_____________________________________________________________________________________

Case No. 11-2164

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Bryan J. Brown Appellant v. Elizabeth Bowman, et al. Appellees

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Reply Brief of Appellant

Oral Argument Requested
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Bryan J. Brown KS Bar No. 17634 Attorney pro se 827 Webster Street Fort Wayne, IN 46802 (260) 515-8511 Brown1634@gmail.com

I. Down the Memory Hole: Defendants factual recitations and admissions evince ideological corruption .................................................................................. 7 A. Defendants First Factual Recitation pulls from an ideologically tainted state court source ....................................................................................................... 7 B. Defendants Second Factual Recitation pulls from an ideologically tainted anonymous source ............................................................................................. 8 C. Defendants factual recitations evince ideological corruption in what they fail to report ....................................................................................................... 8 D. Defendants factual recitations evince ideological corruption through official misrepresentations of the record ...................................................................... 9 E. Defendants arguments against harm evince ideological corruption through an official misrepresentation of the applicable legal standards ....................... 11 F. Defendants admissions on brief evince ideological corruption through demurrer and stipulations to clearly pled unconstitutional acts ...................... 12 II. Two plus two does not equal five: Defendants appeal to Rooker-Feldman fails due to the presence of ideological corruption ............................................. 14 A. Pure Nesses: Political corruption unlocks the exception ........................... 15 B. Nesses - Loubser: Discriminatory biases further the exception ................. 15 C. Nesses Exported - The Third Circuit borrows from the Seventh ................ 17 D. Nesses Foreshadowed: A bar applicant exempted from Rooker-Feldman 18 E. Nesses Need not Apply: Edwards and Hale had no viable path to the exception ......................................................................................................... 18 F. Nesses Applied: If ideological corruption is found, then what? ................. 20

III. Oh how they love Big Brother: Defendants plea for absolute immunity threatens to bring on tyranny ............................................................................... 22 A. Bar applicants of the world unite: Defining the freedom to be both an attorney and a dissident .................................................................................. 22 1. But even a religiously-motivated political dissident? ................................ 23 2. Yes, even a religiously-motivated political dissident. ............................... 25 B. Immunity is Strength: The plea for absolute immunity from government bureaucrats ...................................................................................................... 26 1. Desperately seeking emancipation ......................................................... 26 2. Or is it absolute power that is sought? ................................................... 27 C. Immunity is Freedom: The plea for absolute immunity from mental health agents .............................................................................................................. 28 1. Desperately seeking the good old days ................................................... 28 2. Or is it absolute freedom from responsibility that is sought? ................. 30 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 32
Certificate of Compliance ................................................................................ 33

Table of Authorities

Cases
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1,2 (1971) ......................................................................... 22, 25 Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1141 (10th Cir.2006) ........................................ 17 Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir.2002) ..................................................................... 17 Cooney v. Rossiter,583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................... 30
Davis v. Wallace, 65 S.E.2d 386 (W. Va. 2002) ................................................................................ 29

Edwards v. Ill. Bd. Of Admissions, 261 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2001) ................................................. 18 Eisenberg v. Sternberg, 641 F.Supp. 620 (W.D. Wisc., 1986) ................................................. 18, 20 Floyd & Barker, 12 Co.Rep. 23, 25, 77 Eng.Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber, 1607) ............... 26 Golden v. Sigman, 611 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... 30 Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d
Cir.2010) ......................................................................................................................................... 17, 20

Hale v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir.2003) .............................. 19 Hutchinson v. Lewis, 75 Ind. 55 (1881) ............................................................................................. 28 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 440 (1976)................................................................................. 28 Keko v. Hingle, 318 F.3d 639, 642-43 (5th Cir.2003), reh'g en banc denied, 61 Fed.Appx. 123
(2003) ..................................................................................................................................................... 29

Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,174 (1971)(Black, J,
dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.).................................................................................................... 22

Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir.), cert dend 548 U.S. 907 (2006) ................ 15, 16, 20
Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.2006) (Sykes, J., concurring and dissenting). ...... 16

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003)........................................................................ 27 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26(1995) ............................................................................. 27 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). .................................................................................. 27 Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir.1995) ........................................................................ passim

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 (1957). ............................................ 21, 26 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 247, 249 (1957). (Frankenfurter, J.,
concurring, joined by Clark, J. and Harlan, J.) ........................................................................... 21

Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)(Holmes, J., dissenting) ...... 28 Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1004 (6th Cir.1999) ............................................................ 27 Trewhella v. City of Lake Geneva, Wis., 249 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1070 (E.D.Wis.2003). ............ 12 Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir., 2010) ......................................................................... 20 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). ..................... 26 Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474, 477(7th Cir.1974) ........................... 21

Other Authorities
FRAP 16(b) ............................................................................................................................................... 10

Paul Wynne Jones v Sue Kaney [2011] UKSC 13 .......................................................................... 27

In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act.

-- George Orwell This is a case of government corruption. Not financial corruption, not familial corruption, but rather ideological corruption. Some call it political correctness, some call it the new normal, some just call it common sense. But it is, at least from the Plaintiffs constitutionalist perspective, government corruption. Plaintiff alleges that the managerial agents of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Committee (JLAC) allowed ideology to trump the federal constitution, state constitution, statutory law, common law and due process ideals dating back millennia during the processing of his file through the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (JLAP). In so doing, JLAC used JLAP in a way forbidden to the law examiners and Indiana courts by Supreme Court precedent. (It may be that JLAC itself was used as a tool in this processing.) ECF 1, 17. This conspiracy is revealed in a series of socio-politically biased mental health evaluations and torts undertaken to cover-up unconstitutional acts, including seized work product and fraudulent filings. The conspiracy visited harm upon Plaintiff prior to the state court judgment through these torts, in the state court decision as a result of the unconstitutionally-created reports, and well beyond the state court judgment due to the fact that the reports at issue now are, or soon will be, deposited in a national database for review by any and all state bar examiners (the nation over) weighing Plaintiffs fitness to practice law in the future.

Plaintiff does not seek to set aside an Indiana court judgment. He rather challenges the unconstitutional JLAP processing that corrupted an Indiana judgment and will likely corrupt future judgments if not remedied by the federal court.

I.

Down the Memory Hole: Defendants factual recitations and admissions evince ideological corruption

This Honorable Court is now faced with no less than five different statements of facts. The first statement is found in Plaintiffs verified complaint. The second statement is found in the District Courts order. The third set of facts is found in Plaintiffs initial appellate brief and is meticulously tied to the record.

A. Defendants First Factual Recitation pulls from an ideologically tainted state court source
The fourth set of facts is found in Defendants brief (DB) at pages 916. Rather than stipulate to the District Courts factual finding, Defendants borrowed heavily from the source identified as ECF52-2. Defendants relied upon that source when marshalling facts on pages 910 and 1415 of Appellees brief. ECF52-2 is a document produced by the Indiana Board of Law Examiners in reliance upon the very reports challenged in this action. Pages 119 of that report contain a factual recitation by an unknown author (the law-free report was unsigned, ECF52-2,p.20). This factual recitation was countered by Bar Applicant 24128 at ECF52-2,pp. 21-31. Defendants cite to pages 1-19 repeatedly but never to pages 21-31. When and if those facts (arising out of a process that is alleged to be contaminated by corruption)
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detract from the factual averments contained in either the verified complaint or District Courts order the standard of review applicable to this action is undermined.

B. Defendants Second Factual Recitation pulls from an ideologically tainted anonymous source
The fifth set of facts at bar is found in Appellees brief at pages 4447. That listing of facts is tied to no record whatsoever and contains hyperbole and subjectivist adjectives that argue well beyond the record now before the Court in closing argument style. Referencing no source whatsoever, Defendants deign to instruct the Court on what Plaintiff believed and presume to divine Plaintiffs subjective intent. DB, 45-46. Such fast and loose tendering of facts is evident throughout Defendants brief (but especially on its final pages). Plaintiff denies all unsourced facts in Defendants briefing.

C. Defendants factual recitations evince ideological corruption in what they fail to report
The Defendants refused to stipulate to the facts found by the District Court. The Defendants also refused to include any of the facts set forth in Plaintiffs brief at pp.715 in either of their factual recitations. These omitted facts allege numerous tortious acts consequential to Plaintiffs causes of action and should not be shoved down an Orwellian memory hole just to strengthen the governments case. Defendants largely ignored Plaintiffs Indiana law-based arguments against expert witness immunity, instead making the claim that Plaintiff could have subpoenaed Drs. Ross and Bowman to appear but elected to not do so. DB,46.
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Defendants thus argue from silence, advancing the idea that because Plaintiff did not pay thousands of dollars to ensure that the governments consultants were hailed to Indianapolis to be placed under oath and questioned extensively about their reports that the Plaintiff is to blame for the lack of sworn testimony/admissible evidence at bar. The Plaintiff, they argue, should not be heard to complain about any statutory holes in the tendering of the consultants/witnesses reports given this alleged lack of diligence on his part. DB,47. Plaintiff flatly denies that he is the one to blame for leading the Indiana Supreme Court to deny an applicant the right to practice law based upon inadmissible, nonwitness nontestimony. The Defendants are entitled to their own opinions, but they are not entitled to their own facts. The seizure of notes, religious interrogations, false reporting, inference with contract and other tortious acts are clearly alleged (and even admitted) and thus must be assumed as true at this point in the process -- even if that does severely undercut the governments theory of the case.

D. Defendants factual recitations evince ideological corruption through official misrepresentations of the record
Defendants improper tender of undocumented facts and their blatant omission of unwanted allegations are coupled with averments of a more ominous threat: Defendants mischaracterize and misrepresent key facts to this Court on brief. Substantial misrepresentation number one finds Defendants arguing that since the IBLE issued a subpoena to JLAP for the entire contents of the file of
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Bryan J. Brown (DB, 46) that Plaintiff enjoyed all the due process one in his position could want. Defendants fail to disclose that JLAPs subpoena response was partial and contested. Defendants unsourced and prejudicial claims of transparency directly contradict Plaintiffs verified allegation of conspiracy to obfuscate at ECF1, 204-05,ECF 52-1,p.16. Substantial misrepresentation number two is Defendants allegation that Plaintiff willfully failed to subpoena Drs. Bowman and Ross. DB,46-47. Plaintiff denies this alleged fact. ECF 52-1,p17-18. Substantial misrepresentation number three is the bald assertion that Plaintiff submit[ted] Dr. Bowmans report to the IBLE. DB,15. There is nothing in the record supporting such a conclusion. The record, in fact, shows just the opposite Defendant Sudrovech held the report for more than three weeks and then filed it on January 22, 2009. ECF1,30,201. Substantial misrepresentation number four finds Defendants positing that Plaintiff took full advantage of impeachment opportunities and was given a full and fair opportunity to set forth his concerns in hearings before the Board of Law Examiners. Id, 45. Defendants make no citation to the record while lauding the Indiana bar admission system and claiming that Plaintiff enjoyed more than sufficient due process under the same. Note that Defendants point to no written procedure for the bar hearings, since there are none. Defendants unsourced and prejudicial averments of due process directly contradict Plaintiffs argument to the United States Supreme Court. ECF 52-1,pp.5-13&App.74-93).

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Substantial misrepresentation number five is the unabashed vouchsafing of the entire Indiana process, from the filing of the bar application to the final adjudication before the Indiana Supreme Court. DB,4347. Defendants allege that Plaintiff enjoyed extensive procedural safeguards and was able to take full advantage of the same. DB, 44. This, too, is denied and debunked by ECF 521,pp.11-14.1 Rather than dissect Defendants myriad inaccurate averments line by line, Plaintiff elects to point the Court toward the facts in the verified complaint, District Court opinion and evidentiary record at bar.

E. Defendants arguments against harm evince ideological corruption through an official misrepresentation of the applicable legal standards
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no harm to claim independent of the adverse decision of the IBLE, going so far as to posit that [a]bsent the denial of his admission to the Indiana state bar, the remaining allegations of Browns complaint do not provide a single allegation showing that he was deprived of a right under the constitution. DB,35. Defendants err. Plaintiff never complains of being denied admission (in November, 2009) and instead presents only acts occurring on or before January 22, 2009 to substantiate his harm. Plaintiffs focus is not on the bar admission denial, but rather a conspiracy to fail him through the JLAP process. Complaint,265. See also harm alleged at ECF157,121-22,164-67,175-80. Plaintiff also alleges a
Appellant would welcome an order to work with Defendants to file a stipulated record addressing the alleged errors tendered per FRAP 16(b) at his cost.
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common plan to send error- and religious intolerance- filled reports into the national bank in a bid to keep Plaintiff from successfully petitioning any future state bars. Id.,214-15. Turning from harm claimed to remedy sought, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, equitable relief, nominal, compensatory and exemplary damages, and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs complaint 2. The complaints final paragraphs seek numerous orders sounding in equity. ECF1,end. In a line that seems to betray a lack of sensitivity to constitutional issues, Defendants argue that dismissal is appropriate as that [Plaintiff] failed to allege any recoverable injury. DB,35. Defendants err: Nominal damages may be available in a section 1983 case if a plaintiff was deprived of an absolute right yet did not suffer an actual injury. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, constitutes an injury. Trewhella v. City of Lake Geneva, 249 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1070 (E.D.Wis.2003).

F. Defendants admissions on brief evince ideological corruption through demurrer and stipulations to clearly pled unconstitutional acts
Appellees brief contains numerous troubling admissions supporting the allegation of ideological corruption. Despite credible allegations of: (1) the confiscation of work product from the hands of a licensed attorney; (2) billing fraud; (3) the blatant weighing of political beliefs, Catholic dogma and Christian commitment; (4) misdiagnosis of bipolar disorder; (5) the admitted misrepresentation of another doctors work in a report filed with the government
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ending a career; (6) pre-evaluation directives to not approve a bar applicant; (7) repeated refusals to meet with an applicant or appoint a mentor that had been offered; (8) the critique of empathy as to alternative beliefs by a government agent -despite all of these allegations and even more, the Defendants maintain that Appellants brief raises no allegation that Drs. Bowman and Ross acted outside of their duties and responsibilities with respect to the JLAP process DB,39. In other words, Defendants stipulate that all of the Plaintiffs allegations, which are assumed to be true per the standard of review, merely document that which should have taken place through the JLAP processing. In further ratification of these alleged torts, Defendants stipulate that neither Dr. Bowman nor Dr. Ross performed any tasks extraneous to their mandate as [JLAP designated] experts.

Id. So that none can miss their stipulation as to the JLAC expectations, Defendants
further state that [a]ll of the actions Brown alleges relate to a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights were taken pursuant to their court appointed duties. Id.,42[sic] In other words, the parade of horribles are endorsed by the Defendants as business as usual down at the JLAP offices. This is further demonstrated in Defendants demurrer as to the liability of the supervisors over Plaintiffs processing: [N]one of the allegations in Browns complaint are sufficient to show bad faith on the part of the Defendants, including Harrell and Sudrovech.

Id.,48(emp.add) None of [Plaintiffs sworn allegations evinced by exhibits], even the

[allegations] that specifically mention Defendants Harrell or Sudrovech, come close to showing they acted in bad faith. Id.,49.

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Finally, Defendants admit to playing the role of final decision makers for applicants such as 24128: An applicant who possesses a dependency or [an alleged] mental health problem may be admitted to the bar with appropriate treatment and monitoring, if appropriately engaged with the JLAP process. BD, 43(emp.add).2 If appropriately engaged is the same as the well know it when we see it standard in this instance in the mind of a government social worker controlling the fate of bar applicants. This certainly should raise concerns as to capricious and arbitrary governance especially when JLAP assigns ideological adversaries to evaluate conservative bar applicants, as is the case at bar. Given these admissions, it is likely that future bar applicants of unwanted ideological stripe will be subjected to the same constitutionally-challenged processes.

II.

Two plus two does not equal five: Defendants appeal to Rooker-Feldman fails due to the presence of ideological corruption

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable to this case due to an exception pioneered in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That exception is defined in

Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir.1995).

Defendant Sudrovech informed the IBLE that JLAP questions how much [the Applicant] would value the experience of psychotherapy, how appropriately engaged in a therapeutic process he would be. Further JLAP does not believe that [the Applicant] is a good candidate for any type of monitoring/supervision for these same reasons. The Board used this report to fail the Applicant. ECF52-2(App. 27). Plaintiff alleges JLAC failed him in retaliation for his resistance to the unconstitutional processing of his file. ECF1,166,ECF 52-1,pp.19,24-26.
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A.

Pure Nesses: Political corruption unlocks the exception

Mr. Nesses filed suit alleging that his opponents lawyers had used their political clout to turn the judges against him. Id., 68 F.3d at 1004. A divided panel determined that since the plaintiff claimed that those involved in the state judicial process violated some independent right of his, such as a right (if it is a right) to be judged by a tribunal that is uncontaminated by politics, then he [could], without being blocked by the RookerFeldman doctrine, sue to vindicate that right.

Id.,1005.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in such a factual setting since one suing to vindicate [the independent right to be judged by a tribunal uncontaminated by politics] would be relying on the adverse decision only to show that the violation of his rights had caused the plaintiff's harm. Id. (citeomit).3 Plaintiff at bar files credible allegations of a civil conspiracy affecting state court processing while visiting his with harm independent of the state court decision. Such allegations fit the Nesses exception.4

B.
3

Nesses - Loubser: Discriminatory biases further the exception

Nesses central holding is that a claim that [a] state trial was tainted by politics are distinct from a claim that the state-court judgment was erroneous. Golden v. Helen Sigman and Assoc., 611 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir.2010); cf. Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir.2008)(Nesses exception inapplicable).
Justice John Paul Stevens final footnote in his Feldman dissent argues that a discriminatory fact pattern similar to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356(1886) would one day cause the Court to rue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 488, 490 fn.2(1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting) Applicant 24128 built his petition for certiorari upon Yick Wo.
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In Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439 (7th Cir.), cert dend 548 U.S. 907 (2006) the allegation that an entire county full of Hoosier attorneys, court reporters and judges had so far succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a favorable judgment was found sufficient to pre-empt application of the RookerFeldman doctrine in a divorce proceeding. Id.,441. Ms. Loubser alleged that the defendants conspired to violate her due process and equal protection rights in her divorce case because of her South African heritage and for other corrupt reasons involving due process and civil rights issues.

Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.2006) (Sykes, J., concurring and
dissenting). Brown alleges a conspiracy to violate his First Amendment (via the Fourteenth Amendment) rights based upon his adherence to the teaching of the Catechism of the Catholic Church5 that corrupted the bar admission process, and thus qualifies for the Nesses-Loubser exception.6 Under Loubsers standard, one pleading a viable theory of a corrupted state judicial process should survive review under Rooker-Feldman, regardless of whether they be in bankruptcy, admiralty or general jurisdiction court, and even if they seek a license to shave necks, a nursing license or a license to practice law.

In the realm of political science. Plaintiffs disqualifying views are also those of the Founders and Martin Luther King, Jr. 6 Corruption of the state judicial process renders the end result nothing but an unjust act with little hope of a viable remedy: Otherwise there would be no federal remedy other than an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and that remedy would be ineffectual because the plaintiff could not present evidence showing that the judicial proceeding had been a farce [since] one cannot present evidence to an appellate court. Id.,at442 (citeomit.)
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Reasoning from precedent, since Ms. Loubsers seemingly direct attack on the state court decision did not violate Rooker-Feldman, then neither should Plaintiffs allegedly indirect challenge.7

C. Nesses Exported - The Third Circuit borrows from the Seventh

Nesses recently broke out of the Seventh Circuit in Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.2010). The plaintiff
claimed an arbitrator, numerous attorneys, and state court judges conspired to fix a hearing and thus violate due process rights. Id.,171. Faced with allegations of such courtroom chicanery, Philadelphia looked to Chicago for experienced guidance. Two Seventh Circuit cases aided the Great Western Court: Nesses and Brokaw v.

Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 665(7th Cir.2002)(alleging that certain officials conspired
with private actors (prior to judicial hearings) to file false child neglect charges that resulted in procedural and civil rights violations.) The Third Circuit has taken the Nesses exception just as far down the road as the Seventh, applying judicial logic to park it as closely to standard RookerFeldman analysis as possible. 8 Great Western allows a conspiracy-theory spouting plaintiff to show that the alleged civil rights or due process violations ripened into an adverse state court's decision, thus using only the adverse state court decision as evidence of the harm granting standing in federal court. Id.,(citing 68 F.3d at

See also Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594(7th Cir.,2010)(applying the Nesses exception in a juvenile court context.)
7

Great Western also addressed the inextricably intertwined clause, id., by applying Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1141 (10th Cir.2006).
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1005). Plaintiff has no need to appeal to such harm given the torts alleged during the processing.

D.

Nesses Foreshadowed: A bar applicant exempted from Rooker-Feldman

The pre-Trifecta case of Eisenberg v. Sternberg, 641 F.Supp. 620 (W.D. Wisc.,

1986) foreshadowed the Nesses exception and justifies its use in a bar applicant setting. A previously-disciplined attorney sued the administrator and board members of the state professional responsibility board alleging his civil rights were violated through their process. Judge Crabb determined that since plaintiff's action states claims for relief under 1983 and does not seek review of the state court judgment that federal jurisdiction is proper. Eisenberg, 641 F.Supp. at 624. Since Donald Eisenberg successfully pled such a 42 USC 1983 case against the actual board members who ruled adverse to him, Browns claim should fare even better in this post-Nesses, post-Trifecta legal environment.

E. Nesses Need not Apply: Edwards and Hale had no viable path to the exception
Rooker-Feldman analysis turns on the remedy sought. Does the Plaintiff seek a de facto appeal of a state court judgment or does the Plaintiff seek relief that would leave the state court judgment standing? Brown does not seek a remand so the district court may determine whether the Committee violated [federal law], as did Ms. Edwards in the case that Defendants label a mirror to the instant appeal.

Edwards v. Ill. Bd. Of Admissions, 261 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2001)

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Disappointed bar applicant Edwards sued the wrong party while seeking the wrong relief if she wished to escape Rooker-Feldmans triple-pronged analysis. Plaintiff Brown is not focused on bar denial, he is focused on a separate subroutine set up for weighing applicants and lawyers who run afoul of bar disciplinary committees. Even if this Honorable Court grants Plaintiff everything that he prays for he will remain unadmitted to the Indiana bar and banned from applying for reconsideration until 2014. Defendants also argue that Hale v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 335 F.3d 678 (7thCir.2003) controls. There can be no doubt that Matthew Hales despicable, un-American and racist views contributed to his moral character denial. There can likewise be no doubt that Plaintiff Browns religio-political views about the Great Commission, understanding of the title King of kings and beliefs about the termination of nascent human life commanded Defendants collective focus, which then moved the IBLE to pen their most clearly-stated reason for Applicant 24128s denial in political science terminology.9 The crucial difference between Hales case and the instant appeal is found in the listing of Defendants and the remedies sought. Hale, like Edwards, sued the Board that denied him bar entrance: His complaint named as defendants the Committee, the Board of Admissions to the Bar (Board), the Third District Committee, members of the Hearing Panel in their individual capacity, and the Illinois Supreme Court. Id., 679. Brown, by comparison, sued only those who had no power to admit him to the Indiana bar. Hale, like Edwards, sought a court order
9

Rejecting, e.g., the lessons learned at Nuremberg and in a Birmingham jail. 19

that would have directly nullified the state court order denying him bar entrance. Brown, by comparison, vows that he does not seek such an order. ECF1,21. Plaintiffs situation lines up with Nesses, Loubser, Tully, Great Western and

Eisenberg. The instant facts do not line up with the pre-Trifecta reasoning of Edwards or Hale. Neither Mr. Hale nor Ms. Edwards were able to lay claim to the
Nesses exception, and neither Edwards nor Hale were outsourced to non-attorney privateers for bar application processing (allegedly beyond the reach of constitutional protections). F. Nesses Applied: If ideological corruption is found, then what? If an officer of another state court system can prove that the Indiana system violates the federal constitution, then the federal court in Northern Indiana would owe the Indiana Supreme Court no apology for reviewing the process generating (and blockading) counsel for its court system.10 Justice Frankenfurter opened the door to such district court involvement in state court bar processes: But judicial action, even in an individual case, may have been based on avowed considerations that are inadmissible in that they violate the requirements of due process. Refusal to allow a man to qualify himself for the profession on a wholly arbitrary standard or on a consideration that offends the dictates of reason offends the Due Process Clause. Such is the case here.

Plaintiffs harm includes the present inability to practice in Indianas federal courts since he resides in Indiana. The federal court could review Indianas unique bar admission processes for this reason alone.
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Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 247, 249 (1957). (Frankenfurter, J.,
concurring, joined by Clark, J. and Harlan, J.).11 Seventeen years after Schware, this Court noted the above language and threatened that it would consider review of state court bar admission cases if confronted with proof that it was predicated upon a constitutionally impermissible reason. Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474, 477(7th Cir.1974). Read in context, it is apparent that this Court did not think such an opportunity would present itself given that bar applicant processing in Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin was entrusted to the state supreme courts and their designated committees such as the Illinois Board of Law Examiners. Id. The Whitfield panel did not anticipate the processing of bar applicants being outsourced from officers of the court to those trained in the soft sciences agents of crafts such as social work or psychology -- disciplines often exhibiting less-than-admirable dedication to due process. ECF1;34-44,52-56,64-74,85,89-93,182-89. Such outsourcing could result in wholly arbitrary evaluations advancing inadmissible considerations in a manner offensive to the dictates of [constitutionally-tuned] reason.12 Defendants ran Plaintiff through a series of examinations violative of constitutional reason and thus should not be heard to complain if this Honorable Court shines the light of review upon their post-modern inquisition.13

Applicants 24128 and Schware share much in common as to histories and little in common as to ideologies. 12 As well as purging the bar of those with unwelcome ideological perspectives on the most controversial topics of the day. 13 Justice Black did not believe bar admission decisions should be treated as bargaining chits in culture wars:[T]he right of a lawyer or Bar applicant to practice cannot be left to
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III.

Oh how they love Big Brother: Defendants plea for absolute immunity threatens to bring on tyranny

The conflict at bar is a photo-shopped negative of the bar admission cases fought out on the docket of the United States Supreme Court between the late 50s and early 70s Most of those cases involved bar applicants who were denied admission to practice law solely because they refused to answer questions about their personal beliefs or their affiliations with organizations that advocate certain ideas about government Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1,2 (1971) The Plaintiff, on the other hand, was denied admission after he fully answered numerous questions probing his personal beliefs about the relationship between governance and Divine Providence.

A.

Bar applicants of the world unite: Defining the freedom to be both an attorney and a dissident

Toward the end of the post-war run of bar admission cases Justice Black summed all up by stating that [s]harp conflicts and close divisions have arisen in this Court concerning the power of States to refuse to permit applicants to practice law in cases where bar examiners have been suspicious about applicants' loyalties and their views on Communism and revolution.

Id., 401 U.S. at 3. Substitute endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights for Communism and substitute appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions for revolution and the result is the legal

the mercies of his prospective or present competitors. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,174 (1971)(Black, J, dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.) 22

challenge of In Re Application 24128 (as to the IBLE) and Brown v. Bowman (as to JLAP and its parallel to Hessian mercenaries). As set forth in the complaint, Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to discuss the constitutional ramifications of Defendants actions. ECF 1:32,60-64,91-93,123-25. It was evident that none of the Defendants appreciated the import of the Supreme Court cases defining the appropriate path to law licensure in such an ideologicallycharged environment. 1. But even a religiously-motivated political dissident? Religion was front and center throughout the JLAP processing, culminating in Defendant Sudrovechs use of the religious testing to construct what is dubbed a pregnant syllogism in Plaintiffs petition for certiorari. ECF 52-1,p22-23. The syllogism links Plaintiffs Christian beliefs to his civil disobedience and from there to the admission-denying label personality disorder, not otherwise specified. ECF 1:198-99; ECF 52-1,p.23. The religious focus began in the offices of Drs. Ross and Bowman, ripened into Sudrovechs reports and then, based largely upon Sudrovechs nonrecommendation, moved the IBLE to refuse to certify Brown. See fn.2. At the headwaters of this inquisition stands Dr. Ross and his admittedly religious testing. Since society seems desensitized to allegations of religious discrimination, Ross conclusions labeling Brown are herein presented in alternative prose: I am not making these statements purely based upon the fervor of Mr. Browns [Republican] beliefs and convictions . . . .
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I am not making these statements purely based upon the fervor of Mr. Browns [pro-gay] beliefs and convictions . . . . I am not making these statements purely based upon the fervor of Mr. Browns [communist] beliefs and convictions . . . . ECF1,52 (the word replaced is religious). Dr. Ross should not weigh an applicant for the Indiana bar purely or even almost purely on any ideological basis. (But most of all not on religion or politics.) Many, most notably the United States Supreme Court, consider it ideological corruption to do so. Similarly, the following accusations should not be appearing in any report upon which JLAP, the IBLE and the Indiana Supreme Court decide bar worthiness: Like many people of faith of past millennia, he firmly believes he is obligated as a Christian to put obedience to Gods laws above human laws. He considers his [former protest activities] an integral part of his Roman Catholic Christian faith and considers his actions morally right. His conscience has been shaped by his Roman Catholic beliefs, to which he came in adulthood while seeking moral certainty.He showed a lack of empathy for women whose pregnancies may be the result of rape or incest. He showed lack of empathy for this evaluator whose profession and presumed religious beliefs he repeatedly devalued. ECF1:140,153-54,158-60,17014 Dr. Bowmans empathy theme struck a chord with the social worker Sudrovech. He justified flunking Brown because a thorough probing of the applicants religious perspectives revealed a lack of empathy regarding issues associated with his beliefs. ECF1:197. This no confidence vote is key, for it advised the IBLE to fail Brown. At bottom, the applicant just does not hold the

Note that Dr. Bowman referred to herself as an evaluator. Not consultant, witness or expert.
14

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desired opinions (as to Bowmans anti-Catholic religious perspectives, among other topics de jure), and, even worse, did not seem to care that JLAPs inquisitors discovered ideological impurity in him. Thus Brown does not get JLAPs approval to be licensed as an Indiana attorney since he was unable to demonstrate to the social worker Sudrovechs satisfaction an ability to emphasize with the groupthink adjudged most valuable to the party.15 ECF52-1,pp.19-26 This alleged lack of belief-based empathy caused the Board of Law Examiners to rule against Brown. ECF 52-1,pp.27-28. (See note 2, supra.)16 2. Yes, even a religiously-motivated political dissident. All Defendants rejected the ideological dtente set by the Highest Court in the land in 1971, when it mandated that views and beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law. Baird, 401 U.S. at 8. The IBLE, JLAC, JLAP and their assigns (other than Dr. William Alexy) all ended up rejecting the philosophical root of this applied dtente. That root is an all-American admonition that can be traced back to the Founders, and was applied to the facts at bar thusly: Mere unorthodoxy (in the field of political and social ideas) does not as a matter of fair and logical inference,

"Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows." George Orwell, 1984.
15 16

Loubser asks if the proceedings were a farce. Due to his intent to reapply to the

Indiana bar in 2014 and contemporaneous desire to maintain his Kansas license, Plaintiff will merely direct the Court to the complaint and exhibits attached to ECF52&57.

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negate good moral character. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 (1957).

B.

Immunity is Strength: The plea for absolute immunity from government bureaucrats

All Defendants now seek absolute immunity possibly because they realize that they would not escape a finding of liability under the good faith immunity given well-worn case law such as the fixed star passage from West Virginia State

Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

Defendants Harrell and Sudrovech argue that they need quasi-judicial immunity so that they can continue running the JLAP process as documented herein when hapless bar applicants are remanded to them. Failure to grant them above the law status will fill them with excessive caution or may skew their decisions due to fear of litigation or personal monetary liability. DB, 50. (It remains unexplained why excessive caution should not be exercised to guard the constitutional rights of bar applicants.) 1. Desperately seeking emancipation Defendants seek no small favoritism. Grants of such immunity are rooted in the monarchial privileges of old. According to Floyd & Barker, 12 Co.Rep. 23, 25, 77 Eng.Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber, 1607), this immunity held that the King can do no wrong and that, as sovereign, he must not be drawn into question for any supposed corruption since so having to answer to mere commoners constitutes a slander of the justice of the King. The Ninth Circuit has rightly described absolute immunity as a protection not only from liability but also from being answerable in
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any way for one's actions. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003)(citing

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26(1995).17

Defendants carry a heavy burden, since they seek a first impression ruling that would grant nonlawyers absolute immunity while operating a Star Chamberesque-inquisition into the worthiness of those seeking the title esquire. The pragmatic appeal that such immunity is necessary to put the inquisitors at ease as to threats of civil rights litigation is not the best choice in leading arguments, since it seems to beg a question doesnt it seem to assume that JLAC will be involved in acts worthy of civil rights litigation? Defendants may misunderstand that [t]he very purpose of 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the peoples federal rights to protect the people from the unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial.

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).

2. Or is it absolute power that is sought? If Defendants gain the Holy Grail they seek then the hard-fought bar application cases allowing political dissidents to gain licenses can be laid aside as pass. In this brave new world, mental health officials will govern in the place of seasoned judges weighed down with old-fashioned notions of due process and the
It is ironic that the team that labeled Plaintiff as one lacking sufficient respect for mans law now petitions the court for a total exemption from mans law. Animal Farm comes to mind. See Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1004 (6th Cir.1999)sword and shield doctrine for applicable commentary.
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political science arising out of belief in a brooding omnipresence in the sky.

Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)(Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Appellant urges this Court to not so deputize JLAC. Appellant fears that such a new order could bring a swift end to the cherished freedoms of our cultural patrimony. There is insufficient space in this reply brief to explore all the reasons to deny this plea for princely status, but Plaintiff thoroughly briefed this issue below. ECF 57. In the final analysis, giving Defendants Sudrovech and Harrell the prize that they seek would open the floodgates to monarchial immunity for every government social worker or soft science trained ideologue appointed by a government official. Such a kingly anointing of mere courtiers (who openly eschew the crucible of judicial process, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 440 (1976)) would result in nothing short of judicial tyranny.

C.

Immunity is Freedom: The plea for absolute immunity from mental health agents

Similarly, the mental health agents at bar claim that Hutchinson v. Lewis, 75 Ind. 55 (1881) grants them a right to witness immunity arising out of Indiana common law. Even a cursory reading of Hutchinson undoes Defendants argument, since those testifying in that matter were undoubtedly on the stand and undoubtedly under oath. 1. Desperately seeking the good old days

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The modern trend in the law is ending claims to immunity based upon the mere assertion that one is an expert. This modern trend is documented through gathered cases at Davis v. Wallace, 65 S.E.2d 386 (W. Va. 2002). 18

Keko v. Hingle, 318 F.3d 639, 642-43 (5th Cir.2003), reh'g en banc denied, 61
Fed.Appx. 123 (2003) is a fine example of this modern trend. In Keko the governments chosen expert witness, Dr. West, was sued under the theory that he conspired with state actors to fabricate a criminal case. West argued that his testimony during a probable cause hearing was entitled to absolute (expert witness) immunity, rendering it off limits as to conspiracy theories or any liability whatsoever. 318 F.3d at 644. Dr. West enjoyed far better ground from which to argue for witness immunity than Drs. Ross and Bowman. Note, for example, that West certainly could have been prosecuted for perjury had he prevaricated unlike Ross or Bowman. Yet Dr. Wests argument for such an immunizing prophylactic fell short since he could cite only policy statements enunciated in Briscoe and what he asserts are comparable policies surrounding absolute prosecutorial immunity to justify broadening the concept of testimonial immunity beyond what is introduced in the courtroom. While we have some sympathy for the policy views he espouses, there is virtually no authority to support them. [T]here is no obvious reason why Dr. West should enjoy immunity greater than that of other investigators. 318 F.3d at 644.

This trend is trans-Atlantic. See Paul Wynne Jones v Sue Kaney [2011] UKSC 13. Available online at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2011/13.pdf
18

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Seven years ago, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals could locate virtually no authority to support the argument that an actual testifying expert witness who tendered his reports as evidence under the pains and penalties of perjury enjoyed absolute immunity for the content of those reports. Furthermore that court -- a full twenty years after Briscoe -- could not cite any obvious justification for granting experts such as the testifying Dr. West that highly prized protection 2. Or is it absolute freedom from responsibility that is sought? Defendants Ross and Bowman understandably reject this modern trend and instead ask this Court to greatly expand the limited grant of absolute immunity issued for a particular purpose and against a statutory backdrop in Cooney v.

Rossiter,583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir.2009) Defendants pray for an expansion of Cooney
immunity to include all mental health authorities who can lay claim to their freshly-coined title witness/consultant. Such a vast expansion of absolute immunity would create an exception consuming the rule. If this Court applies Cooney as asked there would be no limit on the application of absolute immunity to government-favored consultants. Once again we find a path through absolute immunity to judicial tyranny. Thankfully this Court did limit the Cooney exception.

Golden v. Sigman, 611 F.3d 356 (7th Cir.2010) recently noted that limitation. Cooney stands only for the proposition that child representatives in Illinois are
entitled to absolute immunity. Id.,361. Indeed, the Cooney Court expressly stated that immunity extends only with respect to conduct that occurred within the

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course of [a child representative's] court-appointed duties. 583 F.3d at 970. It is crucial to note Cooneys context is family law -- and that limited context, children in need -- and, in that limited context, a statute defining the immunity. From actual court appointed experts (not mere consultants) and guardian ad litems (who are statutorily defined) the Cooney Court recognized a specialized niche and granted those filling it the highest level of immunity. It was for the children. This does not translate into grants of immunity for those evaluating adult attorney applicants. Nor does Cooney stand for the proposition that all who can claim the title government-approved psychiatrist while consulting in a quasi-judicial setting enjoy the greatest privilege that the King can bestow (especially in the absence of statutory authority). Neither Defendant Bowman nor Ross acted pursuant to an individualized court order; nor did they tender their reports directly to a judge. They rather acted as directed by Defendant Sudrovech, a social worker employed by the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (which is itself a state agency independent from the Indiana Board of Law Examiners that is expressly granted qualified immunity) and tendered their reports only to Sudrovech. The reports tendered were not testimonial as that term is defined by Indiana law. The experts at bar were not retained by JLACthey were instead hired by the Plaintiff on the firm recommendation (actually an offer that could not be refused) of government bureaucrats. No judicial order appointed the consultants to Plaintiff, and the doctors and the Plaintiff entered into traditional patient-client relationships that mandated signed releases

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to allow JLAC to be briefed. Sudrovechs briefings went so far as to tell the consultant/witnesses what they should, and should not, put in their reports. Plaintiff now seeks to sue his psychologist and psychiatrist, only to be informed by the government that they are above the law. The district court erred, for the treasured medallion of absolute immunity is not minted from the straw-like arguments Defendants advance.

Conclusion
Defendants have misrepresented the record and the law applicable to this case. Rooker-Feldman does not apply in this instance due to the Nesses exception. None of the Defendants have met the burden of proving that they deserve any immunities greater than good faith immunity. Plaintiff believes that a remand to the district court ordering that answers be filed would be just and mete.

Respectfully submitted on August 29, 2011, /s Bryan J. Brown On his own behalf Kansas license no. 17634 827 Webster Street Fort Wayne, IN 46802 (260) 515-8511 Brown1634@gmail.com

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Certificate of Compliance
Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(a) This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(7)(B) as that it contains 6963 words, excluding the applicable sections. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of (6) since this brief was prepared in Microsoft Word using Century Schoolbook12 as the main text font. ______/s______________ Bryan J. Brown, Esq.

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on August 29, 2011, I, Bryan Brown, delivered copies of Appellants brief to the following counsel of record via electronic mail: Mark Baeverstad For Defendant Elizabeth Bowman
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Rothberg , Logan & Warsco, LLP 505 East Washington Blvd. PO Box 11647 Fort Wayne, IN 46859-1647 Sharon L Stanzione Stephen M. Brandenburg For Defendant Stephen Ross11051 Broadway Suite B Crown Point, IN 46307 Francis Barrow For JLAP/Supreme Court Defendants Shepard, Harrell and Sudrovech Indiana Attorney General's Office - IAG/302 Indiana Govt Center South, 5th Floor 302 W. Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770 /s bjb APPENDIX: NONE