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Attempts to order the world from a western perspective reduce others to models of people of the west, erasing their individual identity.
Swazo, professor of philosophy at university of Alaska, Fairbanks, 2K2 [Norman K, Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections p. 110-112]

In world order thinking, I submit, the West discharges the energy of its moral essence, doing so as author of the prevailing morality and as the locus of the dominant subjective egoisms which have been inevitably diffused to determine all political cultures, the latter of which are now bound to the West's hegemony over world political culture. The contemporary world order in structure and value orientation is instituted on the basis of Western reason, and as such it is characterized by an "order of rank" in which European values have primacy, i.e., are hegemonous vis-a-vis all "other" (Asian, African, Latin American, etc.) plausibly autochthonous valuations. World order thinking, thus, compelled by life itself in all its prevalent pathology, posits its valuespeace, justice, economic well-being, ecological balanceover against all that shows itself as the contemporary pathology of "petty politics" and all that is countervaluation in the strife motivated by the requirements of global hegemony. In this positing of primacy to the Western valuation, the Occident reveals its near exhaustion, if not its desperation, in the face of competing modes of subjectivity as manifest by a fragmented and antagonistic "system" of nation-states, each with its "splinter-will." Given that this world order movement is transnational, the West co-opting sympathetic forces in the developing world, neither this exhaustion nor this desperation is restricted to the West: The "crisis" is effectively planetary.
Nietzsche was not amiss in his articulation of the great task that would refine the twentieth century, i.e., the problem of global governance. Neither was he amiss

despite its inexorability. That is, Nietzsche recognizes the persistent, though declining, influence of the Christian ideal with respect to the problem of global governance, anticipating King that this ideal would yet issue in the call for a moral world order: Notwithstanding the death of God, Christian value
in appreciating its hesitant approach, judgments would be ::insmuted into the political domain order would be a "hybrid" of sickness, the will to power heightening the remands of modern man's self-determination, the Christian conscience yet -retainingin short, a "fettered" moment in humanity's movement toward total self-affirmation, total soveteignty in the absence of God and transcendent norms. "They are rid of the Christian God," writes Nietzsche in his Twilight of the Idols ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," note 5), yet "now believe I'm the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality." It is not yet realized, observes Nietzsche, that "when one gives up the Christian faith, one rails the right to Christian morality out from under one's feet." Accordingly, the contemporary world order movement expresses a commitment to transforming the philosophic orientation (values) as well as transforming institutional structures and patterns of behavior.

. The twentieth century's emerging

World order thinking is, thus, normative. That world order thinking is value thinking is evidence of its essential debt to the Nietzschean metaphysic, to thinking the world order from the vantage of subjectness, for it is only with Nietzsche that value thinking comes to predominate in the twentieth century.104 As Heidegger puts it, "Values stem from valuation; valuation corresponds to the will to power." That is, insofar as the creation of secureness is grounded in value-positing and world order thinkers on their own essential authority

(understood metaphysically, not personally) seek to secure a world order, men world order thinking cannot but be so grounded. It is precisely this ground, i.e., a self-grounded value-posit, that entails the technocratic conception of world order and, thus, eliminates a meaningful distinction between the normative and technocratic approaches. How so? Heidegger answers in words that indict all value thinking: "thinking in terms of values Is radical killing. It . . . strikes down that which is as such, in its being-in itself. . . ." Everything which is "is transformed into object" and "swallowed _r into the immanence of subjectivity." Commensurate with this subjectivity is that objectivity which, in the essence of the technological, is total, and which finds its instrument in technocracy. Understood yet further, the avowedly normative posture or position which world order thinking assumes is, in its essence as Western valuation, characterized by a viewpoint which serves as a gauge of conditions of preservation at the least and of conditions of enhancement at best with respect to the world order. Through a posit of values it is possible to assess, to reckon, to calculate, the degree to

which the prevailing wotld order system is diminished, maintained, reformed, transformed. But this is an essentially Western situation, notwithstanding its planetary dimensions. That is, what is at issue is the preservation
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<Swazo Continues> of the West, hence the issue of the latter's enhancement on the basis of its valuational hegemony: A world political order grounded in Western categories of reason is an enhancement of what Nietzsche calls a "construct of domination"a configuration of power (Will to Power, note 715). Thus, the very notion of a "world federation of cultures," as one possibility of global governance, bespeaks Nietzsche's insight into the problem of 'value', i.e., "the determination of the order of rank among values." The resistance of the developing world to the hegemony of Western reason and the insistence of the developing nations on justice rather than order, constitute a sublimation of that tempetament (which Nietzsche anticipated) which says, "There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others" (Beyond Good and Evil, "Natural History of Morals," note 187). Here there is the explicit recognition of the West's venture to secure for itself mastery of its destiny as well as that of the world.
Thus, in his essay Towards a just World, Rajni Kothari rightly and insightfully distinguishes between "the newer conception of universalism" which is "expansionist" and "imperialist" in extending "its notmative framework to cover almost the entire globe

," and "the old univetsalistic conceptions found in China, India, the ancient Greece and Turkey, in the thinking of the Buddha and the Zoroastrian teachers." The latter "were all, despite their considerable diversities, based on the transcendence of the immediate, the local and the temporal thtough the cultivation of the mind and a search for comprehension and meaning in an admittedly mysterious and complex reality, and led to a moderation and containment of selfish and expansionist drives in the human personality." Kothari adds: "Indeed, modern European imperialism represents the first major effort at unifying the entire globe under the dominion of a single regional center.

War, violence, ecological destruction and every other impact imaginable are all inevitable in a world in which we continue calculative thought. The plans of policy-makers often are horrifying, but people will follow those plans simply because they exist. The rationalist ontology of the current world governments is the root of all their impacts, only rethinking our ontology by questioning the 1AC makes an escape from extinction possible Burke Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney 2k7 (Anthony, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason Theory and Event Volume 10 Issue 2.)
My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against

Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply
excessive optimism.86 endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule

Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87
of What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern

the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark

ontology of the friend

and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I
am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90
When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that

This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in
Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price?

Do we see our actions within an

instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or
do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

First Negative Constructive

The alternative is to do nothing. Every effort to control the world only results in new problems, which results in new solutions, which results in new problems in an escalating cycle of serial policy failure. Their claim to finally fix the problem is just the latest grasp to calculate the world. Doing nothing allows us to reflect on the search for solutions itself, and indeed our very positions in the world. Such a move is necessary to maintain connection to the world and avert the current race towards unintended extinction. McWhorter prof phil @ Northeast Missouri state 1992 (Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth Page
3-4)
Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academicians may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For

the thinking he saw as essential is not the simple amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, not a thinking that results from a drive to grasp and know and shape the world; it is a thinking that disciplines itself to allow the world the earth, things to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking reflection . In 1936 he wrote,
Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that

Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the
most deserve to be called in question. 2 contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous natural resource
quick solution always tries to do.1 management policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the

the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet s climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity s power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless
results of humanly produced ecological devastation;

interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?
Heidegger s work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger s call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking s only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.