanmar) to achieve good understanding for the smooth relationship in coming days, months and years. U.S. has also openly said that a policy of pragmatic engagement with the Burmese authorities holds the best hope for advancing our goals.* *U.S. Policy Toward Burma : Kurt Campbell (Assistant Secretary of State) Sunday, November 7, 2010 Suggestions and Opinions are welcome. Please post in the reader comments. Thanks. Posted by mahathuriya : at 6:52 PM Email This BlogThis! Share to Twitter Share to Facebook Share to Google Buzz

In addition, there was also shortly declared that ..

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Either evolution or eformation.... ()... .. ..

.. Revolution Reformation .. .. .? .? .. Revolution is failed. ... .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ..

October 19, 2010 9:01 PM Posted by mahathuriya : at 11:08 PM Email This BlogThis! Share to Twitter Share to Facebook Share to Google Buzz

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

NO 1

China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning? By Yuriko Koike U.S. Policy Regarding Burma By Phil Robertson MYANMAR: US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement By C. S. Kuppuswamy Testimony of Joseph Yun - Deputy Assistant Secretary - U.S. Department of State

News June 27, 2011 China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US VOA News

Photo: ASSOCIATED PRESS

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right, and Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng shake hands during their meeting at World Expo site Saturday, May 22, 2010 in Shanghai, China. (AP Photo/Eugene Ho China is welcoming the opening of a "new channel" of communications with the United States after talks in Hawaii where South China Sea tensions were discussed. A commentary Sunday in the official Xinhua news agency said the talks resulted from Washington's strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and China's growing global influence. It said China welcomes America's enhanced role in the region as long as it is constructive for peace and development. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said after the talks on Saturday with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai that the two had "candid and clear" discussions about the South China Sea disputes. He said the United States wants tensions to subside and that it seeks a dialogue among all the key players in the disputes. Both Vietnam and the Philippines have protested recent actions by Chinese naval vessels in waters the two countries claim as their exclusive economic zones. The two have sought U.S. support in the conflicts, prompting China to warn the United States against outside interference. China and Vietnam agreed at a meeting Saturday in Beijing to peacefully resolve their dispute through negotiations and friendly consultations. The Philippines last week won assurances from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the United States remains committed to a 60-year-old mutual defense treaty with Manila. Despite the tensions, Campbell said the talks in Hawaii helped the the United States and China achieve a better understanding of each other's intentions, policies and actions.

Xinhua quoted Cui as saying the talks had been "friendly, candid and constructive."

The consultations grew out of the third round of a China-U.S. strategic and economic dialogue in May. China says they reflect an agreement between Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship. Further meetings are planned at a date that has not been determined. Ref: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-DialogueWith-US-124580784.html

Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial

All four suspects denied the accusations

Continue reading the main story Khmer Rouge Trials

Khmer Rouge tribunal in disarray "Brother Number Two" Chum Mey: Tuol Sleng survivor Duch: Symbol of horror

A UN-backed tribunal in Cambodia is holding its first hearing in the trial of four former top Khmer Rouge leaders. The defendants include the "number two" in Pol Pot's regime, Nuon Chea. They face charges of genocide and crimes against humanity over the deaths of up to two million Cambodians in 1975-79. They all deny the accusations, and the trial is likely to last for years. Last July, former Khmer Rouge member Kaing Guek Eav, known as Comrade Duch, was jailed for 35 years. But because of time already served and compensation for a period of illegal detention, Duch - the former head of a notorious prison where some 15,000 died - will be free in 19 years. Led by Pol Pot, who died in 1998, the Maoist Khmer Rouge regime was ousted from power by Vietnamese forces in 1979. 'Second Nuremberg' The four defendants appeared at the initial hearing at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) in Phnom Penh on Monday morning. Besides Nuon Chea, they include former head of state Khieu Samphan, former foreign minister and international face of the regime Ieng Sary, and his wife Ieng Thirith, who was minister for social affairs.

The four showed no emotion as opening statements were read out before the court and a packed gallery, in proceedings screened on national television.

Please turn on JavaScript. Media requires JavaScript to play. The BBC's Guy De Launey said the defendants will argue that they should not be on trial at all Moments later, Nuon Chea - who was dressed in a ski hat and sweatshirt - complained he was not well and felt cold and left the courtroom. "I'm ready to come back when the court discusses my requests," he said. The hearing will run for a maximum of four days, and no evidence will be given. Instead, the hearing is expected to focus on witness and expert lists and preliminary legal objections. The trial proper is expected to open later this year, possibly in September. "There hasn't been a case as large and complex as this since Nuremberg," international co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley told the AFP news agency in a recent interview, referring to the historic Nazi trials after World War II. The head of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights said the start of the second case was a "cathartic moment". The crimes "remain ingrained in Cambodia's collective psyche. I hope that this trial... provides all victims with some sense of justice, however delayed that justice may be", Ou Virak said in a statement. Theary Seng, who lost both her parents to the Khmer Rouge, told the BBC: "This is the heart of the matter - this is the case that we have been anticipating for many years, since the operation of the court in 2006.

"It will allow a lot of information to surface which will help to chip away at the repeatedly-asked questions of why did it happen?" Theary Seng is one of almost 4,000 "civil parties" to the case - victims who will have a voice in court alongside the prosecution and defence. Health concerns At least one of the defendants - Ieng Sary - is expected to argue that he should not be on trial at all, the BBC's Guy De Launey in Phnom Penh says. Continue reading the main story Who were the Khmer Rouge?

Maoist regime that ruled Cambodia from 1975-1979 Led by Saloth Sar, better known as Pol Pot Abolished religion, schools and currency in effort to create agrarian utopia Up to two million people thought to have died of starvation, overwork or were executed Defeated in Vietnamese invasion in 1979 Pol Pot fled and remained free until 1997 - he died a year later Brutal Khmer Rouge regime

The former foreign minister received a royal pardon 15 years ago as part of the deal which produced the final surrender of the Khmer Rouge. The defendants are all in or near their 80s and some have been in bad health, so there is a real danger that not all of them may live to see the end of the trial, our correspondent adds. The suspects have been kept in detention since their arrests in 2007. Parts of court proceedings will be broadcast on TV, but hundreds of people from all over Cambodia are still expected to travel to the court to see the accused.

The current Cambodian government has repeatedly opposed efforts to widen the tribunal's inquiries, and insisted that there should be no further trials after that of the four leaders.

Ref: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13922564

The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning? By Kamal Hyder in

Asia

on Thu, 06/23/2011 - 08:30.

Photo by GALLO/GETTY In less than a months time, US forces will begin pulling out of Afghanistan. Even though the move will be more symbolic and not a total withdrawal, it will pave the way forward for an eventual handover of Afghan security to the Afghan National Army (ANA) by 2014. It is a daunting task, by any stretch of the imagination. Afghanistan was bigger than Iraq and was even more rugged and suitable for a long drawn out guerilla war.

The Afghan Taliban, the main adversary in the conflict, had already made its position clear when it said it wanted a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan before any talks could begin. Now US President Barack Obama has made his plans public and that means an almost 30 per cent reduction by the autumn of 2012. The Americans and their allies are hoping they will be able to hand over the task to the fledgling ANA which is already near the 300,000 mark. It is hoped that by 2014 the Afghan army would have sufficient boots on the ground to take over control of their territory. The issue is not just that they will have to have sufficient numbers, however, but that they will need to be well-trained and well-equipped enough to fight against the Taliban, who are more organised and stronger than at any time since the invasion of Afghanistan almost ten years ago. If the past is anything to go by, the real test of the Afghan army will be maintaining the loyalties of its various ethnic groups. During the civil war after the Russians forces pulled out in 1989, many soldiers deserted and switched sides. The Afghan army crumbled like a house of cards and despite attempts to beef up loyalists like Najeebullah in Kabul, Moscow was not able to keep the army intact as a coherent fighting force. The likelihood of such an eventuality repeating itself cannot be brushed aside. The feeling is that once the Americans tone down their presence in Afghanistan, the Afghan army may not be able to cope with the fight. While it is easy for the Americans to shoot their opponents (whether suspected or real), the Afghan army may not be in a position to afford that luxury.

They will be aware that their opposition lives within the same territoriy, and is always within striking distance . As the fighting against the Taliban has intensifies, there have already been numerous cases of desertions within the army. In the eyes of some senior analysts, the present Afghan army was cannon fodder for the US and NATO forces. The policy of pitting Afghans versus other Afghans was always likely to fuel the probability of a civil war, the ultimate benefactors of which will likely be the Afghan Taliban. No wonder there was talk of the need for a political solution to the crisis. In the eyes of one senior US diplomat, the talking should actually have begun years ago. The Americans had already made the blunder of lumping the Taliban in with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The fact is that no Taliban or Afghan was directly or indirectly involved in the attacks on the World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and the Americans went after both. While they may now be more confident about winning the their battle against al-Qaeda, they are far from winning the war against the Taliban. The Americans may be looking at this summer as the beginning of the end, with the withdrawal of 10,000 troops, but the Afghan Taliban are just getting started with their summer offensive. The Americans figured that they had the watches, but the truth is that it was the Taliban who have always had the time. It remains unclear, therefore, whether this is the beginning of the end, or the end of

the beginning of a new era of chaos for the region. The real fear here remains that with the US and NATO leaving, will the other regional states be sucked once more into a proxy war? Ref : http://blogs.aljazeera.net/asia/2011/06/23/beginning-end-or-end-beginning

Opinion

Asia after the Afghan war

The US withdrawal of its troops will test the will of Asia's power brokers to build a secure regional order. Yuriko Koike Last Modified: 24 Jun 2011 10:08

At the recent Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore - in the presence of Chinese Minister of Defence - US Defence Secretary Robert Gates outlined his

ideas for continuing US military operations in and with Asia

July will mark two milestones in America's sometimes-tortured relations with Asia. One is the beginning of the end of the nearly decade-long struggle in Afghanistan - the longest war in United States history - as President Barack Obama announces the first troop withdrawals. The other is the 40th anniversary of Henry Kissinger's

[GALLO/GETTY] secret mission to Beijing, a turning point in the Cold War and the first step on China's road to modernisation - but at the time a huge shock to Asia, particularly Japan. The looming Afghan withdrawal recalls, at least for some Asians, a third, even more traumatic event: America's chaotic exit from Saigon in April 1975. Back then, that debacle seemed to presage a broader US withdrawal from Asia, with a war-weary American public seeking the supposed comforts of isolationism. Today's Asian nervousness exists not only because isolationism appears to be gaining ground once more in America, but also because Afghanistan's stability remains in doubt, while China's power is rising in the absence of any pan-Asian consensus or institutional structure. The US did, indeed, turn inward following the fall of Saigon, and its neglect of Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 led to chaos and al-Qaeda's neartakeover of the country. So it is not surprising that many Asian leaders are asking themselves what commitments the US will maintain once its troops leave Afghanistan. Perhaps equally as important, many people in Asia are also debating whether the region would be able to rebalance itself, should the US scale back its military presence. Fortunately, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has reassured America's Asian friends and allies that regional disengagement is not being contemplated. At the recent Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore - indeed, in the presence of Chinese Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie - Gates outlined his ideas for continuing US cooperation in and with Asia. Gates promised to increase the number of US warships deployed to Singapore as part of the US-Singapore Strategic Framework Agreement; increase the number of US Navy calls in Asian ports; hold more joint naval exercises; and improve multilateral military cooperation.

Even more reassuring were the principles that will, according to Gates, guide America's future Asian strategy: free and open commerce; support for the rule of law and the rights, responsibilities, and sovereignty of Asia's states; open access to Asian and global sea lanes, airspace, and cyberspace; and peaceful resolution of all conflicts. These principles matter, because Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and even Mongolia all regard a US military presence in the region as essential to counterbalancing China's increasing might. Gates, however, is due to step down from his post shortly, which is unfortunate, because the Obama administration's apparent lack of any explicit Asia strategy means that Gates' reassurances might not reassure for very long. Nowadays, US policy on Asia needs the type of strategic vision and insight that guided Kissinger's discussions with Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai four decades ago. Without a clear and convincing doctrine, at least some Asian leaders are likely to remain dubious of America's ability to remain Asia's dominant military force, particularly given its economic woes, projected fiscal retrenchment, and other overseas commitments. This lack of clarity may become particularly troublesome should China's leaders underestimate the enduring quality of America's Asian commitments. Securing a structure of peace in Asia, however, is not solely America's responsibility. America's friends and allies need to think hard about what sort of regional order they want, and they must begin to collaborate in order to breathe life into a structure of peace within which all of Asia can prosper and feel secure. Japan's government in particular needs to identify a coherent Asia strategy and stick to it, instead of leaning towards China one minute, and America the next. In constructing a viable strategy, deepening Japan's partnerships with Asia's great democracies - India, Indonesia, and South Korea - must be a priority. But the biggest question concerns China's place in a consensual Asian order, and its willingness to collaborate with its neighbours, as well as with the US, in creating it. The doubts that many Asians now hold about China's intentions are well grounded, given the secretive nature of China's military build-up, and its leaders' increasingly aggressive

tone in territorial disputes with India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. China's unconditional support for North Korea's wayward regime, despite its repeated crimes against peace, is also a cause for concern about whether China will treat its neighbours' security concerns with respect. Today's Asia-Pacific region has now become the focus of the global economy. According to the World Bank, three of the top five economic powers will be Asian powers (China, Japan, and India) within this decade. The boom that has brought this shift occurred because America's military presence in the region provided stability and predictability. America's withdrawal from Afghanistan must not be allowed to call this stability into question. What happens in Afghanistan as America begins to draw down its troops will test the willingness of all of Asia's powers to work together to build a secure regional order. In Afghanistan, their long-term interests are essentially in harmony, as none - including China - wants to see Afghanistan become a haven for terrorism once again. But only a strong regional consensus on Afghanistan's future can avert the prospect of a renewed struggle for mastery there. If such a consensus can be forged, however, it will provide a foundation for further collaboration in building a pan-Asian order based on consent, not military might.

Yuriko Koike, Japan's former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser, is Chairman of the Executive Council of the Liberal Democratic Party. The article above was first published by Project Syndicate. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Ref: http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011621132915825211.html .

U.S. Policy Regarding Burma By Phil Robertson, October 11, 2005

Key Points

A world-class human rights abuser, Burmas military junta is condemned both by the UN Human Rights Commissionevery year since 1989and by the International Labor Organization for its systematic use of forced labor.

The SPDC continues to refuse to recognize the results of the 1990 elections, won overwhelmingly by the National League for Democracy (NLD), and has imprisoned over 55 NLD parliamentarians.

Economic sanctions by the U.S. and other nations continue to pressure the SPDC regime, despite a recent ruling by the Supreme Court overturning the Massachusetts Burma law.

Springing from obscurity to Americas editorial pages, college campuses, city councils, and state legislatures, Burma has become a major foreign policy issue seemingly out of proportion to its relatively limited ties to the United States. Ruled by a series of harsh military regimes since 1962, Burma serves as a test case for U.S. policy on several fronts: human rights; a growing worldwide heroin epidemic; the role of U.S. state and local governments in relation to international trade policy and practice; forced labor, international labor standards, and the new prominence of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in the era of globalization; and the role of multinational corporations in supporting dictatorships. U.S. verbal commitments to promote human rights and democracy are being put to the test as an embattled democracy movementled by 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyifaces a relentless campaign of arrests and intimidation by the State Law and Order Restitution Council (SLORC) military junta, renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997.

SLORC came to power in September 1988, when it commanded the Burmese army to smash a nationwide democracy movement by gunning down more than 3,000 protesters in Rangoon and thousands more in smaller cities and towns. Nine consecutive years of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the junta demonstrate that little has changed since then. The UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) has criticized the SPDC for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, death in custody, torture, arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention, absence of due process of law, severe restrictions on freedom of opinion, expression, movement, assembly, and association, including portering for the military. The use of forced labor by the SPDC affects as many as 800,000 Burmese daily, according to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In November 2000, the ILO will likely employfor the first timeArticle 33 of its constitution and call on member states to take action against the junta. The ILO is demanding that the SPDC scrap legal authority for the use of forced labor, order all government authorities to cease using it, and prosecute those responsible, especially the military. Attempting to legitimize its rule, SLORC/SPDC organized a multiparty election on May 27, 1990. The move turned out to be a huge miscalculation, as Suu Kyis National League for Democracy (NLD) party won a landslide victory, taking 392 of 485 seats in the Parliament. The official military party won just 10 seats, and the military promptly refused to honor the results of the election. When the SPDC employed mass arrests to prevent the convening of the elected Parliament in August 1998, the NLD announced the formation of the Committee epresenting the Peoples Parliament. Civil society groups continue to be totally repressed. Only in July 2000 did the SPDC reopen universities shuttered since 1996 to prevent student gatherings. The dominance of military spending has relegated Burmas once-proud health service to 190th (out of 191) in overall health system performance, according to the World Health Organization. The SPDC has consolidated control over ethnic groups in border areas by employing the infamous four cuts strategy, designed to cut off insurgents from food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. The result has been forced relocations and human suffering that rivals anything seen during ethnic cleansing in Bosnia or Kosovo. Detailed research

on internally displaced peoples (IDPs) among ethnic groups has found that over 300,000 Shan, more than 200,000 Karen, and over 30,000 Karenni citizens have been forced from their homes. Hundreds of villages have been turned into free-fire zones, in which heavily armed SPDC battalions, using civilians as forced porters and minesweepers, wreak havoc. Another 100,000 refugees have fled to Thailand. The Peoples epublic of Chinathe SPDCs closest ally and primary diplomatic supporterhas provided $1.8 billion in military equipment for the SPDCs military modernization drive. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), recently revealed that Burma has one of the highest numbers of child soldiers in the world. Yet Western and Asian multinationals continue to invest with government ministries or entities like the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, controlled by military officers. Successful efforts by activists to pass Burma selective purchasing legislation in two states (Massachusetts and Vermont) and 21 cities (including New York and Los Angeles) have pressured at least 39 international companies to withdraw from Burma. But on June 19, 2000, the Supreme Court upheld the National Foreign Trade Council challenge to the Massachusetts Burma law, marking a counterattack by a coalition of Americas largest businesses, who oppose any restrictions on foreign trade.

Problems with Current U.S. Policy

Key Problems

Current U.S. sanctions are inadequate, because they only ban new investments allowing most existing projects to continue unimpededand do not address imports into the United States.

The Clinton administration has opposed state- and local-level sanctions as barriers to trade.

U.S. policy has failed to respond sufficiently to SPDC complicity in heroin trafficking networks.

In 1995, after her release from six years of house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi challenged the military regime to enter into a dialoguewith no preconditionsto craft a final political settlement in Burma. This call, repeated hundreds of times by NLD leaders since then, has been consistently ignored by the junta. The SPDC has instead mounted an intensifying campaign to dismantle the NLD through arrests of its elected parliamentarians and members, seizures of property, and junta-organized noconfidence rallies against NLD parliamentarians in their constituencies. An SPDCappointed constitutional drafting convention waits in the wings, at work on a document that most observers believe will permanently enshrine military rule. With their backs to the wall, Suu Kyi and the NLD have called for international economic sanctions against the SPDC, an international tourism boycott, and no new foreign investment in Burma. Following a strategy reminiscent of the African National Congress during its struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the NLD believes that international sanctions will deprive the SPDC and its cronies of opportunities to enrich themselves and will contribute to pressure for an unconditional, tripartite dialogue between the SPDC, the NLD, and the leaders of the ethnic nationalities. In May 1997, a concerted grassroots campaign in the U.S. finally persuaded the Clinton administration to impose economic sanctions to ban future U.S. investment. The measure takes aim both at actions to facilitate investment (including those by foreign nationals) and attempts to evade the investment prohibitions. But all investment contracts signed by U.S. companies before that date are considered legal. In a test case to hold U.S. corporations accountable, Burmese directly affected by forced labor in the building of the Yadana Gas pipeline have joined forces with two U.S. NGOs to use the Alien Torts Claims Act to sue the Unocal oil company for human rights abuses stemming from its partnership with the SPDC. Unfortunately, Washington balks at the next logical stepbanning all Burmese imports into the United States, which are not covered by the May 1997 sanctions. In fact, the National Labor Committee found that between 1995 and 1999, apparel imports from

Burma soared 272%. In the year 2000, U.S. companies will import more than $340 million worth of garments from Burma, including those produced in factories owned by drug traffickers. U.S. activists have vowed that selective purchasing and corporate accountability campaigns will continue, despite opposition from free trade acolytes in the current administration, who played a critical role in persuading the Justice Department to side with U.S. businesses in arguments before the Supreme Court. Washingtons reluctance to ban Burmese imports is even harder to understand, now that it is clear that the SPDC is profiting from collaboration with narcotraffickers. The Drug Enforcement Agency estimated in 1998 that 14% of heroin entering the U.S. is from Southeast Asia and Burma ranks as the worlds second largest producer of heroin. Burmas banks can accept foreign currency deposits of any size with no questions asked, as long as a 30% tax is paid. Cheap amphetamines produced by ethnic groups like the Wa, who have a close relationship with a top SPDC official, Gen. Khin Nyunt, are flooding into Thailand. Yet the U.S. only responds with the same old drug war interdiction efforts, treating the symptoms rather than taking concerted political action against the SPDC regime, which condones these activities. SPDC intransigence has scuttled good faith international efforts to create a road map for political reform that would involve guarantees of aid in exchange for reform. Meanwhile the Clinton administration, while taking commendable steps to unilaterally stop new U.S. investments in Burma, has failed to use its leadership to lobby Australia, Canada, and key European countries to deepen Burmas diplomatic and economic isolation. As a result, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) policy of constructive engagement toward the SPDC, primarily composed of forging commercial links and defending the SPDC from external criticism, continues largely unchallenged. Moreover, Japan is now moving to resume partial overseas development assistance to the SPDC. Another problem is the lack of adequate humanitarian assistance from the U.S. and other nations. The intensifying military campaign against ethnic nationalities along Burmas borders has created a humanitarian crisis that continues to be largely ignored by the international community. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Burmese

remain trapped, hiding in the jungles. Yet only a pittance of international assistance reaches them. Meanwhile, Thailand continues to insist on an overly narrow definition of a refugee as someone who is fleeing from fighting, has declined to accede to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, and refuses to consider setting up refugee camps for ethnic Shans. Between 700,000 and 1.5 million illegal migrant workersmany of whom could qualify as refugeeswork in the underground economy in Thailand.

Toward a New Foreign Policy

Key Recommendations

The U.S. must develop a proactive policy to deal comprehensively with the humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons in Burma and refugees in Thailand.

The U.S. needs to expand efforts to delegitimize the SPDC internationally and must work with allies to apply economic and political pressure on the junta. Unilaterally, the U.S. should ban imports from Burma.

The U.S. should support stronger action at the United Nations, including toughened multilateral sanctions, in concert with the forthcoming ILO call for governments to critically review their relationships with the SPDC regime.

One of the first steps the U.S. should take is to increase resources for cross-border humanitarian assistance (food and medicine) to the internally displaced population while marshalling greater international attention to the plight of the ethnic peoples of Burma. Washington should also proactively work with the Royal Thai government to broaden its definition of a refugee, allow Shan camps to be established, and ensure that no involuntary repatriations occur. U.S. policy correctly urges a tripartite dialogue between equalsthe SPDC, the NLD, and ethnic leaders. As Aung San Suu Kyi recently wrote in the Washington Post, this dialogue should be aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement acceptable to major

political forces in our country. The problem is that this call, echoed by the international community, has been met by the SPDC with shrill rhetoric, the jailing of NLD representatives, and further repression. The main issue for U.S. foreign policy is how to use political and economic leverage to accomplish a sustained dialogue leading to a just settlement. It is still clear that with economic and military backing from China as well as diplomatic support from ASEAN, the SPDC believes it can bide its time and selectively dismantle the NLD. The U.S. must intensify political and economic pressure to deny legitimacy and resources to the SPDC junta. The ILO Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor, headed by three respected international jurists, found systematic use of forced labor in every state and division in Burma. A 1996 report by the U.S. embassy in Rangoon found that 3% of Burmas GDP comes from forced labor. In order to ensure that no products produced with or benefiting from forced labor (which is often used to build transportation infrastructure such as ports and roads) reach American consumers, the U.S. should immediately ban the import of all goods from Burma. Such a move would directly impact sectors closely tied to the Burmese military (like garment production and teak harvesting) and would uphold American principles against forced labor anywhere in the world. At the same time, the current administration must recognize the legitimacy of U.S. state and local governments refusing to do business with companies operating in Burma. Given the flood of heroin entering the U.S. from Burma, the administration should invoke a national security exemption (citing the Government Procurement Agreement) with regard to the World Trade Organization to fend off future attempts to overturn selective purchasing laws. Grassroots activists will certainly continue a concerted campaign of trade-related tactics to target U.S., European, and Asian companies invested in Burma, and the U.S. government should not put obstacles in their way, based on misguided appeals to free trade. At the United Nations, the General Assemblys annual resolutions on Burma are increasingly ignored by specialized UN agencies. In the first half of 2000, both the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNESCO held major conferences with the SPDC

government in Rangoon, lending international legitimacy to the junta. Although there is merit in the efforts of some activists in lobbying for suspension of the SPDC as the legitimate representative of Burma at the UN, Chinas veto in the UN Security Council will make that politically impossible. Instead, the U.S. and its allies should undertake an effort to forbid all UN agencies from conducting regional meetings in Burma and should urge the UN secretary-general to critically review all UN programs in Burma in light of the General Assemblys policy decision to promote human rights and the restoration of democratic rule. The U.S. should also call a session of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning Burmas continued failure to transfer power to the winners of the 1990 election, forcing China to protect its client on the international stage, and further undermining the SPDCs independence in the eyes of its own people. The U.S. should continue its policy of blocking loans and assistance to Burma from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and should do likewise at the Asian Development Bank (ADB). An ADB project, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program, is being used to foster transportation, trade, and investment links between Burma and its neighbors. At the ADB annual meeting in May 2000 in Chiang Mai, invitees included at least two Burmese bankers with direct ties to drug traffickers. Initiatives like a GMS Business Forum, which would help foster closer links between SPDC companies and corporations in neighboring countries, are wholly inappropriate at this time. The U.S. should work with its European counterparts on the ADB board to insist on excluding Burma from all GMS projects or, failing that, should defund the program in its entirety. The U.S. must hold the line as a consistent supporter of the restoration of democratic rule, based on the 1990 election. Without U.S. influence in the international community, promoting a comprehensive policy of economic pressure and political persuasion to push for final political status negotiations, the SPDC may continue its record of grave human rights abuse and repression for many more years. Phil Robertson is the Mainland Southeast Asia Representative of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, based in Bangkok, Thailand. These are the personal

views of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of either the American Center for International Labor Solidarity or the AFL-CIO. Recommended Citation: Phil Robertson, "U.S. Policy Regarding Burma" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, October 11, 2005) Ref: http://www.fpif.org/reports/us_policy_regarding_burma

Paper no. 4539

10-June-2011

MYANMA : US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement -Not So Pragmatic

By C. S. Kuppuswamy In 2009 the US, on realising that its policy on Myanmar has not had the desired impact, embarked on a two-track strategy of engagement with the Myanmar authorities and at the same time continue with the economic sanctions to push for reforms. This is now being often referred to as pragmatic engagement. Even with this pragmatic engagement, US has made no headway in its relations with Myanmar. Expectations were high after the general elections and when the military junta 0n 30 March 2011 dissolved the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). A civilian government was put in place with former Prime Minister Thein Sein as

President. A Voice of America report then said that the US dismissed the so called transfer of power in Burma as immaterial as the military leaders continue to remain in control. A major development since then has been the appointment of a special envoy to Myanmar and a flurry of visits by US officials to Myanmar. Derek Mitchell, the Principal assistant secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Security affairs, has been nominated as a special envoy to Burma. The appointment is still to be confirmed. On this appointment Suu Kyi remarked I am a cautions optimist perhaps hinting that it would not make things any better. In view of the fact that the UN envoys could not do much in the last decade or so, the task is not going to be in anyway easy for the US envoy. Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia along with his deputy Scot Marciel visited Myanmar in November 2009 and had talks with the ruling Generals and Aung San Suu Kyi. They were the first high ranking American diplomats to visit Myanmar since 1995. Kurt Campbell visited Myanmar again in May 2010,when he was allowed to meet Suu /kyi at a state guest house in Rangoon. He warned that the election will lack international legitimacy and that Burmas arms deals with North Korea are against UN sanctions that prohibit buying arms from North Korea. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific affairs, Joseph Y. Yun had visited Myanmar in December 2010 and again in May 2011. US Senator John McCain visited Myanmar from 01-03 June 2011. After meeting some government officials he said it was clear that the new Government wanted a better relationship with the United States. He had also met Suu Kyi and pledged to support efforts to foster democracy. He had also warned in a press meet that Myanmar could face a Middle East-style revolution if the new government fails to implement democratic reforms.

US charge d affairs, Larry Dinger, the top diplomat in Myanmar confirmed to the media in Feb 2011 that: Of course, the United States is engaging in a dialogue with Aung Sang Suu Kyi and the NLD about US assistance programmes in Burma," "We also engaged with the authorities in Naypyidaw and other stakeholders on such important issues in the effort to consider all important perspectives in the formulating of US policies toward Burma," There have been calls from some ASEAN countries and political parties in Myanmar for lifting of sanctions in view of the formation of the Civil Government. Rejecting these calls, US on 16 May 2011 has renewed its economic sanctions against Myanmar. President Obama while renewing the sanctions in a formal notice to the Congress said that Burma was taking actions hostile to US interests. While some senators have argued in favour of the stand taken by Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, for continuance of the sanctions, some think tanks and Burma watchers are of the opinion that it is time for the US to rethink as the sanctions have not served the desired purpose. On the contrary they argue that the sanctions have strengthened the regime, weakened the opposition, created a bitterness towards the west and have given China and neighbouring countries a great economic opportunity. Review of US Policy A detailed review of the US Policy on Burma since October 2009 is contained in the opening remarks of Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 02 June 2011. It is worth noting some excerpts of his remarks. The Administration firmly believes that easing sanctions at this time (after

transition to the Civilian Government in March 2011) is premature, absence of fundamental reform or other regime actions to address core international concerns, and that Burma's poor economic performance is primarily due to the regimes gross economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption. Burmese authorities continue to express a desire for improved relations with the United States and identified several confidence-building measures that they would like from the United States, including our use of Myanmar instead of Burma as the official name of the country and our direct assistance toward achieving the countrys Millennium Development Goals. The United States clearly and consistently condemned the elections as neither free nor fair. With former regime officials occupying most key positions in all branches of government, the United States is not optimistic that we will see any immediate change in policies or progress on our core concerns. The United States alone cannot achieve progress in Burma. We are tirelessly working with our European allies and our ASEAN and regional partners to urge the Burmese government to constructively engage with the international community and address these long-standing issues. India and China remain important to this issue. This review is a more an action taken report without indicating any progress achieved in US-Myanmar relations and shifts the total blame on to the Myanmar authorities for the current status of relations. Some comments on US Policy At this stage, Aung San Suu Kyi is still a determining factor in U.S. policy towards Burma/ Myanmar. Her status in the post-election period may determine U.S. Policy toward that country for a considerable period. David I. Steinberg.

If the US continues to press the regime about its relationship with Pyongyang, as seems highly likely, tensions between Washington and Naypyidaw are bound to grow, making a constructive dialogue on other issues even more difficult. Should it be discovered that Burma is indeed violating one or more UNSC Resolutions, President Obama would have no option but to revert to a much tougher line. This outcome may satisfy critics of the Administration's current policy, but it will not bring the resolution of Burma's domestic problems any closer. - Andrew Selth, Griffith Asia Institute. "US policy for a long time has been based on an objective that was extremely unlikely to be met - a dialogue between opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi [who was recently released after 17 years in jail and under house arrest] and the junta leading to democratic change. Western sanctions that were put in place to force the dialogue have not bankrupted the government, nor pressured leaders toward political reform. What they have done is severely weaken the position of independent businessmen and the middle classes on whom an open society depends." -Thant Myint-U The US should consider Myanmar through a broader lens with a holistic consideration of its foreign policy interests in the region, including nuclear nonproliferation. Reorienting US policy towards Myanmar does not mean casting aside human-rights issues, which were the initial motivation for imposing economic sanctions. - Shanan Farmer, Alex Roesler and Christina McDonnell (AT online 07 June 2011). Conclusion The US policy is dictated by growing support from Congress for continuance of sanctions, and a strong pro-democracy lobby of the expatriate groups. However it is time for the US to rethink on its policy on Burma. While due deference must be given to Aung San Suu Kyis views, the US should not be obsessed with democracy and human rights and think of the larger interests of the nation, the people and the US interests in the region. A good beginning, although a minor

gesture would be to recognise the new name Myanmar instead of Burma. Though it is said to be a "two track policy", what is seen on the ground is a "one track policy" of continuing the sanctions. Sanctions have not worked and will not work so long as China and India the two large neighbours are not taken on board. These two countries are in no mood to go along with the US on the question of sanctions. A break through is necessary and it is for the US to take the initiative when the new government has indicated its desire to improve its relations.

Copyright South Asia Analysis Group All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and articles, provided the source and the author's name are acknowledged. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.

Ref: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers46%5Cpaper4539.html

Testimony of Joseph Yun Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

U.S. Department of State Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs June 2, 2011 Block Burmese JADE Act and ecent Policy Developments

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Berman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the central aspects of our Burma policy, including elements of our two-track approach that comprises pressure coupled with principled engagement. In light of my recent visits to Burma in December 2010 and again two weeks ago, I would also like to provide an overview on the Administrations efforts to promote democracy and human rights in Burma and on key recent developments in Burma including the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the 2010 elections, and the formation of a government headed by former top regime general and now President Thein Sein. After a comprehensive policy review, which Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell outlined for your Committee in October 2009, the United States launched a dual-track Burma policy, combining pressure with direct dialogue with the regime. We are currently pursuing these parallel and complementary tracks in a full-scale effort to advance progress on core concerns of the United States and the international community, including the unconditional release of all political prisoners, respect for human rights, and an inclusive dialogue with the political opposition and ethnic groups that would lead to national reconciliation. We also urge the Government of Burma to respect its international obligations, including adherence to all UN Security Council resolutions on nonproliferation. We have made these representations repeatedly in the context of Burmas nontransparent (2) relationship with North Korea. Although meaningful progress remains elusive, I believe we must continue to bring the full

range of diplomatic tools to bear and use both dialogue and pressure to promote positive change in Burma.

First, let me start with the pressure side of our policy. We play a leading role in the international community in shining a light on the regime's dismal human rights record and signaling to Burmese authorities that the world is watching. We support an annual resolution at the UN General Assembly on Burma that draws attention to human rights abuses and calls for cooperation with the international community to achieve concrete progress with regard to human rights, fundamental freedoms and political processes. In 2010, this resolution passed by a higher vote margin than in any previous year. More recently, in March of this year, we supported the annual resolution on Burma at the UN Human Rights Council to renew the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Burma, Mr. Tomas Ojea Quintana. We continue to call upon the Burmese government to fully cooperate with Mr. Quintana, including by allowing him to visit the country again, which authorities are refusing. Secretary of State Clinton has also expressed our commitment to pursuing accountability for human rights abuses through establishing a commission of inquiry for Burma in close consultation with our friends, allies, and partners at the United Nations. Coupled with this international pressure, we maintain extensive, targeted sanctions against senior leaders of the Burmese government and military, their immediate family members, their key supporters, and others who abuse human rights. We work closely with our key allies such as the European Union (EU) and its member states, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asian nations and others to encourage them to impose sanctions and to press the regime to make meaningful changes. We were pleased that in April 2011, the EU renewed its Common Position on Burma, which authorizes EU sanctions on key regime officials. U.S. sanctions are based on a series of executive orders and key legislation passed over the past 20 years, including the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Juntas Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008. Successive

Administrations have cooperated closely with Congress to ensure that these restrictions, whether economic, financial or travel related, have the same purpose: that the United States will not allow the use of its resources to perpetuate abusive, authoritarian rule. The Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 is the most recent piece of Burma-specific legislation and it constitutes an important component of the U.S. sanctions regime. There are several key aspects of the JADE Act, which is more than a ban (3) on Burmese jade: it focuses on stopping anti-democratic activities in addition to preventing the regime from profiting from trade in precious gems. The JADE Act includes provisions for financial sanctions and bans the issuance of visas for travel to the United States by former and present leaders of the regime, officials involved in the repression of human rights, other key supporters of the regime, and their immediate family members. These provisions complement already existing economic sanctions and travel restrictions. The JADE Act also required the appointment of a Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma to ensure high-level, dedicated focus on improving the situation in Burma and promoting genuine democratic reform. I am very pleased to highlight that on April 14, the President nominated Derek Mitchell for that position. He is the right candidate for this tough job. He brings a formidable blend of Asia expertise and senior government and civil society experience to the table. If confirmed, we have every confidence that Mr. Mitchell will fully carry out his mandate to advance all aspects of our Burma policy, pursuing both pressure on and engagement with Burmese authorities as warranted by their actions. If confirmed, he will further strengthen ties with key Burmese stakeholders in civil society, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and ethnic groups, and coordinate our efforts with Congress, allies, and the NGO community for the benefit of the Burmese people. We look forward to his leadership and hope that his Senate hearing and confirmation will take place as soon as possible.

Finally, the JADE Act bans the import of Burmese jadeite, rubies, and related jewelry into the United States, even if transformed in a third country. The first line of defense is our Customs and Border Patrol certification requirements, issued through a joint DHS/Treasury final rule. We have been very successful in enforcing this prohibition through the final rule, which requires every importer to have written certification at the time of import from the exporter affirming that none of the imported jewelry contains jadeite or rubies mined or extracted from Burma. Our prohibition has been most effective for Burmese rubies and jewelry, as the demand for jadeite in the United States is virtually nonexistent. The second line of defense is the jewelry industry itself; industry sources note that the most valuable rubies from Burma are high quality and very distinctive and that no one in the United States is importing rubies or related jewelry from Burma. The Jewelers Vigilance Committee has conveyed to us its confidence that no rubies imported into the United States were mined or extracted from Burma and that no importer in (4 )the U.S. would want to risk losing their goods or reputation by violating what they refer to as a well-known ban. Burmas regime continues to reap significant revenues from its tightly controlled gemstone industry, and the JADE Act does not cut off all international trade in Burmas gemstones. Burma's export of rubies and jadeite is doing well, in particular because Chinas domestic market for jadeite and related jewelry is on the rise. We will continue to call on China and India and other neighboring countries to cooperate with us on this issue. Before I turn to the engagement track, I would like to note that we regularly hear claims from neighboring countries and a variety of other partners that our sanctions negatively affect the Burmese economy and help to impoverish the Burmese people. Following Burma's elections, some Southeast Asian nations as well as some political parties in Burma called on the United States to ease or remove sanctions. The Administration firmly believes that easing sanctions at this time is premature, absent fundamental reform or other regime actions to address core international concerns, and that Burma's poor economic performance is primarily due to the regimes gross

economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption. While sustaining pressure on the Burmese regime, we have initiated efforts to engage in direct dialogue with senior leaders in the Burmese government over the past 18 months. Assistant Secretary of State Campbell traveled to Nay Pyi Taw, Burmas capital, in October 2009 and May 2010 to meet with senior officials and demonstrate our willingness to embark on this new path of principled engagement. He also met with Burma officials on the margins of UN General Assembly sessions in 2009 and 2010 and in several forums held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). During every visit to Burma, we always consult Aung San Suu Kyi, leaders of the NLD, and other civil society leaders. Building on the dialogue Assistant Secretary Campbell began, I have also made two visits to Burma: one in December 2010 and one more recently, in May 2011. In those meetings, Burmese authorities continue to express a desire for improved relations with the United States and identified several confidence-building measures that they would like from the United States, including our use of Myanmar instead of Burma as the official name of the country and our direct assistance toward achieving the countrys Millennium Development Goals. The Government of Burma, however, has been opposed to taking any of the steps we, the UN, and others have raised to address core human rights concerns and to begin (5) an inclusive dialogue leading to national reconciliation and real democratic reform. The regime continues to insist that all of these issues are internal issues. We are disappointed by the lack of any results from our repeated efforts at dialogue. When we embarked on our dual-track policy, we went in with our eyes wide open and we expected that efforts on engagement and real reform would be a long, slow process. We will continue to try, while also seeking concrete ways to ramp up pressure on the Burmese government both in private and in public, to undertake genuine reform. We expect that the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma will play an essential role in furthering all aspects of our policy and determining if there is a viable way forward.

Against this policy backdrop, I will briefly provide an update and assessment on the political dynamics in Burma, highlighting the governments election process and its results, the future role of former regime leader Senior General Than Shwe, and the release of leading opposition figure Aung San Suu Kyi. Burmas 2010 elections were its first in 20 years. These elections were based on a deeply and fundamentally flawed process with highly restrictive regulations that excluded Burmas largest pro-democracy party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). They took place while Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLDs key leader, remained under house arrest, and many other NLD leaders were in prison. The regime cancelled voting in several ethnic minority areas and heavily skewed the playing field in favor of the regimes proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). The few prodemocracy and ethnic political parties that did compete won only a small number of parliamentary seats and mostly at the regional level. Amid widespread media and well-substantiated claims of vote rigging and manipulation, the regimes USDP won the majority of contested Parliamentary seats, while 25 percent of all seats were reserved for military appointees. The United States clearly and consistently condemned the elections as neither free nor fair. Not surprisingly, the elections resulted in a government comprised almost entirely of either active or former military members of the regime. Together with military appointees, regime-affiliated members occupy 89 percent of all seats in the legislative bodies. This legislature convened in Nay Pyi Taw to rubber stamp approval of Burmas President, two Vice Presidents, and key Presidential appointees. With few exceptions, all of those positions were filled by former military leaders and members of the governments proxy party. The formal regime (6) State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) dissolved and President Thein Sein, the former Prime Minister within the SPDC structure and a top regime military leader, assumed power on April 1, 2011. The convening of Parliament and the formation of a so-called civilian government marked the completion of what the regime refers to as its seven-step roadmap to a

disciplined and flourishing democracy. We strongly disagree with this assessment and believe that many questions remain. Specifically, the extent of Senior General Than Shwes influence is still an important question. He previously held simultaneous titles as Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and Minister of Defense. In the government announced on April 1, he no longer holds any official title. Some observers believe he will still control the political sphere from behind the scenes while others claim that he has truly retired. Therefore, a significant degree of uncertainty exists regarding Than Shwes role and the respective power of the various institutions that emerged such as the Presidency and cabinet, the Parliament, the United Solidarity and Development Party and the military. With former regime officials occupying most key positions in all branches of government, the United States is not optimistic that we will see any immediate change in policies or progress on our core concerns. There has been some positive rhetoric but it has not translated into concrete action or changes by the regime. In his inaugural address, President Thein Sein used terms such as good governance, transparency, and economic development, a departure from the regimes typical focus on stability and security and threats posed by opposition figures and entities. President Thein Sein's statements have addressed the need for economic reforms and his economic advisors recently organized a National Poverty Alleviation Seminar. Whether any of this seemingly positive rhetoric will eventually transform into concrete action toward poverty reduction and a free, open society is deeply uncertain. There is also the noteworthy development of Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyis release on November 13 from seven-and-one-half years of house arrest. Though welcome, her release came only at the end of a sentence that we always maintained was unjustified. She has spent 15 of the past 23 years in detention or under house arrest. We have pressed the Government of Burma to ensure it provides adequately for Aung San Suu Kyis safety and security as well as for all residents of Burma. Members of the international community, when allowed to visit Burma, are now able to consult with her on a regular basis, as is our Embassy (7) in Rangoon. I have had

the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues with her during my own visits to Rangoon. Burmese authorities have dissolved Aung San Suu Kyis political party, the National League for Democracy, for refusing to re-register as a political party under Burma's restrictive electoral laws. Although officially disbanded, NLD headquarters remains open and activities continue. Recently, the NLD has become more involved in social welfare activities such as HIV/AIDS support and care, education, and provision of clean water to address humanitarian needs. We are committed to fully supporting Aung San Suu Kyis efforts to seek reinstatement of the NLD as a legal, political party and to hold a direct, meaningful dialogue with senior government authorities.

I would also like to highlight the range of humanitarian assistance activities that we are undertaking inside Burma, which have been authorized consistent with or are exempted from JADE Act sanctions. Managed by USAID and the State Department, we support health and education projects targeting Burmas most vulnerable populations and initiatives to strengthen civil society and promote democracy. Assistance includes livelihoods, water and sanitation projects, a teacher training program and activities to combat infectious diseases and grave public health threats, such as avian influenza, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. It is important to mention the effects of the ongoing civil conflict in Burma between government forces and ethnic armies that are fighting for greater autonomy. In the conduct of these wars, the military has destroyed thousands of villages and subjected civilians in these areas to pillage, forced labor, killing and rape. This ongoing internal conflict and the regimes repression have created significant refugee flows and serious burdens on neighboring countries that are hosting Burmese refugees. While regime-created humanitarian crises, large-scale displacement and human suffering will only come to end through political change that promotes genuine democracy and respect for human rights, we must do what we can in the meantime

to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to those who have had to flee their country of origin. For more than 20 years, we have provided crucial support to UNHCR and NGOs for humanitarian assistance and protection to Burmese refugees who have fled from persecution and violence to neighboring countries. Since 2005, the United States has resettled approximately 70,000 Burmese from Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and India, almost 50,000 of whom (8) were from the Thai-Burma border region. Later this month, the Department of States Assistant Secretary for Population, efugees and Migration will be in Bangladesh to address serious issues of Burmas ethnic Rohingya refugee population in that country. We also support the International Committee of the Red Cross, which facilitates family member visits to political prisoners and provides orthopedic and prosthetic services to landmine victims. These initiatives enable us to tackle immediate humanitarian issues that affect some of the most vulnerable people in Burma. Our challenges in Burma remain daunting and the human rights situation deplorable. Though Aung San Suu Kyi is free, over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention, the conflicts and the attacks against civilians continue in the ethnic minority areas, and millions of Burmese citizens are denied basic rights including freedom of speech, assembly, and association. The United States alone cannot achieve progress in Burma, and as I noted at the outset of my testimony, we are tirelessly working with our European allies and our ASEAN and regional partners to urge the Burmese government to constructively engage with the international community and address these long-standing issues. India and China remain important to this issue and we regularly discuss our concerns with them about the Burmese regime. We are in complete agreement with the JADE Acts call for a unified and comprehensive approach to promote long-overdue change for the Burmese people aspiring for genuine and meaningful progress. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions. N. B. Numbers in brackets are the pages of the original pdf file.

..

China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US Cambodia: First hearing ex-Khmer Rouge leaders' trial The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning? By Yuriko Koike U.S. Policy Regarding Burma By Phil Robertson MYANMA : US Policy of Pragmatic Engagement By C. S. Kuppuswamy Testimony of Joseph Yun - Deputy Assistant Secretary - U.S. Department of State

SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 1 - Tuesday, June 28, 2011

SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 2 - Wednesday, July 27, 2011

This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/

News,Views & Opinions

Wednesday, June 27, 2011

NO 2

Prologue

Sometimes the ruled could overwhelm the ruling class and it could itself create the new ruling class. But, in many cases, the ruled in general could not overthrow the old ruling class completely and conclusively so that the new ruling class must be formed by means of sharing power with the old ruling class and the ruled.

Examples of the classical revolutions in world history are the 1789 French Revolution, the 1848-50 European Revolutions, the first abortive Russian Revolution of 1905, and the Russian Revolution of 1917 which had created socialist centralization economy and a single party system that had attempted to abolish capitalism and freedom from the world. The political consequences of the above said classical revolutions had shown the proof that the feudal society could not be transformed into capitalist society without having been both politically and economically formed its class structure to have the full strength to be born as the capitalist society. Apparently the history had revealed that all those classical revolutions in examples were ended up in coups d'tat and the autocratic feudalism only went forward onto the stage of the political power of the society concerned. There was no exception for the Lenins Soviet Russia. The proletariat dictatorship of V.I Lenins totally wrong theoretical outlook to Marxs political ideology in general and in essence, and Marxs political lessons taken from French society and French revolutions were also negated and neglected by Lenin. Thus, instead of democracy and capitalism, Lenins Russia went backward to Feudalism and autocracy in the name of socialism. That is to be called the restoration of the autocratic feudal society or the slipping back to the feudal autocratic society. Lenin had dragged back Russia into the dark age by coup d'tat as Napoleon Bonaparte and his nephew, Napoleon the III of French and Czar Nicholas II of Russia in 1905 had done, though there might be differences in historical and economical values in each of the cases. The point is that all the revolutions themselves failed and ended in coups d'tat, and the societies went into the hands of the new feudal landlords. In short, after Lenin, there were Stalin to Gorbachev in Russia and Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping in China. Many mini Stalins and Maos had appeared in various parts of the world both in power and not in power. The twentieth century was put into motion

mostly under the ideological influences of Marxism-Leninism or Communism-Socialism. It was but just a so-called Marxism-Leninism. In fact, merely the Leninism had been taken the major role to make political influence by force in that century. Marx was only an academician and one of the greatest historians, for that case, Lenin or Mao could never be matched. In the years approached toward the twenty first century, such a name known as Modern Reformations came out to the front line of our global society. Gorbachev of Russia and Deng Xiaoping of China, the two great reformists, had attempted to change their societies by means of reformation. They had both attempted to extricate their societies from the hell like ocean of complete darkness in socialist economy together with totalitarianism. However, Deng selected the economic reform as his first and basic priority when Gorbachev chose the path in favor of political reform. It was because Russia had more problems than China and Russia at that time was also a super power rivaling with USA. In addition, Russia had its eastern bloc and its own socialist empire. In my view, modern reformations are how the reformers had taken the lessons from history especially over such classical revolutions of the past. The lessons are not only political but also economical indeed. Eventually, what Karl Marx said was correctly and pragmatically interpreted by those two leading reformers in this modern time. Only because of the economic crisis, there became mass-uprisings, can be called them as revolutions. So, how to prevent or how to cure the economic crisis is the key point of how to evade the evils of such a type of classical revolution reincarnating into our modern societies.

Sunday, July 10, 2011

Refs: - A History of Modern France Volume 1: 1715-1799 by Alfred Cobban - V.I.Lenin Biography by David Shub (1948) - Selected Works Volume 1 by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels - A History of Europe by H.A.L. Fisher 1936 - Deng Xiaoping - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaoping - Mikhail Gorbachev - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Gorbachev

Collectors Items
- STATEMENT BY DEREK MITCHELL - Ambassador-designate, U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma - JUNE 29, 2011 - Thailand's general election - Lucky Yingluck

- New US Defense Chief Optimistic About Defeating al-Qaida - July 09, 2011
- Life after Capitalism - Opinion - Robert Skidelsky - US, Chinese Military Chiefs Discuss Maritime Disputes, Other Issues -VOA News - July 11,
2011

- Principles of U.S. Engagement in the Asia-Pacific - Testimony of Kurt M. Campbell January 21, 2010

STATEMENT BY DEREK MITCHELL Ambassador-designate, U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE JUNE 29, 2011 Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the Presidents nominee to serve as the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma with the rank of Ambassador. I appreciate the confidence that President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have shown in me by this nomination. As you are well aware, Burma is a nation rich in history, rich in culture, and rich in possibility. At the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, Burma sits on sea lanes, natural resources, and fertile soil that create the conditions for potentially unlimited development. It is therefore particularly unfortunate that while much of Southeast Asia has become more free, prosperous, and globally interconnected in recent decades, Burma has been the outlier. Burma remains a country at war with itself and distrustful of others. With a government that has chosen for several decades to distance itself from the outside world, Burma now is the poorest country in Southeast Asia and a source of great concern and potential instability in the region. Although rich in natural and human resources, nearly a third of Burmas population lives in poverty. Hundreds of thousands of its citizens are internally displaced and thousands more continue to seek refuge and asylum in neighboring countries largely due to the central authoritys longstanding conflicts with and systematic repression of the countrys ethnic minority populations. Over 2,000 political prisoners languish in detention, while Burmas military continues to routinely violate international human rights. Overall, the average Burmese citizen lacks fundamental freedoms and civil rights. Although the Burmese government has claimed a successful transition to a disciplined, flourishing democracy, a political system that exhibits anything close to recognizable standards of representative democracy remains to be seen. I am encouraged that the new President of Burma speaks of reform and change, but the pathway to real national

reconciliation, unity among its diverse peoples, and sustainable development requires concrete action to protect human rights and to promote representative and responsive governance. As a result, U.S. relations with Burma have been strained. Over the past two decades, international policies of either pressure or engagement alone have not produced the change in Burma that we and the rest of the international community seek. In 2008, Congress directed the establishment of a Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma to enable more focused, sustained, and coordinated attention on Burma by the U.S. government. Consistent with this directive, in September 2009, the Obama Administration completed its Burma policy review and announced its intention to pursue a more flexible U.S. policy approach that integrated both sanctions and engagement to achieve results in Burma. This dual-track approach is fully consistent with President Obamas call for principled engagement with nations around the world. 2 Although U.S. policy toward Burma has evolved, our overriding objective has not: the United States still seeks a peaceful, prosperous, open, and democratic Burma that respects the rights of all its citizens and adheres to its international obligations. The United States remains prepared to establish a positive relationship, based on mutual respect and mutual benefit, with a Burmese leadership that advances these principles. If I am confirmed, my role as Special Representative and Policy Coordinator will be to work closely with and build upon the excellent foundation established by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Yun in implementing Burma policy. I will seek opportunities for direct and candid dialogue with the regime concerning a path forward for Burma that promotes our values and broader national interests, and contributes to Burmas own development as a secure and prosperous nation. Of course, engagement is not an end in itself or the single measure of success: engagement must be time-bound, results-based, and accompanied by meaningful progress. If confirmed, I will report regularly to the White House, Secretary of State Clinton, and the U.S. Congress on the results of our dialogue and evidence of

such progress so we may calibrate our dual-track policy appropriately. I believe we should be prepared to respond flexibly and with agility to opportunities available in Burma and according to evolving conditions on the ground. If confirmed, I will also conduct extensive consultations with key stakeholders both inside and outside government, at home and abroad. My objective will be to implement U.S. law faithfully and coordinate efforts to advance the common international objectives of bringing about in Burma the unconditional release of all political prisoners, respect for human rights, an inclusive dialogue between the regime and the political opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and ethnic groups that would lead to national reconciliation, and Burmas adherence to its international obligations, including all UN Security Council resolutions on nonproliferation. To date, in my view, the inability of key members of the international community to coordinate their approach to Burma has undermined the effective realization of our shared objectives.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I have the right mix of skills, experience, and regional expertise to carry out fully the congressional mandate for this position. My first job in Washington was in the foreign policy office of the late Senator Ted Kennedy, where I learned the importance of congressional oversight, particularly on international issues of unique interest to Members and the American people. I have more than 20 years of experience studying and working on Asia from various perspectives both inside and outside of government, from within the United States and in Asia itself. For eight years, I led the Asia division at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program and established CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative. I currently serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, where I have been responsible for overseeing U.S. security policy and strategy throughout East, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. My first visit to Burma was in 1995, when I traveled to Rangoon with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and met with government officials, international NGO representatives, and political party leaders, including the remarkable Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. I made subsequent visits, which solidified my appreciation for

the richness of the countrys history and culture as well as the tragic limitations of its political and economic development. 3 I retained a keen interest in Burmas affairs in the years since, and co-wrote an article in the journal Foreign Affairs in 2007 that outlines a new U.S. policy approach to the country not dissimilar to results of the Obama Administrations 2009 policy review. Mr. Chairman, I know you take a particularly keen personal interest in the situation in Burma, as do many others in Congress, throughout our country, and around the world. It is a country of unique interest to me as well. It would be a great privilege to serve my country as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. If confirmed, I will bring the full weight of my diverse experience, personal contacts, understanding of Asia, and strategic instincts to this position. I will consult closely with you and other Members of this Committee and in the Congress to fulfill the mandate of this position in the interest of the United States and toward the betterment of the people of Burma.

Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your questions. Ref: http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mitchell_Testimony.pdf

Thailand's general election Lucky Yingluck Even copying their opponents policies has done the ruling party little good Jun 23rd 2011 | BANGKOK | from the print edition

WITH little more than a week to go before polling day on July 3rd, it is clear that the opposition Pheu Thai (PT) party will win more seats than any other in Thailands 500strong parliament. This will mark an extraordinary comeback for the unofficial leader of PT, Thaksin Shinawatra, a former prime minister ousted in a military coup in 2006 and now living in exile in Dubai as a fugitive from Thai justice. Some even predict that PT may win an outright majority, though a hung parliament looks more likely. But in Thai politics merely winning an election is not enough; whether PT gets to form a government is another matter entirely.

The surge of enthusiasm for PT owes a lot not only to Mr Thaksins enduring popularity among Thailands rural poor, but also to the dizzying rise of the official party leader, his younger sister Yingluck, who was unknown only a month or so ago. When Mr Thaksin picked her to lead PT into the election many dismissed it as a quixotic, even bizarre gesture. It turns out to have been a stroke of genius. The 44-year-old businesswoman has never held or campaigned for political office before. Yet she behaves as if she has been doing it all her life and has completely wrong-footed her main opponent, Abhisit Vejjajiva, the prime minister and leader of the Democrat Party that heads the ruling coalition. At the start of the campaign the two rivals were just about even. It is mostly Ms Yinglucks bravura campaigning that has opened up the gap. Mr Thaksin described his younger sister as his clone. In fact, she brings her own qualities and attributes to the campaign, drawing in people beyond the PT base. A fresher face even than the relatively youthful 47-year-old Mr Abhisit, and a woman campaigning in the very male world of Thai politics, she has injected a buzz and excitement into the election. Her seasoned, pragmatic campaign managers have exploited her looks and easy-going nature to the full. She, for her part, has played the perfect candidate by sticking closely to her sound bites and smiling ceaselessly at the camera. As to her policies (not that her adoring supporters care), she has promised to continue the populist economic programmes of her brother when he was prime minister from 2001 to 2006. She promises, for instance, to give free Tablet PCs to about 1m new schoolchildren and to raise the minimum wage. But, aware that triumph for Mr Thaksins party will undoubtedly rile those (such as the army) who got rid of him in a 2006 coup, she has struck a conciliatory tone. She vows that there will no revenge for the coup, and that she wont rush into devising amnesties for Mr Thaksin. For all the enthusiasm of his red shirt supporters, he remains a divisive figure. Even with the advantages of incumbency, the Democrat Party has floundered. Their rather bewildered campaign manager concedes that the timing of Ms Yinglucks candidature, pretty much on the day the campaign began, was brilliant. She stole the

headlines and has never looked backand a month is just long enough to remain an exciting novelty while avoiding serious scrutiny. Some mutter that she could yet have to answer to charges of perjury arising from the sale of Mr Thaksins telecoms company five years ago, but that will have to wait until after July 3rd. In contrast to the smiley-feely Ms Yingluck, Mr Abhisit and his deputy and finance minister, Korn Chatikavanij, are both Oxford-educated technocrats, less polished at working a crowd. Mr Abhisit has looked less stiff on the stump than in past elections, though it doesnt come naturally. One recent afternoon, he walked the length of a market in Bangkok, shaking hands, posing for photos with vendors and residents, a yellow garland draped around his powder-blue shirt and windbreaker. Supporters foisted gifts on him; cakes, flowers and the odd baby. He smiledbut it might as well have been a wince. Arriving at a community centre where former drug addicts had gathered on plastic chairs, he launched into a detailed analysis of why Mr Thaksins hardline policies against dealers did not work. He lost the audiences attention. It does not help that the Democrat Party has proposed a lot of similarly populist economic policies to PTs. In the scramble for votes, especially among Mr Thaksins core constituency of poorer supporters, the Democrat Partyagainst its better instinctshas also made a lot of expensive promises. It is offering subsidies for rice farmers and its own version of a hike in the minimum wage. One academic commentator, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, has called this campaign the race to the populist bottom. Mr Korn has costed PTs populism at a whopping 2.06 trillion baht ($68 billion) in the first year, but the Democrats arent doing so badly either. These promises of largesse alienate their traditional supporters in business, nervous about having to pay for the new wages, and do Ms Yingluck no damage. The minnows will decide For all the focus on Mr Abhisit and Ms Yingluck, if neither wins an outright majority of seats, then it will (as usual) be Thailands smaller parties that play a decisive role in a hung parliament. None has any ideology; they will simply haggle for ministerial posts and local pork.

Bhumjaithai, a vehicle for Newin Chidchob, a banned politician and former Thaksin henchman, could come third, perhaps with 40 or so seats. The party says it will stick with the Democrats, its current partners, and is leery of PT. Another party, Chart Thai Pattana (CTP), is courting both main parties and may well join PT in a flash. Other parties lack the numbers but could add some ballast, particularly if PT is nervous about fraud cases that might disqualify MPs. One tiny party is led by a retired general, Sondhi Boonyaratglin, leader of the coup in 2006, and so an unlikely ally for Thaksinites. But there are no permanent enemies in Thai politics. And then there is Mr Thaksins old foe, the powerful army. Besides staging the 2006 coup, it was instrumental behind the scenes in the formation of the present government. It has promised to stay in its barracks. But a close result and the ensuing horse-trading might tempt it to meddle againespecially if it looks as if Mr Thaksin is on his way back.

Ref: http://www.economist.com/node/18866885?story_id=18866885

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Asia July 09, 2011 New US Defense Chief Optimistic About Defeating al-Qaida

Photo: AP/Paul J. Richards, Pool

USMC Gen. John Allen, left, and Gen. David Petraeus, incoming CIA Director, greets former CIA Director and new U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as he lands in Kabul, Afghanistan, Saturday, July 9, 2011.

Newly appointed U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is on a previously unannounced visit to Afghanistan, his first since taking over the defense post on July 1. He says he is optimistic about defeating al-Qaida, and that victory over insurgents in Afghanistan is "within reach." In the aftermath of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, Panetta says the United States is closer than ever to "strategically beating" al-Qaida, crippling the terrorist group's ability to stage mass attacks.

Panetta took over at the Pentagon this month after leading the CIA for two and a half years. Speaking with reporters traveling with him to Kabul, he said that if the United States keeps up the pressure, al-Qaida will no longer be able to conduct significant operations. "I think now is the moment - now is the moment - following what happened with Bin Laden, to put maximum pressure on them, because I do believe that if we continue this effort that we can really cripple al-Qaida," he said. The U.S. defense secretary said that information gained during the raid that killed bin Laden in Pakistan, plus other intelligence the U.S. has collected over years, has resulted in an "active pursuit" of between 10 and 20 terrorist leaders. Visiting Kabul for the first time since he left the Central Intelligence Agency, Panetta is expected to meet with the U.S. and NATO military commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, who will soon be returning to the United States himself, to take over from Panetta as CIA director. In addition, Panetta will meet with U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, who also is leaving his post by the end of this month. Those personnel changes closely follow the White House announcement that a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan is beginning, with 10,000 troops leaving by the end of the year. Pressure to reduce military spending due to the U.S. economic downturn is one of the factors behind the troop withdrawals, but Panetta said he believes costs can be cut without cutting America's military capability. "I do not believe that you have to choose between fiscal responsibility and a strong national defense. I believe that we can achieve savings and have a strong defense force at the same time," he said. The new defense secretary went on to echo his predecessor, Robert Gates, who expressed concern that excessive cuts could "hollow out" the U.S. military.

The Pentagon chief also intends to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. The U.S. relationship with Mr. Karzai has been strained for years, and the Afghan president has complained strongly about civilian casualties in his country caused by coalition airstrikes. Panetta said he is optimistic that a new U.S. military and civilian leadership team in Afghanistan can mark a new beginning in the nations' partnership.

Ref: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/New-US-Defense-Chief-Optimistic-AboutDefeating-Al-Qaida-125268919.html

Opinion Life after capitalism If capitalism means that money always talks, does the end of capitalism finish our urge to listen to it?
Robert Skidelsky Last Modified: 07 Jul 2011 17:51

Could capitalism have exhausted its potential to create a better life? [Reuters]

In 1995, I published a book called The World After Communism. Today, I wonder whether there will be a world after capitalism. That question is not prompted by the worst economic slump since the 1930s. Capitalism has always had crises, and will go on having them. Rather, it comes from the feeling that Western civilization is increasingly unsatisfying, saddled with a system of incentives that are essential for accumulating wealth, but that undermine our capacity to enjoy it.

Capitalism may be close to exhausting its potential to create a better life at least in the worlds rich countries. By "better", I mean better ethically, not materially. Material gains may continue, though evidence shows that they no longer make people happier. My discontent is with the quality of a civilization in which the production and consumption of unnecessary goods has become most peoples main occupation. This is not to denigrate capitalism. It was, and is, a superb system for overcoming scarcity. By organising production efficiently, and directing it to the pursuit of welfare rather than power, it has lifted a large part of the world out of poverty. Yet what happens to such a system when scarcity has been turned to plenty? Does it just go on producing more of the same, stimulating jaded appetites with new gadgets, thrills, and excitements? How much longer can this continue? Do we spend the next century wallowing in triviality? For most of the last century, the alternative to capitalism was socialism. But socialism, in its classical form, failed as it had to. Public production is inferior to private production for any number of reasons, not least because it destroys choice and variety. And, since the collapse of communism, there has been no coherent alternative to capitalism. Beyond capitalism, it seems, stretches a vista ofcapitalism. There have always been huge moral questions about capitalism, which could be put to one side because capitalism was so successful at generating wealth. Now, when we already have all the wealth we need, we are right to wonder whether the costs of capitalism are worth incurring. Adam Smith, for example, recognized that the division of labor would make people dumber by robbing them of non-specialized skills. Yet he thought that this was a price possibly compensated by education worth paying, since the widening of the market increased the growth of wealth. This made him a fervent free trader. Today's apostles of free trade argue the case in much the same way as Adam Smith, ignoring the fact that wealth has expanded enormously since Smith's day. They typically

admit that free trade costs jobs, but claim that re-training programs will fit workers into new, "higher value" jobs. This amounts to saying that even though rich countries (or regions) no longer need the benefits of free trade, they must continue to suffer its costs. Defenders of the current system reply: we leave such choices to individuals to make for themselves. If people want to step off the conveyor belt, they are free to do so. And increasing numbers do, in fact, "drop out". Democracy, too, means the freedom to vote capitalism out of office. This answer is powerful but nave. People do not form their preferences in isolation. Their choices are framed by their societies' dominant culture. Is it really supposed that constant pressure to consume has no effect on preferences? We ban pornography and restrict violence on TV, believing that they affect people negatively, yet we should believe that unrestricted advertising of consumer goods affects only the distribution of demand, but not the total? Capitalism's defenders sometimes argue that the spirit of acquisitiveness is so deeply ingrained in human nature that nothing can dislodge it. But human nature is a bundle of conflicting passions and possibilities. It has always been the function of culture (including religion) to encourage some and limit the expression of others. Indeed, the "spirit of capitalism" entered human affairs rather late in history. Before then, markets for buying and selling were hedged with legal and moral restrictions. A person who devoted his life to making money was not regarded as a good role model. Greed, avarice, and envy were among the deadly sins. Usury (making money from money) was an offense against God. It was only in the 18th century that greed became morally respectable. It was now considered healthily Promethean to turn wealth into money and put it to work to make more money, because by doing this one was benefiting humanity. This inspired the American way of life, where money always talks. The end of capitalism means simply the end of the urge to listen to it. People would start to enjoy what they

have, instead of always wanting more. One can imagine a society of private wealth holders, whose main objective is to lead good lives, not to turn their wealth into "capital". Financial services would shrink, because the rich would not always want to become richer. As more and more people find themselves with enough, one might expect the spirit of gain to lose its social approbation. Capitalism would have done its work, and the profit motive would resume its place in the rogues' gallery. The dishonoring of greed is likely only in those countries whose citizens already have more than they need. And even there, many people still have less than they need. The evidence suggests that economies would be more stable and citizens happier if wealth and income were more evenly distributed. The economic justification for large income inequalities the need to stimulate people to be more productive collapses when growth ceases to be so important. Perhaps socialism was not an alternative to capitalism, but its heir. It will inherit the earth not by dispossessing the rich of their property, but by providing motives and incentives for behavior that are unconnected with the further accumulation of wealth.
Robert Skidelsky, a member of the British House of Lords, is professor emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University, author of a prize-winning biography of the economist John Maynard Keynes. A version of this article first appeared on Project Syndicate. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Source: Project Sydicate

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/201176105512730267.html .

Asia
July 11, 2011 VOA News

US, Chinese Military Chiefs Discuss Maritime Disputes, Other Issues

Gen Chen (R) said he had found common ground in talks with Adm Mullen

The top military commanders from the United States and China say they held "candid" talks Monday about territorial disputes in the South China Sea and other contentious issues. The official Xinhua news agency quoted Chinese armed forces chief Chen Bingde saying the two also discussed cyber security, China's military development and the attitude of some U.S. politicians toward China. Admiral Mike Mullen is in Beijing on a four-day visit, the first by a U.S. military chief of staff since 2007. Xinhua quoted Chen saying the two found "a lot of common ground" but had "different opinions on certain issues." Mullen said after his arrival in Beijing Sunday that he is worried about China's disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over competing territorial claims in the resource-rich

South China Sea. China says the United States should stay out of the disputes. Washington recently reaffirmed its commitment to a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. The United States has also declared a national interest in maintaining free navigation through the South China Sea, which carries vital sea traffic between Northeast Asia, and Europe and the Middle East. Speaking Sunday at Beijing's prestigious Renmin University, Mullen said the United States is, and will remain, a Pacific power. But he said the regional and global challenges facing the U.S. and China are too large and too vital to be blocked by misunderstandings. Mullen also called for greater openness from China's growing military. He said that "with greater military power must come greater responsibility, greater cooperation and just as important, greater transparency." During his visit, Admiral Mullen is due to visit Chinese military bases outside Beijing. His meetings are also expected to deal with stalled nuclear disarmament talks with North Korea, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and confidence building measures between China and the United States. China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan all claim territory in the South China Sea, with most of those claims centered on the potentially energy rich Paracel and Spratly island chains. China's claim is the largest and it has issued sharp warnings in recent weeks, including threats of military action, to enforce its claims.

Ref:
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/US-Chinese-Military-Chiefs-Discuss-MaritimeDisputes-Other-Issues-125331783.html Ref: ( pics) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14097503

US-China spat over South China Sea military exercises

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Testimony of Kurt M. Campbell Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of State Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 21, 2010

Principles of U.S. Engagement in the Asia-Pacific

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me here today to testify about the vital importance of Asian- Pacific countries to the United States and the key aspects of our engagement strategy with the region. There should be no doubt that the United States itself is a Pacific nation, and in every regard -- geopolitically, militarily, diplomatically, and economically -- Asia and the Pacific are indispensable to addressing the challenges and seizing the opportunities of the 21st century. Senator Webb, as you have eloquently noted, The United States is a Pacific nation in terms of our history, our culture, our economy, and our national security. As the Asia-Pacific century emerges, defining the new international environment, the United States must enhance and deepen its strategic engagement and leadership role in the region. Our economic relationships demonstrate the mutual importance of the interactions between the countries of the Asia-Pacific and the United States. The region is home to almost one-third of the Earths population. The Asia-Pacific accounts for almost onethird of global GDP and is a key driver for technological innovation. American and Asian economies are growing increasingly interdependent while assisting the global economic recovery.

Despite significant economic growth and vitality, the Asia-Pacific region is home to many of the most pressing security challenges of the modern era. What is most often absent in our discussion about the Asian miracle are the challenges posed by uneven growth, poverty, and weak and ineffective governments. Hundreds of millions have yet to benefit from the fruits of the Asian miracle, and income inequality continues to strain the capacity of governments to respond. Perhaps the most significant unintended consequence of the Asian miracle has been the acceleration of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Asias densely populated littoral nations will likely suffer as climatic variations target the region. Compounding these challenges is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremist groups in Southeast Asia, unresolved territorial disputes, and growing competition over energy and natural resources. The severity and transnational nature of these challenges demand collective action and American leadership. They also suggest a need for America to enhance, deepen, and sustain our engagement to seize opportunities and minimize risk.

Renewed Engagement Generates Results - Let me now take this opportunity to briefly
list the steps we have undertaken over the past year to step up and broaden U.S. engagement in the region. First, we have newly reengaged in the region through visits of our senior leadership and attendance at high-level meetings. Our attendance has produced concrete results that further U.S. strategic interests. In November, President Obama spent 10 days visiting Japan, Singapore, China, and South Korea, strengthening U.S. leadership and economic competitiveness in the region, renewing old alliances, and forging new partnerships. Under the leadership and guidance of President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Geithner, we hosted the first U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009, and we will have follow-on discussions in 2010. The dialogue set a positive tone for the U.S.-China relationship, while underscoring challenges and opportunities to enhance that relationship. We continue to build the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, which would provide a framework to broaden and deepen the bilateral relationship. Secretary Clinton has visited the region four times. Her first overseas trip as Secretary last February and her subsequent trips in July, November, and earlier this month bolstered bilateral relationships and enhanced U.S. ties to multilateral organizations.

The renewal of high-level engagement is producing tangible results. President Obamas November trip included participation in the 17th Annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders meeting in Singapore, important for U.S. trade since APEC members account for 53 percent of global GDP, purchase 58 percent of U.S. goods exports, and represent a market of 2.7 billion consumers. APEC leaders endorsed the Pittsburgh G-20 principles and agreed to implement the policies of the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, further expanding the global commitment to achieve more balanced growth that is less prone to destabilizing booms and busts. They also put forward a strong statement of support for concluding the Doha Round in 2010 and agreed to reject all forms of protectionism. In addition, Leaders agreed on core principles to promote cross-border services trade that will provide a strong basis for our efforts to facilitate and promote trade in services in the Asia-Pacific region. Leaders also pledged to make growth more inclusive through APEC initiatives that will support development of small and medium enterprises, facilitate worker retraining, and enhance economic opportunity for women. Finally, Leaders took steps to ensure environmentally sustainable growth in the region by agreeing on an ambitious plan to address barriers to trade and investment in environmental goods and services. President Obama also attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Meeting, the first ever with all 10 ASEAN members represented, providing a clear demonstration of renewed U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia. Secretary Clintons July trip included meetings with regional foreign ministers at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Thailand and the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN nations. Her November visits to the Philippines, Singapore, and China included attendance at APEC Ministerial Meetings and meetings with allies and regional partners that further solidified relationships and deepened U.S. multi-lateral engagement.

Let me turn to another area of renewed engagement: Burma. Mr. Chairman, your leadership on this issue has been instrumental in changing our policy and initiating steps to engage the Burmese junta. As you are well aware, the Administrations formal review of U.S. policy towards Burma reaffirmed our fundamental goals: a democratic Burma at peace with its neighbors and that respects the rights of its people. A policy of pragmatic engagement with the Burmese authorities holds the best hope for advancing our goals. Under this approach, U.S. sanctions will remain in place until Burmese authorities demonstrate that they are prepared to make meaningful progress on U.S. core concerns. The leaders of Burmas democratic opposition have confirmed to us their support for this approach. The policy review also confirmed that we need additional tools to augment those that we have been using in pursuit of our objectives. A central element of this approach is a direct, senior-level dialogue with representatives of the Burmese leadership. Since I testified before you on the subject late last September, I visited Burma November 3 and 4 for meetings with Burmese officials, including Prime Minister Thein Sein, leaders of the democracy movement, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and representatives of the largest ethnic minorities. In my meetings, I stressed the importance of all stakeholders engaging in a dialogue on reform and emphasized that the release of political prisoners is essential if the elections planned for 2010 are to have any credibility. Finally, I want to underscore the Obama Administrations commitment to stepping up our engagement with Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island nations. Secretary of State Clinton was en route to Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and Australia last week, but the pressing need to help organize U.S. assistance to Haiti led her to postpone that visit. Her trip builds on her meeting with Pacific Island leaders in September 2009 in New York, with all parties committing to work together to address climate change and other transnational issues. The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Susan Rice, has met regularly with her Pacific Island counterparts to share views and build cooperation on key issues before the United Nations. Within weeks of assuming my current responsibilities, I traveled to Cairns, Australia, to represent the United States at the Pacific Island Forums Post Forum Dialogue of key partner countries and institutions. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd

chaired the proceedings, which focused on improving the coordination and effectiveness of development assistance efforts in the region.

U.S. Principles for Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region The Asia-Pacific region is of
vital and permanent importance to the United States and it is clear that countries in the region want the United States to maintain a strong and active presence. We need to ensure that the United States is a resident power and not just a visitor, because what happens in the region has a direct effect on our security and economic well-being. Over the course of the next few decades climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and widespread poverty will pose the most significant challenges to the United States and the rest of the region. These challenges are and will continue to be most acute in East Asia. This situation not only suggests a need for the United States to play a leading role in addressing these challenges, but it also indicates a need to strengthen and broaden alliances, build new partnerships, and enhance capacity of multilateral organizations in the region. Fundamental to this approach will be continued encouragement of Chinas peaceful rise and integration into the international system. A forward-looking strategy that builds on these relationships and U.S. strengths as a democracy and a Pacific power is essential to manage both regional and increasingly global challenges. With the positive outcomes of renewed engagement as a backdrop, I would like to discuss a series of principles that will guide our efforts moving forward. Intrinsic to our engagement strategy is an unwavering commitment to American values that have undergirded our foreign policy since the inception of our Republic. In many ways, it is precisely because of the emergence of a more complex and multi-polar world that values can and should serve as a tool of American statecraft. Five principles guide the Obama administrations engagement in East Asia and the Pacific. In her January 12 speech in Honolulu, Secretary Clinton detailed the five principles for how we view the Asia-Pacific architecture and U.S. involvement evolving. These include the foundation of the U.S. alliance system and bilateral partnerships, building a common regional economic and security agenda, the importance of result-oriented cooperation, the need to enhance the flexibility and creativity of our multilateral cooperation, and the principle

that the Asia-Pacifics defining institutions will include all the key stakeholders such as the United States. For the last half century, the United States and its allies in the region Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand have maintained security and stability in East Asia and the Pacific. Our alliances remain the bedrock of our engagement in the region, and the Obama Administration is committed to strengthening those alliances to address both continuing and emerging challenges. The United States, therefore, must maintain a forward-deployed military presence in the region that both reassures friends and reminds others that the United States will remain the ultimate guarantor of regional peace and stability. There should be no mistake: the United States is firm in its resolve to uphold its treaty commitments regarding the defense of its allies. Our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in Asia. The May 2006 agreement on defense transformation and realignment will enhance deterrence while creating a more sustainable military presence in the region. The Guam International Agreement, signed by Secretary Clinton during her February 2009 trip, carries this transformation to the next stage. As part of our ongoing efforts to assist the Government of Japan with its review of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) Agreement, a high-level working group met in Tokyo in November and December, and the Government of Japan is continuing its review. In addition to our focus on these issues, we are working to create a more durable and forward-looking vision for the alliance that seizes upon Japans global leadership role on climate change and humanitarian and development assistance programs, to name a few. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the alliance, we will work closely with our friends in Japan to think creatively and strategically about the alliance.

We are also working vigorously with our other critical ally in Northeast Asia, the Republic of Korea, to modernize our defense alliance and to achieve a partnership that is truly global and comprehensive in nature. Building off the Joint Vision Statement

between Presidents Obama and Lee Myung-bak, we are committed to creating a more dynamic relationship that builds on our shared values and strategic interests. We look forward to the Republic of Koreas growing international leadership role as it hosts the 2010 G-20 Leaders Meeting. Japan and the Republic of Korea have been key partners in our joint efforts to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and, in particular, to denuclearize North Korea through the Six-Party process. The process suffered serious setbacks in 2009 with North Korea carrying out a series of provocations including its April 5 missile test and its May 25 announcement of a second nuclear test. As President Obama said, North Koreas actions blatantly defied U.N. Security Council resolutions and constitute a direct and reckless challenge to the international community, increasing tension and undermining stability in Northeast Asia. However, the international communitys unified response to North Koreas provocations is another example of the fruits of U.S. engagement. The U.N. Security Council, led by our Five-Party partners, unanimously condemned the DPRKs provocative actions and passed UNSCR 1874, introducing tough sanctions against North Koreas weapons and proliferation finance networks. When North Korea began to show renewed interest in dialogue later in the year, the United States sent U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang on December 8 for discussions with North Korean officials about the nuclear issue. In these discussions, the DPRK reaffirmed the importance of the Six-Party Talks and the September 2005 Joint Statement on the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We did not, however, reach agreement on when and how North Korea will return to Six-Party Talks, a matter that we will continue to discuss with Asian partners early in 2010.

Our deep and sustained engagement with China continues to yield progress on important international issues, such as the global economic recovery, climate change policy, and efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. However, we obviously do not see eye-to-eye with China on every issue, as evidenced by our discussions on human rights and concerns over Chinas opaque military modernization and exclusionary

industrial policies. We will continue to address these issues through continuous and frank dialogue, seeking out Chinese cooperation on areas of mutual concern while directly addressing differences. A recent example of this approach is our engagement regarding Googles troubling allegations regarding intrusions and the routine accessing of human rights activists e-mail accounts by third parties. U.S. officials have emphasized the importance of China's addressing the concerns raised by Google as well as the importance of Internet freedom as a central human rights issue. We need to recognize Asias importance to the global economy. Close U.S.-Asian economic cooperation is vital to the well-being of the U.S. and international economic order. However, as President Obama noted in his recent trip to Asia, We simply cannot return to the same cycles of boom and bust that led us into a global recession. The United States and Asia need to emphasize balanced growth and trade.

It is worth highlighting that four Asian economies (China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan) are now among our top-twelve trading partners. Today, the 21 APEC economies purchase almost 60 percent of U.S. goods. Taken as a group, ASEAN is also a large and critical trading partner. The strong Asian participation in APEC, the WTO, and the G-20 reflects the increasing importance of Asian economies and their centrality to strengthening the multilateral trading system and maintaining our economic recovery. Continued integration of the economies of this region will create new business opportunities, benefitting workers, consumers, and businesses and creating jobs back here in the United States. Despite strong export growth to the Asia-Pacific, the United States share of the total trade in the region has declined by 3 percent in the past five years. To reverse this trend, we will continue to work with the Congress, stakeholders, and the Republic of Korea to work through the outstanding issues of concern so we can move forward on our bilateral free trade agreement. We will also enter into negotiations of a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, as President Obama announced to APEC leaders in November. As the Administration stated when it announced its intention to

launch these negotiations, we intend to work in partnership with the U.S. Congress and stakeholders to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional agreement that will serve as a potential platform for economic integration across the region. This is an exciting opportunity for the United States to engage with some of the fastest growing economies in the world as well as to update our approaches to traditional trade issues, address new issues, and incorporate new elements that respond to 21st-century challenges.

The U.S. commitment to democracy and the protection of human rights is an intrinsic and indispensable aspect of our character as a nation and our engagement in the AsiaPacific region. Let me be clear, the promotion of democracy and human rights is an essential element of American foreign policy. It is part of who we are as a people. We believe human rights are not only core American values, but universal values. These values are a force multiplier in a region where democratic norms are on the ascent. We believe that citizens around the world should enjoy these rights, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity, religion, or race. The United States will continue to speak for those on the margins of society, encouraging countries in the region to respect the internationally recognized human rights of their people while undertaking policies to further liberalize and open their states. As President Obama said in his speech on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, We must promote our values by living them at home -- which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. President Obama has eloquently stated that our willingness to speak out on human rights and other democratic values is the source of our moral authority and courage. In order to ensure that human rights and the development of the rule of law and civil society remain strong pillars of our engagement, we will continue to adopt new and creative approaches that seize the opportunities of a dynamic information age. The freedom to speak your mind and choose your leaders, the ability to access information

and worship how you please are the basis of stability. We need to let our partners in the region know that we will always stand on the side of those who pursue those rights. Democratic governance is rapidly evolving within Asia; advancing human rights, freedom, and democracy is critical to alleviating poverty and conditions that catalyze extremism. Sustained economic growth requires governments that are transparent, non-corrupt, and responsive to the needs of their people. Our strategy is to maintain pressure on local decision-makers to improve governments human rights records while cooperating closely with international and non-governmental organizations involved in monitoring and reporting on human rights. As the Asia-Pacific region evolves, so should our own approach to multilateral economic and security cooperation. The President stated in Tokyo that we aim to participate fully in regional organizations, as appropriate, including engaging with the East Asian Summit. Secretary Clinton spoke in Honolulu of the need to enhance the flexibility and creativity of our multilateral cooperation. We plan to consult with allies and partners in the region and with Congress on how the United States, working with our Asian counterparts, can join and shape the regions evolving multilateral bodies. Strong, multilateral links to Asia can help ensure that the United States remains a critical part of this dynamic region.

Multilateral engagement can be an effective way to address our efforts to deal with transnational security challenges such as climate change, pandemics, or environmental degradation. For example, steps taken by APEC and ASEAN to improve cooperation among regional emergency management agencies is an important step in light of the spate of recent natural disasters that have battered the region. Multilateral efforts are also proving effective in addressing new transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy that threatens our sea lanes, and traffickers who exploit women, children, laborers, and migrants. In 2011, the United States will host APEC for the first time in 18 years, providing us with unique opportunities to demonstrate our commitment to and engagement in the

region, shape the organizations agenda in ways that reflect our values, and will help U.S. businesses and workers to compete on a more level economic playing field in this dynamic region. Through APEC, we will continue to advance regional economic integration, reduce barriers to trade and investment in the region, and help rebalance the Asia-Pacific economies. Working with ASEAN, the U.S. will seek to streamline and strengthen the ASEAN Regional Forums (ARF) institutional processes and create a more action-oriented agenda, especially with respect to transnational and non-traditional security challenges.

Conclusion
The United States faces a number of critical challenges in the coming years in its engagement with Asia. These include rising and failing states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, critical global issues like climate change, violent extremism in some parts of Southeast Asia, poverty and income disparity. The essential ingredient in meeting these challenges is United States leadership. We need to play an active role in helping the countries of the region to enhance their capacity to succeed. The region is vital to U.S. interests not only in the Asia-Pacific context, but also globally. We are a vital contributor to the regions security and economic success. The Asia-Pacific region, in turn, has a profound impact on our lives through trade, our alliances, and partnerships. As the region continues to grow and as new groupings and structures take shape, the United States will be a player, not a distant spectator. Under President Obama and Secretary Clintons leadership, we are ready to face these challenges. We look forward to working with Congress and this Committee to seek opportunities to influence positively the future direction of the region.

Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this pressing and vitally important issue. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have. Ref: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/134168.htm

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Epilogue
WAR IS ONLY A CONTINUATION OF STATE POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. GENERAL CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ (1780-1831)

Clausewitz continued to say that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. # He also said that war is the means and the means must always include the object in our conception. Thus, in other words, war is the continuation of political means with an act of violence. # In his definition of war, Clausewitz said again that war therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. # So, when the political means collapsed, the means of war would take place as the other means of political instrument to initiate to accomplish the strategic policy of the nation. To end the war or to prevent the war, however, we have to use diplomacy between or among the nations. It is in time of peace, alliances or adversaries, to manipulate their foreign policies to achieve their goals in trade or in security, would be into practice of diplomacy for the sake of their own national interests. But diplomacy itself is very sensitive and subtle. Some strategic policy issues could not be solved within a few years. The several meetings of the head-ofstates or diplomats or special envoys could not gain the result perfectly and immediately. Sometimes, facts finding alone would take times a lot.

In certain extraordinary cases, Secret Diplomacy or Quiet Diplomacy is unavoidable and obligatory rather than Gun-boat diplomacy which is backed by threat of force or Public diplomacy which makes use of publicity. The entire story of the Nixon-Kissingers historic diplomacy with Mao Zedong had apparently revealed how Sino-US relationship was successfully rebuilt and how China became the international figure and how the balance of power was reshaped and revitalized in new designs but with the old mantras. It was the great example of the exercise of Secret Diplomacy between US and China successfully well before the global society. Quiet Diplomacy is in other words known as Preventive Diplomacy that is the range of peaceful dispute resolution approaches mentioned in Article 33 of the UN Charter. One form of diplomacy which may be brought to bear to prevent violent conflict or to prevent its recurrence is Quiet Diplomacy. * When one speaks of the practice of quiet diplomacy, definitional clarity is largely absent. Multiple definitions are often invoked simultaneously by theorists, and the activities themselves often mix and overlap in practice.* The following, though not intended as an exhaustive list, provides a brief overview of the primary options for quiet diplomatic engagement for the prevention of violent conflict: good offices, special envoys, facilitation, mediation, conciliation, adjudication and arbitration. * Diplomacy describes the conduct of international relations through the interaction of official representatives of governments or groups. It encompasses a broad range of activities and approaches to exchanging information and negotiating agreements which vary widely according to the actors and situations involved.* For the purposes of this typology, we distinguish such activities from coercion or the use of force thus excluding sanctions and military interventions from consideration

while acknowledging that non-coercive diplomacy may well take place in contexts where these factors are present.* So, if the issue is not concerned with Article 33 of the UN Charter, Secret Diplomacy should be considered as the most appropriate technique. As sanctions issues are becoming at major consideration, practical engagement should be silent and secret. Public diplomacy should be totally set aside and the most appropriate technique should be Secret diplomacy. It is because the genesis of the issue is not the sanction but the relationship. Let me say again that diplomacy itself is very sensitive and subtle. As the political means collapsed, the means of war would take place as the other means of political instrument, similarly, if or when the diplomacy would be collapsed, the war might come into place.

Sunday, July 24, 2011 References: Carl Von Clausewitz On War Volume I # Craig Collins and John Packer - Options and Techniques for Quiet Diplomacy (2006) * Henry Kissinger White House Years

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

Prologue and Epilogue are contributed by YE KYAW SWA

NO 2

Collectors Items
- STATEMENT BY DEREK MITCHELL - Ambassador-designate, U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma - JUNE 29, 2011 - Thailand's general election - Lucky Yingluck

- New US Defense Chief Optimistic About Defeating al-Qaida - July 09, 2011
- Life after Capitalism - Opinion - Robert Skidelsky - US, Chinese Military Chiefs Discuss Maritime Disputes, Other Issues -VOA News - July 11,
2011

- Principles of U.S. Engagement in the Asia-Pacific - Testimony of Kurt M. Campbell January 21, 2010

SELECTED NEWS AND VIEWS COLLECTED BY YE KYAW SWA

No 2 - Wednesday, July 27, 2011

The Eighteenth September of Burmese Bonaparte By Ye Kyaw Swa

Written: 20 July 2010 - 20 October 2010

Prelude

On September 18 1988, the followers of General Ne Win , led by General Saw Maung, took the State power by a coup d'etat and established the military dictatorship in the name of SLORC. The mass uprising of the August 8 1988 was crushed. However, given the synonymous title of the past, those who captured the leading role of the mass uprising proclaimed it as the second independence struggle of Burma as in 1947. Though, the majority described it as democracy movement for Burma from Socialist One party ruling.

The Mass Uprising

The mass uprising was occurred as spontaneous outburst in August 1988. There was no single solid vanguard as the head of

the revolution. Many leaders and many revolutionary organizations as Unions attempted to take the role of leadership of the mass uprising. But, none became the sole leader as the revolutionary vanguard, both in theory and practice, to drive the revolution to the end of its goal, the state power.

In truth, and honestly saying, the revolution was failed. It was unable to overthrown the ruling class but was brutally crushed, and having been soothed by the ruling class with a multi-party election.

General strike committee was formed, after the sudden outbreaks in nearly all towns of the country where city strike unions were formed and led the situation of day to day anti-government movements. The outstanding major organizations were the Student Unions which could really lead the most of the uprising as center position.

As the ruling class had attempted to appease the nation of chaos to become normal condition, it provided with an election. General strike committee with various splintered groups, agitated gangs and disunited unions as politically revolutionary organizations later became to form political parties. There were, unbelievably, more than 200 political parties, soon after the stepping down of BSPP as politically totalitarian and economically centralization party in power. Among which, NLD, its separated party, UNDP

and Democracy and Peace Party and the adopted party of BSPP, NUP were only publicly well-known and had enough capacities to take nationwide participation in the election given by the SLORC.

The greatest wonder was no asking of a single question to the SLORC by the oppositions or no explanation to the people about what sort of the coming elected House of Representatives would be, by the oppositions as well as by the existing government, SLORC. The terms, single or duel house, presidential or premiership; no precise a word was made. At the time, by virtue of the coup d'etat, the entire 1974 Constitution was dead. People were bullied not only by the ruling class as they said later but also by the self-made vanguard of the revolution, the pseudo representatives of the people, the political parties. They were indeed accomplices of the counter-revolution. All after the election, the need of the Constitution was proposed by the ruling class and the landslide victory of the NLD was denied to be in power. The voters trusted and crowned NLD to go forward to do for their sakes. The major political conflict was started not between the government and the opposition but between the opposition and the people; how NLD would walk further as a revolutionary vanguard, after that counterfeit role had been entitled by the voters. For such title, it had itself hastily attempted to mount onto the stallion of the revolution very recently. The rein of the stallion was received in the hands of NLD. But, the question is whether it could handle the rein of a revolutionary bridle successfully or not.

In fact, it was too inexperience and lacking of class representative support to take the power. The question is again whether it was a true representative of the people in class nature although it had gained the landslide votes.

Votes show peoples hearts but not their brains. And, the representation of the class nature cannot be evaluated by a single election.

NLD was the winner of the election and actually larger opposition party but it was not the sole and single vanguard of the recent revolution. NLD was cheered up by the majority but it was not unanimously supported by the nation as a whole.

It is not an argument over the acceptance of the majority votes and democratic representation. It is merely the statement over the assessment of the class representation and the process of the development of the class struggle of the society.

Understand that, the ruling class was doing its own business and would be doing so forever. No ruling class should easily and quickly step down. It maybe a fantastic hallucination if one thinks it is so easy to be in power.

The ruling class will suppress, oppress and dominate; it is its job. This is nothing but a class struggle that we are being challenged since mankind originated on earth.

The Society

Burma, only a single part of the global society, was a monarchy before the complete colonization of the British in 1885. Under British, the society was analyzed as semi-colonial semi-capital society. That was done by most of the leading generation of the land who were Marxist-Leninist as they described themselves.

During the Second World War, Burma was occupied by the Fascist Japanese whom the thirty comrades, formed by the underground leaders of the Do Bama Asi Ayone, had brought into the motherland with the hope of Independence. Then, again, Burma became Independence, after the accomplishment of the Second World War, given by the British Labour Party government which had pushed the little young inexperienced country to become the Socialist State and negotiated to agree legally seceded from the union by the nationalities in ten years. The Civil War was taken into place within three months after Independence. It was soon widespread in a year becoming into

multi rebellions against the socialist AFPFL government, also with major and minor ethnic groups. The demand for secession, known as federalism in misinterpretation of the term, was the cause of the insurgency by ethnic groups. Communist insurgents had fought for proletarian dictatorship (not for Democracy), claiming to gain freedom for workers and peasants. In fact, that Civil War was what the British really wanted to be for Burma. To be weak in wealth and disunity in strength of the nation is their true political objective. The British favoured the left wing political forces and suppressed the right wing political forces in Burma was also another aim to become disunity between the two major political forces to be at war in politics forever.

The history had developed and changed in many steps forward, but the characterization of the society was unchanged and underdeveloped. Semi-colonial semi capital society, as it termed since the British era, had still been expressed.

Is it true? No, it is untrue.

The society of Burma is a Feudal Autocratic one. Burma since the time of monarchy and throughout under British and Japanese and after Independence, up to now, is politically in autocracy and economically in feudalism. Burma never went under capitalism at least in .01 percent. The sayings of full-fledged capitalism are totally wrong.

Ye Kyaw Swa Yangon, Myanmar Sunday, October 31, 2010

Part One finished :.