JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial review is the doctrine under which legislative and executive actions are subject to review, and possible invalidation, by the judiciary. Specific courts with judicial review power must annul the acts of the state when it finds them incompatible with a higher authority, such as the terms of a written constitution. Judicial review is an example of the functioning of separation of powers in a modern governmental system (where the judiciary is one of three branches of government). This principle is interpreted differently in different jurisdictions, which also have differing views on the different hierarchy of governmental norms. As a result, the procedure and scope of judicial review differs from country to country and state to state.

complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another

BONDOC VS. PINEDA [201 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 97710; 26 Sep 1991] Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987,
Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

B. Supremacy of the Constitution enforced through judicial reviewAngara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 NATURE: Original action in teh Supreme Court for the issuance of a writ of prohibition torestrainand prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents from taking further cognizanceof the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent against the election of said petitioner asmember of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. FACTS: IN the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose Angara and respondents, Pedro Ynsua,Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of theNational Assembly for the first district of the Province of Taybas.. On October 7, 1935 petitionerAngara was proclaimed as memberelect of the National Assembly and he later took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed ResolutionNo. 8 which declared with finality the victory of petitioner. On December 8, respondent Ynsuafiled before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara praying that said the ormer be declared elected member of the National Assembly or that the election of the said position be nullified. On December 20, Angara filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest" arguing that a) Resolution 8 was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its member should be presented ; b) that aforesaid resolution has for its object and is the accepted formula for, thelimitation of said period; and c) protest was filed out of the prescribed period.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives,

at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention

creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with

The ElectoralCommission denied petitioner's motion. Thus, this action in the present case .ISSUE:1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdictionover teh Electoral Commission and teh subject matter of thecontroversy upon the foregoing facts 2.WON the Electoral Commission committed a grave abuse of its discretion having entertained aprotest after the National Assembly passed Resolution 8 which declared the deadline of filing of protests. HELD:1. The nature of the present case shows the necessity of a final arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. NOt taking cognizance of saidcontroversy would create a void in our constitutional system which may in the long run provedestructive of the entire framework.In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutitonl organ which can be calledupon to determine the proper allocation of powers between teh several departments andamongteh ingral or constituent units thereof.2. The Electoral Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction. It has been created by thewConstitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction todecide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of theNational Assembly". Thus, entertaining the protest of Ynsua must conform to their ownprescribedrules and the National Assembly cannot divest them of any such powers.Wherefore, petition DENIED

division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

WHO MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW?

Sec.1,4(2) 5(2)A , Art.8 Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Section 4 (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

How is judicial review exercised? SEC 4(2) ART 8.

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in

Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals (GR 128448, 1

February 2001) Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals [ Facts: Spouses Alejandro and Lilia Mirasol are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced 70,501.08 piculs of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following crop year, their acreage planted to the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 piculs of sugar, with 23,696.40 piculs marked for export. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the Mirasols' attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latter's sugar in both domestic and export markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. Exercising his law-making powers under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree 579 in November, 1974. The decree authorized the Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.

(PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the United States and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry, and finally, by the Office of the President. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. Finally, the decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions, overhead expenses and liabilities had been deducted. The government offices and entities tasked by existing laws and administrative regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the purchase price of export sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at P180.00 per picul. PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols for crop years 1975-1976 and 1976-1977. These crop loans and similar obligations were secured by real estate mortgages over several properties of the Mirasols and chattel mortgages over standing crops. Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to pay their obligations, the Mirasols asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB ignored the request. Meanwhile, the Mirasols continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their current accounts with said bank. PNB then asked Mirasols to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these demands for payment, the Mirasols on 4 August 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid overdrawn account of P1,513,347.78. On 10 August 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by the Mirasols to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB still had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93. The Mirasols continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar for crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under PD 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes. On 9 August 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Civil Case 14725). On 16 June 1987, the complaint was amended to implead PHILEX as party-defendant. After trial on the merits, the trial court decided in favor of the Mirasols (1) declaring PD 579 and all circulars, as well as policies, orders and other issuances issued in furtherance thereof, unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID being in gross violation of the Bill of Rights; (2) Ordering PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of 25,662 piculs in export sugar for crop year 1973-1974 at an average price of P300.00 per picul, deducting therefrom however, the amount of P180.00 already paid in advance plus the allowable deductions

in service fees and other charges; (3) and also, for PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the whole amount corresponding to the unpaid actual price of 14,596 piculs of export sugar for crop year 1974-1975 at an average rate of P214.14 per picul minus however, the sum of P180.00 per picul already paid by PNB and PHILEX in advance and the allowable deduction in service fees and other charges; and (4) directing PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the sum of P50,000.00 in moral damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the litigation. The same was, however, modified by a Resolution of the trial court dated 14 May 1992, which adding the following paragraph: "This decision should however, be interpreted without prejudice to whatever benefits that may have accrued in favor of the plaintiffs with the passage and approval of Republic Act 7202 otherwise known as the 'Sugar Restitution Law,' authorizing the restitution of losses suffered by the plaintiffs from Crop year 1974-1975 to Crop year 1984-1985 occasioned by the actuations of government-owned and controlled agencies." The Mirasols then filed an appeal with the appellate court (CA-GR CV 38607), faulting the trial court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the mortgage contracts, as well as the foreclosure of their mortgaged properties, and the trial court's failure to award them the full money claims and damages sought from both PNB and PHILEX. On 22 July 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court (1) declaring the dacion en pago and the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties valid; (2) ordering the PNB to render an accounting of the sugar account of the Mirasol[s] specifically stating the indebtedness of the latter to the former and the proceeds of Mirasols' 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 sugar production sold pursuant to and in accordance with PD 579 and the issuances therefrom; (3) ordering the PNB to recompute in accordance with RA 7202 Mirasols' indebtedness to it crediting to the latter payments already made as well as the auction price of their foreclosed real estate and stipulated value of their properties ceded to PNB in the dacion en pago; and (4) whatever the result of the recomputation of Mirasols' account, the outstanding balance or the excess payment shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of RA 7202. On 28 August 1996, the Mirasols moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied on 23 January 1997. The Mirasols filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. Furthermore, BP 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with the Constitution. However, Rule 64, Section 3 (Notice to Solicitor General) of the Rules of Court provides that "in any action which involves the validity

of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question." The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. The mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Herein, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.

Functions of JUDICIAL REVIEW: Checking Legitimating symbolic

Salonga vs. Cruz-Pano
[GR 59524, 18 February 1985] En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 9 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 3 took no part Facts: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On 6 September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo

and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. On 12 September 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons. On 20 September 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, on 25 September 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for sometime. On the night of 4 October 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. On 19 October 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. On 21 October 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, Salonga's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until the Supreme Court in the case of Ordoez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (GR 55345, 28 October 1980) issued an order directing that Salonga's right to be visited by counsel be respected. On 2 November 1980, Salonga was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. Salonga stated that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority. Subsequently, on 27 November 1980, Salonga was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges. On 10 December 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent Salonga a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included Salonga as a co-accused). Up to the time martial law was lifted on 17 January 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, Salonga has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. On 9 February 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of Justice. On 24 February 1981, the City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing Salonga, among others of having violated RA 1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for 17 March 1981. On 6 March 1981, Salonga was allowed to leave the country to attend a

series of church conferences and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised AntiSubversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today. Issue: Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner Salonga. Held: The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow

the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.

Requisites of Judicial Review A. Actual Case or Controversy

PACU vs. Secretary of Education Facts: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to reartheir children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Educationunlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706.And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court. Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? Held: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public.Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for

their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition. Tan vs. Macapagal Facts: On October 6, 1971, a five page petition was filed by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogeli V.Fernandez for declaratory relief as taxpayers. They challenged the validity of the Laurel-Leido resolution that deals with the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The petitioners contended that the Constitutional Convention did not have the power to consider, discuss and adopt proposal that seek to revise the present Constitution through the adaptation of a form of government other that the form currently outlined in the 1935 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite for judicial review. Whether or not petitioner has complied with the requisites of making a taxpayers suit as basis for legal standing. Held: Judicial inquiry is to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that the Constitutional Convention has already accomplished or performed an enactment of proposed amendments. Only after concrete actions that shows what it intends to submit for ratification can the court interpose judicial oversight. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for other departments being left alone to discharge of their duties as they see fit. The judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action. Such a principle also applies when the competence of the Constitutional Convention is concerned. The judiciary ought to leave it to fulfill its responsibility and its autonomy respected. Otherwise, it cannot perform its

function well. It is therefore imperative that the rule of non- interference be strictly adhered to until the appropriate time comes. On the other hand, as to the requirement in making a taxpayers suit as a basis for legal standing, a negative answers has been contemplated. The person who impugns validity of a statue must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result to its enforcement. The case of Gonzales v Comelec is different with the case at bar.Furthermore, a Senator is usually considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring such a suit. Motion for reconsideration is DENIED. No costs. Dumlao vs. Comelec Facts: A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Viscaya, seeking to enjoin Comelec from implementing section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, for being unconstitutional, discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection rights. Petitioner Dumlao join the suit filled by petitioner Igot and Salapatan to declare the said provision as null and void for being violative of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari? Held: It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said provision and seeks to prohibit the respondent COMELEC from implementing such, yet the petitioner has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter on which the court is being asked to review on certiorari. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case. The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner. The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared VALID.

DESAMA vs. Gozun Facts: A petition for mandamus and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the IRR issued by the DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40)

and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals. After several unsuccessful actions to cancel the FTAA agreement with the government, the petitioners finally submitted a petition to the court. In their memorandum petitioners pose whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMCFTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution issues, among others issues. Issue: Whether there has been an actual controversy or issue with respect to the unlawful and unjust taking of property without payment of just compensation. Held: Public respondents are of the view that petitioners eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on account of CAMCs FTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which this Court can take cognizance of. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. However, the court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention. Actual eviction of the land owners and occupants need not happen for this Court to intervene. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Nevertheless, the petition was still dismissed due to the baseless contention of the issues submitted. TheFTAA was in full compliance with the necessary requirements of the law and Constitution. The allegation of the lack of payment of just compensation was dismissed since the court has had authority in eminent domain cases to make sure the proper amount was established regardless of the fact that there would be an intervention from an executive department or legislature to make any initial determination of the amount. Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita Facts: On September 28, 2005, President Arroyo issued EO 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, andFor Other Purposes. October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging its vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of EO 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury as it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates power and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for

certiorari and prohibition, and prays that EO 464 be declared unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case to subject petition to judicial review. Held: The Supreme Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy. It would make no sense to await any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined it so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established. However, demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials, such a power belong only to Congress. Petitions are partly granted. Secs 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are declared void, while Secs 1 and 2(a) are held valid. Prof. Randolf S.David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Facts: OnFeb. 24, 2006, Pres. Arroyo declared a state of national emergency and orders the armed forces to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, and suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. A lot of permits to form rallies were revoked and those who have already formed to gather were dispersed, and warrantless arrests were rampant. Among those arrested was the petitioner. The state of emergency was lifted after a week from declaration and after a lot of petitions was filed. Issue: Whether or not the case may be subjected to judicial review even on the grounds that the proclamation contested by the petition has already been lifted. Held: Power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present:first, there must be an actual case or controversy;second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;t hi rd, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; andfourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. However, The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and

academic. And therefore, it can be subjected to judicial review Lacson vs. Perez Facts: On May 1, 2001, Malacaang was assaulted by a violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons. President Arroyo immediately issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. The AFP and PNP were ordered to suppress the rebellion through General Order no. 1. Thereby, warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters were affected. The state of rebellion was lifted on May 6, 2001. For fear of imminent danger of being arrested without warrant, the petitioners filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an urgent issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether the petition filed is qualified as a ripe controversy as a necessary ground for judicial review. Held: The prayer of the petitioners that the appropriate court before whom the information against petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved is deemed premature. As of the date the court hears the pleas of the respondents, no complaints or charges have been file against any petitioners for any crime. Furthermore, the lifting of the state of rebellion makes the case moot and academic. Petitions are dismissed adding petitioners are enjoined from arrest without necessary judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation or connection to the May 1 siege of the palace. Enrile vs. Senate ElectoralTribunal Facts: On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections. On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the total precints involved. On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the petitioners name dropped to the 15th position in the senatorial race. On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate comments alleging petitioners motion is premature considering the SET has not resolved respondents election protest. Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. The SET also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution that denied petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in

Pimentels Protest and to Conduct another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Issue: Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said petition. Held: The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot considering there is no more actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any merit. Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering the resolution of no practical use or value. The petition is dismissed.

Ople vs. Torres Facts: A petition filed bySenator BlasF. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. Issue: Whether or not the petition filed by the petitioner has an actual controversy. Held: The petition filed by the petitioner has an actual controversy and it is ripe for adjudication. The petition is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. The petitioner, as a senator and member of the legislator, also claim that the official action complained is of infringes upon their prerogative as legislators. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. LEGAL STANDING ( LOCUS STANDI) Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."[46] Locus standi or legal standing has also been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of

the governmental act that is being challenged.[47] Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.[48] The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[49] Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.[50] The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."[51] The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government."[52] A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.[53] In private suits, standing is governed by the "realparties-in interest" rule, which means that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.[54] The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.[55] Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in the U.S. case of Beauchamp vs. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern.[56] Based on cases decided by the Supreme Court, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC FACTS:A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Viscaya, seeking to enjoin Comelec from implementing section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, for being unconstitutional, discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection rights. Petitioner Dumlao join the suit filled by petitioner Igot and Salapatan to declare the said provision as null and void for being violative of the Constitution. ISSUE:Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a requisite for a review on certiorari? Whether or not paragraph 1 Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is constitutional? HELD:It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said provision and seeks to prohibit the respondent COMELEC from implementing such, yet the petitioner has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter on which the court is being asked to review on certiorari. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case. The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner. The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared VALID.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year. (3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twentyfour months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.