CONFUCIAN ETHICS AND VIRTUE ETHICS

In recent years there have been criticisms of theories of ethics by antitheorists.1 According to them, there are weaknesses of ethical theories, regardless of their individual substantive content, which need investigation. Of the theories under review, the main ones are Kantian moral philosophy, utilitarianism, and contractarianism. There are neither formal nor informal alliances among anti-theorists, nor are there common grounds for their refutation of ethical theories. Nevertheless, universality and impartiality are generally understood by anti-theorists as the two significant characteristics possessed by theories that have undesirable implications.2 Because a moral theory consists of a (set of) highly abstract universal principle(s) from which concrete moral judgements are deduced, antitheorists question whether the individual characteristics of moral agents, as well as the particularity of situations in which moral judgements are made, can be given proper weight in such theories. Anti-theorists not only object to the view that making judgement is a kind of deductive activity,3 they also point out that impartiality implies abstraction from particular individuals and relationships, and therefore, an impartial moral principle does not pay adequate attention to particular properties of a concrete situation. Besides, impartiality does not allow the moral motivation of agents to be aroused by the special care for someone with whom he or she has special relation, a consideration which anti-theorists find acceptable. Apart from the above-mentioned features of moral principles, the following natures and presuppositions of ethical theories also constitute reasons for rejecting them: reductionism, nonexistence of unresolvable moral conflicts, provision of decision procedure for attaining objectively right judgements, admission of moral specialists, and so forthall of these are either false or undesirable from the anti-theorists' point of view.4 In a previous article,5 I examine most of these objections and attempt to determine the existence of an ethical theory that can withstand them. In another article,6 I scrutinize Confucian ethics to see whether it belongs to the kind of theories that anti-theorists reject. By analyzing the concept of jen and other essential ideas in Confucian ethics, my conclusion is that while admitting universality, impartiality, and normativeness as properties possessed by Confucian ethics, it does not share the demerits that anti-theorists oppose. Thus, Confucian ethics can be viewed as belonging to a completely different category of ethical theory, if it is a theory at all. With this conclusion in mind, one might naturally think that Confucian ethics belongs to an alternative domain, that is, virtue ethics. Nevertheless, whether such is the case requires an independent investigation, which is the task of this article. While trying to avoid repeating the arguments made in the articles mentioned, I do utilize some of the conclusions reached to deal with the

present issue.
TWO DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF VIRTUE ETHICS

It seems unwise to give a single definition of virtue ethics because, like anti-theorists, there are different emphases among virtue ethicists.7 However, we need at least some sort of characterization to set a domain for our discussion, reserving at the same time some room for others. Here I am going to borrow a characterization made by Michael Slote,8 not only because it is more specific compared to others, but also because the issues he brings out in his book have a certain relevance to ours. The following are two distinctive features spelt out by Slote. The idea of a virtue ethics is commonly regarded as involving two distinctive or essential elements. A virtue ethics in the fullest sense must treat aretaic notions (like "good" or "excellent") rather than deontic notions (like "morally wrong," "ought," "right," and "obligation") as primary, and it must put a greater emphasis on the ethical assessment of agents and their (inner) motives and character traits than it puts on the evaluation of acts and choices.9 Slote points out that the fundamental aretaic notions that virtue ethicists employ for making evaluations are not specifically moral (that is, not specifically morally good or morally excellent), but are "broader aretaic notions of a good or admirable character trait, an excellence of character, or, more briefly, a virtue."10 Thus, the notion of admirable would be used to replace "morally good" and other deontic notions. Similarly, "deplorable" would be used for expressing the opposite of admirability and notions such as blameworthy, which have moral connotations, would also be replaced.11 The aretaic notions are broader in that they give evaluative significance to the well-being of the self and to the well-being of others. The recognition of the well-being of the self and the equal weight given to it as to that of others lets virtue ethics avoid the self-other asymmetry (a problem that we shall deal with in the later part of this article) that occurred in Kantianism and common-sense morality. Furthermore, as non-moral goodness is allowed to count in ethical evaluation, "our virtue ethics will cover a great deal of the ground covered by our common-sense thinking."12 For Kantianism and common- sense morality, only other people's well-being is relevant to ethical evaluation; Slote thinks that this makes the sense of ethics too narrow. Roughly speaking, only what concerns people other than the agent or trait possessor counts intuitively as a moral virtue or as morally good, but by our common lights both other-benefiting and self-benefiting traits and actions can be admirable or (instances of) virtues. And clearly it is a part of the business of ethicsthough perhaps not of morality properto describe and evaluate such (largely) self-regarding traits as prudence,

fortitude, heedlessness, circumspection, and injudiciousness.13 Apparently we may conceive two kinds of ethics. In a narrower sense, ethics is equal to "morality proper," whereas in a broader sense, ethics comprises "morality proper" and prudence. It is the latter sense of ethics that Slote recommends. Since the functions of an ethical system and the criteria of its validity depend on the conception of ethics as such, the issue in question cannot be reduced to a problem of terminology. If, for certain reasons, we choose to adopt the broader sense of ethics, then we need to revise the key concepts we are accustomed to use in a narrower sense (henceforth the broader and the narrower senses just mentioned will be signified by "ethics" and "morality," 14) and examine the implications and problems derived correspondingly from them. At this early stage of our discussion, I will use the concept of ethics to investigate whether Confucian ethics belongs to virtue ethics.
ETHICAL NOTIONS IN CONFUCIAN ETHICS

As mentioned above, one of the distinctive features of virtue ethics is that it treats aretaic notions rather than deontic notions as primary. Therefore, I am going to determine whether Confucian ethics belongs to virtue ethics by examining whether the three essential ethical notions in Confucian ethicsjen, yi, and liare deontic notions and also whether they are treated as primary. If this is the case, in what sense are they so treated? Let us start with jen first, for it is the most significant one among the three. Primarily, the meaning of jen denotes the human faculty from which an empathetic feeling toward others arises. Confucius criticizes his student Tsai Wo when the latter declares that he is able to enjoy eating rice and wearing finery in the three-year mourning period; his appearances show that he is feeling at ease. Confucius thinks that being at ease when one should suffer with sorrow in a certain situation shows that one is lacking jen.15 By generating an empathetic feeling from jen, one would feel sorrow to see others in pain. In this sense, jen can also be understood as "awareness."16 Mencius asserts, "No man is devoid of a mind-heart (hsin) sensitive to the suffering of others."17 He further claims that "the feeling of compassion is the germ of jen"18 and "the feeling of compassion pertains to jen."19 Mencius elaborates on this meaning in the following passage: Mencius said, "For every man there are things he cannot bear. To extend this to what he can bear is jen. For every man there are things he is not willing to do. To extend this to what he is willing to do is yi. If a man can extend to the full his nature aversion to harming others, then there will be an overabundance of jen. If a man can extend his dislike for boring holes and climbing over walls, then there will be an overabundance of yi. If a man can extend his unwillingness to suffer the actual

humiliation of being addressed as "thou" and "thee," then wherever he goes he will not do anything that is not yi."20 It is clear that jen is a capacity by which one can transcend from one's own self to others, and thus one would care for others' well-being as well as one's own. Therefore, the primary meaning of jen signifies the transcendental ground of a moral act. Obviously, jen itself is not a deontic notion, nor is it an objective principle by which right and wrong can be differentiated. Strangely enough, jen in this meaning is not an aretaic notion either, because it is not equivalent to goodness or excellence but is a faculty possessed by human beings that makes moral goodness possible. Hence, jen itself is not a virtue but a moral will,21 without which no virtues can be qualified as a (moral) virtue. 22 Nonetheless, there is a second meaning of jen: It signifies one of the virtues commended by Confucians. As a virtue, jen also has two senses, each of which implies a different moral status. In one of its senses, jen can be achieved if and only if other virtues are satisfied. So the relation between jen and other virtues is a relation of subordination (the latter is subordinated to the former). For example, A man with jen is sure to possess courage, but a courageous man does not necessarily possess jen.23 . . . He cannot even be said to be wise. How can he be said to be jen?24 Tzu-chang asked Confucius about jen. Confucius said, "There are five things and whoever is capable of putting them into practice in the Empire is certainly 'jen.'" "May I ask what they are?" "They are respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness in word, quickness and generosity."25 The other sense is that jen is as valuable as the other virtues, therefore, jen and the other virtues are complimentary with each other. Negligence of any of these virtues would cause defects or imperfection in the agent or in his/her moral achievement. This can be viewed as a relation of coordination. The following are examples showing this kind of relation: . . . To love jen without loving learning is liable to lead to foolishness . . .26 The Master said, "What is within the reach of a man's understanding but beyond the power of his jen to keep is something he will lose even if he acquires it. A man may be wise enough to attain it and having enough jen to keep it, but if he does not rule over them with dignity, then the common people will not be reverent. A man may be wise enough to attain it, having enough jen to keep it and may govern the people with dignity, but if he does not set them to work in accordance with li, he is still short of perfection."27

Yi resembles jen in that it also has two meanings, and the two meanings are similar to those of jen. In the first meaning, yi signifies the capacity of human beings to discern appropriateness28 in any situation. According to Confucian thinkers, it is not the properties of events, nor the relationship among people concerned, that determine the appropriateness of an action; it is the agent who activates his or her impartial moral will to decide how to act appropriately. This is illustrated by the well-known claim made by Mencius that both jen and yi are inherent means.29 It can be seen that both jen and yi in their first meanings refer to the subjective condition of a moral agent; they differ only in the aspects on which they individually focus.30 Jen and yi may even be understood as two dimensions of moral will.31 That is why these two notions are always expressed simultaneously. The second meaning of yi denotes the traits or behavior that satisfy the criteria of appropriateness set by the capacity mentioned in its first meaning. When yi signifies a virtue, its importance is only next to jen. But when jen is understood as a virtue, and as the virtue in its first sense, jen consists of yi. Mencius said, "Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it. Shun understood the way of things and had a keen insight into human relationships. He acts from jen and yi, yet does not act in conformity with jen and yi."32 In the last sentence, the first and the second jen and yi have different meanings: The former is used in their first meaning (a faculty of human being, namely, the moral will), whereas the latter is used in their second meaning (kinds of virtue). For Mencius, it is the moral will from which an act springs, rather than the conformity of the act to virtues, that determines its being a moral act. It is true for both jen and yi that their first meanings are primary, whereas their second meanings are derivative. They are primary in that the capacities that these two notions signify make the corresponding virtues possible. This is not only an analytic truth, but for Confucians, it is also a practical fact: Only when one is always motivated by the will of jen (/yi) can one possess the virtue of jen (/yi). Now with the above understanding of the meanings and the senses of jen and yi, let us return to the problem of whether in Confucian ethics, the essential ethical notions are treated as primary. Although when they are conceived as virtues, jen and yi are derivative, what they are derived from are not deontic notions but notions of human faculties. In other words, the second meanings of jen and yi are derived from their first meanings. But this does not imply that they are derived from the deontic notions. Because deontic notions are also derived from the same faculties just mentioned, however, we need to further study this problem. In The Analects, Confucius claimed, "It is only those who possess jen

that are capable of liking and disliking others."33 This means that the necessary condition for one to be right in liking and disliking others is the virtue of jen one possesses. Moreover, as mentioned above, one's being morally right does not depend on his or her acting in accordance with moral rules and social norms, but depends on he or she observing the judgements based on yi. Mencius especially emphasized this point. For instance, he said that a great man need not keep his word, nor does he necessarily see his action through to the end, if he holds yi.34 This shows that although observing moral rules would lead to right actions in normal situations, in some special cases, it is moral for one to engage in an action that deviates from moral rules. Mencius's claim also shows that it is the morally great man who embraces and activates the capacity of differentiating right from wrong and determines what is right. It is not the case that he is a moral man because what he is doing is always the right act. Evidence of this kind can be found everywhere in Menciuss.35 Therefore, it can be concluded that deontic notions such as right and wrong are derived from virtues such as jen and yi. Like jen and yi, there are more than one meaning of li, and those meanings are used without attentive distinctions. Nevertheless, we need to distinguish them for the sake of clarity. Li is a notion that differs from jen and yi in that it possesses a weaker sense of human capacities36 but a stronger sense of norm. The first meaning of li denotes one of the virtues, the importance of which is simply less than that of jen and yi. As a virtue, li signifies the intention of being considerate in attainment. It also represents a sense of orderliness, which moral will intends to pursue. Therefore, li can be viewed as an objectification of moral will in a specific direction. From a Confucian point of view, the observance of li is a path to jen. Yen Yuan asked about jen. The master said, "To return to the observance of the li through overcoming the self constitutes jen."37 Once we overcome our self-interested desires, our moral will would activate and seek to objectify itself by observing li. When the moral will is objectified and endowed with a certain specificity, it gives li substantive content. For example, the moral maxims that Confucius introduces in the same passage cited above: "Do not look unless it is in accordance with li; do not listen unless it is in accordance with li; do not speak unless it is in accordance with li; do not move unless it is in accordance with li"38 are prescriptions directed to one's various aspects of behavior. Although the dimensions of li mentioned in this passage have not been spelt out, it is understood that for each aspect, there are specific rites to follow. Only rites with specific aspects can play a normative role in the empirical world. Such ritual propriety or moral maxims such as respectfulness and reverence can be conceived as instances of the second meaning of li.

Because maxims/propriety refer to specific situations and roles, people sometimes wrongly think that it is the situations or roles that determine the maxims/propriety. But as I have clarified elsewhere, "obligations are not defined by the roles people happened to occupy but rather, obligations are created to suit specific situations."39 It is the emphasis on the decisional capacity of moral will rather than on the external conditions that makes Confucian ethics an autonomous ethical system. There are several functions of maxims and propriety, the details of which shall not be explored here. Of those functions, the main ones are (1) providing criteria for the right act in normal situations on the one hand, and setting restraints on people from following the urges of their desires exceedingly on the other, and (2) enhancing people's awareness of moral will and the cultivation of moral life. As we have seen, however, jen and yi as the moral will itself are still the fundamental basis for li, because li is only an embodiment of the moral will. The exclamation from Confucius"What is the value for one who performs propriety without jen?"40fully expresses this view.41 Similarly, li as a virtue provides a moral connotation to maxims and propriety. Maxims and propriety should not be observed as a formality, but should be practiced with awareness of their spiritual meanings. Mencius said, "A great man will not observe a rite that is contrary to the spirit of li, nor will he perform a duty that goes against the spirit of duti- fulness."42 Because the virtue of li represents the criteria or standards for the right act, performance that conforms to other virtues but in some way deviates from li would cause undesirable outcomes and thus is far from being virtuous. The Master said, "Unless a man has the spirit of li, in being respectful he will wear himself out, in being careful he will become timid, in having courage he will become unruly, and in being forthright he will become intolerant . . ."43 Since maxims and propriety such as respectfulness, carefulness, or courage represent some sort of rules on which right and wrong are based, and since their moral meanings are derived from the virtue of li, apparently deontic notions such as right and wrong can be conceived as derivative or secondary. By now it should be clear that the essential ethical notions that we have examined are treated as primary (when they are considered as virtues), while the deontic notions are derived from them. Still, we cannot conclude that Confucian ethics belongs to virtue ethics; let us move to the second feature of virtue ethics.
ETHICAL ASSESSMENT IN CONFUCIAN THOUGHT

According to Slote, another distinctive feature of virtue ethics is that it

places a greater emphasis on ethical assessment of agents and their motives and character traits than it places on the evaluation of acts and choices. In this section I will show that Confucian ethics does possess this feature. The "extension" and cultivation of the moral mind have been the central concern for Confucians. There are innumerable Confucian teachings on various ways of achieving this aim. This is based on the fundamental belief that only a human being possesses a moral mind, the cultivation of which makes human beings different from beasts. Since the mind can be extended infinitely, self-cultivation is a lifelong effort for an agent devoted to this endeavor. The ultimate state of achievement, as Confucius describes it, is "to follow one's desires without any deviation from the norm."44 An agent can reach a certain stage toward this state during his or her lifetime and his or her ethical achievement can thus be assessed by judging which stage he or she is at. Having used the term "stage" in the above description, it should be noted that this term is used in a somewhat metaphorical sense, for there are not distinctive or clear conceptions of each level of ethical achievement. On the contrary, the way in which one represents oneself is quite unique for each person, and the development of these stages is not linear. Moreover, one's stage would be reflected in many aspects; therefore, we cannot judge it by an individual act one performs or a single choice one makes at a particular time or on a special occasionwe have to assess the agent as a whole person. As emphasized repeatedly in the last section, it is not certain kinds of behavior that Confucian thinkers aim at conforming to, but it is the performance motivated by the moral will that they deem valuable. Apparently, the object of ethical assessment is the motives of an agent rather than the acts or choices he or she makes. Paradoxically, the motive of an agent is something that can hardly be assessed externally. Therefore, a morally good act cannot be judged by other people; this implausibility also applies to a morally good person. In other words, although the assessment of an agent is more important than that of an act, practically no objective results can be arrived at. Nevertheless, one can always assess oneself through self-reflection, and then elevate oneself accordingly by purifying one's mind and strengthening one's will. Confucians think that this is the function of making such an assessment. In moral education, the ethical assessment of students is useful for giving instructions that suit a particular individual, but the assessment is supposed to be made by students themselves. However, if any evaluation of an agent has to be made (for instance, when an example has to be set up for others to follow), then such an evaluation can only be made by judging the agent externally. But we have to bear in mind that an evaluation made externally is not an ethical assessment in its essential senseit might be regarded as a

partial evaluation. For Confucians, an agent's moral achievement can be evaluated partially by his or her performance because they think that moral will can, and should, be objectified. The virtues possessed by an agent reflect the effect of his or her objectification of the moral will. Certainly, as shown above, it is possible for one to behave in conformity with rites and propriety yet abstracted from their spirits, but such kinds of behavior cannot be qualified as virtues. That is why virtues of an agent demonstrated externally can only be a partial reflection of the objectification mentioned. As a partial reflection, for example, we can find that a cultivated person appears to be reverent, since one of the descriptions of a gentleman is "one who cultivates oneself and thereby achieves rever- ence."45 It follows that a person with reverence is probably, though not necessarily, a gentleman. Besides, Mencius also believes that one's ethical quality is manifested in one's body. . . . That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, jen, yi, li and wisdom, is rooted in his mind-heart, and manifests itself in his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back and extends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words.46 But it should be noted that only an agent cultivated to a certain degree (like a "gentleman" or a "sage") is able to manifest his or her moral will fully. Nevertheless, a thorough manifestation of the moral will is as important as the cultivation of it. Thus, while Confucian education aims at increasing the awareness of moral mind and cultivation of moral will, it also stresses the transformation of self. The former objective can mainly be achieved by way of selfreflection, whereas the latter depends on living a virtuous life. This is why a gentlemana person who possesses all the essential virtues has been treated as a central theme in the early Confucian texts such as The Analects and Mencius. Self-transformation consists in a change of oneself, from selfishly-minded to being considerate, from beneficialoriented to righteous-oriented, from insensitive to sympathetic, and so on and so forth. Apart from this, self-transformation also aims at seeking the balance of character, that is, making adjustments to one's original personality if one is too timid, over-confident, too bold, too conservative, too compassionate, or too radical, and so forth. All of this shows that Confucians put greater emphasis on the ethical assessment of one's character traits. In the ethical assessment, acts and choices are relevant only if they can be evaluated from a moral point of view. Therefore, an assessment of acts and choices is meaningful only if it is made within the context of the evaluation of an agent as a whole, with reference to his or her moral motive. From the discussion in the last two sections, it seems that Confucian ethics possesses the two distinctive features of virtue ethics; hence, it can be concluded that it belongs to virtue ethics. But one should be

careful to note that there might be a gap between the meanings of the key concept of "virtue" in the philosophy of Confucianism and that in virtue ethics. If this is the case, it would affect the entire conclusion. Therefore, we need further analysis.
VIRTUES AND ADMIRABILITY

According to Slote, the idea that equal weight should be given to the well-being of the self and to that of others underlies the whole concept of virtue ethics. He also maintains that common-sense and Kantian morality have not given sufficient weight to the interests or well-being of moral agents, "and thus, in an important sense, [they] slight, devalue, or downgrade such agents."47 Apart from this, the unequal emphasis on the well-being of the self as compared to that of others also brings about a serious theoretical consequence, which Slote labels "self-other asymmetry." Self-other asymmetry shows itself in an agentsacrificing permission, which allows an individual to deny him or herself the very things he or she most wants, or causes him or herself unnecessary pain or damage. On the other hand, it does not allow an individual to treat others in such a way. Consider, then, what our ordinary moral thinking seems to allow and to forbid with regard to our treatment of other people. Negligently to hurt another person seems, intuitively, to be morally wrong in a way or to a degree that it does not seem wrong through negligence to hurt oneself. . . . Similarly, if one could easily prevent pain to another person, it is typically thought wrong not to do so, but not to avoid similar pain to oneself seems crazy or irrational, not morally wrong. And so given the agent- sacrificing common-sense permissions we have described, we may now also speak of an agent-sacrificing (or other-favoring) self-other asymmetry that attaches to what is commonsensically permissible. Various ways [in which] one may permissibly act against one's own interests or well-being are ways one is commonsensically not allowed to act against the interests or well-being of others.48 Slote thinks that self-other asymmetry is not acceptable for an ethical system because it causes "odd and even paradoxical consequences"49: Given that we are thinking critically and theoretically about ethics, we may well wish to avoid asymmetry whenever other things are equal . . .50 While ethical systems such as common-sense morality and Kantianism are undermined by the self-other asymmetry, a certain kind of common- sensical approach to virtue ethics can escape this problem. In such a kind of virtue ethics, the understanding of virtues is that "it allows both facts about the well-being of others and facts about the well-being of the agent to support claims about the goodness of some

trait possessed by the agent, claims, that is, about the trait's status as a virtue."51 To illustrate this notion of virtue in another way, we can say that "traits of character can qualify as virtues through what they enable their possessors to do for themselves as well as through what they enable their possessors to do for others."52 In Slote's account, it is obvious that character traits that are either other-benefiting or selfbenefiting can both qualify as virtues. The notion of virtue understood as such is an aretaic notion rather than a moral notion. Apparently, whether common-sense virtue ethics can be free of the problem of selfother asymmetry depends significantly on what is to be or what exemplifies a virtue. It also follows that only those ethical systems that are based on the broader aretaic notions can escape the problem of asymmetry. Slote uses the term "admirable character traits" to signify the aretaic notion of virtue to distinguish it from the moral notion. So we shall use "admirable" to describe traits that are examples of this kind of virtue. Now there are two problems we have to solve before we can determine the nature of Confucian ethics. First, does Confucian ethics contain aretaic notions of virtue, and if so, what are their status? Second, does it encounter the difficulty of self-other asymmetry? In a previous article,53 I examine most of the important Confucian virtues and find that both in the area of interpersonal interaction, and in the area of the moral cultivation of an agent, virtues always play an important role, but mainly in one's moral improvement. The well-being of or benefits to the self and that of the other can enter into one's moral life only if they contribute to the process of improvement mentioned. This means that they do not have any independent significance in moral considerations. In this perspective, virtues are valuable because of their moral values. In this sense, the notion of virtue in Confucian ethics is obviously a moral concept. However, if as in the quote above, virtue is (loosely) conceived as a character trait that enables their possessors to do something for themselves as well as for others, then the moral concept of virtue can fit in well with this description. This is so because while benefit cannot be part of the moral consideration, moral achievement is something that an agent aims at and that he or she does for him or herself as well as for others. Even under moral considerations, one does not necessarily sacrifice one's own interest for others, nor is one permitted to deny one's well-being unjustifiably. Moreover, sometimes the benefit of others has to be sacrificed for the sake of morality. It can be easily seen that from the moral point of view, benefit itself, whether it belongs to the self or to others, would not be the object of moral consideration unless it has moral implications. Sometimes, by acting for the benefit of others one may add significantly to one's moral achievement, and if moral achievement constitutes part of the (and may be the highest)

achievement of human life, then doing for the self and doing for others are two in one. In a broad sense of well-being, of which moral achievement occupies a large part, it is meaningless to differentiate between self and others.54 Because the distinction between aretaic and moral notions is based on such a differentiation, it seems there is no point in attributing either of these notions to qualify Confucian ethics. On the other hand, there is a distinctioneven if not always an opposed relationshipbetween the self and others. It occurs in the nonmoral realm where one's interest is of great importance. In Confucian thought, non-moral values55 are admitted as aims for an individual to pursue.56 So character traits that are beneficial for those aims are admirable, and thus regarded as virtues. For example, Confucians think that apart from moral cultivation, to realize one's potential and to develop one's personality are essential for the development of the whole person. In this respect, being wise, free from desire, courageous, and accomplished are admirable, for they are necessary components for a "complete man."
Tzu-lu asked about the complete man.

The master said, "A man as wise as Tsang Wu-chung, as free from desire as Meng Kung-ch'uo, as courageous as Chuang-tzu of Pien and as accomplished as Jan Ch'iu, who is further refined by li and music, may be considered a complete man."57 In the following passage, it is clear that certain non-moral values are adopted by the Confucians, and that the virtues that lead to those values are worth promoting. . . . If a man is respectful he will not be treated with insolence. If he is tolerant he will win the multitude. If he is trustworthy in word his fellow men will entrust him with responsibility. If he is quick he will achieve results. If he is generous he will be good enough to be put in a position over his fellow men.58 Obviously, insolence, multitude, entrustment, and so forth are nonmoral values, and respectful, tolerant, trustworthy, quick, and generous are admirable character traits that are self-benefiting. It is noteworthy that as far as non-moral values are concerned, Confucians do not hold that one has to fulfil the other's satisfaction prior to one's own. Even in moral consideration, the teaching of "help[ing] others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes to take his stand, and get[ting] others there in so far as he himself wishes to get there"59 does not suggest that one should let one's benefits be overridden by others' benefits. Confucian ethics is altruistic in the sense that it takes the well- being of others into consideration when making moral judgements. On the other hand, when one's well-being is sought in a case that does not necessarily involve morality, the weight of the self and that of others are equal. Apparently, no self-other asymmetry presents itself here.60

CONCLUSION

From the above discussions, we have seen that Confucian thinkers treat virtues rather than deontic notions as primary, but most of the virtues they commend are specifically moral or have moral implications. In this sense, virtue is not a kind of aretaic notion that gives recognition to the well-being of the self and to that of others. Confucian ethics avoids the difficulty of self-other asymmetry, however. Aretaic notions do exist in Confucian thought, but in the non-moral realm. Therefore, we can view the entire problem in this way: Within the moral realm, virtues are specifically moral; beyond this realm, that is, in the non-moral realm, virtues are those admirable character traits that are beneficial to the self as well as to others. In both of these realms, there is no self-other asymmetry. Besides, greater emphasis is put on the assessment of character traits than on that of acts and choices. This is our preliminary conclusion. One might argue that this preliminary conclusion is too simplistic because it only reveals a truism that one treats traits morally in the moral realm ( a realm where things are considered from a moral point of view), and that one treats traits non-morally in a non-moral realm. One might also argue that the crucial stand to define an ethical system is what weight it gives to these two realms. This is a reasonable assertion to which I do not object, but I think more can be discovered. Surely what is moral overrides what is non-moral when a moral point of view is taken. This is true not only for Confucian ethics, but for all moral systems that define morality as something that is overriding. The most important issue here is whether these systems allow the independent existence of another realm beyond that of the moral, and whether they put a certain weight on the non-moral values and urge people to promote them accordingly. If the importance of these values are recognized, then a number of principles can be established. A branch of study might then develop. We can coin a new name for it, or we may just call it "ethics". Confucian thought does not limit itself to a narrow sense of morality; it extends the domain of discourse and concern to this broader sense of ethics.