Veto Players and Referendums Around The World

Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(4): 465515 09516928[2002/10]14:4; 465515; 027705
Copyright & 2002 Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi
VETO PLAYERS AND REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD

Simon Hug and George Tsebelis
ABSTRACT The literature on referendums comes to conicting assessments: for some authors referendums are equivalent to direct democracy, for others, a poor and unfounded substitute. In addition, existing classications use very diverse criteria, and theoretical models lead to different results depending on whether the underlying assumptions reect a single- or multi-dimensional policy space: single-dimensional models lead to specic policy predictions, while multidimensional models typically identify paradoxes connected with referendums. We present a multi-dimensional model of referendums that leads to generalizations of the single-dimensional models. This multi-dimensional model makes predictions about how various provisions for referendums affect policy stability and the relationship between voter preferences and policy outcomes. To assess the relevance of these predictions we present information about referendum procedures all around the world on the basis of our model. Linking this information with existing empirical work on the effects of referendums suggests that our theoretical predictions are largely borne out. KEY WORDS . institutional analysis . referendums . veto players
No act of [representatives] can be law, unless it has been ratied by the people in person; and without that ratication nothing is a law. (Rousseau, 1947: 85) [W]e are deluding ourselves if we consider the referendum and the popular initiative of legislation as modern equivalents and substitutes of direct democracy. (Sartori, 1962: 256) If the people speak in meaningless tongues, they cannot utter the law that makes them free. (Riker, 1982: 239)
Introduction
Institutional provisions for referendums are increasingly being added to new constitutions (e.g. in Eastern Europe, see Auer and Butzer, 2001). More and more important questions are decided by referendum (e.g. recent changes of
Simon Hug acknowledges the partial nancial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grants 8210046545 and 50040487882/1) and the research assistance of Anke Tresch. George Tsebelis acknowledges support by the Russell Sage Foundation.
466
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)
constitutions in Venezuela and Australia, ratication of international treaties in the European Union, etc.). Increasingly scholars advocate greater use of referendums (e.g. Budge, 1996; Zurn, 1996; Abromeit, 1998; Ackerman, 1999; Schmitter, 2000; etc.). But in the theoretical literature Riker's (1982) warning against populism together with recent work on `problems with referendums' (e.g. Brams et al., 1997, 1998; Lacy and Niou, 2000), or the `referendum paradox' (Nurmi, 1997a, b, 1998) still cast some doubt on the usefulness of referendums. We argue that ultimately the difference in assessments can be attributed to inadequate attention paid to the institutions regulating referendums. More specically, scholars tend to neglect the important question of who controls the referendum agenda. We argue that this question is in fact separated into two parts: (1) who asks the question and (2) who triggers a referendum. But the existing literature has a series of additional shortcomings. Some authors classify referendums without paying attention to the strategic choices of the different actors involved. The more theoretical studies come to conicting conclusions depending on whether they assume that the underlying policy space is single-dimensional or has multiple dimensions. Singledimensional models lead invariably to sharp predictions of outcomes, while multi-dimensional models underline possible paradoxes. In this respect the referendum models mirror the rest of the spatial voting literature which leads to median voter results in single-dimensional models and in chaos when more dimensions are introduced. This discrepancy is particularly damaging to the study of referendums, because actual referendums sometimes address a simple question, in which case a single-dimensional model is a reasonable approximation, while at other times they are used to ratify whole constitutions, in which case single-dimensional models are inadequate. We present a multi-dimensional model of referendums on the basis of veto player theory (Tsebelis, 1995a, 1999, 2000, 2002). According to this theory veto players are actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the legislative status quo. Every government of a country represents a certain conguration of veto players.1 As the number of these actors and the ideological distances among them increase, a signicant change in the status quo becomes more difcult (policy stability increases). The possibility of a referendum introduces one additional veto player in each country: the population. As a result, it moves policy outcomes closer to the preferences of the median voter (if such a voter exists), but, provided that the remaining
1. See Tsebelis (2002) on how to identify and count veto-players as a function of the prevailing institutions (presidential or parliamentary regimes, uni-cameral or multi-cameral legislatures, required simple or qualied majorities) and the prevailing political game (number of parties in government, ideological distances among them).
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 467
veto players keep their powers, it also makes signicant policy changes more difcult.2 These are the similarities of all referendums. The differences among them stem from institutional differences about who asks the question and who triggers a referendum. We explain the signicance of these differences and, on the basis of them, examine the institutional details of referendums all around the world. In particular, we argue that if the same actor (whether it is an existing veto player or not) controls both the formulation of the question and the triggering of the referendum, other veto players lose their ability to veto outcomes and hence the number of veto players actually decreases. With our model we address the shortcomings in the different streams of the referendum literature: unlike the conictual conclusions of single- and multi-dimensional models in the theoretical literature, we analyze referendums exactly the same way whether the underlying space has a single or multiple dimensions; we distinguish referendums on the basis of the strategic choices of the actors involved; we do so by paying attention to the institutions regulating referendums; nally, we come to conclusions consistent with the empirical evidence on the effects of referendums. The paper is organized in ve sections. Section I reviews the different approaches in the literature. We show that each one of these approaches has serious shortcomings on the theoretical or the empirical level. Section II introduces a model of referendums on the basis of veto player theory. This model compares the institutions of a representative democracy and a representative democracy combined with referendums. Section III develops the model further and points out the differences between referendums depending on who is empowered to ask the question and who triggers a referendum. On the basis of this classication, we discuss the consequences of various types of referendums. Section IV uses the veto players model to study the institutions of referendums around the world. In Section V we show how well existing empirical evidence resonates with the theoretical claims we advance. The conclusion suggests avenues for further research.
I. Different Literatures on Referendums

The literature on referendums can be subdivided in three groups. The rst is empirical and often presents classications of the institutions allowing citizens a direct say on policies. Each of these classications emphasizes particular aspects of the referendum process, but most are disconnected from any theoretical framework. The other two groups consist of theoretical
2. We will show later that our argument holds even in multi-dimensional spaces where such a median rarely exists.
468
models that examine referendums as games among different actors. However, the rst of these two groups assumes that the questions asked can be represented on a single dimension and as a result the outcomes of different procedures can be calculated and identied, while in the second group the multi-dimensionality assumption leads to a series of paradoxical and disturbing results. Classications At the most basic level authors often distinguish between referendum and initiative (e.g. Ranney, 1978: 69; Magleby, 1984; Cronin, 1989). The referendum in this crude distinction is dened as a vote on a measure adopted by parliament. The initiative, however, allows citizens to propose a ballot measure, which may be adopted in a popular vote. Often, authors add a second criterion distinguishing whether the measure appearing on the ballot is a constitutional amendment or a statute or law (e.g. Ranney, 1978: 69). These distinctions between two basic forms of referendums are questioned in part by authors like Smith (1976), who rely on the functional properties of the referendum device. Smith (1976) argues that referendums can either be pro- or anti-hegemonic, and either controlled or uncontrolled.3 Combining these two criteria, Smith (1976) arrives at a fourfold classication to which he adds an additional residual category, namely that of nonfunctional referendums, dened largely by their non-signicance. This classication, obviously, does not only rely on institutional properties of the various referendum devices, but considers mostly contextual elements. A classication based much more heavily on institutional characteristics appears in Suksi (1993: 28f ). This author proposes four dichotomous criteria to distinguish among different institutional provisions allowing for referendums. First he distinguishes between referendums that are mandatory and facultative. The second criterion discriminates between decisive and consultative. The third one distinguishes between pre-regulated and non-preregulated referendums, while the last one concerns whether citizens play an active or passive role in launching a referendum. The combination of these four dichotomies leads to a classication with (theoretically) 16 possible types, several of which, however, are largely irrelevant since they do not appear in reality. In an attempt resembling Smith's (1976) classication, Hamon (1995) proposes several classications emphasizing the control various actors have over the referendum process. The most interesting aspect of his classication effort is a simple table (Hamon, 1995: 24) showing possible combinations
3. Smith (1976) uses referendums as a generic term, also comprising initiatives.
between the author of a measure appearing on the ballot and the actor triggering the referendum process. Both sets of actors comprise parliament, government, the head of the state, parliamentary opposition and the citizens. While some combinations do not exist in reality, the classication nevertheless goes a long way in emphasizing the difference between triggering a referendum and formulating the question. Uleri (1996) proposes a largely inductive classication relying on six dichotomous criteria, which in part resembles the ones proposed by Suksi (1993). Uleri (1996) arrives, however, only at a fourfold typology, comprising decision-promoting initiative, decision-controlling initiative, decisionpromoting referendum and decision-controlling referendum. Among the latter he distinguishes between rejective and abrogative votes. This classication attempt is picked up by Setala (1999) and combined with some of Suksi's (1993) criteria. Mueller (1996: 177f ) distinguishes among four types of referendums, namely the constitutionally mandated referendum, the governmentinitiated referendum, the citizen initiated veto and the citizen initiative. Hug (1999) derives an almost identical classication by employing two criteria proposed by Suksi (1993), namely whether a referendum is required or not and whether voters are actively involved or not in triggering a referendum. For the non-required referendums, which are launched actively by the citizens, however, he introduces as an additional distinction the criterion of whether the ballot measure is proposed by the government or another actor. These latter two classications are almost identical, since both authors explore the consequences of these four types of referendums in a strategic context. In such a strategic context it is of prime importance to know who triggers the referendum and who detains the agenda-setting power.
Theoretical One-dimensional Models The last two classications also tie in very closely with existing theoretical models of referendums. While early models in the public choice tradition simply presumed that referendums would correct any type of rent-seeking behavior of government (see Mueller [1979] for a discussion of this literature), Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) studying different types of school-bond referendums and demonstrated how required referendums may lead to policy outcomes quite far away from the one preferred by voters. Extending Romer and Rosenthal's (1978, 1979) work, Steunenberg (1992) proposes a generalization of these insights over a whole set of possible institutions for policy-making in a single dimension. Gerber (1996) presents a model more closely reecting the initiative process. However, this earlier work is limited in two ways, namely by assuming rst complete and perfect information for all actors involved in the decision-making process and,
470
second, that the policy to be decided can be represented in a one-dimensional policy space. Relying on more recent work in the agenda-setting literature, several authors relaxed the rst limitation by assuming some informational asymmetry among the actors involved. Lupia (1992, 1994) focuses on the limited information voters may have about ballot proposals and nds that endorsements by interest groups may provide helpful decision cues.4 Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) propose a model of the initiative process where both the legislature and an interest group fail to know the voters' exact preferences. They nd that for most preferences the initiative process allows for policies more closely aligned with the voters' wishes. A similar model of the initiative process appears in Besley and Coate (2001). While they consider two policy issues that have to be decided, in equilibrium only one of them appears on the ballot, while the other is resolved in the legislature. Hence, despite the two issues, voting on the ballot proposal is represented on a single dimension, and the two authors also nd that the voters' wishes are more closely reected in policy outcomes if initiatives are possible. Moser's (1996) incomplete information model of the popular referendum process comes to a similar conclusion. Hug (1999) explores the effect of incomplete information for four types of referendums and nds that the effects of these institutions differ. In general, however, for most preference proles voters (i.e. the median voter) are better off having referendums at their disposal which they may trigger themselves or which are required. While these theoretical models relax the complete information assumption of previous models, they do not question the assumption of a single-dimensional space. Theoretical Multi-dimensional Models The multi-dimensionality of policy decisions in referendums appeared much more strongly in work relying on social-choice-theoretic approaches. McKelvey (1976) and Schoeld (1978) demonstrated the importance of agenda-setting. In their analysis the agenda-setter could produce literally any outcome by sequencing appropriately the questions and exploiting the different preferences among the different individual actors. Based on their ndings Riker (1982) argued strongly against the existence of a Rousseauean `general will' in multi-dimensional policy spaces. Related to these theoretical models is recent work on some paradoxes which may occur in referendum voting, because either policies are multidimensional or voters vote on various non-separable proposals at the same
4. Bowler and Donovan (1998) provide persuasive empirical tests of these implications as well as others in the context of referendum voting in the United States.
time. Brams et al. (1997, 1998) and Saari and Sieberg (2001) focus on the problem of multiple measures appearing on the same ballot. While they are concerned with the fact that possibly no voter has voted for the winning `combination', Lacy and Niou (2000) explore this problem from the angle of non-separable preferences. Provided that various ballot measures are related, voters may have preferences over a particular ballot measure which are dependent on the outcome of another ballot measure. But since voting occurs simultaneously over all ballot measures at the same time, voters with non-separable preferences cannot condition their vote on the outcome of another ballot measure. Lacy and Niou (2000) suggest that referendums are not very good at resolving the problems stemming from non-separable preferences and suggest that legislatures deal more effectively with these issues. Hence, they advocate the use of normal legislative procedures for issues where voters may have non-separable preferences. Brams et al. (1997, 1998), however, suggest using approval voting to overcome the problems of multiple ballot measures. Nurmi's (1997a, b, 1998) work relates much more strongly with social choice theory and suggests a series of paradoxes that may appear in referendums. While this theoretical and empirical work related to social choice emphasizes important problems of referendums, it is useful to take a step back. Work in this tradition assumes well-behaved preferences over individual proposals while emphasizing that these preferences may be nonseparable from those on other proposals. In addition, this work, with the exception of Nurmi (1997a, b, 1998) does not consider how referendums interact with representative democracy. In conclusion, the disorderly image of positive and negative results nding also reection in our quotes at the beginning of our paper persists when one focuses on the accounts in the literature. Multiple criteria and different classications characterize the more empirically oriented literature, while specic outcomes or paradoxes dominate the more theoretical approaches. Our goal is to provide a unied framework for the study of referendums and to demonstrate two points. First we show that the actual provisions prevailing around the world can be understood on the basis of our framework and, second, we demonstrate that the results generated by empirical analyses are congruent with the expectations generated by our theory.
II. Veto players, Direct and Mediated Democracy

Our analysis of the institutional frameworks of referendums is based on the concept of `veto players' and expands on the work of Tsebelis (1995a, b, 1999, 2000, 2002). According to Tsebelis (1995a) a veto player is an individual or collective player whose agreement is required for a change of the
472
status quo. This denition can be applied to all countries and allows for identifying the actors involved in policy-making whether they are individual (like Presidents with the power to veto legislation) or collective (governments, one or both chambers of parliament, parties) actors. Tsebelis (1995b) demonstrates that in countries under a parliamentary regime the actual veto players are most of the time the parties in government.5 Tsebelis demonstrates both theoretically (Tsebelis, 1995a, 2002) and empirically (1999, 2002) that the number of veto players and the ideological distances among them make changes to the status quo more difcult. In addition, he points out (2000) how the interactions in referendums can be understood on the basis of the veto player framework. What difference does it make if outcomes are selected directly by the people or indirectly by the people's representatives in parliament? By denition outcomes selected by parliament will be preferred over the status quo by a majority in parliament, while outcomes selected by a referendum will be preferred by a majority of the voters. In a single dimension the outcome will be determined by the corresponding median voter, but in multiple dimensions such a median voter very rarely exists. The number of policy dimensions involved in a referendum is an open question. Sometimes multiple issues are lumped together; at other times efforts are made to separate issues and decide them one at a time. For example, on the one hand, referendums are sometimes used to approve (or disapprove) whole constitutions; on the other hand, the Italian Constitutional Court decided to exclude a popular proposal on the basis that it contained `such a plurality of heterogeneous demands that there was a lack of a rational, unitary matrix that would bring it under the logic of Article 75 of the Constitution' (quoted in Bogdanor, 1994: 634). This section will rst make the argument that in our model (in sharp contrast with the literature that we reviewed) the number of underlying dimensions makes very little difference. The second issue that we will address is that the preferences of such an às if ' median voter may be signicantly different from the policy selected by existing veto players. Median and Às If ' Median Voter Preferences in Referendums If we consider a group of people voting by majority rule whether to accept a proposal or reject it (and keep the existing status quo (SQ)), the set of
5. However, there are exceptions, for example if the President of the Republic has veto power over legislation (Portugal) or ordinances (France), or in bicameral systems, if the upper chamber's approval is required and a different majority controls this chamber (Germany some of the time).
outcomes that can defeat the SQ form the win-set of the status quo: W(SQ). Social choice literature (Ferejohn et al., 1984) has identied an area within which W(SQ) is located. This area is a circle centrally located within the group of voters. More precisely, Ferejohn et al. make the assumption that voters' preferences are represented by points in space and each voter is indifferent between two alternatives equal distance from their ideal point (Euclidean preferences); they draw all the `median' lines within the voter population.6 They then consider the smallest circle intersecting all these lines and call it the `yolk'. If the yolk has center Y and radius r, and the segment SQY has length d, they show that W(SQ) is included in a circle (Y, d 2r), and includes a circle (Y, d 2r).7 We will take this nding as the departing point in our analysis.8 As a result, the boundaries of the win-set of the status quo are located between two circles; both of them with center Y, one with radius (d 2r) and the other with radius (d 2r). It has also been shown (with computer simulations) that on average the size of the radius of the yolk (r) decreases as the number of voters increases (Koehler, 1990).9 Consequently, for the millions of people who are the potential participants in a referendum, in most countries or states r is (most of the time) exceptionally small. As a result, the win-set of the status quo is contained between two circles that differ little from each other: 4r, when r becomes smaller and smaller. What the previous two paragraphs indicate is that for a large population, the median voter may not exist but all median lines pass through a very small area (of radius r), so an às if' median can be very well approximated by the center Y of the yolk of the population. In addition, the win-set of the status quo for such a large population is also very well approximated by a circle with radius d. In other words, the multiplicity of voters simplies rather than complicates the problem of identication of the median voter and the win-set of the status quo. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the argument. The yolk of the population is very small and has center Y. The win-set of a point that has distance d from Y is the shaded area in the gure, and is located between the two circles with radii (d 2r) and (d 2r), so it can be approximated by the circle (Y, d).
6. Median lines have on both sides of them majorities of voters (including the points on them). 7. If d > 2r; otherwise such a circle does not exist. 8. The interested reader can nd a simple proof of these statements in Miller et al. (1989). 9. We underline òn the average' because one can nd counterexamples. For example, if the voting population has only three distinct preferences, then there is no difference between such a population and a three-member voting body.
474
Figure 1. Win-set of a Large Group of Voters
Representative Democracy Consider a country with ve parliamentary parties, A, B, C, D and E, three of which are required to form a parliamentary majority (a simple example of that would be if each one of them had 20 percent of the seats). Where would a parliamentary decision be located? If we know nothing about the parliament's decision-making except that it requires a simple majority (think of a decision taken in a presidential system where coalitions depend on the issue under consideration), then we have to locate the intersections of any three of the circles with centers A, B, C, D and E. We have shaded these areas in Figure 2. If we know some additional information about parliament's decision-making we can incorporate it in the calculations, and identify the win-set of the status quo more accurately. For example, if we know the parties that form the government of a parliamentary system, we will identify the win-set of the status quo by considering each one of them as a veto player and nding the intersection of their win-sets. Figure 2 indicates with dark shade the area where the outcome will be located if the parties forming the government are A, B and C in a parliamentary system government (where coalitions are, by denition, stable). In the remainder of the paper, when we use the term `parliamentary' we will imply a system with stable majorities, while when we use the term `presidential' we will imply
Figure 2. Win-set of Status Quo in Representative Democracy
the possibility of different coalitions depending on the issue. What happens if representative democracy and referendums are combined? Representative Democracy and Referendums Denmark provides some interesting examples of the differences between the outcomes from representative democracy and referendums. As Vernon Bogdanor (1994: 72) puts it:
It may seem a paradox that the Single European Act, which could not have gained a majority in the Folketing, received a majority in the country, while Maastricht, which enjoyed the support of parties with 80 percent of the seats in the Folketing, was rejected by the voters in 1992.
Figure 3 helps us think the potential paradox through.
476
Figure 3. Difference of Results Between Direct and Representative Democracy
There is no reason to believe that the two processes (representative democracy and referendum) will lead to the same outcome. In fact, we do not even know that the preferences of the public will be centrally located within the preferences of the parties. Even the most pure proportional representation systems like Israel or The Netherlands cannot guarantee representation for minorities of 0.5 percent, for example. Systems with higher thresholds like Sweden's 4 percent or Germany's 5 percent exclude many more. In addition, the existence of electoral districts may create serious differences between the preferences of the voters and their representatives.10 Finally, parliamentary institutions (like committees, qualied majorities) may also create discrepancies between popular preferences and parliamentary outcomes (see Tsebelis, 2002).
10. The literature on referendum paradox (Nurmi, 1998: 3367) shows one mechanism generating such a discrepancy.
In Figure 3 we present how a referendum interacts with the parliamentary arena. In order to capture the differences in preferences between the people and their representatives we represent the center of the yolk Y H generated by the preferences of the people not in the center of the parties' preferences. On the basis of the analysis for median voter preferences, the outcome of a referendum will be located inside the hatched area called W H (SQ). On the basis of the analysis for representative democracies, the outcome of a presidential system would be anywhere in the area W(SQ), while the outcome of a parliamentary system with parties A, B and C in government would be located in the very dark area. One can see that the possible solutions under representative democracy and referendums have several points in common, but the preferences of the population and the political parties do not necessarily coincide. This is only part of the story because there is no guarantee that the coalition prevailing among the voters would be politically the same as the coalition prevailing in parliament. For example, the parliamentary government A, B, C would produce an outcome located inside the very dark area, while the outcome of a referendum could be anywhere inside the hatched area in Figure 3. If a parliamentary decision has to be ratied by the population (as is frequently the case in constitutional matters) then the outcome has to be located in the intersection of the parliamentary and the popular win-sets. In other words, referendums create one additional veto player in the decision-making process: the people. There are two results from this introduction of a new veto player: rst, it becomes more difcult to change the status quo (Tsebelis, 1995a). Second, the nal outcomes will approximate the preferences of the às if ' median voter better when the possibility of a referendum exists (whether the actual decision is made by a referendum or not).11 But the institutions that regulate referendums affect both of these results.
III. Institutions Regulating Referendums

From the perspective of the veto player theory two main criteria are fundamental. First, we have to know who may trigger the process of a referendum. Second, we need to know who is able to frame the question of the popular vote. These two crucial questions underlie, in part, some of the classications discussed earlier, but they are seldom pursued to their ultimate conclusions. Stating these questions clearly and using them as the main criteria for a classication of different institutional provisions for referendums has the
11. Gerber and Hug (2001) discuss in detail these direct and indirect policy effects of institutional provisions allowing for referendums.
478
additional advantage of allowing theoretical claims on referendums to be easily tied into insights gained about representative democracy from veto player theory. Figure 4 employs these two basic questions to derive a fourfold classication which comes very close to the ones proposed by Mueller (1996) and Hug (1999). There are some slight differences. Mueller and Hug dene distinctions among referendums on the basis of what government and opposition do though these concepts may not be well dened in presidential systems. Here we make distinctions on the basis of the behavior of actors identiable in every political system: veto players and non-veto players.12 This allows us to make a much clearer distinction with respect to the two main criteria. How these criteria are used is best presented in a treelike fashion in Figure 4. First,
Figure 4. Questions Dening Different Categories of Referendums
12. There is an additional minor distinction, namely that even in parliamentary systems `government' and `veto-players' are not always identical (see footnote 6).
we have to distinguish between referendums that are required and those that are not. Obviously, in the former case the question of who triggers the referendum process is irrelevant. Non-required referendums come in different forms and shapes and distinguish themselves by the two criteria. With respect to the question of who decides to trigger a referendum, two possibilities have to be taken into consideration. First, a veto player in the normal legislative arena might trigger a referendum. Second, an actor who is not a veto player in the representative system might trigger a referendum: popular vetoes and initiatives are prime examples. When a non-veto player triggers a referendum the crucial question becomes who asks the question. In the Italian case the question is asked by parliament, since referendums may only strike existing laws (or parts thereof ) from the books. In other cases, an actor who does not have veto player status in the legislative arena may ask the question. Popular initiatives, for instance in the States of the USA or in Switzerland, are the main examples. This much more ne-grained classication into four major types allows a very detailed analysis of the policy consequences of the various types of referendums. We discuss these policy effects for each referendum separately. Required Referendums At the most basic level required referendums introduce an additional veto player. Apart from the veto players whose support is normally necessary to change policies, required referendums add the hurdle of the support of the voters. For policies that are the object of required referendums, e.g. constitutional amendments in many countries or changes in the voting age in Denmark (see Table 1), the status quo can only be changed if the change is preferred by the new veto player, namely the voters. Thus, any new policy has to belong to the win-set of the status quo as dened by the voters' preferences. In most cases this win-set corresponds to the set of policies that is preferred by a simple majority of the voters to the status quo. Often, however, provisions for required referendums specify qualied majorities.13 The
13. For instance in the federal system of Switzerland constitutional changes require a majority not only among the voters, but also among the cantons which make up the federation. In Italy, however, a referendum outcome is only valid if turnout exceeds 50 percent. In Denmark, a rejection of a bill transferring some aspects of national sovereignty to an international organization is only valid if at least 30 percent of the voters having participated at the last election reject the bill. If less than this minimal percentage of votes against a proposal it is deemed to be accepted by the voters. This almost resembles the rules under which Napoleon held the rst national referendum in Switzerland on adopting a new constitution for the Helvetic Republic. Although roughly 56 percent of the voters rejected the new constitution Napoleon declared it adopted, since the citizens having failed to vote were obviously in favor (Mockli, 1994: 60).
480
model can easily accommodate such differences in majority requirements (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002). They simply affect the nature of the veto player introduced by referendums. In countries with no turnout criterion the veto player is simply formed by the collectivity of participating voters. In countries with a turnout requirement, some form of qualied majority of voters makes the decision. Despite these considerable variations we limit ourselves in this paper to explore the consequences of referendums of various types under the assumption of simple majority requirements. Under this assumption our model predicts that policies in issue areas subject to required referendums will belong to the intersection of the parliamentary win-set (W(SQ) in Figure 3) and the voters' win-set (W H (SQ) in Figure 3). Figure 3 illustrates that a majority of voters will not be worse off due to required referendums, because required referendums rule out elements of the parliamentary win-set that are worse than the status quo for a majority of voters.
Veto player Referendums From the previous discussion it becomes clear that only under extremely rare conditions would the possible outcomes of the two processes (the win-sets of representative democracy and referendums) be identical. In terms of actual outcomes, they can be identical even when the win-sets differ, or different even when the win-sets are the same. This obviously gives considerable leeway to the veto player who may trigger a referendum, and even more so if this veto player may also formulate the referendum question. We rst consider veto player referendums in which a veto player may trigger a referendum, but the normal legislative procedures leads to the formulation of the ballot question. Then we move on to the case where the same veto player formulates the question and triggers the referendum. Let us focus on Figure 3 and see under what conditions different veto players actually would call for a referendum. In a purely representative system the policy outcome would belong to the win-set of the status quo W(SQ). But any policy not belonging to W H (SQ), the voters' win-set of the status quo is open for a referendum challenge. In order to simplify our calculations, let us assume that a referendum has no political costs for the agenda-setter. Obviously, this is an incorrect assumption, but one can address it easily by adding these costs in the calculations. For instance, if the legislative process led to an outcome in the small petal of the win-set to the lower right, most likely B, but certainly C would trigger a referendum which would result in the rejection of the new policy by the voters. Thus if B and C are veto players and can trigger a referendum, the referendum threat will lead to the adoption of a policy in the intersection of the two
win-sets W(SQ) and W H (SQ).14 For the case in which the veto player triggers a referendum and asks the question we will consider the two different cases of `parliamentary' and `presidential' systems (stable coalition of parties A, B and C in the rst case and any coalition of three of A, B, C, D and E in the second). In each of these cases we consider two possible agenda-setters: party A and party E (the rst is part of the parliamentary system government, the second is not).15 Under complete information the referendum agenda-setter is guaranteed to get his/her most preferred point from the popular win-set of the status quo (W H (SQ) in the picture).16 Given that both A and E are located outside W H (SQ) they can achieve the points AH and E H respectively when they control the referendum agenda. The question is: Can indirect democracy offer to the referendum agenda-setters a more attractive alternative? In order to answer this question we have to calculate the win-set of these two points W(AH ) (see Figure 5) and W(E H ) (see Figure 6). Figure 5 presents exactly the same conguration of players as Figure 3 and identies the point AH , which is the best outcome the referendum agendasetter can achieve (AH is the intersection of the line AY H ) with the circle (center Y H , radius jY H SQj). Figure 5 also identies the win-set of AH instead of W(SQ), since player A can introduce a referendum and obtain AH as the outcome. Out of this win-set A will consider only the points included in the circle (A, AAH ), and trigger a referendum for any point further away than AH . There is only one possible coalition that can approve points inside the (A, AA') circle: A, D and E. Consequently A has to select this coalition in order to get an outcome which is preferred over AH (preferably A?). In our idealized `presidential' system this is what will happen. In the case of a `parliamentary' system with A, B and C in government the situation is more complicated. Note that there is no point that all three parties A, B and C prefer to AH because AH is in the unanimity core of A, B and C.
14. If B and C are not veto-players who can trigger a referendum, for instance if A, D, E form a coalition, then the outcome in the small petal of the win-set to the lower right will not be challenged in a referendum. Since this scenario is only possible in a popular veto, we will cover it later. 15. We consider that agenda-setting belongs to single parties, because then it is easy to identify the proposal that they will make. If several parties (say `the government') control the referendum agenda they will have to negotiate among them what proposal they will make. We have nothing to say about these negotiations, except that feasible outcomes have to be within W H (SQ). Note also that E is not a veto-player. We include this counterfactual case (see Figure 6) in order to show the underlying strategic calculations under all possible congurations, whether they exist in actual political systems or not. 16. In the absence of complete information such precise calculations are impossible. Actors will select points that they think are inside W H (SQ) but they may be wrong in which case the voters will reject the proposal.
482
Figure 5. Possible Outcomes When A Controls the Referendum Agenda
A has to choose between keeping the government in place or leading a government to resign. Similarly, parties B and C may offer to approve outcome AH and avoid a referendum, or they might prefer to delegate their disagreement to a referendum. These calculations lead to three possible outcomes: (1) government ABC remains in power and adopts AH without a referendum; (2) government ABC remains in power and AH is adopted by referendum; (3) the government resigns, and is replaced by another coalition which selects a feasible point from W(AH ).
Figure 6 presents exactly the same conguration of players as before, but assumes that player E can introduce a referendum, so identies the win-set of point E H instead of SQ. Out of this win-set only the points included in the circle (E, EE H ) can be considered, because E would prefer to trigger a referendum than to accept a point further away than E H . There are three possible coalitions that can approve points inside the (E, EE H ) circle: (ABE), (ADE), and (CDE). Consequently E has to select one of the available coalitions. In the case that any coalition is possible (the `presidential' system), E will select his own ideal point supported by (ADE). In the counterfactual case of a `parliamentary' system with (ABC) in government the situation would be more complicated. E could use his/her advantage of referendum agendasetting to try to negotiate a different government: indeed, players A, D and E may prefer a new coalition government. If the parties in government want to stick together, E will trigger a referendum and the government will lose. In all these calculations some previous existing veto players lose their ability to participate in political decision-making. Instead of calculating W(SQ) we were basing our calculations on what the referendum agendasetter could obtain (points AH or E H ). In addition, we saw that a presidential system, where parties can shift coalitions on the basis of the subject matter under consideration, was a more exible system than a parliamentary one, where the existing government coalition was unable to adapt to the new policy environment generated by the referendum not only when a non-veto player controlled the agenda (case of E being the agenda-setter), but also when agenda-setting belonged to an existing veto player (the case of A). A parliamentary system can produce similar outcomes by delegating a political issue to a referendum and leaving it outside the political conict of the main parties. For example, in the UK the referendum on participation in the EU had this special treatment because both parties were divided and could not handle the issue without serious damage to their unity (Bogdanor, 1994). Given these calculations, strategically thinking parties in the legislature (particularly if, for some reason, they want to avoid a referendum) can assure the referendum agenda-setter that they will do anything in their power to make the legislative process end up in an area that is at least as good for him/her as the result of a referendum. These mental experiments lead to the following conclusions. First, the position of referendum agenda-setter translates into signicant policy advantages: if a veto player controls the referendum agenda, s/he cancels other veto players as such. This is a very different analysis than the one presented by referendum advocates who consider referendums the expression of the will of the people (see earlier quote by Rousseau). Second (and this is a consequence of the rst), the legislative outcomes of representative democracy are altered if referendums are possible (Gerber and Hug, 2001).
484
Figure 6. Possible Outcomes When E Controls the Referendum Agenda
Popular Veto If popular vetoes are possible, the outcome of the legislative process has to lead to policies contained in the win-set of the status quo dened by the voters. If this is not the case, an actor may trigger a referendum, provided that s/he prefers the status quo to the policy adopted. In Figure 3 this would suggest that in the parliamentary arena a policy is adopted which lies outside W H (SQ), the set of policies the voters prefer to the status quo. If an actor prefers the status quo to the proposed policy and has the capacity to trigger a referendum, it can ensure that the outcome will remain the status quo. An illustrative example in this respect is the rst Danish Maastricht referendum. While a large majority accepted the Maastricht Treaty in the ratication debates, a minority exceeding one-sixth of the members of parliament voted against the Maastricht Treaty and forced a referendum.17 This minority in parliament evidently preferred the status quo to the Maastricht Treaty. As the rst referendum showed, a majority of the Danish voters also preferred the status quo to the Maastricht Treaty, suggesting that this treaty was not in the win-set of the status quo. Hence, popular vetoes allow non-veto players to force a return to the status quo ante. How this status quo ante is dened may differ quite considerably. For instance, in the rst Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty referred to earlier the status quo corresponded simply to the arrangements under the Single European Act (SEA). In other cases the status quo ante is more complex. For instance, the Italian referendum that struck any reference to proportional representation from the electoral law for the Senate (Newell and Bull, 1993), led to a situation where the senators had to be elected by majority rule. In this case the status quo ante is quite different from the one enforced by the Danish voters. Popular Initiative So far, we have dealt with referendums where the question was asked by existing veto players. Now we focus on referendums delegating agendasetting powers to the winner of a competitive process. If different groups can become agenda-setters (both asking the question and triggering) of a referendum by winning the right to present their question to the electorate (signature collection) the legislative outcome will depend on how competitive the
17. This example also illustrates that members of parliaments may launch a popular veto simply by voting against a bill. Provided that a rejection by a qualied minority automatically triggers a referendum, the mechanisms of such votes correspond perfectly to popular vetoes (Table 2).
486
selection process is. If all potential players are included in the selection process the only way that one can select proposals that will not only defeat the status quo but other proposals as well is to make proposals that are supported by a majority, which means that the process will converge towards the preferences of the `median voter'. If some of the potential agenda-setters (particularly the ones with preferences similar to the às if ' median voter) are excluded from the process, then the remaining ones may be more extreme and the legislative outcome may be further away from the preferences of this voter. As a consequence of this analysis, we have to focus on the process of selecting the agendasetter and assess how competitive it is. This selection obviously depends on the criteria for the qualication of a ballot measure. These criteria comprise the number of signatures of citizens required to qualify the ballot, how much time the qualication process can take, etc. All these elements thus create hurdles a group has to cross. Gerber (1999) links this with the notion that popular initiatives are launched either by broadly based citizen groups or special interest groups. She argues that given the hurdles a group has to cross to qualify a proposal, broadly based citizen groups, which will collect signatures in part or mostly through volunteers, will mostly submit moderate proposals. This simply because only moderate proposals, i.e. proposals close to the center of the yolk, will nd sufcient support in the population to allow volunteers to collect enough signatures. Special interest groups, which often rely on paid signature collectors, may make either moderate or more extreme proposals, depending on how strongly they feel about a particular policy. Consequently, if, for example, what is required is signature selection by volunteers, then, demands that are supported by a majority of the population are likely to get the volunteers necessary for their placement on the ballot, and initiatives that do not have enough volunteers are unlikely to be supported by a majority. Consequently, such a process is a competitive one and one can expect that the outcome will be located close to the preferences of the median voter. If, however, what is requested for an issue to be placed on the ballot is signature selection by remunerated professionals, it is possible that organized groups with ideal points far away from the median voter are also able to participate, in which case the selection process for agenda-setting may translate into outcomes away from the preferences of the median voter. In all cases, the selected outcome has to be closer to the preferences of the median voter than the status quo.18 So, again, despite the fact that the às
18. We have to repeat here that the radius of the yolk is assumed 0, otherwise the selection of a point that is further from the center of the yolk than the status quo by up to 2r could not be excluded.
if' median voter makes the nal decision, the result depends crucially on the preferences of the agenda-setter.
Institutions for Referendums and Their Policy Consequences Our model makes predictions in two related domains. First, it shows how referendums, by introducing a new veto player and possibly eliminating existing ones, affect the potential for policy change. Second, it also shows that referendums affect considerably policy outcomes, namely in such a fashion that voters (i.e. the median voter) are never worse off having provisions for referendums. Both predictions relate closely to the concerns in the general literature on referendums. But our predictions are of a much sharper nature, provided we have information on the institutional rules regulating referendums and, even more importantly, can determine clearly the identity of the actors able to trigger a referendum and to ask the question. Thus, before discussing in more detail our predictions and how they relate to empirical studies on referendums, we provide information on provisions for referendums in constitutions of countries around the world. While various studies provide partial information about the institutions allowing for referendums, none relate this information with the notion of veto player which in our analysis is crucial for understanding the relationship between referendums and representative democracy. For instance, Suksi (1993) presents information for most countries on whether their constitutions have provisions for referendums and classies them according to his dichotomous criteria. Similarly, the Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy (http://c2d.unige.ch) provides information on the institutions present in the countries around the world. But both these sources do not directly provide information on whether or not veto players trigger a referendum and formulate the question, so they do not provide the crucial information identied in Figure 4. We provide this information in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. In collecting this information we relied heavily on Suksi's (1993) work, but updated it considerably, adapting it to the needs of our classication presented in Figure 4. A major criterion in this classication distinguishes between required and non-required referendums. In Table 1 we list all countries that have provisions for required referendums and explain the issues subject to such referendums as well as the date of the constitution consulted.19
19. Suksi (1993: 138, 142) nds that in 56 out of his 160 analyzed constitutions there appear references to referendums on constitutional amendments. Among them 32 explicitly refer to required referendums for constitutional changes. Six other constitutions introduce a required referendum for international treaties, namely Congo, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Singapore, and
488
Overall we identify 54 constitutions containing provisions for required referendums. The number of constitutions allowing for non-required referendums (Table 2) is slightly smaller (47). For all of these 47 countries we provide detailed information on who may trigger a referendum and the identity of the actors who ask the question.20 We use this information to determine whether a veto player or a non-veto player may trigger a referendum and formulate the question to be submitted to the voters. As our theoretical model clearly indicates, it is this information which is crucial to assess the effect of institutions allowing for referendums.21 Table 2 illustrates the wide variety that exists in the institutional provisions allowing for non-required referendums. Predominantly, we nd that existing veto players may trigger a referendum and retain absolute control over the agenda. Only a few constitutions contain provisions for popular vetoes or popular initiatives. The information contained in Tables 1 and 2, combined with the insights from our model allow us to qualify claims prevalent in the literature on referendums which discuss the policy and stability-inducing effects of referendums. With respect to the stability-inducing effects of referendums, the literature is replete with examples and discussions. Neidhart (1970), for instance, discusses in detail the case of Switzerland, for which he argues that the popular veto has made policy changes very difcult. Cronin (1989: 222), however, suggests that `direct democracy devices . . . have been an occasional remedy, and generally a moderate remedy, for legislative lethargy . . .'. Reviewing the evidence of whether referendums have a conservative bias, Gallagher (1996: 237) comes to the conclusion that there is no clear evidence in support of this view nor its counterpart. These differences in assessment relate directly to the ndings based on our model. Generally speaking, referendums introduce an additional veto player into the political game and thus diminish the potential for policy change. While this stability enhancing effect is present in all types of referendums
Zaire (Suksi, 1993: 143). For each of these countries we consulted the most recent constitution and report the detailed procedures that lead to a required referendum in Table 1. Given that countries in Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. Lesage, 1995; Auer and Butzer, 2001) adopted new constitutions in the 1990s, often with provisions for referendums, we also systematically consulted these constitutions and list provisions for required referendums in these countries in Table 1. 20. Again, we used Suksi's (1993) work to identify all countries that had non-required referendums according to the constitutions he consulted. In addition, we checked all constitutions of countries from Eastern and Central Europe to determine whether they had provisions for nonrequired referendums. For all these countries we determined the relevant articles in the constitution to determine the exact procedures for holding such referendums. 21. While several other sources also provide lists of provisions allowing for referendums, none of them identies the actor triggering a referendum and formulating the question for the voters in terms of veto-players.
of our classication (Figure 4), our model also identies the cases that lead to the elimination of veto players: if the same player (whether an existing veto player (veto player referendums) or not (popular initiatives)) controls both triggering and asking the question. First, in a veto player referendum, if a subset of the normal legislative veto players can both trigger a referendum and ask the question, then this cancels out the remaining veto players in the legislative arena (other parties in government). An example for this type of referendum is the provision of Belarus' constitution allowing the President to trigger a referendum and to ask any question. The effect of such powers clearly transpired in the referendums in 1996 in which President Lukashenka broke a stalemate with parliament (Stone, 1997).22 Proposals for increasing the president's powers would never have been passed in parliament. But Lukashenka appealed over the heads of the parliament to the Belarusian voters and changed policy in an area where representative democracy would not have produced any change. The other type of referendum eliminating existing veto players, and thus not necessarily decreasing the potential for policy change, is the popular initiative. Again, this comes about because the power to set the agenda in these referendums is vested in an actor who is not a veto player in the normal legislative game. If citizens can submit their own policy proposals and trigger a referendum, they cancel out the powers of existing veto players. Thus, countries having provisions allowing for the popular initiative may see the potential for policy change actually increase. Given that this increase comes about through reducing the power of the legislative veto players, namely political parties, it is hardly surprising that few constitutions contain provisions for such referendums. Overall, 11 constitutions23 allow for such referendums, but many of these provisions, mostly in East European countries, have hardly been used. At the national level Switzerland uses such popular initiatives most frequently. In several policy domains, for instance environmental protection, this institution is credited with having triggered signicant policy changes. A case in point is a constitutional amendment in favor of protecting the Alpine region against automotive trafc through the Alps, which Swiss voters adopted 20 February 1994, to the chagrin of most elected ofcials. This constitutional amendment basically ruled out the construction of any additional roads crossing the Alpine regions, which might lead to increased trafc through or across the Alps. This new
22. Strictly speaking, the constitution in force required the parliament to agree to a referendum, but the supreme court allowed the referendums to go forward which resulted in a considerable overhaul of the constitution, giving the president increased powers, including the power to launch a referendum on any question he chooses. 23. The following countries have such provisions: Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, Philippines, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and the Ukraine.
490
constitutional amendment originated in a signature petition proposing this change to the constitution. Most observers were surprised by the outcome since it endangered in part the delicate negotiations with the European Union on bilateral agreements and transport.24 The remaining types of referendums, namely the required referendum and the popular veto, leave the powers of the veto players in the representative arena untouched, and thus these provisions decrease the potential for policy change. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that this decrease in the potential for policy change might reect the wishes of the framers of the constitution. Often required referendums apply to constitutional amendments, changes in borders, transfer of powers to international organizations etc. For such policies, obviously, it is desirable to have a limited potential for change. Similarly, popular vetoes often also apply to policy areas that are of central importance. Thus, for instance, the Danish constitution in article 20 requires a majority of 83.3 percent of all members of parliament for bills involving transfers of powers to supranational organizations. Thus, parliamentary minorities of at least one-sixth can force a referendum vote, such as the one leading to the negative outcome in the rst referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (e.g. Konig and Hug, 2000). Again, provisions for such popular vetoes decrease the potential for policy change, as the opt-outs negotiated by the Danish Government after the Maastricht referendum clearly illustrate. A partial exception to this stability enhancing effect of popular vetoes appears with the practice in Italy labeled referendum abrogativo. Article 75 allows for referendums on enacted laws, but also allows for the elimination of parts of laws. Since laws are often artful packages, allowing referendums on elements of these packages also reduces, to some degree, the power of the parliamentary veto players. A clear case in point is the Italian referendum of 19 April 1993 with which the Italian voters canceled a disposition in the electoral rules employed for the election of the senate. More precisely, the referendum largely eliminated proportional representation from the election of the senate. As a consequence of this referendum, the government of Giuliano Amato resigned and the resigning prime minister proclaimed the end of the rst Republic (Newell and Bull, 1993: 607). In some sense it was the culmination of the radical changes that the Italian political system had undergone since the thorough judicial investigations of the partitocrazia carried out under the label of mani pulite.
24. Bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland were negotiated in the aftermath of Swiss citizens' rejection of the European Economic Area, a treaty concluded between countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the EU. Swiss voters accepted the bilateral agreements on 5 May 2000, and at the time of writing EU member countries were in the process of ratifying these agreements.
The investigations started by prosecutors from Milan divulged the massive corruption of the Italian party system. Reformist forces attempted through numerous referendums to force changes in the Italian system. Referendums in Italy allow citizens to collect signatures to force a vote on most legislation and parts of it, long after it has been adopted (Table 2). However, referendum challenges face two important hurdles. First, they have to be accepted by the constitutional court. Of the 13 referendums submitted to the court in 1993, only 10 were allowed to proceed. Second, for a referendum outcome to be decisive, the turnout has to exceed 50 percent. On 19 April 1993 this threshold was easily passed with a turnout of 77 percent, and a yes vote of 82.73 percent. While the adopted referendum only struck a paragraph from the electoral law for the senate, its consequences were considerable. Parliament, which already had attempted unsuccessfully to fend off the referendum by adopting its own changes, went into action and overhauled the election laws in their entirety (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte, 1993). Elections became much less proportional and the plurality element came to predominate. Only after these changes did alternation between two major ideological blocks became possible. Thus, only if the institutional rules allow parts of a bill to be struck down in a referendum may the popular veto increase the potential for policy change. If only entire laws can be struck down, policy stability never decreases. Given that the potential for policy change differs under the various types of institutions allowing for referendums, Gallagher's (1996: 237) mixed assessment of the conservative bias of referendums is perfectly understandable. Depending on the precise institutional provisions referendums may increase or decrease policy stability. Our model suggests clear links between institutions and potential for policy change. Table 1, by listing all countries with required referendums, indicates where we would expect referendums to lead to increased policy stability (only in the policy areas where such referendums are possible). The countries listed in Table 2, by allowing non-required referendums to occur, often reduce the number of relevant veto players and thus mostly have reduced policy stability. But this reduced policy stability is only to be expected if the agenda-setting in the referendum process is either in the hands of non-veto players or a subset of the veto players. Apart from predicting various degrees of stability as a function of the precise institutions allowing for referendums, our model also links these institutions to policy consequences. Our analysis suggests that provisions for referendums generally lead to policies more closely related to the preferences of the voters. The effects of referendums differ, however, according to the exact institutional provisions and which actors (veto players or nonveto players) the latter empower to set the referendum agenda. While the information provided in Table 2 would allow for much more stringent
492
empirical tests of our theoretical predictions, existing empirical analyses of the policy consequences of referendums largely omit the effects that different congurations of veto players may have. Thus we can only relate our predictions with respect to policy consequences on the basis of the classication of referendums presented in Figure 4. Despite this limitation the predictions based on our model strongly resonate with most of the empirical evidence from systematic studies on the policy effects of referendums. Given that provisions for popular initiatives were present only in a handful of countries at the national level, few, if any, studies have attempted or succeeded in demonstrating empirically the effect of such referendums on policy outcomes in cross-national analyses. In studies focusing on the effect of institutional provisions at the subnational level, both in the United States and Switzerland, the results suggest that provisions for popular initiatives and, to a lesser extent, provisions for popular referendums lead to policies closer to the voters' ideal-point. Gerber (1996, 1999) shows for two policies, namely laws on parental consent for teenage abortion and the death penalty, that in states with the popular initiative the policies adopted correspond more closely to the voters' preferences than in states without the initiative. Similar effects appear in Gerber and Hug (2001) for a series of policies aiming at protecting minorities. Most closely related to the theoretical insights discussed in this paper are Hug's (1999) empirical results. Replicating and extending Gerber's (1999) work, he demonstrates that the voters' preferences are the most closely reected in the presence or absence of the death penalty in states that allow for popular initiatives. The relationship between voter preferences and policy outcome in states with the popular veto is weaker, and still weaker is the relationship in states with no non-required referendums. Only in the work by Lascher et al. (1996) and Camobreco (1998) do authors report evidence counter to our theoretical results. Matsusaka (2001), however, convincingly challenges the empirical strategies that these authors employ. Only partly related to this work attempting to demonstrate the effect of voter preferences on policy outcomes is the literature dealing with the effect of provisions for referendums on economic outcomes. Several studies show that initiative states (and cantons) have lower tax burdens, lower decits, etc.25 Since voter preferences do not enter directly into these empirical models, they only indirectly test propositions related to the theoretical conclusions of this paper.
25. Kirchgassner et al. (1999) review in detail these studies, and Matsusaka (1995, 2000) pro vides discussion of the literature on the American states.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to organize our understanding of referendums and the institutions that regulate them in a theoretically consistent and empirically accurate way. We saw that the overall assessments of referendums have been controversial: for some authors referendums are the expression of popular will, for others the connection between popular will and referendum outcome cannot be established. We also saw that classications of referendums do not use the same criteria, and that some of these criteria are based on strategic considerations (like who takes the initiative) while others are based on obscure principles (pro- or anti-hegemonic, controlled or uncontrolled). Finally, even the theoretical approaches come to different conclusions depending on the dimensionality of the underlying space: singledimensional approaches can calculate the results of a referendum as a function of the preferences of different actors; multi-dimensional approaches stress cycles, paradoxes and inadequacies in outcomes. In order to deal with all these variations in assessments and approaches, we introduced a multi-dimensional model which enabled us to understand and explain all these discrepancies. Our model was based on the theory of veto players, which identies the individual or collective actors that are required to agree for a change of the status quo. On the basis of veto player theory, we concluded that referendums introduce one additional veto player, the median voter of the population (or a very close approximation of it, the center of the yolk of the population). In addition, a circle very well approximates the outer bound on outcomes that are preferred over the status quo by this new veto player, as if the millions of voters participating in a referendum were a simple individual. On the basis of our model, the introduction of the mere possibility of a referendum shifts the outcomes of legislative politics closer to the population median. The reason is that legislative outcomes that would replace the status quo by a point that the median voter dislikes more than the status quo can immediately be defeated by a referendum, so successful policy choices have to be located inside the set of preferences of the median voter. Empirical studies corroborate this expectation. Viewing referendums as the introduction of one additional veto player in a political system leads to the prediction that the stability of outcomes increases. The other major consequence of our model is the identication of the institutions that shape not only referendum outcomes, but also the outcomes of the legislative game when referendums are possible. On the basis of our analysis the institutions regulating agenda-setting in referendums signicantly affect the possible outcomes. Agenda-setting in referendums is divided in two parts. The rst is who triggers the referendum (required referendum,
494
existing veto player or non-veto player). The second is who asks the question (veto player, non-veto player). On the basis of the answers in these two questions referendums are divided into four different categories: required referendums (where the question is asked by veto players), veto player referendums (veto players both trigger and ask the question of the referendum), popular vetoes (non-veto players trigger, but veto players ask the question), and popular initiatives (non-veto players both trigger and ask the question). The more agenda-setting is divided, the more likely that competition among the different actors involved may lead the referendum results to approximate the preferences of the median voter. For this reason, popular initiative institutions should be studied on the basis of by whom and under what conditions issues can be placed on the ballot. We believe that the differences in assessments of referendums existing in the literature (as discussed in the introduction of this article) can be attributed to the differences in agendasetting processes. People who dislike referendums pay attention to the question of who controls the agenda of a referendum and why this actor triggered it; people who like referendums assume a competitive popular initiative process. At the empirical level, existing systematic studies largely support the theoretical implications we derive. Institutions allowing for referendums to be triggered by veto players or non-veto players lead to policies that reect more closely the voters' preferences. The strongest additional effect of voter preferences on policy outcomes appears under institutional provisions allowing for popular initiatives. However, as Hug (1999) shows, this stronger effect diminishes quite considerably as the signature requirement increases. But decreasing signature requirements also corresponds with an increasing number of referendums. Thus, constitutional framers should balance well between different institutional provisions for referendums and the costs they wish to impose on possible users of these institutions. While existing empirical research lends some credence to our theoretical model, future research should carry out more stringent tests. More precisely, the information provided in Table 2 on the veto players in control of the referendum agenda in non-required referendums allows for much more precise predictions of the policy consequences, even on multi-dimensional issues. In particular, if provisions for referendums cancel out other veto players our model would predict policy outcomes much more heavily inuenced by the veto player in control of the referendum agenda. Such stringent tests would give constitutional framers much more material on which to base their decision whether to introduce provisions for referendums in new constitutions.
APPENDIX Table 1. Required Referendums Around the World

Country Constitutional Provision for Required Referendum Constitution Used (revised) 1981
Antigua-Barbuda Australia
Art. 47, constitutional amendments, two-thirds of all the members of the House must approve amendment
Art. 128, constitutional amendments, law must be passed 1901 by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament or by one House of Parliament and submitted by the governor-general Art. 44, total revision of constitution after adoption in Lower House and absence of objection in Upper House Art. 54, constitutional amendments, after two-thirds (three-quarters for some Articles) majorities in both Houses adopted amendment Art. 142, constitutional amendments, a bill, passed by two-thirds majorities, which provides for the amendment of the Preamble or any provisions of Art. 8, 48, 94[0r], 56, 95 or 142 Art. 89, constitutional amendments, after passage by two-thirds majority in the Assembly Art. 377, constitutional amendments to Ch. 1 of Title II, after passage in Parliament Art. 172, international treaties for cession, exchange or addition of territory proposed by the president must be adopted by referendum Art. 135, for the association of the Republic of Croatia in alliances with other states, after passage in Parliament by a two-thirds majority vote Art. 137, constitutional amendments, after vote by two-thirds in National Assembly, provided the constitution is completely revised, or the amendment refers to the powers of the National Assembly or to the rights and duties established in the constitution Art. 88, constitutional amendments, after passage by two separately elected Parliaments Art. 28, changes in the voting age, after passage by Parliament Art. 42, constitutional amendments, after approval by a three-quarters majority in Parliament Art. 189, constitutional amendments, after approval by two-thirds of the members of the Assembly 1929 1973
Austria Bahamas
Bangladesh
1996
Botswana Colombia Congo
1966 1991 (2001) 1979 (1992)
Croatia
1990
Cuba
1976
Denmark
1953
Dominica Egypt
1978 1980
continued on next page
496 El Salvador Gabon Gambia Grenada
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4) Art. 89, constitutional amendments on the creation of a Central American republic after passage by Parliament Art. 113, international treaties, if they involve territorial changes Art. 226, constitutional amendments, after passage by three-quarters majority in Assembly Art. 39, constitutional amendments, after passage by two-thirds of the members of the House, amendments to some sections of the constitution have to be adopted in a referendum Art. 280, 173, constitutional amendments, after a two-thirds vote to amend constitution in the National Assembly Art. 164, constitutional amendments, after majority of Parliament has approved amendment to certain parts of the constitution Art. 79, constitutional amendments, after passage by Parliament of an amendment to the status of the Church under Art. 62 Art. 46, constitutional amendments, initiated in the Lower House and after passage in both Houses Art. 49, constitutional amendments, after passage by two-thirds majorities in both Houses Art. 96, constitutional amendments, initiated in the Diet and after passage by two-thirds majorities in both Houses Art. 69, constitutional amendments, after passage by a two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 130, constitutional amendments, after passage by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly Art. 76, 77, amendments to Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, or 77 of the Constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 91, constitutional amendments, after passage by two-thirds majorities in both Houses Art. 148, amendments to Art. 1, Chs 1 and 14 of the constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 74, 120 changes of borders or association with or dissociation from a union, after passage by Parliament with two-thirds majority 1983 1975 (1991) 1970 (1996) 1974
Guatemala
1985
Guyana
1980
Iceland
1944
Ireland Jamaica Japan
1937 1962 1964
Kiribati Korea, South Latvia
1979 1987 1922 (1998)
Liberia Lithuania
1984 1992
Macedonia
1991
Mali
Malta
Art. 115, international treaties, treaties involving 1974 (1991) surrender, exchange, or addition of territory, after passage by Parliament Art. 66, constitutional amendments, after adoption of 1964 amendment to certain articles of the constitution by Parliament continued on next page
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 497 Mauritius Art. 47, constitutional amendments, changes to Art. 57(2) 1985 require referendum and then passage by unanimity in Assembly Art. 141, 142, 143, constitutional amendments, regarding 1994 the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the state, after passage by a two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 104, 105, constitutional amendments after adoption of constitutional change by both Houses by two-thirds majorities Art. 194, constitutional amendments, after passage by three-quarters majority in Assembly Art. 84, constitutional amendments, after passage by a two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 290, constitutional amendments after passage by majorities in both chambers Art. XVII, constitutional amendments, after being proposed by a three-quarters majority of congress or a constitutional convention, which may be called by a two-thirds majority of congress, or congress may submit the proposal for such a convention by a simple majority to the people Art. 147, constitutional amendments, after passage by both chambers by two-thirds majority, or in case of disagreement, by a three-quarters majority of members of both Chambers Art. 109, constitutional amendments, after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament of an amendment to Art. 102 (territorial changes) Art. 77, international treaties, after President proposes territorial changes Art. 108, constitutional amendments to certain sections, after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 5, constitutional amendments, amendments to certain sections of constitution adopted by two-thirds majorities in Parliament Art. 6, international treaties, surrendering of Singapore police or armed forces after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 7, 83, international treaties, entering a state alliance after passage of a constitutional law by three-fths in Parliament Art. 168, constitutional amendments, total revision or partial revision of the preliminary title, Ch. II, Section 1 of Title I, or Title II, after passage by two separately elected Parliaments with two-thirds majorities in both Houses 1972
Moldova
Morocco
Myanmar-Burma Nauru Paraguay Philippines
1974 1968 1992 (2000) 1987
Romania
1991
Samoa
1960 (1962)
Senegal Sierra Leone Singapore
1963 (1989) 1978 (1991) 1963
Slovakia
1992
Spain
1978
498 Sri Lanka St Christopher and Nevis St Lucia St Vincent Switzerland
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4) Art. 101, constitutional amendments, amendments to Art. 77 after passage by two-thirds majority of all MPs Art. 38, constitutional amendments, after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 41, constitutional amendments, after adoption by three-quarters majority in Parliament Art. 38, constitutional amendments, after adoption by the House by a two-thirds majority Art. 140, constitutional amendments, international treaties, urgent executive orders in conict with constitution, after passage by both Houses of Parliament Art. 156, amendments to Chs I, III and XIII of the constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in Parliament Art. 86, constitutional amendments, after passage by a majority in Parliament, provided two-thirds of the members are present Art. 345, constitutional amendments, after the proposal is accepted by a majority in both Houses 1977 1983 1979 1979 2000
Ukraine
1996
Vanuatu
1979
Venezuela Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo)
1999
Art. 200, 263, international treaties that involve secession, 1997 exchange or annexation of territories after ratication by President and adoption of constitutional law, adopted by two-thirds majorities in both chambers, and some constitutional amendments, also adopted by two-thirds majorities in both chambers
Sources: Blaustein and Flanz (1971), Suksi (1993: 1423), Kurian (1998), Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy (http://c2d.unige.ch/, accessed November 2000) and Auer and Butzer (2001)
Table 2. Agenda-setters and Triggers in Non-required Referendums

Agenda-setter Existing Veto player Parliament Two-thirds majorities in Parliament House of Deputies President in agreement with the majority of the Parliament, the Parliament Parliament, Government One-third of lower house Art. 44 (1) Constitutional laws or constitutional provisions contained in simple laws can be passed by the House of Representatives only in the presence of at least half the members and by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, they shall be explicitly specied as such. (2) Any total revision of the Federal Constitution shall 1929 1853 (1998) 1995 1998 Non-veto player
Country and Constitutional Provision Non-veto player 50,000 voters One-fth of members of Parliament Congress
Who Triggers
Existing Veto-player
Constitution Used (Revised)
Albania Art. 150, laws Art. 177, constitutional amendments Argentina Art. 40, laws
Parliament
President in agreement with the majority of the Parliament, the Parliament
Armenia Art. 111, for constitutional matters Art. 112, for legislative matter
Parliament, Government
Austria Art. 44, al. 3, for constitutional amendment
Table 2. continued
Agenda-setter Existing Veto player upon conclusion of the procedure pursuant to Art. 42 but before its authentication by the Federal President be submitted to a referendum by the entire nation, whereas any partial revision requires this only if one-third of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate so demands If the House of Representatives so decides or if the majority of members of the House of Representatives so demands, every enactment of the House of Representatives shall be submitted to a referendum upon conclusion of the procedure pursuant to Art. 42 but before its authentication by the Federal President President Parliament 1995 Non-veto player
500
Country and Constitutional Provision Non-veto player
Who Triggers
Existing Veto player
Art. 43, for statute
Majority of Lower House
Azerbaijan Art. 95, 109
President, Parliament (83 members out of 125)
Belarus Art. 74, 84 Art. 74 450,000 nationals (6.25%): at least 30,000 in every region and the town of Minsk Congress Decision taken by the Parliament (National Assembly) President de la republique 1988 (1993) 1971 450,000 nationals (6.25%): at least 30,000 in every region and the town of Minsk
President, Parliament majority of both chambers
President, Parliament majority of both chambers
1996
Brazil Art. 49 Bulgaria Art. 84
Congress
Decision taken by the Parliament (National Assembly) President de la republique
1972
President on proposal of Government
President or Parliament Constitutional amendment proposed by the two chambers Proposal by Government Proposal by 5% of citizens
1986 (1996) 1989
President of the Republic
Majorities in both chambers
1991 (2001)
Cameroon Art. 36, for important projects, Art. 63, for constitutional amendment Central African Republic Art. 26, bills Chile Art. 117, constitution Colombia Art. 155, 378: constitution Croatia Art. 135, association with other states
President or Government; majority of preliminary decision on two-thirds of the MPs
Proposed by at least one-third Proposed by at least 1998 of the MPs, the President or the one-third of the MPs government; preliminary decision on association/separation taken by majority of two-thirds of the continued on next page total number of MPs
Table 2. continued
Agenda-setter Existing Veto player House of Representatives President of the Republic may, at the proposal of the Government and with the countersignature of the Prime Minister Non-veto player
502
Who Triggers
Art. 80, 81, 87
Proposed by the Chamber of comitats; decision taken by the Chamber of representatives; requested by the Government; decision taken by the President of the Republic with the countersignature of the President of the Government One third of MPs One sixth of MPs Bill has been passed by the Parliament Parliament
Denmark Art. 42, bills Art. 20 delegation of powers international organizations President of the Republic
1953
Ecuador Art. 104, constitutional amendment or important questions for the country
President of the Republic
1984
Parliament Parliament President, on proposition of Government or both chambers 1958
Parliament
1992
Three-fths majority in Parliament
President, on proposition of government or both chambers President and the two chambers President
Estonia Art. 105, legislative Art. 162, constitutional amendments France Art. 11, bills affecting the state and its institutions Art. 89, constitution 1975 (1997)
President
Gabon Art. 18 20,000 voters President
President on proposal of government, majority of MPs
President
1995 200,000 citizens
Georgia Art. 74 Art. 102, constitution
President; 200,000 citizens at least half of each chamber of the Parliament President on proposal of the Cabinet and an absolute majority of MPs; President on proposal submitted by two-fths of MPs and adopted by three-fths majority
Greece Art. 44.2, questions of national importance
President on proposal of the Cabinet and an absolute majority of MPs; President on proposal submitted by two-fths of MPs and adopted by three-fths majority
1975
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 503 continued on next page
Table 2. continued
Agenda-setter Existing Veto player Parliament Parliament shall have the right to call a national referendum. A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the MPs present is required to pass the law on national referenda. President has the right to initiate national referendums Parliament Parliament President on proposal Lower House of majority of Senate and at least one-third of MPs of Lower House 500,000 voters or ve Both Chambers of Parliament regional councils Request is made by one Majorities in both Chambers fth of the members of either Chamber or by 500,000 electors 1944 (1994) 1979 1937 Non-veto player
504
Country and Constitutional Provision Non-veto player 1985
Who Triggers
Guatemala Art. 173
Hungary Art. 19, 30a
Supreme electoral court on proposal of President or the congress Parliament, President
Iceland Art. 26
President when he refuses to ratify a bill
Iran Art. 59
Two-thirds of MPs
Ireland Art. 27 and 47, bills
Italy Art. 75, laws Art. 138, constitutional amendments
1948
or by ve regional Councils, provided amendment has not been adopted by majorities of two-thirds in both Chambers President One-tenth of the voters, Parliament provided law is not adopted by a threequarters majority One-tenth at least of the voters can present a draft revision (completely elaborated) of the constitution to the President, who submits it to the Parliament; if the Parliament amends it, a referendum must be held 1000 citizens 1000 citizens 1500 citizens or four communities Parliament Parliament 1000 citizens, provided proposal has not been adopted by Parliament One-tenth at least of the voters can present a draft revision (completely elaborated) of the constitution to the President, who submits it to the Parliament; if the Parliament amends it, a referendum must be held 1921 (1992) 1960 1998
Ivory Coast Art. 14 Latvia Art. 72, 74, legislative
President on accord from bureau National Assembly
Art. 78, constitution
Liechtenstein Parliament Art. 66, laws Art. 64, 66, laws
Art. 66, constitutional amendments
Table 2. continued
Agenda-setter Existing Veto player 1500 citizens, provided proposal has not been adopted by Parliament Non-veto player
506
Country and Constitutional Provision Non-veto player 1500 citizens 1500 citizens Parliament
Who Triggers
Art. 64, 66, constitutional amendments Art. 66 bis, international treaties 300,000 nationals 300,000 nationals; onequarter of the Parliament, provided amendment deals with Art. 1 or Chs 1 and 14 150,000 nationals Parliament Majority of two-thirds of Deputies Majority of two-thirds of the Deputies Parliament
Parliament
Lithuania Art. 9, laws Art. 147, constitution
Parliament
1992 300,000 nationals; one quarter of the Parliament
Majority of deputies
1991
Macedonia Art. 68, 73 Art. 74, changing frontiers Art. 120, entering, leaving supranational organization
Majority of two-thirds of Deputies
Proposed by the President of the Republic, the government or at least 40 Deputies; decision taken by majority of two-thirds of the Deputies
Madagascar Art. 140, amendment to constitution President President, Parliament 200,000 citizens (8.5%) covering at least a half of the nation's districts and municipalities and in their turn each of those districts and municipalities must be represented by at least 5000 registered signers in support of the initiative; one-third of the Parliament Cabinet Government; President 200,000 citizens (8.5%) covering at least a half of the nation's districts and municipalities, and in their turn each of those districts and municipalities must be represented by at least 5000 registered signers in support of the initiative; one-third of the Parliament 1972 (1996) 1994 1974 (1992)
President in the Council of Ministers
Three-quarters majority of the members of the National Assembly and the Senate
1975 (1992)
Mali Art. 41, laws
President on proposal of the Cabinet or National Assembly President, Parliament
Moldova Art. 66, 75, 88 Art. 141, 142, constitution (provisions regarding the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, as well as those regarding the permanent neutrality of the state)
Government; President
Morocco Art. 69 (70)
King, except if both Chambers have adopted law by two-thirds majorities President
Niger Art. 49
President after consultation with President of National Assembly, Supreme Court
1989 (1996)
Table 2. continued
Agenda-setter Existing Veto player Constitutional amendments adopted by absolute majority in congress Parliament 10% of voters 12% of voters 1989 (1997) Non-veto player
508
Country and Constitutional Provision Non-veto player If amendments are not adopted by two-thirds majorities, referendum is required 10% of voters 12% of voters One-fth of the Deputies 1993
Who Triggers
Peru Art. 206 constitution
Philippines Art. VI, 32 Art. XVII, 2, constitutional amendment Poland President, Senate Art. 235, revision of Chs I, II or XII of the constitution
1987
Art. 125, 144 Art. 90, on sovereignty
President in agreement with the Senate, the Parliament (absolute majority, at least half of the Deputies being present)
House of Representatives (Sejm) by a majority of at least twothirds of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, and by the Senate by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators President in agreement with the Senate, the Parliament (absolute majority, at least half of the Deputies being present)
Romania Art. 90 Two-thirds majorities in both Chambers, or three-quarters majority in joint session President Parliament 1993 1963 (1999)
President
1991
Art. 146, constitution
President after having asked the Parliament's advice Two-thirds majorities in both Chambers, or threequarters majority in joint session
Russia Art. 84
President
Senegal Art. 46, bill
President on proposal of Prime Minister, consultation with Assemblies, Constitutional Court President declares the referendum if 350,000 nationals sign petition Parliament Parliament 350,000 nationals
Slovakia Art. 93, 95, 98, 102 Art. 86, 93, 95, 96, 102
1992
President declares the referendum if the National Council proposes resolution presented by the Deputies of the National Council or the Government At least 30 (out of 90) Deputies 40,000 nationals, onethird of Deputies 30 Deputies National Assembly National Assembly Government
1989 40,000 nationals 30,000 voters, 20 Deputies continued on next page
Slovenia Art. 170, constitution Art. 90 II, 97 I, 99 II, legislative Art. 168, 169, Government 170, constitution
Table 2. continued
Agenda-setter Existing Veto player Approved by more than two-thirds in Parliament Non-veto player
510
Who Triggers
Constitution Used (Revised) 1977 (1988)
Sri Lanka Art. 103, constitutional amendments subject to Art. 101 Art. 103, bills Art. 104 Cabinet President One-tenth of the Riksdag on a bill propose motion, which must be supported by one-third of MPs 50,000 citizens or 8 cantons Majorities in both Houses Upper and Lower House 100,000 citizens Majority in Riksdag
President, if amendment is Supreme Court adopted by a majority larger than two-thirds
Cabinet President
Sweden Art. 15
1975
2000
Upper and Lower House
Switzerland Art. 140, 141 Art. 141, some international treaties Art. 138, 193 Togo Art. 144
100,000 citizens If constitutional Two-thirds majority in amendment gets less Parliament than four-fths and more than two-thirds in assembly
1979 (1992)
President may submit bill or a treaty to ratify President Three-fths majority of the total number of members of the Assembly 1982
Tunisia Art. 47 Turkey Art. 104, legislation for amending the constitution Parliament 3,000,000 citizens (signatures collected in no less than two-thirds of the Oblasts, with no less than 100,000 signatures in each Oblast) 10% of citizens or two-fths of the Assembly may submit proposals 3,000,000 citizens (signatures collected in no less than two-thirds of the Oblasts, with no less than 100,000 signatures in each Oblast) 10% of citizens or two-fths of the Assembly may submit proposals 1967 (1996) (1996)
National Assembly
1959 (1991)
Ukraine Art. 72 I Art. 72 II
President, Parliament
Uruguay Art. 331, constitutional changes
Sources: Blaustein and Flanz (1971), Suksi (1993), Kurian (1998), Thibaut (2000), Trechsel (2000), Research and Documentation Centre on Direct Democracy (http://c2d.unige.ch/, accessed May 2000) and Auer and Butzer (2001).
512
REFERENCES
Abromeit, Heidrun (1998) Democracy in Europe. Legitimising Politics in a Non-State Polity. Oxford: Berghahn Books. Ackerman, Bruce (1999) `The New Separation of Powers', Harvard Law Review 113: 634729. Auer, Andreas and Michael Butzer, eds (2001) Direct Democracy: The Eastern and Central European Experience. Aldershot: Ashgate. Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001) Ìssue Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives. San Antonio', Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, 912 March. Bowler, Shaun and Todd Donovan (1998) Demanding Choices. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Blaustein, A.P. and G.H. Flanz, eds (1971) Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications. Bogdanor, Vernon (1994) `Western Europe', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds) Referendums Around the World, pp. 2497. London: Macmillan. Brams, Steven J., D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker (1997) `Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions', Electoral Studies 16(3): 35977. Brams, Steven J., D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker (1998) `The Paradox of Multiple Elections', Social Choice and Welfare 15 (2): 21136. Budge, Ian (1996) The New Challenge of Direct Democracy. Cambrige: Polity Press. Camobreco, John F. (1998) `Preferences, Fiscal Policies, and the Initiative Process', Journal of Politics 60(3): 81929. Cronin, Thomas E. (1989) Direct Democracy. The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. D'Alimonte, Roberto and Alessandro Chiaramonte (1993) Ìl nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: Quali Opportunita?', Rivista Italiana die Scienza Politica 23(3): 51347. Ferejohn, John A., Richard D. McKelvey and Edward W. Packell (1984) `Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Voting Models', Social Choice and Welfare 1: 4567. Gallagher, Michael (1996) `Conclusion', in Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds) The Referendum Experience in Europe, pp. 22652. London: Macmillan. Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1996) `Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives', American Journal of Political Science 40(1): 99128. Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1999) The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Inuence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Simon Hug (2001) `Legislative Responses to Direct Legislation', in Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (eds) The Impact of Referendums on Liberal Democratic Institutions: A Comparative Perspective, pp. 88108. London: Macmillan. Hamon, Francis (1995) Le referendum. Etude comparative. Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence. Hug, Simon (1999) Òccurrence and Policy Consequences of Referendums. A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence', Typescript. La Jolla: Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego. Kirchgassner, Gebhard, Lars P. Feld and Marcel R. Savioz (1999) Die direkte Demokratie der Schweiz: Modern, erfolgreich, entwicklungs- und exportfa hig. Basel: Helbing und Lichtenhahn. Koehler, David H. (1990) The Size of the Yolk: Computations for Odd and Even-numbered Committees', Social Choice and Welfare 7: 23145. Konig, Thomas and Simon Hug (2000) `Ratifying Maastricht. Parliamentary Votes on Inter national Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts', European Union Politics 1(1): 89122. Kurian, George Thomas (1998) World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 513 Lacy, Dean and Emerson M. S. Niou (2000) À Problem with Referendums', Journal of Theoretical Politics 12(1): 532. Lascher, Edward L., Michael G. Hagen and Steven A. Rochlin (1996) Gun Behind the Door Ballot Initiatives, State Policies and Public Opinion', Journal of Politics 58(3): 76075. Lesage, Michel (1995) Constitutions d'Europe centrale, orientale et balte. Paris: La documentation francaise. Lupia, Arthur (1992) `Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information', American Political Science Review 86(2): 390404. Lupia, Arthur (1994) `Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review 88(1): 6376. Magleby, David E. (1984) Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Matsusaka, John G. (1995) `Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years', Journal of Political Economy 103(3): 587623. Matsusaka, John G. (2001) `Problems with a Methodology Used to Test Whether Policy Is More or Less Responsive to Public Opinion in States with Voter Initiatives', Journal of Politics 63(4): 12506. Matsusaka, John G. and Nolan M. McCarty (2001 `Political Resource Allocation: The Benets and Costs of Voter Initiatives', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17(2): 41348. McKelvey, Richard D. (1976) Ìntransitivities in Multi-dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control', Journal of Economic Theory 12: 47282. Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld (1989) The Geometry of Majority Rule', Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(4): 379406. Mockli, Silvano (1994) Direkte Demokratie. Ein internationaler Vergleich. Bern: Haupt. Moser, Peter (1996) `Why is Swiss Politics so Stable?', Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik 132(1): 3160. Mueller, Dennis C. (1979) Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mueller, Dennis C. (1996) Constitutional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Neidhart, Leonard (1970) Plebiszit und pluralita Demokratie. Bern: Francke. re Newell, James L. and Martin J. Bull (1993) `The Italian Referenda of April 1993: Real Change at Last?', West European Politics 16(4): 60715. Nurmi, Hannu (1997a) `Referendum Design: An Exercise in Applied Social Choice Theory', Scandinavian Political Studies 20(1): 3352. Nurmi, Hannu (1997b) `Compound Majority Paradoxes and Proportional Representation', European Journal of Political Economy 13(3): 44354. Nurmi, Hannu (1998) `Voting Paradoxes and Referenda', Social Choice and Welfare 15(3): 333 50. Ranney, Austin (1978) Ùnited States of America', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, pp. 6786. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Riker, William H. (1982) Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman. Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1978) `Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo', Public Choice 33(4): 2743. Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1979) `Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy', Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(4): 56187. Rousseau, J.J. (1947) The Social Contract. New York: Hafner Publishing Co. Saari, Donald G. and Katri K. Sieberg (2001) `The Sum of the Parts Can Violate the Whole, American Political Science Review 95(2): 415. Sartori, Giovanni (1962) Democratic Theory. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
514
Schmitter, Philippe C. (2000) How to Democratize the Euro-Polity and Why Bother? New York: Rowman and Littleeld. Schoeld, Norman (1978) Ìnstability of Simple Dynamic Games', Review of Economic Studies 45: 57594. Setala, Maija (1999) Referendums and Democratic Government. London: Macmillan. Smith, Gordon (1976) `The Functional Properties of the Referendum', European Journal of Political Research 4(1): 123. Steunenberg, Bernard (1992) `Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power', Kyklos 45(4): 50129. Stone, Christine, ed. (1997) Pariah or Victim? A Reappraisal of Human Right and Democracy in Belarus. Oxford: The British Helsinki Human Rights Group. Suksi, Markku (1993) Bringing in the People: A Comparison of Constitutional Forms and Practices of the Referendum. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Thibaut, Bernard (2000) `Referendums: Latin America', in Richard Rose (ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Elections, pp. 2678. Washington: Congressional Quarterly. Trechsel, Alexander H. (2000) Ìnitiative: Europe', in Richard Rose (ed.) The International Encyclopedia of Elections, pp. 1513. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. Tsebelis, George (1995a) `Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicamerialism and Multipartyism', British Journal of Political Science 25: 289325. Tsebelis, George (1995b) `Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies', in H. Doering (ed.) Parliaments in Western Europe: Majority Rule and Minority Rights, pp. 83 111. New York: St Martin's Press. Tsebelis, George (1999) `Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis', American Political Science Review 93 (Sept.): 591608. Tsebelis, George (2000) `Veto Players and Institutional Analysis', Governance 13(4): 44174. Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (1996) Ìntroduction', in Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds) The Referendum Experience in Europe, pp. 119. London: Macmillan. Zurn, Michael (1996) Uber den Staat und die Demokratie im europaischen Mehrebenensystem', Politische Vierteljahresschrift 37(1): 2755.
SIMON HUG is a Professor of Political Science at the University of St Gallen (Switzerland). His research interests include the formation of new political parties, the effect of institutions and, more particularly, referendums and federalism on decision-making and conict resolution, formal theory and research methods. He is the author of Altering Party Systems (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), Voices of Europe. Citizens, Referendums and European Integration (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleeld, 2002), coauthor with Stefano Bartolini and Daniele Caramani of Political Parties and Party Systems. A Bibliographic Guide to the Literature on Parties and Party Systems in Europe since 1945 (London: Sage, 1998) and co-editor with Pascal Sciarini of Nouvelles valeurs et nouveaux clivages en Suisse (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002). ADDRESS: Institut fur Politikwissenschaft, Dufourstrasse 45, 9000 St Gallen, Switzerland [email: simon.hug@unisg.ch].
HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 515 GEORGE TSEBELIS is Professor of Political Science at University of California, Los Angeles. His work focuses on political institutions and parties of advanced industrialized countries in general and the European Union in particular. He is the author of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (University of California Press, 1990; translated into Portuguese), and Veto players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press, 2002; translated into Italian), and co-author of Bicameralism (Cambridge University Press, 1997). His articles have been published in numerous professional journals and translated in French, German, Greek, Japanese and Spanish. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, 405 Hilgard Avenue, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA. [email: tsebilis@ucla.edu]

Veto Players and Referendums Around The World

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Veto Players and Referendums Around The World

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(4): 465515 09516928[2002/10]14:4; 465515; 027705

VETO PLAYERS AND REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

I. Different Literatures on Referendums

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

3. Smith (1976) uses referendums as a generic term, also comprising initiatives.

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

II. Veto players, Direct and Mediated Democracy

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

Figure 1. Win-set of a Large Group of Voters

Figure 2. Win-set of Status Quo in Representative Democracy

Figure 3 helps us think the potential paradox through.

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

Figure 3. Difference of Results Between Direct and Representative Democracy

III. Institutions Regulating Referendums

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

Figure 4. Questions Dening Different Categories of Referendums

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

Figure 5. Possible Outcomes When A Controls the Referendum Agenda

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

Figure 6. Possible Outcomes When E Controls the Referendum Agenda

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

APPENDIX Table 1. Required Referendums Around the World

Botswana Colombia Congo

1966 1991 (2001) 1979 (1992)

continued on next page

496 El Salvador Gabon Gambia Grenada

Ireland Jamaica Japan

1937 1962 1964

Kiribati Korea, South Latvia

1979 1987 1922 (1998)

Myanmar-Burma Nauru Paraguay Philippines

1974 1968 1992 (2000) 1987

Senegal Sierra Leone Singapore

1963 (1989) 1978 (1991) 1963

continued on next page

498 Sri Lanka St Christopher and Nevis St Lucia St Vincent Switzerland

Venezuela Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo)

Table 2. Agenda-setters and Triggers in Non-required Referendums

Constitution Used (Revised)

President in agreement with the majority of the Parliament, the Parliament

Austria Art. 44, al. 3, for constitutional amendment

continued on next page

Country and Constitutional Provision Non-veto player

Existing Veto player

Constitution Used (Revised)

Art. 43, for statute

Majority of Lower House

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

Azerbaijan Art. 95, 109

President, Parliament (83 members out of 125)

President, Parliament majority of both chambers

President, Parliament majority of both chambers

Brazil Art. 49 Bulgaria Art. 84

Decision taken by the Parliament (National Assembly) President de la republique

President on proposal of Government